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62. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus
- Author:
- Matthew Bryza
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
- Topic:
- Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia
63. How the Conflict Over Ukraine Affects Security in the South Caucasus
- Author:
- Nargiz Gafarova
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- Against the background of the present stage of the conflict over Ukraine, the South Caucasus is experiencing perturbation. Three examples rise immediately to mind: elements of the 10 November 2020 tripartite between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War statement (and the arrangements that have derived from it) are being suboptimally implemented; the leaders of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia continue to hold out the possibility to conduct a referendum on “unification” with Russia; and the uncertain outcome of the talks in Vienna to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Such and similar examples have led all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to pursue variants of a policy some call “neutrality” and others “hedging” between the parties to the conflict over Ukraine. Located at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Greater Middle East—and thus constituting the western part of the Silk Road region, as defined by the Editorial Statement of Baku Dialogues—the South Caucasus is one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most potentially explosive areas bordering the West. Over the past several decades, developments within all three South Caucasus states have contributed to a general sense of insecurity within the region. These include, most obviously, ethno‑political conflicts, civil wars, and color revolutions; the lackluster development of Western‑style governance institutions; and the widely‑held perception of ongoing high levels of corruption. Even the potentially positive strategic consequences of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War—namely, the prospect for the normalization of two sets of bilateral relationships (Armenia‑Azerbaijan and Armenia‑Türkiye) and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region—have been overshadowed by the ongoing restructuring of world order, manifested by the increase of geopolitical volatility and ambiguity due to the major escalation of the conflict over Ukraine whose present phase began on 24 February 2022. The effects of the Western‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia have spilled over into the South Caucasus— notwithstanding the fact that none of the region’s states have formally aligned themselves with them. This essay provides an overview of the reverberations of the conflict over Ukraine towards the South Caucasus, with a focus on its impact on the region’s political, economic, and security environment.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Caucasus, and Asia
64. A Revitalized NATO and Its "New Strategic Concept" Amin Global and Regional Changes
- Author:
- E. Fuat Keyman
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- At the beginning of 2022, just as the globalizing world was entering the postCovid period and the United Nations Climate Change Conference declared a “code red” emergency for the climate crisis at COP 27, a strategically calculated move came from Russian President Vladimir Putin to unlawfully invade Ukraine. From the beginning, the invasion of Ukraine has generated impacts much larger and more transformative than any previous crisis, triggering serious crisis-ridden developments in the international system and globalization and forcing national governments and global actors to recalibrate and reposition. It is in this global and broader context NATO’s Madrid Summit and its “new Strategic Concept” should be analyzed and assessed. This paper argues that the summit is historic, necessary, but not sufficient. To substantiate this argument, it analyzes is NATO’s new strategic concept in detail, exploring its critical importance, its transformative effect and the six challenges that it faces.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
65. NATO's Changing Priorities
- Author:
- Ahmet O Evin
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have led, with very few exceptions, to greater cooperation among members of the Western alliance and brought the transatlantic partners closer to one another. As a result, NATO, which has undergone several changes since the end of the Cold War, has regained its key role as the cornerstone of the West’s collective security interests. In its enhanced position, NATO also appears to be emerging as the champion of the liberal order as well as the universal values embraced by transatlantic partners. Yet, it may also be facing new challenges both from within, particularly in the case of a prolonged conflict in Europe, and from China, which is demonstrating increasing rivalry to the West.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
66. Future Uncertain: NATO in a Post-Quantum Post-AI World
- Author:
- James Sperling
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- The emerging and disruptive technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence and quantum technologies—confront NATO with a paradox: the integration of those technologies into national armed forces will significantly narrow and possibly invert the systemic technology dominance NATO has enjoyed since 1945 and widen the technology gap within the Alliance with potentially debilitating consequences for operational effectives and allied cohesion. The precise impact of these disruptive technologies must remain largely speculative, but it is certain that they will change the nature of war-fighting, exacerbate the security dilemma, and precipitate in a recalibration of the global balance of power.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
67. Russia's Assault on Ukraine: Fallout From the War
- Author:
- Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating “the rest of our territory.” The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a “grinding struggle” may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
68. The Historical Roots of NATO Engagement in the Mediterranean
- Author:
- Matteo Gerlini
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- The new strategic concept of the alliance looks at the Mediterranean situation as a shift in the engagement with a history that is as old as the origins of the Western bloc. In this history, the Italian role has been an example for the other Mediterranean countries that later joined NATO. The steps in the construction of the Atlantic coalition started also in Mediterranean with U.S. military engagement grounded in Truman’s doctrine. Twenty years late, the North Atlantic Council’s report on the alliance’s future tasks examined crucial “exposed areas” for NATO, and first among them was the Mediterranean. After the collapse of the Soviet system, NATO worked on a relationship of coexistence and cooperation with Russia. The ongoing invasion in Ukraine has thwarted years of discussion and work, but the partnerships promoted by NATO with the countries of the so-called enlarged Mediterranean stand as a success story.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Mediterranean
69. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks
- Author:
- Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
70. NATO: The Importance of Activism in the Mediterranean Scenario
- Author:
- Lorenzo Somigli
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- The secure defense of NATO members does not depend on the Kyiv frontline; the southern flank is the most unguarded. This paper deals with the Mediterranean, a closed sea without borders which globalized before globalization, examining some strategic alternatives for Western allies. The Mediterranean is a point of contact, a diaphragm, and a battlefield. In addition, the central Mediterranean is a relevant area where Russia and China have their foot in the door because of the disengagement of France and Italy and the lack of attention of NATO. It is precisely on this weaker frontier that NATO must relaunch its commitment and presence. Defending marine spaces determines the continent’s safety. So, losing the Mediterranean can be disastrous. And finally, it examines Italian policy in the Mediterranean to date and the reasons why Italy can and must correct the strabismus of the USA, which is completely looking at the Indo-Pacific, and of imagines a peripheral Europe without politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Activism
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Mediterranean
71. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region
- Author:
- Claudia Ditel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
- Political Geography:
- Europe
72. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security
- Author:
- Anna Nadibaidze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
- Political Geography:
- Europe
73. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century
- Author:
- C. Anthony Pfaff
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
74. The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq
- Author:
- Heather S. Gregg
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her biographies and numerous travel books. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. Investigating Gertrude Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how Great Britain devised its military strategy in the Middle East during World War I—particularly, Britain’s efforts to work through saboteurs and secret societies to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying the life and work of Bell offers a glimpse into how this unique woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy at this time and the extraordinary set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts—particularly, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals. Bell’s life and work offer insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy.
- Topic:
- History, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, World War I, and Gertrude Bell
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Mesopotamia
75. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War
- Author:
- Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
76. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
77. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
78. Cyber War and Ukraine
- Author:
- James Andrew Lewis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Ukraine
79. The Collapse of One China
- Author:
- Ivan Kanapathy
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
80. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia