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18211. Peace Processes: Negotiating reform of the security sector

Author:
Jasper Linke
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This SSR Backgrounder explains how SSR features in peace processes and how it is linked to other aspects of security, justice and democratic governance. It highlights some of the main factors that influence the inclusion of SSR in peace processes, including the roles and strategies of mediators in shaping the negotiations. It also discusses what issues of SSR are typically not addressed in peace processes and some of the principal challenges of SSR negotiation and implementation. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: Why is SSG central to peace processes? How can SSR feature in peace processes? What aspects of SSR are often neglected in peace processes? What other security arrangements in peace processes are relevant to SSR? What are the challenges of including SSR in peace processes?
Topic:
Security, Peace Studies, Governance, Reform, and Transitional Justice
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18212. Civil Society Roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance

Author:
Ronja Harder and Jasper Linke
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Civil society engagement is part of a culture of participation that enhances the democratic nature of decision-making about security. The expertise and independent interests of civil society provide a counter-balance to government policy by providing policymakers with a wider range of perspectives, information and alternative ideas. However, civil society activism is not always democratic or representative of the population’s needs or interests and does not automatically lead to effective oversight. This SSR Backgrounder explains how civil society can improve the accountability and effectiveness of the security sector. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: What is civil society? How can civil society improve SSG? How can working with civil society help state security and justice institutions? When does civil society make insecurity worse? What challenges does civil society face?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Governance
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18213. Police Reform: Applying the principles of good security sector governance to policing

Author:
Ronja Harder and Jasper Linke
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This SSR Backgrounder is about applying the principles of good security sector governance (SSG) to policing through police reform. The police are the primary state security provider responsible for protecting people and property through public assistance, law enforcement, the maintenance of peaceful public order, and the identification and prevention of crime. The goal of police reform is to ensure that policing becomes more effective, more accountable and more responsive to the needs of all members of society within a framework of democratic security sector governance. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: What is police reform? Why is police reform necessary? Is there a model for police reform? How are police reforms carried out? How is gender equality part of police reform?
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Law Enforcement, and Reform
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18214. Gendarmeries and constabulary-type police: Roles and responsibilities of police with mixed military and civilian characteristics

Author:
Ronja Harder and Jasper Linke
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Gendarmeries and constabulary-type police go by many names, but all combine characteristics of both the military and civilian police. Because of their unique skill sets, demand for such forces to face new threats to domestic and international security has increased everywhere. However, the mixed military–civilian characteristics of gendarmeries and constabulary-type police pose special challenges for democratic civilian control and the appropriate use of force, especially in domestic law enforcement. This SSR Backgrounder describes the roles and functions of gendarmeries and similar forces and explains how applying the principles of good SSG enables them to fulfil their legitimate mission of protecting both state and human security with respect for human rights and the rule of law. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: What are gendarmeries and constabulary-type police? What roles can gendarmeries play in domestic security? How can gendarmeries contribute to international security? Are gendarmeries compatible with democratic security governance? What does SSR mean for gendarmeries?
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Law Enforcement, Military Affairs, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18215. Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces: Roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance

Author:
William McDermott
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This SSR Backgrounder explains what ombuds institutions for the armed forces are, what they do and how they contribute to good governance of the security sector. These institutions provide oversight of the armed forces by receiving and investigating complaints, thereby improving the accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces. They are an essential feature of democratic security sector governance that ensures respect for the rule of law and human rights. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: What are ombuds institutions for the armed forces? What are the different types of ombuds institutions? How do ombuds institutions contribute to good SSG? How do ombuds institutions handle complaints? Why should complaints be encouraged? What kinds of investigations can ombuds institutions conduct? Are ombuds institutions part of the justice sector? How do ombuds institutions ensure the enforcement of their recommendations?
Topic:
Security, Governance, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18216. Defence Reform: Applying the principles of good security sector governance to defence

Author:
Thammy Evans
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This SSR Backgrounder is about applying the principles of good security sector governance (SSG) to defence through defence reform. The military is concerned with the defence of a state and its people. By increasing democratic oversight and control, defence reform ensures that military power is used according to the will and in defence of the population. Defence reform enables the military to fulfil its mandate more efficiently and effectively, in order to function flexibly in a dynamic security environment. This SSR Backgrounder answers the following questions: What is defence reform? Why reform defence? Who carries out defence reform? How does a defence reform process work? What links defence reform to good SSG and SSR? How to overcome barriers to defence reform?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Geneva and Global Focus

18217. Women of the Alt-Right: An Intersectional Study of Far-Right Extremism, Gender, & Identity in the United States

Author:
Sarah Kenny
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
The alt-right, an expression of far-right violent extremism, presents a security risk to citizens in the United States and around the world. As globalization, mass immigration, and multiculturalism flourish, various collectives of fearful individuals and populist politicians will continue to embrace ethnonationalist worldviews and employ violent means to enforce them. To combat this security risk, it is essential to acknowledge that women make significant contributions to the altright and violent extremism. Women can no longer be misrepresented and excluded from efforts to prevent and counter this form of violent extremism. Exclusion has proven both disingenuous and dangerous along the road to realizing a comprehensive threat analysis and strategy.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Terrorism, Women, Domestic Politics, Gender Based Violence, and Far Right
Political Geography:
United States

18218. Removing Obstacles to Women’s Participation at the Peace Table and in Politics

Author:
Pearl Karuhanga Atuhaire and Grace Ndirangu
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
Women who seek to participate in peace processes and political decision-making face many obstacles. To achieve sustainable peace and development, societies emerging from conflict must remove these obstacles. In so doing, they must recognize and prioritize that women are fully capable of active participation in all political processes. Women’s equal participation in leadership at every level and in every sector is imperative to eliminating gender-based violence, poverty and enabling sustainable peace. Across the globe, women are increasingly assuming political leadership. For example, Ethiopia elected a woman president in 2018, and half of the nation’s parliamentarians are women. In the Republic of Rwanda, women make up 78 percent of the representation in parliament.1 Leadership in politics and peacebuilding are linked. That is, women’s political leadership paves the way for women’s participation in peacebuilding processes and vice versa.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Gender Issues, International Cooperation, Peacekeeping, Women, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Africa and Rwanda

18219. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:
European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

18220. Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical wins, strategic setbacks

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the last few years, news about Russia’s conduct in the Western Balkans has resembled dispatches coming from the trenches of political and economic warfare: Moscow has slashed gas supplies, banned imports of agro-food products, conducted coordinated disinformation campaigns, nurtured nationalist organisations, deployed Cossack paramilitary groups, tested cyber defences and allegedly even tried to overthrow legitimate governments. This flurry of disruptive operations caught Europe by surprise and generated debate: does this resurgence herald Russia’s return to the region and if so, what is driving the comeback? What does Moscow want to achieve? What is the Russian modus operandi in the region? Is it confined only to coercion, as the headlines suggest, or is there a softer side to Russia’s power? Finally, looking retrospectively, did Russia’s approach bear fruit? This Brief addresses this set of questions in greater detail, with two key findings. First, Russia’s policy in the region is executed by a network of Russian state and non-state actors who are blurring the traditional lines between the public and private domains. This allows the Kremlin to tap into the resources of informal institutions and hide behind a fog of deniability. Second, Russia has raised the cost of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO by exploiting the region’s political and economic vulnerabilities. That said, although Moscow was able to slow down the process, it has hitherto failed to alter the region’s steady drift towards Western institutions, at least for now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Balkans