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29381. Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast Asia

Author:
Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang, Chen Wenxin, and Zhang Fan
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Center for American Progress and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, have partnered often over the years, working regularly on areas of cooperation between China and the United States and on options for managing areas of competition and tension. Together, CAP and CICIR have held or participated in many conferences, workshops, and symposiums that bring together Chinese and U.S. officials and scholars; we have worked on joint publications; and we believe that we have helped enable substantial cooperation between the United States and China. Mistrust complicates U.S.-China relations and can obscure areas where cooperation might be possible and beneficial. Negative dynamics also obscure from others the depth of U.S.-China cooperation in a wide range of areas. In this report, we try to cut through these dynamics and offer new options. In 2014, CAP and CICIR began to discuss how U.S.-China tensions might be obscuring areas of mutual interest in Southeast Asia, a region of tremendous importance strategically and economically to the entire region and the world. Prior to this project, in our respective organizations, the people who work on Southeast Asia did not work closely with colleagues working on U.S.-China bilateral relations. In most cases, our bilateral experts had spent little or no time in Southeast Asia, yet the tensions at play in the region featured prominently in their day-to-day work. Both the United States and China, meanwhile, were making investments and building new partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. Was Southeast Asia to be an arena of competition for China and the United States, or could there be areas of cooperation with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, that brought benefit to all? The potential for research by our teams with Southeast Asian counterparts was clear. It was our friend and colleague Nina Hachigian who proposed the concept that would make this a groundbreaking project. Now the U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, Hachigian is a diplomat and scholar of rare skill and creativity. She noted that CAP and CICIR could only do productive work in this area by doing two things: First, the organizations needed to join their stovepiped research teams into a single group with expertise on both Southeast Asia and U.S.-China relations. Second, CAP and CICIR had to partner with scholars in the region who study the United States, China, and ASEAN. And rather than holding a conference, why not travel through the region with local hosts?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

29382. Violence and Peace

Author:
Trevor Sutton
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
One of the most profound developments in international affairs since the end of the Cold War has been the rise of a global accountability movement that seeks to hold political authorities responsible for abuses inflicted on their own citizens and those of neighboring countries.1 During the decades between the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes tribunals of the late 1940s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world’s great powers demonstrated little interest in establishing international justice mechanisms to redress gross human rights abuses.2 That changed in 1993, however, when the United Nations passed a resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or ICTY.3 The decade that followed saw the creation of supranational tribunals to try the perpetrators of atrocities in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, and also the founding of an International Criminal Court, or ICC, whose jurisdiction has been recognized by more than 120 nations.4 The purpose of these institutions was to end impunity—that is, the absence of criminal liability—in countries where political and military authorities had committed horrific violence against civilians.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Violence, Accountability, Peace, and International Criminal Court (ICC)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29383. Leveraging U.S. Power in the Middle East

Author:
CAP Middle East Team
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The geopolitical landscape that emerged after the end of the Cold War is facing recent strains from an unprecedented wave of global migration, climate change, and a more assertive Russia and competitive China—and the Middle East has emerged as a focal point for many of these challenges. The administration of the next U.S. president will face a Middle East challenged by regional power tensions; multiple civil wars; state collapse driven by political legitimacy crises; threats from rapidly evolving terrorist networks; record numbers of refugees; and escalating economic and human development pressures. These challenges, along with a new wave of regressive authoritarian forces limiting basic freedoms, will require the next administration to take a proactive and long-term approach to the Middle East. Dynamics in the Middle East have understandably caused many Americans to question the value of U.S involvement in the region. Indeed, this skepticism is supported by the track record of the past 15 years, particularly the fallout from the 2003 Iraq war. But recent events and trends in the Middle East—from the rise of the Islamic State to the refugee crisis spilling over into Europe—demonstrate that the United States has important stakes in what happens in the region. Because of the threats that the Middle East presents for the homeland and the danger that continued conflict in the region poses to global stability, the United States needs to work closely with regional partners to adopt a long-term approach to the region that advances America’s interests and values.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

29384. How Carbon Pricing Could Span the United States and North America

Author:
Gwynne Taraska and Howard Marano
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Carbon pricing is flourishing in North America. Canada, for example, has announced a national price to take effect in 2018, while Mexico has announced a 12-month cap-and-trade pilot that will evolve into a national program. These developments join a network of established pricing instruments, including a carbon tax in Mexico and subnational systems in California, the northeast United States, and several Canadian provinces. Once unlikely, it now seems probable that carbon pricing will proliferate not only across Canada and Mexico but also in the United States. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs have found a diverse set of U.S. proponents, including from the private sector and from across the political spectrum, who view carbon pricing instruments as effective and efficient methods of curbing greenhouse gas emissions and the disruptive effects of climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Regional Cooperation, Carbon Emissions, and Price Control
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

29385. 5 Big Ideas for U.S. Policy in the Americas

Author:
Dan Restrepo, Michael Werz, and Joel Martinez
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Americas affect U.S. national and homeland security, economic prosperity, and stability perhaps more than any other region in the world. Collectively, they are the destination for more than 40 percent of all U.S. exports,1 the source of 65 percent of all U.S. energy imports,2 and the region of origin or heritage for 17 percent of the U.S. population.3 As the next administration looks to the Americas, it will have a fundamental choice: It can embrace the partnership model that seeks to work with those in the region willing and capable to engage on the wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that have predominated the past eight years. Or, in contrast, the administration can unreasonably attempt to wall the United States off from its closest neighbors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, North America, and United States of America

29386. Trade Update 2016: Transfers and Transparency

Author:
Irene Pavesi
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The Small Arms Survey’s Trade Update 2016: Transfers and Transparency reports that the world’s ‘top’ and ‘major’ small arms exporters delivered at least USD 5.8 billion worth of small arms in 2013, an increase of 17 per cent compared to the USD 5 billion worth exported in 2012. The United States exported a record USD 1.1 billion worth of small arms in 2013, followed by Italy (USD 644 million) and Germany (USD 557 million). These three states accounted for almost 40 per cent of exports in 2013. In addition, significant increases in exports were recorded by Croatia, Israel, Spain, and Switzerland, whose small arms exports in 2013 pushed them over the USD 100 million mark. Meanwhile, transfers of small arms to the United States (USD 2.5 billion) alone accounted for 42 per cent of all imports.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, Transparency, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29387. Toward a More Perfect Union: The Struggle for Security in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Libya’s militia problem—which is a primary source of political and economic instability—is more complicated than defeating IS because it is more widespread. Dealing with it is a fundamental part of any effort to build a unified Libyan state. There are said to be as many as 2,000 militias across Libya, and while most are independent, they do fall into three general categories.10 There are those militias aligned with the GNC, many of which are Islamist but not necessarily jihadi. There are those that are generally anti-Islamist, loyal to the HoR and its military strongman supporter General Khalifa Haftar. Then there are those that are radical jihadis, such as IS and Ansar al-Shariah, which have ties to Al Qaeda.11 These militias form coalitions when it suits their purpose and at other times are at odds with each other. Regardless, they have helped create a failed Libyan state with no central authority or security structure.12 The criminal underground in Libya has been functioning since the time of Gadhafi. There are a number of groups, but there is no real central power structure similar to the mafia. Instead, these criminal groups operate independently, and they traffic in a variety of things, including guns, drugs, and people. They work with whoever serves their purpose, including IS. The role of the criminal underground has increased as the Libyan economy continues to crumble. In a very real sense, these criminal groups are the connective tissue between the jihadis and the militias, with all three impeding efforts to rebuild Libya.13 If Libya devolves into further instability—in effect becoming a failed state—it creates a threat to the region; a threat to Europe because of the increased flow of refugees and migrants from Libya; and a threat to both the United States and European Union because of the presence of IS and Al Qaeda affiliates. While addressing Libya’s security crises is an essential piece of the effort to build a functioning state, it will certainly be a difficult and complicated process. Nonetheless, there are things that can be done that will help make Libya more secure.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

29388. Orbán’s Hungary

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The recent U.S. presidential election caught much of the world by surprise and raised a number of questions about how the new administration will govern. Was the rhetoric on the campaign trail a harbinger of things to come, was it a divisive campaign strategy to get elected, or a bit of both? Either way, there is reason for concern and dismay. Taking a closer look at the Trump campaign, there are parallels to the right-wing national populist political movements in Europe. The recent transformation of Hungarian politics—in particular, the metamorphosis of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, leader of the ruling Fidesz Party—offers a cautionary tale of what can happen when a right-wing national populist leader gets elected. Unfortunately, Orbán, who has been invited to Washington by President-elect Donald Trump,1 is only one part of a larger right-wing national populist phenomenon that has taken root in Europe. For example, he is an inspiration for Jarosław Kacszyński, head of the Polish Law and Justice Party, or PiS, which now controls Poland’s government.2 The PiS, taking a page out of Orbán’s playbook, has been trying to consolidate its power by doing such things as attacking Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, its highest court.3 The idea behind this and related moves in Hungary and Poland is to ensure that once the party is in power, it will remain there by rigging the system to make sure its leaders can get specific programs enacted and create a more favorable electoral climate.
Topic:
Nationalism, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Populism, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary

29389. Advancing Climate-Compatible Infrastructure Through the G-20

Author:
Gwynne Taraska, Peter Ogden, Nancy Alexander, and Howard Marano
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
To date, 17 G-20 countries—which account for 67 percent of global greenhouse gas pollution—have officially joined the Paris Agreement, bringing the pact into effect sooner than anyone expected.1 If they follow through with their commitments to reduce emissions, it will represent unprecedented progress in the global effort to curb climate change. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, meanwhile, has suggested a number of actions, including dismantling the Clean Power Plan and pledging to “cancel” the Paris Agreement, that would drive the United States—and potentially other countries—in the opposite direction.2 In light of this, the G-20 summit in July 2017 provides an important opportunity for committed major powers to resist backsliding by any and all G-20 countries—and even to make some progress in meeting the climate challenge. To its credit, the German government, which officially assumed the G-20 presidency in December 2016, has taken steps that position the summit well for just such an effort. When German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced her three “pillar” objectives for the summit, she explicitly identified climate change as a priority. These pillars include fostering global economic stability; making the global economy viable for the future, including through the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; and establishing the G-20 as a “community of responsibility,” including by promoting a compact with Africa that would address infrastructure investment, among other topics.3
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Infrastructure, G20, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Global Focus

29390. Moscow on the Potomac

Author:
CAP National Security and International Policy
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On October 16, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued an extraordinary statement, indicating that the “U.S. Intelligence Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations.”1 The release of this hacked information was all directed at the Democratic presidential campaign and its affiliates, with no hacked information leaked regarding the campaign of the Republican presidential nominee, and now president-elect, Donald Trump. These senior U.S. intelligence officials pointed out that Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, had used similar tactics across Europe and Eurasia to bolster right-wing nationalist parties and that “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process.” Director Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency, noted, “There shouldn’t be any doubt in anybody’s minds, this was not something that was done casually, this was not something that was done by chance, this was not a target that was selected purely arbitrarily. This was a conscious effort by a nation-state to attempt to achieve a specific effect.”2
Topic:
Security, Corruption, National Security, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America