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1. A Strategy for Countering the Houthi Threat at Sea

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab, Nancy Youssef, and Kevin Donegan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
For the first time in four decades, a core US interest — freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce — is increasingly at risk in the Middle East region. By enabling the Yemeni Houthis to attack international vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with armed drones and sophisticated anti-ship missiles, Iran, as it did in the Gulf in the late 1980s, is causing tremendous harm to commercial activity in one of the world’s most crucial waterways. In a memorandum entitled “A Strategy for Countering the Houthi Threat at Sea” and addressed to US President Joe Biden, the Middle East Institute’s Defense and Security Program members Bilal Y. Saab, Kevin Donegan, Mick Mulroy, Sam Mundy, and Joseph L. Votel offer recommendations for the United States on how to effectively degrade the capabilities of the Houthis and protect international shipping in regional waters. To discuss in greater detail the Defense and Security Program’s proposed strategy and the likely future trajectory and implications of the US campaign against the Houthis, MEI is pleased to host Bilal Y. Saab and Kevin Donegan.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Houthis, Shipping, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Red Sea

2. US Military Action in the Middle East

Author:
Joseph Votel and Gerald Feierstein
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss US military action against the Houthis and other militant groups throughout the region.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Houthis, Shipping, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:
Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

4. Ties Between Hostile Actors in the Red Sea

Author:
Mirette F. Mabrouk, Guled Ahmed, and Thomas Halvorsen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the ways in which the Houthis, Al Shebab, Somali pirates, and others are collaborating to undermine maritime security and limit the free flow of commerce in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Maritime, Al Shabaab, Houthis, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Red Sea

5. The Gaza War's Regional Reverberations

Author:
Randa Slim and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, President and CEO of the Middle East Institute Paul Salem and Director of MEI’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program Randa Slim speak to MEI's Editor-in-Chief Alistair Taylor about growing concerns over the potential for large-scale regional escalation as the Gaza war continues. *Note: This episode was recorded before drone attacks that killed US soldiers in Jordan on 1/28. *
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Escalation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

6. Escalation on the Israel-Lebanon Front

Author:
Paul Salem and Randa Slim
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the highly volatile situation between Israel and Hezbollah across the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Hezbollah, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon

7. How non-state armed groups engage in environmental protection

Author:
Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputant
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Non-state Armed Groups have a mixed - and mostly negative - impact on the environment, but there are ways in which NSAG’s engagement can have positive effects on the environment during and after armed conflict. The adoption of the UN principles for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict can provide an avenue for constructive engagement.
Topic:
Environment, United Nations, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

Author:
Tom Connolly
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.
Topic:
National Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

9. Fact Sheet: Crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Violence is escalating in Amhara region, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency Nearly 30 clashes between government forces and Fano militias were recorded in Amhara last week, with most concentrated in North Wello and West Gojam zones, though fighting has been spread throughout the region. This marks an almost eightfold increase in armed clashes in the region relative to the weekly average since the start of the crisis in April. While Amhara was among the least volatile regions in the country prior to the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021, it is now one of the most unstable. Persistent insecurity in Amhara poses a significant threat to the federal government, the Abiy administration, and Ethiopia’s stability at large.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Amhara

10. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran

Author:
Mona Saif
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Yemen

11. Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province

Author:
Heni Nsaibia
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
North Africa and Sahel

12. Armed group opportunism in the face of recent crises: COVID-19 and climate change

Author:
Siobhan O'Neil
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Terrorist and other types of armed groups often exploit natural and human-made disasters and emergencies to advance their causes. This paper studies how some armed groups have responded to two recent global emergencies—climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines the messaging and actions of the Boko Haram in Nigeria and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dissident groups in Colombia in response to COVID and climatic shifts. The paper uses assessment methodology to look into unique survey evidence from each country in order to determine the public impact of armed group decision-making and responses to these emergencies. It also considers the potential policy implications of the findings presented herein.
Topic:
Climate Change, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, COVID-19, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

14. Framing typologies of relations between State and violent non-state actor. From Systemic anarchy to systematic regulation

Author:
Zdeněk Ludvík
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article deals with the issue of violent non-state actors (VNSA). First, it shows that states have developed regulatory mechanisms to mitigate anarchy in the international system and create a less conflictual international order. It discusses why regulatory mechanisms have failed in the case of VNSA and have not been as effective as in the case of states. The article then presents empirical strategies that states can employ in the face of dysfunctional regulatory mechanisms, and considers their advantages and disadvantages. The need for selective use is emphasised, as only part of VNSA poses a security threat. The paper concludes by arguing that a combination of strategies is needed to provide a systemic and long-term solution to non-state violence. At the same time, it warns of the pitfalls that must be overcome.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Anarchy, Regulation, and State
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. CTC Sentinel: September 2023 Issue

Author:
Lorena Atiyas-Lvovsky, Eitan Azani, Michael Barak, Assaf Moghadam, and Christopher Faulkner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Lorena Atiyas-Lvovsky, Eitan Azani, Michael Barak, and Assaf Moghadam find that “jihadi rhetoric is rarely translated into violent attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets … The relative dearth of successful operations, however, has not deterred global jihadi organizations from regularly leveraging the Palestinian issue for political gain, and in order to reinforce their stature as powerful actors in the Middle Eastern and global arenas. Despite jihadi lip service to the Palestinian cause, support for global jihad among Arab Israelis and Palestinians has remained relatively low. Physical and ideological barriers erected by Israel and the Jewish community have so far limited the capacity of global jihadi actors to operate against Israel and the Jewish community.” Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta explore the future of the Wagner Group in Africa after the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin. They write: “Wagner personnel in Africa appear poised to carry on their original missions given the importance of the continent to Russia’s broader strategic ambitions. Though the mercenary mutiny and Prigozhin’s death may lead clients to raise questions about what a continued partnership with Wagner means for relations with the Kremlin, Moscow has signaled a tolerance, if not need, for Wagner or a Wagner-like entity in Africa. Abandoning Wagner clients would severely undermine Russia’s influence on the continent.” Aaron Zelin and Devorah Margolin explore the Islamic State’s shadow governance in eastern Syria since the group lost its last piece of territory in the country in 2019. They write: “While it is true that the organization’s insurgency has been degraded in recent years, only focusing on the Islamic State’s attack claims and propaganda misses an important trend happening at the local level: … the Islamic State has continued attempts to govern as shadow actors in eastern Syria.” They warn that thanks to these efforts, “even if it sounds far-fetched now, a reasonable worst-case scenario is that the Islamic State could rapidly take advantage of a changed local context to attempt to carve out a small statelet in eastern Syria again.”
Topic:
Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Jihad, Wagner Group, Jewish community, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Syria

16. A Conversation with ELN Commander and Peace Negotiator Aureliano Carbonell

Author:
Jerano Abraham
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
National Liberation Army Commander Aureliano Carbonell speaks about prospects for peace in the guerrilla organization’s second round of dialogues with the Colombian government.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Peace, and Guerrillas
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

17. Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement (M23)

Author:
Ladd Serwat
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The March 23 Movement (M23) — Mouvement du 23 Mars in French — is an armed group operating in Nord Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with alleged backing from the Rwandan government. The roots of the M23 go back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars, splitting those willing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in DRC.1 Many fighters remained in Nord Kivu province to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of a former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militant, Laurent Nkunda. A precursor to the M23, the CNDP claimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received Rwandan support.2 The M23’s name comes from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the Congolese government on 23 March 2009.3
Topic:
Political Violence, Non State Actors, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

18. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

19. Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini and María Fernanda Arocha
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a Mexican criminal group that emerged as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel – one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s allies – after the capture of its leader in 2009 led to internal divisions.1 Initially, the group operated as an armed wing of the Sinaloa Cartel. As part of this alliance, it engaged in a deadly turf war against Los Zetas in Veracruz state, where the group stood out for its use of violence and involvement in numerous massacres.2 Under the leadership of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the CJNG grew as an independent organization and one of the most powerful actors in Mexico’s criminal underworld. Rivaling its erstwhile ally, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG turned from an armed wing into a complex drug-producing and trafficking structure, which supplies markets across the globe.3 It has diversified its activities and sources of income, relying on extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, illegal mining, and oil theft,4 such as the capture of the avocado and oil trade in Michoacán and Guanajuato states.5 To support its growth and international ambitions, the CJNG has expanded its presence to at least 27 of Mexico’s 32 states.6 The presence of the CJNG has often driven increased violence at the local level, notably in areas of territorial dispute with other criminal groups.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violence, Organized Crime, and Cartels
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

20. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

21. Cash Cabal: How Hezbollah Profits from Lebanon's Financial Crisis

Author:
Samara Azzi and Hanin Ghaddar
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In March 2020, Lebanon opted for a “hard default” on $32 billion in sovereign debt, allowing the government to avoid negotiating with its Eurobond holders and investors. Beirut thereafter showed little interest in addressing the consequences of default, and the country’s economic meltdown worsened. As usual, the Lebanese people were the casualties, suffering amid what the World Bank has called a “deliberate depression.” This official negligence has cleared the way for a proliferating cash economy—which in turn has spawned a currency exchange scheme involving the central bank, foreign exchange agents, and Lebanese politicians. Hezbollah specifically has profited in areas ranging from real estate to solar energy, pharmaceuticals, and the illicit Captagon trade. In this Policy Note, authors Samara Azzi and Hanin Ghaddar—a venture capitalist and a former Lebanese journalist—skillfully diagram the corrupt status quo and explain why entrenched actors want to avoid systemic change. But as the study makes clear, the future health of the Lebanese economy requires an overhaul, and the international community must now press for deep reforms and personal accountability.
Topic:
Politics, Non State Actors, Financial Crisis, Economy, Hezbollah, and Shia Islam
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

22. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

23. Central African Republic Mine Attack: Can China Protect its Overseas Nationals?

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 19, gunmen stormed a gold mine near Bambari, in the heart of the Central African Republic (CAR), killing nine Chinese workers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Embassy in the CAR issued successive warnings for Chinese nationals to evacuate all areas outside of Bangui, the capital. On the same day as the attack, the Embassy called on Chinese citizens in the CAR’s external provinces to immediately evacuate themselves and report their whereabouts (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 19). A subsequent Embassy warning on March 22 went further, stressing that the situation in the CAR is now “red” or “extremely high risk,” emphasizing that the March 19 attack demonstrated the “extreme necessity of evacuating Chinese companies and nationals” in areas outside the capital “as soon as possible” (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 22). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stressed that General Secretary Xi Jinping was closely monitoring the situation and had instructed that immediate action be taken to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals in the CAR and to “severely punish the murderers” (严惩凶手) (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], March 20). Exactly who perpetrated the attack remains, however, unclear. The CAR government faulted the rebel alliance, the Coalition of Patriots for Change, for the gold mine attack. However, the rebel group blamed Russia’s Wagner Group, which has been deployed in the country to protect the central government since 2018 (South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 20). The timing of the attack and subsequent allegations of Wagner’s involvement was inopportune for Xi as he prepared to travel to Moscow the following day for meetings with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Beijing sought to position itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War (Xinhuanet, March 21). In a blog post on the CAR attack, the well-known nationalist firebrand and former Global Times editor Hu Xijin observed that in “the chaotic situation in CAR anything can happen,” but rejected Western media conjecture concerning the Wagner Group’s involvement as an attempt to “undermine Sino-Russian relations” (Sohu, March 22). He even claimed that due to Wagner’s cooperative relationship with the CAR government, its operators reportedly “helped the authorities deal with the aftermath of the situation and evacuate the bodies of the dead Chinese miners back to Bangui.” Finally, Hu averred that in the “2020s anyone who kills a Chinese national will face severe punishment and retribution.” A post on Tencent echoed these sentiments, stating: “the Central Africa Republic owes us nine lives” before castigating the U.S.-led West for treating Africa as a “modern colonial territory” and creating conditions for “vicious attacks” on Chinese companies to drive them out of emerging markets (Tencent, March 28). Putting aside the murkiness of the March 19 mine attack in the CAR, the incident highlights a growing problem for China, which is the sheer proliferation of state-owned and private businesses operating overseas, either in conflict zones or in areas with chronic political instability. The population’s widespread expectation that the government will exact swift retribution against the perpetrators of attacks on Chinese nationals overseas also puts Xi in a difficult position, as popular assumptions about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to target armed groups in distant and difficult operational environments do not align with its actual capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Violence, and Mining
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Central African Republic

24. Neo-Weberian Reading of Violent Non-State Actors: The Case of Hezbollah

Author:
Mustafa Yetim
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Multiple-actor reality and the impact of different units, except the states in stratified structural relations, have become more apparent in recent international relations. Specifically, the rising role of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) in regions like the Middle East and North Africa, and their challenges to the sole and central position of states, reinforced this idea. Hence, comprehending the possible actorhood of these groups within the structural relations consisting of internal and external realms necessitates alternative concepts and challenging arguments. The Neo-Weberian approach, inspired by historical sociology, offers a grounded and balanced analysis of actors. This approach puts state-society at the center of attention and, thus, looks at all dimensions (both actor and structure) of social relations as ingrained in the theory of structuration. In this way, it seems to capture the complex interactions between actors and structural dynamics, as well as the dynamic transformation of both ontological realities. Along this line, this study intends to illuminate the intriguing aspects and certain advantages of the structuration approach by scrutinizing Hezbollah’s agency, which is a critical VNSA in the Middle East, and its impact on structural relations, as well as its evolution over time. In other words, as a modest contribution to the structuration literature, the mutual interaction between agent and structure is explored via a unique case. This study argues that Hezbollah emerged as a result of the preexisting structural realities and, during the process, it proved its agency and influential role on these stratified structural dynamics. To substantiate these theoretical arguments, the permissive structural conditions in the region and in Lebanon will be explained, and then Hezbollah’s impact as an actor on these structural realities will be surveyed with a special emphasis on Hezbollah’s role over two regional dynamics: Arab uprisings, particularly the Syrian internal war, and its now hegemonic position in Lebanese politics.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon