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101. Social Contract and Social Cohesion: Synergies and Tensions between Two Related Concepts

Author:
Markus Loewe, Armin von Schiller, Tina Zintl, and Julia Leininger
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
“Social cohesion” and the “social contract” are two related analytical concepts, which have become increasingly popular among researchers and practitioners. Both concepts help to understand and characterise societies and countries by shedding light on the relationships between members and groups of society and state institutions. Unfortunately, there is often little precision in the use of the concepts. As a result, their respective analytical strengths have not always been well utilised for policy analysis and project design. Furthermore, the synergies between them have been overlooked. This paper therefore defines both concepts, considers their respective strengths and discusses the relationship between them. The concept of the social contract emphasises the deliverables exchanged between societal groups and governing authorities. Social contracts are the sum of formal and informal agreements amongst societal actors and between them and the actor in power (the government or any other type of authority) on the rights and obligations of one towards the other. Social contracts vary enormously, but all establish more stability in state–society relations, especially if they are inclusive and flexible enough to account for changes in the framework conditions. The concept of social cohesion, in contrast, refers primarily to the quality of the relations between individuals, societal groups and the state, and the underlying values, norms and attitudes that shape these relationships. Social cohesion can be characterised as the glue that holds a society together and enables it to develop a shared vision. It concerns the horizontal relationships between members of society and the vertical relationships between societal actors and political institutions. Social contracts and social cohesion affect each other. Social contracts contribute to social cohesion because the regular and predictable exchange of deliverables between societal groups and the state creates an interdependence that strengthens mutual trust, willing-ness to cooperate and a sense of common identity. Conversely, social contracts tend to be more resilient and sustainable if they are based on cohesive societies. Both concepts are thus useful for national governments and foreign donors to assess opportunities and design policies for sustainable development. The social contract concept helps us to understand the “give and take” in a country: it shows where governments could do better in delivering to society and thereby make state–society relations more stable. The social cohesion concept in turn helps to determine what holds societies together and which attributes of intra-society relations could or should be strengthened. In addition, both concepts assist foreign donors in assessing which interventions would be favourable for the internal relationships in partner countries and in thinking carefully about potential unintended harmful effects. In particular, international donors can benefit from exploiting the mutually enforcing relationship between social contract and social cohesion.
Topic:
Development, Institutions, Development Aid, Social Cohesion, and Social Contract
Political Geography:
Global Focus

102. Tomorrow’s Global Development Landscape: Mapping Trends and Reform Dynamics

Author:
Heiner Janus, Niels Keijzer, and Svea Koch
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The key tools and governance approaches for international cooperation for sustainable development (hereafter, international cooperation) were set up in a markedly different time and age. International cooperation – with official development assistance (ODA) as the dominant means of implementation – remains key, despite being generally considered as no longer adequate for addressing today’s common and collective challenges. Despite numerous declarations of its growing irrelevance or calls for it even being beyond repair, the governance and reporting system of ODA has remained largely unchanged throughout its 60 years of existence. One reason is that there are few alternatives. Pandemic response and preparedness, climate finance, humanitarian aid, the United Nations development system as well as the budgets of the multilateral development banks all by and large remain dependent on ODA. New and additional sources of development finance have been slow to materialise and run the risk of remaining time-bound and ad-hoc, as illustrated by recent discussions on Special Drawing Rights, debt swaps and green bonds. While other actors, such as providers of South-South Cooperation (SSC), and non-governmental actors are increasing and gaining importance, they are only to a limited degree institutionalised. In the absence of transparent and coherent methodologies for monitoring their actions, concrete financial volumes remain hard to assess. This paper analyses structural factors of the institutional inertia in international cooperation and formulates expectations for where new reform impetuses might arise from. To this end, it maps and links key reform proposals for the global development system, with a specific focus on public financial flows consisting of three connected parts. The first part concerns current forms of and reporting processes for ODA, climate finance and SSC. These concern well-established, albeit path-dependent, forms of international cooperation with different types of multistakeholder settings and different levels of institutionalisation. Here, we do not expect fundamental reforms given various entrenched interests and expect that the nexus between climate finance and ODA will be the main driver for change. The second part of our mapping consists of what we call “global first” reform ideas. These ideas begin with a problem-oriented approach at the global level and aim at setting up new, universal financing schemes and redesigning institutional structures for that purpose. While the ideas in this category are still in their initial stage, we regard them to be particularly relevant for conceptualising the “demand-side” of reforms (i.e., “what would be needed?”). Here, we predict that the more ambitious reforms for creating universality of contributions and benefits at the global level will not materialise. However, these concepts play a key role in influencing the future orientation of specific existing (multilateral) institutions. The third part of our mapping entails positioning current multilateral and bilateral development organisations located between the first two parts. We observe that these organisations experience a gravitational pull towards both directions of reform, namely focusing on global public goods versus prioritising the (countries) left behind, often with competing incentives and trade-offs between national and global development priorities. We expect that a reform of bilateral development actors will lag behind in the broader policy field due to their domestic political constraints, whereas multilateral development banks will generate greater reform momentum (and be pushed by their stakeholders) as first movers.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Global Focus

103. Constellations of State Fragility: Improving International Cooperation through Analytical Differentiation

Author:
Jasmin Lorch, Sebastian Ziaja, and Jörn Grävingholt
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations: • Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures. • Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2). • Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour. • Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Fragile States, and Development Aid
Political Geography:
Global Focus

104. Current Developments in West Africa’s Regional Integration – Challenges for the Future Design of Foreign and Development Policy

Author:
Klaus Grütjen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
On 16 September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – all three states led by military regimes – decided to establish a new regional organisation, the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel – AES). This move was prompted by the worsening of the crisis within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, a crisis that reached its peak to date with the announcement by the three AES members on 28 January 2024 of their withdrawal from ECOWAS, a regional organisation set up back in 1975. In a socio-political context in which the role and functions of the state, the extent of state powers and the way in which they are exercised are increasingly being called into question, new forms of political and social organisation are developing. These are also influenced by the current geopolitical developments in the changing world order. At the same time, states and societies and the ongoing regional integration processes are facing major new challenges. Within ECOWAS, conventional ideas of state and society, values and structures are coming up against growing tendencies towards a new understanding of statehood and sovereignty. In the West Africa/Sahel region, new processes of nation-building and state-building are under way, underpinned by efforts to renew social cohesion and to integrate the ‘vital forces of the nation’ – a concept cited increasingly frequently in these countries – as comprehensively as possible. These developments call for a realignment of German and European foreign and development policy. The political and social conditions and expectations of the partners in the West Africa/Sahel region are currently undergoing profound transformation. They need to be aligned with the content and interests of the value-based foreign policy advocated by Germany – in line with the principle of a ‘partnership between equals’. Any appraisal of the future developments and integration of the dynamics that determine them must take account of the various integration processes, which are particularly diversified and run in parallel in this region. Adopting a comparative perspective, this paper provides an overview of the various regional organisations in the West Africa/Sahel region. It analyses the potential of each of them in terms of their development prospects and sustainability. In addition to the critical relationship between ECOWAS and the AES, it also examines the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Integrated Develop-ment Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (Autorité de Liptako-Gourma – ALG) and the G5 Sahel, which is currently being dissolved. If the partnership between Germany and Europe on the one hand and the West African and Sahel states on the other is to be continued, it will be vital to adopt a pragmatic approach and maintain a political dialogue with all the partners. The states in this region are extremely important to Europe’s future development. Moreover, it is only through communication based on mutual respect underpinning cooperation in the economic and development sectors that the growing influence of political powers such as Russia and Iran – whose ideas, interests and values are not in line with the Western Atlantic model of democracy governed by the rule of law – can be curbed effectively.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

105. State Fragility and Development Cooperation: Putting the Empirics to Use in Policy and Planning

Author:
Charles Martin-Shields and Diana Koester
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
State fragility, which describes how different components of a state do (or do not) function, is a central concept for understanding how development activities and policies in complex political, humanitarian and conflict-affected contexts will (or will not) work in practice. Using fragility as a lens, we use feminist development policy and forced displacement as examples to demonstrate how different empirical conceptualisations of fragility can be used to uncover potential challenges and identify opportunities for more comprehensive policy and programming. These examples are only two ways one can apply the concepts of fragility of the OECD and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Indeed, these and other empirical concepts of state fragility have many applications and can be used to measure and understand state–society, conflict and humanitarian dynamics in myriad ways. The longest-running among these kinds of models is the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2023). Other models focus on state fragility as a function of different aspects of “stateness”. This includes IDOS’s Constellations of State Fragility typology, which clusters types of fragility based on strengths/weaknesses in key dimensions of statehood (Grävingholt et al., 2019). Some organisations have moved beyond an exclusive focus on the functioning of the state, with the OECD currently defining fragility contexts as the combination of risks and insufficient coping capacities of multiple levels of governance systems and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks (OECD, 2016). The IDOS and OECD concepts do not rank countries, and the methods used in both models allow them to be applied to different levels of analysis. Essentially, these empirical conceptualisations of state fragility can serve as useful heuristics for the policy-makers responsible for setting policy agendas in fragile contexts.
Topic:
Development, Fragile States, Fragility, Cooperation, and Development Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

106. Getting Special Drawing Rights Right: Opportunities for Re-channelling SDRs to Vulnerable Countries

Author:
Jürgen K. Zattler
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Many developing countries are still grappling with the consequences of the pandemic and the associated high debt burdens while facing huge financing needs, inter alia related to climate change. In response, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued $650 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The G7 and G20 have committed to re-channelling SDR 100 billion of their allocation to developing countries (on-lending, recycling and re-channelling are used interchangeably in this policy brief). The question now is how to implement these commitments in a way that promotes the global transformation and at the same time supports debt sustainability. It is important to note that there are certain restrictions on the re-channelling of SDRs. Most importantly, the re-channelling must be consistent with the SDR’s status as an international reserve asset. There are different interpretations of these requirements. The IMF has encouraged the use of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) for re-channelling. It has also signalled general support for re-channelling SDRs to the multilateral development banks (MDBs). The European Central Bank (ECB) has taken a more restrictive stance. Does the re-channelling of SDRs through the above-mentioned IMF trusts (“the current on-lending option”) effectively support the global transformation? Measured against this objective, the current on-lending regime has two shortcomings. First, it does not sufficiently link foreign exchange support to deep structural transformation. Second, it does not allow funds to be leveraged in the private capital market. In this policy brief, we discuss a promising alternative: recycling SDRs for MDB hybrid capital (“the hybrid capital option”). This option can overcome the two drawbacks of the current system. At the same time, it has its own challenges. Moreover, both the current on-lending option and the hybrid capital option raise concerns about debt sustainability. If implemented in their current forms, they would risk exacerbating vulnerable countries’ debt problems. It would therefore be desirable to modify these options to better integrate debt implications. This could be done by using the on-lent SDRs primarily for programmes that are not “expenditure-based”, but rather help to improve the composition of expenditure and revenue in a socially equitable manner, for example the introduction of regulatory standards, feebates and carbon pricing, or the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. Such an approach could have the added benefit of making previously sceptical member states more receptive to the hybrid capital proposal. The mid-term review of the RST, scheduled for May 2024, as well as the full review in 2025 provide good opportunities to further explore some of the issues raised in this policy brief. In addition, the brief identifies three ways in which interested shareholders of the IMF and MDBs could advance the debate on the hybrid capital option.
Topic:
Development, Sustainability, COVID-19, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

107. 9 candidates in the running for the presidential election in Finland. Towards a 2nd round: Alexander Stubb (KOK) - Pekka Haavisto (Greens)?

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 28 January, in the first round of the presidential election in Finland, 9 candidates are running for the supreme office. If no candidate receives more than half the votes, a second round will be held on 11 February. Finns can vote by post from 17 to 23 January (17 to 20 January for those living abroad.) After two consecutive terms leading the country, the current head of state, Sauli Niinistö (National Coalition Party, KOK), cannot stand for re-election. The Presidency of the Republic is the institution in which Finns have the most confidence (84%), according to a recent survey conducted by the Foundation for Municipal Development and published in January 2024.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

108. Right and left running neck and neck three weeks before the snap general elections in Portugal

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 9 November, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa dissolved the Assembly of the Republic, the single chamber of Parliament, and announced that general elections would be held on 10 March 2024. These elections, which should have been held by 11 March 2026 at the latest, have therefore been brought forward by two years.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, Leftist Politics, and Right-Wing Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Portugal

109. Towards a duel between Peter Pellegrini and Ivan Korcok in the Slovak presidential election?

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The 1st round of the presidential election will take place on 23 March in Slovakia. 11 candidates are standing in this ballot. If no candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes + 1, a 2nd round will be held on 6 April. The term of office of the current President of the Republic, Zuzana Caputova, expires on 15 June next. According to opinion polls, Peter Pellegrini (Hlas-Social Democracy), Speaker of Parliament, and Ivan Korcok, former Foreign Minister, are the favourites and are expected to meet in the 2nd round on 6 April. "The presidential election will tell us whether Slovaks support Prime Minister Robert Fico or whether they want to curb and limit his actions," said Tim Haughton, Professor of Political Science at the University of Birmingham and an expert on Slovakia. He believes that the turnout will be crucial.
Topic:
Domestic Politics and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe and Slovakia

110. Will the Democratic Union (HDZ) remain in power in Croatia?

Author:
Corinne Deloy
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 15 March, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, announced that general elections would be held on 17 April. This election is the first in a series to be held in the country in 2024: European elections on 9 June and presidential election at the end of the year. 3.7 million people are expected to vote on 17 April. Croatia has been governed since 2016 by the Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, allied with the Serbian Independent Democratic Party (SDSS), led by Milorad Pupovac. The outgoing head of government is also the longest-serving prime minister. His coalition is supported by the Social Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja, the People's Party-Reformists (NS-R), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Croatia, the Roma Alliance of the Republic of Croatia, the Union of Albanians and the Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU). However, the Democratic Union is struggling somewhat. It has been criticised for appointing Ivan Turudic to the post of public prosecutor. This choice was confirmed by parliament: 78 MPs voted in favour, against 60 and 2 abstentions. Ivan Turudic's critics point to his links with controversial figures such as Zdravko Mamic, a former manager of Dinamo Zagreb football club who was convicted of tax fraud and fled to Bosnia to escape justice, and a number of senior Democratic Union officials suspected of corruption. The government also faced several demonstrations last March in the country's five largest cities (Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Osijek and Varazdin) - organised by several left-wing opposition forces (Mozemo ("We can" in Croatian) and a coalition of 6 parties led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) - which called on Croatians to rally under the slogan "Enough is enough". Afterwards, Social Democrat leader Pedja Grbin promised to "finish the job at the polling stations". Zoran Milanovic's "coup" The electoral campaign witnessed an unprecedented moment when Croatian President Zoran Milanovic announced at a press conference in mid-March, alongside Pedja Grbin, his candidacy for the general elections as head of the SDP list in Zagreb ... in the first constituency in which the outgoing Prime Minister, Andrej Plenkovic, is running. "Sometimes you have to leave your comfort zone if you want to have solid majority and form a government of national salvation," declared the head of state. Asked to rule on this unprecedented situation, the Constitutional Court stated on 18 March that it was absolutely impossible for the President of the Republic to stand as a candidate in the general elections. "The candidacy of the current President of the Republic in general elections is incompatible with the Croatian Constitution and the principle of the separation of powers. The President is a strictly non-partisan person and cannot take part in the activities of any political party. If he wants to be a candidate, he must resign", the Court ruled. Nor is the head of state authorised to campaign in favour of a particular list, at the risk of annulling the election. Zoran Milanovic responded by describing the members of the Constitutional Court as "illiterate peasants"; he stated that he would only resign once election victory was certain, and that he was therefore in a position to succeed Andrej Plenkovic as head of government. Zoran Milanovic, President of the Republic since 2020, was Prime Minister between 2011 and 2016.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Courts, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Europe and Croatia