Political Geography: United States of America

301. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:: Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

302. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Author:: Rodrigo Duton
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
Topic:: National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific and United States of America

303. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:: Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

304. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

305. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

306. Bro-Politics in Action: Trump and the “Personalization” of Foreign Policy

Author:: Ádám Csobánci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Congratulations poured in from European heads of state and government as soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was turning U.S. battleground states red and winning the presidential election last November. Many presidents and prime ministers posted selfies and pictures with Trump, emphasizing their strong personal relationship and shared history. While congratulations to the new President might seem like standard diplomatic courtesy, the enthusiasm for the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels appears less than sincere, given their rather complicated relationships with the first Trump administration. In contrast, leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who described Trump’s victory as "the biggest comeback in Western political history" and forecasted a golden era in US-Hungarian relations, expressed a strong eagerness to collaborate on shared goals. Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised the "unshakable alliance" between Italy and the U.S., demonstrating clear support for Trump’s win. Recognizing the heightened importance of personal relationships in dealing with Trump and his administration, European leaders are hoping to establish strong personal ties with the President. This trend report predicts how in 2025 further “personalization” of foreign policy is to be expected from the next U.S. administration. I present, through the examples of Orbán and Meloni, that European leaders already possessing close ties with the next U.S. president or his inner circle might have a significant head start to influence Trump’s Europe policy, with far-reaching consequences. Europeans who were not in power during Trump’s first term are pressed for time because the start of his new presidency is expected to bring rapid and aggressive policy changes. With the Republican Party controlling all branches of government, Trump’s administration will likely prioritize advancing its agenda swiftly, particularly before the midterm elections in 2026, when Congressional support could wane. For European leaders who are new to office or lacked strong ties with Trump previously, this creates urgency. They have strong incentives to build closer relations with his administration, whether due to shared ideologies or fears of trade tariffs; however, they face a glaring challenge. They will have to compete for Trump’s very limited time, attention and interest, as European affairs are unlikely to be a top priority for the new administration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Personalization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

307. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

308. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future

Author:: Yam Atir
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
Topic:: Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

309. Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The Current Landscape

Author:: Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns, and Ai Takahashi
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3 While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development. In the remainder of this brief, we summarize the hydrogen policy landscape in the United States and European Union (EU), concluding with an examination of the causes of demand-side stagnation in the clean hydrogen market.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Regulation, Public Policy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus, United States of America, and European Union

310. Trump and the future of transatlantic relations

Author:: Mikkel Runge Olesen and Jakob Linnet Schmidt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: A widespread view in Europe is that the US is becoming more a necessary partner than an ally or a friend. Lack of confidence that the US will defend Europe is as powerful a driver for increased European defence spending as pressure from the US. Due to the breach of trust, transatlantic relations are unlikely to be normalised after Trump.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

311. Tariff Tensions: Redefining Washington-New Delhi Relations

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The strategic partnership between the United States and India faces a critical juncture as recent developments strain their ties. On August 15, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for national self-reliance in trade and foreign exchange, a response to high tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump's administration on Indian imports.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Imports, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

312. Geography and Energy: The US-Central Asia Partnership in Critical Minerals

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting President Donald Trump's recognition of the national security risks posed by China's dominance over global supply chains in this sector. Following the approach of previous administrations, the current leadership has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers to diversify American access to these vital resources. The focus has now turned to the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in minerals essential for energy and defense technologies. Through two primary frameworks, the U.S. has begun exploring Central Asia's untapped critical mineral wealth: the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), alongside a series of bilateral memorandums of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambition does not necessarily align with the logistical challenges of emerging supply chains in Central Asia. In response to these complexities, analysts Haley Nelson and Natalia Stroz published a report with the Atlantic Council titled "Central Asia's geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership."
Topic:: Partnerships, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

313. Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:: Julie Baer and Nora Nemeth
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: The Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 559 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends and recruitment patterns with respect to international students for 2025/26 and (2) trends related to U.S. study abroad in 2024/25, as well as an outlook for 2025/26.
Topic:: Education, Students, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

314. Outlook 2030 Brief: Expanding International Study to the U.S.

Author:: Mirka Martel and Jonah Kokodyniak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: In 2024, over 1.1 million international students pursued their higher education in the United States. By 2030, increasing our efforts will ensure support for U.S. higher education, industries, and innovation. This is the second edition of IIE’s annual Outlook 2030 brief. The data-driven report focuses on key trends in academic mobility to the United States, comparing global findings and looking ahead at the next five years. The United States is the single largest host of international students in the world, attracting top talent from around the globe. International students pursue academic degrees in the U.S. due to the excellence of its higher education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). U.S. colleges and universities, in turn, benefit from the innovation and global perspectives that students and scholars bring to their institutions. Attracting global talent is crucial for driving the U.S. economy’s growth and maintaining the country’s leadership in research and development. The U.S. will continue to drive the development of new industries, and building a domestic and global pipeline of talent will advance this pivotal role.
Topic:: Education, Innovation, Higher Education, Industry, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

315. Food Defence: The Securitisation of the Food Supply

Author:: Elaine Leão Inácio de Melo Andrade, Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira, and Otniel Freitas-Silva
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The notion of food defence emerged in the USA following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, reflecting the idea that the food sector constitutes a critical infrastructure for national security and that the food system must be defended against intentional acts, motivated by political or ideological reasons, that could cause large-scale damage to public health or the economy. This study draws on primary documentary sources on food defence, including government guidelines, laws, norms and regulations issued mainly in the USA, as well as secondary bibliographic sources related to the topic, and draws on insights from securitisation theory in order to show that food defence discourses, norms, guidelines and practices connect to a process of social construction of threats and risks, linked to the frameworks of bioterrorism and biodefence, subjecting the food sector to a process of securitisation. Based on this analysis, we aim to contribute, firstly, by deepening the problematisation of food defence, adding to the debate a political and security dimension. Without this discussion, we argue it is not possible to understand, rigorously and accurately, food defence’s defining core and its specificities within the conceptual constellation of food protection. Secondly, by resorting to the food defence case, we hope to contribute empirically to illustrate an expanded version of securitisation, drawing attention to the importance of a more eclectic and integrated look at the discursive and non-discursive aspects and the different logics that operate in the social construction of security.
Topic:: Food Security, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, Securitization, and Protection
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

316. ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans

Author:: William Tobin
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment. A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following: Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure. The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests. To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran.
Topic:: Markets, Governance, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, Venezuela, and United States of America

317. Open-Source AI is a National Security Imperative

Author:: Mike Sexton
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: America’s footprint in artificial intelligence is prodigious, and it is hard to overstate how consequential this is for the American national interest if it further develops with the right balance between innovation and guardrails. Into this new technology are two divergent directions on the basic structure of the innovation: open-source or company controlled. ChatGPT is the latter model and was developed and licensed by OpenAI. Meta’s LLaMa is an example of open-source AI.1 In this paper, we explore the benefits and drawbacks of open-source AI and conclude that open-source can help balance the safety and security we want from AI with the innovation necessary to set the standard for the world. Both models are right for innovation, safety, and competition. The increasing sophistication of AI raises concerns about risk. One of the chief issues is open-source AI, which a user can run without the developer’s supervision. History shows us that the benefits of open-source software are real but diffuse and nebulous; meanwhile its greatest risks are tangible but mostly hypothetical. Encryption is an example of an open-source success. It is an open-source dual-use technology that vexes the US government. But accepting and adapting to it has been more farsighted than fighting it. Almost every smartphone in the world runs an American-made operating system thanks in large part to Android being open-source. We should not assume the development of open-source AI will necessarily follow the same trajectory. Open-source AI increases the likelihood that no single AI chatbot corners the consumer market and that America remains the innovation leader in AI.
Topic:: National Security, Artificial Intelligence, Science and Technology, ChatGPT, OpenAI, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

318. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:: Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

319. Hegemony and International Alignment

Author:: Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Jiaxian Zhou Wu
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, such as the U.S., foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. This data has shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-20th century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Multipolarity, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

320. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:: Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

321. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:: Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, and United States of America

322. Global development in crisis: Responding to America’s retreat

Author:: Sarah S. Stroup
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: A definitive shift in both resources and rhetoric has upended the global development sector. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the policies of the new US administration, although many European states had already started reducing foreign aid budgets earlier. Beyond its vicious rhetoric and wrecking-ball approach, the Trump administration’s arguments echo three long-standing critiques that development professionals have made themselves. Development experts in the US and Europe argue that development goals have become too broad, aid has failed to reach local actors, and the sector is too technocratic and removed from the concerns of Northern publics. A renewed focus on poverty reduction, combined with power-sharing abroad and public engagement at home, may provide answers to these critiques. Achieving development outcomes may require focusing less on providing direct assistance and more on reducing the harms created by Western states in other arenas, including trade and finance.
Topic:: Development, Foreign Aid, and Budget
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

323. Jordan and the October 7th War: Between National Interests and Palestinian Solidarity

Author:: Ronen Yitzhak
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Ronen Yitzhak examines the effects of the October 7 war on the politics and stability of Jordan.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and United States of America

324. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

325. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:: Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:: Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

326. Achieving burden-sharing: Retrenchment vs. conditionality

Author:: Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Observers and practitioners are frequently frustrated at the level of defense burden-sharing in U.S. alliances—alliance members’ contributions to collective defense objectives—and particularly at allies’ low level of investment in their own defense. This paper compares two approaches to soliciting burden-sharing in U.S. alliances: retrenchment and conditionality. Retrenchment refers to reductions in the amount or timing of wartime assistance the United States will provide to allies, including troop withdrawals. Conditionality, in turn, relies on threats to abandon allies unless they increase their defense efforts and does not necessarily entail reducing protection. Retrenchment may offer the greatest chance of success, particularly in cases where allies doubt the credibility of the United States’ threats to abandon them. Conditionality is likely to be nearly as effective as retrenchment in many other cases, particularly those in which allies take the U.S. threat of abandonment seriously and there is a compelling external threat. Retrenchment and conditionality can be complementary strategies. Retrenchment is effective in cases where conditionality is likely to fail, while conditionality is effective in cases where the United States might be unwilling to retrench due to fears that a revisionist power might seek regional hegemony. Burden-sharing is not without its downsides, including allies potentially desiring nuclear weapons. These risks might be greater if the United States retrenches but may not materialize in practice and are not necessarily insurmountable.
Topic:: NATO, Alliance, Defense Spending, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

327. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

328. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

329. The New Geopolitics and South Asia’s Trade Architecture – What Next?

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja, Amit Bhandari, and Aliasger Bootwalla
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia and United States of America

330. Hague Summit Series: Recalibrating Relations with Russia

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1] In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

331. Hague Summit Series: NATO-Ukraine

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia's war in Ukraine shows few signs of ending. Across Europe, there is a widely held view that the outcome of the war will be critically important to determining the continent's future security: Ukraine must prevail. This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the second Trump administration which, after a brief attempt to negotiate a (unjust) solution, seems unable to deliver on the president's campaign promise to bring peace, in particular if this involves being tough on Russia. Differences between the US and most European Allies regarding both the conditions for ending the war and Ukraine's longer-term integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures present one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. More immediately, uncertainty about how to handle these differences presents the greatest risk that NATO's forthcoming summit in The Hague will not be seen as a success.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Peace, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

332. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:: Felix Gasper
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

333. Hague Summit Series: Trump and the Rebalancing of NATO

Author:: Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

334. Small Drones, Big Problems: Managing the Unmanned Threat to the Homeland

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Drones are everywhere. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the suburbs of New Jersey, it has become increasingly common to find small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in the sky. In the United States, there are now over one million lawfully registered sUAS platforms. The proliferation of sUAS in the civilian population has created a flood of reporting to law enforcement agencies across a variety of scenarios. Quite often, a civilian hobbyist simply flies their sUAS “too close to the sun” and encroaches upon restricted airspace around either civilian or military critical infrastructure. However, there have also been cases of foreign actors operating sUAS in an attempt to reconnoiter specific targets or locations. There are now so many sUAS incidents occurring that it makes for an easily exploitable environment for malign activities by state or non-state actors. Making things even more dangerous, our research shows that quite often, no one knows who to call when a sUAS incident occurs. While officially the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has primacy over sUAS incidents, our research (and the FAA’s own database) shows that local law enforcement is often contacted after sUAS incidents, and cases are often closed as soon as they are opened, without confirmed reporting to the FAA. As a result, Department of Defense (DoD) entities charged with homeland defense, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), are often left without knowledge of sUAS incidents, and cannot observe and monitor trends adequately to support development of adequate countermeasures. They also do not have the authorities to counteract the threat, even when sUAS activity upends military training exercises. To mitigate this threat, the US government should consider: Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Maintaining a single, consolidated reporting database for any sUAS activity over critical infrastructure on an unclassified network. Mandating NORTHCOM to lead DoD efforts within this new JIATF and work with Congress on updated legislation to codify proper authorities for US agencies and the military to thwart UAS intrusions.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Warfare, and National Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

335. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

336. Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. But the ambassador’s argument relies on numerous inaccuracies. Those are detailed below. 1. Somalia currently has territorial integrity, and recognizing Somaliland would break that integrity. The Somali government does not currently have territorial integrity. Islamist terror group al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country. Somaliland has not been functionally a part of Somalia for decades. And Puntland and Jubaland frequently defy Mogadishu. Arguments premised on fictions are irretrievably broken. 2. The US-Somalia partnership has “bolstered regional stability.” The region is as unstable as it has been for decades. 3. “Clan-based ambitions threaten to fracture Somalia’s national cohesion.” There is no national cohesion to fracture, in part because clans remain the fundamental ordering principle of Somalia’s society. Rather than denying that reality, Somalis should build a highly decentralized order that accounts for their preeminent loyalty to clan. The US and its partners should stop pretending that a strong centralized government can work in Somalia. 4. “The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed. 5. “A divided Somalia would distract the central government from counterterrorism operations and disrupt the successes already achieved.” Again, Somalia is already divided. Also, Mogadishu already allows all sorts of things, usually petty political squabbles, to distract it from fighting al-Shabaab. The Somali government’s easily distracted nature has proven time and again that it is not a competent counterterrorism partner for the US. 6. “A unified Somalia . . . can foster transparency, attract responsible investment, and ensure its people benefit from [the country’s] resources—all while reinforcing the stable environment in which US interests can flourish.” The Somali government cannot achieve these lofty goals because Somalia is not unified. Decades of experience demonstrate the country will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future. And it is not clear that unity in Somalia would lead to transparency or competent governance. Mogadishu currently demonstrates neither of those things. There is no reason to believe it will magically improve, even if Somalia somehow, for the first time in its people’s history, becomes unified. 7. “By helping Somalia strengthen its institutions, enhance security forces, and foster inclusive political dialogue, the United States ensures that clan affiliations enrich national identity rather than fracture it into competing states.” The US and others have formed policy based on this belief for over a decade. It has not worked. Why should it suddenly begin working now? What has changed? Fundamentally, the ambassador’s arguments—and Washington’s current policy toward Somalia—rest on fictions: (a) that Somalia is united, politically or societally, (b) that the government in its current form contributes to regional stability, and (c) that Mogadishu’s actions are a net positive for the US. Washington cannot achieve its goals in the Horn of Africa without first acknowledging reality and building policies that reflect that reality, rather than comforting fictions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Africa, Somaliland, and United States of America

337. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:: Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

338. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

339. Nonproliferation in Great Power Competition

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Yashar Parsie
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For decades, the United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among friends and foes alike. This goal, however, may be at risk. While global challenges multiply, regional adversaries like North Korea pose an increased threat to US allies. In particular, South Korea appears to doubt the credibility of US extended deterrence. Seoul has sought to strengthen deterrence and even weighed the benefits of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. This report uses international relations theory, historical research, survey data, and original interviews with South Korean experts to examine (a) nonproliferation’s role in US grand strategy, (b) the relationship among nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and assurance, and (c) growing challenges to these three missions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. It then suggests an approach for the United States to address these challenges. Nonproliferation remains important to national security. But the United States should consider it among other national security priorities. Managing priorities is a matter of continually evaluating risks and benefits. The United States can best do so through a series of measures that improve extended deterrence and assurance to manage the risk that allies pursue nuclear weapons.
Topic:: Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

340. Next Steps for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: History was made at the White House on August 8, 2025, when President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a landmark meeting. Against all odds, and after more than three decades of failed diplomacy by the international community, the two leaders from the Caucasus signed a joint declaration committing to a final peace treaty that will normalize relations between their countries. Their foreign ministers also initialed a draft version of that treaty, which the countries plan on fully ratifying within the next 12 months. Diplomats brokered this breakthrough not in Moscow, Paris, or Brussels—but in Washington. For decades, the South Caucasus has been a flashpoint for regional competition, unresolved wars, and missed diplomatic opportunities. Now, with US reengagement, real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may finally be within reach. It is reasonable to assume that President Trump’s instinctive urge to cut deals—along with his desire to go down in history as an international peacemaker and statesman—drove his determination to lead efforts to end the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The deal also gave him the chance to tie up a loose end from his first administration. Despite Trump’s frequent claims that no new wars started under his watch, the 2020 Second Karabakh War erupted in the final year of his presidency. His administration made no meaningful effort to bring it to a close, creating a vacuum that Moscow filled by brokering a ceasefire agreement—one it ultimately proved unable to enforce. But President Trump could also recognize an opportunity when presented with one. In many ways, he was pushing at an open door. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand the importance of normalization and peace. Both are also exhausted by Moscow’s failed mediation efforts and its waning regional clout. The White House would be mistaken in assuming that since the headlines have passed, the cameras have stopped recording, and the signing ceremony is complete, the job is finished. Three big challenges are still on the horizon: Questions remain about Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political stability, which could be undermined, especially in the lead-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections next June, as hardline nationalists and Moscow-backed groups inside Armenia challenge his authority and the legitimacy of the peace process. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan should expect Russia and Iran to try to discredit the peace process by launching disinformation campaigns. Many questions remain unanswered about how the regional transport links envisioned in the peace agreement—including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—will be funded and financed. Without a resolution of these challenges, President Trump might lose interest in the peace initiative. Only his direct oversight can ensure its success.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

341. Putting US-India Trade Negotiations Back on Track

Author:: Aparna Pande and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: On April 2, 2025, which the White House dubbed “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump announced broad, sweeping tariffs on over 90 countries. While the president’s announcement caused anxiety in foreign capitals, officials in New Delhi remained relatively calm. United States–India relations had been improving for more than two and a half decades, and the US had become India’s largest trading partner. By most accounts, President Trump respected Prime Minister Narendra Modi—even going so far as to refer to his Indian counterpart as his “good friend.” Furthermore, during an official visit in February 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi announced a series of trade targets suggesting that a wider trade deal was imminent. The two leaders pledged to pursue $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030—more than double the current volume—and promised to deepen US arms sales to India, including by laying the groundwork for future acquisitions of F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Modi committed to increasing energy imports from the US and reducing tariffs on American goods. India, by most accounts, was eager to address the Trump administration’s concerns about trade imbalances, and the two sides set fall 2025 as a target for finalizing a bilateral trade agreement. Meanwhile, due to strong messaging from the Trump team against production based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Apple announced plans to shift all assembly of its US-bound iPhones to India. Prime Minister Modi also spoke with Elon Musk to discuss providing Tesla with access to Indian markets. Vice President JD Vance even visited India in late April 2025, and lauded the country’s “sense of infinite possibility.”
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

342. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

343. Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections

Author:: Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A new survey for ECFR reveals people in many countries around the world are upbeat about the second Trump presidency. Many think Trump will not just be good for America but that he will bring peace or reduce tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East and US-China relations. In contrast, US allies in Europe and South Korea are notably pessimistic about the incoming president—suggesting a further weakening of the geopolitical “West”. Ukrainians are slightly more positive than not about the impact Trump might have on ending the conflict with Russia. But they are deeply conflicted about what could be an acceptable compromise settlement with Moscow. Europeans will struggle to find internal unity or global power in leading an outright resistance to the new administration. But the survey reveals that many in the world regard the EU as a player equal to the US and China—a strength European leaders should draw on as they enter the turbulent new presidential term. Rather than harking back to a post-cold war liberal order, Europeans should focus on understanding and seeing opportunities in the new world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Elections, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

344. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

Author:: Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

345. Ride the wave: A big, beautiful European strategy for Trumponomics

Author:: Agathe Demarais
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Eight months into the second term of Donald Trump, Europeans are still struggling to craft a coherent response to American geoeconomics policies in the trade, investment and financial spheres. The Trump administration poses massive challenges to Europe. It has imposed tariffs on nearly all US imports from the EU. It is also considering applying pressure on investors to pick sides between the US and China. Finally, it could soon try to engineer a forced depreciation of the dollar against other major currencies like the euro. For the EU, the best response to baffling Trumponomics is to keep calm and carry on. European policymakers should adopt a self-help mindset—resisting the urge to impose retaliatory measures that could damage European economies, avoiding futile fights over US policies that will not change, and above all, holding the bloc together. Europeans should also use this turbulent moment to push through controversial economic reforms. Such policies include deepening the single market to support those EU exporters that will lose market share in the US; leveraging access to the EU market for digital services; boosting innovation financing through regulatory changes; increasing the global role of the euro; and bracing for the coming currency wars. Europe’s ability to implement much-needed reforms will shape the bloc’s economic prospects, global standing and resilience long after Trump leaves the White House.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

346. Reality show: Why Europe must not cave in Trump’s culture war

Author:: Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europe is in a culture war with Trump’s America. Part of this involves Trumpists propping up their ideological allies in European politics. A deeper level involves humiliating Europeans in their dealings with the US. The two intertwine to tell a single story. Trump and his acolytes can only do this because Europeans let them. At the first level Trumpists exploit polarisation in societies and the rise of Europe’s “new right”. At the second they take advantage of division and hesitation among European leaders. It doesn’t have to be this way. A decade of crises has strengthened European sentiment among the public. Almost all member states still have mainstream-led, pro-European governments. This should give the EU’s politicians the courage to act—and defend a Europe that writes its own script. That would also help preserve a strong transatlantic alliance; one in which the EU and European countries are America’s peers, not its subordinates.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Donald Trump, and Culture War
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

347. Policing Alternatives: A Public Opinion Survey

Author:: The Carter Center
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: Since 1980, incarceration in the U.S. has increased by about 400%, despite crime largely decreasing from the 1990s to the present.8 Currently, taxpayers are footing an annual bill of more than $80 billion, and yet recidivism rates in the U.S. are as high as 83%. An estimated one in six people in local jails and state and federal prisons are serving time for public order offenses, generally defined as charges that violate societal norms, such as charges relating to homelessness or disorderly conduct. Over 40% of incarcerated individuals have been diagnosed with a mental health condition — almost double that of the general population. As the human and financial costs of incarceration rise, alternative solutions are urgently needed in communities across the U.S. to address the needs of those struggling with mental health conditions, substance use concerns, and extreme poverty. For more than 10 years, activists and organizations in Atlanta have been developing ways to support and care for vulnerable members of their community. PAD was created in response to decades of heavy reliance on the criminal legal system to manage social issues such as poverty, homelessness, mental health conditions, and substance use concerns. In 2013, a group of Atlanta activists began advocating for the decriminalization of a variety of public order offenses disproportionately impacting low-income individuals and people of color. In 2015, these activists formed a broad coalition to advocate for the creation of the Atlanta Fulton Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team, which was authorized by the Atlanta City Council and Fulton County Board of Commissioners to begin planning diversion services. The resulting PAD Initiative, originally implemented in two police precincts, has since evolved into a citywide, nationally recognized model for community-based, non-police response to quality-of-life concerns.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Rule of Law, Mental Health, Peace, Police, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

348. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has upended European security and created a reality in which EU and NATO member states, on one side, and Russia, on the other, view each other as fundamental threats, even as the United States is poised to become a less reliable partner for its allies. Why does it matter? An unstable Europe has economic and security repercussions globally, not least given the nuclear capabilities of Russia, on one hand, and NATO on the other. A deeper understanding of assumptions and threat perceptions on both sides can help key players manage the risks of an increasingly militarised region. What should be done? Diplomacy and deterrence are both required. Kyiv’s backers should seek a settlement to the war that ensures Ukraine’s continued capacity to defend itself. European allies should reduce reliance on the U.S. and – together with Washington – pursue risk mitigation with Russia through limits on weapons deployments and other activities.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

349. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:: Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:: International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

350. Cambio Climático y Transición Energética: Una Transformación Geopolítica en Marcha

Author:: Xira Ruiz
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El artículo analiza la dimensión geopolítica del cambio climático y de la transición energética, en un contexto internacional marcado por la rivalidad entre grandes potencias y la fragmentación del orden global. Se exploran los efectos que estas transformaciones generan en la reconfiguración de las interdependencias materiales, el acceso a recursos críticos y la redefinición de la seguridad energética. El texto se centra especialmente en el papel de Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, así como en las implicaciones para el Sur Global. También analiza el desplazamiento del liderazgo climático desde los marcos multilaterales tradicionales hacia nuevas formas de diplomacia orientadas a la competencia por el liderazgo tecnológico y el control de cadenas de valor. El artículo concluye que la transición energética implica una reorganización estratégica de las relaciones internacionales, que genera nuevas formas de dependencia, redefine las prioridades de seguridad y plantea desafíos para la equidad global y la gobernanza compartida.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Global South

351. Delivering on Draghi after Munich: A quantum perspective

Author:: Ulrich Mans
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In light of shifting transatlantic relations, Europe must assert greater technological sovereignty, with quantum technology emerging as a key strategic domain. The EU already has a strong foundation in quantum, but risks falling behind due to fragmented policies, low private investment, and supply chain dependencies. While recent public investments and initiatives like the Quantum Flagship and Quantum Pact are promising, Europe needs a bold commercialisation strategy and coherent regulatory framework. To secure leadership, the EU must accelerate industry adoption, align member state efforts, and foster global partnerships, including with the US, UK, and Switzerland. Quantum presents a defining test for Europe’s innovation agenda – and a critical opportunity to deliver on the Draghi Report’s call for strategic autonomy.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

352. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

353. Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac: How U.S. Defense Spending Prioritizes Innovation over Deterrence

Author:: Carlton Haelig and Philip Sheers
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: or more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac that has allowed China to steadily shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in its favor. Recent U.S. defense budgets have disproportionately invested in long-term developmental programs at the expense of producing sufficient capabilities available for the near term. As a result, today’s Joint Force is smaller, older, and less capable than at any other time in recent history. Over the past 15 years, the average time and cost the Pentagon has taken to field major weapon systems has grown significantly, and the share of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) spending within the broader defense budget has continued to steadily grow. Despite extended periods of very expensive research and development, major weapon systems have frequently failed to enter production on time or in numbers large enough to make a difference for U.S. warfighters. RDTE cost growth has also affected mature programs, where unexpected modernization challenges have interfered with plans to expand production of available capabilities. Bolstering deterrence involves a challenging balance of time horizons: The Department of Defense (DoD) must expand procurement of today’s capabilities to support near-term deterrence but cannot risk sacrificing next-generation modernization programs that sustain America’s long-term military advantage in doing so. As China’s accelerated conventional military buildup places significant pressure on today’s Joint Force, the urgency to close near-term capability gaps has become critical. Reductions in the Joint Force’s overall size and relative conventional capability have opened a dangerous window of opportunity for China. This report finds that the fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request and one-time reconciliation funding from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (BBB) ultimately fail to make the needed investments to strengthen deterrence in both the near and long term. Instead, the current administration appears to be falling into the same mistake as many previous administrations by prioritizing costly development of next-generation systems at the expense of purchasing and fielding capabilities that are available to fill deterrence gaps today. Moreover, by pursuing modernization through reconciliation, the FY 2026 budget risks subjecting future modernization priorities to the political outcomes of nondefense debates. Absent a return to standard defense budgeting processes, modernization programs that received a down payment from the BBB will likely stall or fail entirely. There are some opportunities in future defense budgets to produce greater numbers of existing high-end capabilities that can meaningfully contribute to deterrence in the near term while pursuing critical long-term modernization investments. This report’s analysis highlights five major capability areas where existing or near-ready capabilities, such as ground-based fires or combat aircraft, can be procured in meaningful quantities and contribute to important missions in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, this analysis highlights important areas, such as hypersonic weapons, in which extensive developmental timelines and exorbitant procurement costs likely preclude near-term contributions to deterrence and in the long term will only be fielded in small quantities. Expanding the U.S. military’s capacity and capability in the near term will likely require both larger budgets and the rapid development and production of complementary, less expensive capabilities. The United States faces a generational inflection point in how it approaches its defense investments. Rather than continue the disproportionate focus on next-generation technologies, the White House, Congress, and the DoD must budget a sustained pivot to purchasing existing capabilities that close near-term deterrence gaps. While this pivot must be balanced with continued investments in long-term modernization, the United States can no longer afford to sacrifice near-term procurement imperatives. Breaking out of the developmental cul-de-sac will require future defense budgets to emphasize procurement and accelerated RDTE across major defense programs.
Topic:: Budget, Innovation, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

354. Prepared, Not Paralyzed Managing AI Risks to Drive American Leadership

Author:: Janet Egan, Spencer Michaels, and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Trump administration has embraced a pro-innovation approach to artificial intelligence (AI) policy. Its AI Action Plan, released July 2025, underscores the private sector’s central role in advancing AI breakthroughs and positioning the United States as the world’s leading AI power.1 At the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance cautioned that an overly restrictive approach to AI development “would mean paralyzing one of the most promising technologies we have seen in generations.”2 Yet this emphasis on innovation does not diminish the government’s critical role in ensuring national security. On the contrary, AI advances will yield significant threats alongside unprecedented potential in this domain. Experts warn of advanced AI introducing more autonomous cyber weapons, bestowing a broader pool of actors with the know-how to develop biological weapons, and potentially malfunctioning in ways that cause massive damage.3 Private and public sector leaders alike have echoed these concerns.4 The urgent task for policymakers is to ensure that the federal government can anticipate and manage the national security implications of AI with advanced capabilities—without resorting to blunt, ill-targeted, or burdensome regulation that would undermine America’s innovative edge. In other words, the government must prepare at once for potential risks from rapidly advancing AI without imposing onerous regulations that unduly stifle the technology’s vast potential for good. The status quo is insufficient: Technical expertise in advanced AI remains concentrated in a handful of companies, and the government is playing catch-up. Existing voluntary information-sharing commitments between AI labs and the federal government already face hurdles and likely will prove insufficient over time as the costs of providing transparency increase. Meanwhile, the private sector lacks both the national security expertise and the commercial incentives to manage these risks to the national interest. The United States cannot afford policies built solely on speculative fears. Yet in the face of real and rapid progress in national security–relevant capabilities, neither can it risk allowing an AI-driven disaster or a regulatory vacuum to derail technological progress. While much of the policy debate rightly focuses on innovation and accelerating adoption, this report concentrates on a less developed but equally vital counterpart: managing the risks that could undermine those ambitions without stifling AI’s innovative potential. Effective risk management is not a brake on progress but a prerequisite for it, playing an essential role in sustaining public trust, preventing setbacks, shaping global standards, and ensuring that American leadership in AI endures over the long term.
Topic:: Regulation, Leadership, Risk, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

355. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age

Author:: Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: fter decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires. It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces. As this report’s analysis of U.S. defense spending reveals, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in both legacy and emerging counter–uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities for nearly a decade. However, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. Despite the Pentagon’s shortfalls in procuring purpose-built C-UAS capabilities, U.S. counter-drone operations in the Middle East have been notable. The United States views China as its foremost strategic threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its drone capabilities by developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale. Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan. This is a complex challenge with no silver bullet solution. The DoD must act swiftly. The stakes are not theoretical—without adequate defenses, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks. Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense Prioritize counter-drone defense and extend capabilities beyond the air defense community. Drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units. Every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Expand counter-drone training across the Joint Force. The Pentagon needs to develop and share best tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensure that all forces are trained in drone self-protection. Improve the rigor and realism of counter-drone prototype testing. The current test and evaluation process fosters a false sense of confidence in prototype counter-UAS, as they are often assessed using unrealistic facsimiles of enemy drones and low-fidelity tests of electromagnetic weapons.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

356. Atomic Advantage: Accelerating U.S. Quantum Sensing for Next-Generation Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Author:: Costanza M. Vidal Bustamante
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: O One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation, trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world’s PNT, but the system’s inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding $1 billion a day.1 In the face of rising threats to traditional PNT, quantum sensors offer a compelling alternative. Leveraging the immutable properties of atoms, these devices offer unmatched measurement precision, long-term accuracy, and reliable operation in contested environments—capabilities that can back up and even outperform current GPS-based services. Quantum sensors could enable resilient U.S. PNT within a few years—from the navigation of submarines, drones, and munitions to the synchronization of telecommunications networks, power grids, and financial systems—but only if America continues to develop and deploy the technology. While atomic clocks—the most mature quantum technology today—already power GPS, emerging quantum sensing capabilities are beginning to show their promise as local sources of high-precision, resilient PNT. Next-generation atomic clocks can sustain timing accuracy over longer durations. Quantum accelerometers and gyroscopes can measure a moving platform’s velocity and rotation with greater precision. Quantum gravimeters and magnetometers can reference the Earth’s unique gravitational and magnetic fields for stealthy positioning. All of these technologies offer enhanced performance without relying on vulnerable radiofrequency signals. Although early quantum sensors are beginning the move from lab to field, many prototypes remain too fragile and bulky for widespread deployment. To deliver real operational value, these devices must be hardened so their delicate quantum states can survive harsh environments and continuous use on dynamic platforms. At the same time, developers must further miniaturize and integrate the sensors’ atomic, optical, and control subsystems into compact devices.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

357. Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider

Author:: Gregory Johnsen
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On March 15, 2025, the United States launched an offensive against the Houthis in Yemen with the stated goal of restoring “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea and ending Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Fifty-two days later, on May 5, the United States ended its operations in Yemen following an agreement with the Houthis that the group would no longer target U.S. military vessels or U.S. flagged ships. This article provides an assessment of that campaign, known as Operation Rough Rider, looking at what the United States hit, who was killed, and what it cost as well as how the Houthis have rebounded and regrouped, the current situation on the ground in Yemen, and what is likely to come next.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Houthis, Shipping, Military Operations, and Operation Rough Rider
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

358. The Escalation of U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia and the Role of Perceived Threats to the U.S. Homeland

Author:: David Sterman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In 2025, the United States substantially increased the pace of its airstrikes in Somalia. At the same time, it increasingly cited not just regional security rationales for the increased pace of strikes but also rationales rooted in an assessed potential threat to the U.S. homeland from Somalia—in particular from the Islamic State-Somalia’s recruitment of foreign fighters. This article examines the increased pace of strikes, the rationales that have been cited to explain the increase, and what existing evidence reveals about the potential threat to the U.S. homeland. It also underscores the need for greater clarity from the U.S. government regarding its assessment of the extent of such a threat.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, Airstrikes, and Military Operations
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and United States of America

359. Feature Commentary: Confronting Cartels: Military Considerations South of the Border

Author:: Brian Michael Jenkins
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Possible U.S. military action against Mexico’s drug cartels poses unique challenges. The situation is complicated, and the United States must be prepared for possible counteractions. The cartels are not a single actor. If attacked, they may avoid direct confrontation, accepting temporary losses, anticipating that the United States will not sustain a long campaign. Or Mexico’s cartels may respond violently, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in Mexico—and possibly north of the border. The government of Mexico is a separate actor. It can assist or undermine U.S. efforts. Past government campaigns against the cartels led to soaring rates of criminal violence. Chaos in Mexico could have serious implications for U.S. homeland security. The United States needs a ‘Red Team’ to examine a range of scenarios. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I contrasts recent U.S. military actions in Yemen and Iran with possible military action in Mexico. Part II examines perceptions of the threat. Part III examines how the history of U.S.-Mexico relations will shape the battlefield. Part IV reviews our own experience in combating foreign drug traffickers, offering some preliminary takeaways. Part V examines possible options. Part VI looks at how the cartels might react, how the United States might be forced to respond—and how other adversaries of the United States might attempt to exploit the situation.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Borders, Organized Crime, Cartels, and Military Operations
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

360. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

361. The Changing Character of Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism

Author:: Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, Brian Dodwell, and Ned Curry
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The competition between terror movements and counterterrorism forces is an interactive and iterative game, as the actions taken by one side are designed to defeat, circumvent, or shape the activity taken by the opposing players. To better understand these interactive dynamics, it is important to evaluate how terrorism and counterterrorism have been evolving. This article first takes high-level stock of how the spread, structure, scale, and speed of terrorism have been changing in recent years and highlights key challenges and implications for counterterrorism. It then evaluates the United States’ ongoing effort to find a sustainable counterterrorism path, a journey that has been filled with challenges, benefits, dilemmas, and opportunities, and discusses how key factors have been shaping the direction, reach, and pace of change. An important takeaway from these reviews is that while the threat of international terrorism is not what it used to be, there is a lot of change occurring across the terrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism has also been undergoing some important shifts, and there are open questions about whether U.S. CT forces and assets will be spread further. If not managed carefully, change taking place across these two ‘systems’ could interact in ways that may disrupt CT progress.
Topic:: National Security, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

362. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Peace or Pause?

Author:: Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: At the White House in Washington, on August 8th, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace deal and signed an agreement on the establishment of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP): a transport link connecting Azerbaijan-proper with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, which had been a contentious issue in the peace negotiations. While the imagery and potential positive consequences of this should not be underestimated, much is still unclear about what the agreements actually mean, including certain formulations and their interpretation as well as the question of how long the US commitment to the region will last. At the same time, the Washington summit represents an opening and a positive momentum for further development of not only the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, but larger connectivity in South-Caucasus, and several capitals will have been watching the proceedings keenly. This paper first briefly discusses the agreements reached and some of the remaining questions surrounding them, and then analyses the attitudes and/or reactions of the US, Russia, Iran, Türkiye and the EU, which in some cases, will be crucial to the success or failure of the initiative.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Eurasia, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

363. The Biden Administration’s New Industrial Policy: Domestic and International Implications

Author:: Barbara Regulska-Ingielewicz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to analyze new industrial policy based on the example of actions taken by the Joe Biden administration. Their essence is transforming the economy in line with climate goals while stimulating development. The paper will present the main assumptions of the United States’ green industrial policy, its goals, and international implications, which indicate that it is characterized by economic nationalism. The article attempts to answer three main research questions: What is the essence of the new industrial policy? What are the goals of the new industrial policy initiated by the Joe Biden administration? What are the expected international implications of this policy? Answers to the above questions will enable verification of the hypothesis, which states that the Joe Biden administration has initiated a new industrial policy in the spirit of state interventionism based on new environmental protection assumptions. Its goal is to give the U.S. economy new pro-development impulses and increase its competitiveness. The first part of the paper will present assumptions of the new industrial policy, then the goals and measures of the new United States industrial policy, and the third part will show the international implications of the above policy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Economic Growth, Joe Biden, Green Transition, Green Economy, and Economic Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

364. Could the War Have Been Prevented? US Lessons from Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:: Andrzej Demczuk
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The main goal of this article is to analyze American leadership in the context of Russia’s War in Ukraine. Examining the role of the US is important because the results of the study might identify some US strategic and policy weaknesses, which, if applied, might prevent other wars from happening. The main research question has been formulated: Could the Russian War in Ukraine have been prevented? The author’s work is based mainly on the analysis of the interviews with policymakers from the first circle of people in power, mostly the presidents’ advisers who have been particularly involved in implementing American foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine since the end of the Cold War, as well as Ukrainian officials and those participating in the US-led coalition. US lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine are of particular significance today, when the world faces a possible confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region between China and Taiwan, as well as the spread of the Middle East turmoil.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Security, Leadership, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

365. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety

Author:: Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

366. Global Spillovers of US Monetary Policy: New Insights from the Remittance Channel

Author:: Pablo Aguilar-Perez
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper examines the global spillovers of US monetary policy through the remittance channel, in both sending and recipient countries. Using a dataset covering 8 remittance-sending and 41 recipient countries from January 1997 to December 2017, we apply a local projections framework to trace the dynamic effects of unexpected US monetary tightening. We find that remittance outflows decline in advanced economies following policy shocks, illustrating the pro-cyclicality of remittances in source countries and their role in amplifying global financial spillovers. Among recipient countries, our results show that in countries with low to moderate remittance dependence, inflows tend to increase following a contractionary shock – consistent with altruistic or insurance-driven motives. In contrast, remittances decline in highly dependent countries, aligning with self-interest or investment-driven behavior. We find that these heterogeneous responses are shaped by migrant profiles: countries with high remittance dependence typically have a larger share of low-skilled migrants and display more strongly pro-cyclical remittance patterns. In contrast, less dependent countries tend to have more skilled or diversified diasporas, resulting in more stable and less cyclical remittance flows.
Topic:: Emerging Markets, Monetary Policy, Economy, and Remittances
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

367. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations

Author:: Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
Topic:: Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

368. The US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal

Author:: Penny Naas, Georgina Wright, Eamon Drumm, and Antonia Wunnerlich
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Eighty years to the day after Germany’s surrender in World War II, two of the victorious allies in that conflict unveiled a new economic partnership, the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD). It is the first bilateral agreement of its kind concluded by the Trump administration since its new tariff policy was introduced in early April. Leaders have described the EPD as a “trade deal”, but it functions more as a framework for future action. It includes tariff concessions on selected goods, grants greater access to the British market for certain American agricultural products, and outlines areas for future negotiation, including in digital regulation, export controls, and, potentially, investment screening. A separate technology-focused agreement is also planned for both countries to find ways to collaborate on biotech, life sciences, quantum computing, nuclear fusion, aerospace, and space technologies. In substance, the EPD freezes tariffs at 10% for most goods while buying time for technical-level discussions and laying the groundwork for deeper alignment. For the United Kingdom, 30% of whose exports go to its largest export market, the United States, the deal is an important diplomatic win. It is for the United States, too, whose ninth-largest trading partner is the United Kingdom. In 2024, the United States imported $68.1 billion in goods from Britain and exported $79.9 billion to the country. For countries eyeing negotiations with Washington, the EPD underscores that US trade talks are increasingly shaped by national and economic security considerations, not just trade balances. The agreement links future tariff relief to shared approaches on US strategic issues such as digital policy and alignment on export controls, including to China. As Peter Mandelson, British ambassador in Washington, put it, the EPD is the "end of the beginning". Much will now depend on the outcomes of technical-level discussions, which could have direct repercussions on London’s reset talks with the EU.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and United States of America

369. Europe Between the United States and China

Author:: Gesine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

370. Unsolicited Thoughts on How the New Administration Can Improve American Diplomacy

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: A country’s political leadership establishes its foreign policy goals, and its diplomatic service works to achieve them. Ideally, a country’s fundamental foreign policy goals should be so clear and compelling that they transcend specific administrations and provide enduring guidelines for carrying out the work of diplomacy. Previous post-Cold War administrations have made half-hearted, but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to do this. The new administration may want to consider these three strategic objectives: 1) create a more stable international system; 2) avoid an alliance between China and Russia; 3) decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war. These objectives are clear, compelling, and enduring. The benefits of any system adhere disproportionately to those at the top of the system. Since we are at the top of the current international system, no one has a greater interest in its stability than we do. An alliance between the other nuclear superpower and the other economic superpower would represent a clear and present danger to our preeminence. And in all likelihood, we’d all be dead after a major nuclear war. A diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives should include: 1) prioritizing US interests; 2) talking less and listening more; and 3) leading by example.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and International System
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

371. Biden’s Troubled Foreign Policy Legacy

Author:: P. Michael McKinley
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: In the waning days of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security adviser Jake Sullivan highlighted the foreign policy achievements of the previous four years including marshaling support for Ukraine, preventing a wider war in the Middle East, and galvanizing Indo-Pacific ties. The outgoing president himself gave a spirited defense of his accomplishments just days before he left office. As a reelected President Trump takes over, however, it seems fair to ask just how sustainable the efforts to “reenergize alliances and partnerships” and America’s global leadership actually were. And in at least one crucial respect, the Biden administration’s “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class” turned out to be more continuity than a break with President Trump’s “America First:” a protectionist national economic security doctrine now appears to be a centerpiece of American foreign policy. The swan song of a certain kind of American internationalism seems at hand, as the incoming administration signals policies which, reflecting the national mood, will prioritize a more unilateralist approach to the outside world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, International Order, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Ukraine, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

372. How to Fix the Peace Corps

Author:: Thomas Brodey
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: With its small budget and secluded work, the United States Peace Corps is one of the least conspicuous arms of US foreign policy. Yet the agency, originally founded in 1961 as a way for Americans to work on community development abroad, still exerts a major influence. In many developing countries, such as Madagascar, where I served, volunteers are most people’s only exposure to American diplomacy. And for those volunteers who complete service, the Peace Corps is a proven path into the Foreign Service and foreign policy establishment. Despite its apparent stability, however, the Peace Corps is currently facing two of its largest challenges in decades, one acute and one long-term.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, and Peace Corps
Political Geography:: North America, Madagascar, and United States of America

373. Bohlen’s Dictum: First, Be There

Author:: Thomas E. McNamara
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: On my first foreign service posting in Paris, my boss, Ambassador Charles Bohlen, said that the diplomatic service required many skills, but the most important one was “being there when something happens.” Later, working on Vietnam in the embassy’s political section, I learned that Bohlen’s Dictum was true.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, and Memoir
Political Geography:: France, Vietnam, and United States of America

374. Aftershocks from Gaza: From Local to Global Consequences (Part 1)

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The grotesque attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza have upended long-standing assumptions about regional order. The Middle East’s previous reliance on a US-led security framework has given way to a fragmented, multi-aligned landscape in which middle powers pursue their interests, while the Palestinian issue—long marginalized—has returned to the center of regional and global diplomacy. Israel has secured tactical military gains but at the cost of increasing diplomatic isolation, while conditions in Gaza have fueled global demands for a sustainable political solution. Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria face profound setbacks, while Turkey and the Arab Gulf states seek to expand influence without the means to dominate. China and Russia remain cautious players, unwilling or unable to shape the conflict’s outcome. For the United States, the Gaza war poses a strategic dilemma. Despite efforts to broker ceasefires and secure hostages, Washington has been unable—or unwilling—to exert decisive leverage on Israel. The Biden and Trump administrations alike have struggled to articulate a coherent, sustainable strategy that balances US interests in security, energy, stability, and credibility. The ISD Gaza Report is organized in two parts: Part I: A ground assessment of the regional shifts since October 7, with particular focus on Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the reemergence of Palestine as the central unresolved question in Middle East politics, and the role of regional states. Part II: A deeper analysis of Iran’s position and prospects, scenarios for regional order, and US policy options, culminating in concrete recommendations for advancing stability while protecting US strategic interests. Participants underscored that any durable path forward begins and ends with Palestine and the Palestinians. US policymakers must adapt to a regional order defined not by hegemonic control but by contested pluralism and assertive middle powers. Strategic clarity, consistent diplomacy, and credible leverage are essential if Washington hopes to pursue its interests amid the aftershocks from Gaza—and not merely react to them.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Palestinians, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

375. Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face a two-pronged crisis. Increases in global temperatures call for the rapid expansion of critical mineral infrastructure—to include mines and refinement—if we hope to deploy the technology needed to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the United States’ primary geopolitical adversary has obtained a near-monopoly position in the supply of most of these minerals. Heavy use of certain minerals in our defense-industrial base further underscores the need to reduce reliance on People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies. Both our climate and our national security demand concerted efforts to wean us away from fossil fuels and the PRC’s market power. In the spring of 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a New Global Commons working group over two meetings titled “Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals.” Working group participants represented academia, think tanks, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, bringing a broad range of experience and global perspectives to the discussions. Participants discussed definitions of critical minerals and the need for a successful green energy transition to support digital technology and fulfill 21st-century defense needs. Participants weighed the complexity of overlapping issues and how the United States and its partners might best effectively coordinate and balance these issues.
Topic:: National Security, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Mining, Energy, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

376. What You Can Learn Standing on a Street Corner

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: I arrived in Moscow in late August 1988 to begin a three-year assignment heading the US embassy’s political section. I had learned during my pre-departure consultations in Washington that there were still diametrically opposing views among policy-makers and within the intelligence community about whether the reform program that Mikhail Gorbachev had begun was meaningful. The negative view held that the reforms were intended merely to make the Soviet system operate more efficiently and that, if successful, the US would be faced with an equally hostile, but even more dangerous adversary. One of my key objectives was for the embassy’s political reporting to have meaningful impact on this debate.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Reform, Memoir, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

377. “European Army”: A Thought Experiment

Author:: Lutz Unterseher
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: In nine concise pages, German military analyst Lutz Unterseher provides the strategic orientation, operational modalities, force allocations, institutional framework, overall personnel requirements for active duty and reserves, command organization, and armament composition of an integrated European Union armed force. He then provides a budget for the component parts. The total annual cost is €170 billion, 1% of EU nations’ GDP. Unterseher concludes: It is hardly accidental that the European Union was chosen as the political framework for this force model. Above all, that is because, given Trump-era U.S. policy, NATO in its Atlantic-partnership sense no longer exists. Whether a self-confident “Euro-NATO” can emerge under American pressure and attempts to sow division remains highly questionable. It does, however, seem wise to “carry over” NATO’s infrastructure and communication networks into the authentically European armed forces wherever possible.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

378. Iran: A Report on the DACOR Bacon Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference

Author:: Keith McCormick
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The DACOR Bacon House Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference, held on September 12, focused on Iran. The conference brought together academics, former diplomats, and policy activists to analyze the new situation facing Iran in the Middle East after a string of military setbacks, and the prospects for diplomacy with the United States. A list of participants is appended to this article.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, Environment, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

379. History Matters

Author:: Robert Hunter
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: History matters. So does ignoring it. These truisms play a major role in the mess that US foreign policy is in now. Americans’ playing down of history and related critical analysis began late in the Cold War. Indeed, by then, basic strategic thinking that was needed to manage the balance of terror with the Soviet Union had long since been done.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

380. Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World

Author:: Dennis Ross
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In a world that is multipolar and America has less relative power, the United States no longer has the luxury to practice statecraft badly. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the "forever wars." But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft--diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education--to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, a significant update of the first edition, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft--German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8 - and bad cases of statecraft - going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, and Statecraft
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

381. Building on Momentum in U.S.-Turkey Relations

Author:: Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The two leaders can use their personal rapport to solve bilateral and regional problems, but they will also face tough challenges in matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dealings with China. In the second in a series of TRANSITION 2025 memos, Soner Cagaptay explores areas for U.S. partnership with Turkey in the Middle East and beyond. After a decade of malaise, relations between the two countries have lately recovered thanks to Turkish support for Sweden’s accession to NATO, granted in return for permission to buy U.S. F-16 fighter jets. The personal magnetism between President Trump and his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could smooth the way for further cooperation in military and economic areas, and also potentially help the new U.S. administration in Ukraine and Syria. But complex challenges remain, relating not only to the Syrian conflict—where Ankara and Washington backed different actors—but also to dealings with China and affinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. MIDDLE EAST POLICY TRANSITION 2025 by Washington Institute experts address challenges and opportunities for the Trump-Vance administration during a period of extraordinary change in the Middle East. A primary challenge will be countering Iran’s march toward the bomb. Also critical will be determining a sustainable U.S. force posture in the region and updating America’s counterterrorism mission. Opportunities, meanwhile, are suddenly ample after blows to the “axis of resistance” and include the imperative to forge a better relationship with Turkey, which is set to be an influential player in post-Assad Syria.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

382. Inside the Latest PKK Talks (Part 2): Implications for Turkish and U.S. Policy

Author:: Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: If Ankara seals the deal and preempts potential spoilers, the results could prove historic for Turkish politics, Erdogan’s legacy, joint counterterrorism efforts, and wider U.S. regional interests. nkara’s new dialogue with the PKK was born from nearly a decade of meticulous counterterrorism work, carried out by the country’s security forces and National Intelligence Organization and based on a political plan formulated by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who served as intelligence chief until 2023. The steps involved in this strategy have since become clear: (1) double down on pressuring and weakening the PKK via drone strikes and other effective tools, (2) bring the group back to the negotiating table from a position of weakness, and (3) negotiate the group’s breakup via Kurdish political intermediaries, as described in Part 1 of this PolicyWatch. The first phase of the plan achieved major successes against PKK militants in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, while phases two and three are seemingly being checked off as well amid reports that Abdullah Ocalan may soon ask his group to lay down their arms. To close the deal, end the PKK threat once and for all, and score a domestic political prize in the process, Fidan, Erdogan, and Turkey’s national security elites have been actively engaging Kurdish actors at home and abroad, whether to increase pressure on the group or offer incentives for disbanding.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Negotiation, Kurds, PKK, Dialogue, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

383. Navigating the Syria Sanctions Conundrum

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Washington should act quickly to facilitate transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, lest public discontent lead to widespread protests and possibly government collapse. America’s sanctions policy for Syria is broken, but the answer is not to pretend existing licenses and waivers are working or to summarily terminate all sanctions. Instead, Washington should quickly take steps to allow financial transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, and begin to assess the conditions under which sanctions could be rolled back more broadly. The Syrian people are desperate, and within weeks, they could take to the streets to protest the country’s dire conditions, possibly leading to collapse for the interim government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This would be in no one’s interest, including America’s, in large part because it could allow Iran and the Islamic State to reassert themselves in Syria and across the region. In this Policy Note, former Treasury official Matthew Levitt explains how the United States can facilitate urgently needed investment in Syria by extending sanctions waivers, opening up a banking channel, and considering steps like delisting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a foreign terrorist organization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

384. Saudi Public Opinion in a Changing Middle East: Great Powers, the Gaza War, Pathways for the Kingdom

Author:: Catherine Cleveland
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: China and Russia get higher marks than the United States, and Israel normalization is on hold—but respondents view Hamas negatively, want Arab involvement in the peace process, and increasingly support moderate interpretations of Islam. Recent polling in Saudi Arabia offers reasons for concern as well as optimism regarding U.S. interests. On the downside, Saudi respondents are more likely to prioritize good relations with China or Russia as opposed to America, despite a history of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties. Likewise, enthusiasm for Israel-Saudi normalization has fallen from already-low levels amid the Gaza war, although support is slightly higher for business links. More encouragingly, respondents express negative views about Hamas, growing support for an Arab role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and increasing sympathy for moderate interpretations of Islam, mirroring the trajectory of Riyadh’s official rhetoric. In this Policy Note, polling expert Catherine Cleveland offers thought-provoking analysis of surveys taken shortly before Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran. U.S. policymakers can chart a productive course, she explains, by first taking an honest look at Saudi public skepticism of bilateral ties and then promoting initiatives more likely to earn support.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Normalization, Hamas, Regional Politics, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Palestine, Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

385. Strategic U.S. Engagement with Algeria: A Pathway amid Shifting Global Dynamics

Author:: Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Washington should help Algiers embrace greater openness, both to promote stability in North Africa and to advance U.S. interests like counterterrorism and economic competition with China. Since gaining independence in 1962, Algeria has earned a reputation as a relatively closed country, with policies guided by self-sufficiency, noninterference, and nonalignment. Yet it has also long sought to demonstrate relevance on the world stage, such as after 9/11, when it served as a regional partner in the U.S.-led war on terror. Today, Algeria faces challenges including a migrant crisis that has strained the social fabric and the Western Sahara conflict next door—which is not on the leadership’s preferred trajectory. Washington has an interest in helping Algiers navigate these challenges and embrace greater openness, both to promote stability in North Africa and to advance U.S. interests like counterterrorism and economic competition with China. In this Policy Note, North Africa expert Sabina Henneberg focuses on trends in Algeria since the 2011 Arab uprisings as a means of understanding where the country might go from here. Effective U.S. engagement will require patience, she counsels, but could offer benefits that include expanded corporate opportunities in this large, relatively wealthy country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Economic Competition, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Algeria, North Africa, North America, and United States of America

386. Here’s How State Department Cuts Would Impede U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Author:: Ben Fishman and Elizabeth Surman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s budget cuts, intended to make America “safer, stronger, and more prosperous,” could wind up harming U.S. interests in the region while strengthening Russian and Chinese media warfare. At a time when the Middle East needs additional help managing the fallout from the war with Iran, the extreme State Department budget cuts initiated by the Trump administration are especially ill-timed. By cutting funds to partners who combat Iran’s most dangerous regional proxies, the administration risks enabling a faster rehabilitation of Tehran’s “axis of resistance.” Other cuts would limit Washington’s ability to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to Yemen, constrain efforts to reach the Iranian people, and cede ground to China and Russia in the information wars—one of the many negative repercussions of eliminating a vital network like Voice of America (VOA). The Senate has until July 18 to object to these cuts because the administration submitted its budget by means of a rescission bill, a rarely used procedure that gives Congress a limited period to respond to the administration’s proposal before it takes effect.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, State Department, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America

387. Funding in the Shadow of Conflict: AIPAC’s Financial Influence on US Congress Post-2023 Israel-Hamas War

Author:: Ömer Naim Küçük
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been a key player in mobilizing support for Israel’s foreign policy within the US Congress, especially during regional conflicts. While studies have examined the influence of the pro-Israeli lobbies’ donations on US policymakers, the strategic allocation of these funds remains less explored. This study addresses that gap by analyzing factors that influenced variations in AIPAC donations to US Congress members following the 2023 Israel-Hamas war. The findings reveal two main determinants: Congress members' sponsorship of pro-Israel bills and the electoral competition in their constituencies. Those actively supporting pro-Israel legislation receive more financial contributions, indicating a link between legislative support and financial incentives. Additionally, members facing strong electoral competition attract more donations, suggesting AIPAC’s targeted investment in politically secure candidates. This research highlights how the Israeli lobby strategically uses financial contributions to shape US foreign policy, particularly in the context of Israel's military engagements.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Lobbying, Congress, Foreign Influence, 2023 Gaza War, and AIPAC
Political Geography:: Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

388. Electoral Dynamics in post-2003 Iraq: Systemic Reforms, Security Challenges, and External Influence

Author:: Fatih Oğuzhan İpek
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s political trajectory has been shaped by systemic reforms, security challenges, and external interventions. Parliamentary elections serve as a key measure of Iraq’s democratic governance, revealing persistent issues such as electoral system debates, pre-election violence, political fragmentation, and foreign influence from actors like the US and Iran. Low voter turnout, weak election security, and recurring allegations of fraud have further eroded public trust. The protracted government formation process, driven by sectarian divisions and external meddling, has reinforced political instability. This study examines these patterns by using the process tracing method to provide a comprehensive understanding of Iraq’s electoral landscape and its broader implications for governance. The election process is divided into three timelines and analyzed before, during, and after the elections. Drawing on news and reports on Iraq as well as speeches by Iraqi figures, the study argues that seven patterns embedded in systemic reforms, security challenges, and external interventions have overwhelmed Iraq’s electoral processes and democratic governance since 2003.
Topic:: Security, Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, Parliament, and Ali al-Sistani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

389. Securing the Future: The US-Maldives Defense Partnership and Regional Stability

Author:: Matthew House
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The defense relationship between the United States and the Maldives has evolved significantly over the years, culminating in a robust partnership characterized by mutual interests and shared security concerns. This article examines the historical context of this partnership, the bolstering of relations of the current decade, and the future outlook for this critical defense relationship.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: North America, Maldives, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

390. Debating American Primacy in the Middle East

Author:: Marc Lynch, Richard K. Hermann, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Dana El Kurd, and Elham Fakhro
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: In September 2024, POMEPS and the Mershon Center for International Studies at the Ohio State University convened a workshop with regional experts and international relations theorists to debate the nature of American primacy in the Middle East. The papers in this collection range widely over theoretical approaches and empirical examples to bring out the assumptions and implications of different perspectives. The discussions were shaped by the shadow of Israel’s war on Gaza, in all of its moral and strategic dimensions, with sharp disagreements over the extent to which this represented a fundamental break with or continuity with prior trajectories. We are delighted to present POMEPS Studies 54: Debating American Primacy in the Middle East and hope that it helps to reframe and sharpen the critical ongoing debates about US foreign policy, global order, and the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, Development, Hegemony, Authoritarianism, Liberalism, Engagement, Unipolarity, Multipolarity, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

391. Regional Order Making after October 7

Author:: Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Marc Lynch, Simon Mabon, Waleed Hazbun, and Curtis R. Ryan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: In December 2024, we convened a workshop at the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute in partnership with POMEPS and SEPAD to discuss regional changes and their meaning for our book. How did the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and Israel’s rapidly expanding military actions from Lebanon to Iran change the region? Were those changes in line with the book’s theoretical predictions? And what would our book have to say to the new aspirants hoping to remake regional order?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Alliance, Violence, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and United States of America

392. Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar

Author:: Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports. Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in rare earth elements (REE) sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC. As U.S.–PRC competition intensifies, Myanmar’s fragmented sovereignty enables armed groups with ties to Beijing to shape REE supply chains, complicating potential U.S. and Indian efforts to source Burmese minerals.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Natural Resources, Strategic Competition, Militias, Supply Chains, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America

393. Defense and Security Cooperation as a Pillar of Engagement: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing Indo-Pacific

Author:: Tu Lai
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The elevation of Vietnam–US relations in September 2023 to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP), the highest tier in Vietnam’s current diplomatic hierarchy, not only reflects Hanoi’s ongoing efforts to diversify its international relations but also underscores the strategic weight assigned to its ties with Washington. The CSP would have been improbable without sustained progress in defense and security cooperation, which has served both as a catalyst for mutual trust and as a practical mechanism for advancing more substantive, effective collaboration.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Collaboration, Regional Security, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: South Asia, Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

394. How Trump’s Foreign Policy May Hurt US Interests in Southeast Asia

Author:: Aristyo Rizka Darmawan
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s neglect of Southeast Asia, coupled with controversial foreign policy decisions like his Gaza proposal and the abolishment of USAID, is eroding US credibility and trust in the region. As ASEAN states seek alternative partnerships with middle powers and China capitalises on Washington’s missteps, America risks losing its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, USAID, ASEAN, Strategic Interests, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

395. Australia Needs Strategic Reconfiguration in the Asia Pacific

Author:: Arpit Raswant and Jiye Kim
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Facing mounting pressure from US tariffs and global trade volatility, Australia must urgently realign its economic strategy. Deepening ties with key Asian partners and investing in emerging sectors like space technology could safeguard national prosperity and regional influence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Tariffs, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

396. “Do Not Come”: The US Root Causes Strategy and the Co-optation of the Right to Stay

Author:: Jesús M. de la Torre, Brenda Peralta, and Karla Rivas
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: In 2021, the United States unveiled the Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America (“Root Causes Strategy” or “the Strategy”) to improve living conditions in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as a means to prevent future migration to the US-Mexico border. Through a combination of foreign policy tools and public-private investment, the US administration focused on enhancing economic, security, and governance conditions in the region. Although the Root Causes Strategy has received scrutiny in light of broader research on policies to address the root causes of migration, more attention is needed from the perspective of communities that these strategies target. Therefore, this article assesses the Root Causes Strategy’s alignment with Northern Central American communities’ plans to ensure their right to stay and thrive. It explores three areas of inquiry: the Strategy’s provision of formal engagement and participation mechanisms for local communities; the Strategy’s alignment with local communities’ priorities to ensure their right to stay; and the Strategy’s respect for local communities’ right to migrate in relation to their right to stay according to local projects of thriving. Through critical policy analysis, relying on primary governmental sources and secondary sources on the lived experience of communities in the region, the article argues that the Root Causes Strategy co-opted communities’ right to stay for three reasons. First, Northern Central American communities’ notions of their right to stay were sidelined. Communities did not have a formal role in the design and implementation of the Strategy, which lacked transparency and accountability mechanisms. Second, the Root Causes Strategy did not align its tools with communities’ notions of thriving. Private investments lacked sufficient labor, environmental and human rights protection, and oversight mechanisms to ensure they would not result in more displacement. Funding structures and processes failed to significantly expand access by local communities in support of grass-roots community projects. The US targeted sanctions for human rights violations and corruption followed communities’ cues in some countries and occasions while neglecting them in others. Third, the United States used its root causes policy to justify a restricted notion of the right to migrate. The US administration utilized its root causes policy and the widening of some insufficient legal migration pathways to justify and advance US border externalization policies and limit access to asylum at the US-Mexico border. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the US administration, the US Congress, and civil society in Central America, Mexico, and the United States. It recommends delinking root causes of migration strategies from the goal of reducing migration to the donor country and foregrounding communities’ participation and perspectives before, during, and after the implementation of root causes policies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Investment, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:: Central America, North America, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and United States of America

397. The Gendered Impact of In-State Tuition Policies on Undocumented Immigrants’ College Enrollment, Graduation, and Employment

Author:: Susan Averett, Cynthia Bansak, Grace Condon, and Eva Dziadula
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: Assessing the impact of policies offering in-state tuition and financial aid to undocumented immigrant youth is highly pertinent from a policy perspective. Eligible immigrants arrived as children and the United States is often the only home they have ever known. Without the right to stay or a path to citizenship, they cannot achieve their full potential as productive members of society. Policies improving access to higher education have the potential to elevate their social mobility and amplify economic contributions by improving job prospects and bolstering tax revenues. Since 2001, roughly half of the U.S. states have expanded in-state college tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants. Around one-third of states have also provided financial aid; yet approximately one-tenth have imposed heightened barriers to accessing higher education. While early studies found an increase in enrollment in states with in-state tuition policies, recent studies accounting for additional state policies found no impact on enrollment. These results mask varying impacts based on gender and marital status. We assess these policies, control for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and analyze the impact of in-state tuition on college enrollment, graduation rates, employment, and self-employment. Our analysis relies on data from the 2005 to 2019 American Community Survey. To identify individuals who are the most likely to be undocumented and affected by the policy, we focus on noncitizen Hispanic youth, excluding those likely authorized (e.g., licensed professionals, veterans, and refugees). That said, we are assuming that state policies are the same for all undocumented residents, not just the Hispanics in our sample. Our findings are as follows:
Topic:: Education, Employment, Higher Education, Undocumented Population, and Gender
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

398. Migrant Deaths in California’s Borderlands, 2018–2023

Author:: Marni LaFleur, Kat On, and Daniel Martínez
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: We examine the deaths of undocumented migrants in southern California (i.e., San Diego and Imperial counties) for fiscal years (FYs) 2018–2023 using data obtained from the San Diego County Medical Examiner’s Office (SDCMEO) and Imperial County Coroner’s Office (ICCO). We recorded 314 deaths of undocumented migrants, with 157 in San Diego County (SDC) and 157 in Imperial County (IC). We describe trend fluctuations in migrant deaths and both the overall and county-specific proportions as they relate to causes of death and demographic characteristics (biological sex and age at death). Additionally, to capture the potential effects of the 2019 border wall expansion and COVID-19 pandemic on migrant deaths, we examined differences in these factors between two periods: FY 2018–2019 and FY 2020–2023. We conclude by comparing migrant deaths reported by the medicolegal authorities to estimates published by US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol for southern California. From 2018 to 2020, there were approximately 30 known migrant fatalities annually in California. This increased to about 88 deaths per year in 2021 and 2022 before dropping to 50 in 2023. Across the study period, the leading causes of death were drowning (35.4 percent), environmental exposure (23.6 percent), and blunt force trauma (16.9 percent), with the latter cause being largely associated with falls from the border wall. However, we found significant differences between SDC and IC. For instance, 51.6 percent of migrant deaths in IC were due to drowning, compared to 19.1 percent in SDC. Conversely, 21.7 percent of deaths in SDC were due to blunt force trauma, while just 12.1 percent of deaths in IC occurred in this manner. Overall, we found that 75.2 percent of decedents were male, 20.4 percent were female, and 4.5 percent were of unknown sex. Among cases in which a precise age at death was listed, the average age was 34.6 years. Nevertheless, sex and age differed by county in that SDC had a higher proportion of female decedents (28 percent in SDC vs. 12.7 percent in IC) and a higher average age at death (SDC x¯ = 36.8 vs. IC x¯ = 32.0). We also found significant differences between the two periods examined. Perhaps most striking, deaths due to blunt force trauma increased from 3.4 percent of cases in FY 2018–2019 to 19.9 percent of cases in FY 2020–2023. Decedent characteristics also appear to have changed across time. The share of male decedents decreased from 84.5 percent to 73.0 percent, while the share of females increased from 5.2 percent to 23.8 percent between the two periods, while the proportion of decedents ages 50 to 64 years increased significantly (from 4.7 percent to 12.7 percent). Finally, for FYs 2018–2022, CBP reported 25.6 percent fewer migrant deaths than medicolegal authorities in southern California. High numbers of migrant deaths in 2021 and 2022 can be attributed to circumstances during and following the COVID-19 pandemic, including a Trump Administration policy aimed at blocking access to the US asylum system. The expansion of the border wall during the Trump era may also explain increased migrant mortality in 2021 and 2022. Decreases in deaths in California in 2023 may be because of a novel entry location in the San Judas Break or result from a shift in migration trends toward other border states (i.e., Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). County differences in drowning and blunt force trauma deaths were likely due to the presence of the All-American Canal in IC (drowning), and greater coverage of the pedestrian border wall in SDC (blunt force trauma), respectively. Although speculatory, the higher percentage of female decedents and older age of decedents in SDC may be because these vulnerable individuals perceive San Diego to be a safer route. Changes between FYs 2018–2019 and FYs 2020–2023 in blunt force trauma deaths (3.4 percent to 19.9 percent) are a result of falls from the newly expanded and constructed border wall. We suggest that after more than 30 years of implementation, the United States should eliminate the use of “deterrence” strategies to prevent further and unnecessary loss of life. Additionally, the following actions could reduce migrant mortality in California: installing buoys or other anti-drowning devices in the All-American Canal, making potentially life-saving resources (e.g., blankets and water) available on known migrant routes, and reducing the height of or removing the border barrier. We call for both CBP and medicolegal authorities to provide disaggregated data on migrant fatalities, which would facilitate an accurate accounting these deaths, increase understanding of where and why deaths occur, and therefore be used to support policy changes.
Topic:: Borders, Undocumented Population, Death, Migrants, and Forensics
Political Geography:: California, Mexico, and United States of America

399. Enforced Disappearance as a Border Management Tool: The Case of Border Patrol Detentions of Immigrant and Asylum-Seeking Families in the United States

Author:: Diego F. Leal and Natalie L. Cadwalader
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This study examines the experiences of international migrants and asylum-seeker families recently released from the custody of the United States Border Patrol (BP) to assess their ability to make phone calls while in BP detention. The focus on phone access is critical to determining whether respondents experience enforced disappearance under international law, given that BP custody is usually incommunicado. To determine whether some BP detainees experience enforced disappearance in custody, authors collected and analyzed data from 117 respondents using a novel questionnaire. Respondents were heads of families. These families consisted of at least one adult and at least one minor child who were released to a non-profit short-term shelter in the United States (U.S.). Findings show that 78 percent of the respondents who were in BP custody experienced an enforced disappearance because they were not able to make phone calls and there was no reliable publicly accessible locator system to otherwise locate them. While this study provides critical context to how one distinct group of individuals released from BP custody (i.e., families released into the U.S.) experienced enforced disappearance, we note the importance of future studies that assess the situation of additional groups, including single adults released from BP into the U.S. and groups and individuals forced back (typically) to Mexico upon release from BP custody. We discuss policy recommendations to mitigate and prevent continued enforced disappearances in BP custody and to prevent additional human rights violations that are facilitated by enforced disappearance, including the right to access counsel, the right to due process, the right to seek asylum, the right of non-refoulment, and that may constitute a grave threat to the right to life.
Topic:: Asylum, Detention, Enforced Disappearance, and Border Patrol
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

400. Virtual Briefing Series | The Future of US-Iran Relations

Author:: Zeina AlShaib, Alan Eyre, and Jason Campbell
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: This on-the-record briefing, moderated by MEI's Zeina Al-Shaib, discussed the future of US-Iran relations. The recent 12-day war saw coordinated US and Israeli airstrikes against key Iranian military officials and nuclear facilities. Washington is weighing Iran’s conditional offer to return to nuclear negotiations contingent on firm security guarantees. Tehran is assessing whether to pursue diplomacy or reinforce its deterrent capabilities after this decisive confrontation. What impact will Tehran’s and Washington’s next steps have on the region’s already fragile political balance? The briefing featured Alan Eyre, a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI. A former senior State Department diplomat, Eyre served as a core member of the US nuclear negotiating team with Iran in 2010-15. The briefing also featured Jason H. Campbell, Senior Fellow at MEI. Campbell has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Our experts discussed the lessons learned from the war between Israel and Iran; the prospect of renewed fighting; the future of Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the ripple effect of this conflict on the wider region; as well as outlines of a durable diplomatic solution.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS