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1. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

2. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

3. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:
Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security

Author:
John R. Deni, Chris Alden, Erik Brattberg, Roger Cliff, Mark Duckenfield, R. Evan Ellis, Nicholas Nelson, and Laura Speranza
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Given the depth and breadth of the pandemic-induced recession in Europe, private companies in need of capital and governments looking to shed state-owned enterprises may be tempted to sell shares, assets, or outright ownership to investors with liquidity to spare. Of greatest concern is the role that China might play in Europe, building Beijing’s soft power, weakening allied geopolitical solidarity, and potentially reprising the role it played in the 2010s, when its investments in Europe expanded dramatically. More specifically, there is concern over China’s investments in infrastructure and sensitive technologies relevant to American and allied military operations and capabilities. Whether Europe is prepared and able to parry Beijing’s economic statecraft is somewhat unclear, given varied attitudes toward China and the patchwork of investment screening mechanisms across the continent. Regardless, the outcomes will have significant implications for US security and for the Defense Department specifically. In support of US European Command (EUCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled an interdisciplinary team to examine these issues and offer actionable policy recommendations for military leaders and decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Economy, Investment, Transatlantic Relations, COVID-19, State-Owned Enterprises, and Recession
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

6. Contested Deployment

Author:
Bert B. Tussing, John Eric Powell, and Benjamin C. Leitzel
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As indicated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and evolving Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, the assumption the homeland will provide a secure space for mobilization and deployment is no longer valid. This integrated research project goes beyond affirming this assumption and contributes to efforts to mitigate the concerns a contested deployment entails. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2, “Army Deployments in a Contested Homeland: A Framework for Protection,” explores how current coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the DoD and state and local government may need realignment, with civil authorities preparing themselves to support military mobilization. Chapter 3, “Strategic Seaports and National Defense in a Contested Environment,” examines the 22 strategic seaports across the United States, identifying issues with throughput, structural integrity, security, readiness, funding, and authorities. Chapter 4, “Single Point of Failure,” identifies how strict adherence to a business efficiency model for munition production and distribution may jeopardize the successful employment of military forces. Chapter 5, “The Interstate Highway System: Reinvestment Needed before a Contested Deployment,” provides the status of the deteriorating road network and explains how associated vulnerabilities could be exploited by an adversary. The two appendices provide points for consideration on cyberattacks and defense and the impacts a full mobilization of reserve forces would have on the homeland.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Public Policy, Army, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Framing the Future of the US Military Profession

Author:
Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Sexual Violence, Army, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. Don’t Fear Vacuums: It’s Safe To Go Home

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran,” President Biden said this July in defense of his administration’s continued commitment to the Middle East.1 His comments reflect a widely held misconception: that a U.S. military exit from the Middle East would empower U.S. adversaries, and thus somehow make Americans less secure.2 U.S. leaders and pundits have expressed similar fears about the danger of creating vacuums by leaving Syria, Afghanistan (before U.S. exit of course), and even Africa, where only smatterings of U.S. troops are stationed.3 Vacuum fears also fuel more general warnings against surrendering influence in the developing world. Chinese investments via its Belt and Road Initiative—a massive set of infrastructure-development loans—for example, are said to exploit a vacuum the United States should compete to fill. Chinese trade in South America, or Russian port calls there, are said to reflect a failure to exert U.S. influence.4 The burgeoning idea behind these claims is that “great power competition,” which once seemed a useful rationale for exiting conflicts and lingering endeavors of the global war on terror, demands winning an open-ended, ill-defined contest for influence with Russia and China in the greater Middle East and developing world, or what is now sometimes called the global south.5 Vacuums that could be said to follow a U.S. exit—not the terrorists or insurgents U.S. forces were deployed to fight—are the new justification for staying.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

10. The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

Author:
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, and Marc Sanborn
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Joint Operations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America