Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: within 3 Years

201. Trump’s Return: What It Could Mean for Palestine and the Region

Author:: Ramzy Baroud
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s return to the White House in the context of the Gaza war and other regional conflicts raises questions regarding his approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

202. Trump 2.0: Where Rhetoric Meets Reality

Author:: Diana Bartelli Carlin
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The new president has made big promises, but can he keep them?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

203. Round Two: Trump’s Foreign Policy Takes on New Challenges

Author:: William B. Quandt
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trump will have to manage the continuing conflict in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the rising power of China as he navigates the beginning of his second term
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Middle East, and United States of America

204. American Netizens Worry For the Future of TikTok

Author:: Sydney Wise
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The temporary banning of TikTok in the United States in January prompted concern over the politicization of tech platforms. The two likeliest paths forward for TikTok represent alternate visions of the relationship between Big Tech and government
Topic:: Science and Technology, Social Media, TikTok, and Politicization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

205. Longer Sticks and Shorter Carrots: How the U.S. is Changing its Engagement in MENA

Author:: Amr Adly
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The United States’ approach to achieving international hegemony is shifting away from trade and investments back toward bombs and missiles
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Investment, Trade, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, and United States of America

206. The View from Africa Before and After the U.S. Elections—Q&A with Mark Deets

Author:: Omar Auf and Mark Deets
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trump’s re-election brought massive changes to many aspects of the United States and the world. What led to Trump regaining the presidency? What will the reverberations look like in West Africa? Omar Auf sat with historian Mark Deets to find out
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Interview, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, and United States of America

207. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths

Author:: Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

208. Eight Principles for the 2025 Tax Policy Debate (that Republicans and Democrats Should Be Able to Agree On)

Author:: Kimberly A. Clausing
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which Congress passed in 2017, came with a built-in policy time bomb—several of the more popular provisions are set to expire on the last day of 2025. These tax cut expirations limited the cost of the law to meet the requirements of the budget reconciliation process and thereby avoid being blocked by a Senate filibuster. The bill's architects deliberately made the less popular provisions (corporate tax cuts) permanent, but they wagered that the more popular individual tax cuts could be extended when the time came. That time has arrived. Yet Congress faces daunting challenges in extending the expiring tax cuts this year, including their high costs, competing fiscal priorities, a fractious Republican caucus with narrow House and Senate majorities, and President Trump's mercurial demands. As the 2025 tax policy debate moves forward, Clausing offers eight principles that both parties should be able to agree on. Of course, actual agreement on these principles is far from likely in today's political environment. Still, she suggests "middle of the road" positions for those who would resuscitate bipartisan tax policy cooperation.
Topic:: Budget, Domestic Politics, Tax Systems, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

209. Destined for Division? US and EU Responses to the Challenge of Chinese Overcapacity

Author:: Salih Bora, Mary Lovely, and Luis Simón
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Heightened concerns about China’s exports have intensified competitive pressures on producers and compelled American and European policymakers, government officials, and political leaders to try to counteract those concerns. President Donald Trump’s decision to raise tariffs on China by 145 percent is the most recent—and arguably most dramatic—example of broader concerns about Chinese overcapacity. The clash with China is particularly evident in sectors that US and European leaders have deemed essential for growth and security, charging that Chinese industrial subsidies, rather than comparative advantage, are the basis for the country’s export success. However, the European Union and the United States have taken different approaches to resolve tensions with China. The European Union seeks, at least for now, to preserve and adhere to global trading rules. By contrast, the United States has acted unilaterally (even before the second Trump administration) to defend its domestic production by engaging in a trade confrontation with China that, together with China’s retaliation, has rattled global financial markets. This Policy Brief explores these EU-US divisions, their reflection on trade and industrial policy, and prospects for coordinated action against Chinese overcapacity. The authors argue that the European Union can take the lead toward a resolution within the rules-based system while maintaining an open door to future US participation.
Topic:: European Union, Tariffs, Exports, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

210. Alignment or Misalignment? US and EU High-Tech Trade and Sanctions Policies toward China

Author:: Antonio Calcara and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief focuses on the alignment or misalignment of the European Union and the United States on high-technology trade and sanctions vis-à-vis China. The Trump administration is likely to continue the aggressive US stance toward China in the technological realm, putting increasing pressure on its European allies to align with US policy. The Europeans, for their part, are in a difficult position: On the one hand, they are under pressure from the US government; on the other hand, the more Washington restricts Chinese trade, the more Chinese exporters will look to the European market to sell their manufactured goods. Increased competition from Chinese imports in Europe, especially in the automotive sector, could in turn trigger a political backlash that weakens support for transatlantic coordination on China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, European Union, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and European Union

211. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

212. Untethered Sentiments: How Politics, Visibility, Perception, and Demographic Differences Shape American Views on Foreign Investment and Trade

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim and Nils Wollesen Osterberg
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The key takeaways from this study are as follows: 1. Impact of Perception on Foreign Investment Attitudes: The study finds that individual perceptions of FDI at the state level play a crucial role in shaping attitudes toward investment. Individuals who perceive high Korean FDI or states where Korean FDI has more visibility tend to have more favorable views toward foreign investment compared to those in states with low FDI or visibility of such investments. This finding highlights the importance of strategic communication and visibility in shaping public perceptions of foreign investment. Simply increasing investment is not enough; companies and governments must actively promote their contributions to local economic growth and job creation to gain broader public support. 2. Variation in Support Based on Country of Origin: While most Americans view foreign investments as beneficial, attitudes differ based on the investing country’s origin. Investments from South Korea, Japan, and Germany, for instance, are viewed more favorably than investments from China and Russia. 3. Political and Ideological Divides in Trade and Tariff Attitudes: The data reveals partisan differences regarding trade and tariffs. According to our data, a substantial majority of Republicans—at the time of this survey—favor tariffs, mirroring their party leader’s policies. Meanwhile, a minority of Democrats expressed similar support for the use of tariffs. 4. Dissonance on Trade and Tariffs: Despite broad support for U.S. participation in international trade, a significant portion of respondents also favor maintaining or increasing tariffs, suggesting support for the theoretical benefits of trade and protectionism. Evidence suggests that partisan or ideological drivers may be at work. 5. Demographic Influences on Trade and Investment Opinions: Factors such as gender, age, income, and education significantly impact trade attitudes. Younger individuals, higher-income earners, and those with higher education levels are more supportive of open trade, while lower-income and older individuals are more skeptical. 6. Reciprocity as a Key Factor in Investment Policy Preferences: Many Americans favor restrictions on inbound foreign investment unless similar restrictions are removed for U.S. investments abroad, highlighting the importance of the reciprocal approach to trade and investment policies. 7. Limited Influence of Job Creation on Investment Preferences: While respondents recognize that foreign investments create jobs, this factor alone does not significantly sway opinions on investment restrictions, as other economic and political considerations often take precedence. 8. Defense Industrial Cooperation and Export Control Concerns: A majority of respondents support maintaining or increasing restrictions on defense-related industrial cooperation, emphasizing national security concerns over economic benefits from defense-related investments and trade.
Topic:: Politics, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

213. US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean

Author:: Wazim Mowla and Maite Gonzalez Latorre
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Caribbean’s geographic proximity to the United States—as well as its use as a transit point for US citizens, goods, and financial services—makes it a crucial hub for US national interests. However, the relationship has suffered from inconsistent and infrequent assistance. Changes in US policy priorities bring ever-changing adjustments to US engagement, leaving the Caribbean, its leadership, and its institutions with insufficient time to benefit from US policy action. For Caribbean countries, policy continuity is critical for implementation and to see tangible and meaningful development. The region’s small populations and markets, vulnerability to natural disasters and changing global commodity prices, and limited institutional capacity slow the pace of receiving and utilizing development assistance and support. Underpinning US-Caribbean ties with stronger US congressional engagement can provide needed longevity to the relationship. Congressional actions—like newly appropriated resources and committee hearings—can bring tangible benefits to US-Caribbean relations.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

214. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:: Greg Weaver
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

215. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

216. Trade with Colombia is big business for US exporters—amid growing Chinese influence in Latin America

Author:: Geoff Ramsey and Enrique Millán-Mejía
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Colombia and the United States have achieved a close, mutually beneficial partnership over several decades on migration, security, counternarcotics, and commerce—with the US trade surplus with Colombia totaling $1.3 billion in 2024. The Colombian market is particularly important for US agricultural producers. Thanks to the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), Colombia is the top destination for US agricultural exports in South America and the third main destination in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is still Colombia’s largest trading partner in South America—with $36.7 billion in two-way trade in 2024—but January data showed Chinese products leading over US imports for the month. The TPA promotes both reciprocal trade and US influence; interpretative improvements to previously agreed-upon matters are possible,
Topic:: Economy, Business, Tariffs, Exports, Trade, and International Markets
Political Geography:: China, Colombia, South America, Latin America, and United States of America

217. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:: Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:: Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

218. CTC Sentinel: May 2025 Issue

Author:: Daisy Muibu, Yayedior Mbengue, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, and Briar Bundy
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In the May 2025 feature article, Daisy Muibu and Yayedior Mbengue examine the evolving counterterrorism challenge in Somalia. They write that “nearly three years after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the security landscape remains precarious. Al-Shabaab has resurged, coordination between federal and Puntland forces is limited despite Islamic State-Somalia’s growing global remit, and the future of the African Union mission is uncertain. These trends are driven by political discord, a fragmented national landscape, donor fatigue, operational challenges, and al-Shabaab’s resilience.” Our interview is with Christine Abizaid, the former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center. She emphasizes that: “The CT business is still a needles-in-the-haystack business; it’s still one piece of information that can open up a whole new threat network. You have to be digging into and accessing multiple sources of information, collaborating with multiple partners who see things in different ways.” Aymenn Al-Tamimi charts the rise, fall, and dissolution of al-Qa`ida’s loyalist group in Syria Hurras al-Din. He writes that: “The primary ongoing concern from a counterterrorism perspective is that regardless of Hurras al-Din’s own weakness, individuals who were members of the group, particularly leading figures, may try to coordinate with other members of al-Qa`ida or other jihadis outside Syria for the purpose of organizing terrorist attacks abroad.” Saif Tahir and Amira Jadoon examine the geographical origins, mobility patterns, and demographic characteristics of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants through an analysis of 615 profiles from the organization’s own martyrdom commemorative publications spanning 2006-2025. Julika Enslin outlines the evolution of the Islamist terror threat landscape in Germany since 2020 by taking an in-depth look at all nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks and the 20 publicly reported thwarted attack plots during that time. A personal note: Over the last 10 years, it has been the privilege of a lifetime to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of CTC Sentinel to showcase the best and brightest scholars and practitioners in our field. It’s time for me to pass the baton. The publication will be in great hands with my brilliant colleagues Kristina Hummel and Don Rassler. I look forward to continuing my close association with the Combating Terrorism Center and CTC Sentinel. The faculty and staff at the center, past and present, are the very best of America. I greatly appreciate the trust that directors Colonel Sean Morrow, Brian Dodwell, and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bryan Price placed in me. Above all, I would like to express my thanks to our extraordinary contributors. They have greatly helped the counterterrorism enterprise. Who thinks wins.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, African Union, Salafi-Jihadism, and Hurras al-Din
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Syria, North America, Somalia, and United States of America

219. Strategies for States to Weather DisasterRelated Income Tax Extensions

Author:: Nancy Y. Augustine, Miles Murphy, Kate Kellen, and Coleman Stallworth
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:: The Academy will conduct comprehensive research and analysis to examine how disaster declarations affect tax extension periods in states and the IRS decision-making process in determining the extension duration. The objective of this engagement is to improve state and IRS coordination, communication, and decision making.
Topic:: Budget, Financial Management, Intergovernmental Models, and Government Operations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

220. Washington’s Opportunity in Central Asia (and the South Caucasus)

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: As the Trump Administration conducts a global survey of strategic opportunities for the United States, it would be well advised to view Central Asia and the South Caucasus (the core subregions of what this journal’s Editorial Statement calls the “Silk Road region” and what is commonly still called “Eurasia” in some circles) as areas where a creative, new approach would yield lasting strategic gains—both for America and those states themselves. To be sure, this region is not and will not become a major priority or a vital interest for the United States—nor is that necessary. But its importance in world politics as an area of strategic competition among many rival states, including Russia and China and several aspirant and rising middle powers, is increasing. Therefore, it should be understood to be beneficial for all the states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that Washington both enhance and sustain at a higher level its comprehensive, multi-dimensional engagement with them because only America can provide or convene many of the public goods they need.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Central Asia, South Caucasus, and United States of America

221. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

222. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

223. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

224. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

225. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

226. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

227. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:: Grace Price
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:: Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

228. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:: Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

229. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:: Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

230. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:: Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

231. Sanctuaries, Islands, and Deserts: A Typology of Regionalized Abortion Policy

Author:: Payton Gannon and Danielle Pullan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:: This paper elaborates a typology of regionalized abortion policy based on a comparative case study of Italy and the United States. Italy originally legalized abortion in 1978 and has seen little effort to modify the law since. Contrastingly, the United States’ abortion landscape has been in near constant flux since 1974, when, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion. This became even more unstable in 2022 when the Supreme Court overruled Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health and held there is no constitutional right to abortion. Despite their differences in national abortion policy, both Italy and the US have regionalized the implementation of their abortion policies. Italy’s law is national, but implementation is interpreted differently at the regional level. Since Dobbs, US states have proposed and passed many laws about abortion, creating even greater regional variation than before. We propose a typology of regionalized abortion access: “Sanctuaries” where abortion is most protected and available; “Islands” with liberal policies that are surrounded by more restrictive territories; and “Deserts” with minimal abortion access. Through qualitative analysis of policies, political activities, and firsthand accounts by abortion providers and advocates working in places of each type, we then highlight the long-term implications of each of these components of the typology, analyzing the ways that they impact abortion providers and patients.
Topic:: Human Rights, Health Care Policy, Abortion, and Regionalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America

232. The Future of the 'Special Relationship'

Author:: Kim Darroch and Evie Aspinall
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:: Since Winston Churchill first coined the term in 1946, successive American Presidents and Prime Ministers have hailed the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States. For over 80 years, the exceptionally close political, diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence relationship between the two countries has endured changes of government, the end of the Cold War, the ‘War on Terror’, and globalisation. In the week that Donald Trump returned to the White House, the former British Ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, the Director of the British Foreign Policy Group, Evie Aspinall, and Dr James Ellison explored the future of Anglo-American relations. With tariffs looming and Elon Musk waging war on the Starmer government, they asked how should Britain handle this relationship - and explored the challenges it will face over the coming years.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America

233. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

234. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

235. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:: Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

236. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:: Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

237. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:: Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

238. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Author:: Rodrigo Duton
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
Topic:: National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific and United States of America

239. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:: Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

240. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

241. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

242. Bro-Politics in Action: Trump and the “Personalization” of Foreign Policy

Author:: Ádám Csobánci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Congratulations poured in from European heads of state and government as soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was turning U.S. battleground states red and winning the presidential election last November. Many presidents and prime ministers posted selfies and pictures with Trump, emphasizing their strong personal relationship and shared history. While congratulations to the new President might seem like standard diplomatic courtesy, the enthusiasm for the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels appears less than sincere, given their rather complicated relationships with the first Trump administration. In contrast, leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who described Trump’s victory as "the biggest comeback in Western political history" and forecasted a golden era in US-Hungarian relations, expressed a strong eagerness to collaborate on shared goals. Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised the "unshakable alliance" between Italy and the U.S., demonstrating clear support for Trump’s win. Recognizing the heightened importance of personal relationships in dealing with Trump and his administration, European leaders are hoping to establish strong personal ties with the President. This trend report predicts how in 2025 further “personalization” of foreign policy is to be expected from the next U.S. administration. I present, through the examples of Orbán and Meloni, that European leaders already possessing close ties with the next U.S. president or his inner circle might have a significant head start to influence Trump’s Europe policy, with far-reaching consequences. Europeans who were not in power during Trump’s first term are pressed for time because the start of his new presidency is expected to bring rapid and aggressive policy changes. With the Republican Party controlling all branches of government, Trump’s administration will likely prioritize advancing its agenda swiftly, particularly before the midterm elections in 2026, when Congressional support could wane. For European leaders who are new to office or lacked strong ties with Trump previously, this creates urgency. They have strong incentives to build closer relations with his administration, whether due to shared ideologies or fears of trade tariffs; however, they face a glaring challenge. They will have to compete for Trump’s very limited time, attention and interest, as European affairs are unlikely to be a top priority for the new administration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Personalization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

243. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

244. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future

Author:: Yam Atir
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
Topic:: Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

245. Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The Current Landscape

Author:: Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns, and Ai Takahashi
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3 While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development. In the remainder of this brief, we summarize the hydrogen policy landscape in the United States and European Union (EU), concluding with an examination of the causes of demand-side stagnation in the clean hydrogen market.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Regulation, Public Policy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus, United States of America, and European Union

246. Trump and the future of transatlantic relations

Author:: Mikkel Runge Olesen and Jakob Linnet Schmidt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: A widespread view in Europe is that the US is becoming more a necessary partner than an ally or a friend. Lack of confidence that the US will defend Europe is as powerful a driver for increased European defence spending as pressure from the US. Due to the breach of trust, transatlantic relations are unlikely to be normalised after Trump.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

247. Tariff Tensions: Redefining Washington-New Delhi Relations

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The strategic partnership between the United States and India faces a critical juncture as recent developments strain their ties. On August 15, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for national self-reliance in trade and foreign exchange, a response to high tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump's administration on Indian imports.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Imports, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

248. Geography and Energy: The US-Central Asia Partnership in Critical Minerals

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting President Donald Trump's recognition of the national security risks posed by China's dominance over global supply chains in this sector. Following the approach of previous administrations, the current leadership has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers to diversify American access to these vital resources. The focus has now turned to the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in minerals essential for energy and defense technologies. Through two primary frameworks, the U.S. has begun exploring Central Asia's untapped critical mineral wealth: the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), alongside a series of bilateral memorandums of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambition does not necessarily align with the logistical challenges of emerging supply chains in Central Asia. In response to these complexities, analysts Haley Nelson and Natalia Stroz published a report with the Atlantic Council titled "Central Asia's geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership."
Topic:: Partnerships, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

249. Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:: Julie Baer and Nora Nemeth
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: The Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 559 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends and recruitment patterns with respect to international students for 2025/26 and (2) trends related to U.S. study abroad in 2024/25, as well as an outlook for 2025/26.
Topic:: Education, Students, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

250. Outlook 2030 Brief: Expanding International Study to the U.S.

Author:: Mirka Martel and Jonah Kokodyniak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: In 2024, over 1.1 million international students pursued their higher education in the United States. By 2030, increasing our efforts will ensure support for U.S. higher education, industries, and innovation. This is the second edition of IIE’s annual Outlook 2030 brief. The data-driven report focuses on key trends in academic mobility to the United States, comparing global findings and looking ahead at the next five years. The United States is the single largest host of international students in the world, attracting top talent from around the globe. International students pursue academic degrees in the U.S. due to the excellence of its higher education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). U.S. colleges and universities, in turn, benefit from the innovation and global perspectives that students and scholars bring to their institutions. Attracting global talent is crucial for driving the U.S. economy’s growth and maintaining the country’s leadership in research and development. The U.S. will continue to drive the development of new industries, and building a domestic and global pipeline of talent will advance this pivotal role.
Topic:: Education, Innovation, Higher Education, Industry, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

251. Food Defence: The Securitisation of the Food Supply

Author:: Elaine Leão Inácio de Melo Andrade, Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira, and Otniel Freitas-Silva
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The notion of food defence emerged in the USA following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, reflecting the idea that the food sector constitutes a critical infrastructure for national security and that the food system must be defended against intentional acts, motivated by political or ideological reasons, that could cause large-scale damage to public health or the economy. This study draws on primary documentary sources on food defence, including government guidelines, laws, norms and regulations issued mainly in the USA, as well as secondary bibliographic sources related to the topic, and draws on insights from securitisation theory in order to show that food defence discourses, norms, guidelines and practices connect to a process of social construction of threats and risks, linked to the frameworks of bioterrorism and biodefence, subjecting the food sector to a process of securitisation. Based on this analysis, we aim to contribute, firstly, by deepening the problematisation of food defence, adding to the debate a political and security dimension. Without this discussion, we argue it is not possible to understand, rigorously and accurately, food defence’s defining core and its specificities within the conceptual constellation of food protection. Secondly, by resorting to the food defence case, we hope to contribute empirically to illustrate an expanded version of securitisation, drawing attention to the importance of a more eclectic and integrated look at the discursive and non-discursive aspects and the different logics that operate in the social construction of security.
Topic:: Food Security, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, Securitization, and Protection
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

252. ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans

Author:: William Tobin
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment. A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following: Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure. The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests. To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran.
Topic:: Markets, Governance, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, Venezuela, and United States of America

253. Open-Source AI is a National Security Imperative

Author:: Mike Sexton
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: America’s footprint in artificial intelligence is prodigious, and it is hard to overstate how consequential this is for the American national interest if it further develops with the right balance between innovation and guardrails. Into this new technology are two divergent directions on the basic structure of the innovation: open-source or company controlled. ChatGPT is the latter model and was developed and licensed by OpenAI. Meta’s LLaMa is an example of open-source AI.1 In this paper, we explore the benefits and drawbacks of open-source AI and conclude that open-source can help balance the safety and security we want from AI with the innovation necessary to set the standard for the world. Both models are right for innovation, safety, and competition. The increasing sophistication of AI raises concerns about risk. One of the chief issues is open-source AI, which a user can run without the developer’s supervision. History shows us that the benefits of open-source software are real but diffuse and nebulous; meanwhile its greatest risks are tangible but mostly hypothetical. Encryption is an example of an open-source success. It is an open-source dual-use technology that vexes the US government. But accepting and adapting to it has been more farsighted than fighting it. Almost every smartphone in the world runs an American-made operating system thanks in large part to Android being open-source. We should not assume the development of open-source AI will necessarily follow the same trajectory. Open-source AI increases the likelihood that no single AI chatbot corners the consumer market and that America remains the innovation leader in AI.
Topic:: National Security, Artificial Intelligence, Science and Technology, ChatGPT, OpenAI, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

254. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:: Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

255. Hegemony and International Alignment

Author:: Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Jiaxian Zhou Wu
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, such as the U.S., foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. This data has shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-20th century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Multipolarity, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

256. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:: Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

257. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:: Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, and United States of America

258. Global development in crisis: Responding to America’s retreat

Author:: Sarah S. Stroup
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: A definitive shift in both resources and rhetoric has upended the global development sector. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the policies of the new US administration, although many European states had already started reducing foreign aid budgets earlier. Beyond its vicious rhetoric and wrecking-ball approach, the Trump administration’s arguments echo three long-standing critiques that development professionals have made themselves. Development experts in the US and Europe argue that development goals have become too broad, aid has failed to reach local actors, and the sector is too technocratic and removed from the concerns of Northern publics. A renewed focus on poverty reduction, combined with power-sharing abroad and public engagement at home, may provide answers to these critiques. Achieving development outcomes may require focusing less on providing direct assistance and more on reducing the harms created by Western states in other arenas, including trade and finance.
Topic:: Development, Foreign Aid, and Budget
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

259. Jordan and the October 7th War: Between National Interests and Palestinian Solidarity

Author:: Ronen Yitzhak
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Ronen Yitzhak examines the effects of the October 7 war on the politics and stability of Jordan.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and United States of America

260. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

261. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:: Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:: Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

262. Achieving burden-sharing: Retrenchment vs. conditionality

Author:: Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Observers and practitioners are frequently frustrated at the level of defense burden-sharing in U.S. alliances—alliance members’ contributions to collective defense objectives—and particularly at allies’ low level of investment in their own defense. This paper compares two approaches to soliciting burden-sharing in U.S. alliances: retrenchment and conditionality. Retrenchment refers to reductions in the amount or timing of wartime assistance the United States will provide to allies, including troop withdrawals. Conditionality, in turn, relies on threats to abandon allies unless they increase their defense efforts and does not necessarily entail reducing protection. Retrenchment may offer the greatest chance of success, particularly in cases where allies doubt the credibility of the United States’ threats to abandon them. Conditionality is likely to be nearly as effective as retrenchment in many other cases, particularly those in which allies take the U.S. threat of abandonment seriously and there is a compelling external threat. Retrenchment and conditionality can be complementary strategies. Retrenchment is effective in cases where conditionality is likely to fail, while conditionality is effective in cases where the United States might be unwilling to retrench due to fears that a revisionist power might seek regional hegemony. Burden-sharing is not without its downsides, including allies potentially desiring nuclear weapons. These risks might be greater if the United States retrenches but may not materialize in practice and are not necessarily insurmountable.
Topic:: NATO, Alliance, Defense Spending, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

263. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

264. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

265. The New Geopolitics and South Asia’s Trade Architecture – What Next?

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja, Amit Bhandari, and Aliasger Bootwalla
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia and United States of America

266. Hague Summit Series: Recalibrating Relations with Russia

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1] In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

267. Hague Summit Series: NATO-Ukraine

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia's war in Ukraine shows few signs of ending. Across Europe, there is a widely held view that the outcome of the war will be critically important to determining the continent's future security: Ukraine must prevail. This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the second Trump administration which, after a brief attempt to negotiate a (unjust) solution, seems unable to deliver on the president's campaign promise to bring peace, in particular if this involves being tough on Russia. Differences between the US and most European Allies regarding both the conditions for ending the war and Ukraine's longer-term integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures present one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. More immediately, uncertainty about how to handle these differences presents the greatest risk that NATO's forthcoming summit in The Hague will not be seen as a success.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Peace, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

268. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:: Felix Gasper
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

269. Hague Summit Series: Trump and the Rebalancing of NATO

Author:: Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

270. Small Drones, Big Problems: Managing the Unmanned Threat to the Homeland

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Drones are everywhere. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the suburbs of New Jersey, it has become increasingly common to find small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in the sky. In the United States, there are now over one million lawfully registered sUAS platforms. The proliferation of sUAS in the civilian population has created a flood of reporting to law enforcement agencies across a variety of scenarios. Quite often, a civilian hobbyist simply flies their sUAS “too close to the sun” and encroaches upon restricted airspace around either civilian or military critical infrastructure. However, there have also been cases of foreign actors operating sUAS in an attempt to reconnoiter specific targets or locations. There are now so many sUAS incidents occurring that it makes for an easily exploitable environment for malign activities by state or non-state actors. Making things even more dangerous, our research shows that quite often, no one knows who to call when a sUAS incident occurs. While officially the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has primacy over sUAS incidents, our research (and the FAA’s own database) shows that local law enforcement is often contacted after sUAS incidents, and cases are often closed as soon as they are opened, without confirmed reporting to the FAA. As a result, Department of Defense (DoD) entities charged with homeland defense, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), are often left without knowledge of sUAS incidents, and cannot observe and monitor trends adequately to support development of adequate countermeasures. They also do not have the authorities to counteract the threat, even when sUAS activity upends military training exercises. To mitigate this threat, the US government should consider: Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Maintaining a single, consolidated reporting database for any sUAS activity over critical infrastructure on an unclassified network. Mandating NORTHCOM to lead DoD efforts within this new JIATF and work with Congress on updated legislation to codify proper authorities for US agencies and the military to thwart UAS intrusions.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Warfare, and National Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

271. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

272. Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. But the ambassador’s argument relies on numerous inaccuracies. Those are detailed below. 1. Somalia currently has territorial integrity, and recognizing Somaliland would break that integrity. The Somali government does not currently have territorial integrity. Islamist terror group al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country. Somaliland has not been functionally a part of Somalia for decades. And Puntland and Jubaland frequently defy Mogadishu. Arguments premised on fictions are irretrievably broken. 2. The US-Somalia partnership has “bolstered regional stability.” The region is as unstable as it has been for decades. 3. “Clan-based ambitions threaten to fracture Somalia’s national cohesion.” There is no national cohesion to fracture, in part because clans remain the fundamental ordering principle of Somalia’s society. Rather than denying that reality, Somalis should build a highly decentralized order that accounts for their preeminent loyalty to clan. The US and its partners should stop pretending that a strong centralized government can work in Somalia. 4. “The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed. 5. “A divided Somalia would distract the central government from counterterrorism operations and disrupt the successes already achieved.” Again, Somalia is already divided. Also, Mogadishu already allows all sorts of things, usually petty political squabbles, to distract it from fighting al-Shabaab. The Somali government’s easily distracted nature has proven time and again that it is not a competent counterterrorism partner for the US. 6. “A unified Somalia . . . can foster transparency, attract responsible investment, and ensure its people benefit from [the country’s] resources—all while reinforcing the stable environment in which US interests can flourish.” The Somali government cannot achieve these lofty goals because Somalia is not unified. Decades of experience demonstrate the country will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future. And it is not clear that unity in Somalia would lead to transparency or competent governance. Mogadishu currently demonstrates neither of those things. There is no reason to believe it will magically improve, even if Somalia somehow, for the first time in its people’s history, becomes unified. 7. “By helping Somalia strengthen its institutions, enhance security forces, and foster inclusive political dialogue, the United States ensures that clan affiliations enrich national identity rather than fracture it into competing states.” The US and others have formed policy based on this belief for over a decade. It has not worked. Why should it suddenly begin working now? What has changed? Fundamentally, the ambassador’s arguments—and Washington’s current policy toward Somalia—rest on fictions: (a) that Somalia is united, politically or societally, (b) that the government in its current form contributes to regional stability, and (c) that Mogadishu’s actions are a net positive for the US. Washington cannot achieve its goals in the Horn of Africa without first acknowledging reality and building policies that reflect that reality, rather than comforting fictions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Africa, Somaliland, and United States of America

273. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:: Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

274. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

275. Nonproliferation in Great Power Competition

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Yashar Parsie
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For decades, the United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among friends and foes alike. This goal, however, may be at risk. While global challenges multiply, regional adversaries like North Korea pose an increased threat to US allies. In particular, South Korea appears to doubt the credibility of US extended deterrence. Seoul has sought to strengthen deterrence and even weighed the benefits of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. This report uses international relations theory, historical research, survey data, and original interviews with South Korean experts to examine (a) nonproliferation’s role in US grand strategy, (b) the relationship among nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and assurance, and (c) growing challenges to these three missions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. It then suggests an approach for the United States to address these challenges. Nonproliferation remains important to national security. But the United States should consider it among other national security priorities. Managing priorities is a matter of continually evaluating risks and benefits. The United States can best do so through a series of measures that improve extended deterrence and assurance to manage the risk that allies pursue nuclear weapons.
Topic:: Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

276. Next Steps for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: History was made at the White House on August 8, 2025, when President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a landmark meeting. Against all odds, and after more than three decades of failed diplomacy by the international community, the two leaders from the Caucasus signed a joint declaration committing to a final peace treaty that will normalize relations between their countries. Their foreign ministers also initialed a draft version of that treaty, which the countries plan on fully ratifying within the next 12 months. Diplomats brokered this breakthrough not in Moscow, Paris, or Brussels—but in Washington. For decades, the South Caucasus has been a flashpoint for regional competition, unresolved wars, and missed diplomatic opportunities. Now, with US reengagement, real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may finally be within reach. It is reasonable to assume that President Trump’s instinctive urge to cut deals—along with his desire to go down in history as an international peacemaker and statesman—drove his determination to lead efforts to end the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The deal also gave him the chance to tie up a loose end from his first administration. Despite Trump’s frequent claims that no new wars started under his watch, the 2020 Second Karabakh War erupted in the final year of his presidency. His administration made no meaningful effort to bring it to a close, creating a vacuum that Moscow filled by brokering a ceasefire agreement—one it ultimately proved unable to enforce. But President Trump could also recognize an opportunity when presented with one. In many ways, he was pushing at an open door. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand the importance of normalization and peace. Both are also exhausted by Moscow’s failed mediation efforts and its waning regional clout. The White House would be mistaken in assuming that since the headlines have passed, the cameras have stopped recording, and the signing ceremony is complete, the job is finished. Three big challenges are still on the horizon: Questions remain about Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political stability, which could be undermined, especially in the lead-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections next June, as hardline nationalists and Moscow-backed groups inside Armenia challenge his authority and the legitimacy of the peace process. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan should expect Russia and Iran to try to discredit the peace process by launching disinformation campaigns. Many questions remain unanswered about how the regional transport links envisioned in the peace agreement—including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—will be funded and financed. Without a resolution of these challenges, President Trump might lose interest in the peace initiative. Only his direct oversight can ensure its success.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

277. Putting US-India Trade Negotiations Back on Track

Author:: Aparna Pande and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: On April 2, 2025, which the White House dubbed “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump announced broad, sweeping tariffs on over 90 countries. While the president’s announcement caused anxiety in foreign capitals, officials in New Delhi remained relatively calm. United States–India relations had been improving for more than two and a half decades, and the US had become India’s largest trading partner. By most accounts, President Trump respected Prime Minister Narendra Modi—even going so far as to refer to his Indian counterpart as his “good friend.” Furthermore, during an official visit in February 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi announced a series of trade targets suggesting that a wider trade deal was imminent. The two leaders pledged to pursue $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030—more than double the current volume—and promised to deepen US arms sales to India, including by laying the groundwork for future acquisitions of F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Modi committed to increasing energy imports from the US and reducing tariffs on American goods. India, by most accounts, was eager to address the Trump administration’s concerns about trade imbalances, and the two sides set fall 2025 as a target for finalizing a bilateral trade agreement. Meanwhile, due to strong messaging from the Trump team against production based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Apple announced plans to shift all assembly of its US-bound iPhones to India. Prime Minister Modi also spoke with Elon Musk to discuss providing Tesla with access to Indian markets. Vice President JD Vance even visited India in late April 2025, and lauded the country’s “sense of infinite possibility.”
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

278. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

279. Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections

Author:: Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A new survey for ECFR reveals people in many countries around the world are upbeat about the second Trump presidency. Many think Trump will not just be good for America but that he will bring peace or reduce tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East and US-China relations. In contrast, US allies in Europe and South Korea are notably pessimistic about the incoming president—suggesting a further weakening of the geopolitical “West”. Ukrainians are slightly more positive than not about the impact Trump might have on ending the conflict with Russia. But they are deeply conflicted about what could be an acceptable compromise settlement with Moscow. Europeans will struggle to find internal unity or global power in leading an outright resistance to the new administration. But the survey reveals that many in the world regard the EU as a player equal to the US and China—a strength European leaders should draw on as they enter the turbulent new presidential term. Rather than harking back to a post-cold war liberal order, Europeans should focus on understanding and seeing opportunities in the new world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Elections, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

280. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

Author:: Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

281. Ride the wave: A big, beautiful European strategy for Trumponomics

Author:: Agathe Demarais
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Eight months into the second term of Donald Trump, Europeans are still struggling to craft a coherent response to American geoeconomics policies in the trade, investment and financial spheres. The Trump administration poses massive challenges to Europe. It has imposed tariffs on nearly all US imports from the EU. It is also considering applying pressure on investors to pick sides between the US and China. Finally, it could soon try to engineer a forced depreciation of the dollar against other major currencies like the euro. For the EU, the best response to baffling Trumponomics is to keep calm and carry on. European policymakers should adopt a self-help mindset—resisting the urge to impose retaliatory measures that could damage European economies, avoiding futile fights over US policies that will not change, and above all, holding the bloc together. Europeans should also use this turbulent moment to push through controversial economic reforms. Such policies include deepening the single market to support those EU exporters that will lose market share in the US; leveraging access to the EU market for digital services; boosting innovation financing through regulatory changes; increasing the global role of the euro; and bracing for the coming currency wars. Europe’s ability to implement much-needed reforms will shape the bloc’s economic prospects, global standing and resilience long after Trump leaves the White House.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

282. Reality show: Why Europe must not cave in Trump’s culture war

Author:: Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europe is in a culture war with Trump’s America. Part of this involves Trumpists propping up their ideological allies in European politics. A deeper level involves humiliating Europeans in their dealings with the US. The two intertwine to tell a single story. Trump and his acolytes can only do this because Europeans let them. At the first level Trumpists exploit polarisation in societies and the rise of Europe’s “new right”. At the second they take advantage of division and hesitation among European leaders. It doesn’t have to be this way. A decade of crises has strengthened European sentiment among the public. Almost all member states still have mainstream-led, pro-European governments. This should give the EU’s politicians the courage to act—and defend a Europe that writes its own script. That would also help preserve a strong transatlantic alliance; one in which the EU and European countries are America’s peers, not its subordinates.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Donald Trump, and Culture War
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

283. Nuclear Deterrence Explained: Strategic Implications for Europe in the Absence of U.S. Extended Deterrence

Author:: Iakob Dadvani
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy discourse indicate two potential future directions: prioritization or retrenchment.1 Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric clearly reflects a tendency toward retrenchment, particularly with respect to Europe. The most prominent indicators of this shift include the potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO European command, or a significant downsizing of its role2 , which would reduce the alliance’s overall combat effectiveness. This change would necessitate increased defense spending from European countries to maintain credible conventional deterrence, as the aggregate military power must remain constant despite reduced American involvement. Further to this are the moves to solve the Russia-Ukraine war by pressuring Ukrainians into negotiations that result in an unjust peace without security guarantees.3 Such an outcome would likely lead to long-term instability across the European continent.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

284. Policing Alternatives: A Public Opinion Survey

Author:: The Carter Center
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: Since 1980, incarceration in the U.S. has increased by about 400%, despite crime largely decreasing from the 1990s to the present.8 Currently, taxpayers are footing an annual bill of more than $80 billion, and yet recidivism rates in the U.S. are as high as 83%. An estimated one in six people in local jails and state and federal prisons are serving time for public order offenses, generally defined as charges that violate societal norms, such as charges relating to homelessness or disorderly conduct. Over 40% of incarcerated individuals have been diagnosed with a mental health condition — almost double that of the general population. As the human and financial costs of incarceration rise, alternative solutions are urgently needed in communities across the U.S. to address the needs of those struggling with mental health conditions, substance use concerns, and extreme poverty. For more than 10 years, activists and organizations in Atlanta have been developing ways to support and care for vulnerable members of their community. PAD was created in response to decades of heavy reliance on the criminal legal system to manage social issues such as poverty, homelessness, mental health conditions, and substance use concerns. In 2013, a group of Atlanta activists began advocating for the decriminalization of a variety of public order offenses disproportionately impacting low-income individuals and people of color. In 2015, these activists formed a broad coalition to advocate for the creation of the Atlanta Fulton Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team, which was authorized by the Atlanta City Council and Fulton County Board of Commissioners to begin planning diversion services. The resulting PAD Initiative, originally implemented in two police precincts, has since evolved into a citywide, nationally recognized model for community-based, non-police response to quality-of-life concerns.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Rule of Law, Mental Health, Peace, Police, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

285. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has upended European security and created a reality in which EU and NATO member states, on one side, and Russia, on the other, view each other as fundamental threats, even as the United States is poised to become a less reliable partner for its allies. Why does it matter? An unstable Europe has economic and security repercussions globally, not least given the nuclear capabilities of Russia, on one hand, and NATO on the other. A deeper understanding of assumptions and threat perceptions on both sides can help key players manage the risks of an increasingly militarised region. What should be done? Diplomacy and deterrence are both required. Kyiv’s backers should seek a settlement to the war that ensures Ukraine’s continued capacity to defend itself. European allies should reduce reliance on the U.S. and – together with Washington – pursue risk mitigation with Russia through limits on weapons deployments and other activities.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

286. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:: Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:: International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

287. Cambio Climático y Transición Energética: Una Transformación Geopolítica en Marcha

Author:: Xira Ruiz
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El artículo analiza la dimensión geopolítica del cambio climático y de la transición energética, en un contexto internacional marcado por la rivalidad entre grandes potencias y la fragmentación del orden global. Se exploran los efectos que estas transformaciones generan en la reconfiguración de las interdependencias materiales, el acceso a recursos críticos y la redefinición de la seguridad energética. El texto se centra especialmente en el papel de Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, así como en las implicaciones para el Sur Global. También analiza el desplazamiento del liderazgo climático desde los marcos multilaterales tradicionales hacia nuevas formas de diplomacia orientadas a la competencia por el liderazgo tecnológico y el control de cadenas de valor. El artículo concluye que la transición energética implica una reorganización estratégica de las relaciones internacionales, que genera nuevas formas de dependencia, redefine las prioridades de seguridad y plantea desafíos para la equidad global y la gobernanza compartida.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Global South

288. Delivering on Draghi after Munich: A quantum perspective

Author:: Ulrich Mans
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In light of shifting transatlantic relations, Europe must assert greater technological sovereignty, with quantum technology emerging as a key strategic domain. The EU already has a strong foundation in quantum, but risks falling behind due to fragmented policies, low private investment, and supply chain dependencies. While recent public investments and initiatives like the Quantum Flagship and Quantum Pact are promising, Europe needs a bold commercialisation strategy and coherent regulatory framework. To secure leadership, the EU must accelerate industry adoption, align member state efforts, and foster global partnerships, including with the US, UK, and Switzerland. Quantum presents a defining test for Europe’s innovation agenda – and a critical opportunity to deliver on the Draghi Report’s call for strategic autonomy.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

289. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

290. Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac: How U.S. Defense Spending Prioritizes Innovation over Deterrence

Author:: Carlton Haelig and Philip Sheers
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: or more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac that has allowed China to steadily shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in its favor. Recent U.S. defense budgets have disproportionately invested in long-term developmental programs at the expense of producing sufficient capabilities available for the near term. As a result, today’s Joint Force is smaller, older, and less capable than at any other time in recent history. Over the past 15 years, the average time and cost the Pentagon has taken to field major weapon systems has grown significantly, and the share of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) spending within the broader defense budget has continued to steadily grow. Despite extended periods of very expensive research and development, major weapon systems have frequently failed to enter production on time or in numbers large enough to make a difference for U.S. warfighters. RDTE cost growth has also affected mature programs, where unexpected modernization challenges have interfered with plans to expand production of available capabilities. Bolstering deterrence involves a challenging balance of time horizons: The Department of Defense (DoD) must expand procurement of today’s capabilities to support near-term deterrence but cannot risk sacrificing next-generation modernization programs that sustain America’s long-term military advantage in doing so. As China’s accelerated conventional military buildup places significant pressure on today’s Joint Force, the urgency to close near-term capability gaps has become critical. Reductions in the Joint Force’s overall size and relative conventional capability have opened a dangerous window of opportunity for China. This report finds that the fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request and one-time reconciliation funding from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (BBB) ultimately fail to make the needed investments to strengthen deterrence in both the near and long term. Instead, the current administration appears to be falling into the same mistake as many previous administrations by prioritizing costly development of next-generation systems at the expense of purchasing and fielding capabilities that are available to fill deterrence gaps today. Moreover, by pursuing modernization through reconciliation, the FY 2026 budget risks subjecting future modernization priorities to the political outcomes of nondefense debates. Absent a return to standard defense budgeting processes, modernization programs that received a down payment from the BBB will likely stall or fail entirely. There are some opportunities in future defense budgets to produce greater numbers of existing high-end capabilities that can meaningfully contribute to deterrence in the near term while pursuing critical long-term modernization investments. This report’s analysis highlights five major capability areas where existing or near-ready capabilities, such as ground-based fires or combat aircraft, can be procured in meaningful quantities and contribute to important missions in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, this analysis highlights important areas, such as hypersonic weapons, in which extensive developmental timelines and exorbitant procurement costs likely preclude near-term contributions to deterrence and in the long term will only be fielded in small quantities. Expanding the U.S. military’s capacity and capability in the near term will likely require both larger budgets and the rapid development and production of complementary, less expensive capabilities. The United States faces a generational inflection point in how it approaches its defense investments. Rather than continue the disproportionate focus on next-generation technologies, the White House, Congress, and the DoD must budget a sustained pivot to purchasing existing capabilities that close near-term deterrence gaps. While this pivot must be balanced with continued investments in long-term modernization, the United States can no longer afford to sacrifice near-term procurement imperatives. Breaking out of the developmental cul-de-sac will require future defense budgets to emphasize procurement and accelerated RDTE across major defense programs.
Topic:: Budget, Innovation, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

291. Prepared, Not Paralyzed Managing AI Risks to Drive American Leadership

Author:: Janet Egan, Spencer Michaels, and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Trump administration has embraced a pro-innovation approach to artificial intelligence (AI) policy. Its AI Action Plan, released July 2025, underscores the private sector’s central role in advancing AI breakthroughs and positioning the United States as the world’s leading AI power.1 At the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance cautioned that an overly restrictive approach to AI development “would mean paralyzing one of the most promising technologies we have seen in generations.”2 Yet this emphasis on innovation does not diminish the government’s critical role in ensuring national security. On the contrary, AI advances will yield significant threats alongside unprecedented potential in this domain. Experts warn of advanced AI introducing more autonomous cyber weapons, bestowing a broader pool of actors with the know-how to develop biological weapons, and potentially malfunctioning in ways that cause massive damage.3 Private and public sector leaders alike have echoed these concerns.4 The urgent task for policymakers is to ensure that the federal government can anticipate and manage the national security implications of AI with advanced capabilities—without resorting to blunt, ill-targeted, or burdensome regulation that would undermine America’s innovative edge. In other words, the government must prepare at once for potential risks from rapidly advancing AI without imposing onerous regulations that unduly stifle the technology’s vast potential for good. The status quo is insufficient: Technical expertise in advanced AI remains concentrated in a handful of companies, and the government is playing catch-up. Existing voluntary information-sharing commitments between AI labs and the federal government already face hurdles and likely will prove insufficient over time as the costs of providing transparency increase. Meanwhile, the private sector lacks both the national security expertise and the commercial incentives to manage these risks to the national interest. The United States cannot afford policies built solely on speculative fears. Yet in the face of real and rapid progress in national security–relevant capabilities, neither can it risk allowing an AI-driven disaster or a regulatory vacuum to derail technological progress. While much of the policy debate rightly focuses on innovation and accelerating adoption, this report concentrates on a less developed but equally vital counterpart: managing the risks that could undermine those ambitions without stifling AI’s innovative potential. Effective risk management is not a brake on progress but a prerequisite for it, playing an essential role in sustaining public trust, preventing setbacks, shaping global standards, and ensuring that American leadership in AI endures over the long term.
Topic:: Regulation, Leadership, Risk, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

292. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age

Author:: Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: fter decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires. It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces. As this report’s analysis of U.S. defense spending reveals, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in both legacy and emerging counter–uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities for nearly a decade. However, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. Despite the Pentagon’s shortfalls in procuring purpose-built C-UAS capabilities, U.S. counter-drone operations in the Middle East have been notable. The United States views China as its foremost strategic threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its drone capabilities by developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale. Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan. This is a complex challenge with no silver bullet solution. The DoD must act swiftly. The stakes are not theoretical—without adequate defenses, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks. Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense Prioritize counter-drone defense and extend capabilities beyond the air defense community. Drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units. Every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Expand counter-drone training across the Joint Force. The Pentagon needs to develop and share best tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensure that all forces are trained in drone self-protection. Improve the rigor and realism of counter-drone prototype testing. The current test and evaluation process fosters a false sense of confidence in prototype counter-UAS, as they are often assessed using unrealistic facsimiles of enemy drones and low-fidelity tests of electromagnetic weapons.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

293. Atomic Advantage: Accelerating U.S. Quantum Sensing for Next-Generation Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Author:: Costanza M. Vidal Bustamante
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: O One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation, trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world’s PNT, but the system’s inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding $1 billion a day.1 In the face of rising threats to traditional PNT, quantum sensors offer a compelling alternative. Leveraging the immutable properties of atoms, these devices offer unmatched measurement precision, long-term accuracy, and reliable operation in contested environments—capabilities that can back up and even outperform current GPS-based services. Quantum sensors could enable resilient U.S. PNT within a few years—from the navigation of submarines, drones, and munitions to the synchronization of telecommunications networks, power grids, and financial systems—but only if America continues to develop and deploy the technology. While atomic clocks—the most mature quantum technology today—already power GPS, emerging quantum sensing capabilities are beginning to show their promise as local sources of high-precision, resilient PNT. Next-generation atomic clocks can sustain timing accuracy over longer durations. Quantum accelerometers and gyroscopes can measure a moving platform’s velocity and rotation with greater precision. Quantum gravimeters and magnetometers can reference the Earth’s unique gravitational and magnetic fields for stealthy positioning. All of these technologies offer enhanced performance without relying on vulnerable radiofrequency signals. Although early quantum sensors are beginning the move from lab to field, many prototypes remain too fragile and bulky for widespread deployment. To deliver real operational value, these devices must be hardened so their delicate quantum states can survive harsh environments and continuous use on dynamic platforms. At the same time, developers must further miniaturize and integrate the sensors’ atomic, optical, and control subsystems into compact devices.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

294. Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider

Author:: Gregory Johnsen
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On March 15, 2025, the United States launched an offensive against the Houthis in Yemen with the stated goal of restoring “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea and ending Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Fifty-two days later, on May 5, the United States ended its operations in Yemen following an agreement with the Houthis that the group would no longer target U.S. military vessels or U.S. flagged ships. This article provides an assessment of that campaign, known as Operation Rough Rider, looking at what the United States hit, who was killed, and what it cost as well as how the Houthis have rebounded and regrouped, the current situation on the ground in Yemen, and what is likely to come next.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Houthis, Shipping, Military Operations, and Operation Rough Rider
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

295. The Escalation of U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia and the Role of Perceived Threats to the U.S. Homeland

Author:: David Sterman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In 2025, the United States substantially increased the pace of its airstrikes in Somalia. At the same time, it increasingly cited not just regional security rationales for the increased pace of strikes but also rationales rooted in an assessed potential threat to the U.S. homeland from Somalia—in particular from the Islamic State-Somalia’s recruitment of foreign fighters. This article examines the increased pace of strikes, the rationales that have been cited to explain the increase, and what existing evidence reveals about the potential threat to the U.S. homeland. It also underscores the need for greater clarity from the U.S. government regarding its assessment of the extent of such a threat.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, Airstrikes, and Military Operations
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and United States of America

296. Feature Commentary: Confronting Cartels: Military Considerations South of the Border

Author:: Brian Michael Jenkins
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Possible U.S. military action against Mexico’s drug cartels poses unique challenges. The situation is complicated, and the United States must be prepared for possible counteractions. The cartels are not a single actor. If attacked, they may avoid direct confrontation, accepting temporary losses, anticipating that the United States will not sustain a long campaign. Or Mexico’s cartels may respond violently, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in Mexico—and possibly north of the border. The government of Mexico is a separate actor. It can assist or undermine U.S. efforts. Past government campaigns against the cartels led to soaring rates of criminal violence. Chaos in Mexico could have serious implications for U.S. homeland security. The United States needs a ‘Red Team’ to examine a range of scenarios. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I contrasts recent U.S. military actions in Yemen and Iran with possible military action in Mexico. Part II examines perceptions of the threat. Part III examines how the history of U.S.-Mexico relations will shape the battlefield. Part IV reviews our own experience in combating foreign drug traffickers, offering some preliminary takeaways. Part V examines possible options. Part VI looks at how the cartels might react, how the United States might be forced to respond—and how other adversaries of the United States might attempt to exploit the situation.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Borders, Organized Crime, Cartels, and Military Operations
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

297. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

298. The Changing Character of Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism

Author:: Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, Brian Dodwell, and Ned Curry
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The competition between terror movements and counterterrorism forces is an interactive and iterative game, as the actions taken by one side are designed to defeat, circumvent, or shape the activity taken by the opposing players. To better understand these interactive dynamics, it is important to evaluate how terrorism and counterterrorism have been evolving. This article first takes high-level stock of how the spread, structure, scale, and speed of terrorism have been changing in recent years and highlights key challenges and implications for counterterrorism. It then evaluates the United States’ ongoing effort to find a sustainable counterterrorism path, a journey that has been filled with challenges, benefits, dilemmas, and opportunities, and discusses how key factors have been shaping the direction, reach, and pace of change. An important takeaway from these reviews is that while the threat of international terrorism is not what it used to be, there is a lot of change occurring across the terrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism has also been undergoing some important shifts, and there are open questions about whether U.S. CT forces and assets will be spread further. If not managed carefully, change taking place across these two ‘systems’ could interact in ways that may disrupt CT progress.
Topic:: National Security, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

299. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Peace or Pause?

Author:: Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: At the White House in Washington, on August 8th, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace deal and signed an agreement on the establishment of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP): a transport link connecting Azerbaijan-proper with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, which had been a contentious issue in the peace negotiations. While the imagery and potential positive consequences of this should not be underestimated, much is still unclear about what the agreements actually mean, including certain formulations and their interpretation as well as the question of how long the US commitment to the region will last. At the same time, the Washington summit represents an opening and a positive momentum for further development of not only the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, but larger connectivity in South-Caucasus, and several capitals will have been watching the proceedings keenly. This paper first briefly discusses the agreements reached and some of the remaining questions surrounding them, and then analyses the attitudes and/or reactions of the US, Russia, Iran, Türkiye and the EU, which in some cases, will be crucial to the success or failure of the initiative.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Eurasia, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

300. The Biden Administration’s New Industrial Policy: Domestic and International Implications

Author:: Barbara Regulska-Ingielewicz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to analyze new industrial policy based on the example of actions taken by the Joe Biden administration. Their essence is transforming the economy in line with climate goals while stimulating development. The paper will present the main assumptions of the United States’ green industrial policy, its goals, and international implications, which indicate that it is characterized by economic nationalism. The article attempts to answer three main research questions: What is the essence of the new industrial policy? What are the goals of the new industrial policy initiated by the Joe Biden administration? What are the expected international implications of this policy? Answers to the above questions will enable verification of the hypothesis, which states that the Joe Biden administration has initiated a new industrial policy in the spirit of state interventionism based on new environmental protection assumptions. Its goal is to give the U.S. economy new pro-development impulses and increase its competitiveness. The first part of the paper will present assumptions of the new industrial policy, then the goals and measures of the new United States industrial policy, and the third part will show the international implications of the above policy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Economic Growth, Joe Biden, Green Transition, Green Economy, and Economic Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS