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1001. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

1002. China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications

Author:
David C. Logan
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

1003. The Role of the Geopolitical Position of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Towards American Foreign Policy from 1990 to 2017

Author:
Ala Alkhawaldeh, Mohammad Ahmad Nayef Alakash, Hani A. M. Akho-Rashida, Ziad Mohammad Al Wahshat, and Mohammad Saleh Bani Issa
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The role of the geopolitical location of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan towards United States (US) foreign policy from 1990 to 2017 is the focus of this study, which addressed the impact of important regional and international political events, positively or negatively, on the development of relations between the two countries in terms of political and security aspects. The study adopted a qualitative approach, and primary data was collected through interviews with 16 participants from political, economic, and security experts in Jordan and the US. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data obtained. The study concluded that US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability extremely important; Jordan has a suitable location to defend Israel because critical Arab countries surround it, and Jordan enjoys a unique geographical location in the Middle East. Some political events play an essential role in US foreign policy concerning security aid to Jordan, as the US links its aid to Jordan to political events.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Jordan, and United States of America

1004. Betting on Black Gold: Oil Speculation and U.S. Inflation (2020-2022)

Author:
Carlotta Breman and Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Sharp increases in systemically important crude oil prices have been a major cause of the recent surge in the inflation rate in the U.S. This paper investigates the extent to which the increase in oil prices can be attributed to excessive speculation in the oil futures market. Our analysis suggests that excessive speculation in the crude oil market has been responsible for 24%-48% of the increase in the WTI crude oil price during October 2020-June 2022. These estimates translate into an oil price increase of around $18-$36 per barrel and an increase in the U.S. PCE inflation rate by circa 0.75 to 1.5 percentage points during the same period. We complement the analysis with an empirical investigation of the crude oil market which shows that (speculative) long non-commercial open-interest positions in oil futures have increased considerably relative to short non-commercial positions. We further find that higher futures prices for crude oil ‘Granger-cause’ oil spot prices, the futures prices of corn and soybeans and the fertilizer price. These econometric results show that oil speculators have to be held accountable for not just raising oil prices, but also driving up food commodity prices. We finally discuss measures to clamp down on excessive speculation in oil in order to eliminate its systemically adverse consequences for the U.S. economy.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Inflation, and Speculation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1005. Is “Inflation First” Really “Rentiers First”? The Taylor Rule and Rentier Income in Industrialized Countries

Author:
Mario Seccareccia and Guillermo Matamoros Romero
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Taylor rule has returned as a significant policy guide amid increasingly overt political pressures for its official (and not just its implicit) adoption at the US Fed as inflation fears have come to dominate monetary policy actions both in the US and internationally in recent times. Our paper analyzes the effect of monetary policy on the functional distribution of income by reconstructing how the post-1970s “inflation first” policy commitments of central banks came to be crystallized in the Taylor rule. While there are differences among the various specifications of this “rule”, the Taylor relation is merely an offshoot of what can be described generically as the family of Wicksellian reaction functions whose implications support rentier income over time. Because of the internal logic of the Taylor rule, this has led to different interpretations such as, for example, the more Keynesian Yellen rule, which depart from the strict sense of the Taylor rule. The paper also interprets the Taylor Rule in light of Wicksell’s formulation and analyzes the potential consequence of the differences. In contrast to the strict Wicksell rule of “proportional” adjustment, our econometric findings suggest evidence that central banks adjust “over-proportionally” the benchmark money interest rate in the presence of changes in the inflation rate for the complete “inflation first” era since the 1970s until the COVID-19 crisis. They thereby strongly favored rentier incomes in their reaction functions, with the possible exception of the post-financial crisis period. To limit the pro-rentier consequences of such inflation-targeting regimes, it is important that policymakers mandate multiple objectives for central banks, as exemplified in the current US Fed’s dual mandate.
Topic:
Economics, Inflation, Industrialization, and Rentierism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1006. Precedents, Instruments and Targets that the Fed Has Used to Create and Support a Postcrisis Global Safety Net

Author:
Edward J. Kane
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Much has been made of the Global Safety Net that has been put into place since the Great Financial Crisis but the distributional effects of some of the Fed’s strategies are still shrouded in mystery. In supplying bailout funds at below-market terms to uninsured creditors of firms and governments that were economically insolvent, the Fed reinforced the implicit expectation that megabanks are free to take on high levels of risk and benefit from the upside while being protected from any serious downside. An important example of this is the role of currency swaps. By extending its “temporary” dollar swap lines with other central banks, including the European Central Bank, “until further notice” the Fed broadcasted its intention to act as the financial world’s “liquidity provider” of last resort. The “liquidity” support provided by the Fed to megabanks through cross-border lending in fact acted as subsidies, the costs of which were borne by ordinary US citizens. This is just one piece of an unacknowledged game plan of building global strategies of crisis prevention and crisis management based on misdirection and piles of bullsh*t.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, Central Bank, and Safety Net
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1007. Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly for the 3,400 personnel in Syria and Iraq. Since October 7, 2023, dozens of U.S. troops have been injured in attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed Shia militias in both countries, at times resulting in U.S. retaliatory strikes. Defensive measures and luck have prevented U.S. fatalities thus far. But U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq are at significant risk as long as they remain deployed there. If a U.S. ground presence served a core security interest, that risk might be reasonable. But there is no good reason to risk U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the group’s remnants, and the United States can still strike from long distance, if necessary, without local bases. Instead of enhancing U.S. security, the U.S. force presence in Syria and Iraq pointlessly risks war with Iran. Sending additional troops to the Middle East compounds the problem and grants U.S. adversaries in the region added leverage by giving them the ability to threaten U.S. forces. The added danger to U.S. forces is one more reason to withdraw from Syria and Iraq as a step toward de-prioritizing the Middle East more generally.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

1008. US-Japan-Taiwan Dialogue: Deterrence Signaling, Domestic Politics, Defense Cooperation, and War Termination

Author:
Michael Beckley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The risk of a war over Taiwan is higher today than at any time in the past half-century. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is an “inevitable requirement” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Yet peaceful means of reunification have all but disappeared because most Taiwanese are more determined than ever to maintain their de facto independence. This stance threatens China’s territorial integrity, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi’s legitimacy as top leader. In response, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three years, it has conducted the largest and most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in a generation. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than fifty combat aircraft, menace Taiwan almost daily and often simulate attacks on Taiwanese, Japanese, or US targets. Meanwhile, China has been amassing ships, aircraft, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Its military budget increased tenfold from 1990 to 2020. From 2020 to 2023, it doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal. China now militarily outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile inventory and navy by number of ships. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly belligerent in its relations with neighbors from Japan to India. The United States has tried to deter Chinese aggression by declaring its support for Taiwan. But it is no longer clear that the US military could immediately respond to a Chinese assault on the island. Historically, the United States has relied on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries after a war starts. But now that China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation by output, it is possible that both sides could sustain a protracted conventional war—and might be tempted to break the stalemate by using nuclear weapons against military targets. These dangerous trends make deterrence and defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan extremely important. Toward that end, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in November 2023 to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

1009. Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy and Deterrence in the Pivotal Year of 2022

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine presented the world with a dramatic challenge to the rules-based international order. Ukraine’s fierce and continuing resistance has earned the backing of Western democracies. Under the leadership of the United States, democracies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have rallied to provide political, diplomatic, and military support to Ukraine. As of this writing, despite difficult coordination on sensitive military issues, that unity remains intact. In the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought preexisting security challenges into sharper relief. Across the region, security concerns were heightened and acquired greater definition in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. More broadly, Russia’s aggression called into question the staying power of the rules-based international order and, at the same time, raised recognition of the inseparable nature of that order. As the United Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary Liz Truss told the Atlantic Council on March 10, “conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible.”1 This study begins with a consideration of the Indo-Pacific security environment as it evolved during 2022. It goes on to consider the measures by key regional actors—primarily but not exclusively the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India—that strengthened deterrence in the face of an increasingly challenging environment. Expanding diplomatic coordination and security cooperation reflects a strategic commitment by the region’s democracies to support a rules-based order and advance a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. At the same time, European democracies have continued to expand diplomatic and security engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. The policy challenge for the United States and Western democracies has been to resist Russia’s aggression in Europe in support of the rules-based international order and, at the same time in the Indo-Pacific, to strengthen deterrence against the use of force or coercion to change the status quo.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1010. Make Russia Pay: The Case for Seizing Russia’s Sovereign Assets

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States, the European Union, and their international partners acted swiftly in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, imposing sanctions on more than $300 billion of Russian sovereign assets. As the war enters its third year, more individuals and organizations are calling on the US and its partners to confiscate these frozen funds and repurpose them for Ukraine’s assistance and reconstruction needs. The cost of Ukraine’s reconstruction is currently estimated at around $400 billion, though this number increases daily with every new act of Russian destruction. After initial hesitation within the Biden administration and among its G7 partners, support for this proposal is reportedly growing—especially as further assistance for Ukraine encounters headwinds in the divided US Congress. Below are some key takeaways from a recent Hudson Institute discussion with Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on making Russia pay for its crimes against Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Sovereign Assets
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

1011. A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Utopia?

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Earlier this summer, well before Hamas launched its raids against Israel, Pierre Goldschmidt, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) former Deputy Director for Safeguards, sent me an analysis of how to approach creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. I agreed to publish it along with a commentary by Ariel Levite, the former Deputy Director of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission. The result is the attached occasional paper, “A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Utopia?” The greater Middle East is at a critical juncture. Either the number of states in the region having nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons options will grow or the number will be frozen and decline. Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria will either become Israel’s nuclear equal (or come within weeks of doing so) or they will forgo the option. In any case, creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the region has been promoted for nearly a half-century and is sure to be an issue in the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings scheduled through 2026. Yet, many analysts have dismissed going to zero nuclear weapons in the region as being unrealistic. Certainly, with Israel so embattled, any movement toward creating a zone now will take even longer. On the other hand, current developments suggest time may not be on our side. Less than a month after Hamas’ first incursions, not one, but two elected Israeli parliamentarians, including a junior member of Israel’s cabinet, publicly recommended Israel use its nuclear weapons against Hamas in Gaza. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince has fielded growing concerns that Iran might quickly get nuclear weapons by repeating his earlier public threat to acquire nuclear weapons if Tehran does. In an effort to deflect this threat and to “stabilize” the region, the Biden Administration wants the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords. As a part of any such deal, the Crown Prince, though, has demanded that the United States green-light Saudi efforts to pursue a “peaceful” uranium enrichment program. This would effectively give the Kingdom a nuclear weapons option and would catalyze nuclear hedging throughout the greater Middle East. It’s unclear if such racing can be curbed. Pierre Goldschmidt lays out an alternative incremental approach toward creating a weapons free zone in the region. Ariel Levite clarifies many of the serious reservations about proceeding now that most Israelis would likely have. Each makes points worth our attention. The hurdles are real but so are the risks of not trying to surmount them.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

1012. Strategic Empathy: Examining Pattern Breaks to Better Understand Adversaries’ Acquisition, Threat, and Use of Strategic Weapons

Author:
Sarah Bidgood, Robert Carlin, Siegfried S. Hecker, Jim Lamson, and Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Drawing from the work of Zachary Shore and others, we define strategic empathy as “the sincere effort to identify and assess the genuine patterns of an adversary’s acquisition, threat of use, and use of strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them.” This concept encapsulates a mindset, a lens, and an approach that help us to understand an adversary’s strategic thinking. In the context of this study, we apply strategic empathy as a tool to examine U.S. adversaries’ policies and actions concerning the acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. It is important to clarify that strategic empathy is not synonymous with sympathy or agreement with the adversary’s viewpoint, nor does it seek to excuse or justify its actions. Instead, it operates on a policy “agnostic” basis, facilitating a more holistic, nuanced understanding of the adversary that can inform strategies of coercion, cooperation, or a mix of both, depending on the circumstances. In this study, our approach for conducting case studies was primarily rooted in Zachary Shore’s book, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind, which focuses on examining what Shore terms “pattern breaks.” These pattern breaks encompass surprising or shocking, high-impact occurrences, and can be either events that affect an adversary or behaviors by the adversary itself. We apply this approach to examining eight pattern breaks for Russia, North Korea, and Iran related to their acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. The aim of these case studies is to shed light on the adversaries’ patterns related to strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them. Through this approach, strategic empathy offers a valuable tool, but it is not intended as a stand-alone approach. Rather, it offers a complementary perspective to other analytical approaches. It is also not intended as a causal theoretical framework but rather an alternative lens that can contribute to a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the adversary.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Empathy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

1013. Dangerous Decline: Russia’s Military and Security Influence in the Global South and the Implications for the United States

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study argues that Russia seeks to boost its military and security influence in the Global South in light of what it considers a protracted, systemic confrontation with Western states. Russia’s capacity to accrue such influence will vary considerably by domain and country. The war against Ukraine and its effects on Russia’s economy, technology base, and reputation are shaping demand and supply side factors—what states in the Global South want from Russia, and what Russia can offer. Though Russian power projection in the Global South will be limited, the impact of Moscow’s actions on U.S. strategic interests will not be trivial.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Global South

1014. Border Apprehensions and Federal Sentencing of Hispanic Citizens in the United States

Author:
Simone Bertolia, Morgan Laouenan, and Jerome Valette
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We provide evidence that Hispanic citizens receive significantly longer sentences than non-Hispanic citizens in the Federal Criminal Justice System in the United States when a higher number of illegal aliens are apprehended along the southwest border. Apprehensions can increase the salience of Hispanic ethnic identity, which is associated with persistent negative stereotypes, and can also deteriorate attitudes toward Hispanics. We rule out concerns that apprehensions might convey legally relevant information to judges. Thus, we provide direct evidence for time-varying discrimination toward Hispanic defendants. Our estimated effect is only at play for defendants without a heavy previous criminal record.
Topic:
Immigration, Ethnicity, Discrimination, Identity, Attitudes, and Salience
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1015. Interview with Ambassador Edward Djerejian

Author:
Christian Allard and Nick Vargish
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Ambassador Edward Djerejian has served as an important thought leader for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Both as Ambassador to Syria and Israel and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the 1990s, Ambassador Djerejian was a vital participant in the Arab-Israeli peace process and was also deeply involved with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. He also presented a coherent vision of how the U.S. should balance the goals of democracy in the Middle East by proclaiming in his Meridian House speech in 1992 that America would not be for “one vote, one person, one time.” This winter, as a Senior Fellow at HKS Belfer Center’s MEI, Ambassador Djerejian sat down with JMEPP editors Nick Vargish and Christian Allard to discuss pressing issues in the Arab World and the prospects for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Interview
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

1016. The Trilateral Security Dialogue, Defence Cooperation, & Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Aiden Warren, Charles T. Hunt, and Matthew Warren
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This report investigates the prospects and difficulties of enhancing AI cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the United States under the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) framework. Significant overlap in national AI objectives and vision, along with shared understandings of global AI competition and the security implications of AI development, exist among the TSD members. Insights from consultations and workshops with various stakeholders in Washington D.C. reveal a strong appetite for further cross-border collaboration in AI. However, several challenges persist across common standards, interoperability, trust, awareness, export control regimes, and data governance. The report, the first in a series, outlines key areas for building a robust and resilient AI partnership that can address the security challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1017. Will DACA Recipients Return to Their Birth Countries If DACA Is Ended?

Author:
Robert Courtney Smith
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Will recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) leave the United States if a legal challenge succeeds in ending this important program? The fate of over 600,000 current DACA recipients may depend on answers to this question in one expert report and one online survey question, which a Texas District Court found to show “a quantifiable percentage” would leave. Had the District Court in its DACA ruling not credited these sources, Texas’ lawsuit could have collapsed, and DACA would persist. The issue of whether DACA recipients will leave if DACA is ended will matter as this case is litigated, most likely to be decided by the Supreme Court. Drawing on research on immigrant return, DACA recipients, survey questions, priming, and intention-behavior gap, this paper argues that this expert report and the single online survey question used by the District Court cannot support the inferences regarding the return of DACA recipients to their birth countries. Rather, relevant research points toward DACA recipients staying in the United States, even if DACA were terminated. The paper recommends offering DACA recipients and long term undocumented residents a short path to legal status and citizenship, reassessing whether these two sources can support the conclusions drawn by the District Court; and analyzing the benefits accruing from DACA to Texas and all Texans, including US citizen children of DACA recipients, in assessing the claimed injury to the state.
Topic:
Migration, Supreme Court, Deportation, and DACA
Political Geography:
North America, Texas, and United States of America

1018. An Analysis of Trends in the US Undocumented Population Since 2011 and Estimates of the Undocumented Population for 2021

Author:
Robert Warren
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
In 2021, the undocumented population residing in the United States (US) increased slightly to 10.3 million, compared to 10.2 million the previous year. The gradual decline or near-zero growth of this population has continued for more than a decade. However, the large increases in apprehensions at the southern border in recent years, along with continued legislative gridlock in Congress, could portend a new era of growth of this population. Unfortunately, the data needed to determine whether the population will enter a period of growth after 2021 — or whether the era of near-zero growth will continue — will not be available for at least a year or two. The most accurate demographic estimates of the undocumented population are derived from data collected in the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. Estimates of the size of the undocumented population in 2022 will not be available until early 2024. This report focuses on the most significant trend in the undocumented population in the past decade — the remarkable decline of 1.9 million in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021. The decline for Mexico in this period was 600,000 more than the total population increase from the seven countries (in order) with the fastest growing US undocumented populations: Guatemala, Honduras, India, Venezuela, El Salvador, Brazil, and China. This paper finds that: • The long-term decline, or near-zero growth, of the total undocumented population that began in 2008 continued in 2021. • The percent of undocumented residents in the total US population declined from 3.8 percent in 2011 to 3.1 percent in 2021. • The undocumented population from Mexico declined from 6.4 million in 2011 to 4.4 million in 2021, a drop of 1.9 million in 10 years. • A total of 2.9 million, or 47 percent, of the US undocumented population from Mexico in 2011 had left the undocumented population by 2021. • The drop in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021 occurred nationwide, and the decline affected the undocumented population in nearly every state. • The fastest growing undocumented populations by country in the last 10 years were from Guatemala, Honduras, India, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Brazil. The combined undocumented populations from these six countries grew by 1.2 million. • Countries that had declining populations after 2011 included Poland, Peru, Ecuador, Korea, and Philippines, in addition to the large drop for Mexico. • California had the largest decline in undocumented residents — 665,000 from 2011 to 2021. The undocumented population from Mexico living in California during this period declined by 720,000. • The combined undocumented population in California, New York, and Illinois fell by more than one million from 2021 to 2011.
Topic:
Migration, Data, Undocumented Population, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America

1019. Access to Justice, the Rule of Law, and Due Process in the US Immigration System: A Tribute to Juan Osuna

Author:
Donald Kerwin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper introduces a special collection of papers on access to justice, the rule of law, and due process in the US immigration system. The collection honors Juan Osuna, a devoted public servant and former director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is the agency in the US Department of Justice (DOJ) that administers the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and legal orientation, assistance, and representation programs. The collection consists of five articles published in the Journal on Migration and Human Security and six CMS essays, written by some of Osuna’s close colleagues and friends. Section I provides a brief biography of Juan Osuna’s life, recites his titles and professional accomplishments, and outlines his views on some of the topics covered in the papers. The section draws heavily from two events that book-ended Osuna’s tenure as EOIR Director, which were organized by the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS). The first took place on February 16, 20121 and the second on July 18, 2017,2 just before Osuna’s untimely death at the age of 54 on August 15, 2017. This section also includes remembrances and reflections from Osuna’s colleagues at a November 15, 2018 event in Washington, DC, devoted to honoring his legacy.3 Section II summarizes the 11 papers in this collection, which reflect Juan Osuna’s commitment to humanizing the law and its fair application to all. The papers examine and propose ways to strengthen: • The nation’s response to large-scale migration. • The US asylum system. • The removal adjudication system. • Immigration Court backlog reduction efforts. • The treatment of survivors of human trafficking and modern-day slavery. • Due process for immigrants through legal representation. Section III offers a concluding reflection on the rule of law, and Juan Osuna’s legacy in a time of political division and discord.
Topic:
Immigration, Courts, Rule of Law, Asylum, and Due Process
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1020. The US Immigration Courts, Dumping Ground for the Nation’s Systemic Immigration Failures: The Causes, Composition, and Politically Difficult Solutions to the Court Backlog

Author:
Donald Kerwin and Richard Millet
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The US immigration court system seeks to “fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret US immigration laws” (DOJ 2022a). It represents the first exposure of many immigrants to due process and the rule of law in the United States, and occupies an integral role in the larger US immigration system. Yet it labors under a massive backlog of pending cases that undermines its core goals and objectives. The backlog reached 1.87 million cases in the first quarter of FY 2023 (Straut-Eppsteiner 2023, 6). This paper attributes the backlog to systemic failures in the broader immigration system that negatively affect the immigration courts, such as: • Visa backlogs, United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) application processing delays, and other bottlenecks in legal immigration processes. • The immense disparity in funding between the court system and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that feed cases into the courts. • The failure of Congress to pass broad immigration reform legislation that could ease pressure on the enforcement and court systems. • The lack of standard judicial authorities vested in Immigration Judges (IJs), limiting their ability to close cases; pressure parties to “settle” cases; and manage their dockets. • The absence of a statute of limitations for civil immigration offenses. • Past DHS failures to establish and adhere to enforcement priorities and to exercise prosecutorial discretion (PD) throughout the removal adjudication process, including in initial decisions to prosecute. • The location of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which oversees US immigration courts, within the nation’s preeminent law enforcement agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ). • The misconception of many policymakers that the court system should primarily serve as an adjunct to DHS. • A past record of temporary judge reassignments and government shutdowns. The paper supports a well-resourced and independent immigration court system devoted to producing the right decisions under the law. Following a short introduction, a long section on “Causes and Solutions to the Backlog” examines the multi-faceted causes of the backlog, and offers an integrated, wide-ranging set of recommendations to reverse and ultimately eliminate the backlog. The “Conclusion” summarizes the paper’s topline findings and policy proposals.
Topic:
Immigration, Courts, Asylum, and Visa
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1021. Concurrent Displacements: Return, Waiting for Asylum, and Internal Displacement in Northern Mexico

Author:
Isabel Gil-Everaert, Claudia Masferrer, and Guadalupe González Chávez
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper explores the ways in which contemporary mobility dynamics in Mexico have changed over the last decade, leading to protracted displacement. It focuses on three populations: (1) the internally displaced due to violence; (2) Mexican nationals returning from the United States, both voluntarily and due to deportation; and (3) populations seeking asylum in Mexico and the United States. These three populations are not usually analyzed together and do not squarely fall under the traditional legal definitions. The paper outlines ways that situations of protracted displacement and insecurity present challenges in four interconnected arenas of life: housing, legal status, employment, and emotional well-being. For governments and local communities, protracted displacement requires immediate humanitarian responses and the development and implementation of public policies focused on integration. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations based on its findings.
Topic:
Migration, Refugees, Asylum, Deportation, and Internal Displacement
Political Geography:
Central America, Mexico, and United States of America

1022. Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of High Technology in U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Sara Hsu, Ja Ian Chong, Rorry Daniels, Hargisl Shirley Martey, and John Lee
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The latest installment in the Finding Firmer Ground report series examines how technological advancements have increased distrust and uncertainty in U.S.-China relations. From big data to semiconductors, the multiauthor report looks into the geopolitical implications of technological development and what strategies, if any, policymakers in the United States and China can take to mitigate tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1023. Effectiveness of Humanitarian Exceptions to Sanctions:

Author:
Erica Moret
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The adoption of several humanitarian carveouts under several Syria-related autonomous sanctions regimes – in response to February 2023’s devastating earthquake – has been strongly welcomed by the humanitarian community. The exceptions adopted by the United States (US), European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), and Switzerland are designed to facilitate transactions in relation to relief efforts and the purchase of oil and petroleum-related products in Syria, particularly by humanitarian actors. They differ in terms of scope of activities authorized, breadth of actors covered, and their duration. This article seeks to map the main characteristics of each exception and assesses them in terms of benefits, ongoing challenges, and areas for potential improvement to inform future sanctions policies.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Sanctions, European Union, Earthquake, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, Syria, Switzerland, and United States of America

1024. Out of the Box: How to Rebalance U.S. Somalia Policy

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
U.S. President Joe Biden promised to end the “forever wars” launched after the 9/11 attacks. In Somalia, however, his administration has reinvigorated a flawed military-first approach to battling Islamist militants. Washington should complement those efforts with others aimed at stabilisation and political reconciliation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, Islamism, Reconciliation, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, Somalia, and United States of America

1025. Sanctions, Peacemaking and Reform: Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The U.S. is levying sanctions more than ever to hold warring parties accountable, restrict their access to resources and nudge them toward negotiations. Yet these measures can have unintended ill effects. Washington should take additional steps to alleviate these problems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Reform, Negotiation, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1026. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The danger of armed confrontation over Taiwan is growing, raising the spectre of a direct conflict between China and the U.S. that would have severe global repercussions. Managing this risk will require the parties to rebuild trust by shoring up decades-old understandings.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Risk, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Taiwan Strait

1027. Bottleneck of the Americas: Crime and Migration in the Darién Gap

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Migrants from far and wide are trekking northward through the Darién Gap, a dense jungle where they face dangers including criminal predation. Steps to improve law enforcement, ease crises in countries of origin and provide more humanitarian aid would push policy in the right direction.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Migration, Law Enforcement, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, United States of America, and Darién Gap

1028. Despite its failure, Oslo process contributed to our national security

Author:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
At a heavy cost in blood, the Israeli public and its leadership now realize the reality that has been demonstrated time and again: the struggle cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Treaties and Agreements, History, Oslo Accords, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

1029. Israel must enhance its strategic value to the US

Author:
Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The material and political support of the United States is an essential pillar in the national security of Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Strategic Interests, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

1030. A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
The rising influence of Christian nationalism in some segments of American politics poses a major threat to the health of our democracy. Increasingly, the major battle lines of the culture war are being drawn between a right animated by a Christian nationalist worldview and Americans who embrace the country’s growing racial and religious diversity. This new PRRI/Brookings survey of more than 6,000 Americans takes a closer look at the underpinnings of Christian nationalism, providing new measures to estimate the proportion of Americans who adhere to and reject Christian nationalist ideology. The survey also examines how Christian nationalist views intersect with white identity, anti-Black sentiment, support of patriarchy, antisemitism, anti-Muslim sentiments, anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarianism, and support for violence. Additionally, the survey explores the influence Christian nationalism has within our two primary political parties and major religious subgroups and what this reveals about the state of American democracy and the health of our society.
Topic:
Religion, Democracy, Survey, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1031. Abortion Attitudes in a Post-Roe World: Findings From the 50-State 2022 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
In late June 2022, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson overturned Roe v. Wade, reversing nearly five decades of precedent that had established a national right to abortion access. Republican-majority legislatures in several states had been chipping away at abortion rights for the past several years through increasingly strict regulations, but the Dobbs decision suddenly changed the policy landscape regarding reproductive rights, catapulting abortion to the forefront of American politics. The immediate impact of repealing Roe v. Wade was that control over abortion law reverted to the states. Some states had “trigger laws” in place to immediately impose abortion restrictions in the event that Roe was overturned, while others had protections in place to keep abortion policy as it was under Roe. In other states, lawmakers went to work crafting legislation in response to Dobbs. As of January 2023, the New York Times reports, 13 states have full abortion bans, some of which allow for exceptions if the life of the mother is in danger and in cases of rape or incest, and Georgia has a 6-week ban in place.[1] According to the Guttmacher Institute, abortion-access laws vary widely in the rest of the country, but all other states allow abortions at least up to 15 weeks into pregnancy.[2] Some state abortion laws have been challenged in court, and access has changed as court orders blocking or allowing restrictions have been put in place or lifted. Republicans in some states have made efforts to restrict reproductive rights a step further, pushing legislation that would limit people’s ability to receive abortion pills by mail or cross state lines to get abortion services, and would even label some forms of birth control as abortifacients.[3] Beginning in March 2022 and throughout the rest of the year, PRRI surveyed Americans about their views on abortion legality and related issues as part of our American Values Atlas. The scope of the project allows us to report results on some questions for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. In general, we found that most Americans support abortion legality in most or all cases and oppose the overturn of Roe. This report delves into the political, religious, and demographic correlates of various opinions on abortion access.
Topic:
Health, Politics, Religion, Survey, Reproductive Health, and Abortion
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1032. Religion and Congregations in a Time of Social and Political Upheaval

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
The religious landscape of the United States has changed dramatically in the past few decades as the country has become more demographically diverse, more Americans than ever have disaffiliated with organized religion, and religious leaders have faced a cultural milieu increasingly polarized along racial and political lines. Churches are also transitioning back to in-person services following the COVID-19 pandemic and dealing with ongoing ripple effects from other major events, including national protests for racial justice, a divisive 2020 presidential election that resulted in a deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, and renewed state legislative battles over reproductive and LGBTQ rights. This new survey examines the religious behaviors of Americans amid this uncertain cultural and political landscape. In addition to highlighting religious affiliation trends, we consider the importance of religion to Americans and look at how often they attend church and engage in religious activities such as prayer. We also look at trends in religious “switching”—leaving one religion for another—and consider the reasons Americans do so. We also analyze the political context that congregations face today. We ask regular churchgoers how often they discuss political and cultural issues in their churches, how well their churches address those issues, and the extent to which partisan divides are apparent in their congregations.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Elections, LGBT+, and Reproductive Health
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1033. The Politics of Gender, Pronouns, and Public Education

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Political debates about gender identity have become heated in recent years, as some state legislatures have increasingly sought to restrict transgender rights. Battles over how — or even if — sexual orientation and gender identity should be discussed in public schools are also erupting at school boards nationally, amid larger frustrations with public education that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic and other social tumult. This new study of more than 5,000 Americans takes a closer look at Americans’ views on gender identity and what is appropriate to teach in public schools with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity. We also gauge Americans’ comfort levels with the idea of a friend using gender-neutral pronouns or pronouns that may not match the respondent’s perception of their friend’s gender. We also ask Americans their thoughts about the age at which children should receive sex education in public schools and what content is appropriate. We consider how partisanship, religion, media trust, parental status, and generation relate to people’s views on these matters. We also consider how knowing people who are LGBTQ influences such views.
Topic:
Politics, LGBT+, Transgender, and Gender Identity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1034. Two Histories, One Future: The Legacy of Confederate Memorials and the Promise of Public Spaces

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
In partnership with E Pluribus Unum (EPU), PRRI convened a series of 26 focus groups across 13 southern states to discuss how residents think about public spaces in their communities and about the legacy and future of Confederate monuments.[1] As documented in the Southern Poverty Law Center’s “Whose Heritage?”project, as of 2022, more than 2,000 Confederate monuments and memorials still exist around the country. Most are concentrated in former Confederate states, but many others have been erected across the country. These monuments take the form of statues and memorials, as well as the names of schools, streets, government buildings, and public parks. Many were built in the early 20th century, as a tribute to the “Lost Cause” of the Confederacy, and some were even dedicated in the 21st century. The past 10 years have brought waves of protests calling for racial justice, triggered by events such as the mass shooting of Black parishioners by a white supremacist at Mother Emanuel Church in Charleston, South Carolina; the “Unite the Right” white-supremacist march in Charlottesville, Virginia; and the killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis, Minnesota. These protests have sparked discussions about the nation’s racial history, during which some people have called for the removal of public monuments and memorials that honor the Confederacy and its leaders. Meanwhile, other people have responded by strongly objecting to their removal. To understand Black and white Americans’ views on this topic, PRRI and EPU convened two focus groups in each of the 13 included states, with participants divided by race: one white group, with a white moderator, and one Black group, with a Black moderator. Having all-white and all-Black groups created a space in which participants were less likely to self-censor their views for fear of offending participants of a different race. Since part of the purpose of the project was to investigate the role of religion in conversations about race and public spaces, the groups included only those who affiliated with a religion and said it was important in their life. Participants were selected to balance other characteristics within the group, including age, gender, and partisan affiliation.[2] Recruitment for each group was focused on a specific city within each state, but owing to the other criteria, some participants came from outlying areas near the city or even other parts of the state.[3] As part of the project, PRRI and EPU also fielded a national survey, with oversamples in each of the 13 focus group states, to see how the focus groups resonated with larger representative samples. Results from the survey are provided throughout this report to provide additional context for the focus group findings.[4] These focus groups provided an important environment for conversations about public spaces and the legacy and future of Confederate memorials. Many Black Americans shared deeply personal anecdotes about how the legacy of the Confederacy has touched their lives and how memorials serve as reminders of a violent past and a tense present. Furthermore, these focus groups shed light on the work that still needs to be done to bridge racial divides in American communities, particularly regarding Confederate memorials.
Topic:
History, Public Space, Confederacy, and Memorials
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1035. Clergy and Congregations in a Time of Transformation: Findings from the 2022-2023 Mainline Protestant Clergy Survey

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Mainline Protestant denominations have played an outsized role in America’s history, given that most of the nation’s founders were members of what we now refer to as mainline Protestant churches. Until the 1960s, more than half of American adults identified with the largest seven mainline Protestant traditions.[1] Since that time, mainline Protestant denominations have suffered significant declines in membership, although their membership numbers have stabilized somewhat in the past few years. Mainline Protestants remained arguably the most neglected of the major religious groups in the American landscape. Unlike white evangelical Protestant clergy and clergy from predominately Black Protestant denominations, mainline Protestant clergy historically are less politically aligned with their congregants and face congregations that are more ideologically diverse.[2] The perspectives of mainline Protestant clergy merit more consideration for several reasons, including their role as leaders within their churches and their local communities. Studies show that clergy often have a significant role in influencing their congregants’ religious and cultural views.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Clergy, and Protestantism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1036. The Faith Factor in Climate Change: How Religion Impacts American Attitudes on Climate and Environmental Policy

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
As the planet’s temperature continues to rise, producing more severe weather events and threatening our future well-being, many religious leaders have in recent years taken clear stances about the dangers that climate change poses. Pope Francis has made climate care an important part of his papacy by establishing a World Day of Prayer each September for the care of creation, and calling on governments to enact more regulations against the emission of fossil fuels and individuals to adopt more sustainable lifestyles. Ecumenical organizations in the United States, such as the National Council of Churches, have long spoken out for environmental causes, linking such concerns to the Christian doctrine of stewardship for the earth. The National Association of Evangelicals issued a sweeping report in 2022 that also called on its followers to address climate change, noting a “biblical basis” to “worship God by caring for creation.” Major Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu religious groups and their leaders have also called for environmental activism based on religious teachings. While the scientific consensus is clear that human activities, particularly through carbon emissions, are the main culprit of climate change, political views differ with respect to the causes of climate change, its political importance, and how to address it. Moreover, religious views on climate change are far from monolithic. This report covers Americans’ assessments of the threats of climate change, how it affects their lives and voting behavior, and what steps they are willing to take to combat climate change, with particular focus on the impact of religion on such views. We also consider how partisanship, media trust, race and ethnicity, generation, and education are linked to climate change attitudes. Furthermore, we explore Americans’ spiritual connections to the earth and reasons why they support taking action to protect the environment.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, and Religion
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1037. Threats to American Democracy Ahead of an Unprecedented Presidential Election

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
In this divided era of American politics, the nation turns its eyes toward an unprecedented presidential election, with two of the oldest leading candidates in history — one of whom is facing federal and state indictments related to efforts to overturn the previous election. The 14th Annual American Values survey, conducted by PRRI in partnership with the Brookings Institution, examines Americans’ attitudes about the leading candidates for president, potential support for third-party candidates, and the issues that define these partisan and cultural fault lines. The survey illuminates Americans’ concerns about the overall direction of the country, the state of the economy and inflation, public education, social connectedness, and the broader health of our democracy. Additionally, the survey highlights attitudes about abortion, gender and LGBTQ issues, immigration, foreign policy, Christian nationalism, and support for QAnon, among other issues.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1038. What’s Next for Oil and Gas Methane Regulations

Author:
Ben Cahill
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Proposed methane regulations for the oil and gas industry are in the works in the United States and the European Union. These new rules—especially the U.S. regulations—could play a critical role in curbing emissions. This brief summarizes the next steps for methane rules on both sides of the Atlantic, including an overview of the emerging regulations in the United States and a synopsis of the EU methane legislation process. It identifies areas that require more analysis, such as how closely measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV), leak detection and repair (LDAR), and reporting requirements will align. The brief also summarizes the current EU approach to reducing methane emissions from its gas imports as well as its longer-term aspirations, outlining the implications for gas exporters to Europe.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Regulation, Sustainability, Methane, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

1039. Centering PEPFAR in U.S. Global Health Security Strategies

Author:
Katherine E. Bliss
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), now in its 20th year, supports initiatives that train health workers, strengthen laboratory capabilities, and deliver critical treatment and prevention services to people living with and at risk of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Credited with having saved more than 25 million lives and enabled more than 5.5 million children to be born HIV-free, PEPFAR programs currently sustain at least 20 million people on antiretroviral therapy. They have also built local capacities that have allowed PEPFAR-supported countries to respond effectively to other health threats, such as the 2019 cholera outbreak in Mozambique, the Covid-19 pandemic, mpox, and the Ebola outbreak in Uganda in 2022. Recognizing the contributions made by PEPFAR to addressing recent health crises, the Biden administration has begun to more explicitly align HIV/AIDS and health security approaches, both in the December 2022 PEPFAR strategy as well as through the July 2023 launch of the Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. In this report, the CSIS Working Group on Reinvigorating U.S. Leadership on HIV/AIDS offers concrete recommendations for advancing progress on reaching the goal of eliminating HIV as a global public health threat by 2030 while maximizing the contributions of a disease-specific health initiative to pandemic preparedness and response.
Topic:
HIV/AIDS, Health, Foreign Aid, and US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief(PEPFAR)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1040. Improving the Efficiency of NRC Power Reactor Licensing: The 1957 Mandatory Hearing Reconsidered

Author:
Matt Bowen, Rama T. Ponangi, and Stephen Burns
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Nuclear energy can play a vital role in helping the US—and the globe—meet mid-century climate goals. But any such role for nuclear depends on overcoming the significant if underappreciated challenges posed by the current nuclear licensing process in the US. Put simply, getting a new nuclear project licensed is time-consuming and expensive. This report, part of ongoing research on nuclear energy at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University SIPA focuses on a singular element of the licensing process that has drawn particular scrutiny for the resources it demands: the so-called mandatory hearing. Dating to a 1957 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, the mandatory hearing was put in place during the early period of nuclear reactor regulation as a way of forcing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to be more transparent with the public about projects under consideration for development. It was intended to provide an open forum in which the details of reactor project applications were aired publicly and debated. But today, well over half a century since the 1957 amendment to the AEA, there are several compelling reasons to reconsider the mandatory hearing requirement.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regulation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1041. The Uncertain Costs of New Nuclear Reactors: What Study Estimates Reveal about the Potential for Nuclear in a Decarbonizing World

Author:
Matt Bowen, Emeka Ochu, and James Glynn
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Models that run decarbonization scenarios to meet mid-century goals for mitigating climate change almost always include a significant role for nuclear energy. The source’s projected level of deployment, however, remains uncertain, largely due to a wide range of estimated costs for new builds. Other factors that make it hard to gauge nuclear’s portion of the future energy mix include whether policies advancing low-carbon technologies will be enacted, the degree of public support for transmission siting and available low-carbon energy sources, whether new reactor technologies and fuels will change the investment equation, and how quickly “competitor” sources such as carbon capture and sequestration, renewables, and storage reduce costs. This report, part of ongoing research into nuclear energy at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA, examines the economics of new nuclear facilities for electricity generation—whether building them out makes sense financially as part of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as power demand grows across the globe. Insights into costs can be gleaned by reviewing the history of construction delays and cost overruns in the United States, international experiences that have fared better and worse, and studies that model a transitioning energy system. Studies reviewed in this report estimate new US reactor costs generally ranging from $3,000/kilowatt (kW) to $6,200/kW based on a variety of reactor designs and cost reduction curves assumed for subsequent years. Internationally, new reactor costs vary significantly by country, depending in part upon factors such as the cost of labor and whether projects involve multiple reactor builds (with attendant efficiencies in manufacturing and construction).
Topic:
Climate Change, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

1042. Overworked and Undervalued: Unmasking Primary Care Physicians’ Dissatisfaction in 10 High-Income Countries

Author:
Evan D. Gumas, Munira Z. Gunja, Arnav Shah, and Reginald D. Williams II
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Commonwealth Fund
Abstract:
In many countries, including the United States, primary care physicians are reaching a breaking point.1 In 2021, an estimated 117,000 physicians in the U.S. left the workforce for reasons like retirement, burnout, and pandemic-related stressors.2 During the COVID-19 pandemic, primary care physicians around the world saw a dramatic fall in in-person visits in favor of telehealth, accompanied in some countries by decreases in revenue.3 The Commonwealth Fund also found that most primary care physicians experienced increases in their workload because of more time spent processing insurance payments, getting patients medications or treatments because of coverage restrictions, and reporting clinical or quality of care data to external entities. This has contributed to increased stress, emotional distress, demoralization, and burnout.4 This brief explores primary care physician work satisfaction in the first year of the pandemic — 2020 to 2021 — drawing from the 2022 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physicians. (See “How We Conducted This Survey” for more details.) Understanding how primary care physicians feel about their everyday work is crucial to improving their patients’ quality of care and to reversing the steady stream of professionals exiting the primary health care workforce. Across 10 high-income countries, including the U.S., we compare primary care physicians’ time spent with patients, number of patients seen, and job satisfaction.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Public Health, Primary Care, and Dissatisfaction
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

1043. Climate Change and Geopolitics in the Blue Pacific

Author:
Danielle Lynn Goh
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Climate change has consistently been articulated as the greatest threat to the region by the leaders of Pacific Island countries. Atoll nations face the possibility of forced displacement due to rising sea levels and extreme weather events. At the same time, these countries risk being drawn into the China-US competition for geopolitical influence even though this rivalry provides opportunities for them to engage with the big powers to deal with climate change. The Pacific island countries have also been strengthening their regional security through a more unified approach, established in their 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Geopolitics, Regional Security, Forced Displacement, and Climate Refugees
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

1044. The U.S.-China Rivalry is Changing International Supply Chains

Author:
Piotr Dzierżanowski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
While the U.S.-China economic rivalry has been intensifying for years and is closely linked to the deterioration in political relations, the sudden collapse of supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the increased role of security considerations in economic relations and the interdependencies between China and developed countries. The American actions to reduce those links will have long-term consequences for U.S.-China relations and the economies of other countries.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Trade, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

1045. Is CBDC Evolutionary or Revolutionary? What Economic History Can Teach Us

Author:
Pierre L. Siklos
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Looking at six historical examples, this paper explores the relationship between technology and monetary arrangements in the context of central bank digital currency (CBDC). The Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom, the greenbacks era in the United States and the end of private money in Canada are among the examples that illustrate the role of the private sector in the development of money, the role of governments in overseeing key functions of money and the impact of economic crises. The author sees CBDC as an evolution, not a revolution, of the monetary system that can co-exist with traditional currency by performing the same core functions of notes and coins.
Topic:
History, Digital Economy, Private Sector, and Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

1046. Sanctions, Economic Statecraft, and Venezuela’s Crisis

Author:
César Rodríguez
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This case study summarizes the evidence on the effect on Venezuela’s economic and social conditions of economic sanctions and other actions of economic statecraft taken by the United States and its allies in response to the country’s political crisis. The preponderance of evidence indicates that sanctions and other statecraft measures—including the formal recognition of a government with no de facto control over the territory—have had a strong and significant negative effect on the Venezuelan economy. These actions have made a sizable contribution to declining oil production, exacerbating the country’s fiscal crisis, and contributing to one of the largest documented peacetime economic contractions in modern history. Many arguments commonly voiced to dispute the effects of sanctions, such as those that appeal to temporal precedence of other causes of the country’s crisis, are either factually incorrect or premised on fallacious logic. Reforming the sanctions regime will be a complex task, given the interaction with other statecraft measures and a broader toxification of the country’s economic relations. Reform attempts should include the introduction of an oil-for-essentials program, support for political humanitarian agreements, issuance of clearer compliance guidelines, introducing an explicit differentiation between strategic and nonstrategic sanctions, and seeking multilateral alignment with international actors on key strategic issues including that of government recognition.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

1047. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1048. EU- Pacific talks: U.S.-Japan relations - new leaders, new chance to restore the old relationship

Author:
Inka Koutná
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
This year’s fifth debate in a series of expert discussions on the EU’s relations with the Pacific took place online on Tuesday 15th of February. The expert guests offered their views on the potential new developments and challenges in U.S.- Japan relations with new political leadership. And future challenges with consideration for a potential multilateral relation with other European countries and countries from the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Multilateralism, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1049. Why the American Public is Less Polarized on Foreign Policy

Author:
Matthew Rochat
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
It is no secret that American social and political life has become a house divided. Over the past several decades, Americans have gravitated increasingly toward politically like-minded clusters. Political ideology now plays a large role in determining the neighborhoods where we live, the friends and family with whom we spend our time, and the news media that we consume. This divisive trend is not limited to the American public, but also characterizes relations between political elites and has contributed to gridlock in congress. The United States has become divided between two camps of increasingly extreme positions, a phenomenon known as polarization. While public opinion has become increasingly polarized on domestic policy, foreign policy has not been susceptible to the same degree. Though foreign policy divisions are growing among political elites, they have not yet trickled down to the general population. The underlying logic is that party elites do not transmit sufficiently clear cues to the public, who in turn, do not effectively interpret these cues. In simpler terms, elites have failed to effectively distinguish Republican foreign policy from Democrat foreign policy. What explains this communication failure?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Parties, Polarization, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1050. Keeping Secrets

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans have had a ringside seat at one of the most unusual of presidential shows: President Joe Biden publicly divulging some of our nation’s most protected, secret insights on what Vladimir Putin and his military might be planning. Some have criticized this; most think it has prevented Putin from controlling the war’s narrative. If we are lucky, it could be part of a more important movement toward liberalizing the use and sharing of intelligence. America and its allies could finally be progressing from a vision of war first theorized a hundred years ago. That violent and indiscriminate vision was fully realized with the city-busting aerial attacks of World War II. Ever since, we have believed that being able to decimate a nation’s military, industrial, and demographic capital promises deterrence in peace and quick victories in war. Today, this vision is being slowly supplanted with weaponry and tactics that can target terror precisely, in order to disable nations without decimating them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Classification, and Secrecy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1051. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

1052. German-US Relations and the Security of the Baltic States

Author:
Marko Mihkelson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fourth brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, we turn our attention to the meaning of Germany’s bilateral relationships. Here, Marko Mihkelson examines the German-US relationship. The health of this relationship is vital for Baltic security, but it has sometimes been turbulent. Berlin’s refusal to support Washington’s invasion of Iraq caused a deep and long-lasting fracture. More recently, their relations have been troubled by Donald Trump’s attacks on Germany, especially over defence spending and the trade imbalance, and by energy politics. To the surprise and disappointment of the Baltic states, President Biden, looking to restore US-German relations, cancelled the Trump administration sanctions that had prevented the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. With Russia again threatening Ukraine, what to do with Nord Stream 2 is now a question for Germany’s new chancellor. Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that Berlin will meet Washington’s expectations for improving defence spending any time soon and diverging US and German policies towards China present fresh challenges to their relationship. It Is vital that Germany recognises, when it deals bilaterally with the US, that it is unavoidably acting as a representative of its European allies too.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, United States of America, and Baltic States

1053. Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups is a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have relied on the Taliban to prevent non-state actors from operating in northern Afghanistan and launching cross-border attacks. In recent months, however, the Islamic State has bombed mosques near the border with Central Asia, and claimed to have launched a rocket attack into Uzbekistan. The deteriorating situation in the region demonstrates the limits of Central Asian states’ security strategies, and highlights that they have few options in dealing with a new threat on their border.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Taliban, Borders, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and United States of America

1054. Afghanistan After Zawahiri: America's Counterterrorism Options in the New South Asia

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Despite the attention in Washington currently paid to developments in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, terrorism remains a threat to US national security. The recent counterterrorism strike against Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul highlights that the fight against al-Qaeda, among other groups, is not over, and that Afghanistan remains a safe harbor for many of the world’s terrorist organizations or their affiliates. Going forward, the United States will need to continue to dedicate resources to detect and disrupt terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. To do so, Washington needs to rebuild a coalition of allies opposed to violent Islamist extremism—both around Afghanistan and inside the country—who can provide intelligence and logistics support as needed, to help in that task.
Topic:
National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

1055. Industrial Feudalism and Wealth Inequalities

Author:
Hanna Szymborska and Jan Toporowski
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The possibility, first raised by Rudolf Hilferding, of stabilizing a capitalist economy through the operations of a ‘general cartel’, leaving only social and political ‘contradictions’ to disturb the functioning of the system, gave rise to a discussion among Marxists not only on whether such a stabilization was at all possible, but also on the nature and scope of those contradictions. This discussion had been anticipated in the 1890s in the work of the Polish Marxist Ludwik Krzywicki (1859 – 1941). He put forward the idea that, in a capitalist economy stabilized in this way, a state of ‘industrial feudalism’ would prevail, in which society would become stratified into social classes without the possibility of mobility between those classes. This analysis was extended in 1940s by Oskar Lange (1904-1965) as he attempted to make sense of the American New Deal and rediscovered in the 1950s by Tadeusz Kowalik (1926-2012). This paper explains the concept of industrial feudalism and argues that the main mechanism for such a stratification today is the unequal distribution of wealth, in the context of declining welfare provision.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Inequality, Feudalism, Industry, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1056. Pricing for Medicine Innovation: A Regulatory Approach to Support Drug Development and Patient Access

Author:
Rosie Collington and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The United States represents the world’s largest market for pharmaceutical drugs. It is also the only advanced economy in the world that does not regulate drug prices. There is no upper threshold for the prices of medicines in the United States. List prices are instead set by manufacturers in negotiation with supply-chain intermediaries, though some federal programs have degrees of discretion in price determinations. In practice, this deregulated system means that drug prices in the United States are generally far higher than in other advanced economies, adversely affecting patient accessibility and system affordability. In this paper, we draw on the “theory of innovative enterprise” to develop a framework that provides both a critique of the existing pricing system in the United States and a foundation for developing a new model of pricing regulation to support safety and effectiveness through drug development as well as accessibility and affordability in the distribution of approved medicines to patients. We introduce a regulatory approach we term “Pricing for Medicine Innovation” (PMI), which departs dramatically from the market-equilibrium assumptions of conventional (neoclassical) economics. The PMI approach recognizes the centrality of collective investments by government agencies and business firms in the productive capabilities that underpin the drug development process. PMI specifies the conditions under which, at the firm level, drug pricing can support both sustained investment in these capabilities and improved patient access. PMI can advance both of these objectives simultaneously by regulating not just the level of corporate profit but also its allocation to reinvestment in the drug development process. PMI suggests that although price caps are likely to improve drug affordability, there remain two potential issues with this pricing approach. Firstly, in an innovation system where a company’s sales revenue is the source of its finance for further drug development, price caps may deprive a firm of the means to invest in innovation. Secondly, even with adequate profits available for investment in innovation, a firm that is run to maximize shareholder value will tend to use those profits to fund distributions to shareholders rather than for investment in drug innovation. We argue that, if implemented properly, PMI could both improve the affordability of medicines and enhance the innovative performance of pharmaceutical companies.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Drugs, Innovation, Medicine, and Price
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1057. Equality Denied: Tech and African Americans

Author:
William Lazonick, Philip Moss, and Joshua Weitz
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Thus far in reporting the findings of our project “Fifty Years After: Black Employment in the United States Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,” our analysis of what has happened to African American employment over the past half century has documented the importance of manufacturing employment to the upward socioeconomic mobility of Blacks in the 1960s and 1970s and the devastating impact of rationalization—the permanent elimination of blue-collar employment—on their socioeconomic mobility in the 1980s and beyond. The upward mobility of Blacks in the earlier decades was based on the Old Economy business model (OEBM) with its characteristic “career-with-one-company” (CWOC) employment relations. At its launching in 1965, the policy approach of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission assumed the existence of CWOC, providing corporate employees, Blacks included, with a potential path for upward socioeconomic mobility over the course of their working lives by gaining access to productive opportunities and higher pay through stable employment within companies. It was through these internal employment structures that Blacks could potentially overcome barriers to the long legacy of job and pay discrimination
Topic:
Labor Issues, Employment, Discrimination, Models, and Equality of Opportunity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1058. Measuring the Impact of Campaign Finance on Congressional Voting: A Machine Learning Approach

Author:
Matthias Lalisse
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
How much does money drive legislative outcomes in the United States? In this article, we use aggregated campaign finance data as well as a Transformer based text embedding model to predict roll call votes for legislation in the US Congress with more than 90% accuracy. In a series of model comparisons in which the input feature sets are varied, we investigate the extent to which campaign finance is predictive of voting behavior in comparison with variables like partisan affiliation. We find that the financial interests backing a legislator’s campaigns are independently predictive in both chambers of Congress, but also uncover a sizable asymmetry between the Senate and the House of Representatives. These findings are cross-referenced with a Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) linking legislators’ financial and voting records, in which we show that “legislators who vote together get paid together”, again discovering an asymmetry between the House and the Senate in the additional predictive power of campaign finance once party is accounted for. We suggest an explanation of these facts in terms of Thomas Ferguson’s Investment Theory of Party Competition: due to a number of structural differences between the House and Senate, but chiefly the lower amortized cost of obtaining individuated influence with Senators, political investors prefer operating on the House using the party as a proxy.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Legislation, and Money
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1059. Investing in Innovation: A Policy Framework for Attaining Sustainable Prosperity in the United States

Author:
William Lazonick
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
“Sustainable prosperity” denotes an economy that generates stable and equitable growth for a large and growing middle class. From the 1940s into the 1970s, the United States appeared to be on a trajectory of sustainable prosperity, especially for white-male members of the U.S. labor force. Since the 1980s, however, an increasing proportion of the U.S labor force has experienced unstable employment and inequitable income, while growing numbers of the business firms upon which they rely for employment have generated anemic productivity growth.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Economic Inequality, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1060. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

1061. Apply the Logic of the Afghanistan Withdrawal to Syria

Author:
Natalia Armbruster
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The logic President Biden used for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan applies to Syria. Since a U.S. intervention should be defined by clear, achievable goals, and since long-range strikes, instead of occupying forces, can accomplish U.S. counterterrorism goals, there is no good case for keeping U.S. troops in Syria either. Around 900 U.S. forces currently occupy territory in eastern and southern Syria, risking conflict with Syrian forces and local militias, as well as Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces. ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria was eliminated in 2019. The few, small, remote areas the remnants of ISIS now hold are largely within territory held by Syrian government forces. Local forces can fight the remnants of ISIS. None of the other standard rationales for keeping U.S. forces in Syria—protecting the Kurds, countering Iran and Russia, unseating the Assad regime—justifies keeping troops in Syria either.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

1062. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

1063. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

1064. Bases, Logistics, and the Problem of Temptation in the Middle East

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The wisdom of making wars easier depends on the wisdom of the wars. Rapid military response to all global trouble may sound good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Maintaining the ability to use rapid military force in the region has become an end unto itself, unmoored from any clear vital strategic interest. Closing bases will make wars more challenging to start, which will help spur public debate about potential interventions due to the transparent upfront costs required. This will give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option in the region. This recommendation is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s logic. Democracy’s benefit for foreign policymaking is its ability to consider many options and give more time to think through various proposals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

1065. At the End of Its Tether: U.S. Grand Strategy of Advancing Democracy

Author:
David C. Hendrickson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Over the past several decades, the United States has made the advance of democracy its great purpose in foreign policy. The Biden administration’s rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is the old habit in new form. U.S. leaders market this goal as consonant with the U.S. liberal tradition, but it in fact offends the nation’s founding ethos, especially in relegating state sovereignty and national independence to secondary status. In the older teaching, accepted even by liberal internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt, free institutions were to expand by example, not by force. After the Cold War, U.S. efforts to push states into becoming democracies by instruction, war, and sanctions have been an abject failure, in large part because they offended against the principle of national independence. Defining U.S. efforts today as the defense of democracy obscures vital problems in the U.S. alliance system, including its expansionist tendencies, its unfair sharing of burdens, and the risks it poses of a major war that would be detrimental to U.S. security. The U.S. should reject the revolutionary policy of regime change and return to the respect for national independence once embedded in the U.S. diplomatic tradition. Overturning autocratic governments is an aim that is antithetical to peace, the most favorable environment for the growth of liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Cold War, Democracy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1066. Implications of a Melting Arctic

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible, which in turn may affect three key issues in the region—militarization, maritime trade, and natural resource development. U.S. security interests in the Arctic remain deterring an attack on the United States and NATO allies and ensuring the lawful use of Arctic waters. The United States can secure both at minimum cost and risk. Greater accessibility does not increase threats emanating from the Arctic, so the United States does not need to do more militarily to ensure its security. Militarization absent threats could lead to a destabilizing security dilemma. Trans-Arctic maritime trade routes and natural resource development present potential economic opportunities; however, both still face significant challenges that limit their near-term viability. The United States should be vigilant to Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic and avoid overreacting or reflexively mirroring their behavior. A U.S. Arctic strategy built on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography, is the best avenue to protect U.S. interests and keep the Arctic at peace.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, Trade, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

1067. War Is a Choice, Not a Trap: The Right Lessons from Thucydides

Author:
Michael C. Desch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap, and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. China faces important geographical and technological obstacles to expanding its hegemonic position in the region. Thucydides’ fundamental lessons for the contemporary United States in its rivalry with China is that democratic Athens erred when it sought primacy by expanding its empire during the Peloponnesian War; today we do not need to preserve a position of primacy in East Asia but can instead rest content with maintaining a balance of power. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, War, History, Alliance, and Geography
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1068. Spheres of Influence in a Multipolar World

Author:
Andrew Latham
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Throughout the modern era, great powers have routinely staked out geographic zones within which they have limited the autonomy of weaker states—often as buffer zones between themselves and potential adversaries or rival empires. Since the nineteenth century, these geopolitical spaces have typically been referred to as spheres of influence. The specific configuration of such spheres depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During moments of multi-polarity, multiple great powers will attempt to assert spheres of influence; during the Cold War era of bipolarity, the international order was defined by two superpower-dominated spheres; during the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. Given this, it was inevitable that the return of multipolarity from the 2010s on would result in the crystallization of a new, multipolar, configuration of spheres of influence—one involving multiple great powers each asserting their own sphere. The relevant question now, therefore, is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how Washington should manage this development in ways that are both realistic and conducive to U.S. interests. The most realistic answer to this how question is to adopt a differentiated strategy that recognizes that, while the U.S. will not be able to prevent spheres of influence as a feature of international order tout court, it may be able to thwart specific spheres in certain specific circumstances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Multipolarity, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

1069. Semiconductors Are Not a Reason to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could cause a major disruption of the global semiconductor supply chain. This has led some to claim that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in order to maintain its supply of advanced chips. Fears that China could seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically are overblown. Interdependence cuts both ways; if China invaded Taiwan, it would be cut off from the vital inputs controlled by the U.S. or its allies, and therefore unable to resume chip production under new management. Others fear Taiwanese chips could be disrupted during a Chinese blockade or a protracted conflict and tend to recommend bolstering U.S. capabilities to deter China. However, there are strong reasons to doubt the U.S. can ultimately deter Beijing if it feels that force is its only option for national reunification. Further efforts by the U.S. to deter China may only present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen, and precipitating the very conflict the U.S. seeks to prevent; a war between the U.S. and China would be exponentially costlier than any potential semiconductor supply shock resulting from a cross-strait invasion. Instead, the U.S. should seek to dial down the temperature with Beijing in order to maintain the political and territorial status quo and buy the time needed to diversify its own semiconductor supplies by onshoring or “allyshoring” chip manufacturing. The U.S. should therefore avoid provoking Beijing unnecessarily, and reaffirm the substance of the One China Policy while seeking to develop a longer-term settlement with Beijing over the future of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

1070. Who Is an Ally, and Why Does It Matter?

Author:
Natalie Armbruster and Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In addition to the 51 allies the United States is obligated by treaty to defend, it has a number of quasi-allies: states the United States is not committed to defend but to which it provides a substantial degree of military and political support. By creating uncertainty about U.S. commitments both at home and abroad, quasi-allies’ ambiguous status creates dangers for both the United States and the quasi-allies. For the United States, the danger is entanglement; having quasi-allies can pull the United States into trouble outside its core interests, creating needless cost, risk, and even war. Quasi-allies may suffer a kind of moral hazard; they may falsely believe they have U.S. military protection and fail to secure themselves sufficiently or become emboldened and dangerously provoke adversaries. U.S. leaders should be more wary of these dangers and avoid loose talk and policy acts that imply a commitment to non-allies’ defense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1071. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

1072. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1073. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1074. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1075. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

1076. Unreliable Data Have Infected the Policy Debates Over Drug Patents

Author:
Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has vividly brought to the public’s attention the key role of medical innovation in saving lives and increasing the quality of daily life. The pandemic has also precipitated an international debate over the role of patents and other intellectual property rights in the discovery, manufacture, and distribution of drugs and vaccines to patients. Even before COVID-19, there has been an ongoing policy debate in Washington, D.C., over drug prices and patents with congressional hearings, proposed legislation, and antitrust enforcement actions. The pandemic has thus made apparent what reliable data have already shown: poorly crafted legislation or antitrust enforcement actions could have a tremendous negative impact on the innovation economy in general and on healthcare specifically by undermining the incentives that drive the billions invested annually in the research and development of life-saving drugs and other medical treatments. Congress and regulators should engage in evidence-based policymaking on these important issues, which have far-reaching implications for economic growth and quality of life. This policy memo identifies a serious concern about the data in these discussions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, Data, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1077. Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Organizational behavior is driven by metrics and measurements, which can compel change more effectively than a flurry of management directives from the C-suite. With Pentagon leaders calling for new ways of building and fighting the force, the time has come to re-examine some of the US military’s fundamental metrics and assess how they could better incentivize the characteristics needed for future combat.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1078. Regaining Decision Advantage: Revising JADC2 to Buttress Deterrence in Our Window of Greatest Need

Author:
Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, Scott Swift, and Eric Wesley
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
We believe that Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a critical priority for the Department of Defense (DoD) as it represents the best path towards deterring potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression and addressing the other military challenges of our time. To the DoD, JADC2 represents the capability to sense and make sense of information at all levels, in all phases of war, across all domains, and with all partners, thereby ensuring information advantage at the speed of relevance.1 JADC2 is therefore the US military’s essential technical enabler to leverage joint and coalition capabilities in complex military operations. Practically speaking, this means choosing important operational problems and wiring together the right sensors and decision aids to deliver the right effects to solve them. The result will create operational dilemmas for our adversaries, and new options for US commanders.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

1079. Building a Team for Next Generation Air Dominance

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US air and naval forces face contested environments over wider areas than ever before. Opponents fighting near their home territory can use long-range surface-to-surface missiles and air defense systems—enabled by a combination of commercial or military satellites and airborne sensors—to threaten US or allied airfields, ships, and aircraft thousands of miles away, as depicted in Figure 1.1 By showing they can slow or prevent US intervention in their regions, aggressors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran hope they can convince neighbors to accept their demands for access, influence, or territory. And if coercion proves unsuccessful, these revisionist powers could employ long-range precision weapons as part of a military offensive to achieve their objectives. Although formidable, long-range weapon and sensor complexes like that of the PRC would not be impenetrable. For example, countermeasures and stealth capabilities could degrade the ability of enemy sensors to target and communicate the location of US ships or aircraft, and self-defense systems could prevent small attacks from being successful. As Figure 1 suggests, against the larger strikes likely to be mounted during war, US ships, aircraft, and bases could also be positioned farther from enemy missile batteries to shrink weapon salvos to within US units’ defensive capacities.3 However, reducing their detectability and attacking from longer ranges would reduce the number and intensity of effects US ships or aircraft could generate. Consequently, adversary leaders may have greater confidence in their ability to win a war on acceptable terms.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1080. Learning to Win: Using Operational Innovation to Regain the Advantage at Sea against China

Author:
Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, and Trent Hone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US Navy has spent the last decade attempting to pivot from efficiently maintaining the post–Cold War peace to effectively preventing and fighting a war against China or Russia. The circa-2000 Navy faced pervasive low-end threats from terrorists, insurgents, and regional opponents; today it is up against great power adversaries who used the past twenty years of relative stability to modernize and expand their fleets. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is now larger than its American counterpart and is narrowing the US Navy’s capability advantages.1 Russia’s Navy, while smaller than that of the United States or China, boasts some of the most capable submarines in the world and hypersonic missile-equipped frigates.2 Proliferation of computing, sensing, material, and countermeasure technologies has leveled the playing field for military capability development. Building faster, more precise, stealthier, or smarter ships, aircraft, and weapons than opponents⎯the US Navy’s playbook since the Cold War⎯will no longer yield substantial or persistent advantages. The Navy will need to continue pursuing improved capabilities, but regaining and maintaining an edge against Chinese and Russian forces will depend as much or more on the US fleet establishing new operational concepts and tactics that exploit its strengths and its enemies’ vulnerabilities.3
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Navy, Maritime, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1081. Restarting the Post-Pandemic Indian Economy

Author:
Aparna Pande, Eric B. Brown, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report is a result of a Takshashila-Hudson Roundtable Series that brought together experts, policymakers, and academics from India and the United States in November and December 2021 to discuss opportunities for the two nation-states to collaborate in a fast-changing global order. This section summarizes key recommendations for policymakers based on deliberations at the Takshashila-Hudson roundtable series Restarting the Post-Pandemic Indian Economy. The recommendations are divided into four themes for India-US Collaboration: Trade, Investments, Technology, and Human Capital Movement.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Immigration, Economy, Investment, Human Capital, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

1082. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1083. State Right-to-Repair Laws Need to Respect Federal Copyright Laws: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Assessment

Author:
Devlin Hartline and Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Various states are considering laws that would mandate that producers of electronic devices provide consumers and repair shops with all the tools and know-how necessary to repair these devices. Proponents of these “right-to-repair laws” argue that consumers should be able to do whatever they want with their devices, whether a smartphone, a smart TV, or a gaming console. Right-to-repair advocates, however, ignore inconvenient facts. These state laws conflict with federal copyright law and are unconstitutional, and they are bad policy as well. First, as a simple legal matter, the proposed right-to-repair laws are unconstitutional. These laws mandate the disclosure and distribution of the code in the computer programs that make our devices work, such as operating systems, apps, and the “digital locks” that protect these computer programs from unauthorized access and copying. Federal copyright law protects all these computer programs and “preempts” any conflicting state laws under the Constitution. Second, state right-to-repair laws are wrong as a matter of policy. These laws upset the long-standing balance of rights implemented by federal copyright law. For over 200 years, Congress has enacted copyright laws to secure to authors and innovators the fruits of their creative labors. These laws have properly balanced the rights of creators, the rights of companies that produce and distribute their copyrighted works, and the rights of consumers and the public. As a result, federal copyright law has been a launching pad for the economic and cultural revolutions in books, movies, music, and now digital games and the internet of things. Everyone values their electronic devices because copyright law provides the legal foundation for today’s thriving digital marketplace. Consumers have access to an incredible selection of movies, music, games, and many other previously unimagined digital goods and services. The same is true for products that consumers have long used and that have become “smart” today, such as phones, TVs, automobiles, and other devices. Overbroad right-to-repair laws fail to acknowledge the legal rights and the underlying policies in federal copyright law that have made all this possible.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1084. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

1085. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

1086. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

1087. Upholding a Rules-Based Order: Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This study is focused on regional order in the Indo-Pacific, as set out in the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and on the policies that the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and European allies have adopted to support this rules-based order in the face of multifaceted challenges posed by the rise of a powerful and assertive China. This study considers the evolution of the foundational elements of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the conceptual origins as set out in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first government by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, the increasing alliance-based cooperation between and among alliance partners, the development of alliance-based strategic partnerships across the region, the evolving multilateralism as reflected in the emergence of the Quad (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the increasing engagement of European allies. The free and open Indo-Pacific—as advanced by Foreign Minister Aso and Prime Minister Abe, and later adopted by the US—set out a framework for regional governance and order based on democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, the market economy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and opposition to force or coercion to change the status quo. To support this vision, alliance ties have strengthened across the Indo-Pacific. Today, the US-Japan alliance is at a historic high point, having moved toward the strategic alignment of its respective policy documents. Meanwhile, the US and Australia have made the Indo-Pacific the focal point of the alliance, and Japan-Australia security ties have deepened, as underscored by the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement. At the same time, the Quad has engaged on wide-ranging economic and security issues relating to the region in support of a rules-based free and open Indo-Pacific. And European engagement in the Indo-Pacific has continued to grow, as underscored by the United Kingdom’s “tilt” toward the region and participation in the AUKUS arrangement. Europe’s expanding engagement is well outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy documents of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union—all reflecting the recognition of Europe’s growing economic, political, and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. This study also considers the implication of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the response of Western powers for international order in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Against a background of contemporary doubts about the staying power of the international order, the response of Western democracies, in both Europe and Asia, has been striking in their support of the rules-based international order. In Europe, NATO’s support for Ukraine has been constant. At the same time, Indo-Pacific allies, concerned about the implications of Ukraine for regional security, have joined in sanctions against Russia. Quad leaders meeting to discuss Ukraine also reaffirmed their support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida asserting that challenges to the international order, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “should not be allowed in the Indo-Pacific.” The pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific order and reaffirmation of a rules-based order in both Asia and Europe now increasingly overlap. Then Foreign Secretary Liz Truss underscored to the Atlantic Council the importance of sustaining Western unity in the face of challenges to the international order—in Europe and in Asia. In her words, “Conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are indivisible.” The challenges going forward will be to sustain Western unity to support an international rules-based order—in Asia, this means reinforcing the free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Order, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1088. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1089. How to Target Iran’s Kleptocracy

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police sparked protests that continue to spread across the country, posing the most serious challenge to Tehran’s theocratic dictatorship in years. The demonstrations have focused on opposing the compulsory wearing of the hijab, but Iranians are also venting anger at a regime that has lost legitimacy after decades of political repression, economic mismanagement, and systemic corruption. Policymakers in the United States are rightly focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program and state sponsorship of terrorism. Sanctions and other measures targeting the regime’s illicit financial networks tend to reflect these urgent priorities. But Iran’s theocratic regime is also a sprawling, deeply entrenched kleptocracy against which the US should apply more pressure. This brief examines the prevailing forms of corruption within Iran, the implications for US policy, and how the US can intensify efforts to expose and target the regime’s kleptocracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

1090. Rocket’s Red Glare: Modernizing America’s Energetics Enterprise

Author:
Nadia Schadlow, Brayden Helwig, Bryan Clark, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Energetic materials are critical chemicals that release huge amounts of energy in a very short amount of time. Energetics come in three main forms: explosives, which create the lethal effects in warheads; propellants, which produce thrust for missiles and rockets; and pyrotechnics, such as fireworks, which illuminate or mark targets for military and civilian applications. Nearly every weapon on the modern battlefield, from small arms to missiles to munitions, relies on some form of energetic materials. Improvements in energetics can offer significant benefits on the battlefield. In some cases, better compounds can boost the range of missiles by 40 percent or more—allowing the targeting of an adversary from a safer distance—while also improving lethality and decreasing munition size. These advantages can help the US military realize many of its operational concepts, such as those developed to counter the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), aims to prevent the US military from operating near its shores by fielding thousands of anti-ship missiles. This concept is often referred to as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. If China’s leaders act on their stated intention to invade the island of Taiwan, denying the PLA this objective would require large numbers of long-range, precision-guided munitions fired from outside the A2/AD “bubble,” coupled with other platforms that could penetrate the PLA’s defenses with powerful munitions. These types of US responses depend on energetics and the munitions that use these compounds. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the industrial base for munitions has grown increasingly brittle as innovation and investments in energetics have stagnated. Although the United States developed key compounds like CL-20—one of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear explosives—in the late 1980s, the US military still overwhelmingly uses the same energetic materials it deployed during World War II.1 Moreover, recent assessments of the industrial base have found that the DoD imports roughly a third of its energetic materials from foreign sources, with a significant portion of these sourced from China or other countries.2 For instance, one expert we spoke with stated that most trinitrotoluene (TNT) in the explosive fill of common US bombs comes from foreign sources. Other challenges include an aging network of twentieth-century production facilities, a broken business model that discourages innovation and investment, a shrinking workforce, and stifling regulations.
Topic:
National Security, Weapons, Supply Chains, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1091. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

1092. A Rotten Money Regime is Responsible for Pandemic and War Inflation

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Who is responsible for the Great Pandemic and War Inflation of 2021–22? Is it Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell, former President Donald Trump, President Joe Biden, or President Vladimir Putin? The answer is that the buck stops at a rotten monetary regime—the so-called “2-percent-inflation standard.” Trying to blame particular individuals may help those who gain from the present monetary status quo. Yet blaming them absolves the monetary regime, which is trampling upon the green shoots whose growth is essential for the renaissance of competitive free-market capitalism. If the United States had a good money regime when first the pandemic and then the Russian war struck the economy, the great monetary inflation that these shocks spawned would not have occurred. The current money regime might well have done better with more capable leadership and good luck—but the regime’s deep flaws prevented the possibility of an overall good outcome. Furthermore, even if the pandemic and war had not struck, the bad money regime was producing bad outcomes—including economic sclerosis with sluggish growth rates for productivity and living standards while advancing monopoly capitalism. These outcomes could well have gotten a lot worse.. This policy memo focuses on the shocks of the pandemic and war rather than what could have happened without them. However, it does venture into the counterfactual of how a good money regime would have responded to those shocks, while helping demonstrate what has gone wrong. Demonstrating the links between the rottenness of the monetary system and the high inflation during the pandemic and Russian war requires sharing with the reader a preview of the differences between good and bad money regimes. A broader analysis of these should follow in subsequent policy memos
Topic:
Economics, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1093. Eleven Myths and Realities about Biden’s Missile Defense Review

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On October 27, 2022, the Biden administration released the public version of the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The document is commendable in some respects and is concerning in others. Below are some myths and realities about the Biden MDR.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1094. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

1095. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:
Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

1096. Advancing the Quantum Advantage: Hybrid Quantum Systems and the Future of American High-Tech Leadership

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Quantum computers mark a transformational revolution in information technology. Whereas most computers process data using bits that consist of either a zero or one, quantum computers can use those digits simultaneously through superposition.1 The many resulting benefits will include the discovery of new drugs, new processes for carbon capture and advanced battery research, and a new exactitude in weather prediction, including in dealing with climate change.2 All in all, experts expect the global quantum computing industry to grow to $450–850 billion in value in the next 15 to 30 years.3 Yet because of the challenges of engineering qubits—the physical basis of quantum computing—most authorities push the timeline for full-scale quantum computer commercialization beyond 2040 and as far as 2050. Even some quantum experts do not expect any big breakthroughs until the 2030s at the earliest. The true path to the quantum future is the combination of quantum and classical digital technology, especially in computing, which will powerfully accelerate access to the potential benefits of quantum information science. While key players in the industry, including IBM and Microsoft, have recognized the potential synergy of hybrid architectures and applications, the federal government needs to expand its attention and resources devoted to this aspect of securing America’s quantum future and its leadership in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Leadership, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1097. US-China geoeconomic rivalry intensifies: A risk or an opportunity for European companies?

Author:
Jana Titievskaia
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
As the US and China balance between the pursuit of strategic security interests and ambitions to attain economic growth, novel sources of risk are emerging for globally active businesses, ranging from sanctions to export controls. The Biden presidency will offer only moderate respite from the escalation of this geoeconomic rivalry, even as US-China trade recovers in the aftermath of the pandemic. In the face of US-China rivalry, the EU and its member states have opted for the third way of “open strategic autonomy”, including a range of trade instruments that will allow the EU to support the competitiveness of its companies more effectively. European companies need to closely monitor their risk exposure in various transmission channels and stay attuned to unexpected opportunities that can materialise in the form of market entry possibilities and the development of new niches.
Topic:
Hegemony, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1098. US global security partnerships in the Biden era: Twilight or regeneration?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Guarantee-based alliances underpinned US grand strategy during the Cold War, but policies designed for the War on Drugs (WOD) after the 1990s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 2000s, and counter-piracy operations in the 2010s have led US policymakers to increasingly rely on ad hoc security partnerships. Looser partnerships facilitate cooperation that is quick to reform and redistribute, benefiting the US when reacting to urgent risks. When the necessity for cooperation diminishes, partnerships allow for prompt “exit options”. Guided by a narrowing set of strategic priorities under President Biden, the US partnership network is undergoing some downsizing. As part of a wider effort to challenge the US-led international order, Russia and China seek to reduce US opportunities to renew security partnerships. Ever closer US and NATO partnerships with Finland and Sweden have bucked an otherwise weakening global trend in recent years. Russia’s escalated aggression in Ukraine has caused Finland and Sweden to seek policy change from partnership-based security policies to NATO membership and stronger deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1099. A Roundtable on Tizoc Chavez, The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H.W. Bush

Author:
Kelly M. McFarland, Jeffrey A. Engel, Silke Zoller, Seth Offenbach, M. Elizabeth Sanders, and Tizoc Chavez
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
Presidential diplomacy has arguably been more front and center in the American public consciousness than usual over the last half decade. President Trump made his personal relationship with a multitude of world leaders a key media talking point. Whether it was his use of Twitter to praise, degrade, or threaten another leader, his bombastic actions at NATO and G-7 summits, his secretive discussions with Vladimir Putin, or his eventual BFF relationship with Kim Jong Un, Trump was always quick to place himself at the helm of his administration’s diplomatic endeavors. Likewise, albeit with a different tone, strategy, and oftentimes different desired outcomes, President Biden has made much of his personal diplomatic skills, and his belief in the need to use them. Candidate Biden touted his foreign policy experience on the campaign trail, noting that he personally knew many world leaders. Biden has used his experience and full Rolodex to try and repair relationships with allies. This approach has been on full display since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This recent atmosphere of personal presidential diplomacy makes the arrival of Tizoc Chavez’s work, The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush, all the more important. Chavez makes it clear that presidential diplomacy as we know it today become part of the office, for better or worse, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Most importantly, Chavez demonstrates that regardless of a president’s personal inclinations, personal diplomacy will come into play at points throughout their presidencies due to any one, or a combination, of four consistent structures. In doing so, he adroitly demonstrates how personal diplomacy became an ingrained part of the modern presidency.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hegemony, Leadership, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1100. The Ukraine Crisis: There Is Still Room for Diplomacy

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Confronting each other over the future of Ukraine, NATO and Russia are engaged in complicated diplomatic bargaining over security, power and the limits of the transatlantic alliance in Europe. Diplomacy can work toward a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis, in spite of the heated public rhetoric. The US and the EU share a common objective in preventing a war in the short term and reaching an understanding with Russia in the longer term. The EU may not be at the negotiating table, but it is still actively involved in the diplomatic discussions. It plays an important role via deterrence and diplomacy in several fora, while France is steadily upgrading its geopolitical standing and pursuing a modus vivendi with Russia. Greece is closely monitoring the Ukrainian crisis and supports all de-escalation efforts. The presence of Greek diaspora communities in Ukraine is an important factor. So are Turkey’s efforts to assume a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia with a view to upgrading its own NATO standing.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America