Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: within 3 Years

1. Global Energy Competition in the Arctic: A Reassessment

Author:: Sergey Vakulenko
Publication Date:: 07-2027
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Western powers may soon find it hard to escape an unpalatable dilemma: either they need to invest heavily in ice-class marine capability, both military and commercial, with unclear payback prospects, or they will have to cede leadership in the Arctic to the Sino-Russian tandem.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, Global Focus, and United States of America

2. The US's tougher stance on multilateral formats

Author:: Szymon Zaręba
Publication Date:: 03-2027
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: The administration of US President Donald Trump will seek to exert greater influence over processes within the UN, whilst reducing its involvement in the activities of several international organisations (IOs) which it considers less important. The reduction in funding for various formats will increase pressure on Poland and like-minded states to increase their contributions towards their maintenance.
Topic:: International Organization, United Nations, Multilateralism, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Poland, North America, and United States of America

3. Empire Salon | William Smith | Oct 14 2020

Author:: William Smith
Publication Date:: 12-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Center for the Study of Statesmanship, Catholic University
Abstract:: William Smith, a distinguished former student of Committee Board member Claes Ryn, has written an insightful book on the realistic and restrained foreign policy tradition of the United States. Smith highlights the great Harvard scholar, Irving Babbitt, with his clear understanding of the crooked timber of man -- especially when acting collectively -- which reduces moral inhibitions against violence. James Madison explained in Federalist 55, “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Democracy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

4. What Happens If the United States Leaves the WTO?

Author:: James Bacchus
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Aresolution before Congress calls for US withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both international law and US law permit withdrawal. The case for withdrawal, however, is misguided and misinformed. Much of what is said and widely believed about the effects of WTO membership on the United States is simply untrue. In fact, American membership in the WTO has been for decades and remains today enormously beneficial economically to US businesses, workers, and consumers. Withdrawal by the United States from the WTO would result in the loss of many of these economic benefits, including those derived from decades of accumulated trade commitments made by the 165 other member countries on thousands of different US goods and services traded within the WTO legal framework; those resulting from the commercial shield of WTO rules forbidding trade discrimination against US exports; and those emanating from the availability to the United States of an impartial, binding, and enforceable system of WTO trade dispute settlement. Moreover, withdrawal by the United States would cede US leadership in the WTO to other leading trading countries, including the second-largest trading country in the world, China. Trade is a win-win economically for all WTO members. WTO membership maximizes the overall economic gains from engaging in trade. The United States should remain in the WTO and help lead it toward needed reforms that will make it more beneficial to all in the modern global economy of the 21st century.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: During 2025 multiple contending Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals were put forward by the Trump administration and America’s European partners. This article examines how the leading official proposals fell short. And it presents two, simpler proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. The article also explores the evolution of US, Ukrainian, Russian, and West European public opinion on the war. The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster – not only for the two principal combatants, who together have suffered 300,000 deaths, but for the entire world. This fact drives the imperative to end this conflict forthwith via negotiated compromise. Yet, as the article shows, none of the official proposals embrace this imperative. Instead, all exhibit efforts to win advantage for one side or the other. They are instances of diplo-fare – war by means of diplomacy. As such, their aim may be rejection not agreement, with an eye toward painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, build support for continuing the fight – or, in the case of President Trump’s preference, establish a pretext for US withdrawal. The simplest proposals may be the most practicable but these must reflect current battlefield realities rather than attempting to “correct” or “re-balance” them. This principle guides the independent cease-fire options suggested in this article. Otherwise, the article explores the possibility that Europe’s so-called Coalition of the Willing will respond to any serious fracture of Kyiv’s effort – a distinct possibility – by establishing a new nuclearized Europe-vs-Russia “central front” inside Ukraine. (With an Appendix summarizing the official November and December peace proposal texts.)
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, European Union, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere

Author:: Sergey Sukhankin
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington. The Kremlin’s relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela’s oil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda. Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela’s crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia. Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia’s military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Power Projection
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

7. Venezuela: The Emperor Has No Clothes

Author:: Anil Anand
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: America’s attack on Venezuela—alongside threats to annex Greenland, incorporate Canada as its 51st state, attack Colombia, or seize control of the Panama Canal—raises existential concerns about America’s commitment to a rule-based order and the legitimacy of the prevailing system for global governance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Order, and Nicolas Maduro
Political Geography:: South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

8. The Impact of Occupational Status on Public Attitudes Toward Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey

Author:: Michelle S. Dromgold-Sermen
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: For many non-immigrants in the United States, adjusting one’s legal status to lawful permanent residence through employment-sponsorship is a unique and attractive pathway to permanent residence and prospective citizenship in the United States. However, amidst an uncertain future for non-immigrant temporary work visas, tech layoffs, and stalled legislative immigration reform, many non-immigrant visa-holders are leaving the United States and taking their talent with them. This paper specifically examines visa and immigration processing delays for employment-sponsored adjustments of status to lawful permanent residence in the United States between 2007 and 2019. Based on descriptive analysis and discrete time event history models of data posted to an online immigration forum I call “Immigration Journey,” I document how immigrant visa-holders’ waiting in the U.S. immigration bureaucracy for employment-based immigrant visa processing reflects and reproduces racial, educational, and socioeconomic hierarchies and inequities. I find that immigrants from countries of origin with smaller populations, higher skill levels, and those able to pay for premium processing have higher likelihoods of a quick adjustment of status decision. Conversely, immigrants from countries of origin with larger populations or those with lower skill levels are left waiting longer for their adjustment of status decisions — even when they pay for premium processing of their petition for an immigrant visa. Based on this finding, I introduce the concept of a hierarchy of waiting to illustrate the ways in which legislation and inequitable administrative policies in U.S. immigrant visa processing become mechanisms of waiting. By doing so, this paper makes a theoretical contribution for understanding stratification within the employment-based immigrant visa pathway and highlights how this hierarchy of waiting exacerbates inequalities in immigration more broadly. The empirical findings and conceptualization of a hierarchy of waiting inform policy recommendations for: 1. legislative reform of country caps for lawful permanent residence; 2. legislative reform of preference category caps for lawful permanent residence; 3. increased funding for United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processing; and 4. increased transparency and communication of USCIS processes. Such policy changes would make immigrant visa availability and USCIS processing more equitable for future lawful permanent residents and citizens who are eligible to adjust their status through employment-based and other immigrant visa preference categories. Streamlined changes to the U.S. immigration legislation and administrative processes are critical for the United States’ future innovation and growth.
Topic:: Employment, Bureaucracy, Immigration Policy, and Lawful Permanent Residence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

9. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions

Author:: Pavel Devyatkin
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

10. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:: Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

11. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica

Author:: Xavier Villar
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
Topic:: Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

12. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:: Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

13. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:: Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

14. Mapping Support for LGBTQ Rights Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: LGBTQ Americans trend younger, Democratic, liberal, and more religiously unaffiliated than other Americans. One in ten Americans identify as LGBTQ. Two in ten Americans ages 18-29 (20%) identify as LGBTQ, compared with smaller shares among those ages 30-49 (11%), ages 50-64 (5%), and ages 65 and older (4%). LGBTQ Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats (40%), compared with 28% of all Americans, and are nearly twice as likely to identify as politically liberal (51% vs. 26%, respectively). The majority of LGBTQ Americans identify as religiously unaffiliated (51%), compared with 27% of all Americans. Views on LGBTQ rights differ strongly by state. Massachusetts (85%), Maryland (82%), and Alaska (81%), along with the District of Columbia (82%), hold the highest support for nondiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, while Mississippi (60%), Wyoming (57%), and Arkansas (53%) show the lowest support. Massachusetts (72%), Hawaii (71%), Vermont (71%), and Connecticut (70%), along with the District of Columbia (70%), show the strongest opposition to religiously based service refusals, while West Virginia (44%) shows the lowest opposition. The only states without majority support for same-sex marriage are Mississippi (47%) and Arkansas (50%). Massachusetts (85%), Rhode Island (85%), and Vermont (81%) show the highest support. Except for Christian nationalism Adherents, strong majorities of Americans — including most people of faith — support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals. Most Americans support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people (72%), with Democrats (90%) being the most supportive, followed by independents (76%) and Republicans (56%). Majorities of most major religious groups support non-discrimination protections, though support is highest among non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Christian nationalism Rejecters (91%) are the most likely to support nondiscrimination protections, followed by 77% of Skeptics, 61% of Sympathizers, and 42% of Adherents. Over the past decade, Americans ages 18-29 have shown a gradual decrease in support for LGBTQ nondiscrimination laws, from 80% in 2015 to 70% in 2025, largely driven by young Republicans, while seniors 65 and over have increased their support from 61% to 74% over the same period. Except for Republicans, Christian nationalism Adherents, and Sympathizers, most Americans continue to oppose religiously based service refusals for LGBTQ people. Most Americans oppose allowing small businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people on religious grounds (59%), with Democrats (82%) more likely to oppose, compared with independents (60%) and Republicans (35%). Opposition among white Christians grew from 49% in 2015 to 55% in 2020, but has declined since to 46%. Opposition among Christians of color, non-Christians, and religiously unaffiliated Americans remains high. Christian nationalism Rejecters (83%) are the most likely to oppose religiously based refusals for LGBTQ people, followed by 62% of Skeptics, 44% of Sympathizers, and 32% of Adherents. Support for same-sex marriage remains high for most Americans, but partisanship, religious affiliation, and Christian nationalist views are linked to differing opinions. Support for same-sex marriage remains higher today (65%) than in 2015 (53%). Today, Republicans (49%) are notably less likely than Democrats (83%) and independents (69%) to support same-sex marriage. Majorities of most religious groups support same-sex marriage, except for Latter-day Saints (47%), Hispanic Protestants (45%), white evangelical Protestants (37%), Muslims (37%), and Jehovah’s Witnesses (19%). Nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (93%) and three-fourths of Skeptics (73%) support same-sex marriage, compared with 46% of Sympathizers and 22% of Adherents. Except for young Americans under 30, support for same-sex marriage has steadily grown across older age groups, gender, race, and education levels. While most Americans agree that transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans, just 40% oppose laws that require transgender people to use bathroom of their sex assigned at birth. Seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans,” including most Democrats (88%), independents (77%), and Republicans (57%). Except for Christian nationalism Adherents (40%), solid majorities across all religious groups, Christian nationalism groups, age, gender, race, and education levels agree that transgender people deserve the same rights as other Americans. The majority of Americans (56%) favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex at birth, with most Republicans (81%) in favor, compared with 55% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Americans who agree transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans are less likely to favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex assigned at birth than those who disagree that transgender people deserve the same rights (49% vs. 77%).
Topic:: Human Rights, Religion, Discrimination, LGBT+, Transgender, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15. Netanyahu’s Long Game to Reorder the Middle East

Author:: Akram Zaoui
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the inspirator of the ongoing war in the Middle East, Netanyahu’s actions must be read through decades of political action. US participation in the war marks the apex of years of manoeuvring in Washington to reshape the region. Goals sought include obliteration of regional strategic threats and normalisation with Arab countries from a position of undisputable strength.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Normalization, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

16. Letter from Joseon to Korea: International Politics of the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Muhammad Eren Yıldırım
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: South Korea has indispensable military relations with the United States (US), especially in the context of its hostile relations with North Korea. In addition, China’s giant economic power makes South Korea reluctant to abandon its relations with China. Yet another significant factor complicating the regional dynamics for South Korea is the unresolved historical issues inherited from the imperial exploitation by the Japanese Empire on the Korean peninsula. This book aims to replace the narrative of South Korea’s as an “agent” in the global arena, considering its historical values and above-mentioned transforming conditions, with a multifaceted approach called “strategic pragmatism.” The author asks the following questions: what resources does South Korea have in its foreign policy-making processes?, what is its strategy based on these resources?, and what are the sources of the fundamental beliefs that construct the policymakers’ perception of South Korea’s foreign policy strategy?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Book Review, Regional Politics, and Strategic Pragmatism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

17. Deepening Strategic Alignment: Priorities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:: Kristi Govella and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: With new leadership in both countries, Japan and the United States are facing an increasingly uncertain global environment. As Japan prepares to revise its core national strategy documents, it is a particularly important time for Tokyo and Washington to deepen their strategic alignment. Although bilateral cooperation continues to proceed relatively smoothly at the operational level, there is a pressing need to articulate a strategic vision to guide alliance priorities and facilitate effective implementation of common objectives.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Managing the Transatlantic Relationship in the Absence of US Leadership: Understanding the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy

Author:: Paul Fritch
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a radical shift in US foreign policy, involving a move from global leadership of a rules-based international order to unabashed nationalism and regional hegemony. The new strategy no longer views the country’s sprawling network of alliances and partnerships and its ability to attract and integrate high-level talent from around the world as unique strengths, but rather as vulnerabilities to be mitigated. However, as jarring as these substantive changes are, the document’s structural changes and the irregular process that produced it may prove more significant in demonstrating just how sharply Washington is turning away from 80 years of bipartisan foreign policy consensus. The change is evident not just in the Trump administration’s policies, but – crucially – in the decision-making process that produces them. The new NSS is best understood as the formalisation of the administration’s abandonment of traditional policy coordination and strategic planning itself, an effort that has included the removal of senior career diplomats, military commanders, and intelligence officers; the systematic dismissal of senior judge advocates general and inspectors general; and the firing of many National Security Council (NSC) staff. The collective result of these steps, which find their natural culmination in the NSS and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that followed in January 2026, is a policymaking process that is less informed by objective intelligence and analysis, less constrained by legal and policy advice or alliance consultation, and thus more subject to impulsiveness and ideological influence. Both of these developments – a new “America First” nationalism that eschews multilateral constraints and an erratic decision-making process that produces unpredictable and often impracticable outcomes – require a fundamental assessment by the country’s partners of their approach to the United States, both bilaterally and within established multilateral frameworks. This Policy Brief examines the practical implications of the 2025 NSS and the dramatically changed decision-making process it represents. For transatlantic allies and other middle powers, the central question is no longer whether US strategy has changed, but how to operate effectively in an environment of reduced predictability and diminished US strategic anchoring.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

19. Representatives in Robes? How California Respondents think of Judicial Representation

Author:: Nancy Bays Arrington and Matthew Moore
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: Many have identified the tension between conceptualizing judges as legal versus political actors. One dimension of this tension is the extent to which we should or do think of judges as political representatives, both broadly and in ways that are either similar to or distinct from elected political representatives. In this project, we address the role of judges as representatives and then assess whether and to what extent California residents think of judges as representatives. Using public opinion data of California residents from the CalSpeaks survey fielded in the spring of 2021, we find that about a third of respondents do consider judges representatives in some way. While we find no gender differences in perceptions of judicial representation and very limited racial differences, there are strong age differences: younger respondents were significantly more likely to indicate that judges are representatives in some way compared to older respondents. This project informs how Californians understand the role of the courts, which might have consequences for judicial legitimacy and effectiveness.
Topic:: Politics, Public Opinion, Representation, Legitimacy, and Judiciary
Political Geography:: California, North America, and United States of America

20. COVID-19 Relief Measures had Few Durable Post-Pandemic Effects on Renters

Author:: Benjamin Mark Reicher and Michael Kuehlwein
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic was responsible for an unprecedented crisis in the rental housing market, as families faced eviction as a consequence of pandemic lockdowns and resulting economic recession. In response, for the first time ever in US history, eviction moratoria were introduced to protect renters from being evicted for nonpayment; these were accompanied by several stimulus measures to support renters and the overall economy. This study asks whether these pandemic-era policies had any lingering effects after they had ceased to be implemented, by examining whether renters’ housing vulnerability at the state level saw any improvement in the post-pandemic years of 2022-23. For comparison, the study also evaluates the effects of variables reflecting economic fundamentals and renters’ housing burden. The findings suggest that the included policies had little effect on renters’ post-pandemic housing precarity.
Topic:: Economics, Public Policy, Eviction, COVID-19, Housing, Rent, and Housing Market
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

21. Lilliputians at the Gate: Small Individual Campaign Donations and Political Polarization in Western State Legislatures

Author:: Todd Lochner, Ellen Seljan, Madeleine MacWilliamson, and Valerie Naborska
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: Scholars seek to understand campaign donor behavior and its effects on candidates. Researchers generally agree that individual donors are more ideologically extreme than most organizational donors but disagree as to whether small individual donors (those giving less than $200 per cycle) are especially correlated to extremist candidates. We study the relationship between small individual donors and legislators’ NPAT and CFscores for the California, Washington, and Oregon legislatures between 2016 and 2022. We find both that individual donors correlate to more partisan legislators in general and that the correlation between donors and politically polarized legislators is even greater for small individual donors than for large individual donors in most cases.
Topic:: Politics, Campaign Finance, Campaign Donations, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: Washington, California, North America, United States of America, and Oregon

22. The 2026 oil crisis: an opportunity for Europe's energy transition

Author:: Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Seven weeks after the launch of the joint US-Israeli attacks against Iran on 28 February, the damage to regional production facilities and the virtual halt to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a rise in crude oil prices of nearly 60% for the WTI index and over 70% for Brent. Despite the two-week truce declared on 7 April, these increases have already had a painful impact on our economies. The duration of the tensions will, of course, determine the severity of the crisis, but the damage has already been done.
Topic:: Oil, Armed Conflict, Energy Crisis, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

23. Law and Politics of Israel and the United States’ Attacks on Iran with Maryam Jamshidi (Episode 54)

Author:: Sahar Aziz and Maryam Jamshidi
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Join host Professor Sahar Aziz (https://www.law.rutgers.edu/bio/sa1356) in her conversation with Professor Maryam Jamshidi (https://www.colorado.edu/law/node/125...) about the political and legal implications of Israel and the United States' unprovoked military attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. As Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu publicly admitted, the Israeli government has been preparing for a war to topple the Iranian regime for over 30 years. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internation...) Knowing they do not possess sufficient military capacity to do it alone, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the United States to start a war of aggression against Iran under the Bush, Obama and Biden administrations. The reasons for restraint by past US administration were often the same. Iran posed no direct threat or conducted an imminent attack toward the US that legally justified an offensive war of aggression. The risk of a global economic downfall and the exorbitant price tag of a major war far outweighed the benefits of removing a hostile government. And perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, the United States had no exit strategy. Indeed, these were the same reasons that led to the Democratic Party winning the White House in 2008 after expensive and endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001. Republican politicians campaigned on an America First platform in the 2021 elections by explicitly rejecting wars of choice in the Middle East that cost American lives and treasure. And yet, Republican President Donald Trump violated that promise to his constituents and granted Israel its 30-year dream to start an offensive war on Iran despite no credible evidence of an imminent threat by Iran. The result has been predictably catastrophic for the Middle East and the global economy. The war has engulfed the Gulf states, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to the 20% of global supply of oil and natural gas, energy prices are skyrocketing across the world, Tehran is being bombarded daily by Israel, over 1300 Iranians have been killed thus far, and the war is costing American taxpayers $1 billion per day.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Aggression, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

24. Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States (3/17/26)

Author:: Juan Cole and Mojtada Mahdavi
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States with Dr. Juan Cole, University of Michigan & Dr. Mojtada Mahdavi, University of Alberta (3/17/26) Israel and the United States' military attacks on Iran have prompted heated debates on the legality, political motives, and global economic impact of this latest war in the Middle East. Join the Rutgers Law Center for Security, Race and Rights for a critical analysis of the history, politics, and international relations between Israel, the United States and Iran by experts on Iran and the broader Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, International Law, Armed Conflict, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

25. Hindutva in America: A Threat to Equality & Religious Pluralism (11/12/2025)

Author:: Safa Ahmed
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Hosted by the Rutgers Law chapter of the American Constitution Society (ACS) and the Center for Security, Race, and Rights (CSRR). Join us for an engaging discussion on the rise of Hindutva—a Hindu nationalist ideology—and its influence in the United States. This conversation will explore how religious nationalism manifests within diaspora communities, its impact on civil rights and pluralism, and the role of law and policy in addressing related challenges.
Topic:: Nationalism, Diaspora, Ideology, Civil Rights, Pluralism, and Hindutva
Political Geography:: India, North America, and United States of America

26. E-Waste as a U.S. Social Policy Challenge: Addressing Inequity, Governance Gaps, and Consumer Rights Through a Repair-Reuse-Regulate Framework

Author:: Cynthia Norgbey
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Electronic waste (e-waste) is one of the most rapidly growing waste streams in the United States, creating pressing environmental, economic, and social challenges. The United States generates over seven million tons of e-waste each year, and has a largely unregulated system, with significant amounts of e-waste burned, landfilled, or exported to countries with weaker environmental protections. The current system is fragmented and inequitable, producing pollution, depleting resources, and perpetuating environmental injustice for both domestic and overseas communities. Without a unified federal policy, structural gaps harm consumers, communities, and the environment. The United States lacks enforceable right-to-repair laws, manufacturers face inconsistent accountability for recycling and reuse, and export loopholes allow toxic e-waste to be shipped overseas with minimal transparency. In contrast, countries in the European Union are modernizing their electronics economy through comprehensive laws that establish minimum standards for repair rights, data transparency, and producer responsibility. This paper proposes a Three-Pillar Strategy for creating an equitable and circular e-waste management system in the United States.: Repair: Enhance consumer rights and equity through national right-to-repair legislation, including requirements for parts availability, diagnostic tools, and restrictions on anti-repair practices. State-level laws in Minnesota and New York provide models. Reuse: Incentivize reuse and refurbishment at the federal level by formally recognizing it as a distinct category in the waste hierarchy, building infrastructure in schools and community institutions, and collecting consistent data on secondary markets. Regulate: Enact a national Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework with clear standards on takeback, design-for-recycling, and export transparency. This includes updating federal regulations and aligning U.S. law with the Basel Convention. The three-pillar approach addresses socially equitable sustainability at upstream, midstream, and downstream intervention points. Using qualitative content analysis of 23 policy documents, this paper analyzes how repair, reuse, and producer responsibility instruments are distributed across U.S. federal and state governance levels, identifying structural gaps from fragmentation and contributing to scholarship on environmental governance and extended producer responsibility. Building on these findings, the paper advances a three-pillar framework: Repair, Reuse, and Regulate, that calls for a federally coordinated approach integrating national right-to-repair legislation, reuse and refurbishment infrastructure development, and a comprehensive producer responsibility system to address these governance gaps.
Topic:: Governance, Regulation, Social Policy, Waste, Electronic Waste (E-Waste), and Consumer Rights
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

27. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities

Author:: John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

28. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:: Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. An Unbowed Petro Successfully Plays the Diplomat

Author:: Juan Antonio Martínez-Sánchez
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s positive meeting with Trump stands to benefit not only his coalition, but also the region writ large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, Regional Politics, and Gustavo Petro
Political Geography:: Colombia, South America, North America, and United States of America

31. Iran may be a turning point for US regime change objectives in Latin America

Author:: Tiziano Breda and Sandra Pellegrini
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: In Venezuela, Operation Absolute Resolve caused no American fatalities, and Nicolás Maduro was captured swiftly and replaced with Delcy Rodríguez, who embarked on normalization of relations with the United States and reforms that benefit US interests. In contrast, Operation Epic Fury in Iran has already seen hundreds of American service members injured and seven killed; Iranian retaliation has inflicted serious political costs on the US and allies; and the replacement for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in US-Israeli operations, is his son, a fellow hard-liner — signaling Iranian defiance rather than concessions. The risk of increasing entanglement in Iran will likely weaken US capacity and dampen domestic appetite for further intervention, at least ahead of the November mid-term elections. Sustained US military engagement in the Middle East may further divert some of its resources deployed in the Caribbean, already deprived of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier.1 This, in turn, may limit the credibility of any threat of further US operations in Venezuela or Cuba, hindering Trump’s ability to extract concessions from Caracas and Havana, particularly those related to democratization. Cuba remains a US priority: Trump has reiterated warnings of imminent changes in the island.2 However, recent US-Cuba engagement suggests that a negotiated political settlement, rather than a direct and costly military operation as in Venezuela, has gained traction. The US has applied pressure to bring the Cuban regime to the negotiating table. A blockade on oil exports has already triggered several power outages that have affected all sectors of the economy and access to basic necessities, and these are likely to deepen as oil import prices hike. The shortages risk heightening social discontent and increase domestic pressure on the government. Previous spikes in demonstrations in Cuba have been spurred by fuel and energy shortages, and recent protests suggest this dynamic remains potent.3
Topic:: Regime Change, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, Energy, and Operation Epic Fury
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Cuba, Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

32. Critical Education in the Age of Trump’s Fascist Politics

Author:: Henry A. Giroux
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: We live in a dangerous historical moment when fascist politics no longer lurk on the margins but occupy the centers of power. Across the globe—from the United States to Hungary, Chile, India, and Argentina, and elsewhere—authoritarian regimes are hollowing out democracy, merging violence with spectacle, and transforming education into a battlefield over truth itself. Journalists increasingly describe this shift as a “campaign of annihilation”. What is under assault is not simply the university or the classroom, but the capacity to think, remember, and act collectively. The struggle over education is therefore the struggle over democracy’s very promise. To reclaim education as a public good is, therefore, to reclaim the means through which consciousness becomes political, and politics becomes collective. The question before us is not merely whether education matters, but whether it can still awaken a public imagination capable of turning thought into resistance, and resistance into mass action. In such times, the issue is also whether education can survive as a democratic force in an age of emerging fascism across the globe.
Topic:: Education, Democracy, Fascism, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

33. Where is AI in GDP statistics? Subtitle Filling the measurement gap

Author:: Anton Korinek
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Quality-adjusted AI production in the United States grew at over 2,000 percent per year in 2024 and 2025, driven by three compounding forces: expanding data-center capacity, hardware efficiency gains, and—the largest of the three—algorithmic progress. Treating the AI sector as a coherent economic entity yields preliminary estimates of nominal AI GDP at approximately $250 billion in 2025, growing at roughly 2,600 percent per year in quality-adjusted real terms. National economic statistics accounts were not designed to track this kind of activity. Statistics agencies should begin developing AI-focused satellite accounts now, before the measurement gap becomes a policy gap. Body The AI economy in the United States has been growing at an unprecedented rate, but this extraordinary growth is largely invisible in conventional GDP statistics. The authors propose developing an “AI GDP” framework to better measure AI’s growing role in the economy.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Artificial Intelligence, and Productivity
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

34. Taking geopolitically motivated US swap lines too far would harm the dollar and Fed independence

Author:: Adnan Mazarei and Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Over the past century, the United States has provided dollar liquidity abroad through both the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, but the appropriate mode of liquidity injection depends on the economic, financial, and geopolitical contexts. The Treasury is the more appropriate lending conduit when geopolitical concerns dominate, while Fed dollar provision should primarily be targeted toward global stability objectives and be more insulated from short-term foreign policy motives. Up to now, political abuses of these foreign lending channels have been constrained to some degree by laws, norms, and intergovernmental understandings, but adherence can no longer be assumed, so more formal guardrails are needed.
Topic:: Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Geopolitics, and Central Bank
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

35. Strengthening Project Vault: The US plan to stockpile critical minerals

Author:: Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The United States depends heavily on imported critical minerals, including rare earth elements, needed for semiconductors, renewable energy, AI expansion, and defense systems. Because supply disruptions could seriously harm the economy and national security, the US government has launched Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private program to stockpile emergency supplies of critical minerals. Funded by a $10 billion EXIM Bank loan and $2 billion in private capital, the project is aimed at reducing reliance on foreign suppliers, particularly China, and protecting American—and eventually allied-country—manufacturers from shortages. Project Vault’s design, however, raises important questions about its durability and day-to-day operations.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Commodities, Artificial Intelligence, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

36. Countering Russian escalation in space

Author:: John Klein and Clementine G. Starling-Daniels
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This report’s findings are meant to guide policymakers in making important decisions about safety, security, and sustainability in the space domain, as well as to better inform the public on these issues. The report explains why current US space policy, Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, and commercial integration strategies by themselves are inadequate to address the growing threats from Russia in space. The report makes the case for the development of policies, practical strategies, and more effective acquisition programs to better address a range of potential futures, considering possible space-related actions by Russia’s political leadership. Beyond recommending changes to US declaratory policy, this report details why the United States needs a more resilient space architecture. It examines how Russia’s nuclear threat—specifically, its designs to place a nuclear weapon in orbit, in clear violation of its obligations under international law—could alter the rationale for pursuing proliferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. This report also explores the kind of space architecture the United States would need during a conflict against a major power, and how the United States can further integrate the private sector and allies in pursuit of its national security objectives. Each of these issues carries significant near-term policy and acquisition implications. This report explains why some US policymakers might be reluctant to take the necessary coercive action to compel acquiescence by Russian political and military leaders. This reluctance is driven by a Western sense of morality and “rightness,” an inherent right of self-defense mentality, and current conceptions of international humanitarian law. US anticipatory actions seeking to deter Russian malicious actions might prove unreliable because any anticipatory action will be a political decision based upon a Western mindset and worldview. This observation underscores that deterrence by denial of benefit—including resilience and active defense—should play a substantial role in military strategies, one even more substantial than cost-imposition efforts. Additionally, assurance and reassurance efforts directed toward Chinese and Indian leadership could help dissuade potential Russian aggressive behavior and deescalate crises. This report’s analysis illuminates important defense and force planning considerations. Its three scenarios span a catastrophic nuclear detonation (NUDET) in LEO to debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to less aggressive action against commercial satellites. A qualitative assessment using a detailed framework highlights the relative importance of the methods used to dissuade potential aggression while also prevailing in conflict. In priority order, the relative importance of affecting Russian leadership’s decision calculus is: deterrence by denial of benefit; assurance and reassurance; and deterrence by cost imposition. Finally, this report provides fifteen actionable policy and defense acquisition recommendations for advancing a comprehensive and practical framework to counter potential Russian aggression and escalation in space. Should dissuasion efforts fail and conflict in space occur, it is necessary that the United States, its allies, and commercial partners fight through Russia’s irresponsible and aggressive actions in space, while working to deescalate any crisis and seek a lasting peace.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Space Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

37. From alignment to action: Building a durable US-Argentina critical minerals partnership

Author:: Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon, and Ignacio Albe
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: For decades, Argentina has been viewed as a mining opportunity that never quite materialized. Now, Argentina’s mining sector is evolving from a speculative frontier to an active, contested space—one where the United States has a clear opportunity. Both countries are confronting different sides of the same challenge. Argentina must translate its mineral wealth into sustained investment and economic growth, while the United States must secure reliable external sources of the materials its economy increasingly depends on. Where these needs intersect, a strategic opportunity is emerging. This report examines Argentina at an inflection point. After decades of policy volatility and stalled development, recent reforms under President Javier Milei, including the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI), are beginning to shift investor sentiment. At the same time, Argentina has signaled clear interest in deepening ties with the United States, including through a new bilateral framework that prioritizes critical minerals cooperation. Yet this opportunity is not guaranteed. Infrastructure gaps, energy constraints, and complex provincial dynamics continue to shape project development. Meanwhile, ownership structures and supply chain relationships for lithium and copper are being set now in ways that will influence market alignment for decades. Against this backdrop, Argentina is a critical test case for US economic engagement in regional mineral supply chains. This report outlines how coordinated deployment of US policy and financing tools can help unlock investment while supporting Argentina’s development priorities, including infrastructure expansion and greater local value creation. Ultimately, the case for deeper US–Argentina cooperation is grounded in mutual benefit. For Argentina, it offers a pathway to convert mineral wealth into durable growth. For the United States, it provides access to essential inputs, expanded commercial opportunities, and a chance to demonstrate that its long-term partnerships can deliver.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economic Growth, Mining, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Argentina, South America, North America, and United States of America

38. Standardizing carbon accounting worldwide with a single, robust, cost-effective system

Author:: Vincent Aussilloux, Yann Coatanlem, and Karthik Ramanna
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Developed economies aren’t just underinvesting in the climate transition—they are missing the mark by an order of magnitude. Because green financing is often characterized as underperforming, the capital they do deploy rarely reaches the projects or regions where it’s needed most. But decarbonization doesn’t have to be a synonym for “high risk.” The key to unlocking high-impact, high-return investment lies in better risk management. Measuring a project’s carbon footprint with greater accuracy will mitigate the guesswork that keeps capital on the sidelines. The authors advocate for the Climate Club, an intergovernmental decarbonization forum, to select a single, robust, and cost-effective method for computing products’ carbon footprint. The framework would provide the rigor required to significantly scale climate finance and drive energy security.
Topic:: Climate Change, Climate Finance, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Energy, Energy Transition, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

39. A US strategy for energy competition with China in emerging markets

Author:: Steven Burns
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Emerging economies are set to drive the largest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades, making them a central arena for competition over influence in the future of global energy systems. China has positioned itself as the dominant partner for energy and infrastructure development across the Global South, in part by pairing state-backed finance with turnkey project delivery, which allows Chinese firms to shape technical standards and financing norms while securing long-term positions in future procurement and service markets. The United States can compete more effectively by organizing its financing, project development, and technical capabilities into a coherent offer that is closer to the speed and simplicity of competing models, while preserving the transparency and predictability on which partners rely.
Topic:: Markets, Governance, Strategic Competition, Energy, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. Mining corridors as catalysts: Building on the Lobito model

Author:: Aubrey Hruby
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In December 2025 the US and the DRC signed a strategic partnership agreement giving the US preferential access to Congolese mineral deposits. The next step should be to build the infrastructure necessary for African nations to derive sustainable wealth from their mineral assets, and for the US to reap the benefits of the strategic partnership agreement. The financing approach and public-private cooperation used to build the Lobito transportation corridor offers a playbook for the US and African governments and investors.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Business, Strategic Partnerships, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa, United States of America, and Democratic Republic of Congo

41. Virtual Briefing Series | US Military Posture and Strike Options Against Iran

Author:: Kevin Donegan, Mick Mulroy, and Jason Campbell
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On January 14, as the Iranian regime brutally cracked down on the largest street protests the country had seen in years, US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to persevere, posting on social media “help is on its way.” At the time, however, limited US military resources in the theater constrained the president’s military options. In the ensuing month since Trump’s post, the Pentagon has repositioned significant forces to the Middle East. This has led to wide speculation that the US is preparing for renewed strikes on Iran even as the Trump administration pursues diplomatic talks with the Iranian regime. To better understand the military planning and force posture dynamics shaping US policy choices, this briefing featured two Distinguished Military Fellows, former commander of the 5th Fleet VADM Kevin Donegan, USN (Ret.), and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Mick Mulroy. MEI Senior Fellow Jason Campbell moderated the discussion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Protests, Military, and Airstrikes
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

42. Compounded Vulnerability: Spatial Patterns of Energy Burden, Heat Exposure, and Pollution in New York City

Author:: Ximena Aristizabal and Paola Jaimes
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Energy insecurity and climate risk increasingly intersect in urban areas, yet they are often treated as separate challenges. This paper examines how household energy affordability stress, extreme heat exposure, and ambient air pollution overlap across urban space, using New York City as a case study. We introduce the concept of compounded vulnerability to describe neighborhoods where high energy burden and high heat exposure coincide, potentially intensifying environmental and health risks. Drawing on tract-level energy burden estimates, satellite-derived surface temperature measures, and summer PM2.5 concentrations, we combine a place-based interpretation of urban infrastructure and historical disinvestment with a tract-level empirical analysis of co-located risks. We document spatial co-location of economic and environmental stressors: neighborhoods facing higher energy burden are, on average, hotter, and areas experiencing joint exposure to heat and energy stress are also situated in environments characterized by elevated summer pollution. These patterns point to a plausible urban mechanism through which climatic extremes interact with energy systems and the built environment, shaping unequal exposure during periods of peak stress.
Topic:: Climate Change, Pollution, Vulnerability, Energy Security, and Heat
Political Geography:: New York, North America, and United States of America

43. Lost in Definition: How Confusion over Agentic AI Risks Undermining U.S. Governance Frameworks

Author:: Yasir Atalan, Ian Reynolds, and Benjamin Jensen
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: “Agentic AI” is an umbrella term that covers a wide range of systems from basic chat assistants to complex autonomous workflows. This ambiguity risks undermining U.S. governance frameworks and creating procurement vulnerabilities that expose organizations to mismatched capabilities and unaccounted risks. If the same vague word is applied to a helpful chatbot and a combat-ready swarm, the United States could accidentally deploy a system with the power to start an operation before that system understands the context or risks involved. The danger is not that the AI lacks intelligence, but that it lacks judgment; a system might be smart enough to execute a task perfectly yet fail to realize that a sudden change in the local situation makes that task a catastrophic mistake. This is particularly critical in national security environments where decisionmaking stakes are high. There is a need for clearer context charts for AI workflows so that commanders know exactly which tasks a machine can handle alone and exactly which who is responsible if the machine makes a mistake. The U.S. government must establish a relational, capability-based taxonomy that specifies where systems sit in workflows, what authorities they exercise, and how accountability is distributed. This approach shifts acquisition and oversight from a narrow focus on technical features to understanding broad organizational impact and ensuring evaluation matches real operational risk.
Topic:: Governance, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, Economic Security, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

44. The Rise of “Watt’s Law” and Why Power Could Put a Ceiling on American Innovation

Author:: Maryam Cope
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: A foundational advantage of the U.S. digital economy is weakening. For decades, Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling delivered steady improvements in computing performance while keeping energy costs manageable and underpinning productivity growth, industrial competitiveness, and national security capabilities. AI workloads upend these assumptions. Modern AI systems depend on massive parallelism, continuous data movement, and sustained operation across large clusters, making energy utilization and availability more important than peak chip performance. This shift defines the emergence of “Watt’s Law.” Under Watt’s Law, AI capability scales with available power growth multiplied by system-wide innovation driven by full-stack optimization across hardware, software, networking, and operations. This can be measured by growth in tokens per joule of energy. Power is now the significant binding constraint on AI progress. National competitive advantage increasingly depends on who can most efficiently convert electricity into sustained, real-world AI output, rather than who builds the smallest transistors. The implications are strategic. Failure to adapt to a power-constrained scaling regime risks forfeiting a key source of productivity growth and long-term advantage in AI-enabled economic and national security capabilities. It also has implications for U.S. partnerships with energy-rich allies.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

45. Practical H-1B Reforms to Serve U.S. Economic Interests

Author:: Philip Luck and Thibault Denamiel
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: In its first year, the second Trump administration has implemented substantial changes to the H-1B immigration program. Some of these changes will create significant economic harm; others have the potential to improve efficiency and support industrial policy goals, with further adjustments. In September 2025, the administration announced a $100,000 fee on new petitions for H-1B visas outside of the United States, a likely prohibitive increase in costs for many firms seeking to hire skilled immigrant labor. In parallel, the administration released a final rule last December to increase the visa lottery system’s allocation efficiency. The administration’s lottery reform would benefit from additional changes to better distribute the economic dividends of skilled immigration to underserved geographies and priority sectors. Such policy changes are critically important to U.S. competitiveness, given the program’s track record of success in attracting global talent and driving economic growth. To strengthen the United States’ technological advantage, innovation ecosystem, and economic prosperity, policymakers should look to expand the H-1B program and reform its incentives while limiting costly new barriers to its use.
Topic:: Reform, Innovation, Economic Security, Immigration Policy, and H-1B Visa
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

46. Using Minerals and Energy to Rebuild the U.S.-South Africa Relationship

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The United States is quietly losing access to the minerals that underpin its defense systems, semiconductor manufacturing, and reindustrialization agenda—not through geopolitical confrontation, but through commercial neglect. South Africa is the dominant U.S. supplier of platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, and military-grade vanadium, and no allied nation comes close to matching its combination of mineral wealth, processing capacity, and technical expertise. Yet rising energy costs and crumbling infrastructure are pushing South Africa’s processing sector toward closure, and without intervention, that capacity will continue migrating to China by default. As political tensions between Washington and Pretoria have intensified, it is worth remembering what is actually at stake: a supply relationship built over more than a century that would be extraordinarily costly to lose and nearly impossible to replace.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Trade, Economic Security, Semiconductors, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

47. Trump’s New Nuclear Architecture for Modernization and Arms Control

Author:: Heather Williams and Nicholas Adamopoulos
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Expanding upon the National Defense Strategy (NDS), Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno recently announced a new nuclear architecture “that addresses the threats of today, not those of a bygone era,” including nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and China’s growing nuclear arsenal. Facing this increasingly volatile security environment, the United States under the Trump administration must simultaneously modernize its nuclear arsenal and pursue arms control and risk reduction measures. To deter adversaries and manage escalation especially in theater conflicts, the United States may need to diversify and expand its nuclear arsenal, including by investing in nuclear-capable standoff weapons. Following this new architecture, the administration should also continue to work toward arms control agreements with both China and Russia, including risk reduction measures, such as a Presidential Nuclear Summit.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Modernization, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

48. The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarised World

Author:: Thomas Greminger
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:: The international system is entering a period of intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation. Competition among China, Russia, and the United States is reshaping the global order and redefining spheres of influence. These dynamics create both challenges and opportunities for middle powers, which must navigate contested spaces where alignment with one great power can generate tensions with others. Middle powers face a delicate balance: they seek to preserve their autonomy, influence multilateral institutions and maintain credibility in international networks, and their choices whether to align with a particular great power, hedge their international relationship bets, or engage in principled diplomacy can either stabilise fragmented regions or amplify systemic competition. Yet debates about the future of the international order tend to focus on great powers and institutional reform, leaving the behaviour of middle powers under-explored. This Policy Brief examines how middle powers can exercise strategic autonomy and influence in a fragmented world. It emphasises behaviour, relational positioning, and policy choices rather than material capacity alone by analysing how middle powers balance principles with pragmatism; manage geography and alignment; and engage in bridge-building, coalition-building, and mediation. It then assesses their capacity to stabilise regional and global orders, support multilateralism, and enhance systemic resilience.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, Polarization, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

49. Assessing US Government Efforts to Support Fossil Fuel–Reliant Communities

Author:: Noah Kaufman
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: The decline of domestic fossil fuel production in the United States poses serious economic risks for communities that rely on fossil fuel industries for jobs and public revenues. Many of these communities lack the resources and capacity to manage those risks on their own. The absence of viable economic strategies for affected regions is a barrier to building the broad, durable coalitions needed for an equitable national transition to cleaner energy sources. President Joe Biden touted investments into fossil fuel–reliant communities as part of his administration’s broader place-based economic and climate change strategies. This study assesses those federal efforts, examining the rationale, design, and implementation status of the major programs involved.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Government, Fossil Fuels, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

50. Pressure points: Africa’s health systems amid global aid contraction

Author:: Joseph Asunka, Boniface Dulani, and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Since the COVID-19 pandemic, African governments have been compelled to reassess how best to protect hard-won public health gains while ensuring equitable and reliable care. These reassessments are taking place against a background of shifting geopolitical alignments, tightening fiscal space, and growing public expectations of quality public services. This reckoning intensified in 2025 with the disbanding of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the cancellation of major foreign-funded health programmes, effectively dismantling one of the pillars of Africa’s health-support architecture.
Topic:: Health, Foreign Aid, Social Services, Public Health, USAID, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

51. The UN Climate Regime and the US Withdrawal

Author:: Margareth Sembiring
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Trump administration announced the US withdrawal from the international climate regime earlier this year. One possible explanation lies in the growing influence of the IPCC’s scientific authority in domestic spheres, which may have altered the perceived costs and benefits of continued participation. Despite the US absence, the UNFCCC remains an important platform for international climate cooperation.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

52. Avoiding a Long War - Objectives and Conditions for the US Attack on Iran

Author:: Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: The American operation in Iran may be prolonged, lasting several months instead of the planned few weeks. The low public support of Americans for intervention and the economic effects of rising oil prices are unlikely to change the US administration’s stance. Difficulties in completely eliminating the threats posed by Iran may prompt Donald Trump to increase military involvement, including the use of special forces or the launch of a ground invasion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

53. Global development policy and the New World Disorder: the Trump Administration's delivery of a high-voltage shockwave to multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles

Author:: Stephan Klingebiel and Andy Sumner
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Global development policy is a particularly revealing field in which the Trump administration combines crude transactionalism with a high level of ideological commitment, namely an authoritarian libertarianism oriented toward elite interests. This is coupled with, at times, a chaotic absence of tactical or strategic coherence. With Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, a significant phase in international affairs, including global development policy, began. This policy brief traces the evolution of the US approach to development cooperation and exposes how Trump's approach represents an overtly aggressive assault, delivering a high voltage shockwave to global sustainable development policy, undermining multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles of international solidarity. The United States (US) has played a decisive role in the conception and evolution of global development policy since the mid-20th century. From the establishment of the post-Second World War order onward, the US shaped the normative, political and organizational foundations of development cooperation, often setting agendas, defining standards, and providing leadership and personnel for key multilateral institutions. Early reconstruction efforts such as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the World Bank embedded development within a broader framework of power politics, positioning aid as both a tool of reconstruction and geopolitical influence. Since January 2025, US development cooperation has undergone a dramatic rupture. The administration rapidly withdrew from multilateral institutions, cut budgets, and de facto dissolved USAID, transferring residual functions to the State Department. This shift was accompanied by conspiracy narratives and an explicit rejection of multilateral norms, marking a sharp departure from previous Republican and Democratic approaches alike. The brief conceptualises this shift as the emergence of a “New Washington Dissensus”: a model of transactional, nationalist development cooperation that treats aid as an instrument of power rather than a global public good. Under this paradigm, development engagement is ideologically conditional, hostile to climate and equity agendas, oriented toward migration control, and explicitly transactional. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy (December 2025) is consistent with this in the sense that it frames an “America First” approach that narrows US priorities to “core, vital national interests” and places strong emphasis on Western Hemisphere pre-eminence via a stated “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. For global development, foreign assistance and development finance are thus instruments of strategic competition and commercial diplomacy. US agencies are mobilized to back US commercial positioning. The consequences are dramatic and systemic. The US retreat has destabilized the global development architecture and intensified geopolitical fragmentation. For many countries in the Global South, this represents a watershed moment, creating both new room for maneuver and new dependencies as states pursue multi-alignment strategies amid intensifying great-power rivalry. At the same time, humanitarian impacts are severe. Overall, the brief concludes that development policy has entered a new phase, which is narrower, more instrumental and overtly geopolitical,and is reshaping not only US engagement but the future of global development policy itself.
Topic:: Development, Multilateralism, Institutions, Norms, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

54. Outward FDI and Hollowing-out: Towards the Strategic Reallocation of Korean Industries

Author:: Nam Seok Kim
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Following a prolonged period of negotiations under the “reciprocal tariff” regime, Korea, similar to other major exporters like the European Union and Japan, secured reduced tariff rates conditional upon committing to large-scale local investments in the United States. The U.S. administration has consistently placed the reconstruction of American manufacturing and domestic job creation at the top of its policy agenda. This commitment is so steadfast that Washington recently hinted at the possibility of re-imposing higher tariffs, citing Korea’s lukewarm implementation of the agreed-upon investment pledges. Crucially, this surge in investment is not merely a political concession but reflects a fundamental restructuring of global value chains. As geopolitical uncertainties intensify, Korean firms are pivoting from a traditional strategy of cost minimization to one of risk minimization. By establishing production bases directly within the United States, these companies aim to insulate themselves from future trade barriers and secure stable access to their most critical market, effectively decoupling their supply chains from geopolitical flashpoints. The scale of capital Korea has pledged to invest locally in the U.S. is staggering, potentially large enough to induce fundamental shifts in the valuation of the Korean won. The bilateral agreement encompasses a monumental package: USD 200 billion in direct cash investments and USD 150 billion in shipbuilding cooperation. These plans are rapidly materializing, evidenced by the U.S. government’s recent release of “America’s Maritime Action Plan,” which explicitly designates Korea as a key partner in rebuilding U.S. naval and commercial maritime capabilities. Beyond the maritime sector, this investment wave spans across Korea’s core strategic industries, including semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, and advanced electronics. Major Korean conglomerates are rapidly breaking ground on large-scale manufacturing facilities across key U.S. states. This broad-based migration of manufacturing capacity signifies a deep integration of Korea’s industrial ecosystem with the U.S. supply chain, moving far beyond simple assembly operations to include high-value-added production processes. It is unprecedented for Korea to execute outward FDI (OFDI) of this magnitude based on a bilateral government agreement. Consequently, this unparalleled volume of capital outflow has sparked intense debate and varied projections among economists regarding its potential impact on the domestic economy.
Topic:: Foreign Direct Investment, Tariffs, Exports, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

55. The Structural Transformation of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and Its Economic Effects

Author:: Gusang Kang
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Over the past decade, U.S. foreign economic policy has undergone a structural transformation that extends beyond partisan political cycles. What initially appeared to be a temporary shift toward protectionism under the first Trump administration has consolidated into a broader orientation centered on economic security, strategic competition with China, and domestic industrial revitalization. The renegotiation of the existing trade agreements, withdrawal from multilateral frameworks, and imposition of Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs marked a clear departure from the liberal trade order that had characterized U.S. policy for decades. Rather than reversing this trajectory, the Biden administration utilized core tariff measures and expanded industrial policy through the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, reinforcing a production-centered strategy aimed at reshaping global supply chains. At the core of this transformation lies a reconfiguration of incentives governing global capital allocation and trade patterns. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) fundamentally restructured the U.S. international tax regime through provisions such as GILTI, FDII, and BEAT while lowering the statutory corporate tax rate, thereby altering firms’ location and investment decisions. At the same time, Section 301 tariffs sought to change relative prices in global value chains, reduce U.S. dependence on China, and induce supply chain realignment. Together, these measures illustrate how U.S. foreign economic policy increasingly integrates trade, tax, and industrial instruments into a coherent framework of economic statecraft. Against this backdrop, this report empirically evaluates the economic effects of these policy instruments. It examines how the TCJA affected U.S. outward and inward foreign direct investment and how Section 301 tariffs influenced trade flows at the product level, particularly with respect to trade diversion involving Korea. By employing panel regression and event-study methodologies, the study aims to identify causal impacts and dynamic adjustment patterns. The findings provide evidence that recent U.S. foreign economic policy has produced measurable structural effects on global investment and trade flows, offering important implications for Korea’s strategic economic positioning.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Global Value Chains, and Structural Transformation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

56. New Frameworks for Language Access: Tracking the Expansion & Features of State & Local Laws & Policies

Author:: Jacob Hofstetter
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: Over the past 25 years, many state and local governments have sought to develop more organized approaches to helping residents with limited English proficiency access public services and information. There are multiple reasons for this. By addressing language barriers, language access policies and laws help governments communicate with an increasingly multilingual U.S. public, enhance public safety and emergency responses, improve access to public information and services, and boost the overall effectiveness of government programs. Since 2020, nine states and 31 localities have enacted new language access measures. These laws and policies, which now exist in 13 states, the District of Columbia, and more than 60 localities, generally share certain common features related to agency responsibilities (for example, on the provision of interpretation services and the translation of written materials) and policy administration (such as naming an oversight office). This report explores the rise of state and local language access policies and laws, their key features, and their role in a changing national policy context during the second Trump term. With growing cracks in the federal policy framework related to language access, state and local efforts play a vital role, the study finds, in meeting the practical, everyday communication needs of state and local governments and their communities.
Topic:: Immigrants, Integration, Immigration Policy, Local Government, and Language Access
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

57. A Human-Centric Framework: Employment Principles for Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Author:: Brennan Deveraux
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.
Topic:: Security, Drones, Emerging Technology, and Autonomous Weapons Systems
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

58. What Luck Has to Do With It: Understanding the Role of Nuclear Luck in Decision-Making

Author:: Tyrus Tibor Kalanyos
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Since the end of the Second World War and the start of the Nuclear Age, there have been numerous cases of nuclear near-use or near-incidents. This article makes a case for how luck, particularly nuclear luck, has not only been an essential variable in preventing nuclear wars and uses, but also how experiences with nuclear luck have shaped the decision-making process in America and the Soviet Union. Through case study analyses of the War Scare events in the early 1980s, primarily the Able Archer-83 incident and the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, the paper identifies attitude and policy shifts in decision-makers’ posture towards nuclear security with an understanding of political psychology scholarship. The findings suggest that experiences of nuclear luck can lead to more careful and risk-averse behaviour, the paper also highlights how the relationship between nuclear luck and the decision-making process can advance theories on behavioural arms control.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Decision-Making, and Luck
Political Geography:: Soviet Union, Global Focus, and United States of America

59. The PATRIOT Act: The Friction Between Civil Liberties and National Security

Author:: Megan Saito
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The shock that followed the attacks of 9/11 prompted the American public to urge the United States government to increase the protection of national security. The PATRIOT Act was created in response to these demands and set out to detect and prevent acts of terrorism from reoccurring in the United States of America. Since the conception of the PATRIOT Act, privacy advocates and civil liberties groups have been protesting the Act's ability to 'infringe' on American citizens’ amendments protected by the United States Constitution. This article responds to the questions to what degree does the Patriot Act infringe upon civil liberties?
Topic:: National Security, 9/11, Civil Liberties, and Patriot Act
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

60. Israel, Qatar, and the Hierarchy of Warning

Author:: Muhammed Ziyade
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: On September 9, 2025, Israeli missiles struck a residential neighbourhood in Doha while U.S. Space Force tracked the operation in real time and relayed no warning to Qatar — the very state that hosts CENTCOM's forward headquarters. This study traces the detection-to-dissemination chain across the September 9th strike and two prior Iranian missile attacks on U.S. bases in Erbil (2020) and Al-Udeid (2025), and demonstrates that who fires the missile determines whether the warning precedes the impact. The Qualitative Military Edge doctrine, codified in U.S. law since 2008, sustains this hierarchy. Its operational consequence is stark: Iranian threats activated direct military channels within minutes, while the Israeli attack routed through a four-layer political chain (CENTCOM to President to Special Envoy to Qatar). September 9th exposes a most-favoured-nation design in American alliance architecture and compels Gulf capitals to construct sovereign early warning capabilities that do not route through the political hierarchies of their guarantors.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Alliance, Space Force, Quantitative Military Edge (QME), and CENTCOM
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Qatar, and United States of America

61. American Populism, American Personhood

Author:: Colin Anthony MacNairn
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Current American populism—an endogenous product of liberal capitalism— functions less as an interruption of liberal democracy than as the political form through which its contradictions are expressed. Starting from that premise, this essay traces how citizens, rendered economically superfluous and politically abstracted, reach for meaning through affective grievance—grievance that populism captures, reroutes, and converts into allegiance. By placing C.B. Macpherson’s critique of possessive individualism in dialogue with Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s analysis of moral incapacitation, A.N. Whitehead’s insights on simplified ideals, and Kant’s republican account of public right, this essay reconstructs the mechanisms by which structural dispossession is transformed into cultural antagonism. Through political-theoretical argument augmented with empirical illustrations, this essay provocatively demonstrates that American populism’s emotional economy reinforces the very structure it claims to resist and why any democratic renewal ought to begin with a reconstruction of personhood itself
Topic:: Politics, Capitalism, Populism, Donald Trump, Illiberal Democracy, Critical Democratic Theory, and New Democratic Theory
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

62. The Threshold of Dissent: A History of American Jewish Critics of Zionism with Marjorie Feld 4/9/26

Author:: Marjorie Feld
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: The Threshold of Dissent: A History of American Jewish Critics of Zionism with Professor Marjorie Feld (4/9/26) Throughout the twentieth century, American Jewish communal leaders projected a unified position of unconditional support for Israel, cementing it as a cornerstone of American Jewish identity. This unwavering position served to marginalize and label dissenters as antisemitic, systematically limiting the threshold of acceptable criticism. In pursuit of this forced consensus, these leaders entered Cold War alliances, distanced themselves from progressive civil rights and anti-colonial movements, and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses in Israel. In The Threshold of Dissent, Marjorie N. Feld instead shows that today’s vociferous arguments among American Jews over Israel and Zionism are but the newest chapter in a fraught history that stretches from the nineteenth century.
Topic:: Human Rights, Leadership, Zionism, Jews, and Antisemitism
Political Geography:: Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

63. Race, Resistance, and the Criminalization of Speech under Trump with Vince Warren (4/16/2026)

Author:: Vince Warren
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Free speech is a lofty principle taught in American schools but not consistently protected when racial minorities collectively dissent against government practices. Vince Warren addresses the contemporary manifestations of these longstanding tensions between law on paper and enforcement in practice.
Topic:: Race, Minorities, Donald Trump, Resistance, Free Speech, and Criminalization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

64. US-PRC Defense Relations: Looking Back and Looking Forward

Author:: David Finkelstein, Thomas J. Christensen, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: April 15, 2026 — One of the less illuminated dimensions of the US-PRC relationship is that between its two militaries. Over the course of four decades, the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army have gone from Cold War partners to strategic competitors. David Finkelstein provided historical and strategic context for understanding how the two militaries came to the place they are in today, and why it matters for the future of the bilateral relationship and the Indo-Pacific region. Speaker: David Finkelstein, Distinguished Research Fellow for National Security Affairs, CNA Introduction by: Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations; Director, China and the World Program, Columbia University Moderator: Elizabeth Wishnick, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, WEAI; Senior Research Scientist, CNA
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

65. When do voters stop caring? Estimating the shape of voters' utility functions

Author:: Aleksandra Conevska and Can Mutlu
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:: In this paper, we address a longstanding puzzle over the functional form that better approximates voter utility from political choices. Though it has become the norm in the literature to represent voter utility with concave loss functions, for decades scholars have underscored this assumption’s potential shortcomings. Yet there exists little to no evidence to support one functional form assumption over another. We fill this gap by first identifying electoral settings where the different functional forms generate divergent predictions about voter behavior. We then assess which functional form better matches observed voter and abstention behavior using Cast Vote Record (CVR) data that captures the anonymized ballots of millions of voters in the 2020 U.S. general election. Our findings indicate that concave loss functions fail to predict voting and abstention behavior, and it is the reverse S-shaped loss functions, such as the Gaussian function, that better match voter behavior.
Topic:: Politics, Voting, and Voting Behavior
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

66. Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations

Author:: Nicholas Burns and Yasheng Huang
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations | Tuesday, February 17, 2026 Speakers: Nicholas Burns is the Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is the founder and faculty chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project and a faculty affiliate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Burns worked in the United States government for over three decades, serving six presidents and nine secretaries of state. Most recently, he served as the US ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2021-2025, leading public servants from forty-eight US government agencies at the US mission to China in overseeing one of America's most important bilateral relationships. Moderator: Yasheng Huang is the Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He also serves as the faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. From 2013 to 2017, he served as an associate dean of MIT Sloan’s GlobalPartnership programs and its Action Learning initiatives. His previous appointments include faculty positions at the University of Michigan and at Harvard Business School. Huang is the author of 11 books in both English and Chinese and of many academic papers. His most recent book, “The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to its Decline”, was a 2023 Best Book of the Year by Foreign Affairs magazine.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

67. Focus on Eurasia: Putin’s War Against the West

Author:: John J. Sullivan, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Focus on Eurasia: Putin’s War Against the West: A Conversation with the Former US Ambassador to the Russian Federation | Monday, March 16, 2026 Speaker: Ambassador John J. Sullivan is the former US deputy secretary of state and former US ambassador to the Russian Federation. His career spans four decades in public service in prominent diplomatic and legal positions under five US presidents. He is a non-resident distinguished senior fellow with the National Security Law Program as well as a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC and New York offices. He co-leads the firm’s National Security practice. Co-chairs: Carol Saivetz is a senior fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is the faculty director of the Center’s MIT-Ukraine Program and co-faculty director of the MIT-Eurasia Program.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Populism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

68. Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz

Author:: Nader Habibi, Ali Kadivar, Caitlin Talmadge, and Dafna Rand
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz | Monday, March 30, 2026 In a rapidly evolving region, gain clarity beyond the headlines. Panelists: Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in the Economics of the Middle East, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University Ali Kadivar, Associate Professor of Sociology and International Studies, Boston College; Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University Caitlin Talmadge, Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT; Faculty Affiliate, Center for Nuclear Security Policy, MIT Security Studies Program Dafna Rand, Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow, Center for International Studies; Former US Assistant Secretary of State Moderator: Richard Nielsen, Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT; Faculty Director, MIT-MENA, MIT Center for International Studies; Affiliate, MIT Security Studies Program and MIT Institute for Data, Systems, and Society This event is sponsored by the MIT-MENA Program.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Trade, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Persian Gulf, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

69. From Vietnam to Campus Encampments & Anti-Ice Protests: A Legal History of Federal Cases On Student First Amendment Rights

Author:: Jacob Blau
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Students who have been silenced for their participation in recent protests should be aware of a deep legal history that has seen federal courts grapple with and protect the concept of student free speech.
Topic:: Protests, Free Speech, 2023 Gaza War, and Politics
Political Geography:: United States of America, Palestine, Vietnam, and North America

70. Minnesota’s Perfect ICE Storm

Author:: Zoe Carver
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: As Minneapolis once again becomes the center of national protests, a dive into the state’s recent history of racial tensions and police violence reveals just why the North Star City has come head-to-head with the executive branch.
Topic:: Protests, Police Brutality, Immigration Policy, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Political Geography:: North America, Minnesota, and United States of America

71. Anchoring Ukraine’s postwar recovery with a US-Ukraine free trade agreement

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: An FTA with the United States would help Ukraine achieve stronger investor protections, regulatory transparency, and anticorruption and dispute settlement mechanisms that anchor private investment needed to support reconstruction and sustain long-term growth. For the United States, Ukraine offers a strategically valuable production platform: a large, skilled workforce; a legacy industrial base; and significant reserves of critical minerals, metals, and agricultural inputs needed for energy transition, defense, and supply chain resilience. Passage of a US-Ukraine FTA in Congress could be controversial because it would bundle together some of the most contentious issues in US trade politics—agriculture, investor protection, government procurement, digital rules, and market access—into one high-salience vote. Policymakers could start by advancing more limited agreements as precursors to a comprehensive FTA. Accession to the European Union will be the core of Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy, implying that a US-Ukraine FTA should be designed to complement, rather than compete with, EU integration. Body Ukraine’s reconstruction is often framed as a financing challenge, but the bigger challenge is institutional: Ukraine must credibly reassure domestic and foreign investors that market-oriented rules, transparent regulation, private property protection, and contract enforcement will prevail and that its territorial integrity will be secure. A free trade agreement with the United States can help Ukraine provide this assurance.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Trade Policy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Free Trade Agreements
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

72. The America First investment pledges: How are they structured and are they realistic?

Author:: Gregory Auclair and Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: In pursuit of President Donald J. Trump's "America First" agenda, the administration has pressured allies and partners to invest in US industrial and infrastructure projects. The White House has announced commitments by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, several Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and others, to import specific amounts of goods and services from the United States and to make sizable investments on US soil. These agreements resulted from a more coercive US foreign policy than in the past. Because the administration is helping select the targets of foreign investment, it is embarking on a major expansion of US industrial policy—one paid for by allied countries. This Policy Brief shows that much about investment pledges, worth more than $5 trillion, remains unclear or aspirational.
Topic:: Politics, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade Policy, and America First
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

73. The COVID era inflation surge: Causes, consequences, and policy lessons

Author:: Karen Dynan and David Wilcox
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The COVID era inflation surge was shaped by an unusual confluence of shocks and policy responses. It nonetheless raises enduring questions about the interaction of demand, supply, expectations, and policy frameworks that decision-makers are likely to confront again. In this Policy Brief, Dynan and Wilcox distill lessons from a broad body of work produced as part of the Peterson Institute for International Economics' Understanding the COVID Era Inflation project, which brought together an extensive group of experts to examine the different facets of the inflation surge. Dynan and Wilcox synthesize the group's insights to recount the origin of the surge, evaluate the key causes and consequences, discuss the limits and strengths of policy tools, and offer lessons for policymakers to deal with future undesirable increases in inflation.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Economy, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, Labor Market, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

74. As US food aid retreats, can BRICS+ and biotechnology fill the world’s food security gap?

Author:: Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Cuts to agricultural development assistance and food aid by the United States and other advanced economies are creating a global vacuum just as climate change and conflict drive global hunger up. Many food-insecure developing economies with significant hunger lack the resources to self-finance agricultural research and development (R&D) and have had to depend increasingly on themselves—and one another—to meet rising food needs. Hendrix argues that the BRICS+ economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia—are well positioned to fill the world’s food security gap.
Topic:: Agriculture, Markets, Foreign Aid, BRICS, Food Assistance, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

75. Can Trump keep his tariffs if the Supreme Court invalidates them?

Author:: Alan Wm. Wolff
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s trade team has vowed to employ alternative legal strategies to keep its high tariff wall in place if the Supreme Court invalidates President Trump’s sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” by striking down his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose them. Wolff reviews the four possible tariff statutes that could be invoked— Sections 122, 338, 301, and 232—but they have major limitations. Each is either narrow, temporary, or specific, compared with IEEPA, and cannot be used to recreate Trump’s across-the-board tariff wall.
Topic:: Politics, Supreme Court, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

76. Shifting Grounds: Public Opinion and the Future of Trilateral Cooperation in the United States, South Korea, and Japan

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The August 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David marked a historic milestone in U.S.-South Korea-Japan relations, establishing new frameworks for crisis consultation, information-sharing, military exercises, and cooperation on critical supply chains. Two years on, the durability of that achievement is being tested by a turbulent second Donald Trump administration, rising Chinese assertiveness, an entrenched North Korean nuclear program, and unresolved historical tensions between South Korea and Japan. Whether the Camp David framework endures will depend not only on the decisions of leaders but on the publics whose support sustains them. This report presents findings from comprehensive public opinion surveys conducted in the United States, South Korea, and Japan in August 2025. It examines where the three countries’ publics converge, where they diverge, and what those patterns mean for the future of trilateral cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

77. Trilateralism Through Transition: Reflections on U.S.-South Korea-Japan Cooperation From Experts and Emerging Leaders

Author:: Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Two years after the Camp David summit among the United States, South Korea, and Japan institutionalized trilateral cooperation, the partnership faces new challenges amid leadership transitions in all three capitals. To assess the stakes, the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) and The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation convened a public panel with Zack Cooper (CSIS), Shihoko Goto (Mansfield Foundation), and Eun A Jo (William & Mary). Drawing on insights from these experts, 15 competitively selected emerging leaders joined a private roundtable to develop blue-sky ideas for the future of trilateral cooperation. This report offers timely perspectives for the policy community on how the three partners can sustain momentum amidst uncertainty.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Leadership, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

78. Promote the antidote: Reducing the risk from toxins

Author:: Bipartison Commission on Biodefense at Atlantic Council
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: While toxins occur naturally, contaminating food and feed with sometimes deadly consequences, malevolent actors have weaponized toxins for assassination and mass-casualty terror. Nation-states, terrorists, and lone actors continue to produce and weaponize these agents. The February 2026 confirmation by European governments that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was assassinated using epibatidine (a lethal neurotoxin derived from a South American poison dart frog) underscores the twenty-first century reality of state-sponsored toxin warfare. Yet, national and international defenses remain fractionated. Efforts to address toxin threats span the agriculture, defense, law enforcement, and public health sectors, which often operate in silos. The policymaking community is not fully aware of the expansion of the threat from toxins, instead focusing on contagious biological threats arising from viruses and bacteria. Significant and systemic governmental policy gaps persist despite a clear history of accidental contamination, criminal use, and the continued development of toxins in foreign offensive biological weapons programs. The United States cannot afford to ignore these vulnerabilities. It must identify and bridge these policy gaps immediately, as any biological event involving toxins will have profound implications for national and global security.
Topic:: Security, Biodefense, Defense Technology, and Toxins
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

79. The WhatsApp World Order: Learning to Live with the New Global Political Economy

Author:: David Henig
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: An inter-connectivity and technology revolution transformed the world over the last 30 years – with AI being the latest instalment. Multiple, interlocking, instant networks now cover the world like an ever-expanding changing set of WhatsApp groups, affecting all countries and governments. Today’s trade is responsive, resilient, diverse, and above all global as a result. Modern globalisation has in turn proved resistant to the many claims of its demise. Yet clearly this is not creating a happy world. Politics has not kept pace with the changes. National control, stability, optimism and trust are as a result particularly in short supply. At a macro level, challenger economies – most notably China – are engaged in mutual suspicion with the former hegemons EU and US, not helped by issues around subsidies and access to markets. All the major powers are undermining existing global rules while simultaneously suggesting an impossible retreat into self-sufficient manufacturing as they seek to come to terms with today’s economy. They are not helped by political debate that largely misunderstands the moment. Meanwhile corporate concentration in global markets has entrenched dominant private actors who navigate diverse regulations but can undermine competitiveness and governments. Political turmoil is enhanced by demographic shifts to ageing populations, social media, and citizen dislocation in the face of intense societal change and financial insecurity. Government failure to deal with challenges they are wrongly assumed to have created is too often simply leading to a search for scapegoats. Matters may even get worse given that the major powers have weaponised trade to a degree in recent years. Many urge them to intensify planning for economic warfare. This is turning dependencies from an inevitable by-product of greater product availability to a dangerous weakness. Such approaches threaten peace and prosperity, reflecting frustration that public demand for control in an inter-connected world cannot be met. Better approaches need to be found, that start with accepting today’s technology-enabled world including a strong China and other emerging economies. Governments must recognise that adaptive institutions will be more effective than trying to second-guess complex supply chains or put in place extensive new national rule-sets, particularly given their diverse public policy objectives. They must then protect where they must, prioritise where they can including for national security, and guide the public through their choices based on the best information that they have. For Europe in particular, long-standing respect for and implementation of rules that balance societal interests is more important than protecting all old industries. Internationally, agreements among friendly countries can be helpful but will not be sufficient. What is required is all countries accepting and enhancing core trade principles which were specifically designed to prevent a 1930s style global descent into mutual suspicion. WTO rules should be modernised to reflect today’s inter-dependencies and the dangers of weaponisation, rebalancing commitments on the basis of a broad definition of reciprocity, and avoiding of concentration of supply when countries grow. This though can only happen satisfactorily when the largest powers understand the need to discipline their own behaviours. Challenges such as dealing with dominant companies and scarce raw materials will never be easily resolved. Improvements will require international cooperation similarly based on trust, and should draw upon global networks of expertise that have developed as another result of today’s inter-connected world. Economies do adjust to new circumstances. Governments must therefore stop decrying resilience as an easy but incorrect way to be seen doing something, and focus instead on rebuilding economies and societies that adjust to today’s emerging inter-connected global order.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, and Connectivity
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

80. Slipping Out of ‘Old Geopolitics’ Through TRIPP

Author:: Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: For much of the post‑Cold War period, the South Caucasus was shaped by a distinct geopolitical logic in which unresolved conflicts functioned as instruments of external influence, connectivity was constrained, and stability was underpinned by interim security mechanisms and contested political arrangements, not by durable peace agreements. This old geopolitics did not seek resolution; it sought control. Frozen or semi‑frozen conflicts allowed external actors—above all Russia—to arbitrate outcomes, limit regional autonomy, and preserve leverage by keeping borders politically charged and economically inert. Order was produced not through integration or enforcement, but through managed ambiguity. The erosion of the old geopolitical order did not occur suddenly, nor has it unfolded uniformly across the region. It began in earnest in 2020, when Azerbaijan fundamentally altered the regional balance of power by liberating its internationally recognized territories that had been under Armenian occupation for nearly three decades. For the first time since the early 1990s, one of the central pillars of the South Caucasus’s old geopolitical order—territorial conflicts sustained by external oversight—was dismantled through local agency rather than external arbitration. This shift deepened in September 2023, when Azerbaijan brought an end to the Russia‑backed separatist entity in Karabakh, eliminating the last institutional remnant of the unresolved‑conflict paradigm in Armenia‑Azerbaijan relations. The withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh in May 2024 confirmed the strategic significance of this moment. This marked a turning point not only in the Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict but in the wider regional balance of influence. Old geopolitics, however, has not disappeared entirely from the South Caucasus. The Georgia‑Russia conflict remains governed by old rules (i.e., military occupation, external veto power, and frozen political arrangements) and stands as one of the last strongholds of the former order in the region. It is against this backdrop that the qualitatively new character of the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan must be understood. Freed from the constraints of frozen conflict management, the two states have increasingly prioritized peacebuilding, connectivity, and economic cooperation. This transformation reached a further milestone at the August 2025 White House summit of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, when the two countries reached an agreement on one of the most contested issues of the post‑war period: the Zangezur Corridor, a transport route intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenia’s Syunik region. The corridor’s establishment was formalized under the framework of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), with the United States assuming a direct role in its infrastructural arrangements. By embedding regional connectivity within a U.S.‑backed infrastructural framework, the TRIPP agreement effectively shifted the role of external guarantor along the corridor through Armenian territory from Russia to the United States. The reactions of Russia and Iran to the TRIPP agreement demonstrated that the South Caucasus is not entering a post‑geopolitical era. However, developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with the altered geopolitical context, indicate that the region is steadily, though slowly, moving away from the older order. The most consequential conflict in the region has been resolved, and the post‑war normalization process is increasingly managed through infrastructure, legal frameworks, and reciprocal commitments that reshape incentives on the ground. While old geopolitics persists in one part of the region (e.g., the Russia‑Georgia conflict), it no longer defines the dominant trajectory of regional order.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Normalization, and Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

81. Between Giants: Strategic Autonomy for East Asia’s Middle Powers in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Author:: Yoochan Kong
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China places South Korea in a delicate strategic position where great-power competition pushes Seoul to choose sides. However, the concept of strategic autonomy shows that middle powers can still navigate a narrow but meaningful path of agency. This paper focuses on how South Korea can sustain strategic autonomy amid U.S.–China rivalry by recalibrating its alliance with the United States, protecting itself from Chinese economic and political coercion, and diversifying partnerships in security, technology, and diplomacy. The central research question asks how South Korea can strengthen its autonomy while managing asymmetric dependence on the United States and growing vulnerability to China. Drawing on historical alliances, the THAAD deployment, and debates over technology alliances, the paper argues that autonomy is not neutrality but, rather, proactive leadership, institutional resilience, and a commitment to democratic values. By doing so, South Korea can shift from a reactive state to a proactive actor shaping a regional order based on freedom and stability.
Topic:: Cold War, Economics, Science and Technology, Alliance, Rivalry, Strategic Autonomy, Coercion, Middle Powers, and Conflict Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

82. Risks for Europe of US dominance of global asset management

Author:: Dirk Schoenmaker
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Asset managers work on behalf of asset owners, such as pension funds and insurance companies, allocating their holdings of household or other savings. In Europe, the market share of United States asset managers is rising, while that of their European counterparts is declining. US asset managers may even be about to overtake European asset managers in Europe. However, there are differences between US and European asset managers, and these could play out in the context of the European Union’s savings and investment union plan. On environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement, European asset managers remain active, while their US counterparts increasingly vote against social and environmental resolutions. This is counterproductive for Europe’s sustainable finance agenda. To preserve the efficiency and efficacy of the EU asset management market, three steps should be taken: 1) strengthen stewardship policies, 2) create a central supervisor and 3) enhance strategic autonomy. Stewardship policies should be tightened and asset managers should highlight how their ESG policies aligns with those of the asset owners for which they work. A major element of this tightening would be the requirement to publish a detailed record of voting on shareholder resolutions. Strong supervision by the European Securities and Markets Authority should ensure that US asset managers are appropriately supervised across the EU. Asset managers apply a hub-and-spoke model, operating from Dublin and Luxembourg. National supervisors cannot effectively oversee the Europe-wide operations, which may create blind spots. A successful savings and investment union needs strong European players to allocate European savings to European investments. The European Commission should act to counter a home bias towards US investments. When hiring asset managers, pension funds and insurers should evaluate not only the lowest cost in the short term, but also financial and ESG performance in the long term.
Topic:: Climate Change, Finance, Investment, Sustainability, Capital, and Banking
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

83. A new strategy to contain stablecoin risks in the European Union

Author:: Lucrezia Reichlin, Bo Sangers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Stablecoins – a form of tokenised money issued primarily by non-banks – promise efficiency gains in payments but also bring new risks to financial stability and monetary control. Because of this, European Union policymakers have so far discouraged the development of stablecoins, instead favouring tokenised deposits issued by banks. This approach might well make sense in a one-jurisdiction world, but risks being counterproductive in the context of dollar-denominated stablecoins encouraged by the United States authorities. EU policy could push European demand for stablecoins outside the EU’s regulatory perimeter, leaving EU holders of dollar stablecoins exposed to US currency risks and US fiscal risks. The EU would also risk adoption by the digital settlement architecture of European financial markets of dollar-based conventions, and settlement activity may migrate away from the Eurosystem’s payments infrastructure in tokenised segments. A strategy to contain these risks without a regulatory race to the bottom should include: Acceleration of the European Central Bank’s Appia project to establish interoperability between digital ledger technology platforms and ECB payments infrastructure; Dispensing with the regulatory requirement to hold a large share of stablecoin reserves in the form of bank deposits; Allowing EU stablecoin issuers to remunerate stablecoin holders directly, as long as the remuneration rate is below the rate on ECB reserves and standard deposit rates; Giving EU-regulated stablecoin issuers access to the ECB’s balance sheet, including to lending-in-last-resort facilities.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Monetary Policy, European Union, Digital Economy, Cryptocurrencies, Digital Currency, Fintech, and Stablecoins
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

84. Defence innovation and procurement reform: an empirical evaluation of the US Defense Innovation Unit

Author:: Ethan Kapstein, Javier Ospital, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Battlefields are evolving rapidly, with new technologies reshaping military strategy and tactics. Many of the new technologies originate in firms outside the traditional defence sector, rather than with the existing prime contractors. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in 2015 to incentivise commercial tech companies to work on national security challenges. How successful has this new unit been in achieving its mission? We provide the first causal evaluation of the DIU’s effects on defence procurement. Using administrative procurement data and a firm-level panel covering 2017-2025, and employing propensity score matching, additional firm-level covariates and a staggered difference-in differences design, we find that the DIU has expanded both the extensive and intensive margins of defence contracting. We find not only a significant increase in the likelihood of receiving a DoD contract because of DIU treatment, but also in the size of the contract. Our findings show that defence innovation organisations can broaden and deepen the defence-supplier base. Governments updating their defence acquisition strategies in response to the lessons from recent conflicts can benefit from reforms that facilitate firm entry into procurement, overcoming the transaction cost and information asymmetry problems typical in defence markets.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Macroeconomics, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

85. Federal Government Spending Is a Leaky Bucket

Author:: Chris Edwards and Ryan Bourne
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: People often hold optimistic views about federal government spending programs. They assume that new and expanded programs can fix the nation’s social and economic problems. The government is a powerful institution, and so people think that it can steer funding to individuals, businesses, and nonprofit groups to solve problems and aid those in need. However, solving problems through the federal government is not so simple. Spending programs require funding from taxation or borrowing, and both create collateral damage on the economy. As funds flow through the government, resources are wasted on bureaucracy, mismanagement, and faulty planning. As the remaining funds flow out of the government and into the private sector, they induce people to change their working and investing activities, further undermining the economy. Only a fraction of the tax dollars raised for programs ultimately delivers on the outcomes promised by policymakers. Economist Arthur M. Okun described this problem as a “leaky bucket.” When the government imposes taxes on some people to aid others, it is not a costless transfer of resources. Rather, it is like transferring water using a bucket riddled with holes. In this study, we describe the many types of holes in the government bucket, and we argue that the leakage of resources is large. We also argue that the government bucket gets leakier as federal programs and bureaucracies continue to expand. With the government running huge budget deficits, policymakers should rethink the many costly programs that it runs. Some programs are essential, and so policymakers should preserve them while reducing the types of waste or leakage that we identify. But many other programs are so leaky that their costs outweigh their benefits. These programs are spilling economic resources all over and should be eliminated from the federal budget.
Topic:: Government, Public Spending, and Fundraising
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

86. World Trade Without the US

Author:: James Bacchus
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: As the Trump administration imposes a barrage of illegal and unprecedented tariffs on an ever-increasing number of imported products, the rest of the world is showing that it can continue trading despite these tariffs and without the United States. Other countries are lowering trade barriers with each other by concluding new bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, and exporters are reconfiguring supply chains to route around American protectionism. Regardless of whether the United States remains indispensable to the global economy, international trade is still happening—and it is happening increasingly without the United States. At the same time, these countries should not be doing what they have mostly been doing: forging new trading arrangements outside the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although the temptation to go outside the WTO legal framework is understandable, the better course of action would be for the other 165 WTO members to redouble their efforts toward trade liberalization within the institution while taking a different approach. That approach should be WTO-based plurilateralism that can build up to multilateralism, which is precisely how, over decades, the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved into the WTO. For this approach to succeed, WTO members must move on from their continued insistence on decisionmaking by consensus, without waiting any longer for the United States. Consensus and American engagement at the WTO is ideal, but plurilateral agreements represent an opportunity to address unfinished business and negotiate rules that meet the demands of the 21st-century economy, while also leaving the door open for other countries to join any agreements if they are willing to be bound by them. The 165 other WTO members must also stand together to defend their rights under the WTO treaty. Although the singular actions of the United States have, at least for now, reduced the Appellate Body to a paper tribunal, that does not have to mean other WTO members have no recourse for standing up to the Trump administration’s bullying and for holding the US accountable under WTO dispute settlement.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

87. Politically Motivated Killers: 51 Years of Terrorist Murders on US Soil, 1975–2025

Author:: Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Politically motivated terrorists are nonstate actors who commit violence to achieve political, ideological, religious, or social goals. Charlie Kirk’s recent assassination prompted many Americans to worry about the scale and scope of politically motivated violence. However, politically motivated terrorism is a small and vastly overstated threat regardless of the ideological motivations of the attackers. The 208 terrorist attackers who killed at least one person on US soil between January 1, 1975, and December 31, 2025, murdered 3,577 people. Murders in politically motivated attacks account for about 0.35 percent of all murders during that time, which translates to an annual chance of being killed in such an attack of about 1 in 4 million per year. The deadliest motivating ideology for those attacks is Islamism, which accounts for a total of 87 percent of all deaths and includes those who were murdered in the 9/11 attacks. Right-wing ideology is the second deadliest motivation at 10 percent, left-wing ideology at 2 percent, and unknown/other, foreign nationalism, and separatism together accounting for less than 1 percent of all murders. Two attacks are responsible for most of the terror deaths on US soil: 9/11 and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Those two attacks caused 3,147 deaths, which is 88 percent of all terrorist murders over the 51-year period. Of the other 430 murders, right-wing terrorists account for 45 percent of people murdered, Islamists are responsible for 32 percent, left-wing terrorists are responsible for 16 percent, and attackers motivated by the other ideologies account for the remainder. The number of politically motivated killings is not increasing over time. Of course, murders don’t capture the totality of politically motivated violence or the amorphous feelings that people have that American politics are out of control. However, they are the best measure of the actual violence and an excellent indicator that the United States is not suffering through a wave of politically motivated terrorist killings.
Topic:: Political Violence, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Ideology
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

88. Ending Community Development Subsidies

Author:: Chris Edwards
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spent more than $20 billion on community development subsidies in fiscal year 2025. The spending flows to state and local governments for housing projects, welfare programs, disaster aid, sidewalk repairs, pickleball courts, business support, grants to nonprofit groups, and many other activities. Congress launched many community development programs in the 1960s to aid poor inner cities. Federal experts were supposed to skillfully help local officials grow their economies. That was the idea, but today HUD’s community development aid is spread widely to both poor and wealthy areas, and experience has shown that aid imposes costly bureaucracy on local investment activities. The Trump administration has proposed eliminating most of HUD’s community development spending. Given the need to reduce federal budget deficits, it makes sense to cut funding for local activities that local governments can fund for themselves. Also, HUD’s community development programs are plagued by intense paperwork, fraud and corruption, and pork-barrel politics. Americans would be better off funding investments such as sidewalk repairs locally, rather than sending their taxes to Washington and hoping that some of it trickles through the bureaucracies and back to their neighborhoods. Congress should end federal subsidies for community development. Local public services and investments should be funded by local governments and the private sector.
Topic:: Development, Investment, Private Sector, Public Service, Subsidies, and Local Government
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

89. The Future of Online Expression and Innovation Depends on Robust Section 230 Protections

Author:: David Inserra
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Section 230 is a cornerstone of how online speech works in the United States. It allows websites and platforms to host user-generated content without being legally responsible for everything their users say, while still giving them the freedom to remove content that they and their users may find objectionable. This legal framework helped the internet grow into a place where millions of Americans can speak, create, organize, and do business. Section 230 removed legal incentives that discouraged content moderation, allowing online platforms to engage in the moderation of user-generated content without assuming liability for all user speech. Section 230 has enabled more free expression and innovation by protecting platforms from being held legally responsible for everything posted by their users. Weakening or repealing Section 230 would backfire, pushing platforms to over-remove lawful speech, limit features, or exit markets to manage legal risk. Expanding platform liability would entrench large incumbents by raising legal and compliance costs that small and new companies cannot absorb, ultimately reducing competition and innovation. As new technologies emerge, such as generative AI, preserving a stable speech-protective liability framework is essential for the United States to remain a leader in innovation and free expression.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Freedom of Expression, Innovation, and Speech
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

90. Understanding Debanking: Evaluating Governmental, Operational, Political, and Religious Financial Account Closures

Author:: Nicholas Anthony
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: This study examines the growing phenomenon of debanking—the sudden and often unexplained closure of individuals’ or organizations’ financial accounts. While media and political narratives often attribute these closures to political or religious discrimination, this study finds that the majority of debanking cases stem from governmental pressure. To identify this cause more accurately, the study distinguishes between four forms of debanking—governmental, operational, political, and religious—evaluating each form in turn. Based on public evidence, governmental debanking appears to be the most significant issue. Congress can correct this issue by reforming the Bank Secrecy Act, repealing confidentiality laws, and permanently ending reputational risk regulation. Doing so would reduce the incentives to debank, expose how widespread debanking has become, and cut out the tools that the government has used to pressure banks and other financial institutions.
Topic:: Government, Financial Institutions, Debanking, and Financial Disclosure
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

91. Addressing Civil Investigative Demand Overreach at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Author:: Solveig Singleton
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: he Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, or the Bureau) often issues civil investigative demands (CIDs), a type of administrative subpoena that compels businesses and individuals to produce evidence such as documents and testimony. Many observers criticize the Bureau’s CIDs for being poorly justified, overbroad, vague, and costly. Modern Supreme Court precedents leave CID recipients with few constitutional protections. Courts defer to the Bureau in legal challenges to CIDs, rendering constitutional and statutory limits on the Bureau’s powers toothless. Legislators are considering reform proposals to bring accountability to the Bureau’s CID practice. The Civil Investigative Demand Reform Act of 2025 would curb overbroad CIDs by requiring them to make specific reference to particular facts, empowering recipients to petition for relief from burdensome or unnecessary demands, and allowing petitioners to appeal directly to federal court upon the denial of a petition. Policymakers should consider additional reforms. For example, the Bureau could be required to prove that CID compliance costs are proportional to the seriousness of the violation. Reforms should ensure that petitions are decided not by the Bureau’s director but by neutral arbiters such as administrative law judges housed outside the agency. The Bureau’s CID overreach can destroy lawful enterprises without corresponding benefits to consumers. Procedural reforms to the CID process are an important step. But ultimately, protection of firms’ and individuals’ liberty will require legislators to take a skeptical view of inessential substantive rules more broadly.
Topic:: Government, Reform, and Consumer Protection
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

92. Let 1,000 Flowers Bloom: Best Practices for Advancing Educational Freedom

Author:: Colleen Hroncich
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The growth of educational freedom in America has been dramatic, with more than 70 programs now operating in over 30 states. While this is welcome news for many families in need of school choice, the rapid expansion has also revealed weaknesses with program design, particularly in funding stability, administrative structure, expenditure approval processes, and family access. This paper identifies essential components for successful educational freedom programs, each of which will be explained in more detail: Universal eligibility. Any student can apply. Universal funding. Funding sufficient to cover all students who apply. Rollover. Unspent funds can be used for eligible expenses in future years. Competitive administration. Allow for multiple program managers rather than a monopoly. Streamlined expenditure approval. Offer multiple ways to pay and utilize risk-based auditing instead of prepurchase approval for most purchases. The paper also traces how we arrived at today’s choice landscape and highlights lessons for policymakers seeking to maximize opportunity while avoiding new monopolies. To sustain momentum, states must move beyond piecemeal design toward comprehensive frameworks. Only then can educational freedom deliver on its promises.
Topic:: Education, Public Policy, Freedom, and Local Government
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

93. Improving Trump Accounts

Author:: Adam N. Michel
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Trump Accounts are new early-life investment accounts that include a $1,000 government-funded seed investment for Americans born between 2025 and 2028. The accounts also allow additional contributions from families, employers, and charitable organizations. Trump Accounts are the latest addition to a tax code that already includes more than a dozen similar qualified investment accounts, each with its own eligibility rules, contribution limits, and withdrawal restrictions. This policy analysis finds that Trump Accounts function primarily as a government welfare program rather than a tax-neutral investment vehicle. For most families, Trump Accounts are less tax-advantaged than existing alternatives and add considerable complexity to an already fragmented system, limiting participation. The analysis concludes by proposing reforms that build on the best features of Trump Accounts by adopting a Universal Savings Account structure and consolidating the remaining system into simpler, more flexible options that expand access and reduce complexity.
Topic:: Reform, Tax Systems, Investment, Welfare, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

94. Federal Budget Reform Opportunities in Higher Education for 2026

Author:: Andrew Gillen
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Over the decades, federal programs have accumulated in higher education. Some of these programs have been rendered obsolete or redundant by subsequent developments, while others have failed to achieve their intended purpose. As a result, there are several federal policy reforms that would improve higher education policy and save taxpayers money. In this report I identify policies that would save more than $265 billion over the next 10 years, including eliminating subsidized loans, eliminating or capping Public Service Loan Forgiveness, modifying the Repayment Assistance Plan, phasing out campus-based aid, repealing ineffective tax expenditures, and benchmarking research overhead rates.
Topic:: Reform, Budget, Higher Education, and Public Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

95. Minimum Wages and Racial Disparities

Author:: David Neumark and Jyotsana Kala
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: There has been substantial research on the employment effects of minimum wages. Much of this research shows that minimum wages reduce employment, with the largest effects observed in the lowest-skilled groups, usually defined in terms of age or education. This is likely because a larger share of lower-skilled workers earn the minimum wage; when the minimum wage increases, these workers are more likely to experience reduced hiring, fewer hours, and job losses. However, there has been little research on how minimum wages affect employment and other labor market outcomes for lower-skilled racial minority workers, even though these groups tend to earn lower wages and hence are more likely to be affected by the minimum wage.
Topic:: Race, Labor Market, Minimum Wage, and Earnings
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

96. Tariffs as Fiscal Policy

Author:: Kimberly A. Clausing and Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The election of Donald Trump to a second term in November 2024 indicated that tariffs would play a much larger role in US economic policy. The use of tariffs—taxes on imports— expanded significantly during Trump’s first term, with tariff revenue nearly doubling relative to the value of imports. But his 2024 campaign promised a far larger role for tariffs, and he has delivered on that promise. In early 2025, the average tariff rate soared from less than 3 percent at the end of the Biden administration to over 20 percent. As of September 4, 2025, it stood at about 17.5 percent, the highest level since 1935. While recent analysis has shown that exemptions and other factors may lower the average tariff rate below this level, this number may understate the negative economic effects of the tariffs because they vary dramatically across trade partners and goods. In any case, the future of tariffs remains unclear: Congress has yet to legislate on tariffs, and legal challenges against many of them are underway. Nonetheless, we expect these issues to be relevant to policy discussions for some time.
Topic:: Tariffs, Fiscal Policy, Donald Trump, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

97. A Look Back and Ahead at the Federal Budget

Author:: Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: After running deficits from 1970 to 1997, the US government ran a budget surplus in fiscal year 2000 for the third year in a row, reaching a post–World War II high of 2.3 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP). The Congressional Budget Office projected that surpluses would increase over time, totaling $5.6 trillion over the next 10 years, and that all public debt would be paid off by 2006. This led to a problem for policymakers and academics: How would monetary policy be conducted, and where would investors find safe assets if no US public debt were available? Then–Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan cited the need to maintain public debt in his pivotal argument in favor of tax cuts. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted major tax-cut legislation, signed by President George W. Bush.
Topic:: Government, Budget, GDP, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

98. Bank Competition and Entrepreneurial Gaps: Evidence from Bank Deregulation

Author:: Xiang Li
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Entrepreneurship plays a vital role in stimulating economic growth by promoting job creation and innovation. However, pronounced racial and gender gaps persist in entrepreneurial ventures. Addressing these gaps can boost economic growth and job creation while also reducing inequality. Therefore, understanding the barriers that impede business formation among minorities and women is crucial. My research examines how bank competition alleviates financial obstacles that disproportionately prevent women and racial minorities from becoming entrepreneurs. My findings reveal that the deregulation of interstate banking in the United States between 1994 and 2021 narrowed gender and racial disparities in entrepreneurship by expanding and improving banking services, reducing discrimination in the financial market, and narrowing gaps in firm performance.
Topic:: Entrepreneurship, Banking, Racism, and Deregulation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

99. Learning About Police Bias: Prosecutors and Police Before and After Body-Worn Cameras

Author:: Emma Harrington and Hannah Shaffer
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Each year, police arrest around seven million Americans, often after discretionary stops, and criminal courts sentence more than half a million to prison. Prosecutors wield considerable discretion in determining which arrests lead to imprisonment, typically basing their decisions on information provided by the police, especially the police report’s characterization of the crime. However, police reports may misrepresent reality and reflect racial bias. Prosecutors thus face a difficult question: To what extent do police reports reflect truth versus bias?
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Police, Racism, Bias, Incarceration, and Bodycams
Political Geography:: North America, North Carolina, and United States of America

100. Should States Reduce Teacher Licensing Requirements?

Author:: Christa Deneault and Evan Riehl
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: All US states require training for teacher certification, making teaching the largest licensed occupation in the country. Because education is mandatory and provided by the government for free, teachers’ wages may not fully respond to supply pressures, and demand remains high regardless of quality. These factors can lead to teacher shortages, forcing some schools to hire unlicensed teachers to fill vacancies. Thus, training requirements may reduce the supply of certified teachers and increase schools’ reliance on teachers with little or no training, potentially undermining licensing laws even if training is effective.
Topic:: Education, Licensing, Teachers, and Local Government
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS