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122. Superstorm Sandy and Coastal Corralling in New York City
- Author:
- Ari Lippi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
- Institution:
- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
- Abstract:
- On October 29, 2012, a cyclone and a tropical storm fused under an inauspicious full moon off the Atlantic Northwest of the US to create Hurricane Sandy. It beelined toward the New York City metropolitan area at high tide and became the most destructive and costly hurricane in the City’s history; costing NYC $19 billion in in damages, 43 deaths and the absence of electricity and heat for around two million people. While the impacts were widespread, the neighborhoods of Coney Island and the Rockaways experienced widely disparate impacts which magnified the underlying social vulnerabilities among low-income racialized and ethicized populations. This paper positions Hurricane Sandy as a locus of interrogation to question how discriminatory policies excised low-income and socially vulnerable populations to the environmentally vulnerable lands of Coney Island and the Rockaways at the time of Sandy, and what injustices preceded the event and were engendered as a result. To answer these questions, this paper will examine the sequence of displacement and place-making over time that created channels for populations with existing social vulnerabilities to be thrust into environmentally risky coastal areas in New York City. Ultimately, the process, which I name coastal corralling, created the conditions for the little-discussed post-storm disaster and environmental injustices in Coney Island and the Rockaways, producing chronic issues that continue to persist over a decade after the storm.
- Topic:
- Natural Disasters, Crisis Management, Hurricane, and Hurricane Sandy
- Political Geography:
- New York, North America, and United States of America
123. White Homeowners’ Racialized Opposition to Affordable Housing Development
- Author:
- Jose Luis Gandara
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
- Institution:
- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
- Abstract:
- I investigate the effects of the race of the perceived beneficiaries of an affordable housing development on white homeowners’ support for the project, using an online survey experiment with 520 participants. I find that priming respondents to believe a nearby proposed project’s residents will likely be Black significantly increases opposition compared to the white prime. However, the effect is moderated by respondents’ racial attitudes, such that self-reported racially sensitive individuals instead become more supportive when led to believe a project’s residents will be Black. Despite racial cues increasing opposition, respondents do not express different concerns with development in a racialized context. These results suggest that race is a central factor driving attitudes toward affordable housing; however, racially motivated public commenters mask their concerns behind those ostensibly unrelated to race. Policymakers concerned with advancing equity while addressing the housing crisis may reconsider public comment’s role informing them of the public’s preferences toward development.
- Topic:
- Racism, Equity, and Affordable Housing
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
124. Two Roads to Reform: Marijuana Policy Changes, Arrest Trends, and Racial Disparities in Chicago and Indianapolis
- Author:
- Mustafa Ali-Smith and Keiana West
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
- Institution:
- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
- Abstract:
- This paper examines the relationship between marijuana policy changes, arrest trends, and racial disparities in arrests in two major U.S. cities, Indianapolis and Chicago, between 2014 and 2023. Chicago implemented statewide legalization in January 2020, while Indianapolis decriminalized certain marijuana offenses at the county level in September 2019. By analyzing public arrest data from Chicago and the State of Indiana, this research addresses three key questions: whether marijuana-related arrests declined after these policy changes, how racial disparities in arrests changed after these shifts, and how marijuana arrest trends compare with those for other drugs. Our findings reveal significant reductions in marijuana-related arrests in both cities following policy reforms, though the degree of change varied. The results also demonstrate stark racial disparities in marijuana arrest rates both prior to and following policy changes in each city, though racial disparities decreased in both Chicago and Indianapolis following each policy change during the study period. Ultimately, racial disparities in both cities increased again as time after reform passed, signaling the need for policies and practices that sustain decreases in disparities overtime.
- Topic:
- Law Enforcement, Reform, Marijuana, and Drug Policy
- Political Geography:
- North America, Chicago, United States of America, and Indianapolis
125. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout
- Author:
- Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
126. What the White House and Congress Can Do to Prevent Global Mass Atrocities
- Author:
- Federica D'Alessandra
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The Unites States has long recognized that preventing and responding to mass atrocities is both a moral responsibility and in its national security interest. Commitment to atrocity prevention and response has long enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and the U.S. government has long been a global leader on the issue. In 2011, the United States was the first country to establish an interagency body dedicated to atrocity prevention. Ever since, each Republican and Democratic administration—with the support of Congress—has taken additional, important steps toward implementing this objective. In 2019, under President Donald Trump, the United States was the first country to enact federal legislation addressing global mass atrocities. The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act mandates the White House to report annually to Congress on government-led atrocity prevention efforts. Under the act, the second Trump administration will again be required to report to Congress by mid-2025, raising the question: What is in store for the atrocity prevention agenda under Trump 2.0? This paper reviews the atrocity prevention track record of the first Trump administration and other relevant action taken so far in this second term to parse out what efforts to sustain and uphold U.S. atrocity prevention obligations could look like under Trump’s second White House. This paper highlights how a number of steps the administration has already taken, including but not limited to the recently announced reorganization of the U.S. Department of State and the effective dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), unless promptly addressed, will raise dire challenges for the readiness and capacity of the State Department and other relevant agencies tasked with operationalizing U.S. commitments to this end. Accordingly, this paper advances a number of actionable recommendations that both the White House and the U.S. Congress should urgently consider to ensure the administration stands ready and capable to fulfill its obligations under the Elie Wiesel Act and other relevant legislation.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
127. Geothermal Energy and U.S. Competitive Advantage: Drill, Baby, Drill
- Author:
- Robert W. Sweeney and Noah Gordon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The United States and the rest of the world sit at the intersection of potentially destabilizing trends. Great power competition, climate change, intensifying geopolitical uncertainty, the economy’s potential deglobalization, and the potential massive increase in energy demands arising from artificial intelligence (AI) are creating challenges for U.S. national energy policy. A foremost concern is the vulnerability of energy supply chains to interference from or control by a hostile power. In this dynamic context, U.S. energy policy has evolved significantly in terms of markets, supplies, regulation, and legislation. The country’s success in using fracking technology and exploiting abundant shale reserves have made it the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons and a major exporter, especially of natural gas.1 Further, as national and international concerns about climate change have grown, U.S. energy policy has become more aligned with transitioning to renewable sources. So far, the focus of clean energy additions has been on wind, solar, and nuclear power. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the United States issued legislation and policies raising renewable energy to the level of industrial policy. Among those were the Energy Policy Act (2005), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (2021), the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (2022). However, geothermal energy—which uses the heat of the earth’s crust for power—has been largely left out of U.S. industrial policy. This is despite the facts that utilizing this source of renewable energy requires some of the same technologies that have made the United States the world’s top oil and gas producer and that geothermal has the potential to provide clean, dispatchable power that does not rely on weather conditions. With U.S. clean firm power demand expected to increase by approximately 700–900 gigawatts by 2050,2 the United States needs to dramatically increase capacity while reducing or eliminating net carbon output and insulating its energy supply from dependence on international supply chains. The question for the country now is: how should public and private resources be directed to provide the United States with an energy system optimized for the current national and international environment? This paper argues that recent advances in geothermal power have made it the technology with superior characteristics for future U.S. energy system development. With its comparative advantages, geothermal power merits an urgent, intense, and dedicated reorientation of U.S. industrial policy, legislation, and resources.
- Topic:
- Development, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, and Geothermal Power
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
128. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India
- Author:
- Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America
129. El Salvador, No Place for Asylum Seekers
- Author:
- Laura Blume, Stephanie Sosa, and Andrea García Rodríguez
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- Deported from the United States without due process, asylum seekers now face political persecution and deadly conditions in El Salvador’s mega-prisons as the Trump administration outsources cruelty to the Bukele regime.
- Topic:
- Prisons/Penal Systems, Donald Trump, Deportation, Due Process, Nayib Bukele, and Asylum Seekers
- Political Geography:
- Central America, El Salvador, and United States of America
130. Tren de Aragua: A Gang, Not Terrorist Invaders
- Author:
- Elliott Young
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- Trump’s use of the Alien Enemies Act to target Venezuelan migrants relies on a false narrative about Tren de Aragua and the Venezuelan state, and sets a dangerous precedent for immigrant rights.
- Topic:
- Immigration, Deportation, Gangs, and Tren de Aragua
- Political Geography:
- South America, Venezuela, and United States of America
131. This Spanglish Bookstore In New York Is Reclaiming Bushwick's Sense Of Latinidad
- Author:
- Victoria Mortimer
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- Mil Mundos began as a means for María Herrón to reclaim her identity. Now, this bookstore’s founder is building a community among Latines in Brooklyn, New York.
- Topic:
- Community, Identity, and Spanglish
- Political Geography:
- New York, North America, and United States of America
132. The U.S. Is Helping Brazilian Police Kill
- Author:
- Joseph Bouchard
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- Brazil’s highly militarized policing disproportionately impacts poor and racialized communities. By providing funding and training, the United States has helped exacerbate the crisis.
- Topic:
- Training, Police, Militarization, and Police Brutality
- Political Geography:
- Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America
133. The U.S. War on Migrants Gets Help from El Salvador
- Author:
- Timothy O'Farrell
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- El Salvador's offer to house deportees and U.S. citizens in its infamous prisons – for profit – signals a new and troubling escalation in the criminalization of migration.
- Topic:
- Migration, Prisons/Penal Systems, Donald Trump, Deportation, and Criminalization
- Political Geography:
- Latin America, El Salvador, and United States of America
134. Impacts of the Artificial Intelligence on International Relations: Towards a Global Algorithms Governance
- Author:
- Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This article examines the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on international relations (IR) and global governance. It begins by presenting a conceptual framework that situates AI within the theoretical and practical dimensions of IR, and explores how AI influences global power dynamics, alters state behaviour, and reshapes institutional frameworks. The study highlights the ethical and regulatory challenges of AI governance, focusing first on the efforts of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). Later, the article discusses the "AI technology race" between the United States and China and their regulations. Finally, the article highlights the need for ethical and responsible AI development to foster global cooperation and address the challenges and opportunities that this technology presents in contemporary international relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, United Nations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Council of Europe
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
135. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision
- Author:
- Chris Kremidas-Courtney
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
136. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?
- Author:
- Anna Jerzewska
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
- Topic:
- European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
137. Biopower: Securing American Leadership in Biotechnology
- Author:
- Vivek Chilukuri and Hannah Kelley
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The biorevolution is upon us. Converging breakthroughs in biological sequencing, engineering biology, and machine learning are ushering in an almost science fiction–like world in which humans can manipulate and even design the building blocks of life with increasing sophistication—for good or ill. In this world, cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. According to one estimate, existing biotechnologies could have a direct economic impact of $4 trillion a year for the next 20 years.1 As innovation continues, the ceiling could be far higher. If next-generation biotechnologies hold great promise, they also come with gathering perils from new bioweapons, intrusive biosurveillance, and the race for biotechnology breakthroughs without adequate safeguards for public health, the environment, and democratic values. For policymakers, the question is not whether the biorevolution has transformative power, but which nation will responsibly harness that power to unlock new tools for defense, health, manufacturing, food security, environmental remediation, and the fight against climate change. No country is better positioned to lead the biorevolution than the United States, but it requires that policymakers act now with swift, ambitious, and far-sighted steps to secure America’s place as the global biopower. The United States enters the biorevolution with formidable tailwinds—an unrivaled innovation ecosystem, world-leading research institutes, unmatched private investment, talent, and a global network of democratic partners and allies. Recent federal investments and an emerging policy framework have fortified U.S. leadership. But in this fast-moving field, settling for gradual progress will guarantee falling behind as competitors like China race to eclipse the United States with ambitions to scale up their biotechnology research, innovation, talent, and infrastructure. To secure America’s place as the global biopower, the Trump administration and Congress should accelerate U.S. tailwinds through greater investment in biotechnology research and infrastructure, especially in sectors beyond health and medicine; expand the pipeline of biotalent; and lead globally to drive biotechnology norms, standards-setting, and responsible adoption. At the same time, policymakers must navigate headwinds that could imperil further progress—specifically, an underdeveloped national biomanufacturing infrastructure; insufficient public and private investment that flows overwhelmingly to biotechnology research and development (R&D) in the health and medical sectors; a lack of uniform federal standards, definitions, and codes; a morass of conflicting policies and regulations; inaccessible and insecure biodata; and low public awareness and trust in emerging and ethically fraught biotechnology applications. This report outlines several recommendations to shore up America’s position as the preeminent biopower, including an investment of $20 billion in new federal funding. Policymakers should view this level of investment as the floor of what it will require to secure U.S. biotechnology leadership. Cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. Regardless of what U.S. policymakers do, countries around the world are moving swiftly to embrace the biorevolution. The United Kingdom (UK) is driving innovation by concentrating and sharing its biodata through the UK Biobank, which houses the fully sequenced genetic codes of 500,000 people.2 France has invested roughly $9.5 billion through Innovation Santé 2030 to drive biomedical research.3 Japan has committed $3 billion to promote its biotechnology ecosystem.4 South Korea is carving out a niche in digital biotechnology and aims to transition 30 percent of its manufacturing industry to biomanufacturing within a decade.5 If any nation can surpass the United States as the global biopower, it will be China. In its most recent five-year plans, Beijing made explicit its ambition to become a biotechnology “superpower.” It is well on its way. China’s biotechnology leadership has surged on the back of significant public investment, long-term policy prioritization, a massive domestic market, decades of largely unrestricted capital flows, and the amassing of biodata through licit and illicit means.6 China’s concerted biotechnology push has already paid dividends: its scholars rank second in the world for authoring biomedical papers, and the country leads high-impact research in biofuels and biomanufacturing. China’s high-impact research in synthetic biology is more than triple that of the United States, posing a high risk of monopolization.7 Today, China is a global biomanufacturing powerhouse that exports roughly 40 percent of the world’s active pharmaceutical ingredients.8 Now, China aspires to move up the biotechnology value chain with a renewed push to support start-ups, integrate its vast biodata with cutting-edge machine learning tools, and dominate emerging markets for biotechnology with “national champions” such as BGI Group and WuXi Biologics, as it did with Huawei and 5G. China’s ambition to close the gap with the United States should inspire action from policymakers to secure and extend America’s lead. To that end, this report outlines a series of immediate and longer-term recommendations in six key areas for leaders in policymaking and industry.
- Topic:
- Leadership, Innovation, and Biotechnology
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
138. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
139. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
140. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America