Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: within 3 Years and within 10 Years

201. Global Spillovers of US Monetary Policy: New Insights from the Remittance Channel

Author:: Pablo Aguilar-Perez
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper examines the global spillovers of US monetary policy through the remittance channel, in both sending and recipient countries. Using a dataset covering 8 remittance-sending and 41 recipient countries from January 1997 to December 2017, we apply a local projections framework to trace the dynamic effects of unexpected US monetary tightening. We find that remittance outflows decline in advanced economies following policy shocks, illustrating the pro-cyclicality of remittances in source countries and their role in amplifying global financial spillovers. Among recipient countries, our results show that in countries with low to moderate remittance dependence, inflows tend to increase following a contractionary shock – consistent with altruistic or insurance-driven motives. In contrast, remittances decline in highly dependent countries, aligning with self-interest or investment-driven behavior. We find that these heterogeneous responses are shaped by migrant profiles: countries with high remittance dependence typically have a larger share of low-skilled migrants and display more strongly pro-cyclical remittance patterns. In contrast, less dependent countries tend to have more skilled or diversified diasporas, resulting in more stable and less cyclical remittance flows.
Topic:: Emerging Markets, Monetary Policy, Economy, and Remittances
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

202. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations

Author:: Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
Topic:: Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

203. The US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal

Author:: Penny Naas, Georgina Wright, Eamon Drumm, and Antonia Wunnerlich
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Eighty years to the day after Germany’s surrender in World War II, two of the victorious allies in that conflict unveiled a new economic partnership, the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD). It is the first bilateral agreement of its kind concluded by the Trump administration since its new tariff policy was introduced in early April. Leaders have described the EPD as a “trade deal”, but it functions more as a framework for future action. It includes tariff concessions on selected goods, grants greater access to the British market for certain American agricultural products, and outlines areas for future negotiation, including in digital regulation, export controls, and, potentially, investment screening. A separate technology-focused agreement is also planned for both countries to find ways to collaborate on biotech, life sciences, quantum computing, nuclear fusion, aerospace, and space technologies. In substance, the EPD freezes tariffs at 10% for most goods while buying time for technical-level discussions and laying the groundwork for deeper alignment. For the United Kingdom, 30% of whose exports go to its largest export market, the United States, the deal is an important diplomatic win. It is for the United States, too, whose ninth-largest trading partner is the United Kingdom. In 2024, the United States imported $68.1 billion in goods from Britain and exported $79.9 billion to the country. For countries eyeing negotiations with Washington, the EPD underscores that US trade talks are increasingly shaped by national and economic security considerations, not just trade balances. The agreement links future tariff relief to shared approaches on US strategic issues such as digital policy and alignment on export controls, including to China. As Peter Mandelson, British ambassador in Washington, put it, the EPD is the "end of the beginning". Much will now depend on the outcomes of technical-level discussions, which could have direct repercussions on London’s reset talks with the EU.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and United States of America

204. Europe Between the United States and China

Author:: Gesine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

205. Unsolicited Thoughts on How the New Administration Can Improve American Diplomacy

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: A country’s political leadership establishes its foreign policy goals, and its diplomatic service works to achieve them. Ideally, a country’s fundamental foreign policy goals should be so clear and compelling that they transcend specific administrations and provide enduring guidelines for carrying out the work of diplomacy. Previous post-Cold War administrations have made half-hearted, but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to do this. The new administration may want to consider these three strategic objectives: 1) create a more stable international system; 2) avoid an alliance between China and Russia; 3) decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war. These objectives are clear, compelling, and enduring. The benefits of any system adhere disproportionately to those at the top of the system. Since we are at the top of the current international system, no one has a greater interest in its stability than we do. An alliance between the other nuclear superpower and the other economic superpower would represent a clear and present danger to our preeminence. And in all likelihood, we’d all be dead after a major nuclear war. A diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives should include: 1) prioritizing US interests; 2) talking less and listening more; and 3) leading by example.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and International System
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

206. Biden’s Troubled Foreign Policy Legacy

Author:: P. Michael McKinley
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: In the waning days of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security adviser Jake Sullivan highlighted the foreign policy achievements of the previous four years including marshaling support for Ukraine, preventing a wider war in the Middle East, and galvanizing Indo-Pacific ties. The outgoing president himself gave a spirited defense of his accomplishments just days before he left office. As a reelected President Trump takes over, however, it seems fair to ask just how sustainable the efforts to “reenergize alliances and partnerships” and America’s global leadership actually were. And in at least one crucial respect, the Biden administration’s “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class” turned out to be more continuity than a break with President Trump’s “America First:” a protectionist national economic security doctrine now appears to be a centerpiece of American foreign policy. The swan song of a certain kind of American internationalism seems at hand, as the incoming administration signals policies which, reflecting the national mood, will prioritize a more unilateralist approach to the outside world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, International Order, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Ukraine, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

207. How to Fix the Peace Corps

Author:: Thomas Brodey
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: With its small budget and secluded work, the United States Peace Corps is one of the least conspicuous arms of US foreign policy. Yet the agency, originally founded in 1961 as a way for Americans to work on community development abroad, still exerts a major influence. In many developing countries, such as Madagascar, where I served, volunteers are most people’s only exposure to American diplomacy. And for those volunteers who complete service, the Peace Corps is a proven path into the Foreign Service and foreign policy establishment. Despite its apparent stability, however, the Peace Corps is currently facing two of its largest challenges in decades, one acute and one long-term.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, and Peace Corps
Political Geography:: North America, Madagascar, and United States of America

208. Bohlen’s Dictum: First, Be There

Author:: Thomas E. McNamara
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: On my first foreign service posting in Paris, my boss, Ambassador Charles Bohlen, said that the diplomatic service required many skills, but the most important one was “being there when something happens.” Later, working on Vietnam in the embassy’s political section, I learned that Bohlen’s Dictum was true.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, and Memoir
Political Geography:: France, Vietnam, and United States of America

209. Aftershocks from Gaza: From Local to Global Consequences (Part 1)

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The grotesque attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza have upended long-standing assumptions about regional order. The Middle East’s previous reliance on a US-led security framework has given way to a fragmented, multi-aligned landscape in which middle powers pursue their interests, while the Palestinian issue—long marginalized—has returned to the center of regional and global diplomacy. Israel has secured tactical military gains but at the cost of increasing diplomatic isolation, while conditions in Gaza have fueled global demands for a sustainable political solution. Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria face profound setbacks, while Turkey and the Arab Gulf states seek to expand influence without the means to dominate. China and Russia remain cautious players, unwilling or unable to shape the conflict’s outcome. For the United States, the Gaza war poses a strategic dilemma. Despite efforts to broker ceasefires and secure hostages, Washington has been unable—or unwilling—to exert decisive leverage on Israel. The Biden and Trump administrations alike have struggled to articulate a coherent, sustainable strategy that balances US interests in security, energy, stability, and credibility. The ISD Gaza Report is organized in two parts: Part I: A ground assessment of the regional shifts since October 7, with particular focus on Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the reemergence of Palestine as the central unresolved question in Middle East politics, and the role of regional states. Part II: A deeper analysis of Iran’s position and prospects, scenarios for regional order, and US policy options, culminating in concrete recommendations for advancing stability while protecting US strategic interests. Participants underscored that any durable path forward begins and ends with Palestine and the Palestinians. US policymakers must adapt to a regional order defined not by hegemonic control but by contested pluralism and assertive middle powers. Strategic clarity, consistent diplomacy, and credible leverage are essential if Washington hopes to pursue its interests amid the aftershocks from Gaza—and not merely react to them.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Palestinians, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

210. Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face a two-pronged crisis. Increases in global temperatures call for the rapid expansion of critical mineral infrastructure—to include mines and refinement—if we hope to deploy the technology needed to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the United States’ primary geopolitical adversary has obtained a near-monopoly position in the supply of most of these minerals. Heavy use of certain minerals in our defense-industrial base further underscores the need to reduce reliance on People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies. Both our climate and our national security demand concerted efforts to wean us away from fossil fuels and the PRC’s market power. In the spring of 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a New Global Commons working group over two meetings titled “Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals.” Working group participants represented academia, think tanks, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, bringing a broad range of experience and global perspectives to the discussions. Participants discussed definitions of critical minerals and the need for a successful green energy transition to support digital technology and fulfill 21st-century defense needs. Participants weighed the complexity of overlapping issues and how the United States and its partners might best effectively coordinate and balance these issues.
Topic:: National Security, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Mining, Energy, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

211. What You Can Learn Standing on a Street Corner

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: I arrived in Moscow in late August 1988 to begin a three-year assignment heading the US embassy’s political section. I had learned during my pre-departure consultations in Washington that there were still diametrically opposing views among policy-makers and within the intelligence community about whether the reform program that Mikhail Gorbachev had begun was meaningful. The negative view held that the reforms were intended merely to make the Soviet system operate more efficiently and that, if successful, the US would be faced with an equally hostile, but even more dangerous adversary. One of my key objectives was for the embassy’s political reporting to have meaningful impact on this debate.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Reform, Memoir, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

212. “European Army”: A Thought Experiment

Author:: Lutz Unterseher
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: In nine concise pages, German military analyst Lutz Unterseher provides the strategic orientation, operational modalities, force allocations, institutional framework, overall personnel requirements for active duty and reserves, command organization, and armament composition of an integrated European Union armed force. He then provides a budget for the component parts. The total annual cost is €170 billion, 1% of EU nations’ GDP. Unterseher concludes: It is hardly accidental that the European Union was chosen as the political framework for this force model. Above all, that is because, given Trump-era U.S. policy, NATO in its Atlantic-partnership sense no longer exists. Whether a self-confident “Euro-NATO” can emerge under American pressure and attempts to sow division remains highly questionable. It does, however, seem wise to “carry over” NATO’s infrastructure and communication networks into the authentically European armed forces wherever possible.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

213. Iran: A Report on the DACOR Bacon Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference

Author:: Keith McCormick
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The DACOR Bacon House Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference, held on September 12, focused on Iran. The conference brought together academics, former diplomats, and policy activists to analyze the new situation facing Iran in the Middle East after a string of military setbacks, and the prospects for diplomacy with the United States. A list of participants is appended to this article.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, Environment, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

214. History Matters

Author:: Robert Hunter
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: History matters. So does ignoring it. These truisms play a major role in the mess that US foreign policy is in now. Americans’ playing down of history and related critical analysis began late in the Cold War. Indeed, by then, basic strategic thinking that was needed to manage the balance of terror with the Soviet Union had long since been done.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, History, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

215. Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World

Author:: Dennis Ross
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In a world that is multipolar and America has less relative power, the United States no longer has the luxury to practice statecraft badly. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the "forever wars." But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft--diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education--to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, a significant update of the first edition, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft--German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8 - and bad cases of statecraft - going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, and Statecraft
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

216. Building on Momentum in U.S.-Turkey Relations

Author:: Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The two leaders can use their personal rapport to solve bilateral and regional problems, but they will also face tough challenges in matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dealings with China. In the second in a series of TRANSITION 2025 memos, Soner Cagaptay explores areas for U.S. partnership with Turkey in the Middle East and beyond. After a decade of malaise, relations between the two countries have lately recovered thanks to Turkish support for Sweden’s accession to NATO, granted in return for permission to buy U.S. F-16 fighter jets. The personal magnetism between President Trump and his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could smooth the way for further cooperation in military and economic areas, and also potentially help the new U.S. administration in Ukraine and Syria. But complex challenges remain, relating not only to the Syrian conflict—where Ankara and Washington backed different actors—but also to dealings with China and affinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. MIDDLE EAST POLICY TRANSITION 2025 by Washington Institute experts address challenges and opportunities for the Trump-Vance administration during a period of extraordinary change in the Middle East. A primary challenge will be countering Iran’s march toward the bomb. Also critical will be determining a sustainable U.S. force posture in the region and updating America’s counterterrorism mission. Opportunities, meanwhile, are suddenly ample after blows to the “axis of resistance” and include the imperative to forge a better relationship with Turkey, which is set to be an influential player in post-Assad Syria.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

217. Inside the Latest PKK Talks (Part 2): Implications for Turkish and U.S. Policy

Author:: Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: If Ankara seals the deal and preempts potential spoilers, the results could prove historic for Turkish politics, Erdogan’s legacy, joint counterterrorism efforts, and wider U.S. regional interests. nkara’s new dialogue with the PKK was born from nearly a decade of meticulous counterterrorism work, carried out by the country’s security forces and National Intelligence Organization and based on a political plan formulated by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who served as intelligence chief until 2023. The steps involved in this strategy have since become clear: (1) double down on pressuring and weakening the PKK via drone strikes and other effective tools, (2) bring the group back to the negotiating table from a position of weakness, and (3) negotiate the group’s breakup via Kurdish political intermediaries, as described in Part 1 of this PolicyWatch. The first phase of the plan achieved major successes against PKK militants in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, while phases two and three are seemingly being checked off as well amid reports that Abdullah Ocalan may soon ask his group to lay down their arms. To close the deal, end the PKK threat once and for all, and score a domestic political prize in the process, Fidan, Erdogan, and Turkey’s national security elites have been actively engaging Kurdish actors at home and abroad, whether to increase pressure on the group or offer incentives for disbanding.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Negotiation, Kurds, PKK, Dialogue, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

218. Navigating the Syria Sanctions Conundrum

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Washington should act quickly to facilitate transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, lest public discontent lead to widespread protests and possibly government collapse. America’s sanctions policy for Syria is broken, but the answer is not to pretend existing licenses and waivers are working or to summarily terminate all sanctions. Instead, Washington should quickly take steps to allow financial transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, and begin to assess the conditions under which sanctions could be rolled back more broadly. The Syrian people are desperate, and within weeks, they could take to the streets to protest the country’s dire conditions, possibly leading to collapse for the interim government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This would be in no one’s interest, including America’s, in large part because it could allow Iran and the Islamic State to reassert themselves in Syria and across the region. In this Policy Note, former Treasury official Matthew Levitt explains how the United States can facilitate urgently needed investment in Syria by extending sanctions waivers, opening up a banking channel, and considering steps like delisting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a foreign terrorist organization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

219. Saudi Public Opinion in a Changing Middle East: Great Powers, the Gaza War, Pathways for the Kingdom

Author:: Catherine Cleveland
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: China and Russia get higher marks than the United States, and Israel normalization is on hold—but respondents view Hamas negatively, want Arab involvement in the peace process, and increasingly support moderate interpretations of Islam. Recent polling in Saudi Arabia offers reasons for concern as well as optimism regarding U.S. interests. On the downside, Saudi respondents are more likely to prioritize good relations with China or Russia as opposed to America, despite a history of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties. Likewise, enthusiasm for Israel-Saudi normalization has fallen from already-low levels amid the Gaza war, although support is slightly higher for business links. More encouragingly, respondents express negative views about Hamas, growing support for an Arab role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and increasing sympathy for moderate interpretations of Islam, mirroring the trajectory of Riyadh’s official rhetoric. In this Policy Note, polling expert Catherine Cleveland offers thought-provoking analysis of surveys taken shortly before Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran. U.S. policymakers can chart a productive course, she explains, by first taking an honest look at Saudi public skepticism of bilateral ties and then promoting initiatives more likely to earn support.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Normalization, Hamas, Regional Politics, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Palestine, Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

220. Strategic U.S. Engagement with Algeria: A Pathway amid Shifting Global Dynamics

Author:: Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Washington should help Algiers embrace greater openness, both to promote stability in North Africa and to advance U.S. interests like counterterrorism and economic competition with China. Since gaining independence in 1962, Algeria has earned a reputation as a relatively closed country, with policies guided by self-sufficiency, noninterference, and nonalignment. Yet it has also long sought to demonstrate relevance on the world stage, such as after 9/11, when it served as a regional partner in the U.S.-led war on terror. Today, Algeria faces challenges including a migrant crisis that has strained the social fabric and the Western Sahara conflict next door—which is not on the leadership’s preferred trajectory. Washington has an interest in helping Algiers navigate these challenges and embrace greater openness, both to promote stability in North Africa and to advance U.S. interests like counterterrorism and economic competition with China. In this Policy Note, North Africa expert Sabina Henneberg focuses on trends in Algeria since the 2011 Arab uprisings as a means of understanding where the country might go from here. Effective U.S. engagement will require patience, she counsels, but could offer benefits that include expanded corporate opportunities in this large, relatively wealthy country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Economic Competition, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Algeria, North Africa, North America, and United States of America

221. Here’s How State Department Cuts Would Impede U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Author:: Ben Fishman and Elizabeth Surman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s budget cuts, intended to make America “safer, stronger, and more prosperous,” could wind up harming U.S. interests in the region while strengthening Russian and Chinese media warfare. At a time when the Middle East needs additional help managing the fallout from the war with Iran, the extreme State Department budget cuts initiated by the Trump administration are especially ill-timed. By cutting funds to partners who combat Iran’s most dangerous regional proxies, the administration risks enabling a faster rehabilitation of Tehran’s “axis of resistance.” Other cuts would limit Washington’s ability to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to Yemen, constrain efforts to reach the Iranian people, and cede ground to China and Russia in the information wars—one of the many negative repercussions of eliminating a vital network like Voice of America (VOA). The Senate has until July 18 to object to these cuts because the administration submitted its budget by means of a rescission bill, a rarely used procedure that gives Congress a limited period to respond to the administration’s proposal before it takes effect.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, State Department, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America

222. Funding in the Shadow of Conflict: AIPAC’s Financial Influence on US Congress Post-2023 Israel-Hamas War

Author:: Ömer Naim Küçük
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been a key player in mobilizing support for Israel’s foreign policy within the US Congress, especially during regional conflicts. While studies have examined the influence of the pro-Israeli lobbies’ donations on US policymakers, the strategic allocation of these funds remains less explored. This study addresses that gap by analyzing factors that influenced variations in AIPAC donations to US Congress members following the 2023 Israel-Hamas war. The findings reveal two main determinants: Congress members' sponsorship of pro-Israel bills and the electoral competition in their constituencies. Those actively supporting pro-Israel legislation receive more financial contributions, indicating a link between legislative support and financial incentives. Additionally, members facing strong electoral competition attract more donations, suggesting AIPAC’s targeted investment in politically secure candidates. This research highlights how the Israeli lobby strategically uses financial contributions to shape US foreign policy, particularly in the context of Israel's military engagements.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Lobbying, Congress, Foreign Influence, 2023 Gaza War, and AIPAC
Political Geography:: Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

223. Electoral Dynamics in post-2003 Iraq: Systemic Reforms, Security Challenges, and External Influence

Author:: Fatih Oğuzhan İpek
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s political trajectory has been shaped by systemic reforms, security challenges, and external interventions. Parliamentary elections serve as a key measure of Iraq’s democratic governance, revealing persistent issues such as electoral system debates, pre-election violence, political fragmentation, and foreign influence from actors like the US and Iran. Low voter turnout, weak election security, and recurring allegations of fraud have further eroded public trust. The protracted government formation process, driven by sectarian divisions and external meddling, has reinforced political instability. This study examines these patterns by using the process tracing method to provide a comprehensive understanding of Iraq’s electoral landscape and its broader implications for governance. The election process is divided into three timelines and analyzed before, during, and after the elections. Drawing on news and reports on Iraq as well as speeches by Iraqi figures, the study argues that seven patterns embedded in systemic reforms, security challenges, and external interventions have overwhelmed Iraq’s electoral processes and democratic governance since 2003.
Topic:: Security, Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, Parliament, and Ali al-Sistani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

224. Securing the Future: The US-Maldives Defense Partnership and Regional Stability

Author:: Matthew House
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The defense relationship between the United States and the Maldives has evolved significantly over the years, culminating in a robust partnership characterized by mutual interests and shared security concerns. This article examines the historical context of this partnership, the bolstering of relations of the current decade, and the future outlook for this critical defense relationship.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: North America, Maldives, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

225. Debating American Primacy in the Middle East

Author:: Marc Lynch, Richard K. Hermann, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Dana El Kurd, and Elham Fakhro
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: In September 2024, POMEPS and the Mershon Center for International Studies at the Ohio State University convened a workshop with regional experts and international relations theorists to debate the nature of American primacy in the Middle East. The papers in this collection range widely over theoretical approaches and empirical examples to bring out the assumptions and implications of different perspectives. The discussions were shaped by the shadow of Israel’s war on Gaza, in all of its moral and strategic dimensions, with sharp disagreements over the extent to which this represented a fundamental break with or continuity with prior trajectories. We are delighted to present POMEPS Studies 54: Debating American Primacy in the Middle East and hope that it helps to reframe and sharpen the critical ongoing debates about US foreign policy, global order, and the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, Development, Hegemony, Authoritarianism, Liberalism, Engagement, Unipolarity, Multipolarity, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

226. Regional Order Making after October 7

Author:: Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Marc Lynch, Simon Mabon, Waleed Hazbun, and Curtis R. Ryan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:: In December 2024, we convened a workshop at the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute in partnership with POMEPS and SEPAD to discuss regional changes and their meaning for our book. How did the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and Israel’s rapidly expanding military actions from Lebanon to Iran change the region? Were those changes in line with the book’s theoretical predictions? And what would our book have to say to the new aspirants hoping to remake regional order?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Alliance, Violence, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and United States of America

227. Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar

Author:: Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports. Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in rare earth elements (REE) sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC. As U.S.–PRC competition intensifies, Myanmar’s fragmented sovereignty enables armed groups with ties to Beijing to shape REE supply chains, complicating potential U.S. and Indian efforts to source Burmese minerals.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Natural Resources, Strategic Competition, Militias, Supply Chains, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America

228. Defense and Security Cooperation as a Pillar of Engagement: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing Indo-Pacific

Author:: Tu Lai
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The elevation of Vietnam–US relations in September 2023 to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP), the highest tier in Vietnam’s current diplomatic hierarchy, not only reflects Hanoi’s ongoing efforts to diversify its international relations but also underscores the strategic weight assigned to its ties with Washington. The CSP would have been improbable without sustained progress in defense and security cooperation, which has served both as a catalyst for mutual trust and as a practical mechanism for advancing more substantive, effective collaboration.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Collaboration, Regional Security, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: South Asia, Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

229. Management practices, competition, and multi-product firms in developing countries

Author:: Victor Gimenez-Perales and Alina Mulyukova
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how liberalization and competition affect firms’ output and product scope depending on management practices. In a model of multi-product firms, we show that firms with better management practices specialize in fewer products with lower marginal costs. The model predicts that, under increased competition, firms with better management practices are less adversely affected by competition, especially in heterogeneous sectors. Evidence from India’s de-reservation policy supports these predictions. Our simulations estimate a 0.29% welfare gain in India from the policy. The same policy could increase welfare by 0.39% in an environment with better management practices, such as the US, highlighting the management practices’ role in liberalization outcomes.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Business, Innovation, Management, and Liberalization
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

230. LNG Projects Are a Bad Deal for Germans and Americans

Author:: Milena Pressentin, Josefin Schmidt, and Julian Schwartzkopff
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Subsidizing fossil gas, especially long-term contracts for liquefied natural gas (LNG), undermines Germany’s energy independence, national security, public health, and climate goals, while also raising energy prices and pollution for Americans. On the other hand, accelerating the deployment of affordable and cleaner technologies across sectors could lower costs and pollution.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Trade, Donald Trump, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

231. How Democracies Defend Themselves Against Authoritarianism

Author:: Robert Benson
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Democracies facing authoritarian threats from within have found ways to push back by strengthening institutions, reinforcing democratic norms, and building popular resistance against encroaching autocracy. Understanding these strategies is vital to learning how to fight back.
Topic:: Human Rights, National Security, Authoritarianism, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Transparency, Voting Rights, Donald Trump, Domestic Policy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, India, Israel, North America, and United States of America

232. Bitter Pill for Brussels? Trump’s Fight with Irish Pharma

Author:: Oskar Fairbairn, Lena Fiedler, and Aoife Hanley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Around 60% of Irish net exports to US are pharma products. Charging a 200% US tariff would devastate all EU exports, not just Ireland’s. Still, business leaders in Ireland are confident that pharma’s competitiveness will help it survive.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Multinational Corporations, Exports, Trade, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, Ireland, and United States of America

233. Syria’s Transition and the Shadow of the Arab Uprisings

Author:: Andrew Miller
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: While the Syrian people should ultimately determine their own future, the United States must learn from its mistakes during the Arab uprisings to best facilitate a democratic transition.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Human Rights, National Security, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

234. Securing American Competitiveness: Building a Clean and Cyber-Resilient Manufacturing Sector

Author:: Jamie Friedman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: As the United States invests in transforming its manufacturing sector to reduce emissions and produce clean technologies, it has an opportunity to strengthen cybersecurity simultaneously.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

235. An Alliance for Open Trade: How to Counter Trump’s Tariffs

Author:: Julian Hinz, Keith Head, Isabelle Mejean, Emanuel Ornelas, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Trump’s renewed tariffs on traditional allies—including the EU, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—signal a return to aggressive protectionism, openly disregarding WTO rules and threatening the stability of the global trade system. The authors argue that unilateral retaliation by individual countries is unlikely to be effective; instead, only a coordinated response by a broad coalition of affected nations—such as the EU, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and South Korea—can exert meaningful economic pressure on the United States. This policy brief proposes that such a joint response should remain WTO-compliant, target politically sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy (including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture), and be framed not as punitive, but as a principled defense of the rules-based international trade order. Timely and coordinated action is critical, as further delays risk deepening fragmentation and inflicting long-term damage on the multilateral trading system.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Tariffs, Free Trade, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

236. Transatlantic Ties beyond Goods Trade: Significance and Policy Implications of EU-U.S. Services Trade

Author:: Frank Bickenbach, Holger Görg, and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Trade in services is an important component of international trade and is becoming increasingly more important with growth rates exceeding the rates with which goods trade increases. This is also true in the bilateral U.S. – EU relationship: Trade in services, and especially trade in digitally deliverable services, is a highly important element of the economic relations between the U.S. and the EU. And it is growing much faster than goods trade between the two economies. Despite its importance, trade in services has received much less attention in political and public discussions on the transatlantic trade relationship – even beyond the current narrow focus on the U.S. goods trade deficit. Against this background this policy brief attempts to explore major developing trends over time in EU-U.S. services trade in general and EU-U.S. trade in digitally deliverable services in particular. In addition to services trade, we analyze the development of services supplied by affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the EU and of those supplied by EU affiliates in the U.S. We provide policy suggestions based on data-driven insights derived from the analysis.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Services, Trade, Digitalization, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

237. Trade Wars and Currency Wars – Lessons from History

Author:: Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Explaining President Trump’s “Liberation-day” tariffs on April 2nd, 2025, Stephen Miran, President Trump’s chairman of the council of economic advisors suggested that countries accept the U.S. tariffs without retaliation to come to a fair “burden sharing”(Miran: 2025). History shows that this assumption is wrong: using a detailed data set of bilateral trade flows constructed for the interwar period, this column shows that in fact the US faced substantial and widespread retaliation from trade partners in response to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (i.e., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff). U.S. exports to retaliating countries fell by as much as 33%, with U.S. trade partners specifically targeting high-end, branded consumer products, such as U.S. autos. The drop in trade contributed to the Great Depression, which in turn triggered a large currency war: between 1929 and 1936, 70 countries devalued their currencies relative to gold. We show that trade was further reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. The currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. The 1930s are a potent reminder of what can happen when international policy coordination breaks down and countries go it alone when negotiating trade and exchange-rate policies.
Topic:: Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

238. Sovereign vs. Corporate Debt and Default: More Similar Than You Think

Author:: Gita Gopinath, Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Theory suggests that corporate and sovereign bonds are fundamentally different, also because sovereign debt has no bankruptcy mechanism and is hard to enforce. We show empirically that the two assets are more similar than you think, at least when it comes to high-yield bonds over the past 20 years. We use rich new data to compare high-yield US corporate (“junk”) bonds to high-yield emerging market sovereign bonds 2002-2021. Investor experiences in these two asset classes were surprisingly aligned, with (i) similar average excess returns, (ii) similar average risk-return patterns (Sharpe ratios), (iii) similar default frequency, and (iv) comparable haircuts. A notable difference is that the average default duration is higher for sovereigns. Moreover, the two markets co-move differently with domestic and global factors. US “junk” bond yields are more closely linked to US market conditions such as US stock returns, US stock price volatility (VIX), or US monetary policy.
Topic:: Economics, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, and Corporate Bonds
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

239. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:: Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:: Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

240. The consequences of the Trump trade war for Europe

Author:: Julian Hinz, Isabelle Mejean, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: • Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. • If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. • The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumersstand to benefit from lower prices.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

241. Ukraine Aid: How Europe Can Replace US Support

Author:: Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort. To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia’s or Poland’s example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to €6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nation’s contributions to the EU budget. Military effort: On military aid, replacing the US will be more challenging, but is possible in many domains. We show weapon-by-weapon that Europe’s industry has viable alternatives for almost all of the main US heavy weapon systems donated to Ukraine. Europe also accelerated ammunition production and this effort would now need to be intensified at greater speed and scale, especially for howitzer ammunition. Our data show that the biggest dependency from US-produced weapons is in (i) rocket artillery such as HIMARS (86% of weapons for Ukraine are US-produced systems), (ii) Howitzer ammunition (82% US produced), (iii) long-range anti-aircraft systems such as Patriots (70% US produced). In other domains, European weapons play a more important role, in particular regarding Howitzers and battle tanks. Among the heavy weapons, US HIMARS and Patriots are hardest to replace, as is the supply of ammunition for these systems. Also, US intelligence sharing and satellite imagery are decisive. To respond to these challenges: Europe needs to ramp up the production of essential weapons and artillery ammunition quickly and broadly. It is advantageous that European donors already transited away from donating from stocks to procuring new weapons for Ukraine from industry. These procurement efforts would need to be extended considerably by making firm medium- and long-term commitments to weapon-producing firms. For US weapons that are hard to replace, Europe could place orders in the US and beyond. Viable alternatives to HIMARS include the South Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israel’s PULS. In addition, Europe could heavily invest in the development and production of alternative systems such as SAMP/T. European countries could also increase drone production considerably, both by European producers, and, more importantly, by directly investing in the highly successful weapons industry of Ukraine. Finally, Europe would need to move fast to build alternative digital, satellite, and intelligence systems, including accelerated and expanded initiatives such as the satellite internet constellation IRIS2.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Arms Trade, Fiscal Policy, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

242. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:: Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Military Spending, Innovation, Geoeconomics, Fiscal Multipliers, Rearmament, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

243. Four scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations: European autonomy and the American challenge

Author:: Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: While concerns about the long-term durability of the US commitment to European security are not new, the unpredictable Trump administration stands out as a serious threat to the foundations of the transatlantic partnership. By analysing the US approach to Europe through the lens of two key variables – investment (whether the US prioritizes Europe) and control (whether the US seeks to dictate Europe’s policy choices) – the Briefing Paper maps out four scenarios for the transatlantic alliance over the next five to ten years. The four scenarios – neglect, partner, vassal, and bloc logic – each present specific challenges and trade-offs for Europe. However, the first two models, neglect and partner, are less thorny on paper because they would preserve European strategic autonomy. Vassal and bloc logic, by contrast, would likely present Europe with far more challenging dilemmas. American pressure to toe the line would compel Europe to choose between unpalatable options, such as surrender or resistance, while testing its ability to preserve autonomy.
Topic:: Power Politics, Governance, Democracy, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

244. Brazil’s split worlds: Navigating between the Global South and the United States

Author:: Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Brazilian foreign policy, traditionally nonpartisan, is increasingly shaped by domestic political divides, complicating alignment with global powers. This also fuels unpredictability, especially in relation to the United States. Brazil’s political right is looking to align with Washington in a bipolar world order, while its political left still seeks multipolarity through the Global South and with the help of the Global East. If, contrary to many expectations and current Brazilian policy, the world becomes bipolar, Brazil may be forced to pick sides, challenging its tradition of balanced diplomacy. If the world appears to be heading towards multipolarity, this would fulfil a long-held Brazilian foreign policy objective. However, Brazil faces regional dynamics that, perhaps paradoxically, resemble bipolarity, as South America remains only a secondary, or even tertiary, zone for great power competition. Hosting major forums like the G20, BRICS, and COP30 puts pressure on Brazil to deliver more consistent global messaging, limiting its room for strategic flexibility.
Topic:: Global South, Multipolarity, Strategic Autonomy, Great Powers, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

245. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

246. Four lenses for observing the second Trump administration: Reflecting uncertainty

Author:: Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The global security landscape has evolved in the four years since President Donald Trump’s first term. The new administration aims to usher in a “Golden Age of America”, with impacts on domestic politics and society, as well as foreign policy. Unlike in 2017, the incoming administration appears better prepared, with outlined plans and key appointments. However, chaotic decision-making processes and an emphasis on loyalty to Trump are likely to introduce unpredictability into governance and policymaking. The administration’s unified domestic and foreign policy strategy can be viewed through four lenses: national sovereignty, economic nationalism, devolution, and the unmooring of power. The Trump administration is likely to embrace disruption and chaos to achieve revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. This thinking draws on tech-inspired startup culture and generational-revolutionary philosophies, which perceive the US as being in a moment of crisis that will usher in a new historical epoch. Key uncertainties remain regarding the administration’s long-term effects on democracy, alliances, and great power competition, particularly concerning trade-security linkages and alliance relations with Europe and Asia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Donald Trump, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

247. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

248. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:: Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

249. Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, and the Challenges Ahead for the United States

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)
Abstract:: The race to secure critical minerals (CM) and rare earth elements (REE) has become an area of increasing geopolitical competition, with China and the United States the two key players. The United States is currently behind in that competition. It is being out-invested, out-innovated, and out-educated. Not only is Washington losing, but it is falling further behind by undermining the alliances and cooperative networks that should play a crucial role in overcoming the existing structural deficit. At the same time, current US policy is weakening the domestic green energy market that relies on CMREE inputs and drives technological innovation and investment as much of the world pushes ahead with the energy transition. Solely market-driven solutions are unlikely to materialize to address this challenge in the United States. After all, it was this approach over at least the last two decades that helped to create the current imbalance. The central challenge for the United States, then, is how to build a foundation from which market forces can once again play a leading role in driving financing, research, and labor in the sector. The interlocking web of policies to build this foundation is complex. To be done right, each policy requires others surrounding for support. Completing the puzzle will require broad-spectrum cooperation between government and business. This will include a renewed focus on industrial policy and require setting explicit goals for the United States and its partners to create secure supply chains. This process is not without challenges and will inevitably produce local, and potentially national, opposition. The refineries required to diversify where CMREE are processed will create environmental hazards as well as stress local water resources, among other vulnerabilities. This set of policies will also demand heavy investment in material sciences to develop new technologies that can reduce and replace CMREE inputs where possible. Pursuing these policies will necessitate much deeper investment in education and training to create a workforce capable of meeting the demands in the CMREE mining, processing, and materials science sector. Even with extensive government support, there is no guarantee that private investment will materialize to sustain the industry. China’s virtual cornering of a vast swath of the market means much of the sector does not operate along traditional axes of supply and demand, discouraging private investment in the process. This makes it more likely that long-term government support in the form of subsidies, tax incentives, and price controls will be required. That puts such funding and support at the mercy of shifting political winds. Under previous US administrations, a wide-ranging challenge like CMREE would produce the requisite policy papers calling for deeper coordination, cooperation, and integration between the United States and a consortium of like-minded countries. Some of that cooperation may yet be possible, but with a US administration that views the world through a zero-sum lens, it becomes less likely each day. Rather than coordination, it will be absolute dollar amounts that drive cooperation. That approach may be successful in the short term in establishing the building blocks of a secure CMREE supply chain. But its longer-term prospects are uncertain. This report and its policy recommendations are based on discussions from two seminars and multiple conversations across several countries and continents with policy analysts, industry professionals, and government officials. The first seminar was conducted in cooperation with the Perth USAsia Centre in Perth, Western Australia. This seminar brought together participants from around the Indo-Pacific to share their views on how allies and partners could coordinate their efforts. The second seminar was held in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs with industry professionals, minerals practitioners, and academic experts from across the United States. A full list of participants can be found in the appendix.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

250. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

251. The AI Bubble and the U.S. Economy: How Long Do ‘Hallucinations’ Last?

Author:: Servaas Storm
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: The U.S. is undergoing an extraordinary, AI-fueled economic boom: The stock market is soaring thanks to exceptionally high valuations of AI-related tech firms, which are fueling economic growth by the hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars they are spending on data centers and other AI infrastructure. The AI investment boom is based on the belief that AI will make workers and firms significantly more productive, which will in turn boost corporate profits to unprecedented levels. But evidence is piling up that generative AI (GenAI) is failing to deliver. This paper argues that (i) we have reached “peak GenAI” in terms of current Large Language Models (LLMs); scaling (building more data centers and using more chips) will not take us further to the goal of “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI); returns are diminishing rapidly; (ii) the AI-LLM industry and the larger U.S. economy are experiencing a speculative bubble, which is about to burst (because of the first point); and (iii) the U.S. bet the farm on a future dominated by U.S.-owned AGI, because, for geopolitical reasons, it could not afford to risk to lose the AI-race with China; this geopolitical bet on AGI is now going bad.
Topic:: Water, Geopolitics, Economy, Profit, Artificial Intelligence, Productivity, Energy, Large Language Models (LLMs), ChatGPT, and Speculative Bubbles
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

252. Is Fedwire Still a Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?

Author:: William Bergman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: This paper examines the Federal Reserve’s current financial losses—unprecedented in scale—and the questionable accounting practices it uses to downplay their impact. It argues that the Fed’s selfdefined accounting standards, particularly the creation of a “deferred asset” to mask negative equity, obscure the fiscal consequences for the U.S. government and taxpayers. The analysis connects today’s losses to longstanding institutional practices, notably the Fed’s flawed costrecovery accounting for its Fedwire payment system. These issues first emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the author, then a Fed staffer, challenged the internal logic used to claim that Fedwire guaranteed payments and still avoided subsidies. The paper includes as an appendix the original 2002 draft, “Fedwire: A Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?”, which helped reveal the moral hazard and accounting inconsistencies that contributed to the 2008 crisis and continue to shape central bank risk and governance today
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Regulation, Central Bank, and Payment Systems
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

253. Historical American Political Finance Data at the National Archives: A Preface to the INET Edition

Author:: Thomas Ferguson
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Narratives in American history, politics, and economics — even those by the most accomplished researchers — often resemble donuts: at their core lies a hole that no amount of sweet speculation can truly fill. They say almost nothing about the financing behind even the most pivotal American political campaigns and elections. Both history and the social sciences suffer greatly when facts are missing and wild guesses take their place. INET’s new data archive of historical political finance records at the National Archives marks a major step toward filling this factual void. It assembles all campaign finance reports filed by political parties and presidential candidates up to 1974, the year before the Federal Election Commission was established. A few additional files, including one from the FEC for 1976, are also included, as detailed below. This INET Working Paper outlines what users need to know to navigate the archive effectively and locate the data they require.
Topic:: History, Elections, Regulation, and Political Finance
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

254. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:: Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

255. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

256. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

257. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

258. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:: Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

259. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

260. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

261. EU Defence Series: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Mobility
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

262. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:: Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

263. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

264. The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the Philippines

Author:: Steve Lewis
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: After decades of conflict and instability, the US government helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group. This was accomplished through a combination of military and development assistance focused on building local legitimacy and protecting the population. The Abu Sayyaf Group was a terrorist and insurgency group active in Southeast Asia. They were aligned with al Qaeda and sought to create a sharia state in the southern Philippines. The challenge of separating the Abu Sayyaf Group from the populations is a hallmark of irregular warfare. In irregular warfare, the human terrain is the key terrain for success. In this conflict, providing legitimate governance and protecting the population was a far more successful strategy than hunting down individual terrorists. This article describes how this was done in the Philippines and provides specific lessons learned from that operation.
Topic:: Development, Governance, Military Aid, Protection, Irregular Warfare, Human Terrain, and Abu Sayyaf Group
Political Geography:: United States of America and West Philippines

265. Assessing Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policies: The Basics

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In an April 2025 interview with the New York Times, former United States Secretary to the Treasury Larry Summers argued that Donald Trump’s trade policies are “the most radical trade policies and probably the most radical, rapid change in economic policies that the United States has announced since the Second World War.” Several leaders and commentators argue that, by leveling tariffs against virtually every American trading partner, Trump is relinquishing American global economic leadership, undermining free trade, winding back globalization, and transforming the US from being an outward-looking superpower into an inward-looking and selfish nation. Now that the Court of International Trade has ruled Trump exceeded his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, the appeals process will address the legality of many of his tariffs. The decision relates specifically to the so-called Liberation Day reciprocal tariffs announced on April 2, tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China related to fentanyl, and the 10 percent baseline tariffs on many other countries. The ruling does not affect other tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles. Regardless of how the legal appeals process unfolds, one should still consider the logic behind general tariffs and how such measures ought to be assessed as an instrument of policy. In many cases, assessments of Trump’s trade policies reflect analysts’ enduring critical or supportive views of Trump’s broader policies, character, and leadership style. The emotive response to tariffs is also unusual in that a tariff is simply another form of a tax applied to goods entering the US market. True, unlike many other taxes, tariffs target foreign-made rather than domestic goods and tend to trigger more serious diplomatic reactions than a domestic tax would. Even so, many countries levy tariffs and use other restrictions against imports into their economies. One might debate the methodology behind the calculation of so-called reciprocal tariffs against many US trading partners, but virtually all US trading partners are undeniably imposing protectionist measures against American goods. Such measures protect local firms and industries and should not be understood as a diplomatic slight or attack against the US. In this sense, some visceral reactions to Trump’s tariffs seem disproportionate and even hypocritical. Indeed, the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will, beginning in 2026, impose a carbon levy on imported emissions-intensive goods based on their quarterly carbon content. The CBAM is designed to incentivize non-EU firms to reduce their carbon emissions if they seek to export their goods into the EU. One purpose of the CBAM is to offer advantages to European firms that have reduced their carbon emissions over firms that have not. Putting aside whether one agrees with the decarbonization project, both the CBAM and Trump’s tariffs change the incentives for firms moving goods into the European and American markets, respectively. As with all other protectionist measures, Trump’s tariffs manipulate the cost-benefit calculations for firms. If a business assesses that the tariff burden is too onerous, it will presumably make a commercially rational decision to either add more US-produced content into the product or abandon the American market. The point is that the imposition of a tariff or any other tax requires a policy debate rather than a moral one. Instinctive outrage that Trump’s trade policies are undermining globalization and free trade, or are an insult to allies and partners, presupposes that globalization is an uncontested virtue, free trade (defined as the absence of tariffs) exists, and a tax on imported goods from a friendly country is an inherently hostile act—all contestable presuppositions. Instead, analysts should assess Trump’s tariffs based on whether they advance the policy objectives the administration is pursuing: reindustrializing America, raising revenue, increasing wages and productivity, and accelerating American leadership and innovation in strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI). Furthermore, the tariffs against China have an explicit geopolitical element, and US tariffs against allied or friendly economies have possible geopolitical ramifications. Therefore, a dispassionate assessment of Trump’s trade policy also requires analysis as to whether the trade policies enhance or weaken America’s geopolitical leverage and standing vis-à-vis China. This policy memo looks at the structural drivers of the changes in US trade policy and why the current administration’s actions should not be dismissed or ridiculed as Trumpian irrationality, vandalism, or malice. Upcoming Hudson Institute briefs will assess whether Trump’s trade policies are achieving the intended policy objectives and outcomes, and whether they are advancing (or hindering) the geopolitical goals of the administration.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

266. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:: Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

267. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:: Nury Turkel
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

268. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:: WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

269. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:: Mark Siegel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

270. Five Ways to Bolster the US Semiconductor Ecosystem Under the Trump Administration

Author:: Jason Hsu
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: As the United States seeks to strengthen its semiconductor industry—a national security imperative amid rising competition with China—the next four years will be crucial. Policymakers and industry professionals need a comprehensive strategy to build on the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore this critical supply chain. This policy memo examines Washington’s past and present approaches to semiconductor policy and provides recommendations for the United States to secure a sustainable and successful ecosystem at a time of intensifying US-China technology competition.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

271. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2025

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: On March 15, the US launched Operation Rough Rider, a massive expansion of its aerial campaign against the Houthi group (Ansar Allah). The strikes followed a Houthi threat to resume targeting Israeli ships due to the blockade of aid into Gaza on March 2. Strikes have been taking place continuously as of the time of writing. The Houthi-affiliated Health Ministry has reported that as of April 14, at least 123 civilians have been killed and another 247 wounded, though the real numbers are probably higher. The airstrikes are fundamentally different than those undertaken during the Biden administration, both in intensity and scope, targeting not just missile installations and weapons depots, but also communications infrastructure and the group’s leadership. International scrutiny of the airstrikes briefly increased when the White House mistakenly leaked operational plans to a journalist.
Topic:: Politics, Houthis, Humanitarian Crisis, Shipping, and Airstrikes
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

272. Law of duty: The case for a US-inspired EU Preparedness Act

Author:: Tiago Antunes
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach. An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises. Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions. While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context. The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Supply Chains, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

273. Law of duty: The case for a US-inspired EU Preparedness Act

Author:: Tiago Antunes
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach. An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises. Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions. While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context. The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

274. Analysing the spread of gendered disinformation in the run-up to the 2024 French and US elections

Author:: Center for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP)
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:: Based on targeted case studies developed in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), this policy brief analyses the spread of gendered disinformation and online misogyny in the run-up to the 2024 French and US elections. It offers compelling empirical evidence that demonstrates how online anti-feminist mobilisations weaponise gendered disinformation to shape public discourse, undermine feminist and democratic imperatives, and influence electoral outcomes.
Topic:: Elections, Women, LGBT+, Disinformation, and Gender
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and United States of America

275. Between Trade and Trust: Rethinking Indonesia–US Cross-Border Personal Data Transfer

Author:: Fikri Adib Rianto
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Indonesia’s recent decision to recognise the United States as an adequate jurisdiction for personal data protection – made under a new bilateral trade deal – permits the transfer of Indonesian personal data to US private entities without additional safeguards. This move, taken before Indonesia’s Personal Data Protection Authority (PDPA) is established and before adequacy criteria are formally defined, raises concerns over legal legitimacy and data governance. Given persistent systemic risks in the US – ranging from corporate misuse and cybersecurity vulnerabilities to expansive surveillance powers and fragmented privacy laws – the decision appears premature. To safeguard privacy while supporting trade interests, Indonesia should complete its domestic data protection framework, clarify adequacy criteria, and temporarily recalibrate its adequacy determination until more robust bilateral governance mechanisms are in place.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Regulation, Trade, and Data
Political Geography:: Indonesia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

276. Tough Times, Tough Choices: Charting PEPFAR’s Next Chapter While Safeguarding Its Legacy

Author:: Rachel Bonnifield and Janeen Madan Keller
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:: The Trump administration and key congressional lawmakers are shaping a new US government approach to the future of PEPFAR, alongside other global health programs like malaria and tuberculosis. The emerging vision emphasizes country ownership and greater government-to-government support via bilateral Global Health Compacts, paired with a financial drawdown of US assistance. The government’s proposed approach offers a broadly reasonable blueprint for PEPFAR’s evolution. Yet, the pace and scale of proposed changes are unprecedented in global health history, posing significant risks to hard-won PEPFAR results. Thoughtful and calibrated risk mitigation measures are needed to prevent financing gaps, service disruptions, and accountability breakdowns. We propose a differentiated three-track framework to operationalize a responsible PEPFAR transition while meeting the administration’s key strategic goals: Track 1 – Graduation: For wealthier and stable partner countries able to feasibly absorb PEPFAR funding on a relatively rapid timeline, following a phased shift of service delivery to government systems Track 2 – Toward self-reliance: For poorer, higher-burden countries, allowing extended timelines to gradually increase domestic financing while sustaining PEPFAR funding for key treatment and prevention outcomes Track 3 – Compassionate: For the poorest and most fragile countries where sustained PEPFAR investment is required, with potential scope for partial service delivery via national systems in some settings. This analysis and proposed timeline only apply to PEPFAR, and should not be extended to other global health programmatic areas and investments. We urge the administration and congressional leaders to pair adequate financial, technical, and human resources with a prudent operational approach to implement this next chapter of PEPFAR—protecting public health outcomes and preserving PEPFAR’s extraordinary legacy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, HIV/AIDS, Development, Global Health, and US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief(PEPFAR)
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

277. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

278. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

279. Calming the Red Sea’s Turbulent Waters

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Renewed violence between the U.S. and the Houthis in Yemen has brought a sudden end to the short-lived calm in the Red Sea during the Gaza ceasefire. The end of the truce threatens a dangerous escalation, not just in these waters but in the region writ large. Why does it matter? From late 2023 to early 2025, a Houthi offensive hit over a hundred vessels allegedly connected to Israel, the U.S. or the UK, raising shipping costs and triggering an international military response. With navies from over fifteen nations operating in the Rea Sea, the risk of wider hostilities is high. What should be done? A permanent end to the Gaza war and Yemen’s internal conflict, alongside a reduction in U.S. tensions with Iran, could quell Red Sea turmoil. For now, and over the longer term, Red Sea coastal states and outside powers should work harder to curb the military build-up and foster collective security.
Topic:: Houthis, Shipping, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Yemen, United States of America, and Red Sea

280. Transición Geopolítica Global: Conectividad, Competición y Fragmentación. Introducción

Author:: Soledad Segoviano and Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en una de las cuestiones relvantes de la trasnformación que está aconteciendo en el sistema internacional, la transformación geopolítica y la rivalidad creciente entre Estados. Se puede decir que el orden internacional creado tras la segunda guerra mundial y reforzado tras el fin de la guerra fría se está disipando en medio de una profunda división y fragmentación geopolítica.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Space, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Connectivity, International Order, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, United States of America, and Global South

281. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:: Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:: Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

282. Facing off Trump’s coercive bargaining: Preparing Europe’s response and retaliation to ‘Liberation Day’

Author:: Ian Hernandez, Varg Folkman, and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariff announcements must be understood not simply as a trade war but as an attempt to reshape the global economic system and to coerce partners through a logic of coercive bargaining. On par with all other countries, Europe is a target and a prey to the US. In this paper, we suggest that there are two fundamental aims the EU must pursue: taking leadership in salvaging the open economic order and increase its capacity to withstand coercive bargaining in defence of own interests. We also consider what the US negotiation strategy entails. While Trump struck a considered ‘madman’ pose to frighten trade partners into making unfavourable deals, he also postponed the tariffs in response to the spectre of a market crash and credit crunch. In the face of fundamental uncertainty, the EU’s tightrope act consists of preparing to negotiate through the threat of retaliation but also preparing for negotiations to fail. We argue for holding off and buying time, letting the Americans reap what they sow, while preparing a vigorous “one date, one strike”- retaliation together with a term sheet for a reciprocal economic deal, making clear European red lines in any rapprochement. We map out various tools and instruments the EU can avail of to push back against US trade aggression. The Union is not without means to fight back against Trump’s coercive approach. The bloc’s Trade Enforcement Regulation allows for a wide set of responses to the trade measures we are seeing from the US. Even more far reaching is the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Additionally, the EU can strike US services trade by tightening digital rules and addressing intellectual property and tax shifting. While increasing trade barriers with partners is a sticking point, the EU must also consider safeguard measures to protect European domestic industries from Chinese overcapacities and trade diversion. Although unlikely at the moment, we also suggest further opportunities, such as pursuing economic security deals with the US. Along with like-minded partners, the EU could also take action to counter Trump, including reinvigorating ideas around a ‘WTO 2.0’. The gravity of the moment should not be lost on us. Europe faces the prospect of a fundamental shift in global economic flows and systems, along with the risk of an international economic crisis. Facing this onslaught will take effort, unity and collective action.
Topic:: European Union, Tariffs, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Coercion
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

283. Accept, prepare, leverage: How Europeans can manage a changing transatlantic security partnership in the Trump era

Author:: Iana Maisuradze
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The transatlantic security partnership is entering a new phase. Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own defence as the United States under President Donald Trump no longer prioritises Europe. Trump’s approach to trying to end the war in Ukraine, including attempts at direct negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and ambiguous security guarantees for Kyiv, pose significant challenges that risk undermining the transatlantic security relationship. For the foreseeable future, however, European security will continue to depend on the United States. To manage that reality, European governments face three main tasks: first, to understand and accept Trump’s political calculations and interests; second, to prepare NATO’s European members and the EU to take the lead on their continent’s security; and third, to ensure that guarantees for Ukraine are credible enough to deter renewed or enhanced Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

284. Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific: Navigating Digital Potential and Cyber Peril

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years. The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways. Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever. To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States. The findings offer cause for both optimism and concern. On the one hand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all undergone notable shifts in elevating cybersecurity as foundational to national security. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy made cybersecurity a pillar for the first time, and the government has passed reforms to facilitate information sharing with the United States and shift toward active cyber defense.2 South Korea updated its National Cybersecurity Strategy to adopt a Defend Forward cyber posture, mirroring the U.S. shift in 2018.3 Taiwan established a National Institute of Cybersecurity within its Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the Executive Yuan approved a four-year plan to boost digital resilience.4 The Philippines finalized a five-year National Cybersecurity Plan.5 For its part, the United States has elevated cybersecurity in its foreign policy with expanded information sharing, capacity building, and diplomacy anchored in a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy within the U.S. Department of State. Recent years have seen Washington both strengthen its proactive cyber capacities and embrace a “name and shame” approach to call out malign cyber operations from foreign adversaries like Russia and the PRC. Still, these laudable efforts to bolster cyber policies, personnel, and partnerships have failed to keep pace with rising threats. Washington’s finger-wagging statements and targeted sanctions in the wake of cyber incidents have failed to stem rising threats. To confront growing cyber dangers across the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its partners need a more assertive and coordinated approach that intensifies efforts on two fronts: (1) building capacity within each country to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience, and (2) strengthening cooperation to enable more integrated, proactive cyber defense, collective signaling, and cost inflicting on malign cyber actors. To that end, this report offers recommendations to government leaders in the United States, along with both country-specific and cross-cutting recommendations for government leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although many of the recommendations directed toward the four countries could fairly apply to the United States, strengthening domestic cybersecurity and resilience is beyond the scope of this report. Summary of Recommendations
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

285. Global Compute and National Security: Strengthening American AI Leadership Through Proactive Partnerships

Author:: Janet Egan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The current pathway to breakthrough artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities relies on amassing and leveraging vast “compute”—specialized chips housed within massive data centers that generate the computational power to train, enhance, and deploy advanced models. If current AI development trends continue, securing and extending U.S. access to a robust compute ecosystem will play a decisive role in whether the United States leads the world in AI or cedes its leadership to competitors. The nation that leads in deploying compute worldwide will wield critical leverage over the rules and norms governing its use. Most importantly, U.S. leadership can crowd out China’s expanding sphere of technology influence and ensure the AI transition is underpinned by trusted democratic technologies. This goal necessitates a strategy with two key components: maintaining U.S. control of the most capable compute infrastructure in the world to ensure leadership at the AI frontier, while simultaneously providing subfrontier levels of compute to partners around the world. Recent advances in AI efficiency, as demonstrated by Chinese AI models like DeepSeek-R1, have not negated the fundamental importance of compute for AI leadership.1 The nation with the most robust compute ecosystem will retain key advantages: the ability to train the most advanced systems, enhance and deploy those systems at scale, and run the experiments necessary to drive new breakthroughs in model efficiency and training.2 These advantages are likely to generate a self-reinforcing cycle of AI development, making it increasingly difficult for other nations to close the gap. If current technical trends hold, and as chip export controls increasingly hinder China’s capabilities, the AI capability gap between the United States and China should widen. However, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Washington’s efforts to protect America’s AI leadership have relied heavily on controlling the export of advanced AI chips. Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment going to China were imposed as early as 2019, followed by AI chip export controls targeting U.S. adversaries in 2022, which were strengthened in 2023, 2024, and 2025.3 In January 2025, the Biden administration’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion went a step further, placing caps on compute exports to most countries in the world.4 While now rescinded, this unprecedented action sent a clear signal to other nations that the United States is willing and able to control AI compute access. However, a heavily protectionist approach faces challenges. Abroad, chip smuggling has provided China with illegal access to advanced chips, eroding the U.S. lead.5 At home, permitting and regulatory constraints threaten to limit America’s ability to meet the energy demand for large-scale AI data centers and chip fabrication. Nondemocratic countries that possess the regulatory flexibility, capital, and readily available energy now seek to rapidly build frontier-scale AI data centers, with the potential to surpass the United States’ own compute ecosystem, absent adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing investments in its compute capacity could eventually create a viable alternative supply chain beyond U.S. control, while growing concerns over reliance on U.S. technology among traditional partners may fuel demand for non-U.S. compute offerings.
Topic:: Partnerships, Leadership, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

286. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:: Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

287. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Author:: Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

288. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:: Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

289. Game Over? How the United States Could Have Won the Trade Wars

Author:: Emily Kilcrease and Geoffrey Gertz
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Center for a New American Security's Energy, Economics, and Security (EES) Program designed and conducted an economic wargame to explore possible pathways to resolve the trade wars sparked by historic levels of U.S. tariff escalation. This trade wargame was designed to examine foreign government responses to U.S. tariffs, including whether they would retaliate, negotiate, and/or make concessions. After being punished by U.S. tariffs, would foreign governments have the appetite to engage in dealmaking with the United States and, if so, under what conditions? The trade wargame was conducted on March 17, 2025, two weeks before President Donald Trump made his real-world announcement of shockingly high tariff rates on a day he deemed “Liberation Day.”
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

290. Ten Years Later: The Legacy of the Paris Attacks on Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks in the West

Author:: Alexandre Rodde
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: A decade ago, the terrorist attacks in Paris illustrated the risks and challenges posed by complex coordinated terrorist attacks (CCTA) in a Western capital. These marauding attacks, striking multiple scenes in quick succession, were different from the bombing of public transport in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. This article explains the evolution of the Western law enforcement response while facing such attacks, and how the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2015 Paris attacks led to operational and tactical evolutions in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow demonstrates the continuing threat posed by CCTA outside of the West. The constantly evolving modus operandi used by terrorists requires a strong anticipation effort by law enforcement agencies in order to prepare for a potential return of CCTA in the West.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

291. A View from the CT Foxhole: Admiral Frank Bradley, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Author:: Don Rassler
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Admiral Frank M. Bradley has been the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) since October 2025. Originally from Eldorado, Texas, ADM Bradley is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has commanded at all levels of special operations, including Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command Central, and Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has multiple tours in command of joint task forces and was among the first to deploy into Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Interview
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

292. Dealing with Third-Country Involvement in Sanctions Evasion

Author:: Floor Stoelinga, Kaspar Pucek, and Rem Korteweg
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: A key challenge to the effectiveness of sanctions lies in the role of third countries that are neither subject to sanctions nor obliged to enforce them. In today’s highly interconnected global economy, trade and financial flows can be redirected through these jurisdictions, enabling the circumvention of restrictive measures. Following the imposition of far-reaching sanctions against Russia in 2022, the EU, U.S., and UK have intensified efforts to counter such sanctions evasion and avoidance (SEA). As a result, the European sanctions framework has acquired an increasingly ‘extraterritorial’ dimension, affecting sectors and operators beyond the EU’s borders. While this approach can strengthen control over evasion, the use of extraterritorial sanctions also raises legal, geopolitical, and economic trade-offs. This paper explores these challenges and outlines eight recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the EU’s counter-SEA framework along a spectrum of extraterritoriality: prioritising high-risk goods, ensuring policy consistency, assessing economic impacts, reviewing institutional arrangements, strengthening international partnerships, employing positive inducements, and leveraging market-based instruments.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Sanctions Evasion
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America

293. Azerbaijan-Armenia Agreement: US Entry Upsets Balance of Power in the South Caucuses

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The US administration succeeded in sponsoring a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, under which the two countries agreed to US management of the Zangezur Corridor, which various regional and international powers are keen to control to tip the balance in their strategic competition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Peace Process
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

294. Trump’s Plan: The Promises and Pitfalls of Peace in Gaza

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Trump’s peace initiative has received approval from the two main parties in the Gaza war—Hamas and Israel—along with broad Arab, Islamic and international support that strengthens its chances of success. However, a number of pitfalls contained within it could reignite the war in the Strip.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Mediation, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

295. Elusive Peace: Russian and Western Manoeuvres to End the War in Ukraine

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Trump-Putin summit failed to advance peace in Ukraine, despite Trump’s push to fulfill his campaign promise. The deep divide between Russian and Ukrainian demands, and mutual ability to block each other’s goals, suggests the war may head toward sporadic truces or a prolonged stalemate.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

296. The First 90 Days of Trump 2.0

Author:: Rachel Tausenfreund, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Claudia Schmucker, Aylin Matlé, and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report examines the first 90 days of the Trump 2.0 administration and offers strategic recommendations for the new German government and its partners in Europe and beyond. DGAP experts analyze the administration’s priorities and methods across key policy areas and explore how best to respond. The opening chapter outlines the ideological foundations of Trump’s new coalition and their foreign policy implications, concluding with key insights and policy takeaways.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Migration, Science and Technology, Trade, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

297. Media and Democracy in Crisis. A Comparative Analysis of Images of the Riots in the USA in the Public Media of Germany, Poland, and Russia

Author:: Dagmara Głuszek-Szafraniec and Patrycja Szostok-Nowacka
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This article presents a diverse European perspective on democracy and freedom of expression. The research was conducted on 73 public television materials after the storming of the Capitol in Germany, Poland, and Russia. The content analysis employed 75 categories in the categorization key. The German perspective focused on stabilizing the democratic system after Biden’s win and on respect for democratic values in the USA. The narrative style is centered around change, a natural process in a democracy. Polish public television dominated an atmosphere of anxiety, but the criticism of the democratic opposition in Poland found an analogy between the actions of media corporations and opposition politicians. The materials in the Russian service were biased and directed against American democracy in general. Criticism was levelled at the hypocrisy of the authorities, the inefficiency of democratic procedures, and the lack of respect for political traditions. The portrayal of crisis events in the USA depended on the level of democracy in the country and, to varying degrees, also served as a pretext for criticizing democracy in general and referencing events in the country being analyzed.
Topic:: Democracy, Media, Narrative, January 6, and Public Media
Political Geography:: Russia, Poland, Germany, and United States of America

298. Transatlantic Relations under the Biden Administration: Balancing between Liberal Internationalism and Pragmatic Realism

Author:: Aleksandra Jarczewska
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article examines transatlantic relations under the Biden administration, focusing on the tension between liberal internationalist ideals and the imperatives of pragmatic realism. In its early stage, the Biden presidency signalled a renewed commitment to multilateralism, democratic values, and revitalised alliances. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine underscored the limits of the idealist framework, compelling a recalibration toward interest-driven, security-oriented policies. The study explores whether this represents a genuine revival of liberal internationalism or a strategic hybridisation of liberal norms and realist instruments of statecraft. Moreover, it identifies elements of continuity from the first Trump administration to Biden’s pragmatic adjustments beneath the liberal rhetoric. The article contributes to the scholarly debate by reassessing certain conceptual frameworks in international relations, offering a nuanced understanding of how liberal internationalism is being reconfigured in response to shifting geopolitical realities. The findings highlight the evolving nature of US-EU cooperation and the challenges facing the international liberal order.
Topic:: European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Joe Biden, Internationalism, and Pragmatic Realism
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

299. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:: Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:: GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

300. Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Zaman Kapsülleri'nin Gelişimi

Author:: Mutlu Erbay
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:: Altinbas University
Abstract:: Bu çalışma, zaman kapsülleri konusunu gündeme getirerek bu konuya dikkat çekmeyi hedeflemektedir. Makalede, zaman kapsüllerinin Amerikalılar ve Türkler için sosyo-kültürel açıdan önemi vurgulanmakta ve önemli örnekler ele alınmaktadır. Zaman kapsülleri, Amerikan kültüründe hatırlama, hatırlatma ve anma yöntemi olarak kullanılmaktadır. Hatıraların anılması, düşünülmesine ve bu yolla anlamlandırılmasına sebep olur. Kültürler, kendi öz hedeflerine yönelik hatırlatma ve hatırlamalar yapabilmektedir. Bu hatırlamalar, geçmişi gelecek kuşaklara tanıtır ve aktarmada önemli bir rol oynar. Zaman kapsülleri, geleceğe gönderilen mektuplar aracılığıyla gelecek temennilerini yansıtmakta; kişilerin ve kurumların geleceği öngörme ve şekillendirme çabalarını simgelemektedir. Yeni açılan bir fabrika, yeni üretilen bir ürün, borsa için yazılan mektuplar, yeni hammadde üretimleri veya uzaya gönderilen yeni araçlar gibi çeşitli sebeplerle zaman kapsülleri hazırlanabilmektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde devlet kurumları, yüksek enstitüler ve fabrikalar tarafından zaman kapsülleri oluşturulmakta, kayda geçirilmekte ve belirlenen tarihte açılması planlanmaktadır. Zaman kapsülleri, Amerikan tarihinin önemli kültürel davranışlarından biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Aşağıdaki makalede, önemli zaman kapsülleri ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Gelecekte açılmak üzere hazırlanan bu kapsüller, geleceğe bir not düşmekte ve bu yönüyle geleceği planlama ve öngörme amacı taşımaktadır. Türkiye’de de hazırlanmış zaman kapsülleri mevcuttur. Çalışma, bu örneklere de kısaca değinerek zaman kapsüllerinin Türk kültüründeki yeri ve önemini ortaya koymaktadır.
Topic:: Culture, Memory, Tradition, and Time Capsules
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS