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151. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:
Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

152. Hegemony and International Alignment

Author:
Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Jiaxian Zhou Wu
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, such as the U.S., foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. This data has shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-20th century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Multipolarity, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

153. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

154. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:
Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and United States of America

155. Global development in crisis: Responding to America’s retreat

Author:
Sarah S. Stroup
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
A definitive shift in both resources and rhetoric has upended the global development sector. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the policies of the new US administration, although many European states had already started reducing foreign aid budgets earlier. Beyond its vicious rhetoric and wrecking-ball approach, the Trump administration’s arguments echo three long-standing critiques that development professionals have made themselves. Development experts in the US and Europe argue that development goals have become too broad, aid has failed to reach local actors, and the sector is too technocratic and removed from the concerns of Northern publics. A renewed focus on poverty reduction, combined with power-sharing abroad and public engagement at home, may provide answers to these critiques. Achieving development outcomes may require focusing less on providing direct assistance and more on reducing the harms created by Western states in other arenas, including trade and finance.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, and Budget
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

156. Jordan and the October 7th War: Between National Interests and Palestinian Solidarity

Author:
Ronen Yitzhak
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Ronen Yitzhak examines the effects of the October 7 war on the politics and stability of Jordan.
Topic:
Politics, Bilateral Relations, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and United States of America

157. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

158. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

159. Achieving burden-sharing: Retrenchment vs. conditionality

Author:
Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Observers and practitioners are frequently frustrated at the level of defense burden-sharing in U.S. alliances—alliance members’ contributions to collective defense objectives—and particularly at allies’ low level of investment in their own defense. This paper compares two approaches to soliciting burden-sharing in U.S. alliances: retrenchment and conditionality. Retrenchment refers to reductions in the amount or timing of wartime assistance the United States will provide to allies, including troop withdrawals. Conditionality, in turn, relies on threats to abandon allies unless they increase their defense efforts and does not necessarily entail reducing protection. Retrenchment may offer the greatest chance of success, particularly in cases where allies doubt the credibility of the United States’ threats to abandon them. Conditionality is likely to be nearly as effective as retrenchment in many other cases, particularly those in which allies take the U.S. threat of abandonment seriously and there is a compelling external threat. Retrenchment and conditionality can be complementary strategies. Retrenchment is effective in cases where conditionality is likely to fail, while conditionality is effective in cases where the United States might be unwilling to retrench due to fears that a revisionist power might seek regional hegemony. Burden-sharing is not without its downsides, including allies potentially desiring nuclear weapons. These risks might be greater if the United States retrenches but may not materialize in practice and are not necessarily insurmountable.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, Defense Spending, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

160. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

161. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

162. The New Geopolitics and South Asia’s Trade Architecture – What Next?

Author:
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Amit Bhandari, and Aliasger Bootwalla
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia and United States of America

163. Hague Summit Series: Recalibrating Relations with Russia

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1] In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

164. Hague Summit Series: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia's war in Ukraine shows few signs of ending. Across Europe, there is a widely held view that the outcome of the war will be critically important to determining the continent's future security: Ukraine must prevail. This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the second Trump administration which, after a brief attempt to negotiate a (unjust) solution, seems unable to deliver on the president's campaign promise to bring peace, in particular if this involves being tough on Russia. Differences between the US and most European Allies regarding both the conditions for ending the war and Ukraine's longer-term integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures present one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. More immediately, uncertainty about how to handle these differences presents the greatest risk that NATO's forthcoming summit in The Hague will not be seen as a success.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Peace, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

165. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:
Felix Gasper
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

166. Hague Summit Series: Trump and the Rebalancing of NATO

Author:
Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

167. Small Drones, Big Problems: Managing the Unmanned Threat to the Homeland

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Drones are everywhere. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the suburbs of New Jersey, it has become increasingly common to find small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in the sky. In the United States, there are now over one million lawfully registered sUAS platforms. The proliferation of sUAS in the civilian population has created a flood of reporting to law enforcement agencies across a variety of scenarios. Quite often, a civilian hobbyist simply flies their sUAS “too close to the sun” and encroaches upon restricted airspace around either civilian or military critical infrastructure. However, there have also been cases of foreign actors operating sUAS in an attempt to reconnoiter specific targets or locations. There are now so many sUAS incidents occurring that it makes for an easily exploitable environment for malign activities by state or non-state actors. Making things even more dangerous, our research shows that quite often, no one knows who to call when a sUAS incident occurs. While officially the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has primacy over sUAS incidents, our research (and the FAA’s own database) shows that local law enforcement is often contacted after sUAS incidents, and cases are often closed as soon as they are opened, without confirmed reporting to the FAA. As a result, Department of Defense (DoD) entities charged with homeland defense, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), are often left without knowledge of sUAS incidents, and cannot observe and monitor trends adequately to support development of adequate countermeasures. They also do not have the authorities to counteract the threat, even when sUAS activity upends military training exercises. To mitigate this threat, the US government should consider: Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Maintaining a single, consolidated reporting database for any sUAS activity over critical infrastructure on an unclassified network. Mandating NORTHCOM to lead DoD efforts within this new JIATF and work with Congress on updated legislation to codify proper authorities for US agencies and the military to thwart UAS intrusions.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Warfare, and National Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

168. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

169. Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. But the ambassador’s argument relies on numerous inaccuracies. Those are detailed below. 1. Somalia currently has territorial integrity, and recognizing Somaliland would break that integrity. The Somali government does not currently have territorial integrity. Islamist terror group al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country. Somaliland has not been functionally a part of Somalia for decades. And Puntland and Jubaland frequently defy Mogadishu. Arguments premised on fictions are irretrievably broken. 2. The US-Somalia partnership has “bolstered regional stability.” The region is as unstable as it has been for decades. 3. “Clan-based ambitions threaten to fracture Somalia’s national cohesion.” There is no national cohesion to fracture, in part because clans remain the fundamental ordering principle of Somalia’s society. Rather than denying that reality, Somalis should build a highly decentralized order that accounts for their preeminent loyalty to clan. The US and its partners should stop pretending that a strong centralized government can work in Somalia. 4. “The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed. 5. “A divided Somalia would distract the central government from counterterrorism operations and disrupt the successes already achieved.” Again, Somalia is already divided. Also, Mogadishu already allows all sorts of things, usually petty political squabbles, to distract it from fighting al-Shabaab. The Somali government’s easily distracted nature has proven time and again that it is not a competent counterterrorism partner for the US. 6. “A unified Somalia . . . can foster transparency, attract responsible investment, and ensure its people benefit from [the country’s] resources—all while reinforcing the stable environment in which US interests can flourish.” The Somali government cannot achieve these lofty goals because Somalia is not unified. Decades of experience demonstrate the country will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future. And it is not clear that unity in Somalia would lead to transparency or competent governance. Mogadishu currently demonstrates neither of those things. There is no reason to believe it will magically improve, even if Somalia somehow, for the first time in its people’s history, becomes unified. 7. “By helping Somalia strengthen its institutions, enhance security forces, and foster inclusive political dialogue, the United States ensures that clan affiliations enrich national identity rather than fracture it into competing states.” The US and others have formed policy based on this belief for over a decade. It has not worked. Why should it suddenly begin working now? What has changed? Fundamentally, the ambassador’s arguments—and Washington’s current policy toward Somalia—rest on fictions: (a) that Somalia is united, politically or societally, (b) that the government in its current form contributes to regional stability, and (c) that Mogadishu’s actions are a net positive for the US. Washington cannot achieve its goals in the Horn of Africa without first acknowledging reality and building policies that reflect that reality, rather than comforting fictions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Africa, Somaliland, and United States of America

170. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

171. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

172. Nonproliferation in Great Power Competition

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Yashar Parsie
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, the United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among friends and foes alike. This goal, however, may be at risk. While global challenges multiply, regional adversaries like North Korea pose an increased threat to US allies. In particular, South Korea appears to doubt the credibility of US extended deterrence. Seoul has sought to strengthen deterrence and even weighed the benefits of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. This report uses international relations theory, historical research, survey data, and original interviews with South Korean experts to examine (a) nonproliferation’s role in US grand strategy, (b) the relationship among nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and assurance, and (c) growing challenges to these three missions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. It then suggests an approach for the United States to address these challenges. Nonproliferation remains important to national security. But the United States should consider it among other national security priorities. Managing priorities is a matter of continually evaluating risks and benefits. The United States can best do so through a series of measures that improve extended deterrence and assurance to manage the risk that allies pursue nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

173. Management practices, competition, and multi-product firms in developing countries

Author:
Victor Gimenez-Perales and Alina Mulyukova
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We study how liberalization and competition affect firms’ output and product scope depending on management practices. In a model of multi-product firms, we show that firms with better management practices specialize in fewer products with lower marginal costs. The model predicts that, under increased competition, firms with better management practices are less adversely affected by competition, especially in heterogeneous sectors. Evidence from India’s de-reservation policy supports these predictions. Our simulations estimate a 0.29% welfare gain in India from the policy. The same policy could increase welfare by 0.39% in an environment with better management practices, such as the US, highlighting the management practices’ role in liberalization outcomes.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Business, Innovation, Management, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and United States of America

174. LNG Projects Are a Bad Deal for Germans and Americans

Author:
Milena Pressentin, Josefin Schmidt, and Julian Schwartzkopff
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Subsidizing fossil gas, especially long-term contracts for liquefied natural gas (LNG), undermines Germany’s energy independence, national security, public health, and climate goals, while also raising energy prices and pollution for Americans. On the other hand, accelerating the deployment of affordable and cleaner technologies across sectors could lower costs and pollution.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Trade, Donald Trump, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

175. How Democracies Defend Themselves Against Authoritarianism

Author:
Robert Benson
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Democracies facing authoritarian threats from within have found ways to push back by strengthening institutions, reinforcing democratic norms, and building popular resistance against encroaching autocracy. Understanding these strategies is vital to learning how to fight back.
Topic:
Human Rights, National Security, Authoritarianism, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Transparency, Voting Rights, Donald Trump, Domestic Policy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, India, Israel, North America, and United States of America

176. Bitter Pill for Brussels? Trump’s Fight with Irish Pharma

Author:
Oskar Fairbairn, Lena Fiedler, and Aoife Hanley
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Around 60% of Irish net exports to US are pharma products. Charging a 200% US tariff would devastate all EU exports, not just Ireland’s. Still, business leaders in Ireland are confident that pharma’s competitiveness will help it survive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Multinational Corporations, Exports, Trade, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, Ireland, and United States of America

177. Syria’s Transition and the Shadow of the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Andrew Miller
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
While the Syrian people should ultimately determine their own future, the United States must learn from its mistakes during the Arab uprisings to best facilitate a democratic transition.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Rights, National Security, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

178. Securing American Competitiveness: Building a Clean and Cyber-Resilient Manufacturing Sector

Author:
Jamie Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the United States invests in transforming its manufacturing sector to reduce emissions and produce clean technologies, it has an opportunity to strengthen cybersecurity simultaneously.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

179. An Alliance for Open Trade: How to Counter Trump’s Tariffs

Author:
Julian Hinz, Keith Head, Isabelle Mejean, Emanuel Ornelas, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Trump’s renewed tariffs on traditional allies—including the EU, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—signal a return to aggressive protectionism, openly disregarding WTO rules and threatening the stability of the global trade system. The authors argue that unilateral retaliation by individual countries is unlikely to be effective; instead, only a coordinated response by a broad coalition of affected nations—such as the EU, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and South Korea—can exert meaningful economic pressure on the United States. This policy brief proposes that such a joint response should remain WTO-compliant, target politically sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy (including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture), and be framed not as punitive, but as a principled defense of the rules-based international trade order. Timely and coordinated action is critical, as further delays risk deepening fragmentation and inflicting long-term damage on the multilateral trading system.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Tariffs, Free Trade, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

180. Transatlantic Ties beyond Goods Trade: Significance and Policy Implications of EU-U.S. Services Trade

Author:
Frank Bickenbach, Holger Görg, and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Trade in services is an important component of international trade and is becoming increasingly more important with growth rates exceeding the rates with which goods trade increases. This is also true in the bilateral U.S. – EU relationship: Trade in services, and especially trade in digitally deliverable services, is a highly important element of the economic relations between the U.S. and the EU. And it is growing much faster than goods trade between the two economies. Despite its importance, trade in services has received much less attention in political and public discussions on the transatlantic trade relationship – even beyond the current narrow focus on the U.S. goods trade deficit. Against this background this policy brief attempts to explore major developing trends over time in EU-U.S. services trade in general and EU-U.S. trade in digitally deliverable services in particular. In addition to services trade, we analyze the development of services supplied by affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the EU and of those supplied by EU affiliates in the U.S. We provide policy suggestions based on data-driven insights derived from the analysis.
Topic:
Globalization, European Union, Services, Trade, Digitalization, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

181. Trade Wars and Currency Wars – Lessons from History

Author:
Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Explaining President Trump’s “Liberation-day” tariffs on April 2nd, 2025, Stephen Miran, President Trump’s chairman of the council of economic advisors suggested that countries accept the U.S. tariffs without retaliation to come to a fair “burden sharing”(Miran: 2025). History shows that this assumption is wrong: using a detailed data set of bilateral trade flows constructed for the interwar period, this column shows that in fact the US faced substantial and widespread retaliation from trade partners in response to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (i.e., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff). U.S. exports to retaliating countries fell by as much as 33%, with U.S. trade partners specifically targeting high-end, branded consumer products, such as U.S. autos. The drop in trade contributed to the Great Depression, which in turn triggered a large currency war: between 1929 and 1936, 70 countries devalued their currencies relative to gold. We show that trade was further reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. The currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. The 1930s are a potent reminder of what can happen when international policy coordination breaks down and countries go it alone when negotiating trade and exchange-rate policies.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

182. Sovereign vs. Corporate Debt and Default: More Similar Than You Think

Author:
Gita Gopinath, Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Theory suggests that corporate and sovereign bonds are fundamentally different, also because sovereign debt has no bankruptcy mechanism and is hard to enforce. We show empirically that the two assets are more similar than you think, at least when it comes to high-yield bonds over the past 20 years. We use rich new data to compare high-yield US corporate (“junk”) bonds to high-yield emerging market sovereign bonds 2002-2021. Investor experiences in these two asset classes were surprisingly aligned, with (i) similar average excess returns, (ii) similar average risk-return patterns (Sharpe ratios), (iii) similar default frequency, and (iv) comparable haircuts. A notable difference is that the average default duration is higher for sovereigns. Moreover, the two markets co-move differently with domestic and global factors. US “junk” bond yields are more closely linked to US market conditions such as US stock returns, US stock price volatility (VIX), or US monetary policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, and Corporate Bonds
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

183. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:
Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:
Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

184. The consequences of the Trump trade war for Europe

Author:
Julian Hinz, Isabelle Mejean, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. • If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. • The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumersstand to benefit from lower prices.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

185. Ukraine Aid: How Europe Can Replace US Support

Author:
Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort. To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia’s or Poland’s example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to €6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nation’s contributions to the EU budget. Military effort: On military aid, replacing the US will be more challenging, but is possible in many domains. We show weapon-by-weapon that Europe’s industry has viable alternatives for almost all of the main US heavy weapon systems donated to Ukraine. Europe also accelerated ammunition production and this effort would now need to be intensified at greater speed and scale, especially for howitzer ammunition. Our data show that the biggest dependency from US-produced weapons is in (i) rocket artillery such as HIMARS (86% of weapons for Ukraine are US-produced systems), (ii) Howitzer ammunition (82% US produced), (iii) long-range anti-aircraft systems such as Patriots (70% US produced). In other domains, European weapons play a more important role, in particular regarding Howitzers and battle tanks. Among the heavy weapons, US HIMARS and Patriots are hardest to replace, as is the supply of ammunition for these systems. Also, US intelligence sharing and satellite imagery are decisive. To respond to these challenges: Europe needs to ramp up the production of essential weapons and artillery ammunition quickly and broadly. It is advantageous that European donors already transited away from donating from stocks to procuring new weapons for Ukraine from industry. These procurement efforts would need to be extended considerably by making firm medium- and long-term commitments to weapon-producing firms. For US weapons that are hard to replace, Europe could place orders in the US and beyond. Viable alternatives to HIMARS include the South Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israel’s PULS. In addition, Europe could heavily invest in the development and production of alternative systems such as SAMP/T. European countries could also increase drone production considerably, both by European producers, and, more importantly, by directly investing in the highly successful weapons industry of Ukraine. Finally, Europe would need to move fast to build alternative digital, satellite, and intelligence systems, including accelerated and expanded initiatives such as the satellite internet constellation IRIS2.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Arms Trade, Fiscal Policy, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

186. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:
Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Military Spending, Innovation, Geoeconomics, Fiscal Multipliers, Rearmament, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

187. Four scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations: European autonomy and the American challenge

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While concerns about the long-term durability of the US commitment to European security are not new, the unpredictable Trump administration stands out as a serious threat to the foundations of the transatlantic partnership. By analysing the US approach to Europe through the lens of two key variables – investment (whether the US prioritizes Europe) and control (whether the US seeks to dictate Europe’s policy choices) – the Briefing Paper maps out four scenarios for the transatlantic alliance over the next five to ten years. The four scenarios – neglect, partner, vassal, and bloc logic – each present specific challenges and trade-offs for Europe. However, the first two models, neglect and partner, are less thorny on paper because they would preserve European strategic autonomy. Vassal and bloc logic, by contrast, would likely present Europe with far more challenging dilemmas. American pressure to toe the line would compel Europe to choose between unpalatable options, such as surrender or resistance, while testing its ability to preserve autonomy.
Topic:
Power Politics, Governance, Democracy, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

188. Brazil’s split worlds: Navigating between the Global South and the United States

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Brazilian foreign policy, traditionally nonpartisan, is increasingly shaped by domestic political divides, complicating alignment with global powers. This also fuels unpredictability, especially in relation to the United States. Brazil’s political right is looking to align with Washington in a bipolar world order, while its political left still seeks multipolarity through the Global South and with the help of the Global East. If, contrary to many expectations and current Brazilian policy, the world becomes bipolar, Brazil may be forced to pick sides, challenging its tradition of balanced diplomacy. If the world appears to be heading towards multipolarity, this would fulfil a long-held Brazilian foreign policy objective. However, Brazil faces regional dynamics that, perhaps paradoxically, resemble bipolarity, as South America remains only a secondary, or even tertiary, zone for great power competition. Hosting major forums like the G20, BRICS, and COP30 puts pressure on Brazil to deliver more consistent global messaging, limiting its room for strategic flexibility.
Topic:
Global South, Multipolarity, Strategic Autonomy, Great Powers, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

189. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

190. Four lenses for observing the second Trump administration: Reflecting uncertainty

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The global security landscape has evolved in the four years since President Donald Trump’s first term. The new administration aims to usher in a “Golden Age of America”, with impacts on domestic politics and society, as well as foreign policy. Unlike in 2017, the incoming administration appears better prepared, with outlined plans and key appointments. However, chaotic decision-making processes and an emphasis on loyalty to Trump are likely to introduce unpredictability into governance and policymaking. The administration’s unified domestic and foreign policy strategy can be viewed through four lenses: national sovereignty, economic nationalism, devolution, and the unmooring of power. The Trump administration is likely to embrace disruption and chaos to achieve revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. This thinking draws on tech-inspired startup culture and generational-revolutionary philosophies, which perceive the US as being in a moment of crisis that will usher in a new historical epoch. Key uncertainties remain regarding the administration’s long-term effects on democracy, alliances, and great power competition, particularly concerning trade-security linkages and alliance relations with Europe and Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Donald Trump, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

191. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

192. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:
Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

193. Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, and the Challenges Ahead for the United States

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)
Abstract:
The race to secure critical minerals (CM) and rare earth elements (REE) has become an area of increasing geopolitical competition, with China and the United States the two key players. The United States is currently behind in that competition. It is being out-invested, out-innovated, and out-educated. Not only is Washington losing, but it is falling further behind by undermining the alliances and cooperative networks that should play a crucial role in overcoming the existing structural deficit. At the same time, current US policy is weakening the domestic green energy market that relies on CMREE inputs and drives technological innovation and investment as much of the world pushes ahead with the energy transition. Solely market-driven solutions are unlikely to materialize to address this challenge in the United States. After all, it was this approach over at least the last two decades that helped to create the current imbalance. The central challenge for the United States, then, is how to build a foundation from which market forces can once again play a leading role in driving financing, research, and labor in the sector. The interlocking web of policies to build this foundation is complex. To be done right, each policy requires others surrounding for support. Completing the puzzle will require broad-spectrum cooperation between government and business. This will include a renewed focus on industrial policy and require setting explicit goals for the United States and its partners to create secure supply chains. This process is not without challenges and will inevitably produce local, and potentially national, opposition. The refineries required to diversify where CMREE are processed will create environmental hazards as well as stress local water resources, among other vulnerabilities. This set of policies will also demand heavy investment in material sciences to develop new technologies that can reduce and replace CMREE inputs where possible. Pursuing these policies will necessitate much deeper investment in education and training to create a workforce capable of meeting the demands in the CMREE mining, processing, and materials science sector. Even with extensive government support, there is no guarantee that private investment will materialize to sustain the industry. China’s virtual cornering of a vast swath of the market means much of the sector does not operate along traditional axes of supply and demand, discouraging private investment in the process. This makes it more likely that long-term government support in the form of subsidies, tax incentives, and price controls will be required. That puts such funding and support at the mercy of shifting political winds. Under previous US administrations, a wide-ranging challenge like CMREE would produce the requisite policy papers calling for deeper coordination, cooperation, and integration between the United States and a consortium of like-minded countries. Some of that cooperation may yet be possible, but with a US administration that views the world through a zero-sum lens, it becomes less likely each day. Rather than coordination, it will be absolute dollar amounts that drive cooperation. That approach may be successful in the short term in establishing the building blocks of a secure CMREE supply chain. But its longer-term prospects are uncertain. This report and its policy recommendations are based on discussions from two seminars and multiple conversations across several countries and continents with policy analysts, industry professionals, and government officials. The first seminar was conducted in cooperation with the Perth USAsia Centre in Perth, Western Australia. This seminar brought together participants from around the Indo-Pacific to share their views on how allies and partners could coordinate their efforts. The second seminar was held in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs with industry professionals, minerals practitioners, and academic experts from across the United States. A full list of participants can be found in the appendix.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

194. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

195. The AI Bubble and the U.S. Economy: How Long Do ‘Hallucinations’ Last?

Author:
Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The U.S. is undergoing an extraordinary, AI-fueled economic boom: The stock market is soaring thanks to exceptionally high valuations of AI-related tech firms, which are fueling economic growth by the hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars they are spending on data centers and other AI infrastructure. The AI investment boom is based on the belief that AI will make workers and firms significantly more productive, which will in turn boost corporate profits to unprecedented levels. But evidence is piling up that generative AI (GenAI) is failing to deliver. This paper argues that (i) we have reached “peak GenAI” in terms of current Large Language Models (LLMs); scaling (building more data centers and using more chips) will not take us further to the goal of “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI); returns are diminishing rapidly; (ii) the AI-LLM industry and the larger U.S. economy are experiencing a speculative bubble, which is about to burst (because of the first point); and (iii) the U.S. bet the farm on a future dominated by U.S.-owned AGI, because, for geopolitical reasons, it could not afford to risk to lose the AI-race with China; this geopolitical bet on AGI is now going bad.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Economy, Profit, Artificial Intelligence, Productivity, Energy, Large Language Models (LLMs), ChatGPT, and Speculative Bubbles
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

196. Is Fedwire Still a Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?

Author:
William Bergman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper examines the Federal Reserve’s current financial losses—unprecedented in scale—and the questionable accounting practices it uses to downplay their impact. It argues that the Fed’s selfdefined accounting standards, particularly the creation of a “deferred asset” to mask negative equity, obscure the fiscal consequences for the U.S. government and taxpayers. The analysis connects today’s losses to longstanding institutional practices, notably the Fed’s flawed costrecovery accounting for its Fedwire payment system. These issues first emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the author, then a Fed staffer, challenged the internal logic used to claim that Fedwire guaranteed payments and still avoided subsidies. The paper includes as an appendix the original 2002 draft, “Fedwire: A Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?”, which helped reveal the moral hazard and accounting inconsistencies that contributed to the 2008 crisis and continue to shape central bank risk and governance today
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Regulation, Central Bank, and Payment Systems
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

197. Historical American Political Finance Data at the National Archives: A Preface to the INET Edition

Author:
Thomas Ferguson
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Narratives in American history, politics, and economics — even those by the most accomplished researchers — often resemble donuts: at their core lies a hole that no amount of sweet speculation can truly fill. They say almost nothing about the financing behind even the most pivotal American political campaigns and elections. Both history and the social sciences suffer greatly when facts are missing and wild guesses take their place. INET’s new data archive of historical political finance records at the National Archives marks a major step toward filling this factual void. It assembles all campaign finance reports filed by political parties and presidential candidates up to 1974, the year before the Federal Election Commission was established. A few additional files, including one from the FEC for 1976, are also included, as detailed below. This INET Working Paper outlines what users need to know to navigate the archive effectively and locate the data they require.
Topic:
History, Elections, Regulation, and Political Finance
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

198. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

199. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

200. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America