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601. Is the World Trade Organization Still Relevant?

Author:
Alan Wm. Wolff
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
There has been a profound shift in American foreign economic policy. The United States has abandoned promotion of a rules-based open international trading system and no longer supports the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States and its allies created the current world trading system as an essential part of the liberal world order, a series of rules-based international organizations and agreements to help rebuild the global economy and foster peaceful cooperation after World War II. Today, rising populism, heightened geopolitical tensions, and persistent inequality are threatening this order. Wolff emphasizes that the WTO is still relevant to the liberal international order, and it is in the core interest of the United States and other countries to continue to support that order. But he cautions that the WTO needs major reforms if it is to survive as an effective force governing world trade. WTO members must engage in serious negotiations to find acceptable solutions to shared problems. The resulting agreements can be political commitments or adoption of binding rules. Regressing to a lack of accountability for one’s trade policy measures, however, would be unacceptably damaging.
Topic:
Economic Policy, Trade, WTO, and International Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

602. Enhancing Trilateral Security Cooperation: Korea, the United States, and Indonesia

Author:
Sook-yeon Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Sook-yeon Lee argues that Indonesia serves as an ideal partner for the United States and South Korea to advance their objectives in the Indo-Pacific region and that the three countries should expand areas for trilateral cooperation. While the bilateral South Korea-Indonesia and US-Indonesia partnerships have deepened over the past several decades, trilateral security cooperation remains unexplored due to the differing scopes of cooperation between the two bilateral relationships. Lee outlines several areas in which the three countries should expand trilateral cooperation and contribute to strengthening regional security. Due to Indonesia’s desire for neutrality and South Korea’s concerns regarding its ties with China, Lee recommends a cautious approach to initiating trilateral cooperation in maritime security and counterterrorism before gradually expanding to additional areas. Such an approach both addresses Indonesia’s immediate cooperative needs and aligns with areas that South Korea and the United States have already identified within their respective partnerships with Indonesia. However, the primary challenge facing trilateral security cooperation is maintaining mutual trust and ensuring the leaders of all three countries are committed to upholding trust as the foundation of trilateralism. Domestic politics and foreign policy considerations of the three countries further complicate efforts to enhance trilateral security cooperation. Thus, Lee recommends that the three countries strengthen strategic dialogues to understand and respect the differences in each country’s respective core interests to ensure the establishment of a durable trilateral partnership between South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Regional Security, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Indonesia, South Korea, North Korea, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

603. Camp David and US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation: Consolidating the Northeast Asia Anchor in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Yasuyo Sakata
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Yasuyo Sakata provides a historical overview of US-Japan-ROK defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, from the Korean War to the Camp David Summit, explaining how the trilateral partnership was redefined as an Indo-Pacific partnership and incorporated the “Northeast Asia Anchor.” Sakata argues that Japan and the United States have taken the lead in reconstructing the Indo-Pacific security architecture through their Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies, and that the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship has been incorporated into this framework alongside other alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. Sakata explores how Korea’s shift back towards the Indo-Pacific under President Yoon’s leadership has allowed for expansion of the scope of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, as affirmed during the Camp David Summit. However, Sakata contends that a comprehensive defense approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific involving allies and partners to build upon this foundation and strengthen defense and security cooperation amidst the challenges posed by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, maritime security, cybersecurity, and space. Action is essential, as time is running out to solidify gains from the Camp David Summit and build a stable relationship. Therefore, Sakata argues that Japan and South Korea should strengthen relations deliberately yet cautiously before domestic politics potentially spoil recent progress.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

604. US-South Korea Cyber Cooperation: Towards the Higher-Hanging Fruits

Author:
Jenny Jun and So Jeong Kim
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the past decade, the US and South Korea faced a relatively narrow set of challenges in cyberspace, notably North Korea’s cyber crime facilitating sanctions evasion. In the next decade, however, the two countries will face a more diversified set of challenges with growing North Korean ties with Russia, its involvement in the war in Ukraine, and intensifying US-China competition. The US and South Korea must develop a joint playbook for responding to scenarios of disruptive cyber operations targeting South Korean public and private sectors and prepare for an even more difficult environment for curbing North Korea’s cyber crime as Russia provides a way out. Over the past two years, the US and South Korea have significantly deepened and broadened cooperation on cyber issues and have expanded cooperation further to trilateral and multilateral settings. The two countries established several regular high-level and working-level dialogues, have issued joint sanctions and threat advisories, and deepened mil-to-mil cooperation. However, 2024 has been a watershed in terms of shifting geopolitical dynamics on and around the Korean peninsula. Cyber threats will become more diversified, and the bilateral relationship will be tested at the seams without a clear joint strategic concept and operational plan.
Topic:
Sanctions, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

605. Clean Energy Pragmatism as a Spark for US-South Korea Relations

Author:
Elan Sykes
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The United States and South Korea are close allies, committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and home to advanced industrial economies. Pragmatic cooperation on clean energy technologies would aid their shared goals in climate mitigation, energy security, and supply chain resilience. US-South Korea cooperation should include pooling shared technological expertise, aligning market and carbon accounting rules, investing in constrained supply chains, and adopting well-targeted policies to encourage research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects for early-stage technologies like clean hydrogen and advanced nuclear power plants. Clean energy pragmatism requires acknowledgment of the constraints facing each country to ensure policies are properly scoped, politically durable, and revised iteratively in light of observed outcomes. Neither country can succeed in this multidecadal transition alone. With their shared industrial capacity, world-class innovators engaged in joint research and development, and properly aligned market standards, however, both countries can solidify their position to achieve 21st-century energy security and economic growth. Yet, policy design and implementation are never complete unless a problem is entirely solved, and climate change is not a problem that can be solved over a single presidential term. Political shifts hold the potential to either undo progress or help spur new action.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Renewable Energy, Supply Chains, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

606. Canvasing Variations in US-South Korea Cooperation on AI and Quantum Technology

Author:
Sanghyun Han
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper elucidates how Washington and Seoul cooperate on AI and quantum technologies, both recognized as critical emerging technologies essential to their national interests. Technology cooperation is denoted as government-to-government efforts aimed at cultivating and developing technology, focusing on national strategies and interests. In AI, the United States holds a dominant leadership position, while South Korea demonstrates strengths in certain areas, though not across the board. Cooperation in AI primarily focuses on standardization efforts, with significant involvement of the South Korean government in partnerships with the US private sector, as well as private-sector-led bilateral research initiatives. In contrast, South Korea’s capabilities in quantum technologies are far more limited. Nevertheless, cooperation in this domain is largely centered on research collaboration, with both governments actively participating alongside international research consortia led by the United States. The differing focuses—standardization in AI and research collaboration in quantum technologies—reflect the respective strengths and needs of the two countries in these critical fields. The progression of the US-ROK alliance in this direction is both natural and beneficial, as the development of advanced and sophisticated technology is incrsaneasingly beyond the capacity of any single state alone.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, Standardization, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

607. Cooperation on Semiconductor Supply Chains and Technology

Author:
Soyoung Kwon
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The security alliance between the United States and South Korea, once focused primarily on military defense, is evolving to include economic security and technological cooperation. The evolving partnership between the two countries, particularly in the areas of semiconductor supply chains and advanced technologies, features the deepening and broadening of the alliance in the form of a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance. This change is driven by intensifying competition between the United States and China, which has led to the securitization of key technologies like semiconductors. This paper examines the opportunities and challenges in deepening and broadening US-South Korea cooperation on semiconductor supply chains. While such developments support the shared objectives of advancing technological innovation, bolstering supply chain resilience, and addressing potential threats from China, challenges remain in diverging threat perceptions and concerns about collective deterrence. The study concludes that aligning strategic objectives in economic security and technological cooperation is essential to ensure the sustainability of the alliance and its ability to navigate the complex global techno-geopolitical landscape.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

608. From Security Alliance to Comprehensive Technology Centered Partnership

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations have embraced the expansion of economic cooperation within the US-ROK alliance, leading to the emergence of South Korea as a valued technology partner of the United States and an era of institutionalization for the bilateral relationship. This issue of Korea Policy examines the commitments of the two governments to cooperate on the development of critical and emerging technologies and is intended to capture major changes in the depth of cooperation reflected in the intensification and expansion of policy dialogues between the two countries in both technology development and the defense industrial base. Major themes highlighted across the papers include challenges to maintaining a technology-centered coalition among like-minded partners, the impact of political transition on the sustainability of technology-driven cooperation, the role of the private sector, and the implications of expanding the concept of an alliance beyond its core security-centered logic. As the alliance management baton passes from the Biden to the Donald Trump administration, an important question will be whether the Biden administration’s efforts to “lock in” institutionalized cooperation are sustainable through the political transition and whether such efforts will only be successful with “buy-in” from President Trump and his new administration.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

609. Spillover effects of the recent US monetary policy shocks on the South African economy: The role of monetary and fiscal policy coordination

Author:
Guangling Liu and Marrium Mustapher
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This study examines how different policy mix regimes affect the impact of recent US contractionary monetary policy on South Africa’s inflation and business cycles. The study uses a small open economy New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with an integrated fiscal block to analyse these effects. Regime M (active monetary policy) is more effective at containing the spillover effects but leads to higher public debt, requiring larger future fiscal surpluses. The commitment to price stability under Regime M increases real interest rates, raising domestic debt service costs and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Regime F (active fiscal policy), in contrast, stabilizes debt more quickly but at the cost of higher inflation, as it does not use future surpluses to manage public debt. These spillover effects are more amplified under both Regime M and Regime F in the case of a complete exchange rate pass-through and a higher degree of trade openness, with Regime F exhibiting a stronger amplification effect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

610. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence

Author:
Kenton Thibaut
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
Topic:
Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

611. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power

Author:
David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

612. Empires of Exceptionalism: Lessons from the EU AI Act and Attempts at AI Legislation in California

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Claudia Lozano
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU AI Act, which passed after three years of negotiations and much ambivalence, sets a comprehensive regulatory framework that reflects the European Union’s unique needs that are not translatable to other jurisdictions. The proposed bill in California (SB 1047) illustrates this case in point. The bill could potentially mislead the public into thinking that AI is already under effective regulatory control. Lawmakers must recognize that the EU differs from other systems. The EU AI Act is not only shaped by the desire to slow down global AI development, allowing Europe to catch up with rivals like the US and China: The EU lacks an enforceable constitution, and the Act prohibits its governments to impose social scoring and discriminatory measures. SB 1047 only addressed humanity-ending disasters and had unclear practical value. Meanwhile, the EU AI Act was passed into law to prevent internal competition and Europe’s history of authoritarianism. Existing laws in California and the EU already regulate most AI use cases. In addition, the EU AI Act reviews existing regulations to ensure they are still fit for purpose, something California failed to do in SB 1047. A critical takeaway is to examine existing obligations or executive powers (including enforcement agencies and public funding) to achieve the desired policy objectives. The diverging outcomes of the two laws show the importance of avoiding mismatches between policy objectives and legislative scope. AI regulation cannot substitute for other policy objectives, like privacy and antitrust. Also, lawmakers must weigh the cost of failed regulation against the risks of non-regulation. California did not see any immediate costs of inaction, whereas delayed action by the EU might have led to the fragmentation of its internal market. Also, given its collective decision-making, the EU can escape accountability for policy failures due to premature laws in a way the leaders in other political systems cannot.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Legislation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe, California, North America, and United States of America

613. CTC Sentinel: February 2024 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, and Daisy Muibu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Long-range aerial attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group, including a ballistic missile that traveled at least a thousand miles toward Israel before being intercepted (reportedly in space) on October 31, 2023, are focusing minds on long-range stand-off terrorism. In this month’s feature article, which conceptualizes, outlines, and examines the implications of this emerging threat vector, Don Rassler argues that the notion that terrorists could strike the United States across the oceans with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is becoming increasingly less far-fetched. Rassler writes that “over the coming decade, hydrogen fuel cell and solar UAS technology will evolve and mature, and will also likely become more available and accessible to the average consumer, which will make longer ranges more accessible as well. Other disruptive technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, will also mature and will likely be used by extremists to help them optimize system performance and to overcome, or devise creative solutions to, technical long-range UAS challenges.” He warns that “long-range stand-off terrorism will be attractive to some extremists because it opens-up new attack pathways, can enable surprise, and has the potential to deliver a potent psychological, ‘we can strike you from afar’ punch. Over the next decade advancements in commercial technologies and systems will also make range, and extended range, more accessible for violent non-state-entities, making it likely that in the future long-range terrorism will become even more of a threat.” Rassler’s article is the first in a new recurring series in CTC Sentinel entitled “On the Horizon” that will examine emerging counterterrorism challenges. Our interview is with Christopher Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. “We need to have sustainable CT operations that prevent terrorists’ actions, principally al-Qa`ida and ISIS, to ensure we are not distracted by what we view as the longer-term strategic priorities, such as peer adversaries,” he says. “As the rest of the Department and other parts of the U.S. government are doing less CT, [this] means that those who are doing it have to do it better and, in many respects, do it more proportionally to the rest of the national security enterprise. This is why SOF is looked to as the lead for the CT fight in the Department.” Daisy Muibu examines the state of Somalia’s military campaign against al-Shabaab. She writes that: “A year and five months after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the initial optimism that characterized its first few months have diminished as the counterinsurgency’s momentum has stalled in the central regions of the country.” She adds that “with only a year left until African Union forces are mandated to fully draw down, significant obstacles remain that cast doubts over the government’s ambitious goals to defeat al-Shabaab and assume full responsibility for securing the country by December 31, 2024.”
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Houthis, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Somalia, Global Focus, and United States of America

614. CTC Sentinel: March 2024 Issue

Author:
Barak Mendelsohn, Paul Cruickshank, Caleb Weiss, and Ryan O'Farrell
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Barak Mendelsohn examines the future of the jihadi movement. His article is the second in a new recurring series in CTC Sentinel entitled “On the Horizon” that examines emerging counterterrorism challenges and long-term developments. Mendelsohn writes that over 20 years after 9/11, “jihadi violence in the West is low, but the number of Sunni jihadi outfits around the world has increased. And while the central leaderships of both al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State appear in tatters, many of their affiliates are experiencing expansion.” He argues that “anti-regime grievances, the appeal of religious ideology, and the ability to hurt, are likely to maintain jihadism as a viable resistance ideology.” He further warns that “jihadism is still a powerful force and is making inroads in various regions” and that “a more modest jihadi strategy with a regional focus is offering jihadis a new path forward.” But, he notes, “a sustainable jihadi success would require moderation that is simply antithetical to the nature of the ideology.” Our interview is with Mitchell D. Silber, the executive director of the Community Security Initiative, an intiative “created by the leading organizations in the Jewish community in New York to protect the Jewish population and Jewish institutions in the Greater New York City metro area.” He previously served as Director of Intelligence Analysis at the New York City Police Department. Silber describes how in the months since the October 7 attacks in Israel, there has been a surge in antisemitic threats and violence in the greater New York area. “This is kind of like a category five storm. Five times the amount of hateful postings that our intelligence desk had to vet through,” he says, adding that “since October 7, 2023, there have been at least 23 anti-Jewish assaults in New York City.” He outlines how in response to these grave threats, the Jewish “community, leadership, and organizations have rallied, have risen to the occasion, and are now creating the security architecture that we never had before in the United States in order to meet the moment.” Finally, Caleb Weiss and Ryan O’Farrell examine how Operation Shujaa, launched in late 2021 by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda against the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in the border regions of the DRC near Uganda, has degraded the ability of the group to disseminate propaganda via the Islamic State’s central media apparatus. They write: “While still a serious and deadly threat inside Congo and beyond, [ISCAP’s] propaganda output is a shell of its former self. This decline is, in part, thanks to the current joint Ugandan-Congolese operations against it.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, Antisemitism, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, New York, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Global Focus, and United States of America

615. CTC Sentinel: July/August 2024 Issue

Author:
Devorah Margolin, Gina Vale, Kristina Hummel, Samuel Bowles, and Noah Tucker
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Ten years ago, in August 2014, the Islamic State began its genocidal campaign against the Yazidi community. In our cover article, Devorah Margolin and Gina Vale evaluate how the group’s gendered violence has manifested during and after its caliphate years. “Even without its caliphate,” they write, “the Islamic State’s gendered violence continues, as its supporters and ideology remain. Arguably, the lack of timely and appropriate responses has perpetuated this violence.” Our interview this month is with William Braniff, director of the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships at the Department of Homeland Security. In it, he describes his office’s efforts to utilize a public health-informed approach to preventing targeted violence and terrorism. Edward Lemon and Noah Tucker examine Central Asians’ prominent role in recent global terror plots and attacks. They argue that analysis should focus more on “the factors that led to mobilization to Syria and Iraq a decade ago and that have been exacerbated in recent years, especially in Tajikistan, including crackdowns on religion, corrupt ineffective governance, high levels of migration, and well-established terror networks that are holdovers from the peak of the Islamic State” as a way to understand this evolving threat area. When news reports appeared earlier this summer suggesting that the leader of the Islamic State in Somalia, Abdulqadir Mumin, may have quietly become the “worldwide leader” of the Islamic State last year and may have been killed in a recent U.S. airstrike, the news created far more questions than answers. Austin Doctor and Gina Ligon take a nuanced look at what the developments—if true—could mean for the group. Jessica Davis provides analysis of the Islamic State’s post-caliphate financial strategies. “The future of the Islamic State’s financial infrastructure,” she writes, “is networked, resilient, and adaptive.” This reality, she warns, portends “a grim future for efforts to combat the group’s international presence.” Finally, in June, the U.S. State Department designated the Nordic Resistance Movement, the largest neo-Nazi group in Sweden, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, only the second white nationalist organization on its terrorist list. Peter Smith outlines the development of the group and considers what the designation could mean for its future.
Topic:
Genocide, Migration, Terrorism, Women, Islamic State, Gender Based Violence, Public Health, Yazidis, and Neo-Nazis
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, Tajikistan, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

616. CTC Sentinel: May 2024 Issue

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, Lucas Webber, Riccardo Valle, and Paul Cruickshank
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the wake of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) attack on March 22 in Moscow and a wave of thwarted plots by the group in Europe, there is growing concern about the international terror threat the network poses. In the feature article, Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, Lucas Webber, and Riccardo Valle assess that “ISK’s nearly decade-long presence in its traditional strongholds of Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with its expanding reach and appeal among Central Asian populations and its prioritization of inspiring and coordinating transnational attacks as part of its growth strategy, underscores the multifaceted and evolving nature of the threat posed by this resilient terrorist organization … Despite ISK’s recent decline in attacks in Afghanistan, the group retains the determination and capacity to conduct destabilizing high-profile attacks in multiple countries. The group remains resilient, but more worryingly, it has learned to adapt its strategy and tactics to fit evolving dynamics, and exploit local, regional, and global grievances and conflicts.” Our interview is with Ahmad Zia Saraj who served as the General Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) of Afghanistan between September 2019 until the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021. He recounts this turbulent period and the lessons learned. He warns that by using end-to-end-encryption, ISK can recruit, exchange information swiftly, plan, and execute international attacks. “Encrypted messaging apps have helped terrorists speed up operations, enhance operational security, save time, save travel costs, and to plan and execute and even monitor attacks in real time,” he says. “The NDS noticed that a newly recruited fighter does not need to physically attend a training camp to learn how to construct a bomb or how to target the enemy. All this can be done via a smart phone with less risk of exposure. Advancing technology has made it possible for someone to be trained in terrorist tactics in any part of the world, regardless of borders or travel restrictions. A terrorist in Afghanistan or Iraq can easily train another one in any part of the world.” Finally, Pete Simi, Gina Ligon, Seamus Hughes, and Natalie Standridge quantify the rising threats to public officials in the United States by reviewing a decade of federal data. They write that: “A review of federal charges for the past decade highlights that the number of threats to public officials is growing. While 2013-2016 had an average of 38 federal charges per year, that number sharply increased to an average of 62 charges per year between 2017-2022. Across the time series, ideologically motivated threats, on average, accounted for almost half of the cases, and the portion steadily increased year over year. A preliminary review of cases from 2023 and 2024 shows that the number of federal prosecutions is on pace to hit new record highs. The rising threat level may produce significant consequences for the U.S. democratic system of governance.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Islamic State, Encryption, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

617. CTC Sentinel: December 2024 Issue

Author:
Graham Macklin, Paul Cruickshank, Kristina Hummel, Michael Horton, Christopher Faulkner, Marcel Plichta, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the feature article, Graham Macklin evaluates ‘transnationalism’ as an analytical lens for understanding racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) terrorism. He writes that “the ‘transnational’ dimension of REMVE terrorism is often ill-defined and misunderstood, leading to misconceptions about the nature of such networks that in turn exaggerate their ‘global’ reach. … Nevertheless, understanding the transnational dimension of social media and its role in the radicalization of lone-actor REMVE terrorists is increasingly important. Online REMVE communities rather than physical organizations per se serve as the medium through which violent ideologies are spread; where lessons from previous attacks are learned and internalized; where the perpetrators of violence are revered; and where further acts of violence are encouraged and incited.” Our interview is with Marshall Miller, the outgoing Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, who oversaw the day-to-day running of the Department of Justice and earlier in his career prosecuted or supervised the prosecution of several high-profile terrorism cases. When it comes to the CT mission of the DOJ, he says that “the number-one piece of advice would be that prevention and disruption always have to remain the top priority. And in order to achieve prevention and disruption, we need to double down on what has been working and continually modernize and calibrate to meet the varied threats. There is a system … that works; it involves coordination and information sharing and intelligence gathering from all sources—both in the intelligence community, of course, but also law enforcement and the Department of Defense.” Michael Horton outlines the Houthis’ expanding footprint in the Horn of Africa. He writes that securing supply chains and funding for their unmanned vehicle and missile programs, “especially funding and supplies that are independent of Iran, is a key objective for the Houthi leadership” and that “both AQAP and al-Shabaab now act as facilitators and, to a degree, as partners that help the Houthis smuggle needed materiel into and out of Yemen.” Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta look at Africa Corps, Russia’s replacement for the Wagner Group in Africa. They write: “Russia’s Sahel strategy, and arguably its Africa strategy writ large, is one that promotes more disruption and chaos, not less. … Russia has limited CT experience and diminished incentives to invest the resources necessary to genuinely solve the complex security crises in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and across the greater Sahel—crises that demand much more than a military solution. Adding to the complications is the potential loss of Russian bases in Syria following the overthrow of the Assad regime. Any resulting Russian forfeiture of its bases … could make airlifting goods to Libya, the Sahel, and Central Africa significantly more challenging in the short term,” with implications for the endurability of Sahelian juntas propped up by Africa Corps.
Topic:
Terrorism, Transnational Actors, Houthis, Countering Violent Extremism, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Syria, United States of America, and Horn of Africa

618. The Navy Working Capital Fund and Operational Resource Management Decisions: A Case Study Analysis

Author:
James Taylor, Elliott Branch, Lewis Crenshaw, Peter Levine, Dorothy Robyn, and Sean Stackley
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN (FM&C)) commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration (Academy) to evaluate how resource management decisions impact the NWCF and identify strategies for improving decision-making processes to safeguard the fund's integrity and DON’s operational efficacy. This report of an Academy Panel of Fellows (Panel) examines the effect of resource management decisions—including programmatic, budgetary, and execution—on the NWCF. Furthermore, it assesses whether program and budget development decision-makers consider the potential impacts of their choices on the NWCF. Finally, it provides actionable recommendations to enhance and improve DON's resource management decision-making processes, delivery methods, organizational support structures, and forecasting (near-, mid-, and long-term), as well as guidance for their effective implementation.
Topic:
Government, Navy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
United States of America

619. Ensuring Excellence: A Guide for Cultivating Healthy High-Performing Agencies

Author:
Lisa Coleman, Nicholas Hart, Peter Hutchinson, Kathryn Newcomer, and Sean O'Keefe
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:
Many public agencies have long struggled to build their workforce given laborious and time-consuming hiring practices, limited salary flexibilities, and promotion rules that value longevity over expertise and performance. Effective recruitment and retention practices are especially critical with the current wave of public service retirements. This report is a playbook for agency leaders and managers with practical strategies and evidence-based practices to improve their agency’s organizational health in order to achieve meaningful and measurable results. The report underscores how important a strong internal culture focused on high performance is to the delivery of essential public services. Among other things, the playbook includes: Guidance on how to continually assess and adapt to evolving work environments, Practices to enhance organizational health to achieve results, and Resource links and case examples to support implementation of these strategies and actions.
Topic:
Recruitment, Implementation, Public Administration, and Organizational Assessment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

620. The United Nations and Human Rights in North Korea

Author:
Raymond Ha
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Despite the emergence of geopolitical trends that threaten global stability, the United Nations is—and will remain—indispensable for the promotion of human rights in North Korea. Domestic political changes in South Korea and the United States have set the stage for robust multilateral coordination on North Korean human rights, including at the United Nations. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea remains the focal point of relevant activity within the United Nations, as the Seoul office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights continues its work in the field. Moreover, the Security Council held a public discussion on North Korean human rights in August 2023 after a six-year hiatus, as South Korea, the United States, and other like-minded countries emphasized the connection between human rights and security issues. It will be vital to keep human rights at the forefront as North Korea reengages with the world following its COVID-19 lockdown. Finally, North Korea’s fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in November 2024 will not only enable states and civil society organizations to spotlight Pyongyang’s human rights record, but also reveal opportunities for engagement going forward.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

621. The Rise of Fragmentation. A New Economic Security Era?

Author:
Alessandro Gili and Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Multiple crises have shaken the foundations of the global economy, and the resulting instability has yet to recover. Instead, it has led to increasing fragmentation along political and ideological lines. The current geoeconomic order is increasingly defined by the use of advanced trade defense and economic security tools, such as tariffs, trade barriers, sanctions, and export restrictions, which have become more sophisticated. Major economies are adapting to this new reality by shaping their own definitions of economic security, particularly to safeguard critical and high-tech sectors. The EU, the US, and China are each calibrating their economic security strategies, seeking a balance between openness and protection that maximizes their respective advantages. However, in this shifting international landscape, new actors are emerging with the potential to influence the global balance of power. What type of "new globalization" is emerging? Could economic security tools become the new normal in the global economy? What are the key economic security strategies adopted by the world's leading economies?
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Ideology, Tariffs, Trade, Economic Security, Instability, Fragmentation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

622. How the European Union should respond to Trump’s tariffs

Author:
Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Petros C. Mavroidis, and André Sapir
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
President-elect Trump has threatened to increase United States tariffs to 60 percent on imports from China and 10 percent to 20 percent on imports from other trading partners, including the European Union. In doing so the US would be ignoring its World Trade Organisation commitments and would also rollback the substantial liberalisation that has taken place during the past 80 years, with a potentially major negative impact on the world economy. In response to this threat, the EU should pursue a three-pronged strategy. First, the EU should engage bilaterally with the US to seek to avoid the imposition of tariffs. This could include an offer to consider measures on facilitation of bilateral trade and on economic security cooperation, while making clear that any trade measures adopted by the EU will be consistent with WTO rules. This offer should be backed up with a credible threat of retaliation that could be implemented if the US decides to impose tariffs on EU exports. Retaliation could take the form of a negative list – the EU would increase its tariffs on all US exports to the same level as the US tariffs, except for products imported from the US identified as crucial for the EU. Second, the EU should act to preserve a functioning rules-based multilateral trading system, including on dispute settlement, and should continue to pursue WTO reform. To this end, the EU should build a coalition of countries including key players from the Global North and the Global South ready to lead in this endeavour. Third, the EU should expand its network of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements. The priority should be the ratification of the agreement with Mercosur, but the EU should also aim to improve trade relations with the United Kingdom and Switzerland and to further strengthen partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and with Africa.
Topic:
European Union, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

623. Catch-up with the US or prosper below the tech frontier? An EU artificial intelligence strategy

Author:
Bertin Martens
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European Union policymakers want to close the artificial intelligence innovation gap with the United States, as a way to accelerate lagging productivity growth. The EU focus is on expanding an existing supercomputer network with more AI hardware and computing infrastructure, with taxpayer support. However, this computing infrastructure is not adapted to AI modelling. The cost of catching up with leading big tech AI computing centres is already prohibitive for EU budgets, and is set to become even more so. The hardware focus overlooks missing EU markets for complementary services that are required to set up a successful AI business: large-scale business outlets for frontier generative AI models to generate sufficient revenues to cover huge fixed model training costs, hyperscale cloud-computing infrastructure and private equity financing for AI start-ups. In the absence of (or with insufficient) complementary services markets in the EU, start-ups are forced to collaborate with US big tech firms. Injecting taxpayer subsidies to make up for these missing markets may further distort EU markets. Regulatory compliance costs, including uncertainty about the implementation arrangements for the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, add to market problems. The EU should address a wider range of market failures in its policy initiatives. It should strive to increase productivity growth below the AI technology frontier, by facilitating investment and applications of AI-driven services produced by derived and specialised generative AI models, or AI-applications that build on top of existing generative AI models. Building these below-frontier AI applications requires far less computing capacity and less heavy investment costs. Promoting the uptake of AI application services across a wide range of industries can substantially stimulate productivity growth. That requires a razor-sharp focus on pro-innovation guidelines, standards and implementation provisions for the EU AI Act, shortening the Act’s regulatory uncertainty horizon as much as possible, and facilitating collaborations between EU AI startups and big tech companies. Widening and deepening the EU private equity and venture capital market would also be very helpful.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Investment, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

624. Is There Life After NATO?

Author:
Marc Trachtenberg
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
It is often claimed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 requires the United States to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. The historical evidence, however, shows that this is not the case at all. It is also commonly claimed that until Donald Trump came along, no American president would have dreamed of threatening not to defend the European allies. This too, it turns out, is not supported by the evidence. But it is not just a question of getting the history right. Those historical claims are important because they support the more fundamental claim that the NATO system is so obviously in America’s interest that it needs to be treated as sacrosanct. But has it been such a phenomenal success?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

625. Why US Immigration Officials Should Allow “Digital Nomad” Admissions

Author:
Angelo A. Paparelli, David Bier, Peter Choi, and Stephen Yale-Loehr
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Existing US immigration statutes, regulations, and policies do not expressly authorize the short-term admission of digital nomads: typically, college-educated professionals who use laptops, cell phones, and other digital technology to perform their occupations remotely while traveling. Nor do these rules explain how to manage the admission of noncitizens who are not digital nomads per se but who, while lawfully visiting the United States to see family or go to an industry conference, log on to their laptop or phone to review and respond to routine business matters such as replying to emails.
Topic:
Visa, Immigration Policy, Remote Work, Digital Nomads, and Work
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

626. Immigration Enforcement and Public Safety

Author:
Helena Gonçalves, Emily K. Weisburst, and Elisa Jácome
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The debate surrounding the enforcement of immigration laws often revolves around the impact of immigration on public safety. Recent surveys show that about half of Americans believe that immigrants are making crime in the country worse, and more Americans believe that immigrants have an adverse impact on crime than on jobs or the economy. Much research has found mixed evidence on the effect of immigration on local crime rates. Nevertheless, those advocating for the enforcement of immigration laws view it as a key policy tool for improving public safety.
Topic:
Immigration, Law Enforcement, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

627. Deterrence and alliance power: Why the AUKUS submarines matter and how they can be delivered

Author:
Ross Babbage
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Significant progress has already been made in the program to deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The AUKUS partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom is well placed to deliver on its objectives in a reasonable timeframe. A largely unrecognised near-term benefit of AUKUS is that Australia will host up to five allied nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) within three years. These jointly crewed submarines will make a significant contribution to joint deterrence and theatre defence. By the mid-2030s, the AUKUS partners will have more than doubled the number of forward-deployed allied SSNs that can be operational in the critical first ten days of any Western Pacific crisis or conflict. Personnel expansion for the Royal Australian Navy will be one of the greatest challenges for the AUKUS program. Nevertheless, provided that upskilled Australian engineers and technical specialists are supplemented by British and American experts, this task will likely prove manageable.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Alliance, Deterrence, AUKUS, and Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSNs)
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, and United States of America

628. The Political Economy of Conditionality and the New Industrial Policy

Author:
Fabio Bulfone, Timur Ergen, and Erez Maggor
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Conditionality was a central concern in the development literature of the 1990s. With the massive expansion of targeted public support to private firms since the Great Financial Crisis, the question of conditionality is once again at the center of industrial policy debates. Despite the growing interest in the concept, the existing literature does not provide a systematic conceptualization of conditionality in the context of industrial policy, nor does it outline the political factors that facilitate the introduction of conditionality by state actors. This paper addresses this gap by offering a systematic political economy of conditionality. We provide an overview of the literature on conditionality, focusing on different industries, historical periods, and national contexts. In doing so, we make three contributions to the debate on industrial policy. First, we distinguish between two broad instruments of conditionality: performance standards and corporate control devices. Next, we map the coalitional, institutional, ideational, and global contextual factors that facilitate conditionality. Finally, we offer two vignettes of recent industrial policy initiatives in the EU and the US as illustrative cases. We make two arguments. First, the presence of conditionality is not primarily a technical matter of political design, but is shaped by combinations of political economy factors. Second, industrial policy conditionality provides an important theoretical lens for assessing how and where the recent revival of state activism represents a substantive break from the neoliberal order.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Political Economy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Conditionality
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

629. Firm Size and Society: The Link Between Firm Size, Job Outcomes, and Political Attitudes

Author:
Sinisa Hadziabdic and Sebastian Kohl
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Given the recent reconcentration of the economy in many private industries, the impact of working in firms of different sizes on occupational and political outcomes is of renewed interest. Using micro-level data for the US and Germany, two most dissimilar cases in terms of labor market and political institutions, we show that large firms provide substantially more material and welfare benefits to their workers, while small firms are characterized by the highest job satisfaction and more harmonious relational dynamics. Workers in medium-sized firms appear to be “betwixt and between,” being worst off in many dimensions, thus contradicting utopias of medium-sized-firm capitalism. Within firms of similar size, we also document a significant polarization between employers’ and their employees’ job experiences and political views. Given the number of waking hours spent in the workplace, the firm, hitherto a neglected locus of social sorting and socialization through which the economy shapes society, should figure more prominently in economic sociology research.
Topic:
Economy, Labor Market, Jobs, Political Attitudes, and Job Outcomes
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

630. The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design

Author:
Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:
The election of Donald Trump as the next President of the United States has reignited discussions about a potential peace agreement in Ukraine. Advisors close to the President-elect have floated the idea of revisiting the Minsk Protocols of 2014 and 2015—agreements initially crafted to address Russian aggression in Ukraine but fraught with significant design flaws. At first glance, revisiting the Minsk Protocols might seem like a logical starting point. However, their design was fundamentally flawed, with three critical weaknesses undermining their effectiveness. First, Russia acted in bad faith by asserting that it was not a party to the armed conflict, despite maintaining a military presence on Ukrainian territory. This claim allowed Russia to avoid any obligations under the protocols, undermining their credibility and enforceability. Second, the “special status” provision in the Minsk Protocols created a pathway for eroding Ukrainian political unity. It fostered governance fragmentation and institutionalized a permanent Russian influence over Ukraine’s internal affairs. Third, the sequencing of the Minsk Protocols required Ukraine to hold elections in Donetsk and Luhansk before regaining control over its territory. This made it impossible to ensure that the elections would be free, fair, and transparent. This blog will explore these design flaws in greater detail and explain why reviving the Minsk Protocols in future peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely to result in a durable peace.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Minsk Protocols
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

631. On U.S.-ASEAN Relations & Trade

Author:
Shay Wester and Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deepen their economic ties, the stakes for both sides are rising. Comprising 10 Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN stands as the fourth-largest trading partner of the United States, with bilateral trade approaching $500 billion in 2023. The region maintains a $200 billion trade surplus with the United States, mainly from high-tech electronics and manufactured goods. Southeast Asia's economic importance to the United States is substantial and growing. By early 2024, the United States had overtaken China as ASEAN's largest export market, with 15% of ASEAN's exports destined for the United States, up nearly 4% since 2018. The United States is also the largest source of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN, with total stock reaching nearly $480 billion in 2023 — almost double the combined U.S. investments in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The region's potential for future growth is impressive: with nearly 700 million people and a GDP of $3.6 trillion, Southeast Asia is projected to be the world's fastest-growing trade area, driven by its young population and economic diversity. The region’s digital economy alone is expected to reach $1 trillion by 2030. These dynamics position Southeast Asia as not only an economic hub but also as a linchpin in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Recognizing this, the U.S. and ASEAN governments have advanced their economic cooperation across multiple fronts. Bilateral ties with key Southeast Asian partners have strengthened, including upgraded partnerships with Indonesia and Vietnam, a new dialogue with Singapore on critical technologies, and an infrastructure initiative in the Philippines. At the regional level, ASEAN plays a key role in facilitating dialogue and shaping economic policies among its member states and external partners. Through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the organization aligns national priorities with broader regional objectives. In 2022, the U.S.-ASEAN relationship was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with President Biden hosting a Special Summit in Washington. The Biden administration has intensified regional cooperation by launching new ministerial dialogues, establishing a U.S.-ASEAN Center in Washington, and increasing investments in areas such as infrastructure, digital economy, and clean energy. However, challenges remain in U.S.-ASEAN engagement. While the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) emerged as a key cooperation platform with seven ASEAN member states, its scope remains limited and progress on trade-related aspects has stalled due to congressional opposition over digital trade, labor, and environmental standards. Concerns about U.S. commitment to the region persist, particularly due to fluctuating policies and strategic competition with China. Many ASEAN nations feel that U.S. initiatives often focus more on countering China than on addressing their economic priorities. As they navigate challenges like economic instability, climate vulnerabilities, and widening socio-economic gaps, ASEAN countries seek more tangible benefits from their engagement with the United States, including improved market access and new investments.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

632. On the Economic Security Agenda

Author:
Jane Mellsop and Mariko Togashi
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Economic security has been hitting the headlines in recent years, with the catchcry that “economic security is national security” underpinning many countries’ view of the world today. While there is no single definition of economic security, the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly concerned about the security and resiliency of their supply chains and access to markets for strategic products, including critical minerals; the disruptions their businesses face from geopolitical, health or climate crises; inappropriate technology transfers; and the risks of economic coercion. The emphasis that each of these countries places on individual economic security issues will necessarily differ due to a range of factors such as their development status, national interests, vulnerabilities, and China policies. In 2023, the Group of Seven (G7) leaders took the first unified step to put the spotlight on economic security as a critical global challenge. Japan shepherded through a new G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security at the Hiroshima Summit, highlighting the need to address economic vulnerabilities and counter exploitative practices. By taking this move, the G7 illustrated its leadership in addressing pressing global economic issues, especially as other groups, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), falter in generating collective responses and rules to address new challenges. Representing around a third of the global economy, the G7 can set the tone and the agenda for action on critical issues facing the global economy, although its small number of members is also a limitation when trying to garner broad support for new initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Economics, National Security, G7, and Resilience
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

633. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:
Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

634. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

635. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

636. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:
Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

637. On U.S.-Australia Relations & AUKUS

Author:
Dominique Fraser and Anthony Bubalo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The forthcoming U.S. presidential election comes at a time of great strategic uncertainty for Australia. Successive governments have said repeatedly that Australia now faces its most complex strategic environment since World War II. A key element of Australia’s response has been to embark on a fundamental re-shaping of the Australian Defence Force. AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, lies at the heart of this transformation. AUKUS is groundbreaking for several reasons, but mainly because it involves the transfer of nuclear submarines to Australia. What also makes the pact remarkable is the length of time it covers — the end point has been set at 2075. This means that a succession of governments will need to sustain support for what is already a complex, ambitious, and expensive endeavor. Every future U.S. election — and for that matter every Australian and UK election — will be highly consequential for AUKUS. However, two things make this November’s election particularly important. It will be the first political test of sustained U.S. political commitment to AUKUS. Whichever candidate wins will be inheriting an agreement they did not sign. Moreover, because President Trump is running there are fears that should he win, his “America First” focus might imperil the agreement. For reasons mostly unrelated to Trump, these fears are probably overstated. Yet, because the next U.S. election will determine the personality and nature of U.S. global leadership, the election will shape Australian public attitudes to an agreement that is already going to entail tough fiscal choices for future Australian governments.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Fiscal Policy, Presidential Elections, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia and United States of America

638. On South Asia in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Farwa Aamer and Vivek Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the dynamic landscape of geopolitical shifts, U.S. policy toward South Asia has consistently been a critical area of focus. As the region continues to evolve amid changing political, economic, and security imperatives, the outcomes of the upcoming elections in the United States necessitate a reassessment of strategic priorities and approaches. This article delves into the interplay of continuity and change in the U.S. policy toward South Asia, analyzing the implications of the possible electoral shifts and how the United States can navigate its interests and partnerships in this pivotal region post-election.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Elections, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
South Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

639. Lessons in leadership: Interviews with 11 of Australia’s former Defence Ministers

Author:
Brendan Nicholson
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In a time of growing strategic uncertainty, 11 of Australia’s former defence ministers have shared valuable lessons they learned over decades running one of the toughest portfolios in government. In this compendium, the former ministers from both sides of politics give their views on topics ranging from the complexity of dealing with a massive department, to the grief they shared with families at the funerals of slain soldiers. The pieces are drawn from interviews with former ASPI executive director Peter Jennings and links to the original video interviews are available in the posts on The Strategist site.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Leadership, Interview, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

640. From broad unilateralism to narrow multilateralism in semiconductor chip controls

Author:
Douglas Fuller
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Almost two years into the broad and unilateral chip controls launched by the Biden administration in October 2022 on admittedly broadly-defined national security grounds, there is evidence of significant success in limiting China’s expansion of advanced fabrication (i.e. chipmaking) for the next decade. The success of this American-initiated project has come from refining policy and pursuing policy coordination with key allies, especially Japan and the Netherlands. There are still concerns about China’s expansion of legacy chips and access to AI chips.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan, Netherlands, Global Focus, and United States of America

641. Preemptive Moves: Analyzing How the United States is Strengthening its Position in West Africa

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Recent Western reports suggest that the United States has redirected military aid, originally intended for Niger, to Ghana, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire. This shift in resource allocation comes in the wake of deteriorating relations between Washington and Niamey, culminating in the United States' withdrawal of its forces from Niger. These developments have sparked widespread speculation about whether these moves signal a new American strategy aimed at bolstering its military presence in West Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Natural Resources, Strategic Interests, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, United States of America, and Benin

642. Voters Consider, Trump Comes, China Coercion Cools

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Australia’s politicians prepare for the national election that must be held by May. In judging the first term of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government, the key concern for Australia voters is the cost of living, while international issues are bracketed by the United States and China—the return of President Donald Trump and the cooling of China’s trade coercion of Australia. The Albanese government tells Australians they face “fraught and fragile global conditions” in a “a time of great global uncertainty,” in “the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” Canberra’s approach to the Trump administration will emphasize traditional alliance ties while reinforcing new elements: AUKUS nuclear submarines, the Quad, the increase of US forces on Australian soil, and steps toward free trade in defense equipment and technology to achieve more integration between US and Australian industries.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Strategic Interests, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

643. Increasing Perils Ahead

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China. Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

644. Beijing Seeks Advantage in US Competition, Leadership Change

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
China marked the end of 2024 and four years of often intense competition for regional influence with the Biden administration and its allies and partners by continuing strong opposition to outside interference and working to advance China’s leading position among most Southeast Asian governments. The Biden government made significant gains at China’s expense, notably in the Philippines, a contrast with the decline in US regional influence and China’s ascendance that occurred during the first Trump administration. Looking forward, Beijing will seek to advance Chinese influence as a reliable partner and stabilizing presence amid widespread regional and global uncertainties caused by growing economic protectionism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and perceived negative implications of a second Trump administration.
Topic:
Leadership, Strategic Competition, Influence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

645. Preparing for Realignment

Author:
Akhil Ramesh
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In 2021, when President Biden took office, the US-India relationship was riding on the positive momentum created by successive US presidents since President George W Bush. Over the four years of the Biden administration, with few positive developments and several other tensions, the partnership was stress-tested across domains. For watchers of the US-India bilateral partnership, the Biden administration’s denouement vis-a-vis the partnership with India was disappointing and underwhelming. While several key supply chain diversification initiatives materialized, issues surrounding India’s position toward Russia—in the aftermath of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine—its alleged involvement in the killing of a Khalistan separatist and lastly Washington’s position on the interim government in Bangladesh highlighted the divergences between the two democracies. For the US-India partnership, President Biden’s term in office could be described as one that alienated an already allyship/treaty-averse India, pushing it further into groupings such as BRICS and other emerging non-Western multilateral institutions. The last eight months were no different. Nonetheless, domestic political developments in both India and the US could potentially set the stage for a recourse in the spiraling US-India bilateral partnership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

646. The Worst Angels of Our Nature

Author:
Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last several reporting periods of Comparative Connections have featured little drama in US relations with the two Koreas. A lot of important changes happened—a burgeoning Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral, Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear weapons program, etc.—but these developments were mostly incremental. However, the June-December 2024 reporting period—the final Comparative Connections—has featured bombshells, both metaphorically and literally. The most spectacular event was South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol going full rogue authoritarian and recklessly declaring martial law at 11pm on December 3 in order to carry out a military “self-coup d’état.” That is, Yoon annulled democratic processes and civil constitutional protections, arrogated all political and executive power to himself and the military, and attempted to suspend the national assembly. This shocking step toward tyranny—considered long-relegated to the distant past of South Korea’s developmental dictatorships of the 1950s-1980s—was as badly conceived as it was executed, farcically falling apart after less than three hours, when legislators (mostly from the opposition) breached the cordon of deployed soldiers around the national assembly, entered the plenary chamber, and voted 190-0 to revoke the martial law decree.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Domestic Politics, Coup, Donald Trump, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

647. Trump’s Return Scrambles Outlook

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports. Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

648. Once Again, Leadership Transitions Challenge US-Japan Alliance

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

649. Regional Overview: The Year of Elections (Finally) Ends

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest). While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government. Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

650. Spring 2024 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS SUREN TADEVOSYAN BALANCING POWERS: AZERBAIJAN’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AMIDST REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES ………………………….. 6 TIANPING CHE JAPAN JOINS AUKUS: MOTIVATIONS, PROGRESS, AND IMPACT ..………. 22 KNARIK SARGSYAN BETWEEN BLOCS AND BLOCKADES: QATAR’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC MANEUVERS ……………………………….……………….. 44 GUO SONG THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE ………………….…………... 64 BOOK REVIEW: ARTYOM TONOYAN AHMED ZAHID SHAHAB AND ALI AKBAR. (2023). IRAN’S SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ……………………………….………………. 84
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Role Conceptions, AUKUS, Regional Security, Alliance, GCC, Diplomacy, Security, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Eurasia, Japan, Asia, United States of America, Qatar, Gulf Nations, Middle East, Palestine, and Israel