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162. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East
- Author:
- Jon Hoffman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
163. Sanctuaries, Islands, and Deserts: A Typology of Regionalized Abortion Policy
- Author:
- Payton Gannon and Danielle Pullan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
- Abstract:
- This paper elaborates a typology of regionalized abortion policy based on a comparative case study of Italy and the United States. Italy originally legalized abortion in 1978 and has seen little effort to modify the law since. Contrastingly, the United States’ abortion landscape has been in near constant flux since 1974, when, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion. This became even more unstable in 2022 when the Supreme Court overruled Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health and held there is no constitutional right to abortion. Despite their differences in national abortion policy, both Italy and the US have regionalized the implementation of their abortion policies. Italy’s law is national, but implementation is interpreted differently at the regional level. Since Dobbs, US states have proposed and passed many laws about abortion, creating even greater regional variation than before. We propose a typology of regionalized abortion access: “Sanctuaries” where abortion is most protected and available; “Islands” with liberal policies that are surrounded by more restrictive territories; and “Deserts” with minimal abortion access. Through qualitative analysis of policies, political activities, and firsthand accounts by abortion providers and advocates working in places of each type, we then highlight the long-term implications of each of these components of the typology, analyzing the ways that they impact abortion providers and patients.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Health Care Policy, Abortion, and Regionalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America
164. The Future of the 'Special Relationship'
- Author:
- Kim Darroch and Evie Aspinall
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
- Abstract:
- Since Winston Churchill first coined the term in 1946, successive American Presidents and Prime Ministers have hailed the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States. For over 80 years, the exceptionally close political, diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence relationship between the two countries has endured changes of government, the end of the Cold War, the ‘War on Terror’, and globalisation. In the week that Donald Trump returned to the White House, the former British Ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, the Director of the British Foreign Policy Group, Evie Aspinall, and Dr James Ellison explored the future of Anglo-American relations. With tariffs looming and Elon Musk waging war on the Starmer government, they asked how should Britain handle this relationship - and explored the challenges it will face over the coming years.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America
165. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Simona Grano
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
166. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States
- Author:
- Lyle Morris
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
167. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world
- Author:
- Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
- Political Geography:
- Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
168. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS
- Author:
- Sophia Gaston
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America
169. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy
- Author:
- Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
- Political Geography:
- North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
170. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia
- Author:
- Rodrigo Duton
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
- Topic:
- National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific and United States of America
171. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit
- Author:
- Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
- Topic:
- NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
172. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
173. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations
- Author:
- Thomas Eder
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
- Topic:
- Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
174. Bro-Politics in Action: Trump and the “Personalization” of Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Ádám Csobánci
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Congratulations poured in from European heads of state and government as soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was turning U.S. battleground states red and winning the presidential election last November. Many presidents and prime ministers posted selfies and pictures with Trump, emphasizing their strong personal relationship and shared history. While congratulations to the new President might seem like standard diplomatic courtesy, the enthusiasm for the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels appears less than sincere, given their rather complicated relationships with the first Trump administration. In contrast, leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who described Trump’s victory as "the biggest comeback in Western political history" and forecasted a golden era in US-Hungarian relations, expressed a strong eagerness to collaborate on shared goals. Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised the "unshakable alliance" between Italy and the U.S., demonstrating clear support for Trump’s win. Recognizing the heightened importance of personal relationships in dealing with Trump and his administration, European leaders are hoping to establish strong personal ties with the President. This trend report predicts how in 2025 further “personalization” of foreign policy is to be expected from the next U.S. administration. I present, through the examples of Orbán and Meloni, that European leaders already possessing close ties with the next U.S. president or his inner circle might have a significant head start to influence Trump’s Europe policy, with far-reaching consequences. Europeans who were not in power during Trump’s first term are pressed for time because the start of his new presidency is expected to bring rapid and aggressive policy changes. With the Republican Party controlling all branches of government, Trump’s administration will likely prioritize advancing its agenda swiftly, particularly before the midterm elections in 2026, when Congressional support could wane. For European leaders who are new to office or lacked strong ties with Trump previously, this creates urgency. They have strong incentives to build closer relations with his administration, whether due to shared ideologies or fears of trade tariffs; however, they face a glaring challenge. They will have to compete for Trump’s very limited time, attention and interest, as European affairs are unlikely to be a top priority for the new administration.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Personalization
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
175. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, North America, and United States of America
176. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future
- Author:
- Yam Atir
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
177. Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The Current Landscape
- Author:
- Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns, and Ai Takahashi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3 While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development. In the remainder of this brief, we summarize the hydrogen policy landscape in the United States and European Union (EU), concluding with an examination of the causes of demand-side stagnation in the clean hydrogen market.
- Topic:
- Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Regulation, Public Policy, and Hydrogen
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus, United States of America, and European Union
178. Trump and the future of transatlantic relations
- Author:
- Mikkel Runge Olesen and Jakob Linnet Schmidt
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- A widespread view in Europe is that the US is becoming more a necessary partner than an ally or a friend. Lack of confidence that the US will defend Europe is as powerful a driver for increased European defence spending as pressure from the US. Due to the breach of trust, transatlantic relations are unlikely to be normalised after Trump.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
179. Tariff Tensions: Redefining Washington-New Delhi Relations
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The strategic partnership between the United States and India faces a critical juncture as recent developments strain their ties. On August 15, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for national self-reliance in trade and foreign exchange, a response to high tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump's administration on Indian imports.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Imports, and Narendra Modi
- Political Geography:
- South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America
180. Geography and Energy: The US-Central Asia Partnership in Critical Minerals
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting President Donald Trump's recognition of the national security risks posed by China's dominance over global supply chains in this sector. Following the approach of previous administrations, the current leadership has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers to diversify American access to these vital resources. The focus has now turned to the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in minerals essential for energy and defense technologies. Through two primary frameworks, the U.S. has begun exploring Central Asia's untapped critical mineral wealth: the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), alongside a series of bilateral memorandums of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambition does not necessarily align with the logistical challenges of emerging supply chains in Central Asia. In response to these complexities, analysts Haley Nelson and Natalia Stroz published a report with the Atlantic Council titled "Central Asia's geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership."
- Topic:
- Partnerships, Energy, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Central Asia, North America, and United States of America