Search

Begin New Search Political Geography United States of America Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 1 Year

101. The Impacts of Parole Supervision

Author:
Luke Brinkman, Andrew Jordan, and Derek Neal
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In 2021, Illinois passed the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today Act, commonly known as the SAFE‑T Act. This legislation received significant national attention because it ended cash bail in Illinois and included numerous reforms to the supervision of prisoners upon their release. In Illinois, most exiting prisoners serve a period of mandatory supervised release (MSR), which is similar to parole supervision in other states. The original SAFE‑T Act modified MSR terms for many parolees, and Illinois amended the law on December 6, 2022, creating a natural policy experiment. During the six months preceding this date, the state assigned a large group of released prisoners to one year of supervision. This group contained prisoners sentenced for both serious offenses (Classes 1 and 2) and lesser offenses (Classes 3 and 4). However, starting on January 1, 2023, the state assigned released prisoners in Classes 3 and 4 to six months of MSR.
Topic:
Crime, Law Enforcement, Incarceration, and Parole
Political Geography:
North America, Illinois, and United States of America

102. Immigration Restrictions and Natives’ Intergenerational Mobility: Evidence from the 1920s US Quota Acts

Author:
James Feigenbaum, Yi-Ju Hung, Marco Tabellini, and Monia Tomasella
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Immigration policy has emerged as a focal point of political debate in many advanced economies. Proposals to curtail immigration are frequently justified on economic grounds. Some argue that immigrants increase competition in local labor markets, depress wages for native workers, and strain public resources. Research has increasingly sought to evaluate the consequences of immigration restrictions on economic growth, employment, and wages. While these studies have deepened our understanding of the shorter-run effects of immigration policy on labor markets, we know less about its implications for future generations of native-born workers. This question is especially important because immigration restrictions often persist for decades once enacted.
Topic:
Economy, Immigration Policy, Social Mobility, and Quota
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

103. The Macroeconomic Effects of Tariffs: Insights from 180 Years of US Trade Policy

Author:
Tamar den Besten, Diego R. Känzig, Régis Barnichon, and Aayush Singh
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The sharp increase in US tariff rates in 2025 has renewed interest in the macroeconomic effects of tariffs. Yet surprisingly little evidence exists on this topic. Most studies rely on post–World War II data—a period with relatively modest movements in average tariff rates—and focus on narrow outcomes, such as relative price changes, industry-level effects, or bilateral trade flows. Consequently, the aggregate effects of tariffs on output, prices, and trade are less well understood.
Topic:
Economy, Tariffs, Macroeconomics, Trade Policy, and Industry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

104. The Incidence of Tariffs: Rates and Reality

Author:
Gita Gopinath and Brent Neiman
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Statutory tariff rates on US imports recently reached levels not seen in more than 100 years. By the end of 2025, the average statutory rate (weighted by the volume of trade subject to each rate) was 26 percent. Imports from 171 countries, accounting for more than 70 percent of all US imports, faced higher tariffs than at the end of 2024.
Topic:
Economy, Tariffs, Manufacturing, Trade, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

105. The global sovereign citizen movement

Author:
Lydia Khalil and Keiran Hardy
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The sovereign citizen movement has spread from the United States to more than 26 countries globally. Covid restrictions and digital networks accelerated its growth and created dangerous intersections with other conspiracy movements. The sovereign citizen movement has grown beyond a nuisance, escalating into a national security challenge for many countries around the world. The transnational threat of the movement requires multilateral intelligence coordination, online interventions to counter influencers, narratives, and networks, and globally informed threat assessments.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Social Media, Conspiracy Theory, Political Extremism, and Sovereign Citizens
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

106. Marriage as Insurance: Household Responses to Immigration Policy Uncertainty

Author:
Cristian Bonavida
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
This paper examines whether marriage serves as a strategic response to immigration policy uncertainty. We study transitions into marriage among cohabiting binational couples—defined as unions between a U.S. citizen and a noncitizen partner—following the shift in immigration policy expectations during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and the subsequent tightening of enforcement in 2017. Using ACS data from 2008 to 2019 and a difference-in-differences design, we compare marriage transitions among binational couples to those of homogeneous citizen couples. Immigration policy uncertainty increased marriage rates among binational couples by approximately 1.5–1.8 percentage points, or about 8-10 percent relative to pre-treatment levels. Event-study estimates show no differential pre-trends and indicate that the response began in 2016, prior to the formal reinstatement of Secure Communities. The effect is concentrated among likely unauthorized immigrants and individuals from targeted nationalities. The findings suggest that marriage functioned as a form of legal and economic insurance in response to heightened deportation risk.
Topic:
Economics, Marriage, Household, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

107. Beyond the Iron Curtain: Prof Patrick Porter and Sophia Gaston

Author:
Patrick Porter and Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
5 March 2026 marks the eightieth anniversary of Winston Churchill's landmark address in Fulton, Missouri. We remember it as the "Iron Curtain" speech, in which Churchill called the United States and the West to the barricades against Soviet communism. Today's Atlanticists might be tempted to see it as a monument to greater days, of transatlantic cooperation, moral clarity and solidarity between democracies. But the title of the speech was "The Sinews of Peace." Churchill used it not just to sound a note of alarm about Moscow, but to appeal for something constructive, urging America to accept the baton of leadership over the Old World. He spoke to an America he feared was erratic, ruthless and unreliable. His speech divided Americans, for whom the very notion of an alliance with Britain was still contentious. In this lecture, Professor Patrick Porter (Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham, and the author of Blunder: Britain's War in Iraq) and Sophia Gaston marked 80 years since Churchill’s momentous address. Can his speech help Europe and the United States renegotiate their ‘special’ relationship under today's darkening sky?
Topic:
Cold War, Transatlantic Relations, Soviet Union, and Winston Churchill
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and United States of America

108. 'Trade is in our Blood': Momentum Builds in Asia for Expanding Rules-based Economic Cooperation

Author:
Jane Mellsop
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The trade world experienced unprecedented upheaval in 2025, but Asia still sees the rules-based trading system as the strongest foundation for its future. Trade is “in the blood” in Asia, and these countries continue to forge ahead with trade arrangements with multiple partners—so-called plurilateral trade arrangements—to further integrate their economies, provide certainty for businesses, promote innovation, and enhance economic growth. However, it has not been all smooth sailing, particularly at a time when evolving trade policy of the United States is demanding significant attention from all economies. Regional plurilateral agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 12 parties and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 parties, have brought benefits to their members; however, to remain relevant, they need to be updated to keep pace with emerging developments. For the CPTPP, this has not been easy given its broad membership with diverse interests that hampers progress toward consensus on ambitious upgrades. Expanding the membership of these agreements or even instituting novel dialogues with other trading blocs as the CPTPP has started with the EU and ASEAN, not only provides opportunities to access new markets and expand integration but also sends an important signal in support of rules-based trade at this critical time. Asia should not be complacent with the trade rules already in place. The region would benefit from harnessing the current moment when countries are focused on diversifying markets and suppliers to pursue new plurilateral cooperation and agreements in specific sectors, or to address specific trade challenges, such as critical minerals, an economic security framework, or green technology. The first two of these in particular are of interest to the current U.S. administration, though Asian countries would also need to consider how China might view any new arrangements. Importantly, countries are more willing now to consider formats other than legally binding comprehensive agreements to support greater economic integration with like-minded partners, such as agreed principles, guidelines, or concrete areas of cooperation to unlock trade and bring benefits to stakeholders, such as the new Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP). While the current global trading context provides impetus for progressing plurilateral initiatives that deepen economic integration among partners, one challenge is the lack of an obvious leader in the region—country or person—to drive such initiatives forward. A group of like-minded countries, such as Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore, could step up and lead the charge in support of increased plurilateral integration and the rules-based system. However, even with the best of intentions, countries will be constrained by their own limited resources for trade negotiations and implementation, while developing countries in particular need capacity building, including from high-quality investments, to make any trade deal successful. This report shares these insights and more from roundtable discussions and interviews with more than 60 experts from both inside and outside government from across Asia and the United States on how like-minded countries can preserve and enhance the rules-based trading system through plurilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and United States of America

109. Scam Offensives in Southeast Asia: Comparing Beijing's and Washington's Strategies and Assessing Opportunities for Coordination

Author:
Bryanna Entwhistle
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Disrupting Asia’s cyber scam industry, which is valued at between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion annually, presents a rare point of mutual interest for the United States and China. Both Chinese and American citizens are both primary targets of complex online fraud schemes run predominantly out of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. To identify where opportunities for cooperation on addressing the issue exist for the United States and China, this paper examines the nature of Beijing's crackdowns on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia, when Beijing chooses to act, and how. It identifies three core factors driving Chinese action: domestic pressure, reputational damage, and national security concerns. Where these factors converge, as in Myanmar, Beijing has acted swiftly and forcefully. Where reputational pressure collides with countervailing strategic interests, as in Cambodia, Beijing's pressure has been delayed but has grown over time. And where none of the three factors materially apply, as in Laos, Beijing has yet to move against major actors. When Beijing does act, it leverages bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks to conduct joint operations and intelligence gathering with its Southeast Asian partners. Framed under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), these mechanisms have broadened the country’s security relationships across the region—although partner states have not always welcomed Beijing's inroads. As Beijing conducted raids against scam centers in Myanmar, the industry began redirecting its targeting toward the West: American losses to China-linked criminal groups grew to $10 billion per year by 2024. Washington has responded with a cross-departmental campaign of sanctions, indictments, asset seizures, and takedowns of scam-enabling online infrastructure. Still, the U.S. response is hampered by limited operational capacity on the ground in Southeast Asia and the "whack-a-mole" nature of the industry. Concerns about China’s GSI expansion, intelligence sharing sensitivities, host-state political economies, and Beijing’s treatment of trafficked workers are substantial obstacles that stand in the way of U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Still, bounded cooperation has the potential to serve the interests of both Beijing and Washington. There appears to be recognition of this on the ministerial level: FBI Director Kash Patel has traveled to Beijing twice in the past year to discuss expanding coordination on tackling cyber scams with China, alongside several other forms of transnational crime. In April, the United States, China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates organized a joint raid on scam centers in Dubai; however, misaligned incentives and strategic distrust have thus far stood in the way of further law enforcement coordination between Beijing and Washington. In support of future law enforcement coordination between China and the United States that takes into account existing obstacles rather than ignoring them, this paper draws on an understanding of Beijing’s cyber scam offensive in Southeast Asia to propose the following recommendations for how Washington could pursue tactical and bounded coordination on the issue: Push for leader-to-leader engagement, drawing on lessons from the fentanyl negotiations; Utilize third countries to mediate and coordinate joint raids and intelligence sharing; Approach Beijing with intelligence-backed asks; Leverage existing channels to facilitate financial intelligence sharing; and Continue using sanctions and indictments to incentivize Beijing to recall key actors.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Fraud, Intelligence Sharing, and Scam Centers
Political Geography:
China, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America

110. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry

Author:
Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

111. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

112. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity

Author:
Sungmin Cho
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

113. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

114. Seeking Agency in Uncertainty: Asian Middle Powers and the Fragmenting Global Order

Author:
Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The concept of middle powers is not new. What is new, however, is the speed, coordination, and strategic intent with which middle powers, across Asia and the West, are recalibrating their foreign policies. This acceleration reflects growing uncertainty in the global system: the perceived drift and unpredictability of U.S. leadership under the Trump 2.0 administration, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and the fragmentation of the post–Cold War order. Countries increasingly find themselves navigating between two systemic pressures: avoiding entrapment in great power rivalries and safeguarding national autonomy, economic resilience, and security interests. In this emerging order, resistant to simple bipolar or multipolar labels, middle powers are neither passive balancers nor quiet bystanders. They are actively constructing a dense network of partnerships, pursuing selective alignments, and diversifying strategic dependencies. Rather than choosing sides, many are hedging to secure national interests: deepening security ties with Washington while sustaining economic engagement with Beijing, expanding mini-lateral frameworks, and strengthening cross-regional linkages that reduce overreliance on any single pole of power. The growing emphasis on economic security, supply chain resilience, technological cooperation, and defense interoperability reflects a broader shift from ideological alignment to pragmatic, interest-driven statecraft. This paper revisits the concept of Asian middle power diplomacy and assesses the forces driving today’s intensified hedging behavior. It examines why urgency around partnerships and alliance diversification has increased, not only among key Asian middle powers themselves but also in their expanding engagement with actors such as the Gulf states, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Through select country-by-country analysis, the paper evaluates how leading middle powers, in both Asia and beyond, are redefining strategic autonomy, which partnerships warrant close attention, and how these evolving alignments are reshaping the contours of the global order. Finally, it assesses the implications of a more assertive, networked middle power landscape for the United States, and what a strengthened middle power layering means for the future architecture of international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, International Order, Hedging, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

115. Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure

Author:
Meghan Morris and Sheng-wen Cheng
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In March 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accepted an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7–12—the first such visit by a sitting KMT chair since 2016. The visit presents both challenges and opportunities for Cheng, who is seeking greater dialogue and stability with China. It also comes just weeks before a scheduled major summit between President Trump and Xi in May and introduces new variables for all three leaders. For Xi, the symbolism of him and Cheng possibly meeting face-to-face to “mend fences” could portray an image of cross-Strait unity that could strengthen Xi’s hand in discussions with Trump. For Cheng, a successful China trip could bolster her political standing among the KMT base in Taiwan, but could also alienate opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters and swing voters, who may view Cheng as “selling out” Taiwan’s sovereignty in pursuit of easing tensions with mainland China. Finally, for Trump, the visit could complicate Washington’s relations with China. Trump will have to walk an even more delicate tightrope of signaling the United States’ enduring “One China” policy with Xi, while responding to the inevitable message from Xi that cross-Straits are “stabilizing” and that the United States should not intervene in the “internal matters of China.” Given this context, this paper seeks to examine the rise of Cheng Li-wun in Taiwanese politics and implications for her domestic, international, and cross-Strait agenda. We argue that while Cheng’s victory as KMT chair signals symbolic change, it has yet to translate into institutional renewal or political legitimacy. Her early appointments of KMT vice chairs suggest continuity rather than transformation—raising questions about whether the KMT is broadening or narrowing appeal within a younger electoral base. It also contends that Cheng’s rhetoric on China and the United States—calling for deeper alignment and accommodation with Beijing while simultaneously casting doubt on the value of Taiwan’s security ties with Washington—positions Cheng to potentially alter the trajectory of cross-Strait ties if the KMT achieves a majority victory in the 2028 presidential elections.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

116. Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.–China relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade, moving from deep interdependence to strategic rivalry, and, meanwhile, China’s policy toward the United States has transformed under Xi Jinping. China’s policymaking mechanism has also evolved, and understanding this shift is critical to understanding the broader U.S.–China relationship. This article examines China’s U.S. policymaking and policy consultation system under Xi Jinping. How does policy consultation on foreign relations work in China? What are the most influential policy research institutions in China's America watch? How do they influence China's U.S. policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

117. Polar security: Strategic competition at the ends of the Earth

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Arctic and Antarctica were strategic theatres in which the Cold War played out, but they were also regions in which concerted efforts were made to bring together the rival superpowers. The polar regions became beacons of global cooperation, Cold War East-West dialogue and best practice statecraft. Today, the polar regions host new ‘players’ or stakeholders and are shaped by increasingly novel forces. The dynamics at the ends of the earth have clearly changed, and the fragile status-quo born from our Cold War system of managing state power (and ambitions) is incredibly brittle. Our polar regions require a modernised system or framework to manage strategic competition, to facilitate the ebbs and flows of geopolitics: the organic state of play between powers. Canberra has enduring, albeit under recognised, national security interests in the polar domains. Australia’s strategic interests in the polar regions will only be protected through enhanced physical presence, deeper security partnerships, and credible investment in deterrent capabilities. Blind faith in liberal institutionalism is no longer an option; indeed, as this report argues, this approach increasingly appears to sustain competitor national interests at the expense of our own. In the Arctic and Antarctica, Canberra confronts a more assertive, and broadly revisionist, strategic climate. Business as usual at either end of the earth will not suffice in this new normal. We need a more holistic approach. With fragmentation and erosion of the specific governance forums and systems in place in the polar regions, it is crucial Canberra leads middle power stakeholders in mounting a collective stand to salvage and ideally, modernise the status quo for Antarctica and the Arctic. Resource insecurity, renewed strategic competition, and environmental change are converging at the poles, determining the future of the Arctic and Antarctica and this Report illustrates why this trinity matters for Canberra.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Cold War, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

118. From the old world to the new: Why German rearmament matters for Australia

Author:
Carl Janz
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
When then chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz delivered the famous Zeitenwende (epochal shift) speech outlining the urgent need for change in defence and security policy as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he presided over a military that reportedly struggled to participate in even basic NATO operations. Today by contrast, Germany is the world’s fourth largest military spender and has committed to military and industrial uplift with zeal. This ASPI Explainer explores the factors driving Germany’s rearmament, its implications for Australia, potential barriers to implementation, and transferable takeaways. It concludes that Germany’s rearmament efforts are set to make the country an increasingly valuable global partner for Australia as the two countries pursue a Status of Forces Agreement. If successfully executed in tandem with its European partners, German rearmament will help establish an increasingly independent European liberal-democratic pole in global politics and will allow the United States to increase its focus on the Indo-Pacific. These developments support Australian interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rearmament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, Australia, and United States of America

119. Markets as the new front line: fusing Australia’s economic statecraft

Author:
James Tennant, James Corera, Alice Hudson, and John Coyne
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Episodes over the past decade—including China’s trade measures against Australia and Japan, Russia’s manipulation of European gas supplies, and the tightening of global controls over critical minerals—demonstrate how economic levers are being used to impose costs and reshape incentives without crossing traditional thresholds of conflict. This has included for the purposes of coercing nations into tolerating military aggression, cyber-attacks and foreign interference, or particularly in the case of China also creating monopolitistic dependencies. More recently, the US has employed overt economic instruments, such as tariffs, as tools of strategic leverage and industrial policy—underscoring not an equivalence of intent or method, but the extent to which the use of markets for geopolitical ends is becoming embedded across the international system. Australia isn’t starting from scratch in responding to these market realities, with substantial foundations already in place. Australia’s challenge isn’t necessarily creating new instruments, nor simply coordinating disparate capabilities across government departments, agencies or sectors of the economy. Rather, the task is to embed deeper integration and fusion of the tools and capabilities that already exist. This report argues that doing so requires strengthening the connective tissue between policy, intelligence, economic and security functions so that information flows more freely, preparedness is built collectively, and joint capabilities can be brought to bear under pressure. In practice, this means a system better able to anticipate pressure, absorb shocks and align economic and security decision-making in more ways that reinforce Australia’s long-term resilience—while operating at speed and across multiple fronts concurrently. Ultimately, in a system as complex and contested as today’s global economy, this report suggests that success depends on clear strategy, disciplined escalation thresholds and integrated decision-making. When nations fail to align intent, tools and execution, they do more than miss opportunities—they risk ceding ground by default. The recommendations set out in this report offer Australia a way to integrate the strengths it already has—its institutions, regulations, alliances and industrial strengths—into a genuinely national capability for economic statecraft, better allowing Australia to act in time, with purpose, and on its own terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Economy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

120. Disruption and opportunity: Australia and critical minerals in a changing global order

Author:
Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In a world defined by accelerating geo‑economic competition aimed at reducing China’s control of critical‑minerals markets and supply chains, Australia’s critical‑minerals ambitions hinge on a powerful but tenuous assumption: that the nation will evolve into a major supplier to the US—its largest investment partner and most consequential strategic ally. Yet today’s market dynamics, policy fragmentation among partners and the US’s own inward‑looking minerals strategy mean that outcome is far from guaranteed. What is clear, however, is that Australia enters this contest with world‑leading geological endowments, a global footprint of successful mining operations, and hard‑won capabilities built over more than 60 years of modern mining and processing. Australian companies aren’t just domestic producers—they’re global investors, operators and technology leaders. Demand for their products is only rising as the energy transition, digitisation, automation and defence modernisation accelerate. But market opportunity alone is no longer enough. Australia’s ability to convert its mineral strength into strategic advantage is being tested by volatile global prices—often shaped by market manipulation—contradictory policies among like‑minded nations and rising competition from other mineral‑rich nations. Domestically, high construction and energy costs, an uncompetitive company tax system, acute skills shortages, regulatory uncertainty and long approval timelines threaten to blunt Australia’s competitive edge. At the same time, commercial and security partners across Europe, Asia and North America increasingly look to Australia not only for resources but also for leadership—technical, environmental, commercial and strategic. Many countries, along with the EU, have signed agreements with Australia to build more secure, sustainable and diversified critical‑minerals supply chains. This report argues that Australia must now pivot from signing partnerships to fully activating them. That means prioritising the like-minded partners and markets where real supply‑chain integration and volume markets are achievable. China, however, will remain an indispensable market for Australian minerals. Crucially, Australia must recalibrate its approach to onshoring. Policies built solely around domestic downstream ambitions risk underestimating the reality of global supply chains and overestimating Australia’s cost competitiveness. The more strategic path is to position Australia as a dominant force across multi‑node critical‑minerals supply chains—linking Australian concentrates and intermediate products, production of Australian companies operating abroad, trusted partners’ processing, manufacturing and technology ecosystems, and of course end users. To seize this moment, Australia should also restore the predictability and competitiveness of its own investment environment. Ultimately, the choice before Australia isn’t whether to be a critical‑minerals superpower—it’s whether to be an indispensable node in the world’s most important supply chains. That requires ambition, disciplined policymaking, deeper strategic partnerships and a relentless focus on execution.
Topic:
European Union, Artificial Intelligence, Research and Development, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

121. Declining US Support for Israel: From Bipartisan Consensus to Generational Fracture

Author:
Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2026, US–Israeli relations will remain strategically close, but a key long-term shift is underway: broad US public legitimacy for Israel is eroding, especially among Democrats and younger cohorts. Polling data indicates a sharp decline in Israel favorability and growing opposition to additional military and economic aid, with signs that skepticism is spreading beyond Democratic voters. In the short term, policy change will likely remain limited due to entrenched elite consensus and institutional ties, but extraordinary or escalatory support is becoming increasingly politically costly. Over time, declining public legitimacy and shifting strategic priorities may contribute to a gradual erosion of US diplomatic and military backing, with wider implications for regional security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

122. Move Fast and Scale: A Brief Insiders' History of the Replicator Initiative

Author:
Kathleen Hicks and Aaron Sherman
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks and former Speechwriter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Aaron Sherman provide an insider account of the Replicator Initiative, tracing its origins, purpose, early implementation, and preliminary outcomes. This initiative to rapidly scale needed military capabilities offers important lessons for reform, from goal-setting and aligning incentives to implementation, feedback, and iteration.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Military Affairs, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

123. Climate, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council

Author:
Helene Maria Kyed and Justine Chambers
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Climate, peace and security (CPS) is a recurring topic of debate within the UN Security Council (UNSC) that, despite never achieving a formal thematic mandate, has advanced with the support of a majority of council members since 2011 and is now reflected in 11 missions. CPS engagement in the UNSC rests on an understanding that the impacts of climate change deepen vulnerabilities that can aggravate existing threats to international peace and security, placing the issue within the UNSC’s charter-given mandate. CPS-supportive council members also acknowledge that climate impacts challenge UN peacekeeping operations and that addressing climate change is important to both peacebuilding efforts and the conflict prevention mandate of the UNSC. The existential threat that sea-level rise poses to low-lying coastal states is another recurring topic. As an elected member of the UNSC (2025-2026), Denmark has positioned itself as a champion of CPS, aligned with one of its three thematic priorities. In 2025, Denmark co-chaired with Sierra Leone the Joint Pledges on CPS – an initiative launched in 2023 to put a spotlight on CPS in the UNSC’s thematic and geographic meetings, resolutions, mission mandates and analyses. Denmark also stressed climate-related risks in the context of Yemen during its March 2025 presidency and later played a role in retaining CPS-language in the mandate renewal of the UN mission in South Sudan. It has collaborated on events, linking CPS to the protection of civilians, peace operations and the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda. These efforts unfold in a challenging political environment, marked by funding cuts to UN missions and a renewed focus on rearmament and hard-security priorities that risk underprioritizing climate change. While Russia and China have consistently opposed placing climate-related issues under the UNSC’s remit, the US’s recent withdrawal from CPS-supporting groups in the Council and its exit from the Paris Agreement have heightened the risk of eroding progress on CPS.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Geopolitics, Peace, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

124. American ambitions in Greenland pose key dilemmas for the Kingdom of Denmark in NATO

Author:
Lise Wiederholt Christensen
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The conflict between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the ownership of Greenland has placed the Kingdom under immense pressure. This conflict will have long-lasting consequences for the NATO Alliance and for the Kingdom of Denmark.1 The Greenland–Denmark–US conflict is a strategic shock for the Kingdom of Denmark and its Arctic security policy. The Kingdom of Denmark has been confronted with a potential recalibration of its relationship with its most important Ally, the US, while simultaneously having to establish new relations with the European Allies in the Arctic region. The Kingdom is navigating exceptionally difficult strategic balances that have been accelerated by this crisis, but which will not necessarily disappear in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

125. An Institutional Test: How Did the U.S. Congress Handle the Case of the Anti-Politicization Fund?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Anti-Politicization Fund, valued at about 1.8 billion dollars, sparked a political and legal crisis within the United States, after facing objections from within the Republican Party itself, alongside criticism related to the mechanism of its creation and the uses of its funds. The dispute reached its peak when Republican Senators Thom Tillis and John Cornyn threatened to obstruct the nomination of Todd Blanche for the position of Attorney General, unless he provided written guarantees to permanently abolish the fund and narrow the scope of the protection preventing the IRS from reviewing some of President Trump’s, his family’s, and his companies’ previous tax filings. Under the weight of this pressure, Blanche issued a decision rescinding the order issued in May 2026 under which the fund had been established, ending the impasse with the two senators and prompting them to announce their readiness to support his nomination. However, the abolition of the fund did not fully end the surrounding controversy: questions remained regarding the legal basis for its creation, the weakness of oversight over its funds, the ambiguity of the categories benefiting from it, the legality of the protection granted to Trump and his family, and the possibility of re-establishing the fund in the future.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Republican Party
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

126. Washington’s Influence: The Significance of Taiwan’s Annual Han Kuang 2026 Military Exercises

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 5, 2026, Taiwan launched its annual Han Kuang military exercises, a ten-day event continuing through August 14, with the aim of simulating the country’s response should China resort to force to reclaim the self-governing island, which Beijing considers a territory under its jurisdiction. The drills included combat scenarios for troops and reservists to test how they would respond to a potential attack on the island. Taiwanese military circles described the exercises as “exceptional and the first of their kind,” given their comprehensiveness and the scale of the realistic threats they simulate, in addition to coming at a time of escalating military tensions between Beijing and Taipei, as well as continued disagreements between Washington and Beijing over the Taiwan issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

127. Navigating Disagreement: Why Did the Brazilian President Visit the United States?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On May 6, 2026, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to Washington at the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, seeking to strengthen bilateral relations. The visit coincided with mounting domestic pressures on the Brazilian president, following a series of successive setbacks—most notably a vote by more than two-thirds of Congress members in favor of legislation proposing to reduce sentences handed down against former President Bolsonaro, despite the presidential veto, and the Senate’s rejection of da Silva’s nominee for the Supreme Court—the first time in decades that a president’s choice for the Court had been turned down. Those reverses gave fresh momentum to Bolsonaro’s son as a leading presidential contender in the 2026 elections, even as da Silva’s capacity to advance his domestic agenda showed signs of strain. Complicating the picture further were a number of unresolved Brazilian-American tensions, set against a turbulent international and regional backdrop marked by escalating U.S.–Chinese competition in Latin America, a dynamic that rendered the visit a practical test of Brazil’s ability to balance its rapprochement with Washington against its commitments to Beijing within the BRICS framework. Against that backdrop, the analysis that follows traces the most significant points of friction in Brazilian-American relations in recent times, examines the motives behind the visit and its anticipated outcomes, and assesses the potential repercussions for the wider region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Lula da Silva
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and United States of America

128. Escalating Pressure: Where Is Washington’s Cuba Strategy Heading?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
May 2026 did not pass without the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump adding a new layer to its policy of maximum pressure on Cuba. American measures unfolded as a graduated campaign aimed at simultaneously choking the island’s political, economic, and security structures. Cuba is gaining increasing importance in American strategic calculations due to its sensitive geographic location and close relations with both Russia and China. Washington now treats the island as a security and geopolitical challenge extending well beyond its borders. Recent developments accordingly raise questions about the motives behind American escalation, its strategic dimensions, and the possible scenarios for the future of the crisis between Washington and Havana.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Cuba and United States of America

129. Conflict and Its Reverberations: The Iran War and Its Implications for the Balance of Power in Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Now entering its fourth consecutive week, the American-Israeli operation against Iran continues to generate mounting regional and international repercussions — not least of which are growing concerns over its implications for Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific (the Indian and Pacific Oceans). A number of observers have raised the prospect that a prolonged Middle East campaign could prompt a “temporary” American strategic redeployment away from the Indo-Pacific and toward the region of active conflict.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

130. The Architecture of Power: The Dollar, Financialisation, and the Struggle for Sovereignty

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
The role of the dollar as the principal currency of exchange in world trade grants the United States exorbitant power. This dossier examines the rise of this currency, the mechanisms of its domination, and the structural limits to building an alternative to the dollar.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Socialism/Marxism, Capitalism, Currency, Financialisation, and Dollar
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

131. Coercive Extractivism: The mechanics of Trump’s transactional approach to Europe

Author:
Rem Korteweg and Diederick van Wijk
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
US foreign policy towards Europe is increasingly transactional and there is growing European awareness that the continent is too dependent on the United States. This report introduces the concept of ‘coercive extractivism’ to describe the current US administration’s transactional approach to Europe. In coercive extractivism, the United States leverages Europe’s economic and security dependencies to extract economic, regulatory or geopolitical benefits and concessions. Resource-poor, regulation-heavy, politically divided and marked by years of underinvestment in its own military capabilities, Europe is particularly vulnerable to this dynamic. The US administration’s recent threat to apply economic leverage in pursuit of its ambitions to annex Greenland was a clear example, but the same dynamic applies elsewhere. The US has leverage over Europe in a number of policy areas, and a wide range of demands of Europe, suggesting that coercive extractivism will continue, if not increase. The approach is shaped by several dynamics: • US foreign policy is driven by presidential impulse instead of institutional process, making unpredictability a feature. • Tariffs are a key policy tool to extract concessions. • US policy towards Europe has become a set of repeat bargaining processes, where nothing is permanently settled. • Policy domains and issues are connected, adding multiple layers of unpredictability. • The US seeks the creation of a deals-based order, instead of a rules-based order, however other countries are unlikely to follow suit. • Coercive extractivism generates countervailing forces. The more it is used, the more countries will seek to balance against it. • A transactional US administration is to be preferred over an ideological one. But ideological disagreements are increasingly at the root of US policy towards Europe. If Europe seeks to make itself immune to coercive extractivism, it must take a number of steps. Flattery may yield short-term results, but it is not a durable strategy. Instead, the European Commission and European governments must develop a common approach, articulate red lines, build coalitions of like-minded countries and execute strategies to reduce their lop-sided dependencies on the US. This includes diversifying trade relations, strengthening the European defense industrial base, reducing energy dependence and identifying ways through which to deter US coercion. In the US, European governments should reach out more intensively to state-level administrations and members of Congress to clarify what is at stake as the eighty-year transatlantic partnership erodes under the pressure of US coercive extractivism. Whether Europe is successful remains unclear, and four options for the future of the transatlantic relationship are laid out. In the near-term, coercive extractivism is likely to intensify as Europe enters a period of increased vulnerability as it seeks to reduce its unwanted dependencies on Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Tariffs, Donald Trump, Decision-Making, and Extractivism
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

132. Making Sense of Trump’s Trade Policy

Author:
Peter E. . Harrell
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the logic, objectives, and implications of U.S. trade policy under the second Trump administration. It argues that, despite its apparent volatility, Trump’s trade policy reflects a coherent set of economic and geopolitical goals that mark a sharp break from the post-war rules-based trading order. Tariffs are central to this approach and are used simultaneously as a source of government revenue, a tool to promote reindustrialisation and onshoring, and an instrument of geopolitical competition, particularly vis-à-vis China. Rather than seeking to reform or uphold multilateral trade rules, the administration favours a system of bilateral, transactional agreements focused on concrete outcomes such as investment commitments, production location, and supply chain control. The brief also highlights Trump’s growing use of tariffs as a substitute for sanctions in pursuit of non-trade geopolitical objectives. While the durability of this model remains uncertain, the analysis suggests that a return to the pre-Trump global trade regime is unlikely. Instead, U.S. trade policy is moving toward a more fragmented, outcome-driven, and politicised trading order with lasting implications for allies and the global economy.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

133. All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace? How techno-libertarian ideas shape US power and challenge Europe

Author:
Diederick van Wijk and Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
A small network of US tech leaders has shifted from lobbying government to embedding within it, aligning with the Trump administration on deregulation, rapid AI development, and deeper tech integration into core state functions. The report introduces the GOALS framework — Growth, Optimisation, Automation, Liberty and Salvation — to explain their worldview, which promotes rapid technological expansion and cast democratic oversight as an obstacle. As these ideas shape US foreign policy and global tech infrastructures, the EU faces growing pressure on its digital regulation and autonomy, risking regulatory erosion, tech dependence, and weaker democratic control. The report outlines three strategic priorities for Europe: anchoring technological development in democratic governance, building strategic capacity in critical infrastructures, and developing a distinct techno-political narrative to counter the techno-libertarian model.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Digital Autonomy, and Techno-Libertarianism
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

134. No Longer Ironclad: America and the Transatlantic alliance

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief analyses the implications of the second Trump administration for the transatlantic alliance and European security. It argues that US foreign policy under Trump represents a fundamental departure from the post-war tradition of sustaining a US-led rulesbased order. Instead, the administration embraces a transactional, interest-driven approach that rejects liberal values, questions alliances as assets, and seeks to extract economic and political concessions from partners. While Europe is simultaneously expected to assume greater responsibility for its own security, US security guarantees are no longer perceived as ironclad. The analysis identifies key characteristics of Trump’s foreign policy, including scepticism toward NATO, the decoupling of security and economic cooperation, a deprioritisation of Europe in favour of China and the Western Hemisphere, and reduced US engagement in Ukraine. It concludes that these dynamics increase strategic uncertainty for Europe, weaken deterrence, and heighten the risk of miscalculation. While transatlantic cooperation may persist, the alliance is increasingly strained and may endure more in form than in substance.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

135. Coercive Extractivism: The mechanics of Trump’s transactional approach to Europe

Author:
Rem Korteweg and Diederick van Wijk
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The episode with Greenland was telling. US foreign policy under the Trump administration has become increasingly transactional, raising serious doubts about the transatlantic relationship across Europe. On 17 January 2026, the US president threatened European NATO allies with ten percent tariff walls “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland.” Earlier, eight NATO allies had sent a very limited number of military personnel to Greenland for a reconnaissance mission, in response to the US president’s claims that Greenland was undefended and should therefore become part of the United States. Since coming to office in early 2025, the president had repeatedly made his ambition to annex Greenland clear. It was not the first time the US administration used European dependence on US economic or security ties to twist arms. This Clingendael Report examines the mechanics of Trump’s transactional approach to Europe, where security, economic and regulatory interests are fused in the pursuit of an ‘America First’ agenda. Based on a series of interviews conducted in Washington DC in late 2025, two papers drafted by US experts Max Bergmann and Peter Harrell, and an expert workshop in December 2025, eight key dynamics emerge that define contemporary US transactional policies. This, in turn, leads to a set of recommendations for how the EU and European countries, including the Netherlands, can respond. Europeans should expect President Trump’s transactional approach to continue as his administration aims to extract economic and political concessions from EU capitals. In the short-term, as European governments increasingly express concern about their dependence on the United States and seek to cushion themselves from US coercion, the extractive nature of US transactionalism could in fact intensify. Europe’s vulnerability will only diminish once steps to reduce lop-sided dependencies have materially delivered results. The report concludes with a set of options for how the relationship between Europe and the US could then evolve.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, Donald Trump, Coercion, and Extractivism
Political Geography:
Europe, Greenland, and United States of America

136. AI Diplomacy for a Multipolar World: Policy Brief Europe’s Moment to Act on Trusted AI Partnerships

Author:
Maaike Heijmans and Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
US and Chinese AI models and their embedded normative biases are spreading, without any clear European counterbalance or alternative. The Netherlands and the EU need an AI diplomacy strategy that builds a modular tech offer to safeguard global AI diversity, openness, and democratic governance. By working on AI diplomacy through the EU’s Global Gateway, the Netherlands can also strengthen its own competitiveness and digital development. Dutch technological niches that are in high global demand and make for concrete sectoral offerings include agritech, cybersecurity, healthtech, and edtech.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Netherlands, and United States of America

137. The US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding Opens the Door to Major Regional Transformations

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The US-Iran MOU has generated extensive debate over whether its provisions favour Iran, the US or Israel. However, far less attention has been paid to the nature of the understandings embodied in the agreement, the extent to which the memorandum is binding, and its likely implications for the balance of power across the region.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Regional Politics, Balance of Power, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

138. Why Did the Plan to Bring Iran’s Kurds into the War Collapse Before It Even Began?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The plan to overthrow Iran’s regime relied on certain Kurdish groups before and during the war. But it collapsed before it began due to flawed Israeli and US assessments and a poor understanding of Iran’s Kurdish population and its ties to the Islamic Republic and regional states.
Topic:
Regime Change, Non State Actors, Minorities, Kurds, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

139. The State, Hezbollah and War: Lebanon's Enduring Political Impasse

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Following a series of meetings, Lebanese and Israeli delegations reached a US-backed framework agreement to advance negotiations. However, Lebanon’s internal divisions, Israel’s record of noncompliance, and overlapping regional conflicts complicate any lasting settlement.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and United States of America

140. America, China and the Middle East: Will the Failure in Iran Lead to a Decline in American Power?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
US strategic failure in the Iran war rests on three claims: misreading limits of military power, failing to achieve core war objectives, and allowing the conflict’s effects to spill beyond the Middle East into broader international consequences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

141. Stalemate: A Fragile Balance in the Iran War

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
US efforts to impose demands on Iran by force have failed, while Iran’s attempt to enforce its own terms through selective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has also fallen short. The result is a tense stalemate that could still shift toward renewed escalation or a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Shipping, Armed Conflict, Energy, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

142. Strategic Paralysis and Escalatory Spillover: Applying Warden’s Five Ring Theory in Operation Epic Fury

Author:
Khalid Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Operation Epic Fury, the joint US–Israeli air campaign launched against Iran on 28 February 2026, reflects a doctrinal application of Colonel John Warden’s Five Ring Theory of strategic warfare. Rather than focusing on battlefield attrition, the campaign has adopted an “inside-out” targeting approach aimed at rapidly paralysing the Iranian state by striking leadership structures, critical national systems and infrastructure before engaging fielded forces. The objective is not merely military degradation but systemic collapse of command authority and war-fighting capacity. While the strategy aligns closely with Warden’s theory of strategic paralysis, the campaign carries significant regional risks. Iran’s response has already demonstrated a counter-strategy: expanding the conflict horizontally by targeting economic and energy infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states. The result is an emerging strategic contest between systemic paralysis and regional escalation, with profound implications for global energy security and regional stability.
Topic:
Regime Change, Infrastructure, Regional Security, Energy Security, 2026 Iran War, and Five Ring Theory
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

143. The Iran War Unraveling: Expanding Scope and Ambiguous Objectives

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
One week after its outbreak, the Iran war has expanded in scope and intensity, with rising losses, more targets and increasingly diverse weapons. The warring parties still believe persistence will achieve their aims, and the conflict has not yet reached a point where the costs of continuing outweigh a ceasefire.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Hezbollah, Shipping, Armed Conflict, Energy Security, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, Gulf Nations, and Strait of Hormuz

144. Targeting the Regime: The Second Round of the US–Israeli War on Iran

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Israel and the US launched a new round of war against Iran, concentrating their attacks on the regime’s leadership. They assassinated Supreme Leader Khamenei, struck key state command-and-control centres, called for the emergence of new leadership prepared to accept their terms, and at the same time urged Iranians to overturn their country’s regime.
Topic:
Regime Change, Leadership, Assassination, Ali Khamenei, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

145. Gains and Losses: Assessing the Trajectories of the War on Iran

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The three main parties to the conflict—the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other—have achieved certain gains and suffered setbacks, yet none has reached the conclusion that the expected benefits no longer justify the costs involved.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Regional Security, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

146. On the Brink of War: US and Iranian Calculations in the New Negotiations

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The United States and Iran conducted a new round of negotiations amid US preparations to strike Iran and demands for greater concessions than before.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

147. US National Security Strategy: The Trump Administration’s Vision for the United States and the World

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy marks a shift from post-Cold War US policy, rejecting global hegemony for "America First" realism. It prioritises sovereignty, economic security, reduced intervention, and burden-sharing with allies while focusing on containing China and hemispheric dominance.
Topic:
National Security, Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Economic Security, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
United States of America, North America, and China

148. New Governments, New Opportunities: US Relations with Bangladesh and Nepal Three Months In

Author:
Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In the past two years, Bangladesh and Nepal have experienced significant upheaval in their respective political orders. Both witnessed violence in response to public protests and ousted their leaders. Both transitioned from interim governments and conducted elections with new prime ministers entering office. During roughly the first 100 days of the two governments, both have had the United States reach out through official visits, agreements, and opportunities for future cooperation. In Nepal, Prime Minister Balendra Shah took office in late March, and senior US diplomats sought to engage the new government immediately. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur made a stand-alone trip to Nepal in April. This is notable because trips to the region by US officials usually cover multiple countries and often include India. US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers visited the next month, as did Sergio Gor, US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. News reports suggest that Gor sought a meeting with Prime Minister Shah, who is insisting on a policy of meeting only with ministerial-level or higher-level officials. This was a missed opportunity for Shah to meet with President Trump’s Special Envoy for the region. Shah and his party were elected by many younger voters disillusioned with the previous era of politics, and observers expect his government to demonstrate more creativity and flexibility than previous administrations. Unlike in Nepal, the United States currently has an ambassador posted in Bangladesh, Ambassador Brent Christensen, to facilitate American diplomacy on the ground. After Prime Minister Tarique Rahman entered office in February, Assistant Secretary Kapur visited Bangladesh in early March and discussed a range of economic and security issues. The United States has been Bangladesh’s leading national export market, and US companies are Bangladesh’s largest foreign investors. Meanwhile, Bangladesh ranks among the largest apparel-exporting countries to the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, South Asia, Nepal, and United States of America

149. Changing Tides in the US Approach to Foreign Assistance in the Pacific

Author:
Kelley E. Currie
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Following the dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and dramatic reduction of other foreign assistance programs in 2025, the Trump administration has begun reconstructing foreign assistance programs around an “America First” approach that is tightly focused on national security and economic interests. The small island states of the Pacific have been an early testing ground for this new paradigm. These states are experiencing unique and extreme developmental challenges, including climate-related issues, and are also an intense theater of great power competition due to their strategic geography. Those charged with reconciling US interests and the needs of Pacific Island states within this new model of foreign assistance must be creative, flexible, and consistent, especially as China continues to expand and deepen its presence in the region. As a proving ground for the Trump administration’s new model of foreign assistance, the success or failure of this approach in the Pacific Islands will have important implications for its overall implementation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, Donald Trump, and USAID
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

150. Trumping Venezuela: Six Thoughts on the Political Significance of the US Military Intervention

Author:
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff and Patrick Keller
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The US attack on Venezuela on January 3, 2026, marks a new phase in the foreign and security policy of the Trump administration. In which ideas about a new world order is this policy rooted? What does it mean for Germany and Europe? We offer a six-point assessment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, Donald Trump, Hugo Chavez, and Security Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, South America, Germany, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America