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481. What does Trump's new National Security Strategy mean for the Middle East?

Author:
David Hale and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
In this episode, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Ambassador David Hale joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). Released on December 4, the document outlines the administration’s foreign policy vision, priorities, and approach to global challenges. Ambassador Hale analyzes the new NSS and how it compares to previous US strategy documents. The conversation focuses on what the NSS means for the future of US policy in the Middle East, and how it is likely to be received by regional actors. Recorded on December 9, 2025.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Donald Trump, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

482. Reauthorizing the Defense Production Act in the Era of Defense Mobilization and Supply-side Industrial Policy

Author:
Michael Hikari Cecire
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) is one of the most significant tools the U.S. government uses to mobilize the civilian economy for national defense. As the United States approaches the DPA’s statutory termination and likely reauthorization in 2025, this article surveys its recent employment during the COVID-19 pandemic and potential for policy iteration, assessing its evolution from postwar and early Cold War origins to a broader industrial policy tool. By analyzing DPA usage, legislative actions, and public interest trends, this study aims to extract key lessons from its recent implementation. The article argues that while the DPA has become increasingly central to the government’s industrial policy initiatives, its application has been broadly inconsistent, unevenly coordinated, and insufficiently integrated into broader strategic frameworks. Reauthorization of the DPA could include creating a more permanent and coordinated executive branch infrastructure, clarifying its use as an emergency versus routine policy tool, and identifying gaps in future deployment.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, COVID-19, Defense Production Act (DPA), and Reauthorization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

483. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:
Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

484. Recent U.S. Government Policy Literature on Critical and Strategic Minerals

Author:
Bert Chapman
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Critical and strategic minerals have become increasingly important in U.S. government civilian and military policymaking in recent years. This is demonstrated by the heavy use of such minerals in many critical civilian and military infrastructures. This work will discuss how this subject has been addressed in laws, presidential documents, and works by government agencies along with congressional oversight committees and support agencies. It will stress how the United States is heavily dependent on strategic minerals from adversarial foreign countries such as China and will examine U.S. efforts to increase its ability to produce such materials in the United States by reforming permitting processes. It will conclude with recommendations for the United States to enhance its ability to produce these materials domestically and acquire them from reliable foreign sources. The conclusion will also suggest ways that the president and federal agency stakeholders can enhance public awareness of this problem and their efforts to rectify it.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Information, Critical Minerals, and Permitting
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

485. NATO's Long Cold Front:​ Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North

Author:
Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

486. The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the U.S. Military Strategy in Proxy Wars, 2020–2024

Author:
Ehsan Ejazi and Mahsa Ahmadyan
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Proxy war has been a dynamic U.S. military strategy since the Cold War. In recent decades, however, artificial intelligence (AI) as a new manifestation of technology has played a significant role in these wars. The United States has been a pioneer in this field, making substantial investments, annually allocates multibillion-dollar budgets to advance robotic and automated weapons to win future wars. Artificial intelligence proxy wars can manage the competition between international actors as a mediating factor without wasting human resources. The main question of this article is as follows: What is the role of artificial intelligence in U.S. military strategy, and how much can this new technology help win proxy wars? The findings indicate that the United States, by applying artificial intelligence technology to its military equipment with remote control capabilities, robots, and automated guided weapons, has reduced human and financial costs while increasing the probability of triumph on the battlefield. However, the obtained data, according to moral and humanitarian criteria, suggest a high rate of civilian casualties in such military conflicts.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

487. Synthesizing Strategic Frameworks for Great Power Competition

Author:
Gavin Holtz
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines the theoretical foundations necessary for conceptualizing and operationalizing modern great power competition through the innovative synthesis of three influential military frameworks: Colonel John R. Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, Colonel John A. Warden’s systems analysis, and Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s unrestricted warfare theory. The research demonstrates how complementary frameworks provide strategic practitioners with comprehensive capabilities for identifying systemic vulnerabilities, orchestrating cross-domain effects, and maintaining decisive advantage through superior decision-making processes. The analysis reveals how modern competition transcends traditional military boundaries, necessitating organizational architectures capable of implementing synchronized operations across multiple competitive domains. This theoretical synthesis supports the proposal for an Interagency Action Committee on China (IAC-C) and identifies the foundational principles of a cross-domain organizational framework.
Topic:
Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Warfare, Great Powers, and Systems Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

488. Strategic Implications of Emerging Weapon Technologies: Kinetic Bombardment, Antimatter, and Antigravity Technology for U.S. National Security

Author:
Ahsan Uddin
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article explores the strategic implications of emerging weapon technologies on U.S. national security, focusing specifically on antimatter, kinetic bombardment systems, and antigravity technology. As global military dynamics evolve, it is imperative for the United States to assess and perhaps integrate these emerging technologies to maintain its military superiority. This article examines the accuracy and destructive capability of kinetic bombardment, the immense energy potential of antimatter, and the groundbreaking applications of antigravity propulsion in aerial operations. The findings underscore the critical role that these technologies may play in improving U.S. national security and provide a foundation for additional research on their national security applications and implications.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Weapons, Research and Development, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

489. The Arctic as a Periphery in U.S.-China Competition​

Author:
Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.
Topic:
Strategic Competition, Periphery, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

490. The Hegemonic Transition in Latin America: To What Extent is China Challenging US’s Hegemony?

Author:
Andoni Maiza-Larrarte and Ricardo Bustillo-Mesanza
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the geopolitical consequences of China’s enhanced engagement in Latin America. China is increasing its economic weight among Latin American countries, reinforcing its external image to counter the perception that the US is a unique relevant ally. In previous research, some authors have supported the idea that China could become a sort of neocolonial power in Latin America, substituting the hegemony of the United States. In this article, we carry out an in-depth review of Western literature and a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship to discuss China’s role in the region. We apply the principles of the hegemonic stability and the power transition theories, and we also include an assessment of “soft power” components. We conclude that China is eroding US power in Latin America but is still far from becoming the new regional hegemon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Transition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

491. Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The South China Sea has long been the subject of territorial and maritime disputes between Beijing, Manila, and other claimants. Since late 2022, escalating confrontations between Philippine and Chinese forces over tiny maritime features such as Second Thomas Shoal have posed a serious and growing risk of a military confrontation, which could in turn entangle the United States. Washington can avoid this worst-case scenario by charting a pragmatic approach and upholding its alliance commitment to the Philippines while avoiding military actions that would needlessly provoke China. The data in this brief show a dramatic increase of maritime incidents starting in the third quarter of 2023. China and the Philippines are disputing control over, among other things, what are little more than specks in the ocean, most located a hundred miles or more from the mainland of either country. However, maritime rights and jurisdiction are significant issues, and there is no question that Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea has been provocative and coercive. Moreover, an international tribunal has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in the dispute, decisively rejecting China’s “historic” claims around the “nine/ten dash line.” The U.S. relationship with the Philippines represents one of the United States’ oldest treaty alliances in the Global South and is important to America’s Pacific strategy. But the South China Sea conflict does not represent a threat of conquest of the Philippine mainland. Washington should recognize that defending maritime rights and tiny land features in waters half a world away is not a vital U.S. national interest and could become a serious liability should it open the door to a high-intensity conflict with China. An honest assessment of U.S. interests dictates a strategy of restraint in the South China Sea. While recognizing Manila’s agency and continuing to strengthen Philippine capacities, Washington should also encourage Manila to engage constructively with Beijing to prevent escalation. Crucially, U.S. policymakers must also avoid raising the risk of conflict by drawing the Philippines into taking a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Washington can help preserve and uphold international law in the South China Sea while reducing the risk of war between the United States and China by taking the following steps: Do not pull the U.S.–Philippines alliance into the Taiwan theater. Washington should not add to its nine existing military sites in the Philippines and, ideally, should disband one or more of the new sites located in northern Luzon (closer to Taiwan) in exchange for Chinese concessions. Do not give the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard a frontal role in countering Chinese intrusions in the South China Sea; enable Manila to take the lead instead. Do not seek to draw the military of U.S. allies (particularly extra-regional ones) into South China Sea disputes, in order to avoid needlessly heightening Chinese perceptions of bloc-formation and armed encirclement. Enhance diplomatic support to Manila for its legitimate claims under international law. Provide aid, capabilities, and intelligence for modernizing the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Build on the early success of the July 2024 Philippines–China understanding on Second Thomas Shoal by emphasizing preventive diplomacy and crisis management to stabilize the maritime dispute and reduce the chances of a conflict spiral.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

492. Big Ideas and Big Money: Think Tank Funding in America

Author:
Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief provides a detailed analysis of a first-of-its-kind, publicly available repository of U.S. think tank funding — www.thinktankfundingtracker.org. The repository tracks funding from foreign governments, the U.S. government, and Pentagon contractors to the top 50 think tanks in the United States over the past five years. It serves as a vital research guide for anyone wishing to learn more about the funding sources of prominent U.S. think tanks. The repository gives a five-point transparency score to each of the top 50 think tanks in the U.S., a scale created by the authors based on five binary questions. Based on this criteria, nine of the top 50 think tanks (18 percent) are fully transparent, while 23 think tanks (46 percent) are partially transparent. Most concerning, the remaining 18 think tanks (36 percent) are “dark money” think tanks, entirely opaque in their funding without revealing donors. In the past five years, foreign governments and foreign government-owned entities donated more than $110 million to the top 50 think tanks in the United States. The most generous donor countries were the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Qatar, which contributed $16.7 million, $15.5 million, and $9.1 million to U.S. think tanks, respectively. The Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, and German Marshall Fund received the most money from foreign governments since 2019: $20.8 million, $17.1 million, and $16.1 million, respectively. In that same period, the top 100 defense companies have contributed more than $34.7 million to the top 50 think tanks. The top donors include Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Mitsubishi, which provided $5.6 million, $2.6 million, and $2.1 million, respectively, to the tracked think tanks between 2019 and 2023. The Atlantic Council, Center for a New American Security, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies were the top recipients of Pentagon contractor money: $10.2 million, $6.6 million, and $4.1 million, respectively. The U.S. government has directly given at least $1.49 billion to American think tanks since 2019. However, the vast majority of this funding — $1.4 billion — goes to the Rand Corporation, which works directly for the U.S. government. While think tanks exist to produce independent analysis, the prevalence of special interest funding raises questions of intellectual freedom, self-censorship, and perspective filtering. This is compounded by instances in which individual researchers simultaneously hold positions at a think tank and a given foreign government or corporation, a clear potential conflict of interest. Moving forward, this brief contains a set of recommendations for various actors: For media: Adopt a professional standard to report any conflicts of interest with sources discussing U.S. foreign policy. For Congress: Pass legislation requiring all nonprofit organizations that seek to influence public policy to publicly disclose all of their corporate, U.S. government, and foreign government donors above $10,000, and improve the conflict of interest disclosure requirements for congressional witnesses. For the Department of Justice: Provide clearer guidelines surrounding what think tanks not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act can do on behalf of their foreign donors. For think tanks: End pay-to-play research and proactively move toward identifying conflicts of interest.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Think Tanks, Donors, Funding, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

493. European Hedging as a Diplomatic Opportunity for the United States

Author:
Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
With the onset of multipolarity in the world and growing disagreement between the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. should expect a declining foreign policy alignment with Europe. Rather than bemoan this development, the U.S. should recognize it as a strategic opportunity. Selective hedging by European countries — reducing their dependency on the United States and cultivating stronger relations with other major powers — would facilitate a diplomacy-led, restraint-based U.S. foreign policy and help the U.S. navigate a multipolar world order. For years, Europe has stood as a de facto vassal of the United States, a continent dependent on American military might and comprising countries largely lacking foreign policy independence. Such self-subordination has had negative consequences for Europe and the United States alike. It has weakened Europe’s overall global standing, which in turn means that the U.S. has been able to draw less advantage from its European alliance. This has unintentionally reduced U.S. diplomatic heft in engaging with adversaries. But a considerable U.S.–European schism has recently emerged. The Trump administration’s decided break from the transatlantic status quo has engendered strong disagreements over Ukraine, European security policy more broadly, and international trade. With the combined weakening of political, military, and economic links across the Atlantic, Europe is more likely to hedge moving forward. Strategic hedging — a posture already adopted by many countries in the Global South — would allow European countries to pursue an independent foreign policy, bolstering their international relevance. This reorientation would be diplomatically advantageous to the United States, as hedgers in Europe could serve as friendly interlocutors for American engagement with rival nations. European hedging could provide a conduit for constructive U.S. diplomacy, while discouraging zero-sum thinking and the disintegration of the global order into hostile blocs. The U.S. must recognize that a vassalized European continent is both unsustainable and antithetical to a restrained foreign policy vision. While retaining friendly ties with European countries, the United States should now actively promote selective hedging, paving the way for long-term European independence and peaceful multipolarity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

494. Under Primacy, Weapons Sales Will Always Supersede Human Rights

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S. government’s expressed commitment to human rights is routinely undermined by its actual commitment to maintaining America’s global military primacy. Since the 1970s, Washington has cast itself as a defender of global human rights, when Congress passed laws to bar the U.S. from providing security assistance to human rights violators. Yet America’s interest in human rights has long been sublimated to the logic of hegemony, from Cold War containment to the Global War on Terror and beyond. Congress has still never successfully voted to block a weapons sale. Today, the myth that American power upholds human rights lies buried beneath the rubble of Gaza. This research brief traces the emergence of human rights within U.S. foreign policymaking in the waning decades of the Cold War — alongside Washington’s rise to the top of the global arms trade — and surveys the various U.S. government efforts to codify human rights considerations in the practice of U.S. foreign policy, particularly arms sales, through the Biden administration. This history reveals how American leaders, regardless of political party, have consistently instrumentalized human rights concerns to target perceived adversaries, while tossing aside such concerns when they apply to U.S. partners. After Israel invaded Gaza following the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration failed to place any meaningful conditions on weapons sales to Israel, despite Israel’s conduct showing clear violations of international and U.S. law. The Trump administration has since expanded America’s unconditional support for Israel. Even as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, the defense establishment remains intent on maintaining U.S. military primacy. In clinging to this pursuit, human rights will remain an afterthought, selectively invoked by U.S. leaders when they do not threaten the military-industrial complex and arms sales. Only a sober recalibration of America’s approach to our new geopolitical reality — including a foreign policy of military restraint — can bring about a deeper commitment to human rights in Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

495. Peace Through Strength in Ukraine: Sources of U.S. Leverage in Negotiations

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The key to American success in ending the war in Ukraine is to broaden, rather than narrow, the issues under negotiation. If American negotiators treat the war as a bilateral dispute between Russia and Ukraine and press both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire, they are likely to fail. In a narrow negotiation, Russia has significant advantages because it has turned the conflict into a war of attrition in which its much greater population and much larger military industry are overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. The United States and Europe lack the capacity to match Russia’s arms production or bridge the Russia–Ukraine manpower gap without direct conflict with Russia. By contrast, if Washington recognizes that Moscow’s security concerns extend beyond Ukraine to the broader military threat posed by U.S. and NATO forces in Europe — a threat Russia cannot blunt by conquering Ukraine — the U.S. can employ leverage that Kyiv lacks in direct bargaining with Moscow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Leverage, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

496. U.S.–Cuban Relations: A Realist Case for Pragmatic Engagement

Author:
William M. LeoGrande and Geoff Thale
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This report, sponsored by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, is the product of a set of consultations among a group of scholars, opinion leaders, and foreign policy specialists that took place over the last nine months to develop a proposal for a new way forward in U.S. relations with Cuba. The project was coordinated by William M. LeoGrande, professor of government at American University, and Geoff Thale, former president of the Washington Office on Latin America and now an independent analyst. In a series of individual discussions, written exchanges, and small group meetings, participants shared views on U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, including the state of U.S.–Cuban relations, the impact of U.S.–Cuba policy on broader U.S. national interests, and the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Cuban people. Participants also discussed the situation in Cuba itself, including the state of the economy, migration, political rights, and civil rights. The group sought additional input from policymakers, former executive branch officials, and congressional staff. The group’s broad consensus is that the national interest of the United States would be better served by resetting U.S. policy toward Cuba, embarking on a path of engagement aimed at eventually normalizing relations. We recognize that this was not the policy that President Trump pursued in his first term, nor was it a policy supported by key members of the president’s current foreign policy team. As of this writing, the new administration has taken several steps toward tightening the embargo but has yet to announce a full-fledged Cuba policy. Sometimes advancing U.S. interests requires setting aside old animosities and engaging with former adversaries, as President Trump has done by opening negotiations with Syria, as well as continuing talks with Russia, China, and others. The president defines his “America First” foreign policy as one that champions “core American interests” and “puts America and its interests first.” 1 U.S. policy toward Cuba in recent years has failed that test. This document lays out the rationale for a new policy that advances U.S. national interests and also takes into account the interests of the Cuban people. It recommends a series of specific policy steps that would address priority issues like mass migration, narcotics trafficking, and the rising influence of U.S. global rivals, both in Cuba and in Latin America, as well as U.S. economic and cultural interests. This report benefited enormously from the thoughtful comments and suggestions of a great many people with deep experience and insight into U.S.–Cuban relations who graciously shared their expertise and advice with us in the course of this project. They include current and former U.S. government officials — from both the executive and legislative branches — as well as civil society leaders who have been engaged with this issue for many years. We offer special thanks to Ambassador (retired) Jeffrey DeLaurentis, who served as chargé d’affaires in the U.S. Embassy in Havana; Angela Mariana Freyre, former special advisor on Cuba at the National Security Council; Victor Johnson, former staff director for the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Cindy Buhl, former legislative director and foreign policy aide to Congressman Jim McGovern. They read several drafts of this report, and their suggestions improved it considerably. Their participation does not mean that they endorse every argument or recommendation; that responsibly rests with us alone. We are also grateful to the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft for sponsoring this project and especially to Sarang Shidore, director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South program, and Marcus Stanley, director of the Quincy Institute’s Studies department, for their support and advice.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, Strategic Interests, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:
Cuba and United States of America

497. Investing in the National Interest: The DFC and American Statecraft

Author:
Karthik Sankaran and Dan M. Ford
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, supports private-sector investment across the Global South, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Congress is currently reviewing legislation to reauthorize the DFC. The DFC is likely to see significant changes in the coming years, including a large expansion of its financial resources and a liberalization of its permissible investments. The likely expansion of the DFC would serve U.S. interests as an instrument of positive influence in the Global South. However, it is also possible that changes made during the reauthorization process may amplify a major concern with the DFC’s focus and strategic approach: an excessive emphasis on national security goals and on exclusionary conflict with U.S. adversaries, particularly China. Such an approach can damage the potential for the U.S. to grow its competitive commercial presence in the Global South and reduce the DFC’s effectiveness as a pro-development instrument that enhances U.S. influence in the Global South. Proposed changes to the DFC’s strategic goals and an outright ban on engagement with Chinese–funded projects may drive the DFC further down an exclusionary, zero-sum path. The DFC should also not be used to invest in high-income countries, which would detract from one of its core missions. This brief outlines a more expansive vision for the DFC, which would help the United States expand its economic footprint in the Global South without the pitfalls of an excessively securitized view of international development. A higher-impact DFC could improve the global influence of the United States, deepen economic partnerships and drive healthy, vigorous competition with China while avoiding coercive and almost certainly ineffective efforts to force countries to completely decouple from Beijing. Critical minerals, energy, and strategic infrastructure should be major focuses of an enlarged DFC. Such projects diversify U.S. supply chains and offer holistic investment opportunities. At the same time, the DFC should pursue an approach that emphasizes broad-based commercial development, to include engagement with small- and medium-sized enterprises. An approach that views target countries as commercial partners rather than pawns for hard security competition best positions the United States to enhance its reputation in the Global South. Expanding the DFC’s range of available financial tools to include, for example, subordinated loans and more mechanisms to manage political and currency risk, could also improve its flexibility as a commercial partner. A clear candidate for a future DFC initiative along those lines is the Lobito Corridor. This project would create a massive transit hub for mineral transportation across sub-Saharan Africa and subsequent incorporation into the global market, bolstering local infrastructure, expanding the supply of critical minerals, and providing ample downstream U.S. investment opportunities. Another possible candidate is the brownfield expansion and modernization of the Puerto Bolivar container port in Ecuador’s El Oro province.
Topic:
Global South, Investment, Private Sector, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, Statecraft, and US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

498. Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Supporting Taiwan Without a Commitment to War

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The first brief in this series made the case that Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying a war between the United States and China. This second brief outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity in a manner that continues to deter Beijing from coercing Taipei while ruling out direct American military intervention in defense of the island. This brief recommends that, in the short to medium term, the United States should maintain its standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan while also carrying out necessary preparations for a noninterventionist policy shift. These preparations include: A clear statement from Washington that it opposes any unilateral move by Taipei to achieve formal independence. A revitalization of the eroding One China Policy. A reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. A bolstering of the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan and nearby treaty allies. Encouragement and support for those in Japan who seek to ease tensions with China and wish to cultivate cooperative Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relationships. The initiation of a results-oriented strategic dialogue with China. The expansion of mutually beneficial trade, investment, and technology exchanges with Taiwanese companies and the offshoring of Taiwanese high-tech capabilities. Once these necessary, gradual preparations have been made, the U.S. president should explicitly state that America will not go to war with China to defend Taiwan but that the United States will support Taiwan — and the development of an improved cross-strait environment — in every other way possible. This policy shift is necessary because ongoing military and political trends are eroding the ability of the United States to deter and reassure China, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The One China Policy is deteriorating, the Taiwanese public increasingly rejects any political association with China, and China is expanding its reliance on military displays, which undermines the credibility of the Chinese commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. More generally, U.S.–China relations continue to worsen. This trajectory renders the standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, which accepts the possibility of a direct U.S. war with China, dangerous and misaligned with U.S. interests. The above preparatory changes will require considerable diplomatic finesse and sustained attention over a considerable period of time. Given the weakened National Security Council and the virtual collapse of the past interagency coordinating process for policy development under President Trump, these required qualities might be in short supply at present. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be able to correct these deficiencies. It is unlikely China would respond to the strategy outlined here by attempting to reunify with Taiwan by force. This is because of the still high — and, in some areas, increased — risks confronting any Chinese use of force and because of the fact that this policy shift would likely increase Beijing’s confidence in eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

499. The Fading of Old Irritants: U.S.–Türkiye Relations in a Post–Assad Landscape

Author:
Adam Weinstein and Steven Simon
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Türkiye relationship today is a fraught partnership marked by discord and strategic misalignment — particularly within the context of the Syrian Civil War but long before it as well. With the fading of old irritants in a post–Assad Syrian political landscape, a more stable and cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship is possible — an opportunity the Trump administration should seize. The United States and Türkiye, though NATO allies, have historically lacked the shared values that make the transactionalism inherent in alliance frameworks easier to manage. As such, tensions have arisen when the strategic interests of each country or domestic politics have diverged. The Syrian Civil War, particularly since the emergence of the ISIS caliphate in 2014, illustrated this division starkly. While initially supportive of the mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, Türkiye became disillusioned with the military campaign once the United States partnered with the Kurdish–led People’s Protection Units, or YPG. To Türkiye, the YPG is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, a militant Kurdish group that the country has fought since the early 1980s and views as an existential challenge. This misalignment of primary objectives in Syria created a fraught dynamic between the U.S. and Türkiye. In December 2024, Bashar al–Assad’s regime fell following a successful military campaign by Hay`at Tahrir al–Sham, or HTS, a Sunni Islamist group with close ties to Türkiye. While HTS’s rule moving forward is precarious, the United States and Türkiye share a common interest in preventing renewed civil strife in Syria. A resumed war could create another wave of asylum migration to Türkiye and beyond, stimulate deeper Israeli involvement, renew Iranian attempts to influence developments, and run counter to a broadly shared international interest in a unitary Syrian state. President Trump has expressed a desire to withdraw American troops from Syria and a willingness to permit greater Turkish influence in northern Syria. To advance a more cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship, this brief recommends the following: The Trump administration should establish a formal working group with Türkiye on Syria, bringing together intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic channels. Türkiye and Kurdish groups should engage in backchannel diplomacy to promote Kurdish integration into a functioning Syrian state and protect the Kurds against human rights abuses. The United States and Türkiye should rebuild strategic trust through targeted defense cooperation, resuming U.S. arms sales to Türkiye contingent on its cooperation in Syria and Iraq, and expanding U.S.–Türkiye joint training and NATO exercises. Türkiye and Israel should engage in stabilization dialogue to mitigate tensions over their respective zones of influence in Syria and to coordinate on eastern Mediterranean energy development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, Syrian War, Kurds, and Political Transition
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

500. Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington

Author:
Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief explores Qatar’s evolution into one of the more influential foreign lobbies in the United States. Qatar’s story demonstrates how money begets influence in the United States. Since Donald Trump was first elected president in 2016, Qatar has spent nearly $250 million on 88 FARA–registered lobbying and public relations firms. From January 2021 to June 2025, Qatar’s agents reported 627 in-person meetings with political contacts in the United States — more FARA–registered meetings than any other country in the world. The current Trump administration has deep ties to Qatar. Three cabinet-level members in the administration — Attorney General Pam Bondi, FBI Director Kash Patel, and EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin — have all previously held consultancy or lobbying positions on Qatar’s behalf. Qatar substantially increased its political influence efforts beginning in 2017, when it was blockaded and reportedly threatened with invasion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In response, Qatar began vigorous efforts to counteract anti–Qatar lobbying in the U.S. conducted by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and pro–Israel groups. More recently, Qatar has used its lobbying influence to bolster its legitimacy and reputation as a global conflict mediator and reassert its importance to U.S. strategic interests and its defense posture in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Hamas attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Qatar worked to combat claims of terrorist sympathies by successfully positioning itself as a mediator for ceasefire and hostage exchange negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The Qatar lobby has also helped to preserve the country’s standing as a critical U.S. ally in the Middle East, heading off a congressional push to move Al Udeid Air Base out of Qatar, preserving Qatar’s designation as a major non–NATO ally, and strengthening defensive ties via lucrative arms sales. Beyond the defense realm, Qatar is heavily invested in the U.S. In the past five years, Qatar has given upward of $9.1 million to think tanks. Since 2001, it has provided $6.25 billion to American colleges and universities. However, contrary to insinuations from some, its university-related funding and influence have primarily focused on educational efforts within Qatar, where the majority of students enrolled are Qatari. Qatar has also invested more broadly in the U.S. economy. This past May, Qatar pledged to invest $500 billion in the U.S. economy over the next decade, demonstrating its intention to retain its U.S. economic influence for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Soft Power, Investment, Donald Trump, Lobbying, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, Qatar, and United States of America