Search

Begin New Search Political Geography United States of America Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 1 Year

221. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

222. Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac: How U.S. Defense Spending Prioritizes Innovation over Deterrence

Author:
Carlton Haelig and Philip Sheers
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
or more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac that has allowed China to steadily shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in its favor. Recent U.S. defense budgets have disproportionately invested in long-term developmental programs at the expense of producing sufficient capabilities available for the near term. As a result, today’s Joint Force is smaller, older, and less capable than at any other time in recent history. Over the past 15 years, the average time and cost the Pentagon has taken to field major weapon systems has grown significantly, and the share of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) spending within the broader defense budget has continued to steadily grow. Despite extended periods of very expensive research and development, major weapon systems have frequently failed to enter production on time or in numbers large enough to make a difference for U.S. warfighters. RDTE cost growth has also affected mature programs, where unexpected modernization challenges have interfered with plans to expand production of available capabilities. Bolstering deterrence involves a challenging balance of time horizons: The Department of Defense (DoD) must expand procurement of today’s capabilities to support near-term deterrence but cannot risk sacrificing next-generation modernization programs that sustain America’s long-term military advantage in doing so. As China’s accelerated conventional military buildup places significant pressure on today’s Joint Force, the urgency to close near-term capability gaps has become critical. Reductions in the Joint Force’s overall size and relative conventional capability have opened a dangerous window of opportunity for China. This report finds that the fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request and one-time reconciliation funding from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (BBB) ultimately fail to make the needed investments to strengthen deterrence in both the near and long term. Instead, the current administration appears to be falling into the same mistake as many previous administrations by prioritizing costly development of next-generation systems at the expense of purchasing and fielding capabilities that are available to fill deterrence gaps today. Moreover, by pursuing modernization through reconciliation, the FY 2026 budget risks subjecting future modernization priorities to the political outcomes of nondefense debates. Absent a return to standard defense budgeting processes, modernization programs that received a down payment from the BBB will likely stall or fail entirely. There are some opportunities in future defense budgets to produce greater numbers of existing high-end capabilities that can meaningfully contribute to deterrence in the near term while pursuing critical long-term modernization investments. This report’s analysis highlights five major capability areas where existing or near-ready capabilities, such as ground-based fires or combat aircraft, can be procured in meaningful quantities and contribute to important missions in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, this analysis highlights important areas, such as hypersonic weapons, in which extensive developmental timelines and exorbitant procurement costs likely preclude near-term contributions to deterrence and in the long term will only be fielded in small quantities. Expanding the U.S. military’s capacity and capability in the near term will likely require both larger budgets and the rapid development and production of complementary, less expensive capabilities. The United States faces a generational inflection point in how it approaches its defense investments. Rather than continue the disproportionate focus on next-generation technologies, the White House, Congress, and the DoD must budget a sustained pivot to purchasing existing capabilities that close near-term deterrence gaps. While this pivot must be balanced with continued investments in long-term modernization, the United States can no longer afford to sacrifice near-term procurement imperatives. Breaking out of the developmental cul-de-sac will require future defense budgets to emphasize procurement and accelerated RDTE across major defense programs.
Topic:
Budget, Innovation, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

223. Prepared, Not Paralyzed Managing AI Risks to Drive American Leadership

Author:
Janet Egan, Spencer Michaels, and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Trump administration has embraced a pro-innovation approach to artificial intelligence (AI) policy. Its AI Action Plan, released July 2025, underscores the private sector’s central role in advancing AI breakthroughs and positioning the United States as the world’s leading AI power.1 At the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance cautioned that an overly restrictive approach to AI development “would mean paralyzing one of the most promising technologies we have seen in generations.”2 Yet this emphasis on innovation does not diminish the government’s critical role in ensuring national security. On the contrary, AI advances will yield significant threats alongside unprecedented potential in this domain. Experts warn of advanced AI introducing more autonomous cyber weapons, bestowing a broader pool of actors with the know-how to develop biological weapons, and potentially malfunctioning in ways that cause massive damage.3 Private and public sector leaders alike have echoed these concerns.4 The urgent task for policymakers is to ensure that the federal government can anticipate and manage the national security implications of AI with advanced capabilities—without resorting to blunt, ill-targeted, or burdensome regulation that would undermine America’s innovative edge. In other words, the government must prepare at once for potential risks from rapidly advancing AI without imposing onerous regulations that unduly stifle the technology’s vast potential for good. The status quo is insufficient: Technical expertise in advanced AI remains concentrated in a handful of companies, and the government is playing catch-up. Existing voluntary information-sharing commitments between AI labs and the federal government already face hurdles and likely will prove insufficient over time as the costs of providing transparency increase. Meanwhile, the private sector lacks both the national security expertise and the commercial incentives to manage these risks to the national interest. The United States cannot afford policies built solely on speculative fears. Yet in the face of real and rapid progress in national security–relevant capabilities, neither can it risk allowing an AI-driven disaster or a regulatory vacuum to derail technological progress. While much of the policy debate rightly focuses on innovation and accelerating adoption, this report concentrates on a less developed but equally vital counterpart: managing the risks that could undermine those ambitions without stifling AI’s innovative potential. Effective risk management is not a brake on progress but a prerequisite for it, playing an essential role in sustaining public trust, preventing setbacks, shaping global standards, and ensuring that American leadership in AI endures over the long term.
Topic:
Regulation, Leadership, Risk, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

224. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
fter decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires. It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces. As this report’s analysis of U.S. defense spending reveals, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in both legacy and emerging counter–uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities for nearly a decade. However, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. Despite the Pentagon’s shortfalls in procuring purpose-built C-UAS capabilities, U.S. counter-drone operations in the Middle East have been notable. The United States views China as its foremost strategic threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its drone capabilities by developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale. Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan. This is a complex challenge with no silver bullet solution. The DoD must act swiftly. The stakes are not theoretical—without adequate defenses, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks. Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense Prioritize counter-drone defense and extend capabilities beyond the air defense community. Drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units. Every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Expand counter-drone training across the Joint Force. The Pentagon needs to develop and share best tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensure that all forces are trained in drone self-protection. Improve the rigor and realism of counter-drone prototype testing. The current test and evaluation process fosters a false sense of confidence in prototype counter-UAS, as they are often assessed using unrealistic facsimiles of enemy drones and low-fidelity tests of electromagnetic weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

225. Atomic Advantage: Accelerating U.S. Quantum Sensing for Next-Generation Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Author:
Costanza M. Vidal Bustamante
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
O One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation, trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world’s PNT, but the system’s inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding $1 billion a day.1 In the face of rising threats to traditional PNT, quantum sensors offer a compelling alternative. Leveraging the immutable properties of atoms, these devices offer unmatched measurement precision, long-term accuracy, and reliable operation in contested environments—capabilities that can back up and even outperform current GPS-based services. Quantum sensors could enable resilient U.S. PNT within a few years—from the navigation of submarines, drones, and munitions to the synchronization of telecommunications networks, power grids, and financial systems—but only if America continues to develop and deploy the technology. While atomic clocks—the most mature quantum technology today—already power GPS, emerging quantum sensing capabilities are beginning to show their promise as local sources of high-precision, resilient PNT. Next-generation atomic clocks can sustain timing accuracy over longer durations. Quantum accelerometers and gyroscopes can measure a moving platform’s velocity and rotation with greater precision. Quantum gravimeters and magnetometers can reference the Earth’s unique gravitational and magnetic fields for stealthy positioning. All of these technologies offer enhanced performance without relying on vulnerable radiofrequency signals. Although early quantum sensors are beginning the move from lab to field, many prototypes remain too fragile and bulky for widespread deployment. To deliver real operational value, these devices must be hardened so their delicate quantum states can survive harsh environments and continuous use on dynamic platforms. At the same time, developers must further miniaturize and integrate the sensors’ atomic, optical, and control subsystems into compact devices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

226. Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider

Author:
Gregory Johnsen
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On March 15, 2025, the United States launched an offensive against the Houthis in Yemen with the stated goal of restoring “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea and ending Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Fifty-two days later, on May 5, the United States ended its operations in Yemen following an agreement with the Houthis that the group would no longer target U.S. military vessels or U.S. flagged ships. This article provides an assessment of that campaign, known as Operation Rough Rider, looking at what the United States hit, who was killed, and what it cost as well as how the Houthis have rebounded and regrouped, the current situation on the ground in Yemen, and what is likely to come next.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Houthis, Shipping, Military Operations, and Operation Rough Rider
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

227. The Escalation of U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia and the Role of Perceived Threats to the U.S. Homeland

Author:
David Sterman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2025, the United States substantially increased the pace of its airstrikes in Somalia. At the same time, it increasingly cited not just regional security rationales for the increased pace of strikes but also rationales rooted in an assessed potential threat to the U.S. homeland from Somalia—in particular from the Islamic State-Somalia’s recruitment of foreign fighters. This article examines the increased pace of strikes, the rationales that have been cited to explain the increase, and what existing evidence reveals about the potential threat to the U.S. homeland. It also underscores the need for greater clarity from the U.S. government regarding its assessment of the extent of such a threat.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, Airstrikes, and Military Operations
Political Geography:
Africa, Somalia, and United States of America

228. Feature Commentary: Confronting Cartels: Military Considerations South of the Border

Author:
Brian Michael Jenkins
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Possible U.S. military action against Mexico’s drug cartels poses unique challenges. The situation is complicated, and the United States must be prepared for possible counteractions. The cartels are not a single actor. If attacked, they may avoid direct confrontation, accepting temporary losses, anticipating that the United States will not sustain a long campaign. Or Mexico’s cartels may respond violently, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in Mexico—and possibly north of the border. The government of Mexico is a separate actor. It can assist or undermine U.S. efforts. Past government campaigns against the cartels led to soaring rates of criminal violence. Chaos in Mexico could have serious implications for U.S. homeland security. The United States needs a ‘Red Team’ to examine a range of scenarios. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I contrasts recent U.S. military actions in Yemen and Iran with possible military action in Mexico. Part II examines perceptions of the threat. Part III examines how the history of U.S.-Mexico relations will shape the battlefield. Part IV reviews our own experience in combating foreign drug traffickers, offering some preliminary takeaways. Part V examines possible options. Part VI looks at how the cartels might react, how the United States might be forced to respond—and how other adversaries of the United States might attempt to exploit the situation.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Borders, Organized Crime, Cartels, and Military Operations
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

229. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

230. The Changing Character of Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism

Author:
Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, Brian Dodwell, and Ned Curry
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The competition between terror movements and counterterrorism forces is an interactive and iterative game, as the actions taken by one side are designed to defeat, circumvent, or shape the activity taken by the opposing players. To better understand these interactive dynamics, it is important to evaluate how terrorism and counterterrorism have been evolving. This article first takes high-level stock of how the spread, structure, scale, and speed of terrorism have been changing in recent years and highlights key challenges and implications for counterterrorism. It then evaluates the United States’ ongoing effort to find a sustainable counterterrorism path, a journey that has been filled with challenges, benefits, dilemmas, and opportunities, and discusses how key factors have been shaping the direction, reach, and pace of change. An important takeaway from these reviews is that while the threat of international terrorism is not what it used to be, there is a lot of change occurring across the terrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism has also been undergoing some important shifts, and there are open questions about whether U.S. CT forces and assets will be spread further. If not managed carefully, change taking place across these two ‘systems’ could interact in ways that may disrupt CT progress.
Topic:
National Security, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

231. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Peace or Pause?

Author:
Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
At the White House in Washington, on August 8th, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace deal and signed an agreement on the establishment of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP): a transport link connecting Azerbaijan-proper with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, which had been a contentious issue in the peace negotiations. While the imagery and potential positive consequences of this should not be underestimated, much is still unclear about what the agreements actually mean, including certain formulations and their interpretation as well as the question of how long the US commitment to the region will last. At the same time, the Washington summit represents an opening and a positive momentum for further development of not only the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, but larger connectivity in South-Caucasus, and several capitals will have been watching the proceedings keenly. This paper first briefly discusses the agreements reached and some of the remaining questions surrounding them, and then analyses the attitudes and/or reactions of the US, Russia, Iran, Türkiye and the EU, which in some cases, will be crucial to the success or failure of the initiative.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

232. The Biden Administration’s New Industrial Policy: Domestic and International Implications

Author:
Barbara Regulska-Ingielewicz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The article aims to analyze new industrial policy based on the example of actions taken by the Joe Biden administration. Their essence is transforming the economy in line with climate goals while stimulating development. The paper will present the main assumptions of the United States’ green industrial policy, its goals, and international implications, which indicate that it is characterized by economic nationalism. The article attempts to answer three main research questions: What is the essence of the new industrial policy? What are the goals of the new industrial policy initiated by the Joe Biden administration? What are the expected international implications of this policy? Answers to the above questions will enable verification of the hypothesis, which states that the Joe Biden administration has initiated a new industrial policy in the spirit of state interventionism based on new environmental protection assumptions. Its goal is to give the U.S. economy new pro-development impulses and increase its competitiveness. The first part of the paper will present assumptions of the new industrial policy, then the goals and measures of the new United States industrial policy, and the third part will show the international implications of the above policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Economic Growth, Joe Biden, Green Transition, Green Economy, and Economic Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

233. Could the War Have Been Prevented? US Lessons from Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:
Andrzej Demczuk
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The main goal of this article is to analyze American leadership in the context of Russia’s War in Ukraine. Examining the role of the US is important because the results of the study might identify some US strategic and policy weaknesses, which, if applied, might prevent other wars from happening. The main research question has been formulated: Could the Russian War in Ukraine have been prevented? The author’s work is based mainly on the analysis of the interviews with policymakers from the first circle of people in power, mostly the presidents’ advisers who have been particularly involved in implementing American foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine since the end of the Cold War, as well as Ukrainian officials and those participating in the US-led coalition. US lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine are of particular significance today, when the world faces a possible confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region between China and Taiwan, as well as the spread of the Middle East turmoil.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Leadership, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

234. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety

Author:
Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

235. Global Spillovers of US Monetary Policy: New Insights from the Remittance Channel

Author:
Pablo Aguilar-Perez
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
This paper examines the global spillovers of US monetary policy through the remittance channel, in both sending and recipient countries. Using a dataset covering 8 remittance-sending and 41 recipient countries from January 1997 to December 2017, we apply a local projections framework to trace the dynamic effects of unexpected US monetary tightening. We find that remittance outflows decline in advanced economies following policy shocks, illustrating the pro-cyclicality of remittances in source countries and their role in amplifying global financial spillovers. Among recipient countries, our results show that in countries with low to moderate remittance dependence, inflows tend to increase following a contractionary shock – consistent with altruistic or insurance-driven motives. In contrast, remittances decline in highly dependent countries, aligning with self-interest or investment-driven behavior. We find that these heterogeneous responses are shaped by migrant profiles: countries with high remittance dependence typically have a larger share of low-skilled migrants and display more strongly pro-cyclical remittance patterns. In contrast, less dependent countries tend to have more skilled or diversified diasporas, resulting in more stable and less cyclical remittance flows.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, Monetary Policy, Economy, and Remittances
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

236. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations

Author:
Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
Topic:
Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

237. The US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal

Author:
Penny Naas, Georgina Wright, Eamon Drumm, and Antonia Wunnerlich
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Eighty years to the day after Germany’s surrender in World War II, two of the victorious allies in that conflict unveiled a new economic partnership, the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD). It is the first bilateral agreement of its kind concluded by the Trump administration since its new tariff policy was introduced in early April. Leaders have described the EPD as a “trade deal”, but it functions more as a framework for future action. It includes tariff concessions on selected goods, grants greater access to the British market for certain American agricultural products, and outlines areas for future negotiation, including in digital regulation, export controls, and, potentially, investment screening. A separate technology-focused agreement is also planned for both countries to find ways to collaborate on biotech, life sciences, quantum computing, nuclear fusion, aerospace, and space technologies. In substance, the EPD freezes tariffs at 10% for most goods while buying time for technical-level discussions and laying the groundwork for deeper alignment. For the United Kingdom, 30% of whose exports go to its largest export market, the United States, the deal is an important diplomatic win. It is for the United States, too, whose ninth-largest trading partner is the United Kingdom. In 2024, the United States imported $68.1 billion in goods from Britain and exported $79.9 billion to the country. For countries eyeing negotiations with Washington, the EPD underscores that US trade talks are increasingly shaped by national and economic security considerations, not just trade balances. The agreement links future tariff relief to shared approaches on US strategic issues such as digital policy and alignment on export controls, including to China. As Peter Mandelson, British ambassador in Washington, put it, the EPD is the "end of the beginning". Much will now depend on the outcomes of technical-level discussions, which could have direct repercussions on London’s reset talks with the EU.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and United States of America

238. Europe Between the United States and China

Author:
Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

239. Unsolicited Thoughts on How the New Administration Can Improve American Diplomacy

Author:
Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
A country’s political leadership establishes its foreign policy goals, and its diplomatic service works to achieve them. Ideally, a country’s fundamental foreign policy goals should be so clear and compelling that they transcend specific administrations and provide enduring guidelines for carrying out the work of diplomacy. Previous post-Cold War administrations have made half-hearted, but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to do this. The new administration may want to consider these three strategic objectives: 1) create a more stable international system; 2) avoid an alliance between China and Russia; 3) decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war. These objectives are clear, compelling, and enduring. The benefits of any system adhere disproportionately to those at the top of the system. Since we are at the top of the current international system, no one has a greater interest in its stability than we do. An alliance between the other nuclear superpower and the other economic superpower would represent a clear and present danger to our preeminence. And in all likelihood, we’d all be dead after a major nuclear war. A diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives should include: 1) prioritizing US interests; 2) talking less and listening more; and 3) leading by example.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and International System
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

240. Biden’s Troubled Foreign Policy Legacy

Author:
P. Michael McKinley
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
In the waning days of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security adviser Jake Sullivan highlighted the foreign policy achievements of the previous four years including marshaling support for Ukraine, preventing a wider war in the Middle East, and galvanizing Indo-Pacific ties. The outgoing president himself gave a spirited defense of his accomplishments just days before he left office. As a reelected President Trump takes over, however, it seems fair to ask just how sustainable the efforts to “reenergize alliances and partnerships” and America’s global leadership actually were. And in at least one crucial respect, the Biden administration’s “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class” turned out to be more continuity than a break with President Trump’s “America First:” a protectionist national economic security doctrine now appears to be a centerpiece of American foreign policy. The swan song of a certain kind of American internationalism seems at hand, as the incoming administration signals policies which, reflecting the national mood, will prioritize a more unilateralist approach to the outside world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, International Order, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific