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201. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

202. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations

Author:
Jeremy Pressman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE

203. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

204. Implications of a Security Pact with Saudi Arabia

Author:
Paul R. Pillar
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration is seeking a deal in which Saudi Arabia would extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel in exchange for the United States providing Saudi Arabia a security guarantee, assistance in developing a nuclear program, and more unrestricted arms sales. Such an arrangement would further enmesh the United States in Middle Eastern disputes and intensify regional divisions. It would work against a favorable pattern of regional states working out their differences when the United States leaves them on their own — illustrated by the Chinese-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Besides being an authoritarian state lacking shared values with the United States, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has aggressively pursued regional dominance, most notably with its highly destructive war in Yemen. A U.S. security guarantee could motivate MBS to engage in even riskier behavior and draw the United States into conflicts in which it has no stake, such as the sectarian dispute that had led Saudi Arabia to break relations with Iran. An expanded Saudi nuclear program would have a military as well as an energy dimension, with MBS having openly expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Granting the Saudi demand for help in enriching uranium would be a blow to the global nonproliferation regime as well as a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy. A race in nuclear capabilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia may result. Meeting MBS’ demands would not curb Saudi relations with China, which are rooted in strong economic and other interests. The United States could compete more effectively with China in the region not by taking on additional security commitments but instead by emulating the Chinese in engaging all regional states in the interest of reducing tensions. Normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be a peace agreement, given the already extensive security cooperation between them. Even the gift of normalization with Riyadh would be unlikely to soften Israel’s hard-line positions regarding the war in Gaza and the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and instead would only reduce further Israeli motivation to resolve that conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Conflict, Normalization, Joe Biden, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

205. Private Finance and the Quest to Remake Modern Warfare

Author:
Michael Brenes and William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Official Washington is all in on promoting a new type of warfare based on military applications of AI and other emerging technologies. This determination was on full display last year when the Biden administration unveiled the “Replicator” initiative, an attempt to develop swarms of high-tech weapons systems at relatively low cost, and in numbers capable of overwhelming any potential adversary. But the history of so-called miracle weapons offers ample reasons to doubt Replicator’s supposedly transformative potential. Previous innovations, from the “electronic battlefield” in Vietnam to drone warfare in the Global War on Terrorism, did not, in fact, revolutionize war as we know it. Cutting-edge technology is no substitute for sound strategy or a realistic assessment of what military force can achieve. Unfortunately, so far, at least, these lessons from history have been no match for the boosterism of venture capital (VC) firms that pride themselves on disrupting industries and overturning conventional wisdom. While estimates of total VC funding of emerging military technology vary widely, it is clear that private investments in emerging weapons technologies are large and growing, driven by a handful of major Silicon Valley players, including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund and Andreessen-Horowitz. Companies backed by these firms, including Palantir, Anduril, and SpaceX, have already landed major contracts for weapons systems that incorporate next-generation technology. These firms and their allies in the Pentagon and Congress are determined to move full speed ahead on the development and deployment of weapons based on AI and other technological innovations, despite many unanswered questions about the costs and risks involved. While the bulk of Pentagon funding still goes to the “big five” contractors — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — VC-backed startups aspire to become the future of military contracting, and they hope that AI and other emerging technologies will be their ticket. These startups may prove to be more nimble and innovative than the bloated, top-heavy firms that currently dominate the arms industry, but they should not be allowed to operate with impunity. Congress must establish ground rules that prevent military startups from exploiting the procurement process in ways that pad their bottom lines while providing flawed systems — outcomes that we have seen all too often from their traditional rivals. What is most important, the rush to profit from emerging military tech cannot be allowed to short-circuit the careful scrutiny and wide-ranging public debate that must precede any move toward a brave new world of autonomous warfare in which human intervention in the kill chain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated. This brief offers policymakers a framework for ensuring that unsupported promises to “reinvent” warfare don’t exacerbate the cycle of corruption and waste that has all too often plagued the Pentagon’s procurement process, to the detriment of our safety and security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Finance, Grand Strategy, and Warfare
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

206. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

207. Subsidizing the Military-Industrial Complex: A Review of the Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) Program

Author:
Brett Heinz and Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
For nearly 30 years, an obscure Department of Defense (DoD) program has given Pentagon contractors a taxpayer-subsidized opportunity to influence U.S. military policy, creating massive conflicts of interest — yet little scrutiny. This research brief offers a first of its kind look at the DoD’s Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) program, which sends U.S. military officers to work at major corporations for a year, and then return and provide recommendations to the DoD for how it might improve. Military contractors benefit disproportionately from the SDEF program. Twenty-nine percent of all SDEF fellows have gone to the nation’s top 50 government contractors, with 15 percent going to the “big five” military contractors alone. None of the 317 fellows in the program’s history has ever served at a public sector institution. Decades of SDEF recommendations have consistently focused on reforms that would both benefit corporations and bolster their influence over the DoD, including calls for a greater share of the agency’s budget to be given to military contractors, reduced oversight, greater private outsourcing of agency responsibilites, and the loosening of international arms trade regulations. SDEF also keeps the revolving door between public service and private profit spinning. Forty-three percent of SDEF fellows went on to work for a government contractor at some point in their post-military career. In consistently failing to distinguish between what’s best for corporate executives and what’s best for the American people, the SDEF program represents a dangerous embrace of the military-industrial complex. Whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence” can be seen in “every office of the Federal Government,” the SDEF program explicitly advocates for it. SDEF has become a reliable method for corporations to disguise self–interested policy aspirations as helpful recommendations for DoD. If this program is to continue, DoD must act forcefully to address and minimize the unsettling conflicts of interest embedded within SDEF by: Enforcing a “one defense contractor per year” rule; Barring fellows from working in “government relations” roles; Exploring post–employment restrictions for former fellows; Re–balancing orientations away from undue corporate influence and political bias; Rationalizing program size.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military-Industrial Complex, and Militarism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

208. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

209. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

210. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order

Author:
Faisal Devji
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Topic:
Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

211. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and James Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

212. Responsibly Demilitarizing U.S.–Mexico Bilateral Security Relations

Author:
Aileen Teague
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
These are trying times for U.S.–Mexico relations. As America’s opioid epidemic reaches unprecedented proportions, U.S. politicians have begun to advocate unilateral military action against Mexican drug cartels in sovereign Mexican territory. This approach would not only do extraordinary damage to one of America’s most vital international relationships, but also carry a real risk of importing violence to the United States. The calls for military action have infuriated Mexico’s leaders, who in turn criticize America’s broken and inhumane border security and Washington’s inability to curb the seemingly insatiable demand for drugs in the United States. The basis for the neighboring nations’ security cooperation, the 2008 Mérida Initiative, seems to have failed, largely failing to stem the tide of violence and instability in Mexico, or to halt the cross border flow of migrants, guns, and drugs. The result is poor regional security and a deteriorating bilateral relationship. There is reason to hope that the Plan Mérida’s replacement, the U.S.–Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, will strengthen bilateral cooperation and help put security relations on a path to demilitarization. However, since the State Department announced the framework in 2021, little progress has been made in developing the shape and contents of this program. The continued failure to articulate how the Bicentennial Framework will represent a meaningful break from failed policies in the past suggests militarized enforcement may still dominate security relations for years to come. This status quo poses grave risks to both countries. But through the Bicentennial Framework, U.S. policymakers have the potential to make meaningful changes in bilateral security relations by: Rejecting U.S. unilateralist measures against Mexico Developing more robust policies to halt U.S. arms flow to Mexico Reducing the military’s role in enforcement functions and redirecting military entities toward civil action and development Supporting Mexico–led development programs By decreasing the scope of militarization in regional security policies through an appropriately designed Bicentennial Framework, the United States and Mexico can achieve healthier and more balanced relations, and eliminate the risk of a worst-case scenario: unilateral U.S. military intervention next door.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Global South, Borders, Restraint, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, Global Focus, and United States of America

213. Imaging the Diaspora: Imperialism, Immigration, Individualism

Author:
K.J. Noh, Ashton Higgins, and Michelle Alas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
K.J. Noh is a political analyst, educator, and journalist focusing on the geopolitics and political economy of the Asia-Pacific. He has written for Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Asia Times, Counterpunch, LA Progressive, MR Online, and People’s Daily. He also does frequent commentary and analysis on various news programs, including The Critical Hour, The Backstory, By Any Means Necessary. and Breakthrough News. He recently co-authored a study on the military transmission of infectious diseases and its implications for Covid transmission.
Topic:
Imperialism, Diaspora, Immigration, Interview, and Individualism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

214. The Evolution and Ethics of Accountability Sanctions

Author:
Mark Ferullo
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
When Yahya Jammeh seized power in The Gambia in 1994 in a bloodless coup d’état, the young army colonel’s promise to eliminate corruption seemed disin- genuous. At the time, few Gambians could have anticipated how corrupt and cruel his rule would be. His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al-haji Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Babili Mansa, as he titled himself, brutalized his country for over two decades. In 2022, The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Com- mission exposed the extent of his violence, revealing that he commanded a hit squad that crushed dissent through murder, torture, and rape. His claim that he could cure AIDS with herbs might have been dismissed as the delusions of an out-of-touch autocrat were it not for the loss of life this lie caused during the medical trials.1 When the United States placed economic sanctions on Jammeh in 2017, most Gambians had little sympathy for their former leader, and few denied he deserved punishment.2 By then, Jammeh had fled the country, but the United States sanctioned him anyway. Jammeh joined 12 other individuals—including an organ-trafficking surgeon from Pakistan, a Guatemalan Congressman who ordered the killing of a journalist, and a Ukrainian police commander who oversaw the shooting of peaceful protestors in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity three years prior—as the first designations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. “There is a steep price to pay for their mis- deeds,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin at the time.3
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

215. The Changing Priorities of the U.S. Empire and the Fate of Puerto Rico

Author:
Pedro Cabán
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Puerto Rico’s fate is captive to the changing priorities of the United States. In this essay I will explore how changes in U.S. colonial administration of Puerto Rico appear to closely correspond to changing U.S. national security concerns and geopolitical priorities. For the purposes of this work, I divide the history of Puerto Rico under American colonial rule into three periods: (1) 1898–1945: From the U.S. acquisition of Puerto Rico until the end of World War II. During this period, the United States’ colonial policy focused on using Puerto Rico to contain European expansion into the Caribbean and to protect the Panama Canal. (2) 1946–1991: From the start of the Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States used Puerto Rico as a propaganda tool in its ideological battles with the Soviet Union and its allies, especially Cuba. (3) 1992–Present: From the end of the Cold War to the present. During this most recent phase, Puerto Rico’s strategic importance to U.S. national security comes to an end. The U.S. domestic political and economic situations drive colonial policy.
Topic:
Imperialism, National Security, History, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Puerto Rico

216. AI and the US Economy: Optimism, Pessimism, or Realism?

Author:
Fredrick Hernandez, Zach Moller, and Gabe Horwitz
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
There were 130 websites on the internet in 1993; today there are 1.1 billion.1 Over those 30 years, the US economy quadrupled in nominal size and tripled in per capita income.2 The digital age has been very good for America. But it has also concentrated wealth and opportunity. The richest American in 1993 would only be the 101st richest today in inflation-adjusted dollars.3 There are now 735 billionaires living in America today, compared to fewer than 75 in the world in 1993.4 Meanwhile, the gains for the middle class were not stellar. Real median household income grew a solid, but not spectacular, 32% during the internet age. Most of that gain accrued to the two-fifths of working age America with a college degree.5 “50% to 70% of the changes in the US wage structure are intimately linked to automation, particularly digital automation,” MIT economist Daron Acemoglu estimates.6 That was the digital age. What about the artificial intelligence age? Ask McKinsey partner Michael Chui about AI and he says “it can be great not only for companies but for humankind.”7 But Eliezer Yudkowsky, co-founder of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, said that if someone builds an over-powered AI, he expects “that every single member of the human species and all biological life on Earth dies shortly thereafter.”8 What seems clear is that whether we’re addressing the future of humankind or the well-being of the workforce, policymakers and industries must make intentional choices to get the best of AI and avoid the worst. Since AI will change the way we work and learn, this paper unpacks different economic projections to give policymakers a better read on what this technology will do to everything from American GDP to skill training. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct perspectives on AI and the economy. Optimists predict AI will elevate the working class, accelerate our national prosperity, and lower costs. Pessimists say AI will contribute to income inequality in the United States, jobs will be automated out of existence, and large corporations will gain far more than workers and families. Pragmatists accept AI will have positive benefits to the economy but acknowledge the mixed bag of how it will affect jobs and generally call for specific actions to mitigate harms and spread benefits. Below, we explore the key takeaways from each perspective. This is a product in a multi-year series to help educate policymakers on the implications and policy choices confronting Congress and the Administration on next generation Artificial Intelligence.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Digital Technologies, and Optimism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

217. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:
Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

218. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race

Author:
Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

219. Designing a New Paradigm in Global Trade

Author:
Ryan Mulholland, Trevor Sutton, and Timothy Meyer
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
How a successful Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum could function while delivering maximum benefits to workers and the environment.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Sustainability, and Metals
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

220. Centering Access, Quality, and Equity and Justice in a Beyond 30×30 Ocean Strategy

Author:
Angelo Villagomez, Jasmin Graham, and Alia Hidayat
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Biden administration should deliver an ocean conservation framework that includes new metrics for success.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Oceans and Seas, Joe Biden, and Equity
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America