Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: within 10 Years

501. Navigating Global Value Chains and Economics in 2025: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing IndoPacific

Author:: Thanh Nha Nguyen
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Vietnam has emerged as an indispensable link in Indo-Pacific manufacturing networks. The country’s strategic advantage lies in its ability to adapt to shifting policies while mitigating risks from trade frictions. To sustain these gains, Vietnam must invest strategically in long-term competitiveness by upgrading workforce skills, improving infrastructure, and climbing the value chain through enhanced design and innovation capabilities. Vietnam’s adaptability has made it a prime beneficiary of the ongoing realignment in global supply chains driven by US trade policy changes. Tariffs on Chinese goods and broader efforts to "de-risk" supply lines have prompted many manufacturers to expand operations in Vietnam, sharply boosting exports and investment. By 2023, Vietnam had vaulted from the 12th- to 7th-largest exporter to the United States, as US imports from Vietnam rose by nearly 35 percent year-on-year. High-profile firms, including Samsung, Apple contractors, and major textile producers, have accelerated investments in Vietnam, solidifying its role as a preferred “China+1” manufacturing base.
Topic:: Economics, Manufacturing, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:: Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

502. Assessing Access to Legal Representation for Unaccompanied Migrant Children: National, State, and County-Level Analysis of Free- and Low-Cost Attorney Prevalence in Relation to Children’s Locations

Author:: Jill M. Williams
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This study presents the first effort to assess unaccompanied migrant children’s access to free and low-cost attorneys in the United States at the national, state, and county levels. Since 2021, over 544,000 unaccompanied children have entered the United States and been apprehended along the southwest border. The vast majority of these children are transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement and released to sponsors across the country while their immigration cases are processed. While unaccompanied children are not guaranteed the right to government appointed counsel, a broad body of research indicates that having legal representation greatly increases the likelihood that a child will identify a form of legal relief and will have a legal outcome that allows them to remain in the country. Access to legal representation additionally connects children with trusted adults and increases opportunities to identify and address instances where children are being abused or exploited. However, a large percentage of unaccompanied children still lack legal representation. To date, little research has explored the factors that support or inhibit unaccompanied children’s access to representation. This study draws on research that shows that geographic proximity to attorneys is one key factor affecting the likelihood that immigrants will obtain counsel and research that demonstrates dramatic unevenness in legal counsel nationally to assess the prevalence of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in relation to where unaccompanied children are released to sponsors. Our findings demonstrate an overall lack of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in relation to the number of unaccompanied children in need of legal representation, with only one attorney for every 137 children nationally. Moreover, in assessing attorney to child ratios at the state-scale, we demonstrate that in 43 states (86 percent of the states in the country) the number of children to attorneys exceeds reasonable caseloads. Importantly, these estimates do not account for the fact that not all free and low-cost immigration attorneys take on children’s cases nor for the overall demand for immigration legal services among the more than three million individuals facing deportation in the United States. In turn, while sobering, our estimates likely significantly over-estimate children’s actual access to representation across the United States. Based on these findings, we offer the following policy recommendations: • Federal, state, local, and philanthropic organizations should strategically invest in workforce development to grow the number of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in general and specifically in areas where the lack is particularly high. • Workforce development programs should both engage new law school graduates and individuals working in private practice who may be looking to enter the public interest sector. • Policy makers, funders, and organizational leaders should invest in and support holistic representation models in order to reduce the burdens experienced by attorneys and foster retention in the field. • Governmental and philanthropic organizations should invest in additional research and program evaluation in order to more fully understand the need for representation among unaccompanied children and barriers to and facilitators of accessing representation. These efforts should go hand-in-hand with improvements in data quality and sharing among governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. • The federal government should immediately reinstate all contracts and programs related to providing legal orientation and representation to unaccompanied migrant children in line with Congressionally appropriated funds allocated for these purposes to both ensure children’s rights under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) are realized and that the existing (already insufficient) workforce of trained and experienced attorneys equipped to represent unaccompanied children is not eroded.
Topic:: Migration, Children, Migrants, Lawyers, and Unaccompanied Children
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

503. The United States, Europe, and the Global Compacts: Honoring the Right to Remain and the Right to Migrate

Author:: J. Kevin Appleby
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: The adoption of the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees in 2019 by the UN General Assembly marked a significant achievement, providing two essential frameworks from which UN Member States could fashion their future immigration and refugee policies. Since their adoption, however, the number of forcibly displaced in the world has increased significantly, prompting receiving nations, such as the United States and the European countries, to rely more on deterrence-based enforcement initiatives to reduce the number of migrants arriving at their borders. At the same time, the number of migrant deaths, both on sea and land, have increased, as desperate migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees have attempted to find new homes in industrialized nations. This paper analyzes the migration policies adopted by the United States and Europe in the nearly six years since the Global Compacts were adopted and provides an assessment about how these receiving nations have adapted to the rising number of forcibly displaced in the world, and whether, in doing so, their policies have been consistent with the provision of both Compacts. The paper finds that: • Both the US and Europe have instituted enforcement policies that violate the spirit, if not the intent, of the two Compacts, and, in some cases, undermine international human rights standards; • Both the US and Europe have attempted to balance their enforcement-related approaches with the creation of legal avenues and immigrant integration policies, consistent with the two Compacts, but their efforts, to date, have been insufficient to the need; • The US has made significant strides in introducing policies to protect refugee-like populations, but has failed to protect asylum-seekers in need of protection who arrive at the US-Mexico border; • Europe has relied on bilateral agreements and restrictive laws to deter migrants from reaching European shores, while at the same time supported sending and transit countries with development assistance; • Both the US and Europe have a mixed record with regard to preserving the principles of the right to remain and the right to migrate, a record which must be improved in the years ahead.
Topic:: Migration, United Nations, Refugees, Freedom of Movement, Rights, and Right to Stay
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

504. More Than Miscommunication: Rethinking Interpretation at the Asylum Office

Author:: Hillary Mellinger
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: The United States requires asylum applicants to provide their own interpreters for their interviews at the Asylum Office, barring exceptional circumstances. Applicants can face significant hurdles in finding suitable interpreters, who play a critical role in giving them a voice in the asylum process. Inaccurate interpretation can have serious ramifications such as denial of an applicant’s asylum claim. Despite the critical need for meaningful language access in the asylum process, interpretation at the Asylum Office remains understudied. This article represents a first attempt at bringing the scholarly and practitioner communities together to rethink interpretation at the Asylum Office, with the goal of identifying feasible steps that the Asylum Office can take to enhance language access. This article proposes the below five holistic policy recommendations to improve interpretation at the Asylum Office, based on data from 28 interviews with attorneys who practiced before either the Arlington or Houston Asylum Offices, as well as the authors’ own prior professional experiences advocating on behalf of asylum seekers. 1. Government provision of telephonic interpreters. 2. Advance notice when a bilingual asylum officer can conduct an asylum interview in a language other than English. 3. Additional institutional support for asylum officers including lunch breaks. 4. Improved data collection regarding interpretation. 5. Additional research including analysis of how the COVID-19 pandemic affected interpretation at the Asylum Office. These recommendations are a starting point to improving language access at the Asylum Office. With this article, the authors hope to spark future research and conversations to ensure that individuals with limited English proficiency have meaningful access to asylum interviews.
Topic:: Immigration, Asylum, Interpretation, Lawyers, and Language Access
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

505. The Undocumented Population in the United States Increased to 12.2 Million in 2023

Author:: Robert Warren
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: In 2023, the US undocumented population reached 12.2 million, exceeding the previous high of 12.0 million in 2008. This report provides estimates of the undocumented population in 2023 based on data collected in the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). The report focuses on trends in annual population growth from 2013 to 2023 for the total population and for 17 countries or areas of origin. It also describes trends in the undocumented population in the six states with the largest undocumented population in 2023. The CMS estimates of undocumented residents include immigrants in the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) programs, and the estimates include most of the people that have entered asylum backlogs or received humanitarian parole status since 2021. The estimates were derived using previous CMS estimation procedures except that higher undercount rates were used to estimate the number of undocumented residents that arrived after 2020. Adjustment for undercount was increased for post-2020 arrivals to account for the unusually large flow across the US/Mexico border in recent years and because relatively more migrants resided in group quarters1 where enumeration can be difficult. The CMS methodology is summarized after the following section, and information about undercount rates for recent arrivals is shown in the Appendix.
Topic:: Demographics, Migration, Immigration, and Undocumented Population
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

506. Fear as a Group Emotion in Mixed-Status Immigrant Ecuadorian Community in Queens, New York

Author:: Halyna Lemekh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This study foregrounds fear as a group emotion shared by members of the Ecuadorian immigrant community in Queens, New York. The study is based on 30 in-depth interviews collected through ethnographic fieldwork in an Ecuadorian enclave in 2022–2023. It illuminates how fear, as a group emotion, instilled by “illegality,” is experienced by first-generation, 1.5-generation, and second-generation immigrants. Group fear experienced by members of the mixed-status immigrant community stems from collective and cumulative fear. This study defines collective fear as an emotion prevailing in mixed-status immigrant communities because of vulnerability from their undocumented status and marginalization passed on to members through socialization. Collective fear affects group dynamics and intergroup interactions, with debilitating effects on its members; however, it has positive functions, cementing social bonds between immigrants and solidifying the community. Another aspect of group fear is cumulative fear, defined in this study as the totality of fears experienced by first-generation, 1.5-generation, and second-generation Ecuadorian immigrants. First-generation immigrants express fear of border crossing, fear of detention and deportation, and fear of uncertainty during the legalization process. Meanwhile, 1.5-generation immigrants convey retrospective fear of crossing the border, fear of detention and deportation, fear of uncertainty during the legalization process, fear of liminal status restrictions, and fear of termination of the temporary protective status granted to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients. Second-generation immigrants, as jus-soli citizens of the United States, report fear of family separation and sympathy toward undocumented community members. Collective fear disseminated through numerous in-group (among community members) and inter-group interactions (community members and interior immigration enforcement) and learned through socialization provides empirical evidence of the “top–down” influence of group members’ experiences on emotions. Conversely, cumulative fear is based on individuals’ immigrant experiences cohering through the “bottom–up” influence of shared emotion on group formation. The only way to eradicate this group fear is to adjust one’s undocumented status, leading former undocumented immigrants to feel guilty about their acquired freedom, as their family members may still live in the shadow of “illegality.” This study demonstrates that U.S. President Joe Biden’s executive order aimed at keeping American families together cannot eliminate the overall paralyzing fear in immigrant communities. Given that the policy will affect an insignificant number of people, drastic measures are needed. The following policy recommendations are offered: • Allow non-citizen spouses and children to adjust their unresolved immigrant status unconditionally (removing the requirement of residence in the U.S. for 10 years or more). • Grant all recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program legal permanent resident status as a pathway to U.S. citizenship. • Allow all liminally legal 1.5-generation immigrants to pursue education and careers through legalization. • Forbid deportation of U.S. citizens’ parents, forgive most undocumented immigrants’ unauthorized entry into the country, and allow them to adjust their status.
Topic:: Immigrants, Fear, Undocumented Population, Amnesty, and Group Emotion
Political Geography:: New York, North America, Ecuador, United States of America, and Queens

507. Virtuality for Real Children: Unaccompanied Minors and US Immigration Custody

Author:: Kif Augustine-Adams, Hayley Pierce, Melissa Alcaraz, and Jhandra Melissa Díaz López
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: In the United States, federal law charges the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with responsibility for the custody and care of unaccompanied migrant children. Since April 2021, more than 1,250 child migrants have experienced what ORR terms a “Virtual” program placement while in its custody. ORR has not: explained what its use of virtuality means for the children in its care, defined Virtual as a program placement type, set forth parameters for its use, or published the criteria by which it selects children for virtual rather than physical placement. Using administrative data, an online video meeting with ORR personnel, and ORR manuals and documents, this article conceptualizes ORR’s use of virtuality as a bifurcation of a child’s custody: ORR takes technical legal custody but not physical custody of the child. The article recognizes risks this bifurcation poses to the physical well-being of unaccompanied children and how bifurcation complicates ORR’s compliance with minimum legal standards set by federal law. The article likewise identifies benefits some children have received from virtual placement: quick release from ORR custody; the opportunity to remain with accompanying non-parental adults, such as siblings and grandparents, rather than enduring separation from them, as is standard practice in US immigration detention; and privileged entry into the US independent of standard legal authorization procedures. The article urges ORR and other US government entities to account for the risks and benefits virtuality poses to the well-being of unaccompanied migrant children.
Topic:: Migrants, Unaccompanied Children, Immigration Detention, and Virtual
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

508. What does Trump's new National Security Strategy mean for the Middle East?

Author:: David Hale and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: In this episode, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Ambassador David Hale joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). Released on December 4, the document outlines the administration’s foreign policy vision, priorities, and approach to global challenges. Ambassador Hale analyzes the new NSS and how it compares to previous US strategy documents. The conversation focuses on what the NSS means for the future of US policy in the Middle East, and how it is likely to be received by regional actors. Recorded on December 9, 2025.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Donald Trump, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Middle East and United States of America

509. Reauthorizing the Defense Production Act in the Era of Defense Mobilization and Supply-side Industrial Policy

Author:: Michael Hikari Cecire
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) is one of the most significant tools the U.S. government uses to mobilize the civilian economy for national defense. As the United States approaches the DPA’s statutory termination and likely reauthorization in 2025, this article surveys its recent employment during the COVID-19 pandemic and potential for policy iteration, assessing its evolution from postwar and early Cold War origins to a broader industrial policy tool. By analyzing DPA usage, legislative actions, and public interest trends, this study aims to extract key lessons from its recent implementation. The article argues that while the DPA has become increasingly central to the government’s industrial policy initiatives, its application has been broadly inconsistent, unevenly coordinated, and insufficiently integrated into broader strategic frameworks. Reauthorization of the DPA could include creating a more permanent and coordinated executive branch infrastructure, clarifying its use as an emergency versus routine policy tool, and identifying gaps in future deployment.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, COVID-19, Defense Production Act (DPA), and Reauthorization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

510. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:: Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

511. Recent U.S. Government Policy Literature on Critical and Strategic Minerals

Author:: Bert Chapman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Critical and strategic minerals have become increasingly important in U.S. government civilian and military policymaking in recent years. This is demonstrated by the heavy use of such minerals in many critical civilian and military infrastructures. This work will discuss how this subject has been addressed in laws, presidential documents, and works by government agencies along with congressional oversight committees and support agencies. It will stress how the United States is heavily dependent on strategic minerals from adversarial foreign countries such as China and will examine U.S. efforts to increase its ability to produce such materials in the United States by reforming permitting processes. It will conclude with recommendations for the United States to enhance its ability to produce these materials domestically and acquire them from reliable foreign sources. The conclusion will also suggest ways that the president and federal agency stakeholders can enhance public awareness of this problem and their efforts to rectify it.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Information, Critical Minerals, and Permitting
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

512. NATO's Long Cold Front: Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North

Author:: Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

513. The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the U.S. Military Strategy in Proxy Wars, 2020–2024

Author:: Ehsan Ejazi and Mahsa Ahmadyan
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Proxy war has been a dynamic U.S. military strategy since the Cold War. In recent decades, however, artificial intelligence (AI) as a new manifestation of technology has played a significant role in these wars. The United States has been a pioneer in this field, making substantial investments, annually allocates multibillion-dollar budgets to advance robotic and automated weapons to win future wars. Artificial intelligence proxy wars can manage the competition between international actors as a mediating factor without wasting human resources. The main question of this article is as follows: What is the role of artificial intelligence in U.S. military strategy, and how much can this new technology help win proxy wars? The findings indicate that the United States, by applying artificial intelligence technology to its military equipment with remote control capabilities, robots, and automated guided weapons, has reduced human and financial costs while increasing the probability of triumph on the battlefield. However, the obtained data, according to moral and humanitarian criteria, suggest a high rate of civilian casualties in such military conflicts.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

514. Synthesizing Strategic Frameworks for Great Power Competition

Author:: Gavin Holtz
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines the theoretical foundations necessary for conceptualizing and operationalizing modern great power competition through the innovative synthesis of three influential military frameworks: Colonel John R. Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, Colonel John A. Warden’s systems analysis, and Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s unrestricted warfare theory. The research demonstrates how complementary frameworks provide strategic practitioners with comprehensive capabilities for identifying systemic vulnerabilities, orchestrating cross-domain effects, and maintaining decisive advantage through superior decision-making processes. The analysis reveals how modern competition transcends traditional military boundaries, necessitating organizational architectures capable of implementing synchronized operations across multiple competitive domains. This theoretical synthesis supports the proposal for an Interagency Action Committee on China (IAC-C) and identifies the foundational principles of a cross-domain organizational framework.
Topic:: Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Warfare, Great Powers, and Systems Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

515. Strategic Implications of Emerging Weapon Technologies: Kinetic Bombardment, Antimatter, and Antigravity Technology for U.S. National Security

Author:: Ahsan Uddin
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article explores the strategic implications of emerging weapon technologies on U.S. national security, focusing specifically on antimatter, kinetic bombardment systems, and antigravity technology. As global military dynamics evolve, it is imperative for the United States to assess and perhaps integrate these emerging technologies to maintain its military superiority. This article examines the accuracy and destructive capability of kinetic bombardment, the immense energy potential of antimatter, and the groundbreaking applications of antigravity propulsion in aerial operations. The findings underscore the critical role that these technologies may play in improving U.S. national security and provide a foundation for additional research on their national security applications and implications.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Weapons, Research and Development, and Military
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

516. The Arctic as a Periphery in U.S.-China Competition

Author:: Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.
Topic:: Strategic Competition, Periphery, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

517. The Hegemonic Transition in Latin America: To What Extent is China Challenging US’s Hegemony?

Author:: Andoni Maiza-Larrarte and Ricardo Bustillo-Mesanza
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: In this paper, we examine the geopolitical consequences of China’s enhanced engagement in Latin America. China is increasing its economic weight among Latin American countries, reinforcing its external image to counter the perception that the US is a unique relevant ally. In previous research, some authors have supported the idea that China could become a sort of neocolonial power in Latin America, substituting the hegemony of the United States. In this article, we carry out an in-depth review of Western literature and a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship to discuss China’s role in the region. We apply the principles of the hegemonic stability and the power transition theories, and we also include an assessment of “soft power” components. We conclude that China is eroding US power in Latin America but is still far from becoming the new regional hegemon.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Transition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

518. Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea

Author:: Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The South China Sea has long been the subject of territorial and maritime disputes between Beijing, Manila, and other claimants. Since late 2022, escalating confrontations between Philippine and Chinese forces over tiny maritime features such as Second Thomas Shoal have posed a serious and growing risk of a military confrontation, which could in turn entangle the United States. Washington can avoid this worst-case scenario by charting a pragmatic approach and upholding its alliance commitment to the Philippines while avoiding military actions that would needlessly provoke China. The data in this brief show a dramatic increase of maritime incidents starting in the third quarter of 2023. China and the Philippines are disputing control over, among other things, what are little more than specks in the ocean, most located a hundred miles or more from the mainland of either country. However, maritime rights and jurisdiction are significant issues, and there is no question that Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea has been provocative and coercive. Moreover, an international tribunal has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in the dispute, decisively rejecting China’s “historic” claims around the “nine/ten dash line.” The U.S. relationship with the Philippines represents one of the United States’ oldest treaty alliances in the Global South and is important to America’s Pacific strategy. But the South China Sea conflict does not represent a threat of conquest of the Philippine mainland. Washington should recognize that defending maritime rights and tiny land features in waters half a world away is not a vital U.S. national interest and could become a serious liability should it open the door to a high-intensity conflict with China. An honest assessment of U.S. interests dictates a strategy of restraint in the South China Sea. While recognizing Manila’s agency and continuing to strengthen Philippine capacities, Washington should also encourage Manila to engage constructively with Beijing to prevent escalation. Crucially, U.S. policymakers must also avoid raising the risk of conflict by drawing the Philippines into taking a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Washington can help preserve and uphold international law in the South China Sea while reducing the risk of war between the United States and China by taking the following steps: Do not pull the U.S.–Philippines alliance into the Taiwan theater. Washington should not add to its nine existing military sites in the Philippines and, ideally, should disband one or more of the new sites located in northern Luzon (closer to Taiwan) in exchange for Chinese concessions. Do not give the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard a frontal role in countering Chinese intrusions in the South China Sea; enable Manila to take the lead instead. Do not seek to draw the military of U.S. allies (particularly extra-regional ones) into South China Sea disputes, in order to avoid needlessly heightening Chinese perceptions of bloc-formation and armed encirclement. Enhance diplomatic support to Manila for its legitimate claims under international law. Provide aid, capabilities, and intelligence for modernizing the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Build on the early success of the July 2024 Philippines–China understanding on Second Thomas Shoal by emphasizing preventive diplomacy and crisis management to stabilize the maritime dispute and reduce the chances of a conflict spiral.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

519. Big Ideas and Big Money: Think Tank Funding in America

Author:: Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief provides a detailed analysis of a first-of-its-kind, publicly available repository of U.S. think tank funding — www.thinktankfundingtracker.org. The repository tracks funding from foreign governments, the U.S. government, and Pentagon contractors to the top 50 think tanks in the United States over the past five years. It serves as a vital research guide for anyone wishing to learn more about the funding sources of prominent U.S. think tanks. The repository gives a five-point transparency score to each of the top 50 think tanks in the U.S., a scale created by the authors based on five binary questions. Based on this criteria, nine of the top 50 think tanks (18 percent) are fully transparent, while 23 think tanks (46 percent) are partially transparent. Most concerning, the remaining 18 think tanks (36 percent) are “dark money” think tanks, entirely opaque in their funding without revealing donors. In the past five years, foreign governments and foreign government-owned entities donated more than $110 million to the top 50 think tanks in the United States. The most generous donor countries were the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Qatar, which contributed $16.7 million, $15.5 million, and $9.1 million to U.S. think tanks, respectively. The Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, and German Marshall Fund received the most money from foreign governments since 2019: $20.8 million, $17.1 million, and $16.1 million, respectively. In that same period, the top 100 defense companies have contributed more than $34.7 million to the top 50 think tanks. The top donors include Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Mitsubishi, which provided $5.6 million, $2.6 million, and $2.1 million, respectively, to the tracked think tanks between 2019 and 2023. The Atlantic Council, Center for a New American Security, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies were the top recipients of Pentagon contractor money: $10.2 million, $6.6 million, and $4.1 million, respectively. The U.S. government has directly given at least $1.49 billion to American think tanks since 2019. However, the vast majority of this funding — $1.4 billion — goes to the Rand Corporation, which works directly for the U.S. government. While think tanks exist to produce independent analysis, the prevalence of special interest funding raises questions of intellectual freedom, self-censorship, and perspective filtering. This is compounded by instances in which individual researchers simultaneously hold positions at a think tank and a given foreign government or corporation, a clear potential conflict of interest. Moving forward, this brief contains a set of recommendations for various actors: For media: Adopt a professional standard to report any conflicts of interest with sources discussing U.S. foreign policy. For Congress: Pass legislation requiring all nonprofit organizations that seek to influence public policy to publicly disclose all of their corporate, U.S. government, and foreign government donors above $10,000, and improve the conflict of interest disclosure requirements for congressional witnesses. For the Department of Justice: Provide clearer guidelines surrounding what think tanks not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act can do on behalf of their foreign donors. For think tanks: End pay-to-play research and proactively move toward identifying conflicts of interest.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Think Tanks, Donors, Funding, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

520. European Hedging as a Diplomatic Opportunity for the United States

Author:: Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: With the onset of multipolarity in the world and growing disagreement between the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. should expect a declining foreign policy alignment with Europe. Rather than bemoan this development, the U.S. should recognize it as a strategic opportunity. Selective hedging by European countries — reducing their dependency on the United States and cultivating stronger relations with other major powers — would facilitate a diplomacy-led, restraint-based U.S. foreign policy and help the U.S. navigate a multipolar world order. For years, Europe has stood as a de facto vassal of the United States, a continent dependent on American military might and comprising countries largely lacking foreign policy independence. Such self-subordination has had negative consequences for Europe and the United States alike. It has weakened Europe’s overall global standing, which in turn means that the U.S. has been able to draw less advantage from its European alliance. This has unintentionally reduced U.S. diplomatic heft in engaging with adversaries. But a considerable U.S.–European schism has recently emerged. The Trump administration’s decided break from the transatlantic status quo has engendered strong disagreements over Ukraine, European security policy more broadly, and international trade. With the combined weakening of political, military, and economic links across the Atlantic, Europe is more likely to hedge moving forward. Strategic hedging — a posture already adopted by many countries in the Global South — would allow European countries to pursue an independent foreign policy, bolstering their international relevance. This reorientation would be diplomatically advantageous to the United States, as hedgers in Europe could serve as friendly interlocutors for American engagement with rival nations. European hedging could provide a conduit for constructive U.S. diplomacy, while discouraging zero-sum thinking and the disintegration of the global order into hostile blocs. The U.S. must recognize that a vassalized European continent is both unsustainable and antithetical to a restrained foreign policy vision. While retaining friendly ties with European countries, the United States should now actively promote selective hedging, paving the way for long-term European independence and peaceful multipolarity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

521. Under Primacy, Weapons Sales Will Always Supersede Human Rights

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S. government’s expressed commitment to human rights is routinely undermined by its actual commitment to maintaining America’s global military primacy. Since the 1970s, Washington has cast itself as a defender of global human rights, when Congress passed laws to bar the U.S. from providing security assistance to human rights violators. Yet America’s interest in human rights has long been sublimated to the logic of hegemony, from Cold War containment to the Global War on Terror and beyond. Congress has still never successfully voted to block a weapons sale. Today, the myth that American power upholds human rights lies buried beneath the rubble of Gaza. This research brief traces the emergence of human rights within U.S. foreign policymaking in the waning decades of the Cold War — alongside Washington’s rise to the top of the global arms trade — and surveys the various U.S. government efforts to codify human rights considerations in the practice of U.S. foreign policy, particularly arms sales, through the Biden administration. This history reveals how American leaders, regardless of political party, have consistently instrumentalized human rights concerns to target perceived adversaries, while tossing aside such concerns when they apply to U.S. partners. After Israel invaded Gaza following the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration failed to place any meaningful conditions on weapons sales to Israel, despite Israel’s conduct showing clear violations of international and U.S. law. The Trump administration has since expanded America’s unconditional support for Israel. Even as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, the defense establishment remains intent on maintaining U.S. military primacy. In clinging to this pursuit, human rights will remain an afterthought, selectively invoked by U.S. leaders when they do not threaten the military-industrial complex and arms sales. Only a sober recalibration of America’s approach to our new geopolitical reality — including a foreign policy of military restraint — can bring about a deeper commitment to human rights in Washington.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

522. Peace Through Strength in Ukraine: Sources of U.S. Leverage in Negotiations

Author:: George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The key to American success in ending the war in Ukraine is to broaden, rather than narrow, the issues under negotiation. If American negotiators treat the war as a bilateral dispute between Russia and Ukraine and press both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire, they are likely to fail. In a narrow negotiation, Russia has significant advantages because it has turned the conflict into a war of attrition in which its much greater population and much larger military industry are overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. The United States and Europe lack the capacity to match Russia’s arms production or bridge the Russia–Ukraine manpower gap without direct conflict with Russia. By contrast, if Washington recognizes that Moscow’s security concerns extend beyond Ukraine to the broader military threat posed by U.S. and NATO forces in Europe — a threat Russia cannot blunt by conquering Ukraine — the U.S. can employ leverage that Kyiv lacks in direct bargaining with Moscow.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Leverage, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

523. U.S.–Cuban Relations: A Realist Case for Pragmatic Engagement

Author:: William M. LeoGrande and Geoff Thale
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This report, sponsored by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, is the product of a set of consultations among a group of scholars, opinion leaders, and foreign policy specialists that took place over the last nine months to develop a proposal for a new way forward in U.S. relations with Cuba. The project was coordinated by William M. LeoGrande, professor of government at American University, and Geoff Thale, former president of the Washington Office on Latin America and now an independent analyst. In a series of individual discussions, written exchanges, and small group meetings, participants shared views on U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, including the state of U.S.–Cuban relations, the impact of U.S.–Cuba policy on broader U.S. national interests, and the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Cuban people. Participants also discussed the situation in Cuba itself, including the state of the economy, migration, political rights, and civil rights. The group sought additional input from policymakers, former executive branch officials, and congressional staff. The group’s broad consensus is that the national interest of the United States would be better served by resetting U.S. policy toward Cuba, embarking on a path of engagement aimed at eventually normalizing relations. We recognize that this was not the policy that President Trump pursued in his first term, nor was it a policy supported by key members of the president’s current foreign policy team. As of this writing, the new administration has taken several steps toward tightening the embargo but has yet to announce a full-fledged Cuba policy. Sometimes advancing U.S. interests requires setting aside old animosities and engaging with former adversaries, as President Trump has done by opening negotiations with Syria, as well as continuing talks with Russia, China, and others. The president defines his “America First” foreign policy as one that champions “core American interests” and “puts America and its interests first.” 1 U.S. policy toward Cuba in recent years has failed that test. This document lays out the rationale for a new policy that advances U.S. national interests and also takes into account the interests of the Cuban people. It recommends a series of specific policy steps that would address priority issues like mass migration, narcotics trafficking, and the rising influence of U.S. global rivals, both in Cuba and in Latin America, as well as U.S. economic and cultural interests. This report benefited enormously from the thoughtful comments and suggestions of a great many people with deep experience and insight into U.S.–Cuban relations who graciously shared their expertise and advice with us in the course of this project. They include current and former U.S. government officials — from both the executive and legislative branches — as well as civil society leaders who have been engaged with this issue for many years. We offer special thanks to Ambassador (retired) Jeffrey DeLaurentis, who served as chargé d’affaires in the U.S. Embassy in Havana; Angela Mariana Freyre, former special advisor on Cuba at the National Security Council; Victor Johnson, former staff director for the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Cindy Buhl, former legislative director and foreign policy aide to Congressman Jim McGovern. They read several drafts of this report, and their suggestions improved it considerably. Their participation does not mean that they endorse every argument or recommendation; that responsibly rests with us alone. We are also grateful to the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft for sponsoring this project and especially to Sarang Shidore, director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South program, and Marcus Stanley, director of the Quincy Institute’s Studies department, for their support and advice.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Engagement, Strategic Interests, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Cuba and United States of America

524. Investing in the National Interest: The DFC and American Statecraft

Author:: Karthik Sankaran and Dan M. Ford
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, supports private-sector investment across the Global South, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Congress is currently reviewing legislation to reauthorize the DFC. The DFC is likely to see significant changes in the coming years, including a large expansion of its financial resources and a liberalization of its permissible investments. The likely expansion of the DFC would serve U.S. interests as an instrument of positive influence in the Global South. However, it is also possible that changes made during the reauthorization process may amplify a major concern with the DFC’s focus and strategic approach: an excessive emphasis on national security goals and on exclusionary conflict with U.S. adversaries, particularly China. Such an approach can damage the potential for the U.S. to grow its competitive commercial presence in the Global South and reduce the DFC’s effectiveness as a pro-development instrument that enhances U.S. influence in the Global South. Proposed changes to the DFC’s strategic goals and an outright ban on engagement with Chinese–funded projects may drive the DFC further down an exclusionary, zero-sum path. The DFC should also not be used to invest in high-income countries, which would detract from one of its core missions. This brief outlines a more expansive vision for the DFC, which would help the United States expand its economic footprint in the Global South without the pitfalls of an excessively securitized view of international development. A higher-impact DFC could improve the global influence of the United States, deepen economic partnerships and drive healthy, vigorous competition with China while avoiding coercive and almost certainly ineffective efforts to force countries to completely decouple from Beijing. Critical minerals, energy, and strategic infrastructure should be major focuses of an enlarged DFC. Such projects diversify U.S. supply chains and offer holistic investment opportunities. At the same time, the DFC should pursue an approach that emphasizes broad-based commercial development, to include engagement with small- and medium-sized enterprises. An approach that views target countries as commercial partners rather than pawns for hard security competition best positions the United States to enhance its reputation in the Global South. Expanding the DFC’s range of available financial tools to include, for example, subordinated loans and more mechanisms to manage political and currency risk, could also improve its flexibility as a commercial partner. A clear candidate for a future DFC initiative along those lines is the Lobito Corridor. This project would create a massive transit hub for mineral transportation across sub-Saharan Africa and subsequent incorporation into the global market, bolstering local infrastructure, expanding the supply of critical minerals, and providing ample downstream U.S. investment opportunities. Another possible candidate is the brownfield expansion and modernization of the Puerto Bolivar container port in Ecuador’s El Oro province.
Topic:: Global South, Investment, Private Sector, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, Statecraft, and US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

525. Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Supporting Taiwan Without a Commitment to War

Author:: Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The first brief in this series made the case that Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying a war between the United States and China. This second brief outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity in a manner that continues to deter Beijing from coercing Taipei while ruling out direct American military intervention in defense of the island. This brief recommends that, in the short to medium term, the United States should maintain its standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan while also carrying out necessary preparations for a noninterventionist policy shift. These preparations include: A clear statement from Washington that it opposes any unilateral move by Taipei to achieve formal independence. A revitalization of the eroding One China Policy. A reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. A bolstering of the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan and nearby treaty allies. Encouragement and support for those in Japan who seek to ease tensions with China and wish to cultivate cooperative Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relationships. The initiation of a results-oriented strategic dialogue with China. The expansion of mutually beneficial trade, investment, and technology exchanges with Taiwanese companies and the offshoring of Taiwanese high-tech capabilities. Once these necessary, gradual preparations have been made, the U.S. president should explicitly state that America will not go to war with China to defend Taiwan but that the United States will support Taiwan — and the development of an improved cross-strait environment — in every other way possible. This policy shift is necessary because ongoing military and political trends are eroding the ability of the United States to deter and reassure China, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The One China Policy is deteriorating, the Taiwanese public increasingly rejects any political association with China, and China is expanding its reliance on military displays, which undermines the credibility of the Chinese commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. More generally, U.S.–China relations continue to worsen. This trajectory renders the standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, which accepts the possibility of a direct U.S. war with China, dangerous and misaligned with U.S. interests. The above preparatory changes will require considerable diplomatic finesse and sustained attention over a considerable period of time. Given the weakened National Security Council and the virtual collapse of the past interagency coordinating process for policy development under President Trump, these required qualities might be in short supply at present. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be able to correct these deficiencies. It is unlikely China would respond to the strategy outlined here by attempting to reunify with Taiwan by force. This is because of the still high — and, in some areas, increased — risks confronting any Chinese use of force and because of the fact that this policy shift would likely increase Beijing’s confidence in eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

526. The Fading of Old Irritants: U.S.–Türkiye Relations in a Post–Assad Landscape

Author:: Adam Weinstein and Steven Simon
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S.–Türkiye relationship today is a fraught partnership marked by discord and strategic misalignment — particularly within the context of the Syrian Civil War but long before it as well. With the fading of old irritants in a post–Assad Syrian political landscape, a more stable and cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship is possible — an opportunity the Trump administration should seize. The United States and Türkiye, though NATO allies, have historically lacked the shared values that make the transactionalism inherent in alliance frameworks easier to manage. As such, tensions have arisen when the strategic interests of each country or domestic politics have diverged. The Syrian Civil War, particularly since the emergence of the ISIS caliphate in 2014, illustrated this division starkly. While initially supportive of the mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, Türkiye became disillusioned with the military campaign once the United States partnered with the Kurdish–led People’s Protection Units, or YPG. To Türkiye, the YPG is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, a militant Kurdish group that the country has fought since the early 1980s and views as an existential challenge. This misalignment of primary objectives in Syria created a fraught dynamic between the U.S. and Türkiye. In December 2024, Bashar al–Assad’s regime fell following a successful military campaign by Hay`at Tahrir al–Sham, or HTS, a Sunni Islamist group with close ties to Türkiye. While HTS’s rule moving forward is precarious, the United States and Türkiye share a common interest in preventing renewed civil strife in Syria. A resumed war could create another wave of asylum migration to Türkiye and beyond, stimulate deeper Israeli involvement, renew Iranian attempts to influence developments, and run counter to a broadly shared international interest in a unitary Syrian state. President Trump has expressed a desire to withdraw American troops from Syria and a willingness to permit greater Turkish influence in northern Syria. To advance a more cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship, this brief recommends the following: The Trump administration should establish a formal working group with Türkiye on Syria, bringing together intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic channels. Türkiye and Kurdish groups should engage in backchannel diplomacy to promote Kurdish integration into a functioning Syrian state and protect the Kurds against human rights abuses. The United States and Türkiye should rebuild strategic trust through targeted defense cooperation, resuming U.S. arms sales to Türkiye contingent on its cooperation in Syria and Iraq, and expanding U.S.–Türkiye joint training and NATO exercises. Türkiye and Israel should engage in stabilization dialogue to mitigate tensions over their respective zones of influence in Syria and to coordinate on eastern Mediterranean energy development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, Syrian War, Kurds, and Political Transition
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

527. Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington

Author:: Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief explores Qatar’s evolution into one of the more influential foreign lobbies in the United States. Qatar’s story demonstrates how money begets influence in the United States. Since Donald Trump was first elected president in 2016, Qatar has spent nearly $250 million on 88 FARA–registered lobbying and public relations firms. From January 2021 to June 2025, Qatar’s agents reported 627 in-person meetings with political contacts in the United States — more FARA–registered meetings than any other country in the world. The current Trump administration has deep ties to Qatar. Three cabinet-level members in the administration — Attorney General Pam Bondi, FBI Director Kash Patel, and EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin — have all previously held consultancy or lobbying positions on Qatar’s behalf. Qatar substantially increased its political influence efforts beginning in 2017, when it was blockaded and reportedly threatened with invasion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In response, Qatar began vigorous efforts to counteract anti–Qatar lobbying in the U.S. conducted by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and pro–Israel groups. More recently, Qatar has used its lobbying influence to bolster its legitimacy and reputation as a global conflict mediator and reassert its importance to U.S. strategic interests and its defense posture in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Hamas attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Qatar worked to combat claims of terrorist sympathies by successfully positioning itself as a mediator for ceasefire and hostage exchange negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The Qatar lobby has also helped to preserve the country’s standing as a critical U.S. ally in the Middle East, heading off a congressional push to move Al Udeid Air Base out of Qatar, preserving Qatar’s designation as a major non–NATO ally, and strengthening defensive ties via lucrative arms sales. Beyond the defense realm, Qatar is heavily invested in the U.S. In the past five years, Qatar has given upward of $9.1 million to think tanks. Since 2001, it has provided $6.25 billion to American colleges and universities. However, contrary to insinuations from some, its university-related funding and influence have primarily focused on educational efforts within Qatar, where the majority of students enrolled are Qatari. Qatar has also invested more broadly in the U.S. economy. This past May, Qatar pledged to invest $500 billion in the U.S. economy over the next decade, demonstrating its intention to retain its U.S. economic influence for the foreseeable future.
Topic:: Soft Power, Investment, Donald Trump, Lobbying, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, Qatar, and United States of America

528. Desecuritizing the Belarusian Balcony: Principles for U.S.–Belarus Relations

Author:: Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief outlines a low-cost, low-risk roadmap for sustained U.S. engagement with Belarus that could help to stabilize NATO’s volatile eastern flank, enabling the U.S. to retrench from the European continent and focus on other theaters. In light of governance concerns voiced by Western officials on the heels of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, and especially since Belarus provided support to Russian troops in the opening weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the E.U. and U.S. have adopted a strictly punitive approach to Belarus. Essentially, Belarus has been viewed as an appendage of Russia. However, this approach misses opportunities for the West to take advantage of inherent divisions between the interests of Belarus and Russia. As outlined in previous Quincy Institute research, President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus has long wished to develop a “multi-vector” foreign policy for his country. Such a policy would permit Belarus to maneuver between the East and West to best safeguard its own national sovereignty and interests. While Belarus has moved significantly closer to Russia in recent years, this pivot has in part been in reaction to Western hostility. Lukashenko likely remains open to some degree of cooperation with the West, and has signaled that he does not wish to increase participation in the Russia–Ukraine War. While it is almost certainly impossible to fully remove Belarus from the Russian camp, exploring ways for Belarus to triangulate between Russia and the West could offer significant benefits for U.S. interests and for regional stability. This brief recommends that the Trump administration explore the following bargain with Belarus: In exchange for a Belarusian commitment not to abet, facilitate, or engage in aggression against any NATO state, the U.S. should promise that it will not engage in any effort at an external change of government in Belarus. To firm up the U.S.–Belarus relationship, the U.S. should consider sectoral sanctions relief, including in the Belarusian civilian aviation sector, and U.S. engagement in other non-military investment opportunities, such as the Belarusian electric vehicle industry. The U.S. should also work to restore Belarus’ access to international financial institutions. The U.S. should mediate border issues between Belarus, Poland, and Lithuania toward the goal of deescalation on NATO’s eastern flank. The U.S. should encourage Belarusian efforts both to facilitate Russia–Ukraine peace talks, such as exchanges of prisoners of war and bodies of fallen soldiers, and to contribute to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, North America, Belarus, and United States of America

529. The U.S. and Mexico: A Special Relationship

Author:: Karthik Sankaran
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: President Trump’s policies carry risks and opportunities for one of the United States’ most vital relationships — that with Mexico. U.S. actions that cause cooperation to break down could damage both prosperity and security in the United States. Alternatively, both the U.S. and Mexico could strengthen cooperation rooted in national interests, allowing deeper linkages that benefit the U.S. economy, enhance stability in Mexico, and alleviate security challenges on the border. Across all trade relationships, the administration appears to seek simultaneously to: repatriate industrial production and employment back to the U.S. (reshoring); open new markets for U.S. investment and exports; construct more geopolitically secure supply lines (nearshoring); limit security threats to the homeland. These aims are not mutually exclusive, and all could be achieved if pursued in a balanced manner. But in the case of Mexico, the U.S. does not appear to be striking this balance. The lack of predictability in trade policy, and the failure to use tools available through existing agreements such as the U.S.–Mexico–Canada–Agreement, or USMCA, are creating contradictory signals and leading the U.S. to leave opportunities on the table. If the administration sends contradictory signals on its trade policy with Mexico, the likely result will be a significant increase in business uncertainty. Beyond the potentially damaging economic effects on U.S. investment decisions, this could have geopolitical consequences, hindering efforts to ensure politically and geographically resilient supply chains. It could also damage the Mexican economy in ways that potentially strengthen organized crime. To simultaneously advance the four key U.S. objectives — restoring manufacturing jobs; building geographically resilient supply chains; gaining economic policy concessions from Mexico; and enhancing the political stability of a neighbor critical to U.S. security — the brief recommends that the Trump administration: recognize Mexican President Sheinbaum’s popularity and openness to compromise as an opportunity to deepen the economic relationship rather than sever it; use the unique legal and institutional features of USMCA to advance the interests of both countries, particularly the improvement of labor conditions and the nearshoring of manufacturing; use diplomacy and USMCA mechanisms to leverage U.S. energy expertise and deepen U.S. investment in Mexico’s renewable energy sector; encourage deeper U.S. investment and engagement in sectors of the Mexican economy other than manufacturing, such as entertainment, retail, financial services, tourism, and healthcare; recognize that economic dealmaking lends itself to security cooperation.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Economy, Investment, Manufacturing, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America, Mexico, and United States of America

530. Taiwan: An Important but Non-Vital U.S. Interest

Author:: Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint that could trigger a direct war between the United States and China. It is critical, therefore, to examine whether or not Taiwan constitutes a vital U.S. interest. This brief asserts that Taiwan is an important but not vital U.S. interest. It is not an interest that justifies the United States going to war with China to defend. A direct war between the United States and China would be cataclysmic and cause extraordinary damage to the global economy. It would risk heavy U.S. military losses and possible nuclear escalation. It is also unclear whether the United States would prevail. Taiwan must be a truly vital interest to justify such risks. While it is important to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan and prevent a regional war that would destabilize East Asia, proponents of a U.S. defense of Taiwan by all means necessary exaggerate Taiwan’s strategic value and China’s military threat to East Asia. Taiwan is neither central to America’s ability to ensure a stable and prosperous Asia open to U.S. economic and political engagement nor is it a critical location for the United States to oppose Chinese hegemony in Asia. China views Taiwan primarily through a political lens. Beijing has not expressed the intent to use the annexation of the island as a stepping stone toward regional hegemony. Moreover, possession of Taiwan would not give China that capacity. The United States is not formally obligated to militarily defend Taiwan, in contrast to its security commitments to treaty allies Japan and South Korea. Washington does have a vital interest in maintaining its security commitments to Tokyo and Seoul — two robust economies and major technology innovators that are each more critical geostrategically than Taiwan. Taiwan does possess considerable value in its high-tech capabilities, producing 60 percent of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors. But replicating this production capacity in the United States and other Western countries would be far less costly than fighting a war with China over Taiwan. Although Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying war and is not a treaty ally, the United States still has a strong interest in preventing Chinese coercion of this U.S.–aligned democracy. An accompanying brief presents an alternative approach to supporting Taiwan while maintaining U.S. credibility with critical Asian allies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Interests, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

531. Is Liberalism as an Ideological Assumption Over?

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Much ink has been spilled debating the implications of the results of the U.S. November 2024 elections. In Europe, following the June 2024 elections, more than 40 far-right parties hold seats in the European Parliament, a growth from 25 the previous term. The far right also managed to increase its vote share in nine out of the 13 European states that held legislative elections in 2024.1 Compared to a decade ago, analysts understand that these events are not exceptional mo- ments, glitches in the system, or accidents of history. Nonetheless, many still prioritize short-term explanations such as, in the United States’ case, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris’ weak campaign performance, high levels of inflation, and unprecedented influxes of irregular migration. Others attribute far-right victories to either morally unacceptable sentiments such as racism and xenophobia or brainwashing via fake news and social media propaganda—whether through X (in the United States’ case and in Germany’s February 2025 elections)2 or TikTok (as in Romania’s first round of presidential elections).3 In both cases, these explanations provide moral reassurance: only citizens with bad intentions, victims of propaganda, or those unable to appreciate lib- eralism’s idealistic goals could vote for the far right. However, these arguments are insufficient in understanding the wave of rejection that societal order seems to be arousing amongst citizens. If one thinks that Donald Trump won only because his voters are systemic racists or susceptible to fake news, then one does not see that he may have won because his political program spoke to a multiracial coalition of blue-collar and white-collar voters and resonated with a growing number of Hispanics and young African American men.4 Our interpretation of Trump’s victory impacts the search for solutions: in the first scenario, the Democrats are not held responsible for their defeat; in the second, they must engage in a deep rethinking of their political platform. Far-right electoral gains are no accidents of history. Illiberal leaders and parties have expanded electorally worldwide in many countries beyond the United States and Europe in varying cultural contexts, such as in Turkey, India, the Philippines, and El Salvador. This suggests that the explanation for their success must be found in structural transformations of our socioeconomic and political landscape, not in one-off sets of issues or grievances. To truly understand the rise of illiberalism, citizens and activists anxious to defend liberal demo- cratic principles must analyze these broader systemic evolutions be- fore discussing what they mean for our vision of liberalism. They should grasp why these systemic challenges have so far been more successfully addressed, electorally speaking, by the right than by the left. The main argument of this paper is that liberalism’s cultural hegemony is over, and those defending liberal principles must recognize that they are now in genuine competition with other political ideologies. To this end, they must abandon the notion that liberalism represents “common sense,” while its op- ponents embody “nonsense.” Ironically, this very contrast is mirrored by illiberal voters, who see their recent electoral success as a return to politics grounded in reality and opposing liberal “wokeness.”
Topic:: Politics, Culture, Elections, Ideology, Voting, and Liberalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

532. Global Public Opinion and the Growth of Right-Wing Populism

Author:: Richard Wike
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: The “super year” of elections in 2024 was unprecedented in voting history, with citizens in more than 60 countries going to the polls. While it was generally a difficult year for incumbents, it was a strong one for challengers, including several from the populist right. Leveraging economic frustrations, divisive cultural issues, and anger at a political class perceived to be out of touch with ordinary citizens, right-wing populist leaders and parties made gains at the ballot box in several nations, building on the growing success they have seen in recent years.1 One of the most high-profile results in 2024 was Republican Donald Trump’s defeat of Democrat Kamala Harris in the United States presidential election, which returned the leader of the populist “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement to the White House after four years of Demo- cratic control. Right-wing populists also gained ground in European parlia- mentary elections. Austria’s Freedom Party, for example, had its best election result ever. The Alternative for Germany Party became the first far-right political party to win a state election in the country since World War II. And even though the cordon sanitaire—a bargain among political parties to keep the far right out of governing coalitions—ultimately kept Marine Le Pen’s National Rally out of power in France, the party nonetheless increased the number of seats it holds in the National Assembly. Parties on the right did well outside Europe and the United States too. For example, El Salvador’s incumbent President Nayib Bukele won reelection with over 80 percent of the vote, buoyed by strong support for his crackdown on criminal gangs. In Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto won the presidential election amid public concerns about his human rights record. And—though forced to form a coalition government for the first time—Indian Prime Min- ister Narendra Modi won a third consecutive victory, and his Bharatiya Janata Party, which captured 240 of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, remains a dominant force in the country’s politics.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Elections, Populism, and Right-Wing Politics
Political Geography:: India, Global Focus, and United States of America

533. Asean y la UE. Estrategias y oportunidades para Indonesia y España

Author:: Dayu Nirma Amurwanti and Alodia Pérez
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: Este documento analiza el potencial de fortalecer las relaciones entre la Unión Europea (UE) y la ASEAN, destacando el rol estratégico de España e Indonesia. Ambos bloques comparten valores como el multilateralismo y enfrentan desafíos comunes como el cambio climático, la tensión entre EE. UU. y China, y la necesidad de integración comercial. España e Indonesia, potencias marítimas y economías emergentes, pueden liderar iniciativas en defensa, comercio, digitalización, educación e innovación. Se propone revitalizar la cooperación bilateral, avanzar en nuevos acuerdos de defensa y vigilancia marítima. Además, se destaca la urgencia de concluir el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica UE-Indonesia, promoviendo el comercio y la inversión verde. En educación y cultura, se plantea intensificar los intercambios universitarios e investigaciones conjuntas. Finalmente, se sugiere elevar la relación bilateral a una Asociación Estratégica y fomentar una agenda común en foros multilaterales para un orden global más justo y cooperativo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Multilateralism, and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Spain, United States of America, and ASEAN

534. Iran’s Cryptocurrency Economy in Crisis: Financial Implications of Cyberattacks on the Nobitex Exchange

Author:: Avi Davidi
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The Iranian regime is currently grappling with an unprecedented economic and energy crisis that is directly impacting its domestic, regional, and international policies. One of the clearest manifestations of this crisis is the severe damage inflicted on the financial system during the war with Israel—particularly in the sphere of cryptocurrencies. Cyberattacks targeted both central banks and Nobitex, Iran’s largest crypto exchange, from which approximately $90 million was stolen in a June 2025 cyberattack. As a result, crypto trading volume in Iran fell by about 70 percent in July 2025 compared to the previous year. In addition, Israeli and U.S. authorities have recently taken measures against Iranian financing infrastructures that rely on cryptocurrencies. In September 2025, Israel’s National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing (NBCTF) announced the addresses of 187 USDT wallets it had identified as belonging to the IRGC.[1] Following the disclosure, the UK-based compliance firm Elliptic published an analysis showing that these wallets had received $1.5 billion in USDT. The analysis noted, however, that it could not determine whether the funds had in fact been used by the IRGC.[2] At the same time, the U.S. Treasury Department issued designations against a broad Iranian oil-export network that was evading American sanctions. This network employed a wide array of front companies operating in multiple countries to facilitate illicit trade in Iranian oil. According to the announcement, two Iranian nationals played a central role in the scheme by purchasing roughly $100 million worth of cryptocurrencies between 2023 and 2025 as payment to the Iranian government for oil. The network’s cryptocurrency fundraising activity was also used by the regime to transfer money to Hezbollah-linked entities, thereby contributing not only to sanctions evasion but also directly to the financing of terrorism.[3] This paper examines the consequences of the June 2025 cyberattack on Nobitex for Iran’s ability to rely on cryptocurrencies to preserve economic and social stability, as well as to facilitate strategic trade—including in security and military components—at a time of continued international sanctions. The developments in Iran’s crypto sector highlight its growing importance for the Iranian economy—both for those seeking to evade the international sanctions regime, including regime actors such as the IRGC and oil traders, and for ordinary citizens trying to preserve the value of their savings. At the same time, they underscore the vulnerabilities and problems inherent in relying on cryptocurrencies, as well as the importance of U.S. and Israeli efforts to address this system in order to prevent its illicit use by the regime and to undermine it.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Economy, Cryptocurrencies, Economic Crisis, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

535. Qatar Positions Itself as Washington’s Preferred Mediator

Author:: Ariel Admoni
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: From Congo to Gaza, Doha positions itself as indispensable to U.S. policy, even as it sustains ties to terrorist organizations
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Terrorism, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, Qatar, and United States of America

536. Democracy at a Crossroads: How Americans View Trump’s First 100 Days in Office

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: Executive Summary Relatively few voters regret their decision in November; however, three in ten non-voters regret not turning out to vote last fall. Nearly all Americans who voted for Kamala Harris (95%) and Donald Trump (92%) are satisfied with their decision to vote or how they voted, as well as 85% of those who voted for another candidate. Thirty-one percent of non-voting Americans say they regret their decision not to vote, compared with 56% who say they are satisfied. Just around four in ten Americans (43%) approve of the job that Trump is doing as president. Roughly four in ten Americans (43%) approve of the job that Trump is doing as president, while a majority (54%) disapprove. White Christian groups are the most likely to approve of the job that Trump is doing as president, including three in four white evangelical Protestants (76%), compared with one-third or fewer of other religious Americans. While Trump gets slightly higher marks for his handling of immigration (48% of Americans approve), just four in ten approve of his handling of the economy (41%) and Russia’s war with Ukraine (40%). White Christian groups are significantly more likely than Christians of color, non-Christians, and unaffiliated Americans to approve of the job that Trump is doing handling immigration, including most white evangelical Protestants (78%), Latter-day Saints (65%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (64%), and white Catholics (63%). While just four in ten Americans have favorable views of Trump, fewer view either Vice President JD Vance or presidential advisor Elon Musk favorably. Four in ten Americans (40%) express favorable views of Trump, including 83% of Republicans, 35% of independents, and 8% of Democrats. White Americans, men, older generations, and those who do not have a four-year degree hold significantly more favorable views of Trump than non-white Americans, women, millennials, Gen Zers, and those who are college-educated. Roughly one-third of Americans have a favorable view of Vance (35%), compared with half of those who hold an unfavorable opinion (50%). Most Americans (58%) view Musk unfavorably. Musk holds less favorable views among Republicans than Trump, 71% vs. 83%. Americans are more likely to view Trump as a dangerous dictator than a strong leader restoring America’s greatness, although such views are polarized along partisan and religious lines. A majority of Americans agree that “President Trump is a dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy” (52%), compared with 44% who agree that “President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America’s greatness.” Most Democrats (87%) agree with the first statement, while most Republicans (81%) agree with the second statement. Around seven in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (70%) view Trump as a strong leader who should be given the power to restore America’s greatness, compared with 46% of Christian nationalism Skeptics and just 15% of Rejecters. Among Americans who voted for Trump and regret their decision, 55% agree that Trump is a dangerous dictator; agreement that Trump is a dangerous dictator is even higher among non-voters who regret their decision not to vote (68%).
Topic:: Public Opinion, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Voting, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

537. Abortion Views Across All 50 States: Key Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: In 2024, PRRI interviewed more than 22,000 adults as part of its American Values Atlas, offering a detailed analysis of Americans’ views on the legality of abortion. The report also explores the relationship between religiosity and abortion laws across states.
Topic:: Religion, Law, Public Opinion, Domestic Politics, and Abortion
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

538. A Tale of Three Rights? Understanding How Republicans Are Changing under Trump

Author:: Thibault Muzergues
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party – and more generally US conservatism – to an extent and in ways that were unthinkable in 2015, when he first emerged as a serious candidate for the presidential primaries. To understand that, we only have to get back to 2012, when the Republican consensus on issues like free trade and immigration was literally opposite to what it is now. Back then, the party supported free trade without reservations and recognised a need for (controlled) immigration. Meanwhile, the Bush family held significant sway, with Jeb Bush, former governor of Florida and son and brother of the last two Republican presidents, considered a frontrunner for the 2016 presidential nomination. Fast forward to the present, and the Republican Party has undergone a dramatic shift under Trump’s influence. Today, being pro-free trade or pro-immigration is almost unthinkable for a Republican candidate in any primary. In the same way, the foreign-policy outlook of the party has drastically changed: dominated by hawks and neo-conservatives in the past, it is now much more influenced by isolationist and inward-looking imperialist elements (those have always existed within the party, but had been marginal in the past, in particular during the George W. Bush years in the early 2000s). Much like it previously did with the Bush family, the party now aligns more closely with Trump’s vision and family influence – exemplified by the personal loyalty tests that are now required for any would-be candidate for office to subscribe to in order to have the president’s support. This is not to say that everything has changed. The Republican Party remains socially conservative, advocating for example anti-abortion policies and low direct taxes. Seen from this angle, the litmus test of what makes (or does not make) one a conservative has not changed. However, Trump has reshaped the party’s priorities and values in significant ways, and will continue to do so. The Republican Party that emerged from the 2024 elections is distinct from the one that lost in 2020 or won the trifecta – presidency, Senate and House – in 2016. To outsiders, especially Europeans, Trumpism may appear as a monolithic structure, an image Trump has sometimes reinforced. However, the US president’s success (and popularity) lies in managing a coalition of diverse interests and ideologies. Trump’s coalition includes disparate groups like tech entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley looking forward to a bright future and former steel workers in Youngstown Ohio, looking back with nostalgia to a past that they would like to re-create. Some members of this coalition are organising and seek to apply an ideological lens to Trump’s instincts, in order to define the future of Trumpism beyond the current presidency. It is therefore extremely important to understand how the current Trumpian coalition functions – if we then want to understand where it is headed. Currently, the coalition ruling the party can be divided into three main groups: MAGA-World, the tech-libertarians, and the Country-Club Republicans.
Topic:: Donald Trump, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Republican Party
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

539. Europe’s Nuclear Alternatives: A Time of Reckoning Autori

Author:: Polina Sinovets and Adérito Vicente
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Europe faces an increasingly urgent need to reconsider its dependence on US extended nuclear deterrence, particularly in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the United States’ strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s potential to build credible deterrent capabilities of its own is limited to three alternatives: the strengthening of France’s force de frappe as a European pillar, the creation of an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella and the establishment of a European Multilateral Nuclear Force within NATO. The best course of action for Europe is to follow a balanced approach that enhances European autonomy while safeguarding transatlantic cohesion, with NATO establishing a structured dialogue on Europe’s nuclear future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, France, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

540. The new power model and United States national defence agility

Author:: Stephen Willis
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: This scholarly article provides a comprehensive analysis of how Heimans and Timms’s (Heimans, J. and Timms, H. (2018) New power: How power works in our hyperconnected world—and how to make it work for you. New York, NY: Doubleday) principles of “new power” can be applied to enhance the agility and effectiveness of United States national defence strategies and policies. The analysis underscores the critical importance of fostering collective intelligence, adaptability, flexibility, transparency, and inclusion within the operations and decision-making processes of the US military, emphasising transparency and inclusion is crucial in promoting open source and open information exchange that involves service members and defence leaders at all levels in decision-making. This study presents compelling examples of how embracing new power dynamics can improve the agility of US national security efforts in terms of strategies and policies. Improved agility will potentially save lives and provide a competitive advantage over our adversaries. Additionally, the article highlights the significance of adaptability and flexibility in navigating the rapidly changing global landscape, underscoring the need for the US military to adapt to shifting power dynamics and embrace agility as a critical element in achieving success in the face of modern security challenges. Finally, this research delves into two critical areas: First, we explore a new power model for enhancing the agility of US national defence. Second, we discuss how the new power model can facilitate agile decisionmaking for US intelligence, specifically through the practice of open-source Intelligence. We conclude that making American national defence agile in its policies and strategies requires not only the application of new power principles and concepts, as Heimans and Timms (2018) understand them, but also the ability to apply new power in nuanced, incremental, and thoughtful ways that will allow for transformation of the defence and policy-making apparatus in a way that will be accepted and understood by policymakers and service members and leaders themselves.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Intelligence, International Security, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

541. Interstate Highways and Urban Blight: Evidence from Administrative Housing Data

Author:: Thomas Walter
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This paper estimates the effects of the Interstate Highway System on proximate urban neighborhoods using detailed American Housing Survey data from the 35 most-populous US metropolitan areas. I begin by identifying seven adverse housing conditions and measuring their prevalence with respect to the observational housing units’ distance to the nearest Interstate. I then use weighted linear regressions to estimate the change in likelihood for the presence of each adverse condition when a housing unit is near an Interstate. I find that housing units within one kilometer of an Interstate are 50% more likely to report being near abandoned buildings, 43% more likely to report serious crime in their neighborhood, and 21% more likely to be deemed inadequate. Furthermore, residents of these Interstate-proximate units are 53% and 41% more likely to report dissatisfaction with their neighborhood and housing unit, respectively. To support these estimates by accounting for the fact that Interstates were often intentionally built through marginalized communities, I also employ an instrumental variable approach. My results provide new evidence and stylized facts on the Interstate system as a locus of urban blight.
Topic:: Transportation, Cities, Quality of Life, Housing, Neighborhoods, and Highway System
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

542. Rebuilding U.S. Zinc Capacity in an Era of Global Competition

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Zinc ranks as the fourth-most widely used metal worldwide. In addition to its primary application in steel galvanization, refining zinc also produces gallium and germanium—key inputs for advanced semiconductors and defense technologies. However, amid falling ore grades and limited exploration, the United States remains heavily dependent on zinc imports. Once a global hub for zinc processing, the United States now lacks sufficient refining capacity, importing over 70 percent of its refined zinc. There is an opportunity to rebuild domestic, vertically integrated zinc supply chains and reduce reliance on China, but this will demand deliberate action. Bolstering U.S. resilience will require scaling up domestic mining and refining, strategically deploying tariffs, encouraging private investment, promoting price stability, and deepening partnerships with allied nations.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, Industry, Economic Security, Energy, Critical Minerals, and Zinc
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

543. Why deterrence needs dialogue and détente

Author:: Thomas Greminger
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:: Since at least the time of the Greeks and the Romans it has been conventional wisdom that if you want peace prepare for war. Strong defences, military capabilities and demonstrating resolve can deter an enemy that might have thoughts of attack. American presidents from George Washington to Ronald Reagan (and even Donald Trump) have promoted the security benefits of “peace through strength”. Such logic will no doubt dominate security doctrines for the foreseeable future. But paradoxically, pure deterrence can be potentially destabilizing. Lack of communication with opponents can deepen distrust, create misperceptions and increase the risk of miscalculation. Therefore, at a time of high tensions in international relations, it is vital to retain some aspects of dialogue and détente if deterrence is to be credible and effective.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: United States of America

544. Climate Ambition and Electricity Affordability: Lessons from Connecticut

Author:: Noah Kaufman
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Rising electricity prices are an obstacle to climate action in many US states. Continuing to pursue ambitious decarbonization goals while ensuring affordable electricity to residents and businesses will require bold policy shifts, with solutions that differ across regions. This report explores specific challenges to decarbonization and electricity affordability in Connecticut, as well as opportunities to decarbonize more affordably. Connecticut has among the highest electricity prices in the nation and a binding commitment to achieve 100 percent zero-carbon electricity by 2040.
Topic:: Climate Change, Electricity, Decarbonization, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Connecticut

545. Purple Rain: Temperamental Politics and Budgets in Arizona

Author:: Max Goshert, Janica Murphy, Samira Amin, Mo Abouelenin, and Amber Chisholm
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: Arizona’s evolving political landscape has become a key factor in its fiscal outlook. Once a solid Republican stronghold, the state has shifted to swing status, as seen in President Joe Biden's narrow 0.3% margin win in the 2020 election and a closely divided state legislature. Strong economic growth in prior years led to FY23 General Fund revenues being revised upwards from $15.9 billion to $17.9 billion. Despite this, declining tax revenues and increased spending, particularly on a universal school voucher program, created a projected $1.71 billion deficit for FY25. The state's Republican-led legislature implemented a 2.5% flat income tax and expanded school vouchers, significantly impacting revenue. To address the deficit, the FY25 budget, finalized at $16.8 billion, included cuts to many programs, most notably a $430 million reduction in the Arizona Water Infrastructure and Financing Authority. The political status quo remained consistent after the 2024 election, where Republicans won a marginal gain in both chambers of the state legislature, Democrats kept control of the U.S. Senate seat up for reelection, and the U.S. House seats remained at 6–3 for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. This report examines the fiscal trajectory, proposed tax policy changes, and political state driving Arizona’s FY25 budget negotiations.
Topic:: Politics, Budget, Fiscal Policy, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, Arizona, and United States of America

546. Oregon’s 2024 Legislative Session and Budget: From Incivility to Civility

Author:: Brent S. Steel and Emily Mooney
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: The 2024 Oregon legislative session, spanning a concise 35-day period, marked a return to bipartisan collaboration resulting in significant policy advancements. Major reforms enacted include the implementation of campaign finance limits, modifications to drug decriminalization policies, and the introduction of a substantial housing initiative by Governor Tina Kotek. These actions stand in contrast to the previous year's divisive Republican walkout, which had halted legislative proceedings in protest against proposed bills on gun control, education, and climate change. This walkout led to a new ballot measure that penalized unexcused absences among legislators, threatening the ability of boycotting members to run for re-election. Despite the prior tensions, the 2024 session was distinguished by cooperation, as evidenced by both parties acknowledging its historic success in achieving policy goals. The budget passed on June 25, 2023, outlined a total of $121.264 billion for the 2023-25 period, reflecting a decrease from the previous budget due to a reduction in Federal Funds, counterbalanced by an increase in the General Fund and Lottery Funds. Detailed resource allocations were influenced by the May 2023 revenue forecast, with specific adjustments made during the 2024 session to align with the biennium's objectives.
Topic:: Reform, Budget, Public Policy, Polarization, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Oregon

547. The 2023 Nevada Budget: Record Surpluses, Cautious Optimism, and Bipartisan Support for K-12 Education and State Employees

Author:: Brad Johnson and David Damore
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: In June of 2023, the Nevada Legislature passed the state’s 2023-2025 budget. Buoyed by continued increases in the state’s share of the sales taxes and revenue tied to gaming, entertainment, and tourism as well as business activity, the $10.9 billion general fund budget was the largest in Nevada’s history. After four years of unified Democratic control of state government, the 2023 session was the first budget passed under divided government since 2017. While partisan and interbranch tensions were ever present as evidenced by a record 75 vetoed bills, Nevada’s Republican governor and Democratic-controlled legislature supported substantial investments in K-12 education and state employees. Enthusiasm for long-term spending obligations, however, was tempered by the fact that the general fund budget’s two largest revenue drivers—sales and gaming taxes—fluctuate with macroeconomic conditions. The continued reliance on these revenue sources perpetuates Nevada’s history of booms and busts and undermines the state’s ability to make long-term investments in its human capital and physical infrastructure. Consequently, the budget choices adopted by the governor and legislature reflected broad compromises and investments, while other areas, including costly but much needed reforms to state government, went unaddressed.
Topic:: Education, Government, Budget, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Nevada

548. The Long Shadow of the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights: Colorado's 2024-2025 Budget and Economy

Author:: Michael Berry
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: In one of the most polarized legislatures in the United States, partisan and ideological divisions among Colorado lawmakers often overlap with differences in identity and experience. Although the chasm between Democrats and Republicans on salient social and economic issues is wide, bipartisan policymaking still occurs. Democratic successes in 2022 extended their streak to four consecutive election cycles of remaining even or gaining seats in both the Colorado House and Senate. Unified government with expanded majorities has allowed Democrats to advance their agenda through the state budget with relative ease, and seldom used parliamentary tactics helped bring about liberal policy change in contentious issue areas including gun control. In budgetary politics, the fiscal constraints of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) currently do more to impede the progressive agenda than dwindling opposition votes from minority party Republicans. Statewide ballot measures have also driven policy change, at times in conservative directions, on consequential tax and fiscal policy issues. Coloradans have demonstrated an openness to government reform in some areas, but less so when it comes to ballot measures affecting TABOR.
Topic:: Budget, Economy, Tax Systems, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, Colorado, and United States of America

549. New Mexico 2024: Swinging the Compass. Recalibrating Fiscal Policy to Plan for a Slower Economy

Author:: Kim Seckler
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: In late February 2024, the New Mexico State Legislature closed the books on a relatively uneventful session. After successive years of record revenues and double-digit budget expansion, the legislature modestly reigned in spending increases to less than 7%. Legislators continued their recent trend of stashing some of the state’s massive surplus in newly created endowment funds, hoping to insulate the state from future economic downturns. The legislative action reflects a growing consensus that boom and bust budgeting does not provide for a stable, long-term financial future. Legislators still managed to approve a $10 billion dollar plus budget, set aside reserves upwards of 30%, and spend almost $1.4 billion in capital projects big and small. Though the 30-day session is short, lawmakers still found time to deal with some social issues (public safety, health care, education, and the environment) and some issues personal to the legislature. Though only 72 pieces of legislation passed, the legislature managed to reset the compass on New Mexico’s financial structure while tinkering with current social concerns.
Topic:: Budget, Economy, Fiscal Policy, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and New Mexico

550. Into the Unknown: The 2024 Washington State Legislative Session & Beyond

Author:: Michael Artime, Erin Richards, and Francis Benjamin
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: In this paper, we discuss the political and budgetary landscape of Washington State. With consistent Democratic leadership—in the governor’s mansion and with respect to legislative priorities—the state has been able to advance a more liberal policy agenda than states without Democratic majorities. In this session, the legislature voted to invest in the development of affordable housing, behavioral health initiatives, and policies designed to curb climate change. However, ballot initiatives in November might serve as a significant impediment to these policy pursuits. Voters will decide whether to keep the cap-and-trade climate policy, the capital gains tax, and the long-term care program for the state. The cap-and-trade policy, as well as the capital gains tax, serves as a means of revenue generation and the elimination of these resources would upend the budget in important ways moving forward.
Topic:: Government, Budget, Democratic Party, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: Washington, North America, and United States of America

551. Should Newsom Stay or Should He LAO? California’s 2024-2025 Budget

Author:: Brian DiSarro and Wesley Hussey
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: The FY 2024-25 budgeting cycle in California was far less chaotic than the previous year, when a record $100 billion budget surplus morphed into a widening deficit. This time, Democratic Gavin Newsom and the Democratic controlled legislature had to tackle that mounting deficit as the state’s economy stalled, specifically among the wealthiest Californians, who fund a large portion of the state’s government. Neither Newsom nor the two new Democratic legislative leaders had experienced a budget deficit in office, which made coordination additionally tricky. The state is in much better shape than previous deficits, however, with a large reserve and strong budget resilience among its leaders. One problem- the governor increasingly reports different budget numbers than the state’s nonpartisan Legislative Analyst Office (LAO), which assesses the administration’s budget for the legislature.
Topic:: Government, Budget, Democratic Party, State Legislature, and Gavin Newsom
Political Geography:: California, North America, and United States of America

552. Two Factions Walk into a Budget Session

Author:: Jason McConnell and Robert Schuhmann
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: The 67th Wyoming Legislature’s 20-day budget session was convened Thursday, February 8, 2024, for the beginning of its work in Cheyenne. This year, outside of its typical budget work, over 360 bills were brought forward by both legislative committees and individual legislators. These bills ranged from property tax relief to health care. In the end, on Friday March 8th, the final biennial General Fund budget was close to $3.8 billion – up approximately $100 million from the previous biennium. Deep ideological divides within the state’s dominant Republican Party drove much debate and show no signs of abating before next year’s general session.
Topic:: Government, Budget, State Legislature, and Republican Party
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Wyoming

553. How Are Minority Staffers Utilized? Evidence from the California State Assembly

Author:: Michelangelo Landgrave
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: Legislative staffers are among legislators’ most valuable assets and their appointment by legislators is strategic. Past research has focused on how legislative staffer appointments help legislators meet policy or constituency service goals. In this article I advance the literature by theorizing how minority staffers are utilized. I hypothesize, and show using novel data from the California State Assembly, that state legislators disproportionally place Hispanic and Asian American Pacific Islander staffers in constituency service positions. This may be done as an effort to provide a form of surrogate descriptive representation. Concerningly, because minority staffers are more likely to be placed in constituency service positions, minority staffers are less likely to be placed in policy orientated positions where they might have the most influence over substantive policymaking. This leads to a situation where minority staffers are placed in visible constituency service appointments but continue to be underrepresented in key policy appointments.
Topic:: Government, Minorities, State Legislature, and Staffers
Political Geography:: California, North America, and United States of America

554. On a Roll, or Is It a Slide? Alaska’s Budgeting Process in 2024

Author:: Glenn Wright
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: As in 2023, Alaska’s politics seem to be benefitting from a more moderate and collegial policymaking environment and possibly even more sensible budgetary policy. In part, this seems due to Alaska’s adoption of a new election system which in 2022 generated a more moderate set of legislative coalitions than the previous several election cycles. These moderate coalitions may be short-lived, however, as an effort to repeal the new election system is underway. And even with our relatively moderate State House and State Senate coalitions, headwinds and controversies remain, especially issues around public education funding.
Topic:: Education, Budget, Elections, and State Legislature
Political Geography:: North America, Alaska, and United States of America

555. Western countries' sanctions offensive against Russia

Author:: Elżbieta Kaca and Tymon Pastucha
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: The renewed sanctions imposed by the US, the UK and the EU will reduce Russia's ability to finance its military operations by hitting the oil and gas sectors, which still generate around 25% of its budget revenue. The sanctions underscore the US's determination to force Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine. As a consequence, Russia's economic problems will worsen, and its economic and political influence abroad, including in certain EU countries, will diminish. However, the effectiveness of the restrictions will depend on how they are implemented by the US, how they are further tightened — especially against the Russian shadow fleet — and whether secondary sanctions are applied.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and United States of America

556. China Trying to Strengthen Dialogue with India

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: China sees India as its main rival in Asia. However, the Chinese authorities are maintaining a dialogue with the Indian government, recently even signalling a conciliatory attitude. In this way, they want to prevent an escalation in bilateral relations and try to influence India’s relations with the U.S. and the European Union in a way that is beneficial to China. Although China’s attempts to strengthen dialogue with India are tactical in nature, even a short-term improvement in bilateral relations poses a challenge for the EU. Attempts to reduce Europe’s dependence on China, in which India is to play an important role, are now in question.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Europe, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

557. EU Cooperation with the International Criminal Court

Author:: Stefania Kolarz
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: For years, the EU has consistently supported the International Criminal Court (ICC), considering it one of the key elements in promoting human rights, humanitarian law and justice around the world. The uneven commitment of states to cooperation with the Court, successive decisions to denounce its Statute, and the sanctions imposed on the ICC by Donald Trump's administration are all hampering its functioning, but have not been met with a firm response from the EU.
Topic:: Human Rights, European Union, International Criminal Court (ICC), and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

558. EU Clean Industry Deal: Strengthening Competitiveness in Green

Author:: Kinga Dudzińska
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: In the face of increasing trade pressure from the United States and growing competition from China, the European Union announced actions to rebuild the competitiveness of European industry, as included in the Clean Industry Deal (CID). Increasing the EU’s economic independence while maintaining ambitious climate goals will be a challenge for the industry, especially if electrification based on renewable sources is assumed. Therefore, solutions supporting the attractiveness to businesses of EU production will be decisive, including through efficient deregulation and reduction of energy prices and especially in view of the growing dynamics of changes in the structure of global markets. The EU’s flexible and adaptive approach to the energy transformation will be important here, in particular for countries still dependent on fossil sources, such as Poland.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Industry, and Clean Industry Deal (CID)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

559. U.S. Prepares for a Nuclear Energy Renaissance

Author:: Tymon Pastucha
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: President Donald Trump’s announced “nuclear energy renaissance” is a response to the failure of previous reforms, growing energy demand (driven by AI), his lack of support for renewables, and the weakening U.S. technological position in nuclear energy relative to China and Russia. The changes would focus on reforming nuclear oversight, increasing the role of the Department of Defense, accelerating technology deployment, developing the nuclear workforce, and producing domestic nuclear fuel. Enhanced funding and assertive export diplomacy may encourage new investments in partner countries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Artificial Intelligence, Donald Trump, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

560. A Georgia Led by Georgian Dream Looks to the East

Author:: Wojciech Wojtasiewicz
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: Georgia’s international isolation has deepened since last year’s parliamentary elections in the country. European countries and the United States are introducing sanctions against the Georgian authorities for their ongoing repression of anti-government demonstrations and crackdown on NGOs, free media, and the opposition. With the retreat from cooperation with the U.S. and the EU, Georgia is increasingly more dependent on Russia and China.
Topic:: Elections, Protests, Repression, Parliament, and Georgian Dream Party
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Caucasus, Georgia, and United States of America

561. Europeans and Trump: dishonour, impotence or influence?

Author:: Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Responses to the Turnberry trade agreement between Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen on 27 July (formalised in an EU-US statement published on 27 August) did not mince words: ‘shame’, ‘submission’, ‘vassalage’, ‘humiliation’, and even the beginning of a ‘century of humiliation’ for Europe, following the example of China, which was forced to open up its imports of opium in the mid-19th century, marking the beginning of the long decline of the Middle Kingdom. This agreement must be viewed in the broader context of transatlantic relations during Donald Trump's second term, which includes the situation in Ukraine and, more broadly, the issue of European defence and security. Looking at things in this context, Europeans have so far shown unity, diplomacy and even efficiency. They have begun to learn from their weaknesses, but the road to European power remains fraught with pitfalls.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

562. Understanding, Deterring, and Preparing for a Great-Power War in the Twenty-First Century

Author:: Antulio J. Echevarria II, Larry P. Goodson, and Brennan Deveraux
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US government and the US Army are unprepared for a great-power war. This integrated research project (IRP), sponsored by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General James J. Mingus, is a critical first step in helping senior US Army leaders increase their knowledge of, and preparations for, deterring or fighting a great-power war in the twenty-first century. No one knows how long the US government and the US Army have to prepare for a future conflict. Consequently, the US Department of Defense faces difficult decisions as it balances preparing for a future war with maintaining readiness to address current challenges. The student research in this IRP only scratches the surface of what the US Department of Defense and the US Army should do to understand, deter, and prepare more effectively for the possibility of a great-power war in the twenty-first century. While the steps outlined here are preliminary, they are not tentative. Readers will find that each chapter offers concrete, actionable recommendations based on duly considered analysis. But more work lies ahead.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Gray Zone, Defense Industry, Emerging Technology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

563. Maine’s Immigrant Communities: Diverse Origins, Characteristics, and Challenges

Author:: Valerie Lacarte and Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: Maine’s immigrant population, though small, is distinct in its origins and characteristics compared to immigrants in other states and the nation at large. Due to a long history of movement across a shared border, Canadians have a notable presence in the state. At the same time, immigrants in Maine come from many parts of the world, and nearly half have lived in the United States for 20 years or more. With the state working-age population projected to shrink in the coming years, immigrants are poised to play an increasingly important role in the state workforce. And in fact, foreign-born workers already contribute to many key industries in Maine—from health care and manufacturing to agriculture and aquaculture. This report presents a profile of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Maine’s immigrants, based primarily on MPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. MPI researchers also interviewed staff of nine immigrant-serving organizations in Maine to better understand the types of services some immigrants need—some related to challenges shared with U.S.-born Mainers, while others are more specific to this population.
Topic:: Demographics, Employment, Immigrants, Integration, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Maine

564. Integrating Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Technologies into Common Operating Picture and Course of Action Development

Author:: C. Anthony Pfaff and Christopher John Hickey
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Integrating Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Technologies into Common Operating Picture and Course of Action Development explores the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to revolutionize military planning processes by enhancing situational awareness and expediting course of action development within the Joint planning process. The study delves into technical, organizational, and resource considerations that are critical for AI integration. In addition, the study highlights the importance of clean, structured data in training AI systems, addresses challenges in data collection across varying formats and classifications, and emphasizes the need for AI-friendly infrastructure. By automating processes like common operational picture generation and leveraging AI for course of action analysis, military planners can achieve greater efficiency and decision-making speed. Furthermore, this publication underscores the challenges of ethical implementation, resource sustainability, and organizational adaptation, including upskilling personnel and integrating commercial vendors. Case studies, such as the Maven Smart System and STORMBREAKER, demonstrate AI’s ability to enhance data fusion, improve battlefield awareness, and streamline operational planning. This research provides a robust framework for overcoming barriers to AI adoption, enabling the US military to harness AI technologies for enhanced planning, decision making, and operational success.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

565. More Than a Numbers Game: Comparing US and Chinese Landpower in the Pacific Requires Context

Author:: Brennan Deveraux and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This monograph establishes a contextual baseline that serves as the framework for future comparisons of the US Army and the People’s Liberation Army Army. It examines differences in five key components of land warfare: the two nations’ landpower definitions, uses of land forces to build relationships, underlying warfare concepts, associated modernization efforts, and varying approaches to simulating land warfare in the region. In examining these components, the authors identify warfare intangibles that highlight analytical findings in a way that promotes future research. The existing scholarship comparing the two forces is often limited in scope, focusing on funding or comparing capabilities such as the number of specific weapons systems. This monograph differs from existing scholarship by providing a broad, in-depth comparison of critical landpower components. The analysis challenges long-held assumptions about US Army superiority and sets a foundation for future research. The authors rely heavily on primary sources and ample secondary documents translated directly from Chinese vernacular sources. This study’s conclusions challenge conventional thinking surrounding the People’s Liberation Army and will assist US military and policy practitioners in assessing the relative strengths and advantages the US military can grow or exploit.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Modernization, Simulation, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Warfare
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

566. Weaponizing Risk: Recalibrating Western Deterrence

Author:: Antulio J. Echevarria II
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This monograph discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Such leverage would prove especially useful because Kyiv is unlikely to be permitted to join NATO and the United States may reduce its presence in Europe. Western analysts have not given Russian deterrence enough credit for the alliance’s deterrence failure on February 24, 2022. The alliance did not act fecklessly, nor did it self-deter. Rather, NATO’s deterrence measures were calibrated more for hybrid/gray-zone attacks of the sort it saw in 2014, not for the large-scale combat operations the alliance witnessed in 2022, which involved a nuclear-armed adversary with stronger interests in Ukraine than NATO had. To be sure, the alliance’s leaders acted responsibly in managing the risk of escalation. But in so doing, they also facilitated Russian deterrence efforts, which succeeded in keeping Washington and Brussels from intervening in the war. The alliance thus demonstrated its need for a strategy that would increase the risks and costs of war for Russia without unduly raising NATO’s. In short, the alliance needs a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war,” whereby NATO can provide its full political, economic, and military support to Ukraine without running the risk of putting alliance troops in harm’s way.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Risk, Deterrence, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

567. Cognitive Defense: 2024 Homeland Defense Symposium

Author:: George M. Schwartz
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College hosted the inaugural annual Homeland Defense Symposium from February 6 to 8, 2024, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Reestablishing the Sanctuary,” featured plenary presentations on defending critical infrastructure, contested deployment, and cognitive defense by experts from military, academic, and government organizations. As highlighted in the conference theme, attendees recognized the homeland does not provide the sanctuary it once did, and our society is already under attack. Using disinformation and social media means, our adversaries are engaged in cognitive warfare in the homeland, seeking to shape the attitudes and behaviors of citizens by negatively influencing and disrupting their cognitive processes, thus weakening our society’s political will and degrading national resilience. Using contemporary examples to show how disinformation and malinformation undermine trust in government institutions, the authors of these conference papers provide insights and offer solutions for the cognitive defense of the homeland. These papers from the first Homeland Defense Symposium inform policymakers and practitioners on what to expect as we compete internationally and how to prepare for a possible large-scale conflict.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Homeland Security, Resilience, Cognitive Warfare, and Cognitive Defense
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

568. How Can Stablecoins Work in a Tariff World?

Author:: Sharat Chandra
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: As a growing number of countries face rising tariffs in 2025, stablecoins may be the answer to geoeconomic fragmentation by providing solutions that enhance trade efficiency in response to protectionist policies and regional alliances. While the United States leverages stablecoins to reinforce global US dollar dominance, rising tariffs and de-dollarization trends are boosting demand for gold and other non-dollar-denominated and commodity-backed stablecoins. This trend is especially prominent among BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations that are wary of US monetary policy. Euro-backed stablecoins are also gaining strength and, together with the digital euro, may pose a threat to US dollar hegemony.
Topic:: Digital Economy, Tariffs, Trade, Stablecoins, and Financial Governance
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

569. The Quadripolar World: Understanding Twenty-First-Century Geopolitics

Author:: S. Yash Kalash
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: The current geopolitical environment is defined by constantly changing dynamics among countries: long-standing partnerships are disintegrating while other alliances are strengthening. To better understand a world in flux, this special report presents the quadripolar geopolitical framework (QGF) in which four powers — the United States, China, India and Russia — serve as autonomous strategic poles. The framework seeks to capture the fluid, multidimensional nature of twenty-first-century geopolitics, where states simultaneously compete, cooperate and hedge across domains. Drawing on game theory, the QGF maps bilateral relationships across two axes: ideological alignment versus strategic autonomy, and systemic rivalry versus economic interdependence. Through case studies, the special report illustrates how contemporary power dynamics defy linear alliances and demand new interpretive tools.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

570. Bridging Histories: Lessons for the US Department of Defense from New Zealand Defence Forces’ Integration of Indigenous Cultures

Author:: Shane McNeil
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This article examines the potential lessons the United States Department of Defense (DoD) can learn from the New Zealand Defence Forces' (NZDF) successful integration of indigenous cultures into its military traditions. Through a comparative analysis, it explores the historical military engagements of both nations with their indigenous populations, highlighting the warrior cultures of Native Americans and Māori pre-colonization. The study delves into the NZDF's acknowledgment and incorporation of Māori history and traditions, showcasing the positive outcomes on organizational cohesion, cultural competence, and operational effectiveness. Conversely, it evaluates the current stance of the US DoD towards Native American heritage, identifying gaps and missed opportunities for cultural integration. The article argues that adopting indigenous warrior ideologies and identities could significantly benefit the US DoD by enhancing cultural sensitivity, diversity, and tactical innovation. It concludes with strategic recommendations for integrating indigenous histories and traditions into the US military framework, suggesting that such an approach could foster improved relations with indigenous communities and strengthen the defense sector's cultural and operational landscape.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Indigenous, and Native Americans
Political Geography:: North America, New Zealand, and United States of America

571. To Stand with Palestine with Professor Karam Dana (10/9/2025)

Author:: Karam Dana
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Professor Dana will discuss his book To Stand with Palestine: Transnational Resistance and Political Evolution in the United States that provides a new lens on activism around Palestinian issues, demonstrating how the global Palestinian diaspora has driven transnational political movements. Karam Dana explores the ways that exile has shaped Palestinian identity and allowed for new forms of global activism. He examines the social, political, economic, and technological forces that have created space for Palestinian voices to be heard by wider audiences worldwide.
Topic:: Diaspora, Identity, Palestinians, and Transnational Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

572. Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea — A Book Talk by Joel S. Wit

Author:: Joel S. Wit and Barbara Demick
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Delivered on November 7, 2025, Joel S. Wit discusses his new book, "Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea". Wit examines why U.S. efforts to halt North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have repeatedly fallen short, reconstructing nearly four decades of high-stakes negotiations and secret diplomatic exchanges. Based on more than 300 interviews with policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang, the book uncovers the pressures, missteps, and missed opportunities that shaped U.S.–DPRK nuclear diplomacy. Wit challenges common narratives by presenting Kim Jong Un not as irrational, but as a calculated strategist using nuclear escalation as leverage. He also argues that policy shifts under the Obama and Trump administrations accelerated North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, transforming the North into a direct threat to every major U.S. city. Speaker: Joel S. Wit, Distinguished Fellow in Asian and Security Studies, The Stimson Center Moderator: Barbara Demick, journalist and author of "Nothing to Envy" (2009) and "Daughters of the Bamboo Grove" (2025)
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Negotiation, and Book Talk
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

573. Status Recognition and Great Power Conflicts Today: The US, China, and Russia

Author:: Thomas J. Christensen and T.V. Paul
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: October 17, 2025 — The violent conflict in Ukraine triggered by Russia, China’s drift away from a “peaceful rise” strategy, and America’s near abandonment of liberal leadership have created deep uncertainty. T. V. Paul's new book project asks: Under what conditions do great powers abandon or significantly alter relatively peaceful grand strategies for reasons of status? It examines how strategic interaction between great powers—and the pivotal role of domestic coalitions—shapes expectations of status reciprocity and recognition leading to great power conflicts. The author of multiple books, T. V. Paul is the Distinguished James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University. Moderator Thomas J. Christensen is James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University and the Director of its China and the World Program.
Topic:: Grand Strategy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

574. Climate Clarity: On the Future of Climate Action in the United States

Author:: Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Noah Gordon, and Milo McBride
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: People in the United States who care about fighting climate change are shellshocked. After four years of insufficient, but nevertheless unprecedented, policy support for climate action, there has been a sudden, abrupt reversal. Under the headline of “Energy Dominance,” President Donald Trump’s administration has scrapped environmental regulations, taken a sledgehammer to the green industrial policy of its predecessor, and removed the United States from international climate diplomacy. Programs of every description addressing or even indirectly touching climate action have been cut, and congressionally appropriated funds for decarbonization and strengthening climate resilience have been cancelled, frozen, or delayed indefinitely. The gutting of IRA tax credits and other support for clean energy this July was a major blow to climate action in the United States, and the Trump administration has followed up by obstructing wind and solar projects, even some that were nearly ready to deliver crucial power to Americans. This dramatic U-turn is the product of electoral outcomes, but it is also the result of an important shift in the battle of ideas, one that is playing out in the United States and also in other countries. Opponents of climate action have pivoted from simply denying that human activity is changing the climate and toward what is best described as a “New Denialism”—a narrative based on convincing the public that climate solutions don’t work or are too expensive, that decarbonization is too difficult and unrealistic a goal, and that everyone should make peace with the fact that fossil fuels will be around forever, so the United States might as well produce more of them. Climate change will inflict some damage, but it’s a small price to pay for progress, New Denialists argue. New Denialism is more subtle and thus perhaps more dangerous than its predecessor. It thrives on the fact that the energy transition is complex and nuanced, and that the scientific consensus, though settled on the fundamentals, is uncertain about the magnitude, cost, and timeline of climate damages. The New Denialism exploits these features to undermine the public’s confidence in the entire decarbonization project, while largely ignoring adaptation (or, in some cases, sophomorically suggesting it will be easy). If these ideas take root, they may prevent the formation of coalitions for meaningful climate action in the future, even if a climate-friendly party eventually takes the White House and Congress. Building a fresh, durable consensus for climate action will require not just confronting the New Denialism but also setting forth a new approach that takes an objective, fact-based view of the promise and limitations of the global energy transition and of what the United States needs to do to adapt to climate impacts. But even more important is building a narrative that relates climate action to two other things that Americans are urgently demanding of their political leadership: an affordable way of life and better health for themselves and their loved ones. Many climate solutions can lower the cost of living and safeguard human health, and it is possible—in fact, imperative—to make life more affordable, longer, and healthier for the people of the United States while addressing climate change at the same time. We call our approach Climate Clarity, and it’s based on four foundational ideas that stem from our research and that of our peers. These ideas may be controversial in some quarters, but we are convinced they will lead to a more constructive, reality-aligned public debate about the future of climate policy and action at a key historical juncture in the United States: Clean energy technologies today are effective and cost-competitive relative to fossil fuel alternatives. That is why the global energy transition, led by China and Europe, is now well under way, and why U.S. policy shifts are unlikely to derail it. A wave of disruptive, clean energy innovations is getting close to maturity and will further accelerate the transition. Out of self-interest, the United States should be part of the energy transition rather than sitting on the sidelines and hitching its star to fossil fuels. This will allow Americans to benefit directly from clean energy markets that are growing much faster than fossil fuel markets, enable the global transition to move faster, and keep the goal alive of reaching net zero emissions. Negative emissions technology needs to advance urgently and is an area where the United States could lead. Americans need to prepare for the impacts of climate change by taking a hard, dispassionate look at climate risk and adopting a risk-management philosophy. That means prioritizing the protection of vulnerable groups, ensuring that Americans have the information they need to make climate-informed decisions, and facilitating the mobility of people across and within different regions of the country. Technological innovation alone won’t be enough. Building lasting support for climate-friendly policies that support those technologies will require forming a new political coalition. And that, in turn, will require linking climate solutions to Americans’ most important everyday concerns, namely affordability and health.
Topic:: Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Regulation, Domestic Politics, Innovation, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

575. U.S. Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective

Author:: McKenzie Carrier and Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The global democratic recession of the past twenty years has been marked by numerous cases of elected leaders incrementally dismantling democracy through a steady centralization of power and undercutting of checks and balances—what political scientists label as executive aggrandizement. Under the second Donald Trump presidency, the United States is showing clear signs of following such a path, leading many commenters to draw arresting but often relatively glancing comparisons with other prominent recent cases of democratic erosion, like Hungary, India, Poland, and Türkiye. This paper examines U.S. political developments since the return of Trump to power in an in-depth, comparative light, seeking to illuminate the similarities and differences between the unfolding U.S. context and the experience of other troubled democracies. The paper establishes that the Trump administration’s overall political project conforms to the general model of executive aggrandizement, and is best understood as taking place at three interrelated levels: Establishing the president as supreme within the executive branch: Trump’s team seeks an extreme form of presidential concentration of power within the executive branch. It has weakened accountability institutions and regulations, tightened presidential control over independent agencies and the executive bureaucracy, decreased the political independence of the civil service, and purged perceived opponents from the branch. Making the executive branch dominant over other parts of government: The administration is forcefully seeking dominance over the judiciary, Congress, and states. It has defied court orders, criticized judicial rulings, and constrained individual judges. It has circumvented congressional policies and undermined its powers. And it has attacked and constrained state governments that do not align with administration policies. Weakening societal constraints on executive power: Trump has stymied civil society opposition by attacking independent media, punishing lawyers and law firms perceived to be oppositional, and constraining civic and educational organizations. His team has undermined vertical checks on the executive by weakening voting rights and the independence of election administration. Broadly, Trump is pursuing widespread retribution against perceived opponents and critics. The paper then compares the path of U.S. politics under Trump to seven other recent or ongoing cases of democratic backsliding—Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, India, Poland, and Türkiye—highlighting distinctive features along three comparative dimensions: Focus: The Trump team’s agenda has several priorities that set it apart from other backsliding cases. These include its unique emphasis on intra-executive dominance, delegitimization rather than institutionalized attacks on horizontal checks, and coercive use of the robust federal funding ecosystem to pressure U.S. civil society. Rapidity: The administration has carried out its political program with striking speed. Compared to other backsliding cases, it has sought to centralize power with greater momentum and rapidity. And while other leaders often eroded democratic checks piece by piece, Trump’s team is working to weaken such checks across multiple levels all at once. Severity: The degree of democratic erosion in the United States is not yet as severe as that of most of its backsliding peers. The country has not yet seen the deep-rooted institutional changes that have characterized many of the comparative cases. And repressive measures like coercive force or criminalization have been limited by U.S. democratic norms and institutions. While some comfort can be taken from the fact that the relatively deeply rooted U.S. democratic norms and institutions compared to those in the other cases have resulted in a less institutionalized process of backsliding thus far, the distinctive speed and aggressiveness of Trump’s aggrandizement agenda is cause for serious concern. Numerous avenues and sources of resistance to democratic erosion continue to exist, but U.S. democracy is being put to the test as never before in the country’s modern history.
Topic:: Government, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Turkey, India, Poland, Brazil, Hungary, North America, Ecuador, El Salvador, and United States of America

576. Securing America’s Critical Minerals Supply

Author:: Allan Bentley and Jonas Goldman
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has prioritized building a secure critical minerals supply chain to create economic prosperity and geopolitical leverage. This strategy centers on streamlined permitting, legislative support via the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), and protective tariffs, including a planned 50 percent tariff on copper announced for summer 2025. However, a purely domestic approach will face severe constraints. First, the United States does not have the necessary critical minerals reserves in all cases. This creates fundamental limits to supply that cannot be resolved through domestic policy measures alone. While international agreements, such as the minerals deal with Ukraine, offer potential solutions, mining development requires long lead times, which makes these efforts inherently long-term projects. In addition, there is a tension between domestic mining goals and broader manufacturing competitiveness. Our analysis shows that even under the most optimistic scenarios, by 2035 U.S. domestic production would be able to meet projected demand only for zinc and molybdenum. Even a substantial domestic minerals boom would leave the country requiring substantial imports of copper, graphite, lithium, silver, nickel, and manganese to support industrial expansion and grid modernization. But greater minerals extraction is only half the picture, as a corresponding scaleup of U.S. smelting capacity would also be required. Current policy measures under the OBBBA provide mixed support. While the legislation allocates $2 billion for National Defense Stockpile purchases, $5 billion for the Industrial Base Fund, and $500 million for defense credit programs, it simultaneously phases out the Inflation Reduction Act’s permanent 10 percent production tax credit in 2034. These changes fail to address the structural weaknesses in U.S. mining competitiveness. This analysis identifies two critical pathways. First, a comprehensive domestic industrial strategy must address the entire mining ecosystem—from streamlined permitting and modern equipment to efficient logistics networks and processing economies of scale. Second, a coordinated friendshoring approach must leverage partnerships with allies and developing economies to diversify supply chains away from Chinese dominance. The United States must support value-added processing in these jurisdictions, so that all countries can benefit from a global mining diversification push. One specific policy mechanism is likely to prove crucial. Guaranteed price contracts with miners and processors—modeled on the recent MP Materials rare earths arrangement—could provide investment certainty through shared upside mechanisms rather than blanket import restrictions. Success requires strategically coordinated domestic and international efforts. Tariffs alone will fail. Innovation support, technology standards, and infrastructure development must be integrated in a comprehensive industrial strategy. A balanced approach that strengthens domestic capabilities while securing reliable international partnerships offers the best path toward critical minerals security that enables rather than constrains American manufacturing competitiveness.
Topic:: Development, Natural Resources, Mining, Supply Chains, Offshoring, Critical Minerals, and Onshoring
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

577. The European Radical Right in the Age of Trump 2.0

Author:: Rosa Balfour, Stefan Lehne, and Elena Ventura
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 seemed to herald a revolutionary new era that would reshape not only the United States but also European politics and culture.1 The breathtaking speed and depth with which the second Trump presidency has changed U.S. domestic and foreign policy is reminiscent of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and has caused frantic adaptation across the globe.2 U.S. action in geopolitical theaters that are central to Europe’s security and Washington’s triggering of a global trade war are immensely consequential for Europe. U.S. policy is revealing the ideological detail of the American radical right as it undergoes some solidification and builds an international network in which Europe plays a key role. Europe is high on the agenda of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Yet, however emboldened the European radical right may feel, and despite growing transatlantic linkages, events of the past year suggest that the continent’s own dynamics and challenges remain the main drivers that shape Europe’s political and policy choices. The European radical right has had some electoral successes but continues to struggle to turn that achievement into action, as it is divided in the European Union (EU) institutions and inconsistent on policy. The primary factor in the radical right’s success is the failure of mainstream politics to find effective responses to political challenges. In April 2024, Carnegie Europe published a report on the foreign policies of the fourteen most significant European radical-right parties and their impact on the EU.3 Now, one year into the EU’s 2024–2029 institutional term, this paper asks: With Trump in the White House, can the radical right—in the words of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—“conquer” Europe?4 In fact, the Trump effect on the radical right is more nuanced than is usually assumed. Signals of both empowerment and distance are visible. While the radical right’s electorate is more drawn to Trump in his second term than in his first, most Europeans continue to be skeptical of him, making radical-right parties cautious in their embrace of Trumpism. After all, the Trump administration’s outright anti-EU policies affect radical-right electorates, too. The radical right is as consequential as centrist parties, leaders, and institutions allow it to be. Fears that the radical right with Trump’s support will destroy the EU seem overblown in the short term. However, the right could well be capable of blocking and delaying reforms that are necessary to confront the EU’s current and future challenges. Rather than conquering Europe, the radical right seems set on preventing the EU from becoming what it needs to become.
Topic:: European Union, Donald Trump, Political Parties, Radical Right, Right-Wing Politics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

578. Legacy or Liability? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis, Kristin Zhu, Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, Maeve Sockwell, Lauren Morganbesser, and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Allies are essential to U.S. strategic competition with China but carry costs and risks that require continuous, realistic management. Polarization in Washington has unfortunately impeded the correct approach: critics on the right are too narrowly focused on military power while advocates on the left underplay the real costs and risks involved in U.S. defense commitments. Across the political spectrum, experts are now calling on allies to shoulder more of the burden for security in the Indo-Pacific. This is positive, but plans to deepen U.S. alliances also need to weigh allied political will and the danger of being drawn into conflicts that do not serve vital U.S. interests. This report inventories these costs and benefits for seven key alliances across eight core areas of U.S.-China strategic competition. We conclude that: Japan can further U.S. aims with China across all eight categories, especially as its defense spending increases. It is willing to cooperate in several key areas and poses low risk of entanglement. Australia can make contributions at a more modest level. Political will to cooperate with the United States has increased but is not steady. Risk of entanglement is low. South Korea is reluctant to use its economic and military power to counter China but poses a substantial military burden and risk on the United States. Chip manufacturing and other nonmilitary capabilities help strengthen the case for the alliance. Key European allies—France, Germany, and the UK—will have a limited military role in the Indo-Pacific, but can support important technological, diplomatic, and political objectives of U.S. China strategy. The Philippines has advantageous military geography—but lacks other benefits and poses an entanglement risk in the South China Sea. We stress that if Washington consistently pursues a statecraft that undermines allied trust in the United States, allied leaders will not support U.S. global objectives, weakening America’s hand in competition with China. Some recent U.S. policies, such as the Trump administration’s broad tariffs, appear to have eroded trust. The United States does not need a revolution in its alliances, which remain a source of strength for America at a time when U.S. power is under strain globally. But Washington does need to move with greater caution when deepening them. Ensuring alliances serve the needs of American citizens at a time when the world is in flux will require realism, periodic reassessment, and continuous adaptation.
Topic:: Alliance, Strategic Competition, Polarization, Statecraft, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, North America, and United States of America

579. With Trump, Polarization Among Venezuelans Reaches New Heights

Author:: Steve Ellner
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: Washington’s Venezuela policy has intensified divisions within the opposition, revealing class divides and fears over the fallout from a potential U.S. invasion.
Topic:: Class, Donald Trump, Polarization, Opposition, and Nicolas Maduro
Political Geography:: South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

580. As Detention Surges Under Trump, Organizers Build a Lasting Movement

Author:: Conner Martinez
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: As the president pumps $45 billion into ICE over the next three years, activists and communities must balance rapid response with longer-term resistance.
Topic:: Donald Trump, Opposition, Activism, Organizing, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

581. Balancing Borders: Trade, Security, and Migration in US-Mexico Relations Today

Author:: Diane E. Davis, Jorge Capetillo-Ponce, José Ignacio Hernández, Silvia Nuñez Garcia, and Chappell Lawson
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Balancing Borders: Trade, Security, and Migration in US-Mexico Relations Today: Thursday, October 9, 2025 A conversation on the challenges and opportunities at the intersection of trade, security, and migration. This conference is co-sponsored by MIT-Mexico, UNAM Boston and UMass Boston, and brought together scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to explore the evolving dynamics of the U.S.–Mexico relationship. Speakers: Diane E. Davis is the Charles Dyer Norton Professor of Regional Planning and Urbanism at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design (GSD) and Domain Head of the Publics Track in the Master of Design Studies Program. Trained as a sociologist, Davis’s research interests include urban governance, urban social movements, the politics of planning, and conflict in cities. Her books include Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Conflicts in the Urban Realm (Indiana University Press, 2011); Discipline and Development: Middle Classes and Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation (Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century (Temple University Press 1994; Spanish translation 1999). Jorge Capetillo-Ponce is currently Associate Professor of Sociology and Latino Studies at University of Massachusetts Boston. From 2016 to 2022 he was editor of the Sociology of the Caribbean section for the Library of Congress. He also taught courses and gave lectures from 2002-2021 in the culture program at the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis. Before he joined the faculty of Sociology at UMASS Boston in 2002, Professor Capetillo-Ponce worked as Executive Director of the Mexican Cultural Institute in New York City (2000-2001) as advisor to the Dean of the Graduate Faculty at The New School (1996-2000), and as consultant to Latino/a grassroots organizations in New York City (2000-2002) and Boston (2002-present). José Ignacio Hernández (Caracas, 1974), has a Law Degree from the Universidad Central de Venezuela, with a summa cum laude diploma (1997); an Advanced Study Certificate from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2001) and a Juris Doctor from the Universidad Complutense with a summa cum laude diploma (2002). He is Professor of Administrative Law at the Universidad Central de Venezuela and the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, both in Venezuela. He also teaches Economic Constitutional Law in the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. He has been professor of regulatory framework at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA), also in Venezuela. He is the Director of the Law Review of the Law Faculty of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. He has written more than 100 academic articles published in Venezuela, Colombia, Argentine, Chile, Mexico, US, Italy, Poland and Spain. He also has written 14 books. Silvia Nuñez Garcia is a researcher at Center for Research on North America, from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, where she was director between 2009 and 2017. She also had the responsibility of directing the UNAM office in Los Angeles, California during 2021 and 2022. In 2019, the Government of Canada, through its Embassy in Mexico, awarded her the 'Canada-Mexico 75' recognition for her contribution to strengthening academic ties between the two nations. Throughout her career, she has been a visiting scholar at the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Michigan State University and other prestigious institutions such as Georgetown University and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Likewise, she was distinguished as a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the United States in 1999. Moderator: Chappell Lawson is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT. Professor Lawson's recent work has focused on homeland security policy, Mexican politics, the effect of candidates' physical appearance on their electoral success, and political leadership. From September 2009 through February 2011, Professor Lawson was on leave from MIT as a political appointee in the Obama Administration, serving as Executive Director and Senior Advisor to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Before joining the MIT faculty, he served briefly as a Director of Inter-American Affairs on the National Security Council staff during the Clinton Administration.
Topic:: Security, Migration, Bilateral Relations, Borders, and Trade
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

582. The Third World Imperative: How Brazil-China Relations Emerge from the Aftershock of Richard Nixon’s Latin American Foreign Policy

Author:: Pablo Muñoz
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: This article analyzes the emergence of Brazil-China relations in the context of Richard Nixon’s foreign policy toward Latin America. It examines how American perceptions of Brazil as a potential competitor, and the geopolitical economic maneuvers of the Nixon administration influenced Brazil’s foreign policy decisions. The article highlights Brazil’s growing nationalism and its engagement with the Third World, including economic interactions with the Soviet Union and the eventual establishment of relations with mainland China. Ultimately, it argues that U.S. foreign policy played a significant role in shaping Brazil’s understanding of its Third World imperative, paving the way for closer relations with China that continue to this day.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Nationalism, Third World, and Dictatorship
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

583. Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA (Session 1)

Author:: Peter Krause
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA: U.S. Foreign Policy under Trump An online mini course for the MIT community with Peter Krause (PhD '11). Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. This webinar is hosted by the MIT-MENA program at the MIT Center for International Studies. About the speaker: Peter Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College. His research and teaching focus on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. He currently teaches courses on Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, research methods, and international relations. He is a faculty associate in the International Studies Program and the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program at Boston College, as well as a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, and United States of America

584. Fairness and Safety for Asylum Seekers: Assessing the “Remain in Mexico” (MPP) Policy

Author:: Harrison Fintz, Abigail Leibowitz, and Ila Prabhuram
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: This brief evaluates the MPP program through an ethical lens emphasizing safety, fairness, due process, and burden sharing. It proposes concrete reforms for any future iteration: enforcement guidelines, safety reporting, expedited processing, legal support, and cross-border cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Borders, Immigration Policy, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:: South America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

585. "Reciprocal" tariffs: What are they really for?

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief evaluates the evolving reasons for and application of the Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariffs and finds them wanting. The tariffs, adjusted most recently on August 1, 2025, were originally supposed to achieve reciprocity between the United States and its trading partners but were based on a defective measure because bilateral imbalances do not necessarily indicate unfair foreign trade practices; the methodology used to estimate the reciprocal tariffs was biased towards overstatement, particularly for countries producing primary commodities, which will have high pass-through into US final prices, and for countries exporting products with high import content. Given these defects, the reciprocal tariffs are better seen as a dressed-up anchoring ploy to strengthen America’s hand in negotiations rather than credible estimates of the unfair trade practices that the United States faces. Moreover, even if reduced to 15 percent, the application of these tariffs to America’s poorest trading partners would do little to reduce the overall US trade deficit but considerably harm their economic development.
Topic:: Tariffs, Economic Development, Protectionism, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

586. American Public Attitudes on U.S. Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, 2025

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This year’s KEI/YouGov survey comes at a moment of profound uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy. The Donald Trump administration has unsettled established trade arrangements, raised questions about the durability of U.S. alliance commitments, and injected unpredictability into U.S. engagement with long-standing partners like South Korea. Against this backdrop, American public opinion provides a clearer sense of continuity. The survey reveals enduring support for South Korea as a partner, stable recognition of the alliance’s value, and consistent preference for more open trade, investment, and cultural exchange, even as geopolitical turbulence and partisan divides complicate policymaking. Yet there are signs that American public opinion may be undergoing a transition in how Americans view other countries suggesting possible shifts in global alignments. Finally, within this evolving perception, the type of state appears to matter: Americans tend to weigh national security, trade, and investment differently depending on whether a country is viewed as an ally, partner, competitor, or adversary.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, Northeast Asia, and United States of America

587. America’s Nuclear Red Line: Trust in Alliances, Not Proliferation

Author:: Yujin Son
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: On many foreign policy questions, American voters are sharply divided. But on nuclear weapons, a bipartisan consensus still holds. New polling by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) and YouGov shows broad public opposition to letting allies such as South Korea develop nuclear weapons, even as risks from North Korea, Russia, and other countries mount. In short, U.S. voters demonstrate a durable belief that extended deterrence and U.S. alliances remain the most effective tools for safeguarding international security. The survey shows only 20 percent of Americans support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. Other long-standing U.S. allies fare only slightly better, with just 24 percent supporting nuclear development for Australia and Japan. In every case, opposition to allied nuclear proliferation far outweighs support. The data shows that most Americans support alliances, not additional bombs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Tariffs, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

588. Exploring the global digital ID landscape

Author:: Coley Felt and Will LaRivee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In an increasingly digital world, digital identity systems represent a fundamental transformation in how personal information is authenticated and managed, shifting from traditional physical identification methods to electronic credentials that enable access to digital services across government and private-sector platforms. These systems utilize authenticated credentials that verify individual qualifications and personal information to establish trusted digital documentation, spanning use cases from health certificates to mobile identification for travel security and banking verification. The worldwide adoption of digital identity systems varies significantly across regions and implementation approaches. Estonia’s comprehensive e-ID system, mandatory for all residents, demonstrates transformative societal impact by connecting organizations through distributed databases and blockchain technology. India’s Aadhaar program serves a massive population, proving that large-scale digital identity systems can operate in developing countries while bringing previously undocumented populations into formal economic systems, albeit not without criticism. The European Union’s eIDAS framework mandates that all member states offer digital identity wallets to citizens and businesses, creating interoperability across member states. The African Union has faced infrastructure and data protection challenges, while the United States remains fragmented with individual states implementing mobile driver’s licenses without federal coordination. Digital identity systems offer a breadth of benefits including enhanced convenience, improved access for underserved populations, stronger privacy protections through data minimization principles, and significant cost savings for organizations. These systems hold tremendous potential to transform the delivery of government services and industry interactions, though there are potential risks and limitations to be considered.
Topic:: Human Rights, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Digital Policy, and Digital ID
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

589. Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

Author:: Venezuela Solutions Group
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first Trump administration drafted a framework for encouraging a democratic transition in Venezuela; with a few updates, it represents one policy path the second Trump administration could take. Nicolas Maduro’s recent promotion of a longtime rival may be a sign of how few friends he has left, raising the possibility that he may be more susceptible to the second option: a “maximum pressure” campaign. Whether Washington opts for incentives or a hard line, the goal should be to keep presenting dilemmas that make a democratic transition more appealing than the status quo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Oil, Politics, Sanctions, Reform, Geopolitics, Energy, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

590. How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats

Author:: Philippe Dickinson, Ryan Arick, and Natasha Lander Finch
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, Deterrence, Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

591. Homeland defense in an era of new strategic threats

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Amy Cowley
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Threats to the US homeland have fundamentally changed from two decades ago. In the years following 9/11, the most pressing dangers came from terrorist groups intent on carrying out attacks on US soil. Today’s threat landscape is broader, more complex, and more difficult to predict. Peer-state competitors, transnational criminal organizations, and non-state actors now possess the means to target the US homeland through a range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities—including long-range missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and malign foreign influence. Responding to these evolving threats—designed to disrupt critical infrastructure, weaken public trust, and undermine the ability of the United States to project power abroad— requires a comprehensive approach to homeland defense that extends beyond border security. But how should the United States chart this new course, and what must it entail? The forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), published by the Department of Defense (DoD), offers a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for the next step in strengthening homeland defense. Meeting this challenge requires a focus not only on large-scale air and missile defense and border security but also on the protection of critical defense systems—such as space infrastructure—from cyberattacks and coercive economic activities. The success of these efforts may well determine whether the United States can stay one step ahead of those seeking to do it harm.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

592. Building Networks in the Shadows of War: Mapping Challenges and Opportunities

Author:: Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: In September 2023, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies – and the U.S. Department of State launched a joint project to create a civil-society network of regional thinkers and policy experts. The goal was to foster strategic dialogue, cooperation, and deeper normalization between Israel and its neighbors. However, just two weeks later, the Hamas attack of October 7th and the ensuing war reshaped the regional landscape. This report reflects on the project’s initial challenges, the adaptations made in response to the conflict, and the surprising emergence of real connections and public Israeli-Arab dialogue despite the turmoil.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Normalization, Abraham Accords, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

593. For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

Author:: Elizabeth Sizeland
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative (AANSRI) and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, the initiative calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, Resilience, Non-Traditional Threats, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

594. Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Recent Developments in the US Tariff Landscape

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This short factual overview paper describes the complexity created by the tariffs imposed by the US, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The Policy Brief concludes by highlighting the importance of the EU “Access2Market” tool in addressing these new complexities, helping EU exporters gain access to the US market.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Economy, Tariffs, and Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

595. Why the U.S. Should Embrace Israel-Azerbaijan Alignment

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: This essay argues that Azerbaijan’s joining the Abraham Accords and formalizing its entente with Israel and the U.S. is eminently in the interests of all three states, particularly in the context of the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. In the wake of the 12‑day Israel‑Iran war and the American strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the U.S. proposal to oversee and perhaps even guarantee arrangements regarding the Zangezur Corridor to foster peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this argument makes even more sense, given that Washington has expressed a clear interest in having peace and a lasting presence in the Caucasus. These events highlight the American presence in both the Middle East and the Caucasus and its de facto alliance with Israel. Given the growing intimacy of Azerbaijan‑Israeli ties and U.S. interest in pacifying the South Caucasus, this move by Washington and Baku to formalize ties among these three states would be all the more logical now. Indeed, President Ilham Aliyev has publicly welcomed this American initiative. This idea of extending the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan apparently originated in Israel. Still, there is no sign that Azerbaijan opposes this notion. Moreover, as shown below, this tandem acts—and can act even further—in critical areas to further interests congruent with those of the United States. Since this partnership, long a fixture in world affairs, both reflects and can extend trends in world affairs that are beneficial not only to Israel and Azerbaijan but also to the U.S. Washington should encourage Baku to take this step. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu had to postpone his scheduled visit to Baku in May 2025, his postponement letter cited the deepening bond between the two states, which can be seen in increasing economic cooperation, expanded tourism to and from both countries, Israel’s construction of Azerbaijan’s satellites, and two daily flights by Azerbaijani airlines between the two countries. While this partnership, if not a formal alliance, is primarily founded on a shared fear of Iran’s aggressive intentions against both states, this tandem has now strengthened the economic dimension of the relationship. It is thereby forging a broader and deeper foundation that transcends shared anxieties. This can also be seen in Israel’s technology and defense trade with Azerbaijan, where Baku employed Israeli weapons in its campaigns in Karabakh and is buying Israeli radar and aerial detection systems. However, at the same time, this alignment also exemplifies a larger trend towards trans‑regional partnerships between Middle Eastern and South Caucasus states. A similar trend is observed in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan’s President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev proposed in 2024 that his country establish a strategic partnership with Qatar. Similarly, those Gulf states that are already working with Israel are becoming more entangled with Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. Consequently, the Azerbaijan‑Israel partnership is no anomaly, but rather an illustration of a discernible trend in world politics that Washington should embrace.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

596. Reciprocal Defense Procurement: The Missing Element in U.S.-ROK Relations

Author:: Hwa Yu and Brian Hobbs
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreements—managed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)—exempt “qualifying countries” from Buy American restrictions in return for reciprocal market access and closer strategic alignment. Since the inaugural 1956 agreement with Canada, the DoD has concluded 28 RDP agreements mostly with NATO allies to foster rationalization, standardization, interchangeability, and interoperability among military forces. They also waive specialty-metal restrictions, improving access to critical minerals. Qualifying countries typically possess advanced robust defense industries, field U.S. weapon systems, and face regional threats from Russia or China. Post-Cold War additions such as Austria, Finland and Australia showcased geographic and political expansion; Japan and the Baltic states followed amid rising Russian and Chinese pressure. Ongoing negotiations with Brazil and India illustrate evolving aims: integrating key BRICS economies, shoring up rare earth supply chains, and aligning non-aligned states against rival powers— while discussions with South Korea reflect efforts to deepen industrial cooperation with existing allies. Domestic stakeholder pressures, defense offsets, and “America First” trade policies complicate RDP negotiations, yet countries with robust industry, shared security interests, and demand for U.S. weapons remain strong candidates for future agreements, strengthening a resilient, globally integrated defense industry network.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Tariffs, BRICS, Procurement, Department of Defense (DoD), and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

597. “Unitary Social Democracy” and Lyuh Woon-hyung’s Relationship with the American Military Government in Korea, 1945-1947

Author:: Kyu-hyun Jo
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This article will argue that “Unitary Social Democracy” had its roots in egalitarianism as emphasized by Tonghak and Christian Humanism and aimed to promote social democracy through a mixture of democratic electoral politics and a Socialistic welfare system; it was due to such a radical amalgamation of Left-wing and Right-wing ideas which earned Lyuh the American military government’s ire and led Lyuh to an ultimate failure in finding a satisfactory agreement with American officials who refused and could not understand Lyuh’s objectives. However, despite American reluctance to understand his philosophy, Lyuh never gave up on his quest to realize an equitable system of land and property distribution guided by democracy and socialism, and he never relinquished his firm belief that the only solution to eradicating the Manicheanism of the Cold War was through seeking the American military government’s cooperation. This article will also argue that Lyuh showed a highly consistent and dedicated commitment to realizing his ideals such that he never changed or forfeited his philosophy even after north Korea was established in September 1945, keeping his creed intact until his announcement of the Seven Principles for Left-Right Unification in October 1946 and untimely assassination in July 1947.
Topic:: Government, Politics, History, Welfare, and Social Democracy
Political Geography:: Asia, Korea, and United States of America

598. Diversification Through Trade: Europe’s FTA Agenda

Author:: Filippo Fasulo and Paola Magri
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Amid renewed negotiations between the United States and China and the recent meetings of Donald Trump in Asia, global trade dynamics are once again shifting toward a more strategic dimension. While Washington and Beijing explore a framework to ease tariff tensions and expand cooperation in areas such as critical minerals and supply chains, the European Union is stepping up its own trade diplomacy. Seeking to strengthen economic security and reduce strategic dependencies, the EU is advancing a broad agenda of free trade agreements across Latin America (through Mercosur), ASEAN, Central Asia, and the MENA region, as well as with key partners such as Japan, Australia, and India. These initiatives aim not only to open markets but also to foster resilience, sustainable growth, and geopolitical balance in a rapidly evolving global landscape. Where do these negotiations stand today, and what are the key issues that remain to be addressed with these partners?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Diversification, Trade, Protectionism, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

599. Europe’s dependence on US foreign military sales and what to do about it

Author:: Juan Mejino-López and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Worries about Europe’s dependence on the United States military industrial base have increased with the worsening security situation in Europe and the deterioration of the transatlantic relationship. With a new dataset covering all notifications under the US Foreign Military Sales programme since 2008, we show that Europe has substantially increased its purchases from the US defence industrial base during the last four years, deepening its dependence on US military equipment in the short to medium term. The dependence is particularly significant for high-tech equipment, including air defence, missiles and fighter jets, and for additional equipment and services included in purchases, such as advanced software and sustainment and modernisation required in future years. This strategic reliance on the US, even when the risks associated are low, provide the US with significant bargaining leverage over Europe that can potentially be used in different policy areas, such as trade. Moreover, the US military industrial base faces its own constraints and current and future US administrations might prioritise deliveries to Asia. In response, European policymakers must assess the extent of dependence on the US and develop a strategy on how to minimise the risks. At a time of rising defence budgets, it is crucial that European production of key weapon systems grows faster than demand, so that dependence on the US defence industrial base is gradually reduced. Policymakers should review critical technological dependencies, even for procurement directed at national producers, and should plan to upgrade Europe’s technological base without increasing external dependence. Learning from and cooperating with Ukraine to boost Ukrainian production is one important step. Establishing a timeline to determine the pace at which certain dependencies should be minimised is equally necessary. Europe also needs to reduce its reliance on structural strategic systems provided by the US, such as command, control and communications systems. Given the diverging strategic cultures across Europe, building consensus is of paramount importance. European companies need to grow to the scale that is only achievable in a larger market. Failing to implement a strategy risks Europe losing its freedom and autonomy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Macroeconomics, Trade Policy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

600. Tariffs, deals and multilateral ideals: can the World Trade Organization survive?

Author:: Petros C. Mavroidis
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The second administration of United States President Donald Trump has shaken the foundations of the multilateral trading system by implementing unilateral tariffs on imports from most of its partners, and by signing ‘deals’ with a few of them. It is impossible to legally reconcile these actions with the letter and spirit of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The fundamental purpose of the WTO is to promote non-discriminatory trade liberalisation, primarily through the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle, while subjecting disputes to compulsory third-party adjudication (CTPA). The high, new US tariffs and so-called deals run afoul of MFN, CTPA and several other WTO legal institutions. The US view under Trump seems to be that legality should not stand in the way of political expediency when it comes to promoting US interests as understood by the current US administration. This is happening when the policy relevance of the WTO had already been undermined. Geopolitical concerns have turned its traditional consensus-based voting mechanism into a formidable impediment to block its legislative functions. Its adjudicative function has been moribund since 2019, when the first Trump administration took steps to make the WTO Appellate Body largely redundant. While the WTO still has offices in Geneva, the emerging disequilibrium is hardly sustainable. The WTO has been practically reduced to redundancy, at least with respect to influencing relations between the US and each of its partners. Assuming that current US policy does not change, the relevance of the WTO could wane further. Reviving the multilateral organisation will require a valiant effort from the key stakeholders, and the determination to address issues that the membership has previously avoided. This paper highlights some of them.
Topic:: Governance, Multilateralism, Trade Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS