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301. Implications of the Inflation Reduction Act for the Biotechnology Industry

Author:
Cody Hyman, Henry Dao, Gregory Vaughan, and Fred D. Ledley
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 contains landmark provisions authorizing the government to negotiate the price of selected drugs covered by Medicare Part D. The biopharmaceutical industry has criticized these provisions as a threat to innovation arguing that reducing future revenues could disincentivize equity investment in biotechnology. This research examines the sensitivity of private and public equity investment in the biotechnology industry to drug price indices and market conditions from 2000-2022. The analysis shows that equity financing and valuation in the biotechnology industry were strongly associated with equity market conditions but not indices of either producer or consumer drug prices. These results do not support claims of an association between changing drug prices and the availability of equity capital to emerging biotechnology companies, which currently sponsor the majority of all clinical trials. These results add to evidence that the IRA may not have a negative impact on pharmaceutical innovation.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Inflation, Innovation, Biotechnology, Public Investment, and Inflation Reduction Act
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

302. Scale and Scope in Early American Business History: The “Fortune 500” of 1812

Author:
Richard Sylla and Robert E. Wright
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Fortune magazine began publishing annual rankings of U.S. corporations by revenue in 1955. Ever since, scholars and forecasters have analyzed changes in the Fortune 500 to help inform their judgments about industry concentration and the relative importance of different sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, earlier data are scarce, especially before the Civil War. Through extensive research we have created a sort of historical “Fortune 500” going back to 1812, ranked by corporate capitalization, which we share here. Numerous insights can be drawn from this dataset, including the historical dominance of the banking and finance sectors and the early importance of manufacturing. Perhaps the larger significance of being able to come up with a Fortune 500 for 1812, though, is the fact that even with a population of only about 7.5 million, U.S. already had more business corporations than any other country, and possibly more than all other countries put together, securing its role as the world’s first “corporation nation.” The ease of incorporating businesses released a lot of entrepreneurial energy that helped to build an ever-expanding economy and by the end of the 19th century, the U.S. would be the world’s largest national economy with tens of thousands of corporations.
Topic:
Economics, History, Business, and Industry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

303. Tesla as a Global Competitor: Strategic Control in the EV Transition

Author:
Matt Hopkins and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
In this paper, we assess the implications of Elon Musk’s strategic control over Tesla, the pioneering company that has become central to the electric vehicle transition. We document how, as Tesla’s CEO for 16 years, Musk has exercised strategic control to direct the transformation of the company from an uncertain startup to a global leader. Now that Tesla is profitable corporate predators (aka hedge-fund activists) may challenge Musk’s strategic control—a possibility of which the CEO is well aware. To retain his control over Tesla as a publicly listed company, Musk depends on holding a sufficient proportion of Tesla’s shares outstanding to possess the voting power to fend off predatory value extractors. In addition to accumulating Tesla shares by investing $291.2 million at early stages of the company’s evolution, Musk has relied upon massive stock-option grants from the Tesla board, under the guise of “compensation”, in 2009, 2012, and 2018, to boost his shareholding and, with it, his voting power. Hence the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in January 2024 to rescind Musk’s 2018 stock-option package—by far the largest ever granted to a corporate executive—poses a threat to Musk’s strategic control at Tesla. As the “Technoking” of Tesla strategizes to maintain his control over the company’s decision-making, anyone concerned with the role that Tesla will play in the evolving EV transition should be asking how CEO Musk might use, or abuse, his powerful position.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Competition, Electric Vehicles, Tesla, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

304. Setting Pharmaceutical Drug Prices: What the Medicare Negotiators Need to Know About Innovation and Financialization

Author:
Öner Tulum and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Mandated by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, the U.S. government through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is negotiating with pharmaceutical companies over the “maximum fair price” of ten drugs in wide use by Medicare patients. Over the next few years, the number of drugs whose prices are subject to negotiations will increase. The pharmaceutical companies contend that a “fair” price would be a “value-based price” that enables the companies’ shareholders to capture the value that the drug creates for society. Invoking the dominant “maximizing shareholder value” ideology, the argument for value-based pricing assumes that it is only a pharmaceutical company’s shareholders who make the risky investments that fund drug innovation. Pharmaceutical executives and their lobbyists warn that a lowering of drug prices will reduce investments in new drugs. The purpose of this paper is to enable CMS negotiators to respond to these arguments by showing a) why drug-price regulation is required, given the relation between scale economies in supplying drugs and price inelasticity of drug demand; b) how the pharmaceutical companies with which they are negotiating prices are, in general, not using their profits from unregulated drug prices to fund drug innovation but rather to fund distributions to shareholders in the form of cash dividends and stock buybacks; c) that publicly listed pharmaceutical companies do not typically rely upon investment by shareholders to fund drug innovation; and d) that investment in drug innovation entails “collective and cumulative learning” in foundational and translational research that is both antecedent and external to the investments in clinical research that a pharmaceutical company may make to bring a safe and effective drug to market.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Finance, Innovation, Pharmaceuticals, and Medicare
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

305. Good Policy or Good Luck? Why Inflation Fell Without a Recession

Author:
Thomas Ferguson and Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes claims that the Federal Reserve is principally responsible for the decline of inflation in the U.S. We compare several different quantitative approaches. These show that at most the Fed could plausibly claim credit for somewhere between twenty and forty percent of the decline. The paper then examines claims by central bankers and their supporters that a steadfast Fed commitment to keeping inflationary expectations anchored played a key role in the process. The paper shows that it did not. The Fed’s own surveys show that low-income Americans did not believe assurances from the Fed or anyone else that inflation was anchored. Instead, what does explain much of the decline is the simple fact that most workers nowadays cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. The paper then takes up the obvious question of why steep rises in interest rates have not so far led to big rises in unemployment. We show that recent arguments by Benigno and Eggertson that shifts in vacancy rates can explain this are inconsistent with the evidence. The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent. This arises, as we have emphasized in several papers, from the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. Absent sharp declines in wealth, the continuing importance of this factor is likely to feed service sector inflation in particular.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, Inflation, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

306. Grand Strategy: Shield of the republic

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Leaders must decide how to best translate scarce means into political objectives. Limited resources and the high stakes of national survival force leaders to prioritize. Military power is dependent on wealth, industry, geographical endowments, population size, and effective domestic institutions. The various conditions in which states find themselves help motivate and constrain the grand strategy formulated by their leaders. The United States is still the most powerful, secure, and prosperous country in the world, with a favorable geographic position and many internal advantages. U.S. grand strategy has historically been concerned with preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia by maintaining the balance of power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only great power in the world. Unfortunately, it squandered the “unipolar moment” by pursuing a costly and counterproductive grand strategy of “liberal hegemony,” which has left it overextended. The United States’ secure geostrategic position and the improbability of a Eurasian hegemon allows it to adopt a grand strategy of restraint. This shift will help the United States to preserve its power, minimize risks, and adapt to the rise of new great powers. This strategy requires the United States to adopt a more rigorous definition of its vital interests and to shift to its allies the main burden of defending themselves.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

307. Grand Strategy: The Balance of Power

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The “balance of power” refers to the distribution of capabilities among states, as well as a possible equilibrium between them. A state’s military power is based on several factors, especially its economy and population. To survive in an anarchic world, states “balance” against rivals that threaten to become overwhelmingly powerful. This can include “internal balancing,” by which states build up their own capabilities, and “external balancing,” where states form alliances. Primacists and restrainers disagree about the balance of power. Primacists believe global hegemony is optimal and stable. Restrainers believe the pursuit of global hegemony is quixotic and self-defeating, leading to overextension and provoking counterbalancing by other powers. The United States is extremely powerful and secure thanks to its economy, geography, population, and military, among other factors. The prospect of a potential Eurasian hegemon emerging is remote. China is a formidable great power that warrants attention, but its geography makes expansion difficult, and it can be counterbalanced principally by other states in East Asia. A rough balance of power exists in both Europe and the Middle East, and therefore there’s no potential hegemon on the horizon in either region. The United States’ pursuit of primacy discourages allies from providing for their own defense to balance against threats, while uniting adversaries seeking to counterbalance the United States. The United States should instead encourage its capable allies to take responsibility for their own defense while seeking to keep its competitors divided through prudent diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

308. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

309. Grand Strategy: Geography

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Geographic distance and the current state of military technology interact to favor defense while diminishing the threat of conquest. The stopping power of water in particular obstructs the ability of even the most powerful states to project power overseas. Proximate land powers are the most likely to engage in security competition and conflict, while distant or sea powers are relatively isolated from potential adversaries. This strategic insularity is even greater if a state has a large and diversified economy and the resources to be relatively self-sufficient. The United States is separated from other great powers by thousands of miles of ocean to both its east and west, and is the most powerful, prosperous, and secure state in the world. However, many of the same conditions which make the United States secure also make it difficult to project power, carry out wars far abroad, and maintain military primacy on land in Eurasia. The United States should both embrace its abundance of security and accept the limits to its offensive power, using its position as a continent-sized maritime power to act as an offshore balancer rather than a hegemon on the flanks of the Eurasian landmass.
Topic:
Security, Grand Strategy, Geography, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

310. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:
Michael DiMino
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

311. A new NATO agenda: Less U.S., less dependency

Author:
Benjamin Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should aggressively reduce its force presence in Europe. This would be consistent with NATO’s original balancing purpose and U.S. expectations then that garrisoning Europe was a temporary expedient, not a permanent tool of U.S. dominance. The Russian threat, despite being energized by NATO expansion, is insufficient to demand the current defense effort devoted to it in Europe, whether it’s Americans or Europeans making that effort. The results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underline this happy point: Russia has proven weaker than conventional wisdom held, and the advantages of defense evident in the war bode well for the territorial status quo NATO defends in Europe. A U.S. drawdown in Europe is unlikely to spark a European defense renaissance, but even so, the balance of power in Europe will remain intact, and the United States will be better off with the freed-up resources and reduced risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, Dependency, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

312. Grand strategy: Alliances

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent. States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor. Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.” Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness. The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

313. Rethinking Africa Command

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy. Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent. AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand. Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Counter-terrorism, Africa Command (AFRICOM), and European Command (EUCOM)
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

314. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

315. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

316. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

317. The Washington Summit: Burden-sharing

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the third brief of the series, Tony Lawrence looks at the perennial question of burden-sharing. The Allies will probably not agree to raise the 2% of GDP spending guideline. But in any case, their focus on this metric hides the real picture of how responsibility for security is shared across the Alliance. The European Allies certainly need to step up in all areas, but they should also consider reframing the burden-sharing discussion.
Topic:
NATO, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

318. Keeping the Americans In

Author:
Rachel Hoff
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. The European Allies will closely watch this year’s US elections, concerned that a second Trump Presidency may have devastating consequences for transatlantic relations. In the sixth brief of the series, Rachel Hoff looks at US rhetoric and attitudes towards NATO. The good news is that polling shows that the majority of Americans are favourable towards NATO and support Article 5. But this support drops if the European Allies fail to meet NATO’s defence spending guidelines. Whoever wins the election in November, Europe will need to pull its weight to keep the US engaged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

319. Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO

Author:
Maksym Skrypchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. Ukraine recognises that while it is unlikely to be invited to join NATO any time soon, there is much it can do to prepare itself in advance of a formal invitation. In the final brief of the series, Maksym Skrypchenko describes Ukraine’s progress in implementing its defence reform agenda, focusing on its record of adopting NATO standards, and outlines the challenges of doing so in wartime. The continuing support of NATO Allies will be essential to these efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Reform, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

320. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

321. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

322. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

323. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:
Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:
European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

324. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

325. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

326. Key Takeaways: The Future of US and Allied Hypersonic Missile Programs

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hudson Institute and Space Foundation cohosted a workshop with Congressmen Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Vince Fong (R-CA), and Donald Norcross (D-NJ), Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., and former Office of the Secretary of Defense officials Mike White and John Plumb to discuss the future of the United States military’s hypersonic missile and missile defeat programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Missile Defense, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

327. US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond

Author:
Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This executive summary outlines the key recommendations for policymakers that emerged from deliberations at the Takshashila Institution–Hudson Institute roundtable series “US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond.” Its recommendations are divided into four proposed areas for collaboration between India and the United States: trade and investment, ideas and human capital, technology, and methods and mechanisms.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

328. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

329. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

330. Strengthening Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

Author:
Olivia Enos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has carried out a comprehensive campaign against the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group predominately based in Xinjiang, China. Beijing is holding an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political reeducation camps, subjecting more than 3 million to some form of forced labor, and seeking to reduce the Uyghur population through forced abortions and sterilizations. Because of this and other evidence, the United States issued an atrocity determination declaring that Uyghurs face ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. The atrocity determination was incredibly important as it spurred follow-on action from the US and other governments. The passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was one of the more powerful actions following the US determination. The UFLPA created a “rebuttable presumption” stating that the government would bar all goods produced “wholly or in part” with Uyghur forced labor from entering US markets. The UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021 and enforcement provisions went into effect in June 2022. Now, more than two years after its passage, trendlines are emerging, and policymakers can now evaluate the law’s effectiveness and ascertain new means for mitigating Uyghur forced labor. The CCP has not stopped targeting Uyghurs, and in fact has subjected even more of them to forced labor. Today, the CCP operates what some analysts believe is the largest state-sponsored forced labor program in the world. Given the CCP’s ongoing exploitation, the onus is on the US and the international community to curtail this egregious practice. At a minimum, democratic leaders need to ensure that citizens of the free world are not inadvertently supporting the continuation of these abuses. For the UFLPA to be maximally effective, Washington should complement it with comprehensive sanctions implementation and a secondary sanctions regime that targets entities aiding and abetting in the CCP’s enslavement of Uyghurs. Moreover, other countries need to close their markets to goods produced with Uyghur forced labor. To that end, the US and other countries can coordinate better to implement strong measures similar to the UFLPA. Perpetrators of Uyghur forced labor need to pay financially for their crimes through fines and forfeiture. Finally, the US should offer financial remedies to help survivors of the CCP’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. While the UFLPA was a notable development in the fight against Uyghur forced labor, more has to be done to ensure the end of Uyghur forced labor. The international community needs to join together to hold the CCP accountable and protect Uyghur rights.
Topic:
Legislation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, Freedom of Religion, Forced Labor, and Implementation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

331. Effective US Energy Policy Could Strengthen International Security

Author:
Brigham McCown
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
America faces significant geopolitical risk across multiple theaters of operation. With the post–Cold War peace dividend depleted, today’s multipolar political alignment reflects an instability not seen in nearly 100 years. Russia, Iran, and China are directly challenging the American-led world order. Their goal is clear, and the United States cannot allow them to prevail. While Russia’s disregard for the rule of law and internationally established boundaries preoccupies the near term, an emerging great power competition between the West and China looms over Washington’s mid- to long-term foreign policy priorities. Additionally, Iran’s malign influence has led to a resurgence of violence and instability in the Middle East. Closer to home, socialist and anti-democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere are again wooing voters with the failed and discredited policies of yesteryear. As a new geopolitical status quo emerges, the United States will need a secure source of energy. Energy security can be defined as a country’s ability to ensure the uninterrupted availability of reliable and affordable energy sources. It encompasses the stable supply of energy resources, the resilience of energy infrastructure, and a country’s ability to meet its current and future energy demands while also dealing with emergencies, natural disasters, and geopolitical tensions that could disrupt supply. A responsible energy mix promotes national and economic security while providing a realistic pathway to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This will include hydrocarbons, renewables, nuclear, and lower-emitting energy sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and biofuels. However, the glue that binds any stable energy transition is a key bridge fuel: natural gas. Liquified natural gas (LNG) is critical to meet global energy demand and reduce emissions while promoting American energy security and economic stability worldwide. Yet, the Biden administration recently announced plans to restrict US natural gas exports, directly affecting America’s key allies. In this environment, lawmakers should reflect upon their previous missteps before implementing energy policies that will make the regulatory environment more unstable and unpredictable. Lessons from the Past and Present During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s drive to build an arsenal of democracy required American energy resources. The US supplied 85 percent of the oil and gas the Allies used,1 including 90 percent of aviation fuel by 1944.2 Ever since then, energy security has been necessary for creating and maintaining peace. Recent events have brought the relationship between energy, economics, and national security back into acute focus. Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Arab Oil Embargo, a reminder of the shortsighted energy policies that gave away America’s energy independence and made the US reliant on Middle Eastern oil for decades. The anniversary coincided with Europe’s struggle to sustain itself following the removal of Russian oil and gas from the market.3 That struggle is not over,4 and the collapse of certain European industrial sectors is ongoing as the continent’s energy prices remain elevated (see figure 1). Drawing on these lessons from history and recent events, below are four principles to guide the future of American energy policy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, International Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

332. The Western Innovators of the Mobile Revolution: The Data on Global Royalty Flows to U.S. and Europe and Why It Matters

Author:
Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The mobile revolution has radically altered our world in ways that were imagined only as science fiction a mere thirty years ago. Western innovators launched this revolution in creating its foundational telecommunications technologies; thus, it is unsurprising that private companies in the United States and Europe receive payments for the use of their telecommunications technologies, which is compensation for the billions in investments and decades of research and development of these inventions. The majority of the commercial implementers—the companies that make and sell consumer products that use these telecommunications technologies like smartphones or connected cars—are in Asia. China in particular has an increasingly growing share of these implementers across all sectors of the global innovation economy. This explains in part China’s domestic industrial policies that seek to lower the royalties paid by its national companies like Huawei or Oppo. Evidence-based policymaking should guide U.S. and European laws and regulations. Data confirm the critical role of reliable and effective patent rights, the rule of law, and courts using due process to resolve disputes have been essential for Western innovators creating the modern world—and will drive the technologies of tomorrow in the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

333. U.S. foreign policy, Cold War history, and history of capitalism: An interview with Fritz Bartel.

Author:
Fritz Bartel and Asensio Robles
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
It is an exciting time for Cold War historiography. Long gone are debates that were once central to the field, such as those about the origins of the Cold War and the responsibilities for its emergence. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Cold War for our present, some historians now argue, was not its outbreak but its end. Why did the Eastern bloc collapse in the late 1980s? How was it possible for this collapse to occur without triggering major international and domestic turmoil (Romania’s case notwithstanding)? And why did neoliberalism prevail over other economic paradigms in the new post-socialist democracies? Answering all these questions has become an urgent task in light of today's war in Ukraine, the continuing rise of populism, the growing delegitimization of liberal democracies, and the exhaustion of neoliberalism and globalization as reliable agents of growth in post-industrial societies. These are precisely the three big questions that Fritz Bartel sets out to answer in The Triumph of Broken Promises: The end of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2022). Bartel’s book offers a picture of the end of the Cold War that has at its core a particular interpretation of the nature of the East-West conflict. Eastern communism and Western capitalism shared the same base: the Cold War was a politico-economic contest between two industrial ideologies over how best to ensure the continued social and economic well-being of their own populations. As such, both systems were largely successful during the golden years of post-war economic growth. However, if Western capitalism ultimately won the Cold War, Bartel argues, it was because Western liberal democracies proved to be much more flexible and capable of breaking their socio-economic promises in an increasingly globalized world than the Eastern Bloc after the 1973 oil shock. It was not geopolitics that ultimately decided the end of the Cold War, but rather the different strategies that East and West chose in a world increasingly shaped by oil, international finance, the exhaustion of extensive economic growth, and globalization. I had the pleasure of interviewing Bartel on December 5, 2023. What follows is a summary of our discussion about the origins of The Triumph of Broken Promises, its place in today's literature on U.S. foreign policy and Cold War history, and the lessons this book might have for our turbulent times.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, Interview, and Historiography
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

334. Defending Europe with less America

Author:
Camille Grand
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has revealed the sorry state of European militaries and defence industries after decades of peace dividends, as well as their deep reliance on the US. A second Trump presidency could drastically reduce US defence support for Europe. But regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, the degradation of the European security environment and the shifting priorities of the US mean that Europe needs to be prepared to take more responsibility for its own defence. Europeans require a sustained plan over the next decade that combines immediate efforts to support Ukraine and rebuild readiness, and longer-term goals to develop a “full force package”, including the combat support capabilities and key enablers that are currently provided primarily by the US. Paradoxically, such a deliberate approach to overcoming institutional challenges and strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities may be the best way to preserve a strong transatlantic relationship and a degree of US commitment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

335. Trump’s tinderbox: US politics and the next war in the Balkans

Author:
Adnan Ćerimagić and Majda Ruge
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over recent years, Serbia’s government and Serb nationalists elsewhere in the Western Balkans have increased their revisionist agitation in the region. They recently adopted an “all-Serb declaration” that seeks to overturn the post-Dayton settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and claims Kosovo as an inseparable part of Serbia. Though some international observers have criticised the Biden administration for its concessions to Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, it deserves credit for containing Belgrade’s ability to realise its ambitions and preventing two worst-case scenarios: the disintegration of the Bosnian state and armed escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. That fragile status-quo would come under significant threat from a new Trump presidency in the US. Among other risks, his second administration may seek to reverse sanctions that have constrained separatist appetites among Bosnian Serbs and to revive dangerous proposals for a Serbia-Kosovo land swap. Peace in the region is at stake. Particularly in the event of a Trump victory on 5 November, the EU should prepare a package of new deterrence mechanisms that it can apply in the Western Balkans independently from the US and spoiler member states like Hungary. And in either eventuality, it should take more responsibility for stabilising the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Serbia, Balkans, North America, and United States of America

336. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

337. Nuclear Danger and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

338. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

339. Undoing a Hybrid Regime: What Lessons Can Be Extracted from the Case of North Macedonia?

Author:
Nazif Mandaci
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This study primarily aims to draw attention to the role of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) in North Macedonia’s1 transition from a hybrid regime to a standard democracy from 2015 to the present. The stability of the country has been of paramount importance for the Western interests, thus the EU and US have continuously supported successive governments to uphold the de-facto powersharing system that prevailed since its independence in the early 1990s. By employing Levitsky and Way’s theoretical framework of linkage and leverage, this study aims to elucidate the decisive roles played by the EU and the US in cultivating the conditions necessitated for North Macedonia’s gradual democratic transition after 2015. To do this it addresses political developments in North Macedonia, discusses the problems that aroused during this transition period, which are inherited in a lack of democratic culture and widespread corruption, and finally, suggests that as the Macedonia example demonstrated, EU support and tutelage is critical during such challenging transitions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Democratization, European Union, and Hybrid Regime
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, North Macedonia, and Western Balkans

340. Nuclear Verification’s Holy Grail: Verifying Nuclear Warheads — a new approach

Author:
Miles Pomper, William Moon, Marshall Brown, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Dan Zhukov, Dick Gullickson, and Yanliang Pan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study is the culmination of four years of work to think through what would be required to track and monitor nuclear warheads in a verification process. It first began in 2021, shortly after President Joe Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia extended the New START Treaty until February 2026; the two presidents also announced the launch of bilateral strategic stability talks. This positive moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, which became almost unimaginable after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the original impetus for the project. It also launched in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF Treaty. The Russians had been violating the Treaty with the production and deployment of the 9M729 missile, also known in NATO parlance as the SSC-8. All NATO allies concurred with the withdrawal, which the United States completed in August 2019. The effort began with two strands of activity. The study team knew that when the United States and Russia decided to return to the negotiating table, the United States would place a high priority on seeking direct limits on warheads. Prior treaties had focused on controlling and eliminating missiles but had not focused directly on the warheads that armed them. It had long been a goal of the United States to seek direct limits on warheads, in order to more accurately constrain a Russian preponderance in warheads designated for theaterand shorter-range systems.1 However, if such an agreement were negotiated, the European allies would be ill-equipped to participate. On-site inspections under the INF Treaty had ended on May 31, 2001, so it had been twenty years since the allies had had to participate in verification activities. Most had lost expertise and institutional memory; some had never participated at all. “Raising the IQ” of the NATO allies about participating in arms control implementation was thus the first strand of activity. The second strand grew up around a conviction in the study team that the well-practiced verification techniques that had been exercised in INF and strategic arms control treaties since the 1980s could be augmented with new technology and innovative techniques. Thus emerged the emphasis on using cryptography to underpin a unique warhead tracking system. This work took advantage of some of the finest experts in the field of cryptography at Stanford University, and also the extensive experience gained during the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s many years of work to strengthen warhead protection, control and accounting in Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead storage facilities. This work, which spanned a period of over fifteen years from 1995- 2013, provided the study team with a great depth of knowledge about the normal operating procedures in Russian military warhead facilities. This deep knowledge was vital to developing a concept for the tracking system, providing it with a realism and accuracy that otherwise would not have been possible. These two strands of work culminated in 2022 in a significant study, “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe.”2 However, the team realized that only one element of warhead verification had been touched—the broad outlines of a system for maintaining and exchanging information over the life of an agreement. Other verification elements such as on-site inspections and particular verification technologies had not been considered. They therefore resolved to expand the scope of work to imagine an entire closed system for nuclear warhead verification. With the cryptographic element as its foundation, the team reviewed the extensive experience of treaties, agreements and other activities such as exhibitions and joint experiments that had been built up over the many years of U.S.-Soviet and Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons control. From this, they created a comprehensive menu of measures that could be considered for a future warhead control regime, calibrating the measures according to the level of their intrusiveness.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

341. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:
Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

342. The Great Depression as a Savings Glut

Author:
Victor Degorce and Éric Monnet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
New data covering 23 countries reveal that banking crises of the Great Depression coincided with a sharp international increase in deposits at savings institutions and life insurance. Deposits fled from commercial banks to alternative forms of savings. This fuelled a credit crunch since other institutions did not replace bank lending. While asset prices fell, savings held in savings institutions and life insurance companies increased as a share of GDP and in real terms. These findings provide new explanations of the fall in credit and aggregate demand in the 1930s. They illustrate the need to consider nonbank financial institutions when studying banking crises.
Topic:
History, Great Depression, Banking Crisis, Savings, and Thrift
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

343. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

344. Perils of the U.S. Defense Budget: Silver Lining or Dark Abyss?

Author:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget and I’ll tell you what you value.” When President Biden said this in 2022, the world was in a different state. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was struggling in the face of a surprisingly determined Ukrainian military. The Middle East had its unique but expected challenges, including Iran’s nuclear program. And President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was seeking an unprecedented third term as Communist Party chief. Barely two years later, Ukraine is at best in a stalemate with Russia and, at worst, is faltering. Houthi militants, with materiel support from Tehran, have on a near-weekly basis attacked US and Western ships in the Red Sea. An emboldened Xi is becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, and the PRC has lobbed ballistic missiles over Taiwan for the first time. If the US defense budget in 2022 valued a set of national security priorities—funding Ukraine, countering the PRC, supporting NATO—those priorities are coming under threat in this year’s defense budget.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Geopolitics, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

345. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

346. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:
Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

347. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

348. TikTok Tactics: 2024 US Candidates Dance Around Security Risks

Author:
Lindsay Gorman, Caitlin Goldenberg, and Isabella Nieminen
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Despite TikTok’s ongoing national security risks, 2024 candidates in US House, Senate, gubernatorial, and secretary of state races continue to use the platform to reach voters. Since its emergence onto the social media scene in 2016, viral video app TikTok has exploded in popularity, dominating the screentime of a reported one billion monthly active users worldwide today. This year, the app’s user base has made it an all-but-unavoidable tool for US presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who have used TikTok to make their bids to voters. Yet researchers and lawmakers’ initial national security concerns surrounding the potential for malign influence due to TikTok’s ownership ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have only become louder as additional voices in Washington and beyond have joined the chorus. To address these concerns, in 2024 Congress passed and President Biden signed House Resolution (HR) 7521 to force TikTok to divest from its PRC-based parent company ByteDance or face a ban in the United States. This was mere months before the president’s campaign joined the platform itself. As election day fast approaches, a wide swath of federal and state candidates are seeking to leverage TikTok’s popularity with GenZ users. In October 2022, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) produced a report documenting how US midterm candidates employed TikTok to reach voters and boost campaign visibility. This year, ahead of the 2024 US general elections in November, ASD and the GMF Technology Program researched the question of whether TikTok use among US Senate, House, gubernatorial, and secretary of state candidates has increased, and how candidates have continued to harness TikTok in campaigns. After two years, Democrats still outweigh Republicans on TikTok use, TikTok’s sluggishness in verifying candidate accounts has worsened, and political TikTok styles are beginning to mature.
Topic:
National Security, Social Media, Domestic Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

349. Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Sharinee Jagtiani, Kristina Kausch, Garima Mohan, Martin Quencez, Rachel Tausendfreund, and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
States outside the transatlantic alliance have gained leverage in international affairs in recent years and, with that, the potential to significantly reshape the global order. Engagement with these "pivotal powers", which include Brazil, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, is of paramount importance for Europe and the United States. "Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence" offers tactics for enhancing Western cooperation on global challenges with these countries. This report builds on GMF reports from 2012 and 2023.
Topic:
Security, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

350. International Order Strategies: Past and Present

Author:
Aaron McKeil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
At an important time in foreign policy planning, a new era of “strategic competition” widely noted by policymakers in Washington and allied capitals has produced a new wave of strategic thinking and evolving strategic practices aiming to maintain or modify “international order”. This collected research report aims to clarify how strategies for international order are being understood and formulated today, and how this strategic thinking and planning differs from past eras of strategic competition, toward an assessment of its policy implications today. Dr. Aaron McKeil convenes the International Orders Research Unit at LSE IDEAS. He is Academic Director of the LSE Executive MSc International Strategy and Diplomacy Programme at LSE IDEAS. He holds a PhD International Relations from the LSE. His forthcoming book with the University of Michigan Press explores the collapse of cosmopolitan globalism and rise of strategic competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

351. Advice from an Old School Diplomat to the Chat/GPT Generation

Author:
Polonius
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
I recently asked Chat/GPT to answer the following question: “What is the relationship between theories of international relations and the actual practice of diplomacy and international affairs”? It answered: “Theories of international relations provide conceptual frameworks for understanding global interactions and influencing diplomatic strategies; however, real-world diplomacy is shaped by dynamic factors, including cultural nuances, geopolitical events, and individual leaders, making the relationship between theory and practice complex and often subject to adaptation.” Yes, that’s from Chat/GPT! Perhaps some reader can improve on that answer, but I am not tempted to try.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Memoir, and ChatGPT
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

352. The Christmas Gift that Keeps Giving

Author:
Jack F. Jr Matlock
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
On December 24, 1989, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov informed me on behalf of the Soviet government, ‘We have given the Brezhnev Doctrine to you with our compliments. Consider it a Christmas gift.” Now, some thirty-four years later, I should explain what the Brezhnev Doctrine was, the circumstances under which the gift was conveyed, and why I believe that it was a gift that has infused US foreign policy to this very day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Memoir, and Brezhnev Doctrine
Political Geography:
Soviet Union and United States of America

353. Satchmo, the Duke, and the Count: Representing America at its Best Despite Having Experienced its Worst

Author:
Larry Tye
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Exuberant crowds in New Orleans had crowned Louis Armstrong the pretend King of the Zulus during Mardi Gras in 1949. But in 1960 when he visited the Belgian Congo, not far from the fountainhead of the Zulu people, the Congolese feted him like the real thing. Tom-tommers drummed a greeting reserved for tribal chiefs and hailed him as “Ambassador Extraordinary of the United States.” Grass-skirted tribesmen painted in violet and ochre carried him through the streets of Leopoldville on a homemade throne mounted on poles, a company of police and soldiers leading the way. His hosts had hoped to draw 1,500 people to his concert at King Baudouin Stadium, but so popular was Satchmo that 10,000 churning fans packed the stands. While they chanted “Satcheemo,” he shouted back, in wretchedly accented French, “Merci beaucoup, beaucoup.” His proudest triumph during his twenty-four-hour trip defied even the power of diplomats and kings. As he told it, “There was fighting, and they stopped the war because I played there that night.” That wasn’t merely Satchmo telling tales. The Congo was embroiled in a deadly civil conflict, with civilians caught between rampaging troops. But as one headline hollered, “They Called Truce To Dig Louis.” The Associated Press trumpeted, ‘“Wizard’ Satchmo Unites the Congo!” The warring sides, the AP explained, “joined forces to provide a heavily armed cordon ‘round Satchmo and his party.” They actually danced and cheered side-by-side at that night’s concert, although they resumed their bloody fighting once Louis left the country.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Culture, Soft Power, Memoir, and Music
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

354. Tough Love and the Diplomacy of Foreign Assistance

Author:
Mark G. Wentling
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Providing aid to low and middle-income countries (LMIC) is at the heart of our relationships with those countries. The concept is that needy countries on this list of 132 LMICs, particularly the 45 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the bottom range of this list, require external aid for their development. However, almost all the countries on the LMIC list are the same as they were over 30 years ago, and they are no closer to graduating into a higher income category. It is highly doubtful if any LMIC will achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals set for 2030. This raises several fundamental questions about the return on the US government’s investment. What are the cost-benefit and recurrent costs analyses? Do the returns justify the investment of the USG’s human resources and funding amounts? Is USG assistance contributing to modifying the host country’s behavior so that it is more favorable to US interests? Basically, is the activity worth USG resources?
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Investment, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

355. Diplomacy and the Mysteries of the How: The ‘Craft’ in Statecraft

Author:
Philip Zelikow
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Practical leadership has two dimensions. The first dimension is one we know well: choosing what to do. The second dimension is less well known. How to do it? If leaders provide guidance about what is to be done, and how to do it, the rest is management and execution. The first part, the “what to do part,” is an easy debate to follow. It is mostly about goals. People discuss problems, which problems they care about, their values, the role of government. The news is naturally devoted to spotlighting problems and making claims for attention. The second part, the “how to do it part,” is a good deal harder to understand. The debates are far more obscure. People have to make judgments about practical action. That requires specialized knowledge about the available instruments and the relevant circumstances. My argument is that between these two dimensions—the well-known what to do part, the little known how to do part—the “how” knowledge is the high card in the deck. Once it is played, high sounding goals often turn to dust. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it this way: “Ideas are not policies. Besides,” he added, “ideas have a high infant mortality rate.” The “how” is the “craft” in statecraft. Usually, the best diplomacy is a kind of choreography. Roles are assigned, steps are planned. Each of the dancers hits their marks. Mastery of the “how,” as any sergeant can tell you in a platoon, is the true source of practical leadership. Yet this dimension is not well understood. It is infrequently studied and rarely taught.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Leadership, Peace, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

356. Has NATO Enlargement Enhanced US National Security?

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
What effect has NATO enlargement had on US national security? Few issues have been as central to US foreign policy over the last three decades. Since the mid 1990s, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus has held that enlarging the alliance was critical to US national security and the only practical manner of consolidating what President Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” This position is so well-established in the United States’ political culture that several rounds of NATO expansion proceeded without meaningful debate in the US Senate. Indeed, occasional efforts by some policymakers to question the merits of enlargement have been met with accusations of isolationism, or of “working for Vladimir Putin”. By this logic, not only does US national security benefit from an enlarged NATO, but were the United States to stop expanding NATO the sky would be likely to fall. In contrast, this paper makes the case that NATO expansion has been a net loss to US national security and ought not to continue. Note that I focus on US national security, not whether enlargement may have benefitted other actors. Drawing on over a decade of archival research into the origins and consequences of enlargement, I advance three specific arguments. First, claims that NATO benefitted US national security by anchoring the alliance, ensuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and promoting democracy are almost certainly overstated. Instead – second – the alliance has generated a host of problems for the United States by encouraging allied cheap riding and reckless driving, limiting US strategic flexibility, and contributing to the collapse of relations with Moscow. As a result, future enlargement to states such as Ukraine is not in the United States’ interest. The remainder of this essay proceeds in three sections. First, I review and critically evaluate the purported benefits of NATO enlargement. From there, I discuss the variety of problems enlargement has posed to US national security. In both of these sections, I pay particular attention to the consequences of enlargement itself and to how alternative policy options may have affected US interests. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of enlargement at a time when Ukrainian accession in particular dominates policy debates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

357. When I was a Vice Consul in Nuevo Laredo

Author:
Edward Marks
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
When FSOs gather in congenial surroundings, even very senior and well-known diplomatic personalities often begin their favorite stories with “Now, when I was a vice consul in Tegucigalpa….” Time passes and now I tell such stories. When I was a vice consul in Nuevo Laredo, I was introduced to the time-honored responsibility for the “Care and Protection” of American citizens in foreign climes. It is the most retail of a diplomat’s responsibilities. American consulates in Mexico do a lot of this sort of business, what with the flood of American tourists seeking foreign exotica across the border.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America

358. Representation is Work

Author:
Charles A. Ray
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
At a recent event to launch Diplomatic Tradecraft, a book that discusses the day-to-day aspects of diplomacy, a colleague took me to task for saying that “diplomatic receptions are for work, not for fun” to illustrate that the public doesn’t understand what diplomats really do. My colleague said that he “looked forward to these events for the networking opportunities they gave him.” I didn’t make a point of it at the time, but he and I said essentially the same thing, just from different perspectives. To be perfectly transparent, I probably could have stated my position with much more clarity. I am one of those people who does not enjoy attending crowded functions and listening to long, boring speeches on the off chance that something of importance might inadvertently (or deliberately) be said, while at the same time making nice, often with people who would not be on my A-list for socializing. My long-time colleague, on the other hand, is a much more gregarious and outgoing type.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Africa, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

359. Why the Biden Cease-fire Proposal Will Not End the Gaza War Despite UN Approval

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The proposal that the Biden administration attributes to Israel does not promise an end to the war, much less Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. While claiming to support the proposal, Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserts that “we have maintained the goals of the war, first of them the destruction of Hamas.” Is this consistent with the proposal? It is. How?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Hamas, Ceasefire, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

360. Fletcher, Russia, and a Path Forward: A Conversation with Evelyn Farkas

Author:
Evelyn Farkas
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
I always tell the young people: always ask. If you see something you want to do, an opportunity… I was at the Council on Foreign Relations, and I heard about a trip to Hungary, and this was in 1989, and the Wall had just come down, and I was really junior, and I just asked. I said, “Look, I speak fluent Hungarian; maybe you can use me as your rapporteur on this trip.” And in fact, the first time I asked, the Vice President said, “Oh, I don’t know if we have the money.” So I did some quick calculations because I knew at the time that a charter flight to Hungary was like $600, or something, round-trip from New York. So I said, “Well, I’ll pay my airfare.” It is a good thing I didn’t offer to pay for the hotel because they stayed in quite a swanky hotel. But the lesson I learned was: Oh my god! You have to ask! So, I think always ask and be open to opportunities. You can’t plan your career. I had this hokey calendar growing up with little phrases. One that always stuck with me was, “Luck is where preparation meets opportunity.” You’re getting prepared at Fletcher, and then your luck is going to be when you’re already prepared, and some opportunity comes along. You can take that opportunity because you’re prepared and because you have the guts to take it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Memoir, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

361. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition

Author:
Joey Ching Aracena
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. ​ Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

362. Strategic Instability: Challenges for Deterrence and the Changing Character of Warfare

Author:
Philip Ritcheson
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Cold War was replaced by what the late commentator Charles Krauthammer termed a “Unipolar Moment.” The Soviet Union disintegrated without the Cold War turning hot, and the United States led a broad international coalition to reinforce the rules-based international order in the First Persian Gulf War. Some thought that without an ideological alternative to liberalism, there was an “end to history.” Meanwhile, a sense of strategic complacency set into the United States as it forgot that it needed to compete geostrategically, resulting in hubris. Still, the United States was in an enviable position of not having to seriously account for strategic escalation with an adversary. That said, autocracy regained its footing in Russia, and a multi-dimensional form of competition emerged with China. In the background, terrorists planned, prepared, and conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the United States focused on the Global War on Terror and linkages between rogue regimes, terrorists, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In Europe, a growing NATO alliance seemed more focused on diplomatic engagement than military capability development and deterrence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Deterrence, Instability, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

363. Countering Terrorism in a Period of Great Power Competition

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Over more than 20 years, the U.S. built a counterterrorism enterprise that proved remarkably successful at preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack like September 11. By investing heavily in counterterrorism over such a long period of time, America not only created new agencies dedicated to fighting terrorism but also systems that enabled the military and other security agencies to carry out a high rate of operations across multiple geographic areas, supported by unique collection platforms and tools. These further benefited from robust intelligence analysis capabilities that translated vast amounts of collected information into timely and actionable intelligence. But the inherent tradeoff was that all those dollars, intelligence resources, and more went to support primarily kinetic missions. Thus, two factors—widening the national security aperture to address other priority threats and making the counterterrorism mission more sustainable over the long term—now underlie the need to rationalize counterterrorism efforts. Today, the threats that demand quick, dedicated investments emanate from states like China and Russia and from emerging transnational threats such as climate change and pandemic preparedness.
Topic:
Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

364. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

365. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

366. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

367. How Washington Emboldened the Houthis

Author:
Noam Raydan and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Greater decisiveness would have shortened the conflict, lessened the toll on global maritime trade, and reassured U.S. partners in the region and beyond. Since the Houthis launched their assault on global shipping in November, the United States and its partners have scrambled for ways to restore calm and commerce to the Red Sea. First, on December 18, Washington assembled a maritime coalition designed to boost the U.S. presence in the area and promote regional security. Then, in January, the United States started intercepting Iranian military shipments bound for the Houthis and issued multiple warnings to the group. Finally, after nearly two months of continuous attacks in the Red Sea, the United States and the United Kingdom launched a barrage of strikes against the Houthis’ facilities. But these attacks have not halted or seemingly slowed the onslaught. The group has continued to lob missiles and drones, prompting continued strikes by Washington and its allies...
Topic:
Maritime, Houthis, Shipping, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

368. Tunisia at the Crossroads: What Role for the United States in a Multipolar World?

Author:
Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The United States, in recognizing the limits of its traditional “bloc-building” approach, faces the imperative to adapt to a multipolar reality. Embracing multipolarity as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy could pave the way for more flexible and effective international engagements. In today’s global landscape, the clear-cut divisions of the Cold War era have given way to a complex web of challenges and a multipolar world marked by competitive dynamics. This shift demands a nuanced approach from the United States, a move away from seeking dominance through large-scale coalitions against adversaries like China, since such strategies risk escalating tensions in a world that lacks the bipolar stability of the past. In this global reconfiguration, the role of “swing countries” like Tunisia gains unprecedented importance. In the midst of North Africa's political upheaval, countries like Tunisia stand at a critical crossroads, evaluating the merits of their longstanding alliances with Western nations against the enticing prospects of deepening relations with Eastern powers, particularly Russia and China. Against this backdrop, the United States has yet to articulate a definitive stance on engaging with nations such as Tunisia, where authoritarian tendencies are on the rise and anti-Western sentiments increasingly pronounced. This ambiguity raises important questions about Washington’s strategic approach in a region caught between historical affiliations and the lure of new partnerships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
North Africa, North America, Tunisia, and United States of America

369. U.S. Returnees from Syria Reveal Much About the Repatriation Challenge

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The latest U.S. repatriation is an important model for the international community to follow, but much work still needs to be done on resolving the precarious detainee dilemma before the situation in northeast Syria deteriorates further. On May 7, the United States repatriated eleven Americans and one noncitizen from northeast Syria, its largest repatriation of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) to date. The group included Brandy Salman and her nine U.S.-born children (five of whom are now adults), as well as two minor children of Abdelhamid al-Madioum, who was repatriated in 2020 and pleaded guilty to supporting terrorism a year later. Notably, one of the two Madioum children is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. The move brings the total number of Americans repatriated to fifty-one. Between 2013 and 2019, an estimated 300 Americans joined or attempted to join IS and other jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq—part of a wave of more than 53,000 men, women, and minors from roughly eighty countries who did the same. Since the fall of the IS territorial “caliphate” in March 2019, successive U.S. administrations have led the charge in encouraging these countries to repatriate their citizens. Although the number of people involved in this week’s repatriation is small, their cases set a potent precedent and illustrate the urgency of accelerating the pace—while also showing why the process has been such a challenge.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Detention, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

370. North Africa in an Era of Great Power Competition: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya, Louis Dugit-Gros, Ben Fishman, Sabina Henneberg, and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Washington can demonstrate its decisive edge in areas like climate change remediation and economic development, while highlighting the many dangers posed by partnership with Russia and China. This week, Tunisia’s President Kais Saied will be among the leaders attending the tenth China–Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing. The event deserves U.S. attention, even as foreign policy minds remain focused on Ukraine and Gaza, because North African countries are strategically significant to U.S. defense and economic interests. Viewed through the lens of great power competition, China generally advances its economic interests by developing local infrastructure (e.g., ports), whereas the other main U.S. competitor—Russia—favors a security-based approach, supporting whatever actor it believes will help advance its goals (e.g., Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya). Such inroads threaten American interests and require responses that address the region both holistically and state-by-state. In this Policy Note, five experts argue for more robust U.S. engagement in North Africa against the anti-liberal designs of Beijing and Moscow. An effective approach, they contend, would amplify the benefits of cooperation in areas like climate change remediation and economic development, while highlighting the dangers posed by America’s rivals to national growth, freedom, and—especially in the case of China—sovereignty.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Africa, and United States of America

371. U.S. Policy in the Middle East Amid Great Power Competition

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The true U.S. strategy debate in the Middle East is not about whether we should stay or go; it’s about how to continue advancing the interests pursued by successive administrations even as hostile competitors and unresolved threats combine to throw U.S. regional policy off balance. By the end of the 2010s, two points of broad foreign policy consensus prevailed among Republicans and Democrats: The United States should not fight any more wars like Iraq, and the United States must shift to a focus on the Indo-Pacific given the threatening implications of China’s rise and demonstrated desire for hegemony in Asia. Both points seemed to imply a diminished U.S. commitment to the Middle East. Now, however, this consensus has evolved. American policymakers have arrived at the conclusion that strategic competition with China and Russia is global in scope, and the Middle East has a key role to play in it. That great power competition should draw the United States into—rather than out of—the Middle East is no historical anomaly. America was deeply engaged in the Middle East long before the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror. This engagement came not despite but because of the need to counter our great power competitor, the Soviet Union, which American policymakers worried might dominate the region’s resources and exert undue influence over its governance. Today, America’s competitors are once again contending for Middle Eastern influence. What’s more, unlike during the Cold War, the Middle East in turn is influencing events well beyond its boundaries...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

372. Washington Returns to Damascus with High Stakes for Syria’s Transition

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The delegation’s findings on key political and security issues will have a major impact on future U.S. engagement with Syria’s new leaders, including the decision on whether or not to remove sanctions. For the first time since October 2011, when Ambassador Robert Ford was pulled from Syria amid U.S. concerns about the Assad regime’s crackdown on protesters, Washington is back in Damascus—this time to engage with the new transitional government led by rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Earlier today, U.S. officials met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (aka Ahmed al-Sharaa) to uncover information on missing Americans Austin Tice, Majd Kamalmaz, and others; they were also scheduled to meet with civil society figures, activists, and representatives of various minority communities. The delegation includes Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs; Roger Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs; and Daniel Rubinstein, a long-time Arabist and retired ambassador recently recalled to duty. Their visit comes on the heels of a Pentagon announcement that the U.S. military presence in Syria has jumped from 900 to 2,000 soldiers, illustrating concerns about how the Islamic State (IS) might take advantage of the new situation. The delegation arrives at a momentous time in Syria’s transition process, which is officially scheduled to last until March 1. Local sources suggest that the second phase of the transition will begin in the coming days, during which HTS is supposed to open the process to more representatives from all of Syrian society, rather than just the HTS loyalists who have overseen the first phase. Therefore, much is at stake for the current U.S. delegation and Washington’s broader efforts to redevelop a Syria policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transitional Government
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

373. Determinants of Leader Visits: A Review and Future Directions in Scholarship

Author:
Ali Balci
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
A recent surge in studies on high-level leader diplomacy has the potential to evolve into a fruitful research field. While the current literature predominantly focuses on the leader visits of two great powers, the U.S. and China, this emerging field requires both broadening and deepening in its scope. We lack data on leader visits from the vast majority of countries, and many existing hypotheses do not adequately explain the determinants in various cases. The more countries that are covered and the more refined our hypotheses become, the more insightful this field will be in understanding interactions among states and international organizations. This article aims to present the current state of the literature on leader visits and suggests potential areas of interest for future research.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, and Research
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

374. Impacts of Trade Diversion from China in the United States Market on Wages in a Third Country: Evidence from Thailand

Author:
Kazunobu Hayakawa and Sasatra Sudsawasd
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since the latter half of the 2010s, China’s exports to the United States (US) have gradually decreased due to the US-China trade war and other factors, such as lockdown measures in China to combat COVID-19. This decrease has resulted in increasing exports from third countries, including Thailand, to the US market by substituting China’s exports, i.e. trade diversion. Against this backdrop, this study empirically investigates how the changes in exports to the US driven by the change in China’s exports to the US affect wages in Thailand. Especially, we examine the heterogeneous effects according to workers’ characteristics. To this end, we conduct regression analyses using individual-level quarterly data from the first quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2023. Our main finding is that the wage gap between low- and middle-skilled workers decreased, whilst the gap between middle- and high-skilled workers increased. Namely, the increased exports to the US caused ‘wage polarisation’ in Thailand. We also find that the increase in exports to the US contributed to expanding the wage gap by age but narrowing it by gender.
Topic:
Markets, Trade Wars, Exports, and Wages
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Thailand, and United States of America

375. Have Dynamic Spillovers and the Connectedness of Trade Policy Uncertainty Changed During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Sino–US Trade Frictions?

Author:
Chien-Chiang Lee and Farzan Yahya
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the spillover and connectedness between the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) of the United States (US), China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) under global geopolitical risk (GPR), infectious disease equity market volatility (EMVID), and GPR from North Korea (GPRNK) using a relatively novel time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) approach. Additionally, method of moments quantile regression is utilised to estimate the asymmetric effect of GPR, GPRNK, and EMVID on TPU. Our findings suggest that there is a high total and directional spillover amongst underlying variables during Sino–US trade friction that further elevated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period. The US is a net receiver of spillover from the TPU of all economies, while the Chinese TPU receives spillover from EMVID. The results further confirm that both the TPU of China (TPUCN) and the TPU of the US (TPUUS) are vulnerable to EMVID, but the effect is stronger for Chinese TPU in the higher quantiles. Although Japanese TPU is less vulnerable to GPR and EMVID, it is significantly exposed to GPRNK. Korean trade shows resiliency and immunity to pandemic-induced volatility and GPRNK.
Topic:
Trade Wars, Trade Policy, COVID-19, and Spillovers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

376. Foreign Direct Investment, Brand Value, and Economic Performance: A Multinational Analysis

Author:
Tuba Yıldız, Ünal Arslan, Zeynep Ökten, Yıldız Sağlam Çelıköz, and Hale Kırmızıoğlu
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:
Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:
The visibility and dependability of multinational corporations’ products increase with the fact that they introduce their goods to markets in other nations through foreign direct investments. The method for presenting products to international markets through foreign direct investments reveals the product’s reputation and therefore the brand’s development value. This study examines the relationship between foreign direct investments and brand value in Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Spain, the USA, and the UK for the period 2007-2023. The majority of studies in the literature attempt to explain the impact of brand value on foreign direct investments. However, very few studies explain the impac foreign direct investments on brand value and 1st generation unit root tests were generally used. Unlike existing studies, In this study, the second-generation unit root test, Durbin-Hausman cointegration, and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation methods were used. As a result, it is anticipated that this study will contribute to the literature in this regard. The findings show that increases in foreign direct investments boost brand value.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Corporations, Data, and Branding
Political Geography:
Japan, China, United Kingdom, Canada, India, France, Spain, Australia, Global Focus, and United States of America

377. Ten Likely Changes to Immigration Policy Under Trump 2.0

Author:
Elizabeth Carlson and Charles Wheeler
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
During his first administration, former President Trump adopted aggressive anti-immigrant policies, which included family separation, a ban on individuals from Muslim-majority countries, stringent border policies like the Remain in Mexico and Title 42, and attempted terminations of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for several national groups. Attorneys and representatives for immigrants had some success in pushing back against the administration’s most extreme measures through litigation and advocacy. Should they return to the White House, Trump and his supporters have promised to enact an even more draconian anti-immigrant agenda, including a commitment to conducting the largest mass deportation in U.S. history, ending birthright citizenship (which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment), and revoking humanitarian protections for those already in the United States. Many of these efforts, of course, will be challenged in court. This article summarizes 10 likely immigration initiatives under a second Trump administration. It seeks to educate members of the public who value the crucial role and myriad contributions of immigrants and refugees — past and present — in the United States. It will also outline how advocates can fight to protect their clients from these measures.
Topic:
Immigration, Donald Trump, Deportation, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

378. The Texas Landscape: Accounting for Migrant Mortality and the Challenges of a Justice of the Peace Medicolegal System

Author:
Courtney C. Siegert, Molly A. Kaplan, and M. Kate Spradley
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper details the structural and resource challenges in Texas related to identifying migrant decedents, investigating their deaths, repatriating them, and adhering to legal and ethical requirements in addressing this humanitarian tragedy. While actors working on migrant decedent investigations in Arizona can map and provide accurate counts of migrant deaths, this is not yet possible for Texas cases. Texas’ mixed Medical Examiner/Justice of the Peace medicolegal system suffers from fragmentation across county jurisdictions, lack of resources, and minimal access to investigative tools for transnational families. These challenges produce a landscape where unidentified presumed migrants may structurally disappear (e.g., buried in temporarily marked graves as unidentified persons with no investigation or case tracking). The article highlights the work of Operation Identification (OpID), a humanitarian project formed to assist border counties with recovering, identifying, and repatriating migrant decedents. OpID’s extensive community outreach and collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental partners in the United States and Latin America have improved practices in some Texas counties. However, systemic change is still needed to address this humanitarian disaster. The article proposes that presumed migrant decedents be managed using a disaster victim identification (DVI) approach, which prioritizes identification, rather than how and why someone dies. It also proposes the establishment of regional Migrant Identification Centers (MICs) to streamline identification and repatriation efforts, while ensuring compliance with Texas law by Justices of the Peace (JPs). Centralization, the article argues, can lead to more accurate counts of migrant deaths and lay the groundwork for greater resources. The article also supports increased access to national databases including the National Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS) and the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs). It argues that transnational families of missing persons be afforded expanded access to investigative tools (e.g., NamUs)
Topic:
Migration, Irregular Migration, Medicolegal System, and Humanitarian Forensic Action
Political Geography:
Mexico, Texas, and United States of America

379. Excessive Use of Force and Migrant Death and Disappearance in Southern Arizona

Author:
Robin C. Reineke and Daniel E. Martinez
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
In this article, we present a qualitative analysis of the events surrounding death or disappearance in autopsy and missing person reports from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona to highlight how interactions between border enforcement personnel and migrants can be deadly. We reviewed PCOME records of undocumented border crosser deaths between 2000 and 2023 and observed three main types of deadly U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) practices: reckless motor vehicle pursuits, aggressive strategies used to detain individuals who are on foot, and the use of lethal force. Our findings reveal that these tactics, which we argue constitute forms of “excessive use of force,” represent significant yet overlooked factors contributing to migrant death and disappearance in southern Arizona. We make the following policy recommendations:
Topic:
Migration, Borders, Disappearance, and Use of Force
Political Geography:
Mexico, Arizona, and United States of America

380. Migrant Deaths in New Mexico: What is Known; What is Unknown

Author:
Jasmine R. Hernandez
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The United States is no stranger to migration across its borders. In 2020, its Southwestern border saw a drastic increase in apprehensions by the Border Patrol. While imperfect and an undercount of the true number of migration events, apprehension data is often used as a proxy to understand migration patterns. The rise in migration was coupled with an increased but unknown number of deaths along migration routes. This article focuses on the New Mexico portion of the El Paso Border Patrol Sector and the increased migrant caseload at New Mexico’s Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) over the last few years. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first academic study to examine migrant deaths in detail in southern New Mexico. We begin by contextualizing the changing pattern of migrant deaths in New Mexico within the broader framework of border policing strategies that have intentionally pushed migration routes to remote areas. We describe the work of the OMI, highlighting its very recent initiatives to track migrant deaths in its database. We then discuss the changes seen by the OMI in its migrant caseload from fiscal year (FY) 2009 to 2023, with the most drastic increase in cases occurring from 2022 to 2023. For instance, the data indicate that most of the identified migrants that have died in New Mexico were recovered in June and July (45 percent), crossed through Doña Ana County (66 percent), were male (60 percent), and among those identified, were from Mexico (65 percent) and between 20 and 39 years of age (69 percent). Of the 248 cases of migrant deaths, 87 percent have been identified. The most common causes of death were undetermined (46 percent) and environmental exposure (41 percent). We then explore the effects of changing governmental policies and state initiatives to curb/reduce migration in the US on OMI’s increased caseload. We discuss the impact that the rapid shift in migration deaths is having on the OMI and how OMI is working to respond and adjust to the dynamic situation. This work highlights the collateral damage of border security measures, underscored by the increasing number of deaths and challenges faced by the OMI. We consider the need for new and amended policies aimed at mitigating the humanitarian crisis that continues to unfold, emphasizing the need for the humane treatment of migrants. Finally, we suggest allocating resources to death investigating agencies. These resources would provide essential support to find, identify, and repatriate migrants, improve agencies’ abilities to collaborate with governmental agencies and programs such as Border Patrol’s Missing Migrant Program, and improve our understanding of the circumstances along the Southwestern border.
Topic:
Migration, Borders, Irregular Migration, and Medicolegal System
Political Geography:
United States of America and New Mexico

381. Tracing Trajectories: Qualitative Visualizations of Migrant Death in South Texas, 1993–2020

Author:
Molly Miranker
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper explores how qualitative information may be used to enhance understanding and inform recommendations for improved accounting of migrant deaths along the Texas-Mexico border. While border crossing related deaths affect jurisdictions throughout the US’s Southwestern border states and Northern Mexican states, Texas has unique challenges that merit specific examination. In short, the management and investigation of unidentified migrant decedents in Texas is severely fragmented and often noncompliant with Texas Criminal Code Procedure. I explore a way to improve accounting of migrant deaths leveraging qualitative information, local newspaper articles from South Texas and Northern Mexico, by using descriptive summaries coupled with Sankey Diagrams and a programmatic technique, qualitative spatial representation (QSR). QSR enabled me to identify under-recognized stakeholders (South Texas locals, Mexican consulates) and under-supported counties (i.e., those with migrant deaths that do not share a border directly with Mexico). I found that local English-language newspapers obscured the prevalence of migrant deaths and that their narrative tone of “business as usual” normalized the occurrence of such deaths. The Spanish-language articles better represented the diversity of agencies and individuals that were involved in the various aspects of migrant remains management and forensic investigation, most notably residents of South Texas themselves (or situational participants who first found the remains) and Mexican consulates. Finally, I noted that the collaborations among Texas counties and between Texan and Mexican jurisdictions, when they were described in the newspapers, highlighted that the phenomenon of migrant deaths penetrates beyond the dividing line of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo River. Migrant deaths must be accounted for in a way that reflects a regional experience in which people may perish as far as ~100 miles into Texas’ interior. Considering these observations, I have two policy recommendations. First, the Office of the Texas Governor should establish funds distinct from the Operation Lone Star program for the management of unidentified human remains. Currently, grants through the Operation Lone Star Program are the only funds available in Texas to support identification of migrant decedents. However, this program is explicitly designed to further border security operations in the state of Texas, which can contradict efforts around recovery and identification. The documentation and forensic investigation of the unidentified deceased can be eclipsed or neglected under the larger deterrence aims of Operation Lone Star. Second, to improve accounting and increase documentation of migrant deaths, a Regional Identification Center should be established in South Texas. Not every county in Texas has or has access to a Medical Examiner’s office, including the means to transport and pay for autopsy or other forensic services. The Center would provide training, store extra equipment such as mobile refrigerated morgues, and hire personnel to inventory cases, and report information to the state (e.g., vital statistics) and to foreign consulates. A Regional Identification Center would counteract the challenges highlighted in the local newspaper summaries and QSR by decreasing the isolation of counties experiencing migrant deaths and serve as a documentary and communication hub for stakeholders in Texas and Mexico.
Topic:
Data, Qualitative Research, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
Texas and United States of America

382. Impeding Access to Asylum: Title 42 “Expulsions” and Migrant Deaths in Southern Arizona

Author:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Immigration at the US-México border has drastically changed since the mid-2010s. Instead of adult undocumented Mexican men, generally migrating for economic purposes, there are now large numbers of men, women, unaccompanied minors, and families from diverse countries seeking asylum in the United States, as they are allowed to do under US and international law. In response to these changes, the US federal government leveraged multiple strategies to impede access to the country’s asylum system, including relying on Title 42 “expulsions.” Title 42, a COVID-19-era health measure, prevented migrants from initiating an asylum claim. Instead, asylum-seekers were typically immediately expelled to the closest port of entry in México. The use of public health as a pretext to control the border placed these migrants at risk and led many to attempt repeat border crossings. Given this policy context, we ask: what, if any, is the association between Title 42 expulsions and migrant deaths in southern Arizona? We address this question by drawing on records of recovered undocumented border crosser (UBC) remains investigated by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Tucson, Arizona. We examined differences in the number and demographic characteristics of UBC remains recovered between what prior studies have characterized as the “Localized Funnel Effect” Era of border enforcement in southern Arizona (i.e., October 1, 2013–March 19, 2020; N = 851), and the “Title 42” Era (i.e., March 20, 2021–September 30, 2023; N = 709). We also assessed how, if at all, the geography of recovered UBC remains shifted between these eras. We found that migrant deaths rose from an annual mean of 133 during the Localized Funnel Effect (LFE) Era to 198 in the Title 42 (T42) Era, representing a 48 percent increase. Compared to the earlier era, remains recovered during the T42 Era clustered closer to the border and near the cities of Nogales and Agua Prieta, Sonora, having shifted from west to east in southern Arizona. Additionally, we found that Title 42 disproportionately affected Mexican and Guatemalan nationals both in terms of expulsions as well as deaths. We propose several policy recommendations based on our study’s findings intended to reduce unnecessary suffering and increase human security: • The US federal government should not impede or limit migrants’ access to the asylum system. Policymakers should instead create clear pathways and procedures that obviate the need for migrants to undertake dangerous journeys and overcome barriers to fair consideration of their claims. • The US government must expand its ability to address these claims, as continued attempts to block asylum seekers will result in additional loss of life and increased violence. It should increase its capacity to screen asylum seekers at the US-México border. We propose an increase in USCIS Asylum Officers to carry out this duty. US Customs and Border Protection agents should not screen asylum seekers, nor should they assume the responsibility of serving as asylum officers, given the agency’s extensively documented record of persistently dehumanizing and mistreating migrants. • The US federal government must take measures to eliminate the backlog of asylum cases in the immigration courts. These measures need to include reforms in the underlying immigration system and in the removal adjudication system, such as greater access to legal counsel and changes to the law that offer legal pathways to imperiled migrants who do not meet the narrow definition of asylum. Absent these reforms, the asylum case backlog will grow, and many asylum seekers with strong claims to remain will be removed after living for years in the United States.
Topic:
Migration, Borders, Asylum, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
North America, Arizona, and United States of America

383. Undeterred: Understanding Repeat Migration in Northern Central America

Author:
Abby Córdova
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have long rested on the idea of deterrence — if migrants know that a border is dangerous to cross and the likelihood of deportation is high, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, and the billions of dollars invested in it, deterrence efforts largely have failed, with the number of border crossings in recent years exceeding those of 30 years ago. To understand why this decades-old, bipartisan deterrence strategy has proven ineffective, we focus on individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have previous migration experience, with a vast majority of them seeking entry into the U.S. These individuals have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border crossing poses, yet many report plans to try to cross the border again. To understand why they persist, we rely on survey data specifically collected to better understand the root causes of international migration. We find that citizens with previous migration experience are significantly more likely to report plans to emigrate, in particular women, younger cohorts, and those at the bottom of the economic ladder. In contrast, family reunification does not appear to play a significant role in driving the migration intentions of those with a prior migration experience. Further, deportation does not deter migrants from trying again, as individuals who have been deported are just as likely to report plans to emigrate again as those who returned to their home countries voluntarily and those who never reached their destination. Most importantly, our research indicates that human insecurity is at the core of why Central Americans who have migrated in the past are more likely to report migration plans for the future. Both the threat of violence and food insecurity are central drivers of their persistent predisposition to embark on the journey again. Individuals remain undeterred in their efforts to escape their country because upon returning to that country, they confront the same conditions that led them to attempt to flee in the first place. We draw two main policy implications from our research. First, the U.S. government should continue its prioritization of investments in tackling the root causes of forced migration through the empowerment of civil society organizations and the channeling of foreign aid to marginalized communities affected by human insecurity, such as those suffering food insecurity or fearing violence. The main objective of these investments should be to improve the living conditions of individuals, giving them a viable option of remaining in their country. Second, the U.S. must invest greater resources in its immigration system to reduce the current backlog of asylum cases, and expand H2-a and -b visa programs to provide a more expansive legal path to migration. Facilitating a legal pathway to immigrants who face heightened human insecurity, like the potential repeat migrants in our study, would prevent further deaths that lay at the hands of a border policy focused on deterrence.
Topic:
Migration, Food Security, Borders, Violence, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Central America and United States of America

384. Forced Migration, Deterrence, and Solutions to the Non-Natural Disaster of Migrant Deaths Along the US-Mexico Border and Beyond

Author:
Donald Kerwin and Alejandra Agustina Martínez
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The International Organization of Migration has characterized the US-Mexico border as the world’s deadliest land migration route. By August 2024, a minimum of 5,405 persons had died or gone missing along this border since 2014, with record high numbers since 2021. Migrant deaths occur despite decades of: US Border Patrol search and rescue initiatives; public education campaigns targeting potential migrants on the dangers of irregular migration; dozens of academic publications and reports highlighting the root causes of these deaths; efforts by consular officials, local communities, and humanitarian agencies to locate, identify, and repatriate human remains; and desperate attempts by families to learn the fate of their missing loved ones. This paper introduces a special edition of the Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS), which draws on original research and the expertise of medical examiners, forensic anthropologists, social scientists, and humanitarian organizations to examine this persistent human tragedy. Many of the authors investigate migrant deaths in their professional capacities. They identify the dead, return remains to family members, and champion reforms to prevent deaths and better account for the dead and missing. This JMHS special edition represents a collaboration between the University of Arizona’s Binational Migration Institute, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMSNY), and the Working Group on Mapping Migrant Deaths along the US Southwest Border. The Working Group includes scholars and practitioners from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and New York who have met monthly since October of 2021. The special edition examines in granular detail the causes of migrant deaths, US border enforcement strategies and tactics, migrant death statistics, and the resource and capacity challenges faced by US counties along and leading from the US-Mexico border in investigating these deaths. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and many public officials attribute the deaths to the predations of human smugglers, the victims’ ignorance or assumption of risk, and the harsh “natural” conditions to which migrants finally succumb. This special issue also documents the underlying non-natural causes of this enduring tragedy, and offers both overarching and more targeted solutions to preventing and minimizing migrant deaths. The issue builds upon and extends seminal research on migrant deaths first featured in CMSNY publications more than two decades ago. Section I introduces the issue of migrant deaths by posing the question: Why should we care? Section II describes the genesis of “prevention through deterrence”—a border enforcement theory and strategy—and its evolution through subsequent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Border Patrol strategic plans. It describes the immense enforcement infrastructure built around this idea by successive administrations and Congresses, and it explains why it has failed to stem irregular migration and how it has contributed to migrant deaths. Section III reviews the main causes of migrant deaths—forced migration, the combined effects of prevention through deterrence and border enforcement tactics, the denial of access to asylum, the border wall, the “naturalization” of migrant deaths, and the dominant vision of the border as a site of danger and exclusion. Section IV reviews the legislative standards for identifying, investigating, and reporting on migrant decedents. It also details the deficiencies of Border Patrol and county-level sources of data on deaths, and it outlines ways to strengthen data collection. Section V discusses the burdens placed on communities along and leading from the border in investigating deaths and their need for greater resources and capacity to address this problem. Section VI outlines the anomalies and challenges related to the Border Patrol’s migrant rescue program. Section VII describes international legal standards to guide the investigation of migrant deaths and two model programs. Section VIII sets forth policy recommendations to prevent migrant deaths and to honor and account for the dead.
Topic:
Borders, Deterrence, Forced Migration, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America

385. After a Decade of Decline, the US Undocumented Population Increased by 650,000 in 2022

Author:
Robert Warren
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This report describes estimates of the undocumented population residing in the United States in 2022 compiled by the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS). The estimates are based on data collected in the American Community Survey (ACS) conducted by the US Census Bureau (Ruggles et al. 2023). The report finds that the undocumented population grew from 10.3 million in 2021 to 10.9 million in 2022, an increase of 650,000. The increase reverses more than a decade of gradual decline. The undocumented populations from 10 countries increased by a total of 525,000: Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and India; El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in Central America; and Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in South America. The undocumented population in Florida increased by about 125,000 in 2022, Texas increased by 60,000, New York by 50,000, and Maryland by 45,000. The report explains why undocumented population growth is much less than the number of apprehensions by DHS. Finally, the Appendix provides a detailed description of the CMS methodology. • After remaining at or near zero growth from 2010 to 2021 (Warren 2023), the US undocumented population increased by 650,000 in 2022. • The largest population gains in 2022 were for Central America (205,000), South America (200,000), and Asia (140,000). • From 2015 to 2022, the undocumented population from Mexico declined by 1.3 million; in the same period, the combined population from Central and South America increased by 1.2 million. • The undocumented population from Asia declined by 115,000 from 2015 to 2021 and then increased by 140,000 in 2022. • California, Texas, Florida, New York, and New Jersey had the largest undocumented populations in 2022. The total population in those five states increased by 300,000 in 2022. • The combined undocumented population from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was undercounted by almost 400,000 in 2022. Correcting this data accounted for more than half the estimated increase in the undocumented population in 2022.
Topic:
Survey, Undocumented Population, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

386. What Will It Take to Eliminate the Immigration Court Backlog? Assessing “Judge Team” Hiring Needs Based on Changed Conditions and the Need for Broader Reform

Author:
Donald Kerwin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This paper examines the staffing needs of the US Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), as it seeks to eliminate an immigration court backlog, which approached 2.5 million pending cases at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2023. A previous study by the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) attributed the backlog to systemic, long-neglected problems in the broader US immigration system. This paper provides updated estimates of the number of immigration judges (IJs) and “judge teams” (IJ teams) needed to eliminate the backlog over ten and five years based on different case receipt and completion scenarios. It also introduces a data tool that will permit policymakers, administrators and researchers to make their own estimates of IJ team hiring needs based on changing case receipt and completion data. Finally, the paper outlines the pressing need for reform of the US immigration system, including a well-resourced, robust, and independent court system, particularly in light of record “encounters” of migrants at US borders in FY 2022 and 2023.
Topic:
Immigration, Courts, Borders, Asylum, and Department of Homeland Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

387. Service Needs, Context of Reception, and Perceived Discrimination of Venezuelan Immigrants in the United States and Colombia

Author:
Carolina Scaramutti, Renae Danielle Schmidt, and Seth Schwartz
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Millions of Venezuelans have fled their country in hopes for a better future outside the political and financial turmoil in their home country. This paper examines the self-reported needs of Venezuelans in the United States and Colombia. Specifically, it looks at perceived discrimination in each country and its effect on the service needs of Venezuelan immigrants. The authors used data from a larger project conducted in October to November 2017 to perform a qualitative content analysis on the specific services that participants and others like them would need following immigration. The sample consisted of 647 Venezuelan immigrant adults who had migrated to the United States (n = 342) or Colombia (n = 305). Its findings indicate statistically significant differences between the two countries. Venezuelan immigrants in the United States were more likely to identity mental health and educational service needs, while those in Colombia were more likely to list access to healthcare, help finding jobs, and food assistance. When looking at perceived discrimination, means scores for discrimination were significantly greater for participants who indicated needing housing services, who indicated needing assistance enrolling children in school and who indicated needing food assistance, compared to participants who did not list those needs. Venezuelans who had experienced greater negative context of reception were less likely to indicate needing mental health services, where 11.9 percent of those who did not perceive a negative context of reception responded that they needed mental health services. Evaluating existing service networks will be essential in working to bridge the gap between the services provided to and requested by Venezuelans. Collaboration between diverse government actors, community-based organizations (CBOs) and other stakeholders can help identify gaps in existing service networks. CBOs can also facilitate communication between Venezuelan immigrants and their new communities, on the need to invest in necessary services.
Topic:
Immigration, Discrimination, Services, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

388. Trajectories of Forced Migration: Central American Migrants on Their Way Toward the USA

Author:
Ludger Pries, Oscar Calderón Morillón, and Brandon Amir Estrada Ceron
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Mexico is increasingly important as a country of transit migration between the Global South and the Global North. Migration dynamics from Central America to and through Mexico are mainly considered as economic or mixed migration of people looking for work and a better life in the USA. Nevertheless, since the 2010s the number of asylum applications in Mexico has sky rocketed. Based on a survey of Central American migrants in Mexico we demonstrate that some kind of (organized) violence was a crucial driver for leaving and a constant companion during their journey. After contextualizing the migration route from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) toward Mexico, we present the design of the study, describe sociodemographic and general contexts of the 350 interviewees, and present the migration trajectories as long-lasting sequences of events and stays, where violence in quite different forms always is at play.
Topic:
Forced Migration, Transit Migration, and Organized Violence
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

389. Role of Gardening in Mental Health, Food Security, and Economic Well-Being in Resettled Refugees: A Mixed Methods Study

Author:
Rashmi Gangamma, Bhavneet Walia, and Shaelise Tor
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Home and community gardening is emerging as a beneficial intervention for resettled refugee populations. Using an interdisciplinary lens, we examined whether gardening influences mental health, food security, and economic well-being. A mixed methods study (n = 29) was conducted with quantitative surveys to assess indicators of mental health, food security, and economic well-being. Qualitative, semi-structured interviews explored gardener participants’ experience of gardening benefits (n = 10). Participants had on average been in the United States for seven and a half years, with most having lived in refugee camps prior to arrival. Findings showed gardeners reporting fewer symptoms of anxiety, depression, and trauma, and lesser food insecurity than non-gardeners, and similar indicators of economic well-being. Non-parametric regression analysis showed that being a gardener significantly predicted less psychological distress. Qualitative data substantiated these findings with gardeners reporting improved mental health, closer family, social relationships and connections with culture, and more access to fresh and organic food. The multiple, simultaneous benefits of gardening reported here provide strong support for building community-based health promotion programs to assist refugee integration, including long after arrival. The study further highlights the importance of examining these interrelated factors of mental health, food security, and economic well-being simultaneously and reevaluating the established goals of refugee resettlement, particularly in the United States. We offer the following recommendations: • Policymakers and refugee resettlement practitioners should integrate culturally appropriate community-based health promotion efforts in refugee programs long after the initial resettlement period. • Researchers on refugee integration outcomes should include interdisciplinary perspectives that offer comprehensive understanding of processes related to health outcomes. • Policymakers on refugee resettlement and integration should consider the linkages between mental health, food security, and economic well-being.
Topic:
Food Security, Refugees, Mental Health, Resettlement, Well-Being, and Gardening
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

390. Avoiding a second front: De-escalating simmering tensions between Israel and Hezbollah

Author:
Paul Salem, Patricia Karam, and James F. Hollifield
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Tensions have run red hot on Israel’s northern border since October, as near-daily clashes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah risk the prospect of greater escalation. US diplomatic efforts have focused on preventing a full-scale war from breaking out, while intensified military deployments have sought to deter Iran and its regional proxies. Could the recent escalation in exchanges between Israeli and Hezbollah forces lead to the opening of a second front in Israel’s war? How should we assess US mediation efforts so far? What are Hezbollah's and Israel’s strategic calculations? What would the costs of a wider war be for Lebanon and its already hard-hit population? Finally, what would be the broader regional implications of a full-scale Israeli-Hezbollah conflict
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hezbollah, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and United States of America

391. Silencing the guns: Bringing the war in Gaza to a sustainable end

Author:
Brian Katulis, Khaled Elgindy, and James F. Hollifield
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
More than six months on from Hamas’ brutal attack on Oct. 7, the war in Gaza shows few signs of slowing down. In the devastated coastal strip tens of thousands have died, over a million are internally displaced, aid delivery remains exceedingly difficult, and famine is beginning to spread. Meanwhile, other than a brief, two-week pause that expired in December, repeated efforts to negotiate another cease-fire have failed. US, Egyptian, and Qatari diplomats have been hard at work for half a year, but over 130 hostages remain in captivity with no real indication of how many are still alive. Rising tensions between Israel and Iran are only likely to exacerbate the situation, with unpredictable consequences. How can the US and its regional and international partners help bring the war to a sustainable end? What does Washington want the region to look like after the dust settles? And what steps must it take to reach that goal?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

392. How might US-Israeli relations evolve under the Trump administration?

Author:
Nimrod Goren and Ilai Saltzman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs Nimrod Goren and Associate Research Professor Ilai Saltzman discuss potential shifts in US policy, the outlook for Israeli politics in 2025, and the challenges to advancing peace on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Tune in for expert insights on what lies ahead.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

393. The Israel Hamas Conflict: An Analysis on Threats and Security Implications Posed by Iran in the Middle East

Author:
Rahat Anwar and Tajmmal Abbas
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
In the history of world one can trace a series of wars fought between Arabs and Jews on the land of Palestine, which is sacred land for Muslims, Jews and Christians. A country ―Palestine‖ which is inheritance of Arab Muslims is now mostly occupied by Jews and converting into Israel, a state whose idea of existence came into being after Balfour declaration in 1917, and officially came into existence in May 14, 1948. This research has been conducted by consulting many secondary sources including different research articles, international journals and several books regarding Palestinian conflict. Due to the reason of non-recognition of Israel, it had to go through a series of deadly wars in the past but contemporary war is one of deadliest war in the history of this conflict. This study aims to find out Iranian involvement in the war as Iran is vocal supporter of Hamas attack. Objective of this study is to identify the threats to regional security particularly Iran. Iranian involvement is visible, no doubt China has brokered the peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia but long-standing rivalry cannot be overcome overnight. Iran is anti-American since 1979; it has rivalry with both Saudi Arabia and USA. To destroy U.S. brokered Abraham Accords between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran allegedly urged Hamas to attack on Israel. This study suggests that Iran often sacrifice its interests over the lives of hundreds of thousands of people’s securities in the region. This study recommended that to stop terrorist financing and by not proving them safe sanctuaries is the only way to de-escalate war and make this region prosperous.
Topic:
Security, Military Intervention, Conflict, Peace, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

394. Black Power and Palestine

Author:
Michael R. Fischbach
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
MAAS alum Dr. Michael R. Fischbach discusses his groundbreaking research on divisions within the 1960s Black Freedom Struggle in America over the Israel-Palestine conflict and how Black Power activists supported the Palestinian struggle for liberation—planting the seeds for transcontinental solidarity that continues today.
Topic:
History, Solidarity, Activism, and Black Power
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

395. Teaching Israel-Palestine

Author:
Khaled Elgindy and Yousef Munayyer
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
Two CCAS instructors reflect on their experiences of teaching Palestine in this historic moment.
Topic:
Higher Education, Academia, Teaching, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and United States of America

396. Teaching in a Time of War

Author:
Nader Hashemi, Jonathan Lincoln, and Fida Adely
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
Professors Nader Hashemi, Jonathan Lincoln, and Fida Adely, each of whom direct academic centers within Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, reflect on what it means to educate and care for students in this present moment.*
Topic:
Higher Education, Academia, Teaching, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

397. Fires From the Shore: Supporting the Fight for Sea Control

Author:
Shaun Callahan
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The struggle to obtain, maintain, and exploit sea control during a campaign is an inherently Joint endeavor requiring a multi-Service, ­cross-domain application of firepower and maneuver. Maritime strikes from the land domain provide a critical offset to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing strength at sea and enable Joint force maneuver in the Western Pacific. To have a meaningful impact on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) surface action groups and contribute to a Joint force objective to gain sea control in the Western Pacific as part of a coordinated campaign, the U.S. Army’s maritime strike capability must be aggregated into effective salvos by the supported maritime component commander. If deterrence fails in a strategically near future, naval operations in the Western Pacific will need to incorporate the U.S. Army’s multidomain task forces and their maritime strike capability to defeat the PRC’s antiaccess, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Army, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Sea Control, and Joint Force Maneuver
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

398. Oceans Are Now Battlefields: How the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Can Counter North Korea’s Navy in an Evolving Age

Author:
Alan Cunningham
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Korean armed forces are one of the main threats in the Asian geographic region and consistently have been a thorn in the side of Western allied Asian nations and the United States. In such a conflict with the North Koreans, the United States would, alongside others, take a lead role in countering North Korean naval forces. Taking into account the Force Design 2030 and 2045 battleplans devised by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it is imperative to explore how the United States could work to combat North Korean forces in the near future. With the Force Designs and stated modernizations and improvements being performed in sea-based warfare, there is much more to do to make a strong military force that can strike against the North Koreans.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Maritime, Marine Corps, Amphibious Operations, and Force Design
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

399. Bringing Clarity to Stand-in Forces: How Operational Art and Science Provide the Linkage between Stand-in Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Reconnaissance/Counterreconnaissance Operations

Author:
Pat Hassett
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The U.S. Marine Corps’ 2021 Concept for Stand-in Forces (SIF) “describes how forward-postured, steady-state forces operating in contested areas—capable of transitioning rapidly from competition to crisis to conflict and back again—can create a strategic advantage. This concept explains how Marines can operate effectively with allies and partners from within a contested area.”1 Yet confusion pervades because the Marine Corps organized to perform sustained ground combat operations at the expense of core Title X requirements. The new concepts called SIF—expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), and reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance operations (RXR)—articulate potential employment options for Joint force commanders to accomplish regional and threat-focused responsibilities. Doctrinal components of operational art provide linkage between SIF, EABO, and RXR. This framework illuminates the links required to operationalize these novel maritime concepts and to succeed in projecting maritime power in support of Joint and coalition forces.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Maritime, Reconnaissance, Marine Corps, Stand-in Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Counter-reconnaissance
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

400. Reconnaissance-Strike Tactics, Defeat Mechanisms, and the Future of Amphibious Warfare

Author:
B. A. Friedman
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Professional discussions of tactics tend to revolve around debates over “strategies” of maneuver versus attrition, ongoing discussions of revolutions in military affairs, and proposals for new concepts of operation. What these discussions are really about though is tactics, specifically what kind of tactics are appropriate for the modern operating environment. Active-duty practitioners have little time to think deeply about tactics due to the intense demands of training to execute doctrine, which are codified tactics that have worked in the past but may not be sufficient to adapt to changing and uncertain situations in combat. Fortunately, with a little focus on tactics we can cut through the hype as all of these ideas have been circling around the identification of the modern tactical regime: reconnaissance-strike tactics. This article first reviews the current debate about maneuver versus attrition tactics and propose that, instead, the advent the reconnaissance-strike regime demands a more sophisticated examination of tactical principles applied against defeat mechanisms. Lastly, it examines implications for amphibious warfare and the Marine Corps generally.
Topic:
Reconnaissance, Military Tactics, Marine Corps, Attrition, Amphibious Operations, and Maneuver
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America