Political Geography: United States of America / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Economics

1. US-ASEAN Digital Economy Cooperation

Author:: Hanh Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Long criticized for its lackluster record in economic engagement with Southeast Asia, the US is now looking to bolster digital economy cooperation with the region as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Both sides have already engaged in several cooperation initiatives to strengthen Southeast Asia’s digital capacities. These actions/engagements aim to help the region capture the immense benefit and respond to potential socioeconomic disruptions brought by the digital economic boom. However, US-ASEAN cooperation will have to deal with two challenges. First, China has already established a comprehensive and prevalent presence in the region’s digital economy, from hard infrastructure and customer-facing businesses to developing digital standards. Second, Southeast Asia’s diversity in economic development leads to varied capacities among its members. These attributes carry certain security complications for Southeast Asia and the US in the long run. Addressing them will require both sides to further boost cooperation, particularly in shaping regional digital standards.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Digital Economy, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries

Author:: Sergio R. Vale and Eduardo Viola
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has had a marked economic impact. However, since Russia is a net producer of important commodities, the impact of sanctions on its economy was less than expected. But what would happen if there was a war involving a country that was a net importer of commodities? In the case of a possible China-US conflict over Taiwan, the impact on the world economy would be different, with a deeper recession around the world, but the impact on the Brazilian economy would still be positive on account of the possibility that would remain of agricultural exports to China.
Topic:: Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Commodities, and Exports
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. The Regressive Nature of the U.S. Tariff Code: Origins and Implications

Author:: Lydia Cox
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Tariffs are often thought of as taxes that fall uniformly across goods or industries. In reality, however, the U.S. tariff schedule is extremely complex—the modern‐day tariff code comprises 4,394 pages of tariffs on 19,347 varieties of goods. As a result, there is a lot of variation in tariff rates, even within narrowly defined categories of goods. We study this complexity through the lens of a little‐known but consequential pattern in the modern U.S. tariff schedule: tariff rates are systematically higher on low‐value versions of goods relative to their high‐value counterparts. For example, the tariff on a $400 handbag made of reptile leather is 5.3 percent, while the tariff on an $8 plastic‐sided handbag is 16 percent. Through a comprehensive analysis of U.S. tariffs over the past 100 years, we show that this regressive pattern is, and has been, a systematic feature of tariffs for decades. Our findings are emblematic of a more fundamental feature of U.S. tariff policy: tariffs set to meet policy objectives of the past have persisted through vast changes in the economic landscape and, despite their historical origins, are still affecting consumers today.
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

6. Korea Matters for America/America Matters for Korea (2023)

Author:: East-West Center
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The 4th edition of Korea Matters for America/America Matters for Korea, part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and South Korea at the national, state, and local levels. This publication and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-Indo-Pacific relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Economics, Education, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Governance, Population, Public Health, and Travel
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

7. Japan Matters for America/America Matters for Japan (2023)

Author:: East-West Center
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The 4th edition of Japan Matters for America/America Matters for Japan, part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and Japan at the national, state, and local levels. This publication and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-Indo-Pacific relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Economics, Education, Politics, Science and Technology, Governance, Population, Public Health, and Travel
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Is the supermultiplier nil? - A Replication Study of Deleidi and Mazzucato (2021)

Author:: Jens Boysen-Hogrefe
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Analyzing US macro data via a structural vector-autoregressive model, Deleidi and Mazzucato (2021) find strong positive spillover of mission-oriented government spending on private research and development activity and on overall economic dynamism ("crowding in"). However the result hinges on specific transformation of the data. Deleidi and Mazzucato deflate all variables in their model via the GDP deflator. Applying originally price adjusted data a spillover on GDP cannot be found. Estimating the model with data starting in 1984, the results point at “crowding out” of private research and development activity.
Topic:: Economics, Fiscal Policy, Innovation, and Fiscal Multipliers
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

9. The path of economics research production: Insights into the seesaw between theory and empirics

Author:: João Ricardo Faria, Rajeev K. Goel, and Neela D. Manage
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper provides insights into the apparent seesaw between the generation of theoretical versus empirical economics research over time. A dynamic model considers the incentives of researchers to focus on empirical versus theoretical papers. It yields the main characteristics of the path-changing of economics research, from theoretical-intensive to empirical-focused. The model has two equilibria, one with a higher proportion of theoretical papers and another with a higher proportion of empirical papers. Curiously, the equilibrium with greater theoretical papers is stable, while the one with more empirical papers is a saddle point. This suggests that the current trend of increasing empirical research is unlikely to last.
Topic:: Economics, Research, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

10. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?

Author:: Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
Topic:: Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

11. The “Odious” Legacy of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: The Case of Angola

Author:: Rafael Marques de Morais and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Within days of taking office, China’s new foreign minister, Qin Gang, was on a plane to his country’s main African client: Angola. Landing in Luanda on January 12, Qin Gang was ostensibly bringing a gift—a $250 million loan to help Angola expand high-speed broadband. Some gifts, however, are not what they seem, and some of the recent financial gifts from Chinese sources have been toxic. Soon after Qin visited Angola, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to three African countries but skipped Angola, possibly because of its checkered history with Chinese development assistance. The case of Angola raises questions about the extent and nature of Chinese loans and infrastructure aid to a growing number of African nations, as well as the consequences of such loans on those countries’ relations with the US.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, Trade, Development Assistance, and Loans
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Angola, and United States of America

12. Radical Steps Are Essential to Jump-Starting the Replacement of the Flawed US Money Regime

Author:: Brendan Brown
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: A previous policy memo argued that flaws in the actual US money regime are responsible for the Great Pandemic Inflation.1 Now that reported inflation has been falling, some of us might imagine that addressing these flaws has become a non-urgent matter. After all, great supply shocks tend to come rarely. But such complacence does not fit the facts. The case for getting rid of the present rotten monetary regime is not simply based on the argument that it has malfunctioned so severely during the pandemic and war supply shock. That malfunctioning continues into the present, where there is now positive supply side news (the pandemic dislocation is fading, and a natural gas glut has emerged despite the continuing Russia-Ukraine War). The Federal Reserve and other central banks, still trying to navigate policy in an anchorless monetary system by choosing a path for short-term interest rates, are stumbling from one huge blunder to another, even if they have a rare lucky stretch in between. Beyond the woes of how the 2 percent inflation standard performed during the supply shock and subsequent supply restoration, this regime should be held responsible for a range of economic and social consequences that predate the pandemic and war. These include malinvestment (poor allocation of capital due to corrupted signaling in markets), advancement of monopoly capitalism, bloated government outlays, and punitive monetary taxation (in the form of inflation tax or monetary repression tax), all of which take their toll. Instead of enjoying a top-quality money with all its benefits, individuals have had to put up with a poor money and all its related costs, particularly the ongoing danger of serious loss of purchasing power.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

13. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:: Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

14. Perú entre Estados Unidos y China: Adaptación de la política exterior peruana de cara a las divergencias chino-estadounidenses

Author:: Bruno Macciotta Pulisci and Pablo Biderbost
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Desde hace un tiempo China viene compitiendo con Estados Unidos por una posición dominante en el mundo. La competencia es, sobre todo económica, aunque implica, por supuesto, aspectos también políticos, sociales y militares. Una de las regiones más disputadas es, sin duda, América Latina, en la que Estados Unidos pierde cada vez más terreno y China se posiciona como el mayor socio comercial. En este contexto, los países latinoamericanos han tenido que reconfigurar sus políticas exteriores para poder satisfacer sus expectativas de la mano de quien le ofrezca mejores posibilidades. Perú no ha sido una excepción y, de hecho, se ha acercado en los últimos años más a China como principal socio comercial, aunque no ha soltado la mano de Estados Unidos del todo. El presente artículo explora cómo se ha reconfigurado la política exterior peruana de cara a la competencia entre China y Estados Unidos.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, South America, Peru, and United States of America

15. Exploring the Interplay between Trade and Industrial Policies and the Impact of Geopolitics on the Transformation of Taiwan’s Economy

Author:: Ying-Jun Lin
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Over the past five decades, Taiwan's economy has shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented, from an import-substitution policy to an export-expansion policy. This evolution in economic structure has also brought about changes in the industrial landscape. While there is an ongoing debate about the respective roles of the market and the government in promoting Taiwan's economic growth, this article argues that the history of Taiwan's economy demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and industrial policies. The integration of market forces and government intervention has played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic success story. However, the dynamics between the United States and China, as well as the emergence of new Asian regionalism, pose challenges to Taiwanese industries and enterprises. In conclusion, this article emphasises the importance of refining trade and industrial policies in line with the geopolitical context in order to maintain the momentum of Taiwan's economy.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

16. ASEAN's medium- to long-term trade strategies and the direction of RoK-ASEAN cooperation

Author:: Sungil Kwak, Seungjin Cho, Jaewan Cheong, Jaeho Lee, Mingeum Shin, Nayoun Park, and So Eun Kim
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: In recent years, the U.S.-China hegemony competition has intensified, dividing the world into two blocs. ASEAN has long culti-vated its position on the international stage by maintaining a certain distance between the United States and China. In that sense, ASEAN is the best partner for Korea to ef-fectively respond to the divided world. Therefore, this study seeks the directions of cooperation with ASEAN in supply chain, digital trade, climate change response, and health and development cooperation in line with changes in the international order.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Strategies of Multinational Companies Entering China in the Era of U.S.-China Competition and Implications for Korea

Author:: Sang Baek Hyun, Ji Young Moon, Min-suk Park, Jonghyuk Oh, and Yunmi Oh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: With the integration of resources and markets around the world sparked by the trend of globalization, multinational companies have continued to grow at a rapid pace. In particular, global manufacturers have maintained their competitiveness by distributing resources more efficiently while establishing a global value chain with China as their main production hub. However, measures taken by the U.S. to block China’s access to technology and supply chains in some high-tech industries have prompted discussions on reorganization of the global supply chain, placing these multinational companies in an uncertain situation concerning their operations in China. At a time when competition between the U.S. and China is intensifying, it is necessary to look at the response strategies of global companies that have entered China and seek effective countermeasures for Korean companies.
Topic:: Economics, Multinational Corporations, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

18. Housing in Wyoming: Constraints and Solutions

Author:: Thảo-Nguyên Bùi, Tim Freeman, Ricardo Hausmann, Farah Kaddah, Lucas Lamby, Tim O'Brien, and Eric Protzer
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Quantitative evidence supports the contention that Wyoming’s housing market is constrained, to a greater degree than many other parts of the US. Prices are persistently above expectations given economic fundamentals in most parts of the state, and the supply of new housing in Wyoming is on average less responsive to price increases than in other US counties. This has undermined natural population growth and contributed to a low amount of population density close to city centers in Wyoming, as compared to other US cities with comparable population levels. Importantly, this phenomenon is not simply the result of pandemic-era economic frictions. The evidence shows that these constraints have durably persisted in Wyoming. This housing constraint weighs heavily on the broader Wyoming’s economy, and chokes off growth in new industries that could add to the Wyoming economy beyond its natural resource base. Businesses consistently report a lack of access to workforce as a leading problem that ultimately results from a lack of housing. Some businesses have even tried to create their own housing for employees, and news reports abound of teachers and nurses who secure jobs in Wyoming communities but then have to leave because they cannot find housing. Key problems behind Wyoming’s housing constraints include excessive regulations concerning housing density and insufficient investment in arterial infrastructure. For example, there is evidence that over-regulated minimum lot sizes in Wyoming are blocking the creation of supply to match free-market demand for houses with smaller amounts of land. Other areas of over-regulation include those concerning allowable housing types, building height, parking spaces per dwelling, and the housing approval process itself. This may be seen as surprising given Wyoming’s reputation as a low-regulation state, but Wyoming maintains restrictions that other states and countries have discarded as outdated and highly counterproductive. Besides outright restrictions on housing development, we find that the most common cost driver undermining the housing development has to do with low public investment in needed arterial infrastructure, especially water systems. Land supply as well as material and construction costs are not primary constraints to housing development across the state, but may matter for select communities. We suggest a portfolio of policy changes for the state of Wyoming to explore in order to solve its housing constraints. One category of changes is regulatory, and focuses on deregulation, reducing bureaucratic overhead, and shifting from veto-cratic to democratic housing approval procedures. Another category is focused on investment on infrastructure to support housing, and exploration of state-local funding structures to facilitate continuous infrastructure improvement. If implemented, these changes will not only help to solve Wyoming’s housing constraints but also facilitate housing development in a way that combats urban sprawl, and in doing so protects open spaces outside of cities that Wyomingites value.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Public Policy, and Housing
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

19. The EU–US Data Protection Framework: Balancing Economic, Security and Privacy Considerations

Author:: Federica Marconi
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The rapid evolution of digital technology has ushered in a data-centric economy, where data accessibility drives marketplace efficiency and economic growth across various industries. However, this shift, while offering numerous benefits, introduces significant privacy and data security challenges, particularly in the context of transatlantic data transfers. Considering the vast economic ties between the EU and the US, the transatlantic data flow vividly illustrates the complexities involved in governing and transferring data. It grapples with the ongoing challenge of striking a satisfactory balance between economic advantages stemming from data utilisation and various concerns pertaining to national security, digital sovereignty and individual rights. In recent years, the European Commission approved two different frameworks on transatlantic data flow – Safe Harbour in 2000[1] and Privacy Shield in 2016[2] – asserting that the US provided a level of data protection for data transfers essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU. However, despite initial optimism, both adequacy decisions faced a significant setback when the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated them in what is commonly referred to as the “Schrems saga”,[3] named after the Austrian activist who first challenged both frameworks before the European Court. The core arguments centred on the absence of adequate safeguards for personal data within US domestic law and the extent of state surveillance over such data when it was transferred, as initially disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.[4] This legal development led to a period of significant uncertainty and further heightened the ongoing debate concerning the regulation of transatlantic data transfer. To address the consequences of this legal turmoil, both EU and the US committed to establishing “a renewed and sound framework for transatlantic data flows”,[5] seeking a long-term solution to address the complexities of data privacy and security, eventually leading to the recently adopted EU–US Data Privacy Framework (“DPF”).
Topic:: Security, Economics, Political Economy, European Union, Privacy, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

20. Germany’s Economic Security and Technology: Optimizing Export Control, Investment Screening and Market Access Instruments

Author:: Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Technological development and increasingly fraught US-China competition have geopolitical consequences for technology access. The erosion of post-Cold War multilateral dual-use technology export control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, and investment and other control frameworks have led to na-tional, EU, and ad hoc measures, such as the restrictions on Russian semiconductor access following the invasion of Ukraine. The German government must integrate technology access and control instruments – export controls, FDI screening, critical infrastructure access, research protection, and outbound investment– in its Digital Strategy and National Security Strategy. The former currently neglects critical technology access and control; the latter must address it comprehensively. German – and EU – dual-use export and FDI screening reforms have been updated and are now in place. Capacity building and alignment with EU and NATO partners now deserves greater attention. Measures could include more robust, institutionalized information-sharing and consultations on dual-use technology export, import, investment, and research controls in a Multilateral Technology Control Committee born out of the G7 or TTC. The commit-tee should also establish the capacity to deny end-user access to German technology through its own Foreign-Direct Product Rules and Entity List.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Science and Technology, Investment, and Exports
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:: Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

22. Untapped Innovation? The Racial and Gender Divides That Hinder the U.S. Knowledge Economy

Author:: Alexander Kersten and Gabrielle Athanasia
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States’ innovative spirit rests on a complex network of economic rules favoring market-based competition, predictable legal arrangements for patenting and securing intellectual property, and incentives for investors. It also relies on a robust university system that provides the requisite educational training and facilities to carry out research and development (R&D). Maintaining this network fundamentally requires a focus on early education, especially in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). A more inclusive innovation economy also demands greater attention to communities of color, who are often poorly connected to the innovation economy; women, who are underrepresented in the innovation economy; and those in regions that do not yet share in the prosperity of the United States’ innovation clusters. To build a more inclusive innovation-based economy, policymakers should foster equitable access to early childhood STEM education. They should encourage the expansion of technology transfer programs across universities and colleges, including historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and connect them to their regions’ economic growth. Policymakers, academia, and industry leaders should also encourage minorities and women to participate in the patenting and venture systems that support the innovation economy. Renewing American innovation means making opportunity as universal as the talent that seeks it.
Topic:: Economics, Gender Issues, Race, Labor Issues, Discrimination, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

23. Comparing Older Adults’ Mental Health Needs and Access to Treatment in the U.S. and Other High-Income Countries

Author:: Munira Z. Gunja, Arnav Shah, and Reginald D. Williams II
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Commonwealth Fund
Abstract:: Nearly all U.S. adults over 65 have some mental health coverage through Medicare. Whether that coverage is sufficient is in question. Comparing mental health care access and affordability for U.S. Medicare beneficiaries with that for older adults in peer nations could highlight coverage gaps and point to opportunities for improvement.
Topic:: Economics, Health Care Policy, Social Policy, and Medicare
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

24. CHIPS Act will spur US production but not foreclose China

Author:: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The CHIPS and Science Act, export controls, and agreements with allied countries will accomplish many of their multiple objectives. More US semiconductor fabrication plants will be built, US R&D will be accelerated, and advanced chips and chip-making machines will be denied to China, Russia, and other adversaries. However, the Act will not make a material difference to US chip supplies in the next two or three years. Slower economic growth has already tipped the chips market in favor of ample supplies. While collective measures have inflicted considerable short-term pain on China, causing a sharp drop in the fortunes of its high-tech firms, China will respond by redoubling its self-sufficiency programs. The United States, however, should not mimic China in pursuing self-sufficiency, as US self-sufficiency is an illusion. The United States currently exports high-value chips and imports low-value chips, so increasing self-sufficiency would require the United States to prioritize basic chip production at the same time it is supposed to be competing with China in advanced chip production. Continuing to prioritize advanced chip production—where the United States has a clear advantage—is the most efficient course of action.
Topic:: Economics, Legislation, Exports, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

25. Soaring demand is driving double-digit import price inflation in the United States

Author:: Caroline Freund
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: At a time of soaring price increases in the United States, inflation in the US import sector has been soaring the most. Import price inflation in the first half of 2022 was in the double digits, above US consumer price index and personal consumption expenditures inflation. Excess demand for certain imported goods is playing a big role, but so are supply shortages caused by temporary business closures overseas and shipping delays associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Correctly identifying the culprit for misaligned demand and supply, and hence rising prices, is central to understanding the type and extent of policy intervention needed. Using movements in prices and quantities of specific goods, the analysis presented in this Policy Brief shows that the increase in import price inflation has been driven to the same or a greater extent by demand compared with supply constraints. The results have important implications for policies to help reduce the supply and demand imbalance and thus tame inflation.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, COVID-19, Imports, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

26. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

27. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:: Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

28. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:: David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Protectionism, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. New Opportunities for the United States-Kingdom of Thailand Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lance D. Jackson
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: In March 2022, the East-West Center in Washington (EWCW), in collaboration with the Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, DC, convened a two-day seminar in which experts from Thailand and the United States discussed issues and opportunities for the US-Thailand alliance. The workshop included a diverse array of discussants hailing from government, military, academic, think tank, and private sector backgrounds. This report, which adheres to the “Chatham House Rule” under which observations referred to in the report are not attributed to any individual participant, is a summary of the group discussions and the key themes from the seminar. The recent signing of the United States-Thailand Communique on Strategic Alliance and Partnership and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) focused on promoting supply chain resilience on July 10, 2022, highlight the pertinence of this report and the associated seminar. The topics detailed in this report aligned with many of the pressing issues addressed in the Communique and MOU, including expanding law enforcement cooperation, deepening cybersecurity collaboration, supporting resilient transportation corridors, advancing military modernization, and catalyzing Thailand’s bio-circular-green (BCG) economy. The report also covered topics and key themes from a series of jointly produced public webinars and an Asia Pacific Bulletin series of policy briefs on US-Thai affairs.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Economics, Education, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Governance, Population, Leadership, Public Health, and Travel
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, Thailand, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

30. An Impact Analysis of California’s State-County Assessors’ Partnership Agreement Program

Author:: Geoffrey Propheter
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: California’s State-County Assessors’ Partnership Agreement Program (SCAPAP) provided select counties with a dollar-for-dollar matching grant from the state for assessment administration over a three-year period from fiscal year 2015 through 2017. One of the policy goals for the grant was to finance administrative activities that would lead to an increase in the property tax base, thereby increasing property tax revenue. This study evaluates how well the grant accomplished this goal. Using the synthetic control method on data from 2007 through 2018, I find little evidence SCAPAP funds increased participating counties’ property tax base. Since the purpose of the program is based on sound economic theory, I caution interpreting this conclusion as a reason to discontinue policy experimentation.
Topic:: Economics, Governance, Tax Systems, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: California, North America, and United States of America

31. Colorado’s Political Climate, Economy, and Budget during COVID-19

Author:: Michael Berry
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic was a monumental exogeneous shock to the Colorado economy. Prior to the pandemic’s onset the state reported historically low unemployment alongside robust growth in personal income levels and state revenue. While the negative economic effects of the pandemic were sharp, the state’s economic recovery is outpacing what many economists previously projected. The General Assembly was compelled to impose major cuts to last year’s budget, many of which were restored with the enactment of the budget for the 2021–2022 fiscal year. The General Fund budget of $13.6 billion proposed by Democratic Governor Jared Polis represented a substantial spending increase of 20 percent from the prior year. The enacted $13.1 billion General Fund budget received nearly unanimous approval among Democrats and modest Republican support. Policymakers ultimately sought to balance competing priorities across many issue areas, while also preparing for the future with a major investment of $1.5 billion to the state’s reserve fund.
Topic:: Economics, Governance, Budget, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America, Colorado, and United States of America

32. Time for a Significant Reimagining of Government in Wyoming?

Author:: Robert Schumann and Jeffrey Jensen
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:: Despite $430 million in spending reductions and the loss of 324 state positions, Wyoming’s 2021 supplemental budget reflected an improved pandemic-driven economic climate. Recent budgetary optimism was attributed to increased performance in energy production and pricing, pent up demand for tourism and travel, and higher than expected sales tax revenues. Continued reliance on Wyoming’s Permanent Mineral Trust Fund, and the state’s attachment to the remainder of its boom-and-bust revenue structure, left surprisingly little appetite for discussions of revenue diversificatioan. Instead, “right-sizing” state government to fit the current revenue stream seems more consistent with the spirit of the times.
Topic:: Economics, Budget, Fiscal Policy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Wyoming

33. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:: Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

34. Investing in Innovation: A Policy Framework for Attaining Sustainable Prosperity in the United States

Author:: William Lazonick
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: “Sustainable prosperity” denotes an economy that generates stable and equitable growth for a large and growing middle class. From the 1940s into the 1970s, the United States appeared to be on a trajectory of sustainable prosperity, especially for white-male members of the U.S. labor force. Since the 1980s, however, an increasing proportion of the U.S labor force has experienced unstable employment and inequitable income, while growing numbers of the business firms upon which they rely for employment have generated anemic productivity growth.
Topic:: Economics, Labor Issues, Economic Inequality, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

35. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:: Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. State Right-to-Repair Laws Need to Respect Federal Copyright Laws: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Assessment

Author:: Devlin Hartline and Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Various states are considering laws that would mandate that producers of electronic devices provide consumers and repair shops with all the tools and know-how necessary to repair these devices. Proponents of these “right-to-repair laws” argue that consumers should be able to do whatever they want with their devices, whether a smartphone, a smart TV, or a gaming console. Right-to-repair advocates, however, ignore inconvenient facts. These state laws conflict with federal copyright law and are unconstitutional, and they are bad policy as well. First, as a simple legal matter, the proposed right-to-repair laws are unconstitutional. These laws mandate the disclosure and distribution of the code in the computer programs that make our devices work, such as operating systems, apps, and the “digital locks” that protect these computer programs from unauthorized access and copying. Federal copyright law protects all these computer programs and “preempts” any conflicting state laws under the Constitution. Second, state right-to-repair laws are wrong as a matter of policy. These laws upset the long-standing balance of rights implemented by federal copyright law. For over 200 years, Congress has enacted copyright laws to secure to authors and innovators the fruits of their creative labors. These laws have properly balanced the rights of creators, the rights of companies that produce and distribute their copyrighted works, and the rights of consumers and the public. As a result, federal copyright law has been a launching pad for the economic and cultural revolutions in books, movies, music, and now digital games and the internet of things. Everyone values their electronic devices because copyright law provides the legal foundation for today’s thriving digital marketplace. Consumers have access to an incredible selection of movies, music, games, and many other previously unimagined digital goods and services. The same is true for products that consumers have long used and that have become “smart” today, such as phones, TVs, automobiles, and other devices. Overbroad right-to-repair laws fail to acknowledge the legal rights and the underlying policies in federal copyright law that have made all this possible.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

38. A Rotten Money Regime is Responsible for Pandemic and War Inflation

Author:: Brendan Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Who is responsible for the Great Pandemic and War Inflation of 2021–22? Is it Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell, former President Donald Trump, President Joe Biden, or President Vladimir Putin? The answer is that the buck stops at a rotten monetary regime—the so-called “2-percent-inflation standard.” Trying to blame particular individuals may help those who gain from the present monetary status quo. Yet blaming them absolves the monetary regime, which is trampling upon the green shoots whose growth is essential for the renaissance of competitive free-market capitalism. If the United States had a good money regime when first the pandemic and then the Russian war struck the economy, the great monetary inflation that these shocks spawned would not have occurred. The current money regime might well have done better with more capable leadership and good luck—but the regime’s deep flaws prevented the possibility of an overall good outcome. Furthermore, even if the pandemic and war had not struck, the bad money regime was producing bad outcomes—including economic sclerosis with sluggish growth rates for productivity and living standards while advancing monopoly capitalism. These outcomes could well have gotten a lot worse.. This policy memo focuses on the shocks of the pandemic and war rather than what could have happened without them. However, it does venture into the counterfactual of how a good money regime would have responded to those shocks, while helping demonstrate what has gone wrong. Demonstrating the links between the rottenness of the monetary system and the high inflation during the pandemic and Russian war requires sharing with the reader a preview of the differences between good and bad money regimes. A broader analysis of these should follow in subsequent policy memos
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

39. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:: Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

40. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:: Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

41. Estados Unidos y África. Historia de una no-política

Author:: Pablo Rey-García and Pedro Rivas Nieto
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: En este artículo se estudian las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y África, desde los puntos de vista económico, político y de seguridad. Son, estos tres campos, interdependientes, pero a la vez enormemente dinámicos, tanto por la inercia política estadounidense, como por los condicionantes propios de África (déficit en desarrollo, pobreza, inseguridad o inestabilidad política) como por el contexto internacional. En este último aspecto, cobra especial relevancia la invasión rusa de Ucrania o la emergencia de la ambición militar China, pues ambos países compiten con Estados Unidos por tener una mejor posición en el continente africano.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, Economics, National Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Asia, North America, Sahel, United States of America, and Horn of Africa

42. Embedding Human Rights in European and US China Policy

Author:: Malin Oud
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Europe and the United States share an interest in promoting human rights in China but often struggle to affect change in this regard. Because of ineffective approaches and low political commitment, human rights are a marginalized issue in transatlantic China policy and an afterthought to commercial interests. European and US policymakers have attempted to compartmentalize their approach to China, keeping human rights separate from commercial and other interests. This does little to advance human rights, and it only seems to encourage more assertive and coercive behavior by China. During the last few years, the Western assumption that trade and foreign capital would transform China into a more open and democratic society has been replaced by a disillusioned realization that its rise as a superpower is reshaping the international order. Under President Xi Jinping, China has evolved from its previous position as rule-taker and status quo-keeper at the UN to become an assertive rule-maker and international norm entrepreneur. Its vulnerability to external pressure has declined while its power to exert pressure and economic coercion on others has increased. China no longer presents its political and economic model merely as different from but as superior to that of the liberal democracies in the West. For several years now, European and US policymakers have declared an “end of naivety” in relation to China. After years of debating how to make the EU more resilient and robust, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has “given birth to geopolitical Europe,” in the words of its chief diplomat, Josep Borrell. It remains to be seen whether this moment of clarity will translate into a more principled defense of human rights and investment in democratic resilience. For this to happen, there needs to be a broader reckoning with how Western countries for decades mishandled the authoritarian challenge to the international order, often because they were pursuing stronger economic ties with the same governments they now see as systemic rivals.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. Strategic Competition in the Financial Gray Zone

Author:: Heather A Conley, James Andrew Lewis, Eugenia Lostri, and Donatienne Ruy
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Over the past 10 years, the U.S. government has slowly reoriented its foreign and security policy from the fight against global terrorism toward strategic competition with Russia and China. This reorientation has been accompanied by a new examination of how strategic competition will impact the integrity and future stability of the U.S. economy and financial system. One of the most important elements of strategic competition is sub-threshold warfare (also called asymmetric, hybrid, or gray zone warfare), wherein strategic competitors seek to shape the geostrategic environment in their favor, from information operations to economic warfare—which includes such tools as illicit finance and strategic corruption. Strategic competitors present a clear economic and financial threat to the United States when they operate in the emerging financial gray zone, in which malign actors can take advantage of the U.S. financial system to further their aims and disarm the country internally. The U.S. government, along with its allies, has only begun to acknowledge the sweeping nature of the financial gray zone and to reposition itself to compete within it. Because adversaries exploit the seams between the internal and external policies and authorities, Washington must have greater insights into a complex operating system and better integrate data across the many relevant agencies—in a way, connecting the financial dots. As it develops this comprehensive picture, the U.S. government should develop stronger defensive and offensive policy tools to counter this emerging threat.
Topic:: Economics, Finance, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Regional Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

Author:: Matthew Goodman and Aidan Arasasingham
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is the Biden administration’s answer to questions about the United States’ economic commitment to the vital Indo-Pacific region. For this initiative to succeed, it must address concerns among regional partners about the framework’s form, function, benefits, inclusivity, and durability. Based on conversations with representatives from over a dozen regional governments, this brief summarizes Indo-Pacific perspectives on the IPEF.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

45. Trump ended WTO dispute settlement. Trade remedies are needed to fix it.

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China’s exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China’s economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Donald Trump, and WTO
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

46. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:: David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:: Economics, Political Economy, Public Opinion, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. South Korea's Critical Moment in Digital Currency Policymaking: Between Regulating Cryptocurrencies and Launching a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

Author:: June Park
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Why is South Korea pilot-testing its Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), and what made it shift from non-issuance to consideration? This paper investigates the Bank of Korea (BOK)’s CBDC-related developments amid the geopolitical contest between the U.S. and China. It examines the Moon Jae-in administration’s defiance of decentralized finance (DeFi) and the BOK’s sudden shift from non-issuance to potential issuance, which led to expedited research, development, and pilot-testing of CBDCs. As in the case of the digital yuan, the BOK envisions a hybrid architecture for the digital won, wherein central banks and associated partner institutions are CBDC distributors, though they are distinguished by placing the digital won on distributed ledger technology rather than by centrally controlling it. However, South Korea’s previously rash decision to forego DeFi under an undemocratic process has deprived the country of the time and opportunity to develop new innovations as a leading country in the digital frontier. By sticking only to digitalizing centralized finance, the country now aims to be in “standby” mode for its CBDC launch if and when required, so as not to fall behind in digital financial architecture. This paper scrutinizes the South Korean government’s moves on crypto and CBDCs and argues that 1) the Moon administration has shown incapability in addressing DeFi amid the crypto boom and bust, and 2) the BOK’s shift from non-issuance to potential issuance of the digital won is driven by its interest to uphold central bank independence amid swaying geopolitics between the U.S. and China and an unpredictable upcoming presidential election in South Korea.
Topic:: Economics, Elections, Finance, Cryptocurrencies, and Digital Currency
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

48. Sanctions, Economic Statecraft, and Venezuela’s Crisis

Author:: César Rodríguez
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:: This case study summarizes the evidence on the effect on Venezuela’s economic and social conditions of economic sanctions and other actions of economic statecraft taken by the United States and its allies in response to the country’s political crisis. The preponderance of evidence indicates that sanctions and other statecraft measures—including the formal recognition of a government with no de facto control over the territory—have had a strong and significant negative effect on the Venezuelan economy. These actions have made a sizable contribution to declining oil production, exacerbating the country’s fiscal crisis, and contributing to one of the largest documented peacetime economic contractions in modern history. Many arguments commonly voiced to dispute the effects of sanctions, such as those that appeal to temporal precedence of other causes of the country’s crisis, are either factually incorrect or premised on fallacious logic. Reforming the sanctions regime will be a complex task, given the interaction with other statecraft measures and a broader toxification of the country’s economic relations. Reform attempts should include the introduction of an oil-for-essentials program, support for political humanitarian agreements, issuance of clearer compliance guidelines, introducing an explicit differentiation between strategic and nonstrategic sanctions, and seeking multilateral alignment with international actors on key strategic issues including that of government recognition.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

49. Unfair Trade or Unfair Protection? The Evolution and Abuse of Section 301

Author:: Scott Lincicome, Inu Manak, and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the U.S. trade representative (USTR) broad authority to investigate “unfair” foreign trade policies allegedly harming American companies and to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions to achieve the removal of those policies. The statute was a common tool of U.S. trade policy from the 1980s to the 1990s, authorizing the USTR to conduct almost 100 different investigations during that period. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995, however, the USTR has used Section 301 infrequently and almost exclusively to initiate or implement WTO dispute settlement actions—actions that, per WTO rules, were supposed to supplant the kinds of unilateral trade actions once applied under the law. The Trump administration departed from this long‐standing U.S. practice and took advantage of Section 301’s flaws to circumvent the WTO and enact unilateral tariffs against multiple U.S. trading partners, imposing significant economic and geopolitical costs along the way. This paper examines the Trump administration’s actions in historical context, evaluates how the law was stretched beyond its intended purpose in direct contravention of the United States’ WTO obligations, and offers practical reforms to prevent future abuse.
Topic:: Economics, Legislation, Trade, Protectionism, and WTO
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

50. The State of the Creator Economy – Assessing the economic, societal, and cultural impact of YouTube in the US in 2021

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: This study presents an updated assessment of YouTube’s contribution to US GDP and employment, and its broader impact on society and culture.
Topic:: Economics, Mass Media, Employment, Social Media, and YouTube
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS