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1. Digital Futures for Europe

Author:
Meelis Kitsing
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
There isn’t one model for success in the digital future; there are many. Europe is now debating what policies that could help to power entrepreneurship and growth in Europe’s economy, and some are arguing that Europe should make itself technologically sovereign – independent from the big platforms from the US. This is not the right approach – partly because there cannot be just one model applied in Europe if it is to become more successful in technology and competitiveness. This briefing paper argues that is far more important for Europe to create a better environment for companies to experiment and discover with new business models, and to learn from the past platform success while they do so. That requires a much greater space for entrepreneurship and that the EU and national governments stay away from excessive regulations that strain new business growth. Europe can be a powerful region that shapes rules and standards globally – “the Brussels effect”. But that isn’t the future for Europe if it ensnares entrepreneurs in red tape – “the Brussels defect”.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Digital Economy, Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

2. Risk Shocks and Divergence between the Euro Area and the US in the aftermath of the Great Recession

Author:
Thomas Brand and Fabien Tripier
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Highly synchronized during the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the Euro area and the US have diverged in the period that followed. To explain this divergence, we provide a structural interpretation of these episodes through the estimation for both economies of a business cycle model with financial frictions and risk shocks, measured as the volatility of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the financial sector. Our results show that risk shocks have stimulated US growth in the aftermath of the Great Recession and have been the main driver of the double-dip recession in the Euro area. They play a positive role in the Euro area only after 2015. Risk shocks therefore seem well suited to account for the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the subsequent positive effects of unconventional monetary policies, notably the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme (APP).
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, Global Recession, Finance, Europe Union, Economic Growth, and Risk
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

3. Work for Others, not Yourself: Globalization, Protectionism and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Protectionism and mercantilism are yet again at the centre of global economic policy. “America First” is the guiding ethos in a good part of US international economic policy. Beijing is taking a larger stake in China’s economy and hand out privileges to domestic firms. Europe is increasingly occupied by achieving “strategic autonomy” and to create European champions at the expense of competition. Old and disreputed economic doctrines are getting a new lease on life. Behind this new orientation in international economic policy stands the old idea that a strong economy is an economy not dependent on others. Human prosperity – our story of rags to riches – tells a very different story. Prosperity is generated when people collaborate and improve our collective intelligence. Open economies are much better at creating wealth because they operate by the principle that people should work for others, not themselves. They specialize – and in the process, they get far more dependent on others. Dependency is a factor of success; economic sovereignty is a sure way of depriving people of opportunity and prosperity.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

4. The Tragedy of International Organizations in a World Order in Turmoil

Author:
Jean-Jacques Hallaert
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
China’s rise and the U.S. response to the perceived threat it represents to its predominance jeopardize the world order and affect international institutions. The paralysis of the WTO and the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO are the most visible examples, but not the only ones. This article presents the case of the International Monetary Fund. Quotas are the cornerstone of IMF governance. They determine each member’s contribution to the institution’s resources and their voting power. As the world evolves, the quota distribution needs to be adjusted. Adjustments in quota shares and thus voting powers have always been politically difficult. However, they were possible. In the early 1990s, members agreed to an increase in the representation of Japan. In the 2000s, they agreed to increase substantially the voting power of emerging economies. In contrast, the 15th General Review of Quotas concluded early 2020, failed to increase and realign quotas. The proximate cause for this was the opposition of the United States to a change in quotas. This paper argues that the U.S. decision was in large part motivated to prevent an increased influence of China. The failure to increase and realign voting powers may have long-lasting consequences. In the absence of a quota increase, the IMF will need to continue to rely on borrowed resources to avoid a drop in its lending capacity. This extension of the “temporary” recourse to borrowed resources undermines the governance of the Fund as voting powers (which are not linked to borrowed resources but only to quotas) are disconnected from member’s total contributions to the Fund and to their economic weight. This may trigger a new legitimacy crisis and provide incentives for countries like China to support the development of new and competing institutions which would better represent their interests and economic weight. Such a development would undermine the complex and fragile international financial architecture.
Topic:
International Organization, International Political Economy, Governance, IMF, and WTO
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Global Focus

5. Learning to Love Trade Again

Author:
Frank Lavin and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
We are at the moment, the first in seventy-five years, where there is no international consensus in support of trade. Indeed, trade is unloved, unsupported, and even unwanted. There is no shortage of topics in the rhetoric of trade complaints: from the rapid rise of China to Coronavirus as a metaphor for the evils of greater connectivity. Regardless of the validity of these complaints, none of them negate the central truth of trade: countries that engage in trade move ahead, and those that do not, stagnate. Our political leaders disagree. Anti-trade positions are held by leaders across the political spectrum, from Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders. And yet, the public is increasingly warm to the idea of trade. When Gallup asks Americans, “Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?” a record high of 79% see trade as an opportunity, with 18% viewing it as a threat. How did the world arrive at this moment where the benefits of trade are clearly evidenced while trade has become politically toxic? We identify four main factors: (i) U.S. absenteeism from the leadership role; (ii) detachment between trade and security architecture; (iii) no alternative leadership in Europe or elsewhere; and (iv) the cumbersome WTO process. Against this background we put forward five initiatives that will be big enough to count but unobjectionable enough to be adopted. The Big Three. The U.S., EU, and Japan, should establish a consultative body on trade to forge a new approach that allows trade to move ahead in the absence of universal consensus. No harm, no foul. Each of the Big Three should commit to zero tariffs on any item not produced in each particular market. A de minimis strategy. Tariffs should be eliminated on all products where the current tariff is less than 2%. At that level tariffs are simply a nuisance fee. Mind the social costs. Expand the Nairobi Protocols to include health products and green tech. Scrapping import tariffs on medical and green goods would not only encourage additional trade but will also provide health and environmental benefits. Harmonize down. The Big Three should commit that on every tariff line each of the three will be no worse than the next worse. In other words, each of the Big Three will agree to reduce its tariff on every product where it has the highest tariff of the three. These actions will spur the WTO, not undermine it. The measures we propose can be set up on a plurilateral basis that would allow other trading powers to participate. By breaking away from the tyranny of universal consensus, these actions will encourage the trading community – including the WTO – to get back in forward motion. In some respect, convergence between the Big Three is already happening. The EU and Japan signed an FTA that lowers import tariffs between these two economies, while the U.S. and Japan agreed to negotiate a comprehensive FTA. And if China is willing to step up? China should be welcomed into this group if it supports the four initiatives, changing the Big Three to the Big Four.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Global Focus

6. Europe’s Quest for Technology Sovereignty: Opportunities and Pitfalls

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Covid-19 and its broader implications have highlighted the importance of Europe’s digital transformation to ensure Europeans’ social and economic well-being. It provides important new learnings about Europe’s quest for “technology sovereignty”. While the debate about technology sovereignty is timely, the precise meaning of sovereignty or autonomy in the realm of technologies remains ambiguous. It should be noted that the political discussions about European technology sovereignty emerged far before the outbreak of the Coronavirus. The European Commission’s recently updated industrial and digital policy strategies “institutionalised” different notions of sovereignty, reflecting perceptions that more EU action is needed to defend perceived European values and to secure Europe’s industrial competitiveness. Often the political rhetoric reflected perceptions that Europe is losing global economic clout and geopolitical influence. It was said that dependency on technological solutions, often originating abroad, would require a European industrial and regulatory response. Against this background, the Corona crisis provides two important lessons for EU technology policymaking. Firstly, during the crisis digital technologies and solutions made European citizens stronger. Technology kept Europe open for business despite the lock-down by enabling Europeans to work from home, receive essential home deliveries, home schooling, online deliveries and to use online payments, etc. In addition, Europe’s citizens became more sovereign with respect to accessing information and data that helped track and contain the spread of the virus. Secondly, the crisis tested Europe’s resilience and perceived dependency on (foreign) technology solutions. Early developments indicate that Member States’ homemade solutions did not fare better than existing European and international solutions. A few national and EU IT solutions failed while existing European and global solutions, from cloud infrastructure to communications, payments to streaming services, all continued to work well. Politically, however, the crisis could be used to justify more EU or national government interference in Europe’s digital transformation. Indeed, for some the debate about European technology sovereignty is largely about designing prescriptive policies, which paradoxically risk reducing Europeans’ access to the innovative technologies, products and services that helped Europe through the crisis. Policies taken into consideration include new subsidies to politically picked companies, or new rules and obligations for certain online business models. Policy-makers advocating for such policies tend to ignore critical insights from the Covid-19 crisis and failed industrial policy initiatives, including sunk public investments and protracted subsidies for industrial laggards. In a time of economic hardship, the EU and national governments should be wary of spending even more taxpayer money to replicate existing world-class technology solutions, that in most cases are used in combination with local technologies, with “Made in EU” services of inferior quality and reliability. Moreover, due to different levels of economic development and differences in regulatory cultures, prescriptive technology policies would exclude many Member States from utilising existing and new opportunities that arise from digitalisation, slowing down economic renewal and convergence. The EU cannot be considered a monolithic block that thrives on a unique set of prescriptive technology policies. Before the Corona pandemic, initiatives towards European technology sovereignty were mainly pushed by France and Germany, fed by concerns over their companies’ industrial strength in times of growing economic and geopolitical competition. Industrial and technology policies favoured by the EU’s two largest countries will have a disproportionately negative impact on Europe’s smaller open economies, whose companies and citizens could be deprived from cutting-edge technologies, new economic opportunities and partnerships on global markets, undermining these economies’ development and international competitiveness. Any EU-imposed technology protectionism along the lines suggested by some policy-makers in large EU Member States would leave the entire EU worse off. It would disproportionately hurt countries in Europe’s northern, eastern and southern countries more than the large countries whose economies are generally more diverse than Europe’s smaller Member States. It would, however, make sense for the EU to agree on a shared definition of “technology sovereignty”. Different interpretations could cause serious policy inconsistencies, undermining the effectiveness of EU and national economic policies. Anchored in technological openness, technology sovereignty can indeed be a useful ambition to let Europe’s highly diverse economies leapfrog by using existing technologies. To become more sovereign in a global economy, Europeans need to focus on becoming global leaders in economic innovation – not just in regulation. If anchored in mercantilist or protectionist ideas, technological sovereignty would make it harder for many Member States to access modern technologies, adopt new business models and attract foreign investment – with adverse implications on future global competitiveness, economic renewal and economic convergence. Policymaking towards a European technology sovereignty that benefits the greatest number of Europeans – not just a few politically selected “winners” – should aim for a regulatory environment in which technology companies and technology adopters can thrive across EU Member States’ national borders. The European Single Market has deteriorated in recent years and significantly during the crisis. The new von der Leyen Commission has now repeatedly called for a strengthening of the Single Market. Becoming a world leader in innovation requires a real Single Market in which companies can scale up, with as few hurdles as possible, and then compete globally. It should be supplemented by pro-competitive policies and incentives for research and investment. Brussels cannot set the global standards in technology policymaking alone. Europe’s policy-makers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 or the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. International cooperation should be extended beyond trade to include cooperation on technology policies, e.g. artificial intelligence. Regulatory cooperation with allies such as the USA is essential to jointly set global standards that are based on shared values. Both the EU and the US have much more to gain if they prioritise such alignment, to advance a shared vision for a revamped open international trading system, in a world increasingly influenced by regimes with fundamentally different views on state intervention and human rights. Anchored in technological openness, the EU and the US can promote technology sovereignty that allows for development and renewal elsewhere in the world.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, International Political Economy, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

7. Global giants and local stars: How changes in brand ownership affect competition

Author:
Vanessa Alviarez, Keith Head, and Thierry Mayer
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We assess the consequences for consumers in 76 countries of multinational acquisitions in beer and spirits. Outcomes depend on how changes in ownership affect markups versus efficiency. We find that owner fixed effects contribute very little to the performance of brands. On average, foreign ownership tends to raise costs and lower appeal. Using the estimated model, we simulate the consequences of counterfactual national merger regulation. The US beer price index would have been 4-7% higher without divestitures. Up to 30% savings could have been obtained in Latin America by emulating the pro-competition policies of the US and EU.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, and Multinational Corporations
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Latin America, and Global Focus

8. Corporate tax avoidance and industry concentration

Author:
Farid Toubal, Mathieu Parenti, and Julien Martin
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
This paper argues that tax avoidance by large corporations has contributed to the 25% increase in concentration among U.S. firms since the mid-1990s. Corporate tax avoidance gives large firms a competitive edge, which translates into larger market shares and an increase in the granularity of the economy. We develop IV and difference-in-differences strategies that show the causal impact of tax avoidance on firm-level sales. Had firms not resorted to tax avoidance in 2017, our results imply that the average industry concentration would have been 8.3% lower, which is around its early 2000 level.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Markets, Tax Systems, Corporations, Tax Evasion, and Corporate Tax
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

9. The dynamic impact of FX interventions on financial markets

Author:
Lukas Menkhoff, Malte Rieth, and Tobias Stöhr
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Evidence on the effectiveness of FX interventions in the prevailing higher frequency approaches leaves a gap at horizons going beyond a few days. This is addressed by identifying a structural vector autoregressive model for the daily frequency with an external instrument. Using Japanese data, we find that FX interventions significantly affect exchange rates, although the effect is smaller than in emerging markets, and this impact persists for up to a year. There is no major effect on interest rates, but stock prices increase in line with currency devaluation, in particular those of large (exporting) firms. The results qualitatively hold for US and UK interventions.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Exports, Data, and Models
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and United Kingdom

10. The US–China trade deal and its impact on China’s key trading partners

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry and Gabriel Felbermayr
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The US–China Economic and Trade Agreement (ETA) entered into force on 14th February 2020, marking a new phase in their protracted trade and geopolitical rivalry. The ETA includes specific targets for increased Chinese imports of US goods and services, amounting to 200 bn USD over 2020 and 2021. The authors show that these purchase commitments can generate substantial trade diversion effects and market share shifts for China’s top trading partners. In manufacturing, Germany is likely to experience the greatest trade diversion effects in a number of industries such as vehicles (-1.28 bn USD), aircraft (-1.59 bn USD) and industrial machinery (-0.72 bn USD). Moreover, developing countries will be hit if China re-directs its imports towards US suppliers. E.g. Brazil could experience a reduction of 4.95 bn USD in soybeans exports to China in 2021 as a result of the ETA.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exports, Trade, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:
United States and China

11. Restraining Ourselves: Helping by Not Hurting

Author:
Nathan Nunn
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
In this brief, I discuss the current state of economic development policy, which tends to focus on interventions, usually funded with foreign aid, that are aimed at fixing deficiencies in developing countries. The general perception is that there are inherent problems with less-developed countries that can be fixed by with the help of the Western world. I discuss evidence that shows that the effects of such ‘help’ can be mixed. While foreign aid can improve things, it can also make things worse. In addition, at the same time that this ‘help’ is being offered, the developed West regularly undertakes actions that are harmful to developing countries. Examples include tariffs, antidumping duties, restrictions on international labor mobility, the use of international power and coercion, and tied-aid used for export promotion. Overall, it is unclear whether interactions with the West are, on the whole, helpful or detrimental to developing countries. We may have our largest and most positive effects on alleviating global poverty if we focus on restraining ourselves from actively harming less-developed countries rather than focusing our efforts on fixing them.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Political Economy, Developing World, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

12. Flattening the Pandemic and Recession Curves

Author:
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
In the short run, the capacity of any country’s health system is finite (capacity of Intensive Care Units, number of hospital beds, number of skilled health professionals, ventilators….). This puts an upper bound on the number of patients that can be properly treated, at any given point in time and is represented by the flat line in the Figure. Unchecked, and given what we know of the transmission rate of the coronavirus, the pandemic would quickly overwhelm any health system, leaving many infected patients with deteriorating pulmonary conditions without any treatment. The fatality rate would surge. The threat is almost beyond comprehension. With a 2% case fatality rate baseline for overwhelmed health systems, and 50% of the world population infected, 1% of the world population -76 million people- would die. This scenario corresponds to the red curve in Figure 1. The part of the curve above the capacity of the health care system faces a sharply higher mortality risk (shaded red area).
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Health Care Policy, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
United States

13. Coronavirus and Managing Your Organization’s Response

Author:
Anton Korinek
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Organizations around the world are working through how to respond to the novel coronavirus, posing one of the greatest challenges to leaders in a long time. Do they restrict travel? Doing so would have substantial financial implication, make months of preparation worthless and lower the morale of many stakeholders who enjoy travel. However, travel is what brought the coronavirus to the country in the first place — and what continues to spread it to new communities within the country. What about instituting remote work procedures? In-person meetings and events may be a critical part of an organization’s activities and an important part of the value it offers. Perhaps there are no known cases of the virus in a given community. However, once it does gain a foothold, social distancing is the only way to slow the spread. Carriers of the virus may unwittingly spread it for days before symptoms manifest themselves. Above all, one of the greatest challenges is to balance an organization’s economic concerns with the question of what is ethically the best course of action.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

14. Shooting Oneself in the Foot? Trade War and Global Value Chains

Author:
Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Despite the “Phase One Deal” agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
United States and China

15. The Exorbitant Privilege of High Tax Countries

Author:
Vincent Vicard
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
The well documented US excess returns on its net foreign assets is no exception at the world level. Excess returns on foreign assets owe largely to yield differential within the FDI asset class and are correlated to the corporate tax rate for a large sample of countries, consistently with tax motivated profit shifting by multinational corporations. Using French firm level data on dividends and reinvested earnings from foreign affiliates, I provide evidence and quantify the impact of corporate tax avoidance on international asset returns. Profit shifting inflates the investment income balance and accounts for the average 2 percentage points return differential between French FDI assets and liabilities. Missing profts in France, estimated at €36 billions or 1.6% of GDP in 2015, are mostly shifted to EU countries.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, European Union, GDP, Tax Systems, Profit, and Corporate Tax
Political Geography:
United States and France

16. A Fistful of Dollars? Foreign Sales Platforms and Profit Shifting in Tax Havens

Author:
Sébastien Laffitte and Farid Toubal
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using public macro-level data on activities of multinationals, we document that U.S. firms geographically disconnect sales and production to avoid paying corporate taxes. We revisit both theoretically and empirically the location determinants of foreign platforms and show that market access motives are far less relevant when considering tax havens. We characterize these countries and shed light on the attractiveness of different tax havens for specific sectors of activity. Our quantification shows that profit shifting by foreign sales platforms in tax havens amounts to about $80bn in 2013. Our findings contribute to the recent policy debate on the reform of international taxation.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Global Political Economy, Multinational Corporations, Tax Systems, and Corporate Tax
Political Geography:
United States