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2. Multipolarity After Ukraine: Old Wine in New Bottles?
- Author:
- Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- One year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has exacerbated the rift between Russia and the “collective West”. While Western governments have been steadfast in punishing Russia for the invasion, other countries around the world have been more ambiguous, at times even choosing to side with Moscow politically or economically. These dynamics have revived the idea of a shift towards multipolarity along an anti-Western trajectory. Are we really heading in that direction? Are we facing increasing fragmentation due to the war or a re-consolidation of longstanding alliances? What principles underlie the formation of these blocs? What are the consequences of these dynamics for global security and the global economy? This Report aims to shed light on these questions, while also outlining the war’s possible future implications for the Russian Federation, the “West”, and the international order.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Economy, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
3. After Ostpolitik: A New Russia and Eastern Europe Policy Based on Lessons from the Past
- Author:
- Stefan Meister and Wilfried Jilge
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The large-scale Russian war of aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 demonstrates both the failure of Germany’s cooperative Ostpolitik of the last 30 years and the need for energy policy disentanglement. Russia has become the greatest security risk in Europe. To safeguard national and European security, Germany’s ruling coalition must learn lessons from the past, initiate a radical new beginning in Germany’s policy on Russia and Eastern Europe, and assume a leadership role in Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Governance, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Central Asia, and Ukraine
4. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy
- Author:
- Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
5. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security
- Author:
- Timo R. Stewart
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
- Topic:
- Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
6. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine
- Author:
- Igor Gretskiy
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
7. The War as an Accelerator
- Author:
- András Tóth-Czifra
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine laid bare the problems with Russia’s domestic governance. The war caught the federal and regional governments unprepared and exacerbated existing bottlenecks in fields such as infrastructure and state capacity. Even before 2022, Russia’s domestic policymaking had prioritized the short-term political interests of a shrinking ruling class and made long-term thinking and deep structural reforms impossible. The invasion completely eliminated long-term policy planning and subordinated policymaking to war aims. One year after the invasion, these problems are causing frictions and elevating domestic political risks for the Kremlin. The botched invasion and subsequent economic sanctions have caused irreversible losses and put significant upfront costs on the Russian state. This stretches Russia’s peculiar, highly centralized system of fiscal and political governance to its limits. In particular, the interlocking challenges of reorienting trade towards Asia without the necessary infrastructure in place, improving an inflexible multi-level public administration system, and turning Russia into a digital securocracy, show how, by starting the invasion, Russia’s rulers contributed to the destabilization of their own country. They also demonstrate how international sanctions impact Russia by increasing domestic risk factors from the Kremlin’s point of view.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Governance, Trade, Domestic Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine
8. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine
- Author:
- Joanna Hosa
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic
9. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly
- Author:
- Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
- Abstract:
- Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
10. How have sanctions impacted Russia?
- Author:
- Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
- Topic:
- Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
11. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?
- Author:
- Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
- Topic:
- Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
12. Different Choices, Divergent Paths: Poland and Ukraine
- Author:
- Thorvaldur Gylfason, Eduard Hochreiter, and Tadeusz Kowalski
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- We compare the economic growth trajectories of Poland and Ukraine since 1990 to try to understand the extent to which the observed growth differentials can be traced to increased efficiency in the use of capital and other factors (intensive growth), rather than to simple accumulation of capital (extensive growth). We stress the role of qualitative factors such as education, governance and institutions. We ask whether the EU perspective and NATO membership played a role. We discuss the closely related histories of the two countries and note the stark differences between them, including their different approaches to the EU vs Russia, full vs incomplete transition to a market economy, and democracy vs anocracy, as well as different initial conditions. We compare key determinants of growth and growth trajectories, using economic as well as social indicators, and trying to disentangle efficiency and accumulation and combine path dependence and the role and scope of creative destruction. While Poland had the shortest and mildest transformation recession among CEE countries, Ukraine has been stagnant, or in decline, since 1990. The statistics we report and the stories we tell suggest that both countries have a complex relationship with democracy and that the nearly threefold difference in per capita GDP at PPP in 2021 in Poland’s favour, with the ratio of investment to GDP similar in both countries, can most plausibly be traced to: (a) Poland’s more extensive and diversified exports, and fewer restrictions on trade, in addition to more comprehensive and quicker restructuring of the national economy inspired by the EU perspective; (b) Poland’s more extensive and better-quality education; (c) Poland’s greater democracy and longer experience of democracy, lower levels of corruption, better governance, and freer press; (d) Poland’s smaller agricultural sector and greater emphasis on manufacturing; and (e) Poland’s lower inflation and higher level of financial development. Furthermore, Poland built market-friendly institutions to EU specifications and joined NATO. Against all this, Ukraine had more economic equality and lower unemployment as well as, from the early 1990s, a lower initial level of income per person, but was hampered by political divisions, path-dependent corruption and poor governance. During the global Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine apparently suffered fewer deaths than Poland, despite fewer vaccinations.
- Topic:
- Economics, Education, Governance, Reform, European Union, Economic Growth, Inflation, Exports, Transition, and Labor Market
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Poland
13. Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine
- Author:
- Saleem H. Ali
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- A key stumbling point in trying to chart a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine has been an inability of both sides to consider hybrid solutions that recognize resource interdependencies that could benefit either side. Such a pragmatic view would not undermine American or Western principles and lead to a more durable peace agreement. The peace process in the Russian-Georgian War and the governance mechanism set up for the autonomous region of Adjara provide useful examples in this regard. Science diplomacy, particularly in the Arctic, could be a useful “ice-breaker” between Russia and the West, and the climate crisis makes such interaction even more urgent.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Governance, Peace, Ecology, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine
14. Ukraine Cybersecurity Governance Assessment
- Author:
- Natalia Spinu
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
- Abstract:
- This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity: the legislative framework, and key national actors in cybersecurity. It describes the main cybersecurity threats in Ukraine and the needs arising from its national security objectives. The present assessment paper describes the normative and legislative framework of the Ukraine, which covers the main aspects of information security and ensures a level of national security of the population, while mentioning the main objectives of the national cybersecurity strategy as well as the main actors and stakeholders in the national cybersecurity.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Governance, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
15. The Eastern Partnership: Three dilemmas in a time of troubles
- Author:
- Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- In early 2021 a new Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit will take place between the European Union and the six countries in its eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After over a decade, the ambitious objectives of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy to deliver ‘stability, security and prosperity’ to the region remain far from reality. Democratization and good governance reforms have been stalled by vested interests in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, while Azerbaijan and Belarus have remained outright autocratic, and the latter faces sustained domestic protests. The EaP faces geopolitical pushback by an increasingly assertive Russian Federation and the region is further affected by multiple protracted and ongoing conflicts, including the recent bitter war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But despite its shortcomings, the EaP is not without successes, especially but not only in the economic sphere. The EU has also managed to keep the door open for conversation, spurred lower-level reform and provided civil society support. As such, the EaP has an important role to play in the policy of the Netherlands towards the region, especially in light of recent requests by the Dutch Parliament to formulate an Eastern Europe strategy. But many thorny questions remain in the run-up to the summit. This report assesses three policy dilemmas that need to be considered by the Netherlands and the European Union in order to make the EaP more effective. First, the EU needs to reconcile its geopolitical interests with its normative aspirations. Second, the added value of the EaP’s multilateral track should be deliberated with consideration of the differentiation in bilateral relations with EaP countries. Third, the EU will need to consider how to deal with protracted conflicts, hybrid threats, and other security challenges in the EaP region.
- Topic:
- Democratization, Governance, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus