Political Geography: Russia - CIAO Search Results

1. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:: Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

2. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:: Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:: Michele Nones
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:: Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:: NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

6. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:: George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

7. The South Caucasus and Great Power Confrontation: Is There a Silver Lining on the Horizon?

Author:: Gulshan Pashayeva
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The onset of the present stage in the conflict over Ukraine in February 2022 further heightened an already tense geopolitical standoff. Although this war has now entered into its third year, there is no clear sign that a peaceful settlement could be within reach. Rather, each passing day makes the situation more complicated and drags both sides towards a dead end in which neither one nor the other of the two direct belligerents is likely to emerge better off than each was before the full-scale fighting began again in earnest. Today, this war in which two major geopolitical actors—the West and Russia—have become trapped is also having an impact on other regions around the globe. The European Union is one, obviously: its ambitions to achieve geopolitical autonomy (at least within the West, as a distinct pole), for instance, have been set back, and Brussels has had to scramble mightily to reconfigure the terms of its energy security. Another is the Silk Road region in general, and the South Caucasus in particular. This essay will examine the latest developments in this latter area through an inquiry into whether (and how) the evolving geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia affects that part of the world. It will culminate with a consideration of whether there is any silver lining that could result from this situation, whereby the South Caucasus could become a politically and economically united region in the time ahead.
Topic:: Power Politics, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Balkans, Georgia, and South Caucasus

8. Pivotal States, Not Swing States

Author:: Mohammed Soliman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The United States, in particular, is grappling with the challenges posed by the emerging multipolar order and the need to secure a favorable position in this evolving global landscape. As part of this contemplation, there is a growing recognition of the significance of “swing states” like India, Türkiye, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia in shaping the outcome of the postCold War order and the broader global system. However, framing these consequential states as “swing states” in and of itself carries significant risk, as it implies that the only choice they have is a binary one: pick the U.S.-led West or the China and Russia axis. In reality, their strategic posture is far away from choosing one side over the other; at the same time, they are not behaving similarly to the Cold War-era non-aligned movement that was inherently anti-Western and leaned towards the Soviet-led block under the disguise of anti-colonialism solidarity. The appropriate strategic name for this growing list of countries in the present-day is “pivotal states,” and includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, chosen for their strategic geography, demography, and overall strength. Alongside these, there are other pivotal states with unique roles, such as Vietnam due to its position in the global supply chain and Egypt as a maritime bottleneck between the East and West. It is now widely acknowledged that international stability and the outcome of the U.S.-China neoCold War are influenced by factors beyond the behavior of Russia and China. But one crucial factor that remains underappreciated is that the behavior of pivotal states— which are determined to chart an independent course—will play vital roles in shaping the future of the international system. It is essential to recognize that these pivotal states inherently reject the bipolarity and “Cold War 2.0” framing that dominates the perspectives of, for example, Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

9. Armenia’s Critical Economic Reliance on Russia: Can the West Eliminate It?

Author:: Orkhan Baghirov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Lately one of the most discussed political issues related to the South Caucasus region is Armenia’s attempt to incline towards the West by trying to move away from Russia’s sphere of influence. This has been manifested both geopolitically and geoeconomically. However, Armenia’s potential strategic shift away from its centuries-old political alignment with Russia raises questions about the future of the overall relationship between the two countries. A key concern revolves around the challenges Armenia may face due to its significant economic dependence on Russia. For such a shift to occur successfully, Armenia would have to not only strengthen its political and security ties with the West, but also develop the ability to replace Russia with Western partners in key economic sectors. Thus, the primary objective of the essay is to assess the degree to which Armenia could economically substitute Russia with the West, determining the feasibility of this transition. To achieve this, we should identify the critical level of Armenia’s reliance on Russia across diverse economic sectors and assess the extent to which the West can mitigate this dependency in anything resembling a realistic timeframe, without, that is, critically endangering Armenia’s economic wellbeing.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, and South Caucasus

10. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?

Author:: Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

11. The Regional Security Complex Theory and Energy Triangle of EU-TurkeyRussia

Author:: Mehmet Ferhat Fırat
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This study explores the application of the regional security complex theory (RCST) to the energy relations between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. It underscores the critical role of energy security in shaping international relations and highlights the mutual interdependence among these actors in the energy issue. The study sheds light on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on energy security and emphasizes the need for diversification of energy sources to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. Turkey's active and neutral policy with Russia has formed a security complex in energy relations among these three actors. The claim that shared concerns or threat perceptions among actors assumed by the regional security complex theory constitutes a security complex has been used within the framework of this study to justify the existence of an energy security complex between Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Furthermore, given its strategic geographical position and energy infrastructure projects, this research outlines Turkey's potential as a critical isolator actor and energy hub in the region. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of energy relations and the evolving regional energy security landscape in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Security, Energy Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Turkey

12. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:: Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

13. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:: Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:: NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

14. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
Topic:: Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:: Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

16. India-Russia Relations in Troubled Times: Steady but Stagnating

Author:: Aleksei Zakharov
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the trajectory of India-Russia relations post-February 2022. The war in Ukraine emerged as a significant challenge for bilateral ties, presenting new obstacles to political and diplomatic relations and intensifying the previous difficulties in developing economic cooperation. Moscow and New Delhi have demonstrated divergent approaches to the advancement of their strategic partnership. While Russia has rushed into reinventing the old friendship with India, the latter has acted with greater discretion. New Delhi has demonstrated a nuanced approach to navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, staying on good terms with Moscow and the West. India’s record imports of Russian crude and other commodities, at times in defiance of Western sanctions, have allowed for a considerable boost in bilateral trade. While this “oil connection” may benefit both the Indian and Russian economies, it should not be misperceived as a leap forward in partnership. The structural challenges appear to still prevent the two sides from reinvigorating the economic ties. Furthermore, their geopolitical understanding is waning, and their defense cooperation is currently in a state of limbo. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, India seems to be prioritizing maintaining the status quo in its relationship with Russia over pursuing new initiatives. This may help to prevent the two sides from drifting apart too far in the near term but is unlikely to lead to any substantive progress in their relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, and India

17. Friends in Need: Russian Strategic Communications in Africa Before and After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Christopher Babcock
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Africa is becoming an important strategic hub for the Russian state as Putin’s regime faces rising ostracization elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze Russian influence in Africa by examining over 1,700 pieces of online content created or re-posted by 4 Russian embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania between January 15 and December 31, 2022. I demonstrate that, despite new developments in Russian strategic communications, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has mostly fed pre-existing narratives rather than drastically shifting the focus or direction of state rhetoric. All four of the embassies used in the analysis promoted narratives that depicted Russia as a revisionist power going up against a “neocolonial” West, portrayed Ukraine as a neo-Nazi puppet of the West, and attempted to contrast this with Russia’s purportedly friendly relations with Africa. The scale and intensity of these narratives exploded in the leadup to and in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine—to the extent that some embassies began to focus almost exclusively on Ukraine in their communications. Meanwhile, many African nations were willing to pragmatically engage with Russia as an alternative (or complementary) ally to the West. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I show that the war in Ukraine has revealed the fault lines of Russian and African thinking, loyalty, and strategy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Engagement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:: Russia and Africa

18. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

19. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:: Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

20. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

21. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:: Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

22. The Realist debate in the context of the War in Ukraine: balancing dynamics, international change and strategic calculus

Author:: Layla Ibrahim Abdallah Dawood and Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The article discusses Mearsheimer’s interpretation of Russia’s use of force against Ukraine based on concepts and categories of Offensive Realism. It is argued that external balancing lost its place during unipolarity. However, Russian internal balancing is one of the factors that enabled the current conflict, and Russia’s rapprochement with China diminishes the prospects for conflict in Asia, allowing Russian military efforts to be concentrated in the European theater. Additionally, the decision to use force will be analyzed in its strategic dimension. It is concluded that Russia’s activities against Ukraine are entirely consistent with Offensive Realism, despite of Mearsheimer’s allegations contrarywise.
Topic:: International Relations, Realism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

24. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:: Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

25. Russia’s Influence and Disinformation Campaign in Armenia

Author:: David A. Grigorian
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Often-overlooked developments in Armenia show how Western policy makers are failing to recognize and counteract the growing sophistication of Russia’s propaganda machine. There is much the West can do. Intelligence authorities can start sharing more information about Russia’s influence operations. We need media that can report with more knowledge from the region. Working more closely with the pro-Western opposition, Brussels and Washington, D.C. can help shape an agenda that is not just offering better conditions for Armenia but also leads to more credibility in a Western-oriented agenda. Finally, it is important for the West to acknowledge their own blunders over the settlements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which led to continued ethnic cleansing.
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Russia and Armenia

26. What if…? 12 Dragon King scenarios for 2028

Author:: Florence Gaub
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: At first glance, this publication appears to be a collection of Early Warning essays – they are, to some extent, but they should not be exclusively read as such. Conventional Early Warning systems have a much shorter time horizon – normally hours, perhaps months at most – than these scenarios, and they are solely mitigation mechanisms, that is to say they provide no insight into how the event they are warning of can be avoided. They are thus not an intellectual thought exercise, but solely an alarm bell. Our Dragon Kings in this volume provide insight into how they can be avoided, but they also challenge our assumptions in more ways than one. They are therefore awareness-raisers no matter how credible or plausible you will find them. Just reading them will have a readiness-increasing effect. (In fact, the more absurd you find them, the more pronounced this is because your mind will learn more when the emotion they generate is greater.) These scenarios can become even more useful, however, if you use them for simulation exercises in a team. You can use them as a blueprint for a wider scenario exercise, whether one wishes to adopt a blue or red team approach to them, and ask questions such as: how could this have been prevented, what would have to be done? What are alternative pathways of this scenario that are even worse, and how can we prevent those? The most important aspect is that every exercise of this kind must lead to some concrete policy steps. Merely thinking about improbable futures is never enough – doing something about them is what makes them a useful policy-tool. In that case, they lead to active, rather than passive, engagement with the content, foster collaboration, encourage innovation, practice decision-making, provide a space for failure and experimentation with alternative courses of action. It is precisely because of this that scenarios are a common feature in military education, but they work just as well in any other strategic context – provided, time and space is made for it. If yes, they contribute to increasing preparedness and readiness, and accelerate the response time to surprise. What’s more, generally engaging in fringe thinking about the future will strengthen these capabilities no matter what kind of surprise eventually occurs. Much like how vaccines teach the immune system, disruptive thinking strengthens our neural networks, making us more resilient for extreme situations.
Topic:: NATO, Natural Disasters, Elections, Crisis Management, Coup, UN Security Council, Biological Weapons, Resilience, Arctic Council, and Readiness
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iraq, Europe, India, Taiwan, Latin America, Nigeria, and Tunisia

27. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:: Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

28. Using the financial system to enforce export controls

Author:: Benjamin Hilgenstock, Elina Ribakova, Guntram Wolff, and Anna Vlasyuk
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russian imports of battlefield goods that are subject to export controls, including from Western producers, have surged since mid-2022 and reached levels close to those prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia thus continues to be able to acquire critical foreign components that it needs for its military industry. These imports occur via mainland China, Hong Kong, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, while other countries including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have also seen massive increases in imports from the EU and other coalition countries that likely end up in Russia. The implementation and enforcement of export controls faces major challenges, which are multifaceted and centre around complex supply chains, lack of transparency in documentation and opaque financial structures. The issues are familiar from anti money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks, where much progress has been made in the last two decades. A similar approach could help in rendering export controls effective. We propose: First, financial institutions could be tasked to play a role in the monitoring of the trade in export-controlled goods and the blocking of illicit transactions, building on their experience with due diligence in financial transactions. Second, non-financial companies could learn from banks’ efforts in the AML/CFT sphere to implement proper due-diligence procedures and to ensure export controls compliance. Public-sector investigations and appropriate fines are critical to increase the incentives for firms to act. Technology sanctions are going to be part of the economic statecraft toolbox for the foreseeable future. The Russia case will test their effectiveness and credibility, or lack thereof.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, Imports, Financial Systems, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

29. Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications

Author:: Zsolt Darvas, Marek Dabrowski, Heather Grabbe, Luca Léry, André Sapir, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Whether and when Ukraine accedes to the European Union will depend greatly on how and when its war with Russia ends and post-war reconstruction starts, and how the EU handles issues of governance, security, migration, trade, investment, the energy transition, decarbonisation and the EU budget. The enlargement process is likely to overlap with post-war reconstruction, increasing the EU's influence in fostering Ukraine’s institutional development. Ukrainian leaders will have strong incentives to comply with the accession criteria, which the EU should use astutely to create a better-functioning economy and public institutions, especially by reducing opportunities for corruption. This will require clearer standards for rule-of-law and fundamental values, including effective tools to ensure continued compliance after accession. That is also the most effective way to ensure a positive impact of future enlargements on EU governance. The EU will also need to develop assistance programmes to help the Ukrainian government manage post-war external and internal security challenges, including the large number of weapons in circulation, and to encourage Ukrainian refugees to return to the country when possible, as they will be needed for the reconstruction effort. If the current EU budget rules were applied and there were no transitional arrangements – which is unlikely – we calculate the total annual cost of Ukraine's integration into the EU budget at 0.13 per cent of EU GDP, which would hardly change net recipient/payer positions of current EU members. Some of this funding would come back to the EU via EU companies participating in EU-funded projects in Ukraine. Ukraine’s entry into the EU would benefit EU GDP via trade, migration and foreign direct investment, boosting employment, production and tax revenues in the EU. The history of EU enlargement shows that the strongest motivation for difficult reforms is a credible and predictable accession process based on rewarding reforms. Both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies, alongside the formal accession negotiations. That would show the Ukrainian public the tangible benefits of moving towards EU standards, while also bringing Ukraine into areas such as energy cooperation and decarbonisation.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Illiberalism in International Relations

Author:: Alexander Dugin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: There are two main schools in the theory of international relations --- realism and liberalism. Realists believe that human nature is inherently flawed (the legacy of Hobbes’s anthropological pessimism and, on an even deeper level, the legacy of the Christian idea of the Fall, or lapsus in Latin) and cannot be fundamentally corrected, which means that selfishness, predation, and violence are impossible to eradicate. This leads to the conclusion that man (who, according to Hobbes, is a wolf to another man) can only be restrained and regulated by means of a strong state. The state is inevitable and is the bearer of supreme sovereignty. At the same time, the predatory and egoistic nature of man is projected onto the state; therefore, the nationstate has its own interests. These interests take into account only their own state, while the will to violence and greed mean war is always a possibility. Realists believe that this has always been and always will be. International relations are therefore based only on a balance of power between wholly sovereign entities. No world order can exist in the long term; there is only chaos, which changes as some states weaken and others strengthen. At the same time, the term “chaos” in this theory is not bad in itself; it is merely a statement of the actual state of affairs, derived from taking the concept of sovereignty very seriously. If there are several truly sovereign powers, no supranational order can exist between them to which all would submit. Were such an order to exist, sovereignty would not be complete, in fact, it would not exist at all, and only this supranational authority itself would be sovereign. The school of realism has traditionally been very strong in the US, starting with its first founders: Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan in the US, and Edward Carr in the UK.
Topic:: International Relations, Realism, Multipolarity, Illiberalism, and Posthumanism
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

31. NATO: Waging High-Tech Warfare

Author:: Yury Belobrov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: THE rapid technological progress observed in the last decade throughout the world, especially in China and Russia, threatens the established sources of military and industrial dominance of the collective West on the world stage. NATO views this as an alarming trend, and in an attempt to stop it, bloc members are making a determined effort to preserve their militarytechnological leadership and the international order structured around their policies. To this end, they are initiating a new arms race, partially through the active incorporation into the military sphere of the latest breakthrough technologies (Emerging and Disruptive Technologies – EDT), which, they believe, can reverse the emerging multipolarity of international relations and radically change the nature of future wars. Thus, the Allies are stepping up collective efforts to master innovative technologies and introduce them into the operational activities of NATO and all member nations to ensure their victory in future high-tech wars. They emphasize the urgency of adapting the armed forces of said countries to the realities of global technological advancement. As the communiqué adopted at the Alliance summit in Vilnius in 2023 directly stated: “We are accelerating our own efforts to ensure that the Alliance maintains its technological edge in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military advantage including through dual-use solutions.”1 The US, as the main sponsor of NATO militarism, demands that its allies and partners closely and expeditiously collaborate on the creation of novel weaponry utilizing these emerging technologies and dramatically increase investment in various EDT projects and adapt their armed forces to them. Under the US’s diktat, Brussels and its American allies are creating new bureaucratic and financial entities. Private businesses and academic and research institutions are also being drawn into this sphere. To speed up this process, at the urging of Washington at the NATO summit in Brussels in 2021, a strategic initiative was launched to create the NATO Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which will manage and coordinate all this activity within NATO. The main task of this organization is to form an innovative technological network that unites R&D centers, innovative start-ups, defense enterprises, and military agencies in order to simultaneously and rapidly master all types of dual-use EDT technologies and implement them in the civilian and military fields. In addition to these efforts, a decision was also made to form a €1 billion NATO Innovation Fund to finance venture capital companies developing dual EDT in areas of strategic importance to NATO. Essentially, these decisions by the alliance are aimed at mobilizing European resources, primarily to strengthen American military power. Of course, the main efforts to field the latest technologies are being undertaken by the largest member nations.
Topic:: NATO, International Cooperation, Weapons, Innovation, Emerging Technology, High-Tech Wars, and Military and Industrial Advantage
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

32. The Global West and Global South: Development Paths

Author:: Maria Zakharova
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: I would like to highlight the fact that Russia is notably absent, it would seem, from the “South-West” paradigm. This is because our country cannot be fully categorized as either Western or Southern. We exist everywhere, and yet we do not fit neatly into these constructs. Some perspectives associate Russia with the Global North, while others link us to the Global East. However, [Russia’s] 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, which Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko referenced, defines the Russian Federation as a “unique state-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power” – a scope broader than these conventional classifications. And in the context of our discussion today, it is imperative to acknowledge Russia’s influence on global affairs. The concept of the Global West is relatively straightforward; it encompasses the US, the EU countries, and to some extent the Asia- Pacific region, knit together by American-centric military, political, and economic alliances – what they call Euro-Atlantic values. This is a product of the historical West, which has been extending its influence over the non-Western world for around five centuries, starting from the Age of Discovery, in an attempt to dominate it by all possible means. However, it is worth noting that calling the current era neocolonialism may be overly generous. I would refrain from such a characterization, as it gives too much credit. While there are undoubtedly flaws in these cultures, they also have rich cultural histories. In recent decades, individuals have risen to power in the US and Britain whose thinking is characterized more by piracy and banditry than by a philosophical understanding of colonialism, which is by no means good. But this is worse than neocolonialism – it is outright robbery. To illustrate, I once used the analogy of the US acting like a cowboy in the Louvre who simply shoots everything in sight, unaware that the objects before him are valuable works of art.
Topic:: Security, Treaties and Agreements, Developing World, State, BRICS, Civilization, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:: Russia, United States of America, Global South, and Global West

33. Civilizational War: The Will to Win

Author:: Andrey Ilnitsky
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The US National Security Strategy defines the US as a global hegemon that sees no dividing lines between domestic and foreign policies and treats the world as its sphere of interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Globalization, National Security, War, Hegemony, Ideology, Civilization, Deep State, and Generative Models
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

34. Russia 2024: Making or Breaking the System

Author:: Laetitia Spetschinsky
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2024, Russia is poised for Putin’s fifth term amid a lackluster presidential election. The political landscape leans towards conservatism, emphasizing protection against internal dissent. Putin’s focus on family values and the crackdown on LGBTQ rights underscores a nationalist agenda. Internationally, Russia aims to defend Russian-speaking communities and expand alliances, particularly in BRICS. The pivotal year presents challenges in territorial acquisition, maintaining the war economy, and preserving national unity. Putin’s legacy hinges on navigating these challenges and proclaiming a strategic victory in the face of Western pressures.
Topic:: Elections, Domestic Politics, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

35. Freerider or Strategic Balancer? Austria vis-à-vis NATO and Russia. US – perspective on Austrian neutrality politics

Author:: Jason C. Moyer and Patrick Kornegay
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 highlighted the fragility of peace and security in Europe. The resurgence of war in Europe prompted a reassessment of the security postures of traditionally neutral countries. Norms on military spending and assistance have been shattered, leading to Finland and Sweden reversing decades of military non-alignment to join NATO. Even Switzerland is eyeing a strategic overhaul and is considering joint exercises with NATO (Revill, 2022). Despite Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO Austria remains committed to neutrality. The public debate on Austria’s strategic culture has remained largely the same and policymakers in Vienna have not changed their stance on NATO. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored Austria’s need to reevaluate its policy of neutrality and strategic approach vis-a-vis NATO and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Austria, and United States of America

36. Energy as a weapon - decoding blackmail tactics in Europe

Author:: Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: ‘Energy blackmail’ became a buzzword following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent energy crisis, but the phenomenon is not new. Energy blackmail has been employed by states to leverage their strategic energy resources for decades. In Europe, the weaponisation of energy predates Vladimir Putin’s time in Kremlin. Despite EU efforts to diversify its energy supply, the threat of energy blackmail persists, posing challenges not only to traditional energy dependencies but also to the increasingly digitalised energy sector.
Topic:: European Union, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

37. The war in Ukraine poses unprecedented threats to aid workers

Author:: Jethro Norman
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: An interstate war in Europe presents new security challenges for humanitarians. Along the 960km Ukraine-Russia frontline, humanitarian infrastructure has been hit by shelling, missiles and drone strikes, and aid delivery disrupted by electronic warfare. Supporting specialised training and removing outdated bureaucratic burdens are some of the ways in which donors and policymakers can help humanitarian organisations adapt to this new context.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, Conflict, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Aid Workers
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Humanitarian principles are under fire in Ukraine

Author:: Jethro Norman
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Ukraine presents a unique challenge for many international humanitarian organisations. Operating in a context of heightened geo-political and donor interest, and in close proximity to military actors, amateur volunteer groups and Ukrainian civil society are testing the core principles of neutrality and impartiality that once underpinned humanitarian work.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Humanitarian Aid, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. The Children of War

Author:: Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Children, Civilians, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security

Author:: Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

41. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:: Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

43. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:: NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

44. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:: Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:: Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa

46. Lavrov Visits Latin America to Try to Lure It to Russia's Side

Author:: Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On 17-21 April, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. During his trip, he argued that the goals and interests of Russia and most Latin American countries coincide. He also repeated false Russian narratives, for example, about the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine, portraying Russia as a victim of the policy of the West. While he used his stay in Brazil to legitimise the Russian narratives, in other countries, it was mainly about consolidating Russia’s ties with their authoritarian regimes, including cooperation on evading sanctions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Latin America

47. U.S. Re-Focuses Arctic Policy-The Consequences for Its Allies

Author:: Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Biden administration is increasing the U.S. capabilities in countering the effects of climate change in the Arctic, an aim overlapping the rivalry with Russia and China in this region. The U.S. announced increasing investments in infrastructure projects and defence, for example, modernising the Coast Guard’s Arctic fleet. The planned measures provide an opportunity for closer American cooperation with their allies and may mark the beginning of a regional division of labour in the area of shared defence.
Topic:: Climate Change, Infrastructure, Investment, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

48. Refugees from Ukraine Adapting to the European Labour Market

Author:: Jolanta Szymańska
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Due to the length of the war in Ukraine, more and more refugees from this country have decided to take up employment in the EU. Preliminary data indicate that they are integrating into European labour markets faster than refugees from other regions. However, the mismatch between their jobs and qualifications remains a challenge. Despite the refugees’ inclusion, the deteriorating economic situation in Europe may lead to negative perceptions in host countries.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Refugees, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

50. EU Member States Take a Position on the Emigration of Russians

Author:: Aleksandra Kozioł and Stefania Kolarz
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Hundreds of thousands of Russians have decided to emigrate as Vladimir Putin’s regime has increased repression of citizens with dissenting views of the government or unwilling to participate in the war in Ukraine. Some of them are trying to enter the EU, justifying it with humanitarian reasons. However, the Member States, which decide the granting of visas and residence permits, have different practices. Elaborating a unified approach remains a major challenge for the EU.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Civilians, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS