Political Geography: Russia - CIAO Search Results

1. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)

Author:: Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 12-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
Topic:: Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

2. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

3. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. The New Syria and the Regional Balance of Power

Author:: Amjed Rasheed
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024 and the subsequent rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now leading the Syrian interim government in the country, have dramatically shaped the regional balance of power. Remarkably, the HTS-led interim government has been making some serious attempts to consolidate its control, and boost legitimacy, but also rebuild Syria after 14 years of civil war and a half-a-century of Assad dynasty rule. In its pursuit to achieve these ends, the interim government has launched diplomatic efforts toward regional and international powerhouses. Everybody, including Russia, is currently welcome to visit Damascus. Yet there is also failure so far to open up the transition to others, which could generate grievances and lead to disruptive regional interference. While the success of such a policy remains to be gauged, the HTS approach to accommodate regional contradiction is worth explaining.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Gulf Nations

5. Trump’s Call with Putin Raises Great Concerns, Few Hopes

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: US President Donald Trump’s phone call with Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin, especially when read in combination with Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s re-definition of US Europe policy, casts a long shadow. There are good reasons to be more concerned than hopeful about the peace deal that seems to be taking shape in the minds of the US Administration. At the same time, there are elements suggesting a less pessimistic assessment of the looming negotiations. Trump’s call with Putin has made a big splash but has not yet pierced Ukraine’s armour.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

6. Transformation of Turkish-Russian Relations: Rivalry and Cooperation in Eurasia and the Levant

Author:: Mustafa Aydin
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Relations between Russia and Türkiye have developed considerably since the end of the Cold War. What began as energy trade in the late 1980s evolved into cooperation in business, energy, construction, tourism, politics and even security. Behind the ever-expanding cooperation lies a mistrust fueled by historical enmity and regional rivalry that occasionally leads to confrontation. As the two countries seek to shape their competitive cooperation beyond the current geopolitical challenges and constraints of regional security and alliances, the question of whether they could find ways to advance their partnership is of paramount importance and has regional and global implications. This paper seeks to understand how they have managed their conflict-ridden past to develop a modus operandi in the post-Cold War world by proposing a new conceptual model, namely “competitive cooperation” or “coopetition”, to understand the relationship that developed over the last 30 years in different geographical regions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rivalry, and Competitive Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, Mediterranean, and Black Sea

7. Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivilized War

Author:: Hüsna Taş Yetim
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, has attracted considerable attention from International Relations specialists, analysts, intellectuals, and academics. Russia's decision to go to war has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some scholars have linked it to the country's imperial and Soviet history (Mankoff 2022; Rojeck 2022; Trenin 2022; Timothy 2022; Van Harpen et al. 2023), while others have seen it as a deliberate distraction from internal problems (Torbakov 2022). Paul D’Anieri’s second edition of “Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivilized War”, which consists of ten chapters, challenges prevailing views by providing a comprehensive analysis of the historical context of the conflict. D’Anieri contends that the origins of the Ukrainian war of 2022 go beyond the immediate crises of late 2021 or the events of 2014. Instead, he identifies three post-Cold War dynamics - the security dilemma, democratization, and domestic politics - as the primary drivers of the war. According to D’Anieri, these factors strained ties between Russia, Ukraine, and the West, leading to the conflict (pp. 2-3). Chapters three, four, and five meticulously dissect each dynamic, offering a detailed analysis of the intricate relationships between the United States (US), Russia, Ukraine, and Europe from 1989 to the present conflict.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Book Review, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. KGB Operations against the USA and Canada in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1991

Author:: Nebahat Akkoç
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Professor Zhuk’s “KGB Operations against the USA and Canada in Soviet Ukraine, 1953- 1991” focuses on the post-Stalin Cold War period, when Soviet Ukraine was gradually opened to American and Canadian visitors and combines counter-intelligence documents in the 1st (and 16th) fund of Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) archive with the Committee for State Security’s (KGB) official correspondence and reports to the political leadership of Soviet Ukraine.
Topic:: Cold War, History, Book Review, and KGB
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

9. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

10. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

12. Foreign Malign Influence Targeting U.S. and Allied Corporations

Author:: Daniel Byman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: U.S. corporations are regular targets of foreign governments seeking to undermine the United States. These hostile states have both commercial and strategic motives, and they use disinformation, malinformation, and artificial promotion to tarnish the reputations of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations and the U.S. government should take steps to mitigate this threat, including improving corporate counterintelligence, building networks of advocates for use in crisis situations, and sharing more information on the scope and scale of the problem.
Topic:: Terrorism, International Security, Geopolitics, Corporations, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

13. Political and Legal Foundations of Russia’s Strategic Planning in the Field of Nuclear Weapons

Author:: Tatyana Kashirina
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: RUSSIA’S official position on nuclear deterrence is outlined in several strategic planning documents concerning national security and defense. The deterioration of the international situation, worsening Russian- American and Russian-European relations, and the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014 prompted Moscow to revise its Military Doctrine in 2014. This document places significant emphasis on the increased activity of military forces unfriendly to Russia and foreign nations operating in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies. Among the key external military dangers are threats to global stability (which is primarily based on the possession of nuclear weapons) and regional stability through the development and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that disrupt the established balance of power in the nuclear missile domain. Other threats include the implementation of the “global strike” concept, intentions to deploy weapons in space, the proliferation of high-precision nonnuclear strategic systems, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

14. Hermeneutics and Psychology of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence

Author:: Vasily Belozyorov
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: RECENT developments surrounding Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy have sparked widespread reactions in Russia and abroad, ranging from belligerent and aggressive to eschatological and apocalyptic. On November 19, 2024, official guidelines were unveiled in the updated document titled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence1 (hereinafter referred to as the Fundamentals). Several factors compelled Russia to revise its approaches to nuclear deterrence policy: the erosion of strategic stability, provocations and nuclear blackmail by Ukraine, and Western encouragement of the latter’s irresponsible and reckless leadership. The increasingly adversarial nature of global relations has brought the international system to the brink of large-scale war. The release of this new doctrinal policy provides a critical opportunity to analyze various aspects of Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Deterrence, Hermeneutics, Russia-Ukraine War, Perception, and Intimidation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

15. Assad Regime's Rapid Fall Rattles Russia's Middle East Strategy

Author:: Filip Bryjka
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria seriously weakens Russia’s position in the Middle East and its ability to provide security to its allies. After 13 years of supporting the dictatorship, Russia is also losing its ability to influence the political situation in Syria and its neighbourhood The Russian government’s priority is to keep the right to use the military bases in the country—a naval base in Tartus and an air base in Khmeimim. Losing them would make it difficult for Russia to conduct military operations in the Mediterranean and Africa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, Influence, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, and Syria

16. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:: Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

17. Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security

Author:: John R. Deni, Marina E. Henke, Aylin Matlé, Sophia Besch, and Tim Bosch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Regarding strategy, Germany’s approach lacks focus, offering broad goals without addressing trade-offs or specific threats. On defense policy, the Zeitenwende marked a renewed commitment to defense spending, bolstered by a €100 billion modernization fund. But delays in procurement, operational shortcomings, and an underfunded long-term defense budget hinder Germany. Similar challenges affect the defense industry, despite increased spending and exports. In energy policy, Germany rapidly diversified energy sources and expanded its liquefied natural gas infrastructure to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Still, achieving energy security, affordability, and sustainability remains complex. Internationally, Germany abandoned decades of Ostpolitik, prioritizing Ukraine over ties with Russia. Germany’s evolving China policy focuses on derisking and maintaining economic ties, raising questions about whether Berlin has reduced vulnerabilities. Though Washington supports Germany’s strategic shift, concerns remain about its sustainability, particularly in Germany’s NATO and EU commitments. Each chapter concludes by identifying the implications for the United States as well as the steps to overcome identified challenges.
Topic:: NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Energy Security, Burden Sharing, and Zeitenwende
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Germany, and United States of America

18. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Russia’s Deterrence Strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:: Miguel Paradela López
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The article analyzes the two-part strategy Russia developed to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. First, the country helped to weaken Armenia’s position in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidate Azerbaijan’s. Second, the Russian military deployed peacekeeping troops to the border of the two countries to stabilize the conflict, deter any new Azeri military advance in the region and improve the Russian influence in the Caucasus. Although this strategy was initially successful, as it increased Russia’s military capacity in the region, the unexpected complications Russia experienced during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 severely weakened its role as peacekeeper and deterrence power. Russia’s involvement in a highly demanding conflict has led to considerable suffering, increased international pressure, and a deteriorated perception of its military power, precluding it from deterring the expansion of a Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia’s deterring capacity failed as it was uncapable of sending a credible threat to Azerbaijan and this country could achieve historic goals in the region. Consequently, Russia severely compromised its own position in the Caucasus, and increasing pressure over Armenia should be expected.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

20. Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis and the Belt and Road Initiative: Russia’s Growing Dependence on China in the Aftermath of the Ukraine War

Author:: Hanna Samir Kassab
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This paper focuses on Russia’s current economic isolation due to the war in Ukraine. The more western states punish Russia, the more likely it will become economically dependent on China. H. J. Mackinder argues that whoever controls, or organises, the heartland of the Eurasian continent, controls the world’s political system. The more dependent Russia is on China, the more China will exercise control over Russia. If China were to gain this political leverage over Russia, it would be in a good position to organise the heartland, and possible become global hegemon.
Topic:: Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-Ukraine War, International Politics, and Dependence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

21. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:: Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine: Tuesday, March 11, 2025. The Russian assault on Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity and transmission grid as part of its full-scale war against Ukraine, is unprecedented in the history of warfare. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO of Ukraine’s electric grid operator Ukrenergo, discussed the challenges of securing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the war, lessons for mitigating grid vulnerabilities, and prospects for rebuilding a more resilient energy system in Ukraine and Europe. Speaker: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi served as the CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator Ukrenergo from February 2020 until September 2024. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s electrical grid has undergone preparations for synchronization with the power system of Continental Europe ENTSO-E and emergency synchronization with ENTSO-E in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From February 24, 2022, Mr. Kudrytskyi and his team at Ukrenergo managed the Ukrainian power grid through unprecedented Russian attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Kudrytskyi held leadership roles in key Ukrainian energy sector companies, including Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta. Mr. Kudrytskyi holds a degree in international finance from Kyiv National Economic University. Moderator: Mariana Budjeryn is the author of Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) and a winner of the 2024 William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award, the first female in the award’s 25-year history. Dr. Budjeryn is a member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academies of Sciences and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Topic:: Electricity, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

24. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:: Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

26. The 8 Percent Approach: A Big Bang in Resources and Capacity for Europe’s Economy and Defence

Author:: Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Ismail Abdi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe has become a region of feeble economic performance and military frailty. Its share of the world economy is rapidly shrinking, and the region is struggling to keep up with economies at the modern technological frontier. Countries in the European Union have for decades talked about the importance of raising Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and allow greater space for an entrepreneurial business sector that is prospering on the back of innovation. However, the results are poor. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have largely been stagnant, business investment and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have tanked. Rates of new business formation and growth are paltry, partly as a result of gross overregulation. Productivity growth has continued its decades-long path of deceleration, and the EU is increasingly behind international leaders. Fortunately, Europe is beginning to wake up from its strategic slumber. Defence expenditures are now growing faster than in previous decades – and some countries, like Poland, are becoming serious powers. Yet, the region’s own military capacity remains poor. Europe must rebuild core conventional capacities at a time when defence modernisation requires substantial resources and focus. Russia may be bogged down by its war against Ukraine, but it is rebuilding its capacities fast and is increasingly aided by partnerships with other countries that want to break down what remains of a liberal world order. Many European NATO-members are now hitting the 2-percent spending target but must spend vastly more to acquire sufficient capacities to defend themselves and their interests.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

27. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

28. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:: Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:: Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

29. Playing the long game: Russia in the Mediterranean

Author:: Giangiuseppe Pili, Alessio Armenzoni, Gary C. Kessler, and Diane M. Zorri
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia has fi rmly re-established its presence in the Mediterranean. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis reveal that Russia is currently more active in North Africa and the Middle East, including operating a shadow fl eet of tankers that economically sustains Putin’s regime and its war eff orts in Ukraine. Given its size and capabilities, the current Russian squadron is not intended to engage in a full-scale naval battle against any NATO fl eet. Instead, it is deliberately kept weak enough to avoid being perceived as a major military threat.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Navy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

30. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:: Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

31. Two to tango: Russian-Iranian drone cooperation

Author:: Katie Fricke, Taylor Hankins, and Victoria Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Iran and Russia are strengthening their partnership through collaboration on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) development and deployment. Iran’s drone programme presents a multifaceted challenge to NATO. The acquisition of Western technology through reverse engineering, coupled with Iran’s growing reputation as a drone supplier, enhances its military capabilities and global infl uence. Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine exposes vulnerabilities in NATO-provided defence systems and undermines eff orts to protect member states and partner countries. The proliferation of this technology to other state and non-state actors complicates NATO’s defence strategies. It is important for NATO to understand the drone warfare dynamics shaped by the Russia-Iran partnership. Analysing their innovations and integration into military doctrines is crucial for anticipating threats and developing countermeasures.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

32. Achieving Minimum Viable Cyber Resilience: A Leadership Top Ten “To-Do” List

Author:: Steve Hill
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: I t is a reflection of the growing maturity of the cybersecurity industry that when the UK’s Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden, a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security, claimed in a speech to the November 2024 NATO Cyber Defence Conference that Russia “can turn the lights off for millions,” he was roundly criticized for hyperbole. Pragmatism has replaced alarmism as the driver for persuading the state and the C-suite to invest in cybersecurity. The world has neither ever been more complex nor more fast-moving. But that is not the same as saying that the world is more dangerous. The same inter-connectedness that creates supply-chain fragility also acts as a disincentive for governments whose priorities are primarily inward-looking (domestic stability and growth) to escalate conflicts to outright regional or global warfare that will likely undermine that domestic agenda. We see therefore brinkmanship and “grey conflict” taking place throughout the world. This includes targeted assassinations, arson attacks, disruption of underseas cables, drone activity, social media election influence campaigns, and all kinds of cyber-attacks.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Gray Zone, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

33. A Transforming Eurasian Order

Author:: Feng Yujun
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: I n recent years, driven by multiple factors, the international order has been undergoing rapid adjustment, evolution, and reshaping. In Eurasia, the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered persisting upheaval, acting as a pivotal catalyst for shifts in the regional order. Its impact has prompted historic changes in power dynamics, mutual perceptions, national identities, and strategic orientations among Eurasian states—shifts unmatched since the Soviet Union’s dissolution over three decades ago. These transformations are set to profoundly influence the regional order, becoming a central element in current and future global developments.
Topic:: Post-Soviet Space, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

34. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

35. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

36. Global Futures Bulletin: The BRICS and the Decarbonization and Biodiversity Protection Challenges

Author:: Igarapé Institute
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Igarapé Institute
Abstract:: The world faces an unprecedented convergence of environmental crises – climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss – that collectively threaten the planet’s ecological balance and humanity’s future. Reversing the Triple Planetary Crisis necessitates urgent and coordinated action across all sectors and countries, accelerating the transition to low-carbon economies while protecting biodiversity are key challenges for the coming years. Countries that have joined the BRICS in its inception (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are increasingly an important geopolitical force in current global politics, and their individual and collective action is key to the success of concerted global action. The group’s recent expansion – BRICS+ includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia joining in 2025 and Saudi Arabia finally formalizing its membership – offers an opportunity to boost the role of their New Development Bank (NDB) in bridging climate, biodiversity, and development finance, and aim for greater policy coherence for concerted global action across these agendas. Combined, BRICS countries are not only biodiversity and energy-rich but also contribute to a large share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This Strategic Paper examines the role of the expanded BRICS+ and explores whether and how this “mini-multilateral” grouping, with its considerable human and technological capacity, can address two major global challenges: accelerating decarbonization and protecting biological diversity. The discussion is framed around the opportunities and challenges faced by the member countries to increase their ambitions and become leading voices in these agendas – not only for BRICS countries (some of which are among the most biodiverse in the world) but also for the wider international community. Without a strong commitment by BRICS countries (individually and as a group) the world will fail to accelerate action on decarbonization and biodiversity protection.
Topic:: Climate Change, Pollution, BRICS, Decarbonization, Biodiversity, and Minilateralism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and Global Focus

37. Lessons from West Germany's Cold War experience

Author:: Paul Williams
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine is now more than three years old. A new US administration is implementing a radical approach to securing a ceasefire and appears poised to limit direct military assistance to Ukraine. Consequently, Europe now recognizes that it must approach this war in a decidedly different manner than might have been presumed only a few months ago. The past may offer hints to a path forward for Ukraine to survive and ultimately prevail against Russia. While the imminent threat of war hung over Europe during the Cold War, West Germany lived under the constant threat of Soviet aggression. Yet, through economic revival, strategic military growth and partnerships, and careful political maneuvering, West Germany not only outlasted its aggressor but laid the groundwork for long-term stability and prosperity. West Germany's experience during the Cold War offers valuable insights for Ukraine in its pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity amid external threats. This blog explores some of the lessons that may be drawn from West Germany across economic and military themes.
Topic:: Cold War, Economics, History, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and West Germany

38. Plunder by Paperwork: Land Use and Legal Manipulation in Russian-Occupied Ukrainian Territories

Author:: Kateryna Kyrychenko and Patricia Wiater
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: In war, land is more than terrain — it is power, memory, identity, and future. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, where the battle is being waged not only with weapons but with registries, decrees, and legal manipulation. Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has not merely been to seize land — but to rewrite the law that governs it. Through reclassification, coerced registration, and demographic engineering, the occupying power is attempting to transform occupation into ownership — to fabricate a claim to sovereignty through legal means. Beneath a facade of administrative normalcy lies a systematic campaign of illegal appropriation — one that violates both international humanitarian law and human rights protections. This blog post outlines the legal framework governing land under occupation, examines how Russia has sought to subvert it, and explains why land law is now a frontline of resistance.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Law, Occupation, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. Russian Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in Ukraine

Author:: Paul Williams, Gregory P. Noone, and Sindija Beta
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: Numerous investigative reports into the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 have documented extensive and shocking use of sexual and gender-based violence (“SGBV”) by Russian nationals against Ukrainian civilians, prisoners of war, and other detainees. Russia has long been responsible for a largely under-discussed and distressing amount of SGBV crimes, including rape. Russian SGBV atrocities have historically been especially brutal during World War II in Germany, as well as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Georgia. Focus has recently turned to the question of how Russia could be held accountable for its use of SGBV as a weapon of war in Ukraine. Various sources of international law provide prohibitions on the use of SGBV during armed conflict, and there have been successful examples of holding individual perpetrators accountable under international criminal law in past conflicts. As the Russian attacks on Ukraine continue unabated, it is appropriate to appraise the scale of SGBV committed, the international laws being breached, and the possible enforcement mechanisms.
Topic:: Gender Based Violence, Rape, Sexual Violence, Atrocities, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. Recognizing 2014: The Legal and Moral Imperative for Full Reparations for Russian Aggression

Author:: Kateryna Kyrychenko, Paul D. Williams, and Sindija Beta
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: Why are the earliest victims of Russia’s war in Ukraine — those targeted since 2014 — still excluded from reparations, when it was exactly the failure to respond to that initial aggression that directly enabled the full-scale invasion in 2022?
Topic:: Law, International Crime, Reparations, Russia-Ukraine War, and Aggression
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

42. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2025-2026

Author:: Marc Ablong
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia faces a perilous strategic environment with multiple threats overlapping and, in some cases, converging. We’re confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, multiple conflicts around the world, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyberwarfare. Our largest trading partner, China, is increasingly aggressive militarily and has growing control of critical technologies integral to our societies. In Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, rearmament is underway, including increased prospects of nuclear proliferation. Australia is a part of that rearmament, though others are moving much faster. Great powers flout the international rules-based system, either seeking to expand their spheres of influence, as Russia and China are doing, or pursuing a transactional and user-pays form of vassalage in the case of the US under the Trump administration. To be clear: the actions of the US are not comparable to those of Russia and China, but the administration’s tendency to treat all countries the same, without separating friend from foe, is causing unhelpful disruption and adding to global uncertainty. Many countries’ politics are become more partisan and prone to populist movements, fuelled by social-media outrage and demagoguery. Hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure, internet-connected systems and the political foundations and institutions of states are becoming more common. Trust in public institutions is eroding, and cynicism is rising and often turning into belief in conspiracies. We’re reminded in the ministerial forewords to almost all public national-security documents that there’s no greater responsibility for the government than defending Australia. Part of that most fundamental responsibility is the obligation of government to resource the national-security community appropriately to prepare the nation for the challenges it faces. That’s why, this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has broadened its budget brief, The cost of Defence, beyond its traditional focus on the budget of the Department of Defence. The security challenges that Australia faces cannot, and should not, be borne by Defence and our armed forces alone. For too long, Australian governments have partitioned Australia’s security and failed to deliver a comprehensive approach to national security. ASPI has been vocal in calling for comprehensive national-security planning, and now we reflect that by examining the government’s national-security spending as a whole. Moreover, The cost of Defence: ASPI defence budget brief 2025–26 thoroughly examines the government’s progress with, and spending on, the 2024 National Defence Strategy. The core of the strategy is the concept of national defence, defined as ‘a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’. This year’s Cost of Defence therefore asks some more fundamental and strategic questions and evaluates whether the government is paying enough attention to the traditional strategy calculation of ends, ways and means. Has it identified and articulated the objectives that meet Australia’s strategic intents, as set out in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy? Has it chosen the best plans for meeting those objectives? And has it allocated enough resources for those plans? We also examine whether the government is giving enough attention to the nation’s preparedness and resilience. This is a major theme for ASPI in 2025. The 2025 ASPI Defence Conference: Preparedness and Resilience will focus on those challenges for Australia, including how they bear on our industry, civil society and relationships with international partners. This year’s Cost of Defence provides ASPI’s views as a lead-in to that conversation. Another issue is whether the government is too focused on future equipment acquisitions, rather than the preparedness and readiness of the current force. Given that most of the major acquisitions won’t arrive until well into the 2030s and 2040s, we must ask the unnerving question of whether the ADF is too hollow for military operations this decade. Can the ADF we have now deter adversaries from attempting military domination in our area of primary interest? The issue has been on the country’s mind since a Chinese flotilla this year sailed close to Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea and rehearsed strikes on Australia’s cities, national infrastructure and joint military facilities. Finally, this year’s Cost of Defence asks the hard questions about whether the government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation investment in defence and about the criticality of Australia’s defence industry base, national economic base and resilience is being matched by resources. This includes money in the latest Budget for 2025–26 and the forward estimates and, perhaps more importantly, human capital in the form of a larger skilled workforce. There are also the strategies, concepts and interagency, intergovernmental and international engagements that government must be delivering. We argue, as we did last year, that resourcing isn’t matching the rhetoric. We suggest that, in part, that’s because the implementation of strategy has been frustrated by bureaucratic, time-consuming and inefficient processes. In a first for the Cost of Defence series, we recommend ways for the government and the Defence Department to shift the dial towards agility, adaptability, effectiveness and efficiency. That includes increased and more effective messaging on why defence investment is needed. Whatever percentage of GDP the government spends on defence, it is a large number, and not enough has been done to foster public support for the defence spending required to deter the types of conflicts we see in Europe and elsewhere. Governments shouldn’t wait for public pressure to make security decisions, but a measure of social licence is needed for defence investment, and that in turn takes candour about the gravity of the threats we face. ASPI’s charter requires us to inform and nurture public debate on defence and security and to provide alternative advice for the government. The cost of Defence does so objectively, sharing the government’s and Defence’s aim of strengthening Australia’s long-term security, prosperity and sovereignty. It’s never been more important for experts inside and outside the Australian Public Service to speak truth to power frankly and fearlessly in order to give decision-makers the strongest possible suite of options. We don’t expect all readers to agree with our positions. Indeed, we welcome debate and disagreement in the hope that Australia will be stronger, more prepared and more resilient for the challenges we confront now and will face in the future.
Topic:: Economics, Armed Forces, Artificial Intelligence, Defense Industry, Research and Development, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: Russia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

43. A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Author:: Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, and Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change. Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future. The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions. Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria. Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface. The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.
Topic:: Regime Change, Geopolitics, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and Eastern Mediterranean

44. A Possible Ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025: Is the OSCE on Board?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: “Where is the OSCE during Russia’s war on Ukraine?” asked Pál Dunay (Dunay, 2022). To be honest, not in the spotlight. However, changing political realities in 2025 might provide the Vienna organization with renewed legitimacy, fifty years after the signature of the Helsinki Accords that served as its groundwork. After more than 1,000 days of attrition war, several factors may bring the conflict in Eastern Europe to a turning point. Despite both parties’ recent military escalation, there seems to be no end in sight on the battlefield. Neither side has the resources to achieve a decisive victory, a situation that academics describe as “mutually hurting stalemates” (Slantchev & Goemans, 2025). Militarily, Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, but Putin’s goal of defeating the Ukrainian armed forces in open combat and occupying more Ukrainian territory is a “strategic impossibility” (Dickson & Holowinsky, 2024). It is doubtful that 2025, which marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazism, will coincide with a triumphal parade on Moscow’s Red Square. The resilience and morale shown by the Ukrainian armed forces deserve admiration and tribute, but Kyiv knows that it will not recover Crimea and the Donbas by force. After more than two years of grinding conflict, the weariness of its population is becoming evident. Because neither side can achieve its ultimate goals, new approaches to ending the Ukraine war are beginning to surface. Compared to only a few months ago, more actors are ready to look at alternative scenarios.
Topic:: Politics, Ceasefire, OSCE, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

45. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:: Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

46. Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental grid

Author:: Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The disconnection of the Baltic States from the Russian electricity system and their synchronisation with the Continental European Network is a key technological and geopolitical milestone. But safeguarding energy infrastructure remains vital. Operating within a shared electricity grid across multiple countries improves reliability. This arrangement allows transmission system operators (TSOs) to share resources, maintain a steady flow of electricity and handle mismatches between supply and demand more efficiently, helping to lower overall costs and ultimately benefiting consumers. However, geopolitical tensions have turned the Russian electricity system into a strategic paradox: the Baltic States, NATO and EU members are connected to Russia’s electricity dispatch system – a perceived security threat – for grid stability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Baltic States

47. Europe's migration block crumbles in Niger

Author:: Hans Lucht
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Frontex has warned that Russia could leverage migration and growing influence in Libya and the Sahel to put pressure on Europe. Based on fieldwork in Niger, this policy brief analyses the shifting political realities on the ground. Driving from the airport in Niamey to the city centre after the coup remains a familiar journey except for the new Russian flags at the roundabouts, alongside those of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Since the ousting of the democratically elected president, Mohammed Bazoum, in July 2023 Niger’s military rulers fronted by General Tchiani have thrown out the former colonial power France, turned their backs on Europe and the US, and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with the political and military backing of Russia. This new and challenging scenario in the Sahel has had a profound impact on several important European priorities in the region. These range from fighting militant jihadism, to great power rivalry with Russia, competition over rich African energy and natural resources, development assistance, and also reducing irregular migration to southern Europe.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Borders, and FRONTEX
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Libya, Sahel, and Niger

48. The rise and fall of the Wagner Group

Author:: Karen Philippa Larsen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Wagner Group’s rise, conflict and fall show a process firstly of endorsing private military companies in Russia, only to later seek to regain control by including the groups in the official security structures. The plane crash that killed the leader of the Wagner Group, oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and six other high-ranking Wagner Group members in August 2023 marked the literal and figurative fall of the Wagner Group’s considerable influence on Russian foreign policy. The Wagner Group is what Russia calls a private military company (PMC), which tends to have a much closer relationship to the state than we would normally expect from a private company in the West.
Topic:: Security, Wagner Group, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

49. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:: Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Arctic

50. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

51. Strategic Shift: Understanding Russia's Delisting of the Taliban

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Russia's relationship with the Taliban has undergone a significant transformation in recent times. Moscow now perceives the Taliban as a potential strategic partner, seeking to establish more open diplomatic relations—a remarkable departure from the hostile stance maintained since 2003 when Russia formally designated the movement as a terrorist organization. This gradual evolution has unfolded over recent years, culminating in a growing understanding and emerging cooperation between two former adversaries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, Geopolitics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, and Taliban

52. Pop-Propaganda: How the Kremlin Markets Its War Like Netflix and Coca-Cola (09/30/2025)

Author:: Andrew Ryvkin and Elise Giuliano
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: How does a government sell war, repression, or the curbing of freedoms to millions of people in the age of attention economy? If you think Russian propaganda is just burly TV hosts threatening to drown the Eastern Seaboard and millions of bots on X, then you haven’t been paying attention. In today’s Russia, the boundaries between entertainment and propaganda have all but disappeared. The Kremlin’s disinformation machine is no longer built only on bureaucracy and censorship—it operates like a modern media conglomerate, blending state messaging with digital marketing, social media influencers, and Netflix (yes, the Kremlin has its own streaming platform). Modern propaganda is memes, influencers, and sophisticated campaigns to market government initiatives in ways that resemble consumer brands. Drawing on his experience as both a Kremlin propagandist and a journalist covering Russia for The Atlantic and Air Mail, Andrew Ryvkin will show how propaganda is packaged and spread, and what can we do to counter it.
Topic:: Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, Entertainment, Consumer Behavior, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

53. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:: Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

54. Reclaiming Trust: Inga Springe on the Role of Independent Media in the Baltics

Author:: Masha Udensiva-Brenner and Inga Springe
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Harriman Magazine editor Masha Udensiva-Brenner interviews Latvian investigative journalist Inga Springe of Re:Baltica about the rise and fall of the newspaper Diena, Latvia's journey to join NATO and the EU, and how investigative journalism addresses corruption and Russian influence in the Baltic region.
Topic:: NATO, Corruption, European Union, Media, Journalism, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Latvia, and Baltic States

55. Arbitral Jurisdiction in Crimea Investment Disputes: Connecting the Dots

Author:: Petro Halimurka
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Institution:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Abstract:: Under normal circumstances, bilateral investment treaties (BIT) are designed to promote the mutual enhancement of investment climate and to guarantee that foreign investors are treated no worse than investors of host and third States. In many respects, maintaining such relations is believed to reflect economic globalization and the increasingly widespread acceptance of such legal standards as non-discrimination and of striking a balance between national and private foreign interests. Practice shows, however, that the equilibrium of an investment treaty regime can sometimes be disturbed by a chain of actions governed by a field of law with a purpose of a completely different nature, such as the law of armed conflict. Such an interaction can be observed in relations between Russia and certain Ukrainian investors. Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, a number of investors, some of whose assets were based in Crimea, commenced investment arbitration proceedings in an attempt to recover some of their rights and interests. This article examines the jurisdictional practice of these arbitral tribunals, along with a critical analysis of the relevant provisions of the Ukraine-Russia BIT, as well as other norms of international law operative in relations developed.
Topic:: International Law, Investment, Arbitration, Jurisdiction, and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

56. The (Self-)Isolation of the Russian Academic Legal Community: A Case Study of Research Into Military Interventions for Humanitarian Purposes

Author:: Konstantin M. Brik
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Institution:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Abstract:: This article explores the phenomenon of the Russian academic legal community’s isolation. It particularly focuses on the parts of the community conducting their research in international law and military interventions for humanitarian purposes. A quadrifactorial explanation for this isolation is proposed: domestic legal acts, the government’s educational policy, insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, and cultural and political beliefs impact the way Russian jurists perceive the international legal system as well as endow their writing with an excessive focus on theory of international law and peripheral issues. Additionally, these four factors reconcile the Russian academic legal community’s critical attitude toward the concept of military interventions for humanitarian purposes in general, condemnation of specific foreign interventions, and praise for Russian interventions. This article also argues that the Russian academic legal community perceives military intervention for humanitarian purposes as a two-tier threat: a political threat to the Russian Federation on one hand, and an epistemic threat questioning the validity of their largely theoretical knowledge on the other. Finally, the article argues that the Russian academic legal community’s perception of being threatened by military interventions for humanitarian purposes and its isolation are mutually enhancing.
Topic:: Law, Humanitarian Intervention, Academia, and Isolation
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

57. The Joy of Reading

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Reading and popular literacy programmes have played an important role in revolutionary processes, from the Mexican, Chinese, and Russian revolutions in the early twentieth century to today.
Topic:: Revolution, Literacy, and Reading
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America, and Mexico

58. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

59. Hague Summit Series: Recalibrating Relations with Russia

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1] In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

60. Russia and the Red Sea since 2022: Militarised Foreign Policy or Strategy of Conflict?

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Accounting for over 10% of world trade, the Red Sea is an essential waterway and a chokepoint for international shipping. Piracy, instability, and inter-state conflict are long-term challenges that have kept regional and extra-regional powers engaged in contributing to the security of the area. Since 19 October 2023, the Red Sea attacks on commercial shipping by the Yemen-based Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) have only raised the stakes. In this context, Russian engagements with the region deserve scrutiny. Crucially, between January 2022 and August 2024, Russia’s share of the total oil transit through the Suez Canal jumped from just above 0% to almost 70%.[1] Moscow’s reported support for the Houthi movement, its search for a naval base on the Red Sea shores, and its broader military diplomacy raise questions about the Kremlin’s intentions in the area. What is Russia’s approach to the Red Sea? How does it fit into Moscow’s broader aggressive foreign policy?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Piracy, Conflict, Houthis, and Shipping
Political Geography:: Russia, Yemen, and Red Sea

61. Hague Summit Series: NATO-Ukraine

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia's war in Ukraine shows few signs of ending. Across Europe, there is a widely held view that the outcome of the war will be critically important to determining the continent's future security: Ukraine must prevail. This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the second Trump administration which, after a brief attempt to negotiate a (unjust) solution, seems unable to deliver on the president's campaign promise to bring peace, in particular if this involves being tough on Russia. Differences between the US and most European Allies regarding both the conditions for ending the war and Ukraine's longer-term integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures present one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. More immediately, uncertainty about how to handle these differences presents the greatest risk that NATO's forthcoming summit in The Hague will not be seen as a success.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Peace, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

62. The Kremlin’s Balancing Act: The War’s Impact On Regional Power Dynamics

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government accelerated the preexisting trend of centralizing control over regional power and economic assets. This centralization drive has manifested in several ways including tightening control over regional and municipal political institutions, expanding financial control over regional budgets and policy priorities, nationalizing and indirectly mobilizing business assets, and introducing new priorities in personnel policy. While they did not lead to open rebellion, the changes nonetheless created winners and losers, resulting in friction and resistance from regional elites who perceive their interests and autonomy as threatened. Key areas of contention have included the ongoing asset redistribution, which has been challenged by legal and other means; attempts to curtail the political leverage of regional elites; and even certain policies related to the war or its domestic portrayal. The sustainability of the Kremlin’s centralization strategy is uncertain. While the conflicts between the Kremlin and regional elites primarily revolve around bargaining and power dynamics within the existing system, rather than a challenge to Russia’s domestic political arrangement as a whole, the current approach risks intensifying tensions with regional elites and undercutting the federal government’s efforts to make policy implementation more efficient, potentially leading to worse quality governance and instability. Policymakers should seek to understand these dynamics in the context of the prolonged political and economic conflict between Russia and the West and the eventual transition of power following Putin’s rule.
Topic:: Centralization, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

63. Setting the Stage: An Overview of Chinese and Russian Interests and Influence in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In late September, a US HC-103J Super Hercules spotted four foreign vessels operating about 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island, Alaska. Upon closer inspection, the patrol turned out to be Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast Guard ships. While this marked the northernmost location at which the US military has spotted Chinese ships operating, the presence of the joint Chinese-Russian patrol fit an increasingly common pattern. This sighting was the third time in three months that the US has spotted either Chinese or Russian ships close to Alaska. In both 2022 and 2023, the US Navy sent assets to shadow joint Chinese-Russian naval patrols operating in the Aleutian Islands region.[1] The Chinese and Russian navies have also been operating together near US partners and allies closer to their own shores, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, a Chinese-Russian patrol circumnavigated Japan’s main island. China’s official description of the event claimed the flotilla was focused on “maintaining international and regional strategic stability,” while Russia’s Defense Ministry said its goal was to “maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” In an understatement that certainly masked some alarm, Japan merely characterized the patrol as “unusual.”[2] Since then, the pace of Chinese-Russian naval patrols and exercises in the region has increased, with several in 2024 alone. One of these, Ocean 2024, involved some 90,000 troops and more than 500 ships and aircraft, according to the Kremlin, and was the largest of such exercises in 30 years. Ocean 2024 came on the heels of another joint naval patrol in the northern Pacific and another set of drills in the waters off Japan.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

64. Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China’s Use of the Instruments of Power

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The first report in this series examined Chinese and Russian influence and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China’s use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China’s, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report. Although it does not explicitly analyze the information instrument, the report weaves Beijing’s use of information throughout the narrative. The report analyzes Beijing’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments in the Indo-Pacific region, and then examines how Russia perceives China’s activity in the region. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, the report examines Chinese activity in the following subregions: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Japan/East China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)/South China Sea, and India.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Power Politics, Economy, Strategic Interests, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

65. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

66. Preparing for a Fourth Year of War: Military Spending in Russia’s Budget for 2025

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian government has been devoting an ever-increasing volume of resources to the war with Ukraine, while attempting to maintain normality for its citizens. Russia has maintained an almost balanced budget because the economy has been growing at a rapid pace, despite tough international sanctions. The challenge in preparing the budget for 2025–27 was to continue this balance as the economy showed signs of overheating and the Central Bank attempted to cool it, creating problems for businesses. Despite diminished budget transparency, Russia’s total planned military expenditure in 2025 can be estimated at 15.5 trillion roubles, a real-terms increase of 3.4 per cent over 2024 and equivalent to 7.2 per cent of gross domestic product. This level of spending should be manageable, but budgetary pressures could mount. A growing share of total military spending lies outside the budget chapter ‘National defence’, including spending on social support. This is rendering ‘National defence’ an ever more unreliable proxy for Russian military spending. In addition to military expenditure, the budget includes war-related spending on territory occupied in Ukraine and its own border regions.
Topic:: Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

67. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

68. The Impact of Drones on the Battlefield: Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War from a French Perspective

Author:: Tsiporah Fried
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine War is not just a geopolitical earthquake—it is a tactical and technological inflection point. While many initially focused on tanks and artillery, the war’s defining feature has become the mass deployment of cheap, disposable, and networked technologies—especially drones, loitering munitions, and small-scale electromagnetic warfare systems. In Ukraine, we are witnessing an Uberization of warfare—the use of low-cost, on-demand, and ubiquitous weaponry—alongside the dawn of the robotization of war. In World War II, Germany introduced the concept of blitzkrieg, combining new equipment with the idea of mobile warfare. Today, drone swarms—capable of saturation, connectivity, real-time surveillance, and precision targeting—are not only a tactical revolution, but also a profound disruption of operational art, much like blitzkrieg once was. Moreover, a major shift in the acquisition and technology-development processes made this tactical revolution possible. This revolution—sometimes called a crowdfunding war—should be both a wake-up call for those in charge of defense procurements and a call for a revolution in military affairs. Yet questions remain about the true strategic impact of drone warfare. Indeed, the rapid development of counter-drone measures raises doubts about the long-term dominance of aerial drones as a decisive tool in future conflicts.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Missile Defense, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and France

69. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

Author:: Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

70. The bear and the bot farm: Countering Russian hybrid warfare in Africa

Author:: Will Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia has made significant inroads in Africa—particularly in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic and Mali—deploying military operations that, while limited in scope, are often devastating for local civilian populations. At the same time, Moscow has developed a powerful propaganda machine that taps into existing antipathy towards Europe, particularly France, to push African governments closer to its foreign policy objectives. Europeans have no genuine, resolute partner in Africa today. Most governments and elites are skilfully hedging their bets between Europe and Russia. Like-minded Africans and Europeans should push back with comprehensive sanctions on enablers, counter-disinformation campaigns, a re-evaluation of outdated development models, stronger military aid, and support for influencers who can challenge Russia-aligned narratives in local networks.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, Soft Power, Hybrid Warfare, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Europe

71. Polarization of the Post-Soviet region - A Harbor for Local Autocrats

Author:: Nino Imedashvili
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the challenging regional environment, marked by intense interactions and high tensions between Russia and the West, has often been leveraged by local autocrats to consolidate their power. By instrumentalizing the fragile security landscape and perceived foreign threats in the post-Soviet space, they have effectively obscured the decline of democratic governance. Since the 2000s, the international environment for post-Soviet countries has become increasingly polarized. As Russia has sought to assert its dominance in the region and strengthen its economic standing, the West has intensified its engagement with local nations. However, the European Union’s limited influence in the region has allowed the local authoritarian regimes to survive for many years. This was made particularly evident in two significant events in the region that significantly increased the level of polarization, following which, local autocrats, with the support of Russia, were able to take steps to reinforce their power. The first was the successful color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-2004, which sparked optimism for regional democratic development. The second was the full-scale attack by Russia on Ukraine in 2022, which dealt a devastating blow to those emerging hopes. This article aims to illustrate how certain countries in the region - specifically Armenia, Belarus, and Georgia – have leveraged regional polarization, with the support and in imitation of Russia, to reinforce their repressive governance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Polarization, Post-Soviet Space, Autocracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus

72. Armenian Foreign Policy in 2025: The Return of Geography

Author:: Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2024 and the first months of 2025, coupled with the new US administration’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Russia to end the war, have increased the likelihood that Russia, in the short- to mid-term, will expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. The United States’ shifting focus from Europe to Asia–Pacific, diverging policy views between Washington and Brussels, and the socioeconomic challenges European Union member states face will likely diminish the role of the United States and the EU in the region. Meanwhile, ad hoc partnerships and minilateral groupings prioritizing regionalism prevail over larger, more formal multilateral coalitions. Armenia can only adapt its foreign policy in 2025 to the evolving regional geopolitical landscape and the looming risk of regional instability. The primary goals of Armenian foreign policy should be: ● Continuing negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey; ● Deepening cooperation with Georgia and Iran; ● Establishing a new modus operandi with Russia; ● Exploring the establishment of minilateral groupings1 ; ● Readjusting relations with the United States and the European Union while maintaining the positive momentum of recent years. This approach will allow Armenia to safeguard its sovereignty, navigate shifting power dynamics, and seize emerging opportunities while minimizing the risk of antagonizing regional and global powers.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Armenia

73. Nuclear Deterrence Explained: Strategic Implications for Europe in the Absence of U.S. Extended Deterrence

Author:: Iakob Dadvani
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy discourse indicate two potential future directions: prioritization or retrenchment.1 Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric clearly reflects a tendency toward retrenchment, particularly with respect to Europe. The most prominent indicators of this shift include the potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO European command, or a significant downsizing of its role2 , which would reduce the alliance’s overall combat effectiveness. This change would necessitate increased defense spending from European countries to maintain credible conventional deterrence, as the aggregate military power must remain constant despite reduced American involvement. Further to this are the moves to solve the Russia-Ukraine war by pressuring Ukrainians into negotiations that result in an unjust peace without security guarantees.3 Such an outcome would likely lead to long-term instability across the European continent.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

74. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has upended European security and created a reality in which EU and NATO member states, on one side, and Russia, on the other, view each other as fundamental threats, even as the United States is poised to become a less reliable partner for its allies. Why does it matter? An unstable Europe has economic and security repercussions globally, not least given the nuclear capabilities of Russia, on one hand, and NATO on the other. A deeper understanding of assumptions and threat perceptions on both sides can help key players manage the risks of an increasingly militarised region. What should be done? Diplomacy and deterrence are both required. Kyiv’s backers should seek a settlement to the war that ensures Ukraine’s continued capacity to defend itself. European allies should reduce reliance on the U.S. and – together with Washington – pursue risk mitigation with Russia through limits on weapons deployments and other activities.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

75. Non-Malign Influence: What Does the Russian Community in Serbia Think and Do?

Author:: Srdjan Cvijic and Kristina Nikolic
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:: This study examines the political views of the Russian immigrant community in Serbia who relocated following the beginning of a full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. It reveals the primary reasons for leaving Russia, the willingness to engage in political and civic activism, and their adaptation to Serbian society and plans for the future. The research methodology combines a public opinion survey with in-depth structured interviews with a representative sample of Russian nationals living in Serbia. The study confirms prevailing assumptions that this group tends to hold liberal, pro-democratic views, and is largely opposed to Vladimir Putin’s regime and its military aggression in Ukraine. These results counter concerns about the potential for this community to destabilise the region or serve as a vehicle for propagating Moscow’s influence. A significant majority of participants report feeling safe in their new country of residence and well-adapted to the local environment, with 40.2% planning to stay in Serbia for at least the next five years. Despite the widespread opposition to Putin and the war, however, most respondents (72.8%) express limited interest in engaging more actively in political affairs. This research concludes that Russians in Serbia prioritise their safety and economic well-being, and are hesitant to jeopardise these by participating in political activities that might draw attention to their opposition to the regime in Russia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Immigrants, Adaptation, and Political Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Serbia

76. Understanding Russia’s Calculus on Opportunistic Aggression in Europe

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Kate Johnston, and Greg Weaver
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Numerous factors are working to dissuade Russia from directly challenging NATO, but once Moscow reconstitutes its military, one scenario stands out as a plausible path to a NATO-Russia war: The United States becomes involved in a major crisis in the Indo-Pacific. Russian President Vladimir Putin could view this as his last best chance to undermine the alliance, judging that Washington would have neither the political interest nor the resources to rapidly come to Europe’s defense, and that absent the U.S. capabilities being redeployed to the Indo-Pacific, the European members of NATO would be vulnerable.1 In the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, the United States would likely fulfill some of its requirements by drawing on capabilities already in Europe and/or those in the United States that NATO expects would be used to reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict there, generating gaps in European defense. Even a lower-intensity crisis in the Indo-Pacific, like a blockade, would likely create gaps in Europe because the United States would probably view such a crisis as the opening phase of a larger conflict and would flow military assets to reinforce the region. The military requirements in the Indo-Pacific—and therefore the gaps in Europe’s defenses—would grow as any crisis worsened. The resources required to defend Taiwan are different to the largely land-based forces that are required to bolster European security, but there are significant areas of overlap where resources are in short supply, giving rise to challenges in the following areas: space-based assets and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; strategic enablers; maritime support; ground-based air and missile defense; long-range precision fires; drones; and combat aircraft. There are also likely to be shortages in the pool of ready forces (in Europe), sustainment units, munitions stockpiles, specialist personnel, and special operations forces. These gaps in European security would erode the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defense, leading Moscow to perceive a golden opportunity to accomplish its aims: to divide the United States and Europe, expand its sphere of influence, and relitigate the post–Cold War security order in Europe. The greater the gaps and vulnerabilities in NATO’s conventional forces that Russia perceives, the greater the risk Moscow is likely to accept in pressing its ambitions. Moscow is likely to assume that, with hostilities in Asia, the imperative for the United States and Europe would be to de-escalate, creating a context that the Kremlin would view as exceptionally permissive.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Indo-Pacific

77. Russian negotiating style. When does the West learn?

Author:: Carsten Søndergaard
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s negotiating style is rooted in power, patience and prestige, not compromise. Russia has consistently approached diplomacy as an extension of conflict rather than a means to resolve it. Understanding this mindset is vital if Europe and its allies are to deter, rather than accommodate, Moscow. This paper identifies seven enduring traits of Russian statecraft that continue to shape its diplomacy: 1. GREAT-POWER BY RIGHT – the belief that no major international question should be settled without Russia’s participation; 2. BORDERS AND BOUNDLESSNESS – an ambiguous relationship with borders that keeps neighbours uncertain; 3. INSTRUMENTALISED IDENTITY – the political use of identity, particularly “Russians abroad”, as a tool of influence; 4. RUSSIA SHOULD BE FEARED – projecting power through intimidation, with respect earned by fear rather than trust; 5. HONOUR AND INFLUENCE – insisting on parity with the United States and China, favouring bilateralism and equating dignity with strength; 6. ZERO-SUM LOGIC – viewing global politics as a contest in which one side’s gain is another’s loss; 7. EXPERIENCE AND DECEPTION – combining skilled diplomacy with maskirovka and hybrid warfare to mislead the West. For the West, effective engagement requires realism, deterrence and unity, not misplaced faith in goodwill negotiations.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Negotiation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

78. Moving Targets: Implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for Drone Terrorism

Author:: David Hambling
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Small and commercially available drones in the hands of violent extremists pose a rapidly growing terrorist threat. This article examines that threat in the light of the invasion of Ukraine. Consumer drones such as DJI Mavics, FPV racing drones, and Shahed-style one-way attack drones have become potent weapons. Their affordability, accessibility, and adaptability enable precision strikes, bypass traditional defenses, and democratize air power for state and non-state actors alike. This article details how these drones have been used in Ukraine—from grenade-dropping quadcopters to long-range strategic attacks—and highlights their potential adoption by violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The second part of the article assesses the implications for global counterterrorism, emphasizing the psychological impact, scalability, and low operational risk of drone attacks. It concludes by outlining countermeasures, including electronic jamming, physical barriers, kinetic interception, and the growing role of drone-on-drone defense, urging a comprehensive and adaptive response to this multifaceted and accelerating threat.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Counter-terrorism, Drones, Innovation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

79. Armenia’s Changing Relationship With Russia

Author:: Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Armenia is distancing itself from Russia after Moscow failed to support it in the conflict with Azerbaijan Armenia is diversifying its foreign policy toward the EU and US to reduce reliance on a single partner Armenia still depends on Russia—especially in trade, energy, and the economy—making it hard to make 'either-or' choices The EU can help Yerevan reduce its reliance on Russia by deepening cooperation in these areas Continued European backing for Armenia’s democratic development through incentives and conditionality is essential
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Armenia

80. The Crisis of Belarusian Sovereignty

Author:: Kaspar Pucek
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Belarus is facing a potentially existential crisis as Russia’s growing influence threatens its existence as a sovereign state. This is to a significant extent a result of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. European policymakers should look for opportunities to strength Belarusian sovereignty and strategic autonomy through pragmatic engagement. Pragmatic engagement should focus primarily on normalising diplomatic relations and targeted sanctions relief.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Sanctions, Pragmatism, Foreign Influence, and Political Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

81. Are International Institutions/Organizations Useful for Maintaining Peace and Harmony? An Analysis in Combination with a Case Study on the Conflict in Ukraine

Author:: Fabian Boettcher
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: February 24, 2022: Russian forces start the full-scale invasion of Ukraine under the orders of Russian President Putin. Since then, our world has been in turmoil; what seemed certain for years is not certain. After the end of the Second World War, the World Powers established international organizations to prevent that amount of suffering from happening again. Are international organizations useful for maintaining peace? This research essay is going to address the question based on available literature and internet news sources to draw some tangible conclusions and perhaps even to suggest some improvements on how international organizations will be able to stay relevant for global peace in the future. The War in Ukraine will serve as a case study in the essay’s second half. The reader will learn that international organizations have performed well in their functions, that Western nations did things wrong in handling the Ukrainian crisis, and that organizations like NATO got a new drive and purpose courtesy of the Russian aggression. Most importantly, the reader will learn that argumentations on the demise of the liberal world order are premature at best.
Topic:: International Relations, NATO, International Organization, United Nations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

82. The Power of Russian Propaganda: Identity-Related and Authoritarian-System Correlated Factors

Author:: Olga Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This article examines identity-related and authoritarian-system correlated factors, as well as how they influence the positive reception of government propaganda in Russia. Identity-related factors include references to specific historical contexts in the state propaganda narrative and a strengthening of specific values and social beliefs, mainly anti-Western ones, in order to achieve the desired social attitude towards the events under discussion. Authoritarian-system correlated factors include both tight regime control over the entire media landscape and issues related to political apathy, attitudes of conformism and manifestations of cynicism as essential elements of political culture in Russia. The methods of communication between the government and society learnt in the authoritarian system also create fertile ground for the impact of the state narrative: it is a specific combination of identity-related factors exploited by Kremlin propaganda (identity framing), as well as those connected to authoritarian settings, such as political apathy and its resulting consequences, that influence Russians’ susceptibility to state propaganda. These two elements, which work together, mean that Russian propaganda does not have to be persuasive to be effective – it should only strengthen and confirm the already encoded beliefs of the majority of citizens.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Propaganda, Identity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

83. Russian Hybrid (New Generation) Warfare in the Time of a Systemic Political-Military Transition

Author:: Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: The field of hybrid warfare studies has largely stagnated over the past decade. The term is almost exclusively applied to Russian policy carrying an emotional rather than an analytical connotation. Yet originally, it was introduced to describe specific types of armed conflicts. American military experts coined the concept to capture non-conventional forms of warfare encountered in Afghanistan, Iraq, and earlier conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. Over time, it evolved to denote complex, multi-domain operations. The Russian military took interest in the idea, informally adopting elements of the concept without accepting the term itself. In Russia, however, its scope was narrower than in U.S. usage. Whereas “hybrid warfare” in the American sense referred broadly to multi-domain operations, Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” (NGW) described, more narrowly, military operations to be employed in the multi-domain context. After 2014, Western discourse increasingly applied the label “hybrid warfare” to nearly all aspects of Russian foreign policy—creating a methodological problem: if a term applies to everything, it applies to nothing. This study seeks to reassess the substance and evolution of hybrid warfare and to make sense of Russian hybrid operations by clearly distinguishing between cases that qualify and those that represent more traditional foreign or defense policy. A more precise definition will help clarify the phenomenon and enable the development of a predictive framework to anticipate when, where, and how Russia might pursue hybrid operations in the future. To this end, the study begins by tracing the emergence and evolution of the concept, then identifies the elements of hybrid warfare incorporated into Russian policy, highlighting both similarities to and differences from the original American concept. It concludes with case studies of Russian hybrid operations and considers how hybrid warfare may continue to evolve in Russian strategy. For the purposes of this study, the term hybrid warfare refers to complex, multi-domain operations that employ a broad array of both military and non-military tools—political, economic, psychological, informational, cyber, and others. Used in combination, these instruments enable the achievement of operational goals without large-scale use of force, primarily by influencing political and decision-making processes in the target country. Typically, the intended outcome of hybrid operations is either a change of political regime in the target state or the strengthening of an existing regime; in some cases, their goal is “victory without war” by disabling the adversary’s ability and resolve to resist. The military component of hybrid warfare is always limited. It may include special operations, support for paramilitary groups, sabotage, and other forms of deniable or clandestine activity. Even more open use of force is preferably implemented short of war. This study considers use of force integral to hybrid warfare and one of its defining characteristics. By contrast, a multi-domain operation that does not include any use of force is not classified as hybrid warfare. For example, Russia’s war against Ukraine cannot be considered a hybrid operation because it constitutes a full-scale war. Similarly, China’s activities in Africa do not qualify as hybrid warfare: while they involve investment, construction programs, and other economic tools aimed at expanding Chinese influence as well as support for friendly political regimes, they lack a military component. Along the same lines, Russian information warfare against the West is best described as propaganda—traditional or modern (e.g., through social media)—rather than hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, information operations may form part of hybrid warfare when combined with other domains, including limited military action. This study assumes that hybrid warfare is a universal phenomenon not limited to any single country. The tendency of the past decade to associate the term exclusively with Russian policy runs counter to its American origins and is methodologically flawed. When applied only to one country, the term becomes a largely emotional and negative label rather than an analytical tool. Hybrid warfare should instead be understood as a toolbox that any state can employ. The nature of the tool does not depend on its ultimate purpose, whether positive or negative. Indeed, Russia has borrowed many elements of its hybrid operations from U.S. practices in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. The fact that the United States pursued democratic regime-building while Russia aimed at the opposite outcome does not mean the underlying toolbox differed fundamentally.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia

84. The Pendulum Swings Back: Envisioning the Future Trajectory of an Increasingly Asymmetric Iran-Russia Defense Relationship

Author:: Jim Lamson and Hanna Notte
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Key takeaways (1) Cooperation continues. Over the course of 2024 and spring 2025, defense cooperation between Iran and Russia continued. The countries’ adoption of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership capped a string of other activities, including numerous high-level political-military meetings and transfers of select defense technologies. Iran delivered Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia and continued to assist Russia’s UAV production. Most assistance, however, flowed from Russia to Iran, especially in the aerospace, ground, and space domains. (2) A year of upheaval. Silhouetted behind these general trends, a confluence of geopolitical, regional, and battlefield developments fueled a growing asymmetry in the defense relationship. The DPRK emerged as an increasingly important supporter of Russia’s war against Ukraine; Israel’s campaign against the “axis of resistance” and Iran itself ushered in a new era of strategic vulnerability for Iran; in spring 2025, the U.S. administration began to engage Moscow diplomatically, potentially affecting Russia’s calculus regarding cooperation with Iran, at least in the most sensitive areas; and finally, in mid-June, Israel (eventually joined by the United States) engaged in a short aerospace conflict with Iran. (3) A growing asymmetry in needs. Israel’s campaign against Iran and the “axis of resistance” damaged the country’s military-defense assets and exposed key shortcomings, forcing Iranian strategic planners back to the drawing board. Strategically more vulnerable, Iran’s preexisting appetite for Russian assistance in areas such as long-range strike, air and missile defenses, and naval denial has only grown further. For Russia, which expanded the local production of Shahed drones, diversified its sourcing of UAV components, and shifted to focus on other UAV designs, reliance on Iran has passed its peak. Though Russia may well remain interested in production technology for the Shahed-238 drone and its variants as well as Iran’s transfer of other drones and even missiles to enable more diverse strike packages, its dependence on Iran to meet battlefield needs in Ukraine is presently trending downward. (4) The pendulum swings back. While both partners likely retain an interest in sharing lessons from their respective military campaigns, and while a degree of institutional inertia may propel defense cooperation, we observe a shift toward an increasingly asymmetric partnership, with Iran far more dependent on Russia than vice versa. Full battle damage assessments from the Israel-Iran aerospace conflict, the trajectory of battlefield conditions in Ukraine, and the extent of Chinese assistance to both Russia and Iran, are among the factors that will determine how far the pendulum will swing back toward a more asymmetric Iran-Russia defense partnership. (5) Imagining different futures. Based on developments since 2024 that have affected Iran’s and Russia’s defense needs from each other, as well as the drivers and constraints shaping the defense relationship, we consider a continued strategic partnership to be the most likely future. Other futures—a limited military alliance, a full military alliance, or a breakup—are less likely, though not altogether inconceivable, assuming certain contingencies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, and Middle East

85. Putin’s New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps

Author:: Hanna Notte
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Key Takeaways (1) The emergence of Africa Corps. Over the past two years, Africa Corps has taken over most of the Wagner Group’s former Africa operations, elevating them to the level of official state-to-state relations. The new entity emerged after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in late June 2023, with the Russia-Africa summit a month later a key catalyst. (2) Focus on the Sahel. Unlike in Libya, Africa Corps’ takeover from the Wagner Group in Mali was marked by hiccups, and the two entities coexisted there somewhat uneasily until recently. Africa Corps embraced new openings in the Sahel, deploying to Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as more recently to Equatorial Guinea. In consolidating its presence in the Sahel, Russia both benefited from and actively encouraged the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States and a deepening and widening of joint activities among the three Sahelian juntas. (3) Wagner in the Central African Republic. In the Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner Group fighters did not sign new contracts with the Russian defense ministry, and the group has continued to operate as Wagner. It remains to be seen whether, and for how long, Wagner can resist the defense ministry’s usurpation of its CAR operations, especially after the formal end to Wagner operations in Mali in early June 2025. (4) Wagner, rebranded. Africa Corps’ emergence appears to have been largely a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding exercise. The new entity gobbled up many former Wagner fighters and usurped much of the group’s recruitment infrastructure. The Russian military tethered the new entity closer to the military’s chain of command, but seems to not have created any new units for the corps. While the entity’s recruitment campaigns are highly visible, replete with detail on deployment requirements, salary, and benefits, little is known from open sources about its command and manpower. (5) Less nimble and less risk-prone. Africa Corps has thus far prioritized training and routine security assistance for its host countries, compared to the high-risk missions the Wagner Group used to undertake. For its funding, Africa Corps currently appears to rely on Russia’s state budget. In the future, it will likely seek more diverse sources of funding and may even allow new “mini-Prigozhins” to spring up, to engage in profitable business activities to generate funding. (6) A sustainable model? Though worst-case expectations about the fate of Russia’s Syrian bases—namely, that Russia would be ousted from them—did not come to pass after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Russia appears to be engaged in efforts to diversify its military logistics to ensure the sustainability of its Africa operations. Should Africa Corps continue to eschew the types of higher-risk missions that Wagner used to undertake, it might face growing competition from other players, such as China, Iran, and Turkey. It also remains to be seen to what extent Africa Corps will make inroads into Togo, Benin, and a number of other potential target countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Vladimir Putin, Wagner Group, and Africa Corps
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Sahel

86. Yulia Navalnaya in the Václav Havel Library

Author:: Yulia Navalnaya and Ondřej Kundra
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Vaclav Havel Library
Abstract:: In her first live interview in the Czech Republic, Yulia Navalnaya spoke with Ondřej Kundra, a journalist from Respekt, about the book Patriot (Universum, 2025), which is about the life and work of her husband, Alexei Navalny, a leader of the Russian opposition, who was brutally murdered by Putin's regime. The debate between Navalnaya and Kundra touches on some of the most difficult moments of Julia and Alexei’s lives, but also delves into Alexei’s childhood, his entrance into public life and politics, and his fight for a free Russia.
Topic:: Repression, Vladimir Putin, Opposition, and Alexei Navalny
Political Geography:: Russia

87. The Showman: An Interview With President Zelensky’s Wartime Biographer

Author:: Simon Shuster
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Time Magazine Senior Correspondent Simon Shuster discusses his book on Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky and the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine; the current state of affairs; and some of the historical context that brought us here.
Topic:: Journalism, Volodymyr Zelensky, Russia-Ukraine War, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

88. The Weaponization of Energy Resources: Fossil Fuels as Instruments of Geopolitical Leverage in the EU–Russia Context

Author:: Nataliia Khoma and Maiia Nikolaieva
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper examines how energy functions as a strategic instrument of geopolitical coercion, focusing on Russia’s prolonged weaponization of natural gas and the European Union’s evolving response. Building on Soviet-era infrastructure, Moscow has employed price increases, supply cuts, and control of pipelines to pressure states. At the same time, the EU has countered with sanctions, diversification of suppliers, and accelerated investment in renewable energy. For more than fifty years, energy has served as leverage that blurs the boundary between economics and security, imposing heavy economic and political costs on both producers and consumers. Interdependence amplifies these vulnerabilities, allowing energy to operate as a “weapon” on both supply and demand sides. Although the EU plans to end Russian gas imports by 2027, Moscow’s continuing circumvention efforts demonstrate that energy remains a critical tool of power and national security worldwide.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Weaponization
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

89. How Democracies Defend Themselves Against Authoritarianism

Author:: Robert Benson
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Democracies facing authoritarian threats from within have found ways to push back by strengthening institutions, reinforcing democratic norms, and building popular resistance against encroaching autocracy. Understanding these strategies is vital to learning how to fight back.
Topic:: Human Rights, National Security, Authoritarianism, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Transparency, Voting Rights, Donald Trump, Domestic Policy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, India, Israel, North America, and United States of America

90. The Geopolitical Externality of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Killian Conyngham, Maríene de Vries, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper formalizes the geopolitical externality of climate policy and estimates its plausible magnitudes. Specifically, domestic reductions in fossil fuel demand depress global prices, thereby lowering export revenues for resource-rich autocracies – many of which allocate substantial resources to military spending. As a result, climate policy reduces geopolitical and security burdens on Western democracies, offering a potential “peace dividend” as a cobenefit. Exploiting the link between the European Union’s oil consumption and the EU’s costs of the Russian war in Ukraine as a case study, we highlight the relevance of this externality. We estimate that each euro spent on oil in the EU generates geopolitical costs of 0.37 [0.01 - 4.7] euros related to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Based on our central estimate, a carbon price of 62 euros per ton of CO2 would be required to internalize these costs. Even under conservative assumptions, our analysis highlights that the geopolitical externality offers a compelling argument for strong unilateral efforts to reduce fossil fuel demand in the EU.
Topic:: Climate Change, War, European Union, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

91. The Security Dividend of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: By reducing reliance on fossil fuels, EU climate policy substantially lowers Russia’s financial strength, thereby limiting its military capabilities to sustain its aggression on Ukraine and beyond. We provide estimates for the security dividend of EU climate policy. A one-euro reduction in oil consumption in the EU results in a security dividend of 37 cents (central estimate). Based on the security dividend alone, a significant carbon price (central estimate of 60 euros per ton of CO2) on oil consumption is justified – in addition to its climate, terms-of-trade, and local health benefits. Ambitious EU climate policy that reduces demand for oil and natural gas should be seen as an important pillar of the European security architecture, complementing military spending, diplomatic efforts, and continued support to Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

92. Ukraine Aid: How Europe Can Replace US Support

Author:: Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort. To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia’s or Poland’s example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to €6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nation’s contributions to the EU budget. Military effort: On military aid, replacing the US will be more challenging, but is possible in many domains. We show weapon-by-weapon that Europe’s industry has viable alternatives for almost all of the main US heavy weapon systems donated to Ukraine. Europe also accelerated ammunition production and this effort would now need to be intensified at greater speed and scale, especially for howitzer ammunition. Our data show that the biggest dependency from US-produced weapons is in (i) rocket artillery such as HIMARS (86% of weapons for Ukraine are US-produced systems), (ii) Howitzer ammunition (82% US produced), (iii) long-range anti-aircraft systems such as Patriots (70% US produced). In other domains, European weapons play a more important role, in particular regarding Howitzers and battle tanks. Among the heavy weapons, US HIMARS and Patriots are hardest to replace, as is the supply of ammunition for these systems. Also, US intelligence sharing and satellite imagery are decisive. To respond to these challenges: Europe needs to ramp up the production of essential weapons and artillery ammunition quickly and broadly. It is advantageous that European donors already transited away from donating from stocks to procuring new weapons for Ukraine from industry. These procurement efforts would need to be extended considerably by making firm medium- and long-term commitments to weapon-producing firms. For US weapons that are hard to replace, Europe could place orders in the US and beyond. Viable alternatives to HIMARS include the South Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israel’s PULS. In addition, Europe could heavily invest in the development and production of alternative systems such as SAMP/T. European countries could also increase drone production considerably, both by European producers, and, more importantly, by directly investing in the highly successful weapons industry of Ukraine. Finally, Europe would need to move fast to build alternative digital, satellite, and intelligence systems, including accelerated and expanded initiatives such as the satellite internet constellation IRIS2.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Arms Trade, Fiscal Policy, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

93. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:: Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Military Spending, Innovation, Geoeconomics, Fiscal Multipliers, Rearmament, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

94. Veterans of Russia’s war of aggression: Failed reintegration as a threat to the post-Putin era

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the eventual demobilization of troops is set to pose the greatest veteran reintegration challenge in Russian society since World War II. Problems that have already emerged, such as crimes committed by veterans, will almost certainly increase. Russian society is unlikely to be welcoming towards veterans, either now or in the future, due to emerging inequalities. These inequalities stem from the high rewards paid for military service and the many other privileges granted to veterans and their relatives. Besides offering various benefits, the Kremlin has sought to prepare for this situation by appointing veterans to positions in regional administrations. However, efforts to maintain their respected status will fall short amid the unprecedented number of veterans. Moreover, those promoted to high-profile bureaucratic roles do not actually represent the broader veteran population. The simmering discontent among veterans is unlikely to pose a critical threat to Putin’s rule because the conditions for any kind of oppositional political organization are non-existent under the current regime. Instead, the veteran problem, the scale of which remains unclear, could become a significant factor in deepening the political crisis in post-Putin Russia.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Veterans, Armed Conflict, Demobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

95. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

96. Russia’s war dilemma: Can the Kremlin seek peace without losing face?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The Kremlin appears to be cautiously testing public sentiment on potential peace negotiations, using state-controlled media and elite statements to gauge reactions. Support for peace talks is growing, particularly among regime supporters, reflecting increasing war fatigue. This shift is largely shaped by Putin’s narrative that the war is nearing its objectives, reinforcing the perception of a strategic victory. Most Russians remain insulated from the direct consequences of the war, but exposure is gradually increasing through family connections. As a result, concerns about the country’s stability and the long-term costs of the war are rising. Even if peace negotiations take place, Vladimir Putin – not the military – will claim the political benefits by framing the outcome as a victory. Despite the war, Russia’s military elite has not significantly increased its political influence, and public trust in the armed forces has declined.
Topic:: War, Authoritarianism, Negotiation, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

97. Moldova’s EU Path: Between Moscow’s Shadow and Brussels’ Promises

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In the ongoing confrontation between the European Union and Russia, the Republic of Moldova occupies a critical—though often overlooked—position. While not as militarily pivotal as Ukraine, Moldova’s struggle is no less consequential: it is a contest over national orientation and the future of the European order. Moldova’s plural identity makes it especially vulnerable to Russian interference, complicating its EU accession process and straining internal cohesion. The country’s trajectory mirrors the broader dilemma facing post-Soviet states still defining themselves amid renewed geopolitical rivalry between East and West. Moldova’s future will depend on the decisions of its leaders and electorate, the course of the war in Ukraine, and the EU’s readiness to honour its commitment to membership. The 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections will reveal whether Moldova’s leadership retains a popular mandate to pursue the European path. This policy brief outlines key aspects of the current situation and sets out how the EU can help safeguard the integrity of Moldova’s upcoming elections and support its pro-European trajectory amid heightened geopolitical risk.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, Foreign Interference, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

98. From Syria to the Black Sea: Containing Russia, Partnering with Turkey?

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The outcome of the Russo-Turkish power competition in Syria will impact the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This, in turn, will impact the outcome of any peace negotiations with Ukraine and its relative position in the Black Sea. The future of Syria very much matters for the EU, therefore. Because blunting Russia’s attempts at achieving dominance over the Black Sea will play an important role in Europe’s security. And because the Syrian coast is only 300KM from Cyprus, the EU’s southeastern most border. Syria is the EU’s neighbour for all intents and purposes. In Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey and the EU finally have a key strategic objective in common.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Black Sea

99. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:: Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

100. The Fog: The Opacity That Warns

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Now in its fourth year, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become more than a battlefield confrontation. It is fire, ice, and fog at once: the hot war in Ukraine fought with mass, drones, and attrition; the cold confrontation with NATO, centred on escalation management; and the fog of Russia’s internal struggle, marked by fatigue, militarisation, repression, and a growing social isolation, as much of the population seeks to distance itself from the war both mentally and in daily life. Considered alone, each dimension distorts the picture. Taken together, they reveal a Russia both fragile and resilient, archaic and adaptive. This is Part III: The Fog, examining Russia’s internal front—the least legible dimension of the conflict. The system performs strength while pressure accumulates beneath the surface: raison d’état coexists with societal passivity, producing fragility that yields lurches rather than orderly decline. This Policy Brief maps that opacity through an economy of exhaustion, the “veteran variable” as battlefield costs migrate home, a society that holds still under pressure, elite cohesion sustained by fear and performance, and the indicators that often precede sudden shifts. The policy lesson is simple: do not mistake opacity for stability—prepare for discontinuity, monitor the silent front, and prioritise endurance over spectacle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS