Political Geography: Russia - CIAO Search Results

1. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:: Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

2. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:: Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:: Michele Nones
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:: Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:: NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

6. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:: George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

7. The South Caucasus and Great Power Confrontation: Is There a Silver Lining on the Horizon?

Author:: Gulshan Pashayeva
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The onset of the present stage in the conflict over Ukraine in February 2022 further heightened an already tense geopolitical standoff. Although this war has now entered into its third year, there is no clear sign that a peaceful settlement could be within reach. Rather, each passing day makes the situation more complicated and drags both sides towards a dead end in which neither one nor the other of the two direct belligerents is likely to emerge better off than each was before the full-scale fighting began again in earnest. Today, this war in which two major geopolitical actors—the West and Russia—have become trapped is also having an impact on other regions around the globe. The European Union is one, obviously: its ambitions to achieve geopolitical autonomy (at least within the West, as a distinct pole), for instance, have been set back, and Brussels has had to scramble mightily to reconfigure the terms of its energy security. Another is the Silk Road region in general, and the South Caucasus in particular. This essay will examine the latest developments in this latter area through an inquiry into whether (and how) the evolving geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia affects that part of the world. It will culminate with a consideration of whether there is any silver lining that could result from this situation, whereby the South Caucasus could become a politically and economically united region in the time ahead.
Topic:: Power Politics, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Balkans, Georgia, and South Caucasus

8. Pivotal States, Not Swing States

Author:: Mohammed Soliman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The United States, in particular, is grappling with the challenges posed by the emerging multipolar order and the need to secure a favorable position in this evolving global landscape. As part of this contemplation, there is a growing recognition of the significance of “swing states” like India, Türkiye, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia in shaping the outcome of the postCold War order and the broader global system. However, framing these consequential states as “swing states” in and of itself carries significant risk, as it implies that the only choice they have is a binary one: pick the U.S.-led West or the China and Russia axis. In reality, their strategic posture is far away from choosing one side over the other; at the same time, they are not behaving similarly to the Cold War-era non-aligned movement that was inherently anti-Western and leaned towards the Soviet-led block under the disguise of anti-colonialism solidarity. The appropriate strategic name for this growing list of countries in the present-day is “pivotal states,” and includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, chosen for their strategic geography, demography, and overall strength. Alongside these, there are other pivotal states with unique roles, such as Vietnam due to its position in the global supply chain and Egypt as a maritime bottleneck between the East and West. It is now widely acknowledged that international stability and the outcome of the U.S.-China neoCold War are influenced by factors beyond the behavior of Russia and China. But one crucial factor that remains underappreciated is that the behavior of pivotal states— which are determined to chart an independent course—will play vital roles in shaping the future of the international system. It is essential to recognize that these pivotal states inherently reject the bipolarity and “Cold War 2.0” framing that dominates the perspectives of, for example, Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

9. Armenia’s Critical Economic Reliance on Russia: Can the West Eliminate It?

Author:: Orkhan Baghirov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Lately one of the most discussed political issues related to the South Caucasus region is Armenia’s attempt to incline towards the West by trying to move away from Russia’s sphere of influence. This has been manifested both geopolitically and geoeconomically. However, Armenia’s potential strategic shift away from its centuries-old political alignment with Russia raises questions about the future of the overall relationship between the two countries. A key concern revolves around the challenges Armenia may face due to its significant economic dependence on Russia. For such a shift to occur successfully, Armenia would have to not only strengthen its political and security ties with the West, but also develop the ability to replace Russia with Western partners in key economic sectors. Thus, the primary objective of the essay is to assess the degree to which Armenia could economically substitute Russia with the West, determining the feasibility of this transition. To achieve this, we should identify the critical level of Armenia’s reliance on Russia across diverse economic sectors and assess the extent to which the West can mitigate this dependency in anything resembling a realistic timeframe, without, that is, critically endangering Armenia’s economic wellbeing.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, and South Caucasus

10. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?

Author:: Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

11. The Regional Security Complex Theory and Energy Triangle of EU-TurkeyRussia

Author:: Mehmet Ferhat Fırat
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This study explores the application of the regional security complex theory (RCST) to the energy relations between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. It underscores the critical role of energy security in shaping international relations and highlights the mutual interdependence among these actors in the energy issue. The study sheds light on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on energy security and emphasizes the need for diversification of energy sources to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. Turkey's active and neutral policy with Russia has formed a security complex in energy relations among these three actors. The claim that shared concerns or threat perceptions among actors assumed by the regional security complex theory constitutes a security complex has been used within the framework of this study to justify the existence of an energy security complex between Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Furthermore, given its strategic geographical position and energy infrastructure projects, this research outlines Turkey's potential as a critical isolator actor and energy hub in the region. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of energy relations and the evolving regional energy security landscape in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Security, Energy Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Turkey

12. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:: Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

13. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:: Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:: NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

14. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
Topic:: Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:: Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

16. India-Russia Relations in Troubled Times: Steady but Stagnating

Author:: Aleksei Zakharov
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the trajectory of India-Russia relations post-February 2022. The war in Ukraine emerged as a significant challenge for bilateral ties, presenting new obstacles to political and diplomatic relations and intensifying the previous difficulties in developing economic cooperation. Moscow and New Delhi have demonstrated divergent approaches to the advancement of their strategic partnership. While Russia has rushed into reinventing the old friendship with India, the latter has acted with greater discretion. New Delhi has demonstrated a nuanced approach to navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, staying on good terms with Moscow and the West. India’s record imports of Russian crude and other commodities, at times in defiance of Western sanctions, have allowed for a considerable boost in bilateral trade. While this “oil connection” may benefit both the Indian and Russian economies, it should not be misperceived as a leap forward in partnership. The structural challenges appear to still prevent the two sides from reinvigorating the economic ties. Furthermore, their geopolitical understanding is waning, and their defense cooperation is currently in a state of limbo. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, India seems to be prioritizing maintaining the status quo in its relationship with Russia over pursuing new initiatives. This may help to prevent the two sides from drifting apart too far in the near term but is unlikely to lead to any substantive progress in their relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, and India

17. Friends in Need: Russian Strategic Communications in Africa Before and After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Christopher Babcock
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Africa is becoming an important strategic hub for the Russian state as Putin’s regime faces rising ostracization elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze Russian influence in Africa by examining over 1,700 pieces of online content created or re-posted by 4 Russian embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania between January 15 and December 31, 2022. I demonstrate that, despite new developments in Russian strategic communications, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has mostly fed pre-existing narratives rather than drastically shifting the focus or direction of state rhetoric. All four of the embassies used in the analysis promoted narratives that depicted Russia as a revisionist power going up against a “neocolonial” West, portrayed Ukraine as a neo-Nazi puppet of the West, and attempted to contrast this with Russia’s purportedly friendly relations with Africa. The scale and intensity of these narratives exploded in the leadup to and in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine—to the extent that some embassies began to focus almost exclusively on Ukraine in their communications. Meanwhile, many African nations were willing to pragmatically engage with Russia as an alternative (or complementary) ally to the West. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I show that the war in Ukraine has revealed the fault lines of Russian and African thinking, loyalty, and strategy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Engagement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:: Russia and Africa

18. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

19. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:: Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

20. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

21. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:: Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

22. The Realist debate in the context of the War in Ukraine: balancing dynamics, international change and strategic calculus

Author:: Layla Ibrahim Abdallah Dawood and Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The article discusses Mearsheimer’s interpretation of Russia’s use of force against Ukraine based on concepts and categories of Offensive Realism. It is argued that external balancing lost its place during unipolarity. However, Russian internal balancing is one of the factors that enabled the current conflict, and Russia’s rapprochement with China diminishes the prospects for conflict in Asia, allowing Russian military efforts to be concentrated in the European theater. Additionally, the decision to use force will be analyzed in its strategic dimension. It is concluded that Russia’s activities against Ukraine are entirely consistent with Offensive Realism, despite of Mearsheimer’s allegations contrarywise.
Topic:: International Relations, Realism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

24. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:: Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

25. Russia’s Influence and Disinformation Campaign in Armenia

Author:: David A. Grigorian
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Often-overlooked developments in Armenia show how Western policy makers are failing to recognize and counteract the growing sophistication of Russia’s propaganda machine. There is much the West can do. Intelligence authorities can start sharing more information about Russia’s influence operations. We need media that can report with more knowledge from the region. Working more closely with the pro-Western opposition, Brussels and Washington, D.C. can help shape an agenda that is not just offering better conditions for Armenia but also leads to more credibility in a Western-oriented agenda. Finally, it is important for the West to acknowledge their own blunders over the settlements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which led to continued ethnic cleansing.
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Russia and Armenia

26. What if…? 12 Dragon King scenarios for 2028

Author:: Florence Gaub
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: At first glance, this publication appears to be a collection of Early Warning essays – they are, to some extent, but they should not be exclusively read as such. Conventional Early Warning systems have a much shorter time horizon – normally hours, perhaps months at most – than these scenarios, and they are solely mitigation mechanisms, that is to say they provide no insight into how the event they are warning of can be avoided. They are thus not an intellectual thought exercise, but solely an alarm bell. Our Dragon Kings in this volume provide insight into how they can be avoided, but they also challenge our assumptions in more ways than one. They are therefore awareness-raisers no matter how credible or plausible you will find them. Just reading them will have a readiness-increasing effect. (In fact, the more absurd you find them, the more pronounced this is because your mind will learn more when the emotion they generate is greater.) These scenarios can become even more useful, however, if you use them for simulation exercises in a team. You can use them as a blueprint for a wider scenario exercise, whether one wishes to adopt a blue or red team approach to them, and ask questions such as: how could this have been prevented, what would have to be done? What are alternative pathways of this scenario that are even worse, and how can we prevent those? The most important aspect is that every exercise of this kind must lead to some concrete policy steps. Merely thinking about improbable futures is never enough – doing something about them is what makes them a useful policy-tool. In that case, they lead to active, rather than passive, engagement with the content, foster collaboration, encourage innovation, practice decision-making, provide a space for failure and experimentation with alternative courses of action. It is precisely because of this that scenarios are a common feature in military education, but they work just as well in any other strategic context – provided, time and space is made for it. If yes, they contribute to increasing preparedness and readiness, and accelerate the response time to surprise. What’s more, generally engaging in fringe thinking about the future will strengthen these capabilities no matter what kind of surprise eventually occurs. Much like how vaccines teach the immune system, disruptive thinking strengthens our neural networks, making us more resilient for extreme situations.
Topic:: NATO, Natural Disasters, Elections, Crisis Management, Coup, UN Security Council, Biological Weapons, Resilience, Arctic Council, and Readiness
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iraq, Europe, India, Taiwan, Latin America, Nigeria, and Tunisia

27. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:: Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

28. Using the financial system to enforce export controls

Author:: Benjamin Hilgenstock, Elina Ribakova, Guntram Wolff, and Anna Vlasyuk
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russian imports of battlefield goods that are subject to export controls, including from Western producers, have surged since mid-2022 and reached levels close to those prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia thus continues to be able to acquire critical foreign components that it needs for its military industry. These imports occur via mainland China, Hong Kong, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, while other countries including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have also seen massive increases in imports from the EU and other coalition countries that likely end up in Russia. The implementation and enforcement of export controls faces major challenges, which are multifaceted and centre around complex supply chains, lack of transparency in documentation and opaque financial structures. The issues are familiar from anti money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks, where much progress has been made in the last two decades. A similar approach could help in rendering export controls effective. We propose: First, financial institutions could be tasked to play a role in the monitoring of the trade in export-controlled goods and the blocking of illicit transactions, building on their experience with due diligence in financial transactions. Second, non-financial companies could learn from banks’ efforts in the AML/CFT sphere to implement proper due-diligence procedures and to ensure export controls compliance. Public-sector investigations and appropriate fines are critical to increase the incentives for firms to act. Technology sanctions are going to be part of the economic statecraft toolbox for the foreseeable future. The Russia case will test their effectiveness and credibility, or lack thereof.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, Imports, Financial Systems, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

29. Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications

Author:: Zsolt Darvas, Marek Dabrowski, Heather Grabbe, Luca Léry, André Sapir, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Whether and when Ukraine accedes to the European Union will depend greatly on how and when its war with Russia ends and post-war reconstruction starts, and how the EU handles issues of governance, security, migration, trade, investment, the energy transition, decarbonisation and the EU budget. The enlargement process is likely to overlap with post-war reconstruction, increasing the EU's influence in fostering Ukraine’s institutional development. Ukrainian leaders will have strong incentives to comply with the accession criteria, which the EU should use astutely to create a better-functioning economy and public institutions, especially by reducing opportunities for corruption. This will require clearer standards for rule-of-law and fundamental values, including effective tools to ensure continued compliance after accession. That is also the most effective way to ensure a positive impact of future enlargements on EU governance. The EU will also need to develop assistance programmes to help the Ukrainian government manage post-war external and internal security challenges, including the large number of weapons in circulation, and to encourage Ukrainian refugees to return to the country when possible, as they will be needed for the reconstruction effort. If the current EU budget rules were applied and there were no transitional arrangements – which is unlikely – we calculate the total annual cost of Ukraine's integration into the EU budget at 0.13 per cent of EU GDP, which would hardly change net recipient/payer positions of current EU members. Some of this funding would come back to the EU via EU companies participating in EU-funded projects in Ukraine. Ukraine’s entry into the EU would benefit EU GDP via trade, migration and foreign direct investment, boosting employment, production and tax revenues in the EU. The history of EU enlargement shows that the strongest motivation for difficult reforms is a credible and predictable accession process based on rewarding reforms. Both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies, alongside the formal accession negotiations. That would show the Ukrainian public the tangible benefits of moving towards EU standards, while also bringing Ukraine into areas such as energy cooperation and decarbonisation.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Illiberalism in International Relations

Author:: Alexander Dugin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: There are two main schools in the theory of international relations --- realism and liberalism. Realists believe that human nature is inherently flawed (the legacy of Hobbes’s anthropological pessimism and, on an even deeper level, the legacy of the Christian idea of the Fall, or lapsus in Latin) and cannot be fundamentally corrected, which means that selfishness, predation, and violence are impossible to eradicate. This leads to the conclusion that man (who, according to Hobbes, is a wolf to another man) can only be restrained and regulated by means of a strong state. The state is inevitable and is the bearer of supreme sovereignty. At the same time, the predatory and egoistic nature of man is projected onto the state; therefore, the nationstate has its own interests. These interests take into account only their own state, while the will to violence and greed mean war is always a possibility. Realists believe that this has always been and always will be. International relations are therefore based only on a balance of power between wholly sovereign entities. No world order can exist in the long term; there is only chaos, which changes as some states weaken and others strengthen. At the same time, the term “chaos” in this theory is not bad in itself; it is merely a statement of the actual state of affairs, derived from taking the concept of sovereignty very seriously. If there are several truly sovereign powers, no supranational order can exist between them to which all would submit. Were such an order to exist, sovereignty would not be complete, in fact, it would not exist at all, and only this supranational authority itself would be sovereign. The school of realism has traditionally been very strong in the US, starting with its first founders: Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan in the US, and Edward Carr in the UK.
Topic:: International Relations, Realism, Multipolarity, Illiberalism, and Posthumanism
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

31. NATO: Waging High-Tech Warfare

Author:: Yury Belobrov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: THE rapid technological progress observed in the last decade throughout the world, especially in China and Russia, threatens the established sources of military and industrial dominance of the collective West on the world stage. NATO views this as an alarming trend, and in an attempt to stop it, bloc members are making a determined effort to preserve their militarytechnological leadership and the international order structured around their policies. To this end, they are initiating a new arms race, partially through the active incorporation into the military sphere of the latest breakthrough technologies (Emerging and Disruptive Technologies – EDT), which, they believe, can reverse the emerging multipolarity of international relations and radically change the nature of future wars. Thus, the Allies are stepping up collective efforts to master innovative technologies and introduce them into the operational activities of NATO and all member nations to ensure their victory in future high-tech wars. They emphasize the urgency of adapting the armed forces of said countries to the realities of global technological advancement. As the communiqué adopted at the Alliance summit in Vilnius in 2023 directly stated: “We are accelerating our own efforts to ensure that the Alliance maintains its technological edge in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military advantage including through dual-use solutions.”1 The US, as the main sponsor of NATO militarism, demands that its allies and partners closely and expeditiously collaborate on the creation of novel weaponry utilizing these emerging technologies and dramatically increase investment in various EDT projects and adapt their armed forces to them. Under the US’s diktat, Brussels and its American allies are creating new bureaucratic and financial entities. Private businesses and academic and research institutions are also being drawn into this sphere. To speed up this process, at the urging of Washington at the NATO summit in Brussels in 2021, a strategic initiative was launched to create the NATO Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which will manage and coordinate all this activity within NATO. The main task of this organization is to form an innovative technological network that unites R&D centers, innovative start-ups, defense enterprises, and military agencies in order to simultaneously and rapidly master all types of dual-use EDT technologies and implement them in the civilian and military fields. In addition to these efforts, a decision was also made to form a €1 billion NATO Innovation Fund to finance venture capital companies developing dual EDT in areas of strategic importance to NATO. Essentially, these decisions by the alliance are aimed at mobilizing European resources, primarily to strengthen American military power. Of course, the main efforts to field the latest technologies are being undertaken by the largest member nations.
Topic:: NATO, International Cooperation, Weapons, Innovation, Emerging Technology, High-Tech Wars, and Military and Industrial Advantage
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

32. The Global West and Global South: Development Paths

Author:: Maria Zakharova
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: I would like to highlight the fact that Russia is notably absent, it would seem, from the “South-West” paradigm. This is because our country cannot be fully categorized as either Western or Southern. We exist everywhere, and yet we do not fit neatly into these constructs. Some perspectives associate Russia with the Global North, while others link us to the Global East. However, [Russia’s] 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, which Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko referenced, defines the Russian Federation as a “unique state-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power” – a scope broader than these conventional classifications. And in the context of our discussion today, it is imperative to acknowledge Russia’s influence on global affairs. The concept of the Global West is relatively straightforward; it encompasses the US, the EU countries, and to some extent the Asia- Pacific region, knit together by American-centric military, political, and economic alliances – what they call Euro-Atlantic values. This is a product of the historical West, which has been extending its influence over the non-Western world for around five centuries, starting from the Age of Discovery, in an attempt to dominate it by all possible means. However, it is worth noting that calling the current era neocolonialism may be overly generous. I would refrain from such a characterization, as it gives too much credit. While there are undoubtedly flaws in these cultures, they also have rich cultural histories. In recent decades, individuals have risen to power in the US and Britain whose thinking is characterized more by piracy and banditry than by a philosophical understanding of colonialism, which is by no means good. But this is worse than neocolonialism – it is outright robbery. To illustrate, I once used the analogy of the US acting like a cowboy in the Louvre who simply shoots everything in sight, unaware that the objects before him are valuable works of art.
Topic:: Security, Treaties and Agreements, Developing World, State, BRICS, Civilization, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:: Russia, United States of America, Global South, and Global West

33. Civilizational War: The Will to Win

Author:: Andrey Ilnitsky
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The US National Security Strategy defines the US as a global hegemon that sees no dividing lines between domestic and foreign policies and treats the world as its sphere of interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Globalization, National Security, War, Hegemony, Ideology, Civilization, Deep State, and Generative Models
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

34. Russia 2024: Making or Breaking the System

Author:: Laetitia Spetschinsky
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2024, Russia is poised for Putin’s fifth term amid a lackluster presidential election. The political landscape leans towards conservatism, emphasizing protection against internal dissent. Putin’s focus on family values and the crackdown on LGBTQ rights underscores a nationalist agenda. Internationally, Russia aims to defend Russian-speaking communities and expand alliances, particularly in BRICS. The pivotal year presents challenges in territorial acquisition, maintaining the war economy, and preserving national unity. Putin’s legacy hinges on navigating these challenges and proclaiming a strategic victory in the face of Western pressures.
Topic:: Elections, Domestic Politics, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

35. Freerider or Strategic Balancer? Austria vis-à-vis NATO and Russia. US – perspective on Austrian neutrality politics

Author:: Jason C. Moyer and Patrick Kornegay
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 highlighted the fragility of peace and security in Europe. The resurgence of war in Europe prompted a reassessment of the security postures of traditionally neutral countries. Norms on military spending and assistance have been shattered, leading to Finland and Sweden reversing decades of military non-alignment to join NATO. Even Switzerland is eyeing a strategic overhaul and is considering joint exercises with NATO (Revill, 2022). Despite Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO Austria remains committed to neutrality. The public debate on Austria’s strategic culture has remained largely the same and policymakers in Vienna have not changed their stance on NATO. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored Austria’s need to reevaluate its policy of neutrality and strategic approach vis-a-vis NATO and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Austria, and United States of America

36. Energy as a weapon - decoding blackmail tactics in Europe

Author:: Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: ‘Energy blackmail’ became a buzzword following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent energy crisis, but the phenomenon is not new. Energy blackmail has been employed by states to leverage their strategic energy resources for decades. In Europe, the weaponisation of energy predates Vladimir Putin’s time in Kremlin. Despite EU efforts to diversify its energy supply, the threat of energy blackmail persists, posing challenges not only to traditional energy dependencies but also to the increasingly digitalised energy sector.
Topic:: European Union, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

37. The war in Ukraine poses unprecedented threats to aid workers

Author:: Jethro Norman
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: An interstate war in Europe presents new security challenges for humanitarians. Along the 960km Ukraine-Russia frontline, humanitarian infrastructure has been hit by shelling, missiles and drone strikes, and aid delivery disrupted by electronic warfare. Supporting specialised training and removing outdated bureaucratic burdens are some of the ways in which donors and policymakers can help humanitarian organisations adapt to this new context.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, Conflict, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Aid Workers
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Humanitarian principles are under fire in Ukraine

Author:: Jethro Norman
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Ukraine presents a unique challenge for many international humanitarian organisations. Operating in a context of heightened geo-political and donor interest, and in close proximity to military actors, amateur volunteer groups and Ukrainian civil society are testing the core principles of neutrality and impartiality that once underpinned humanitarian work.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Humanitarian Aid, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. The Children of War

Author:: Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Children, Civilians, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The Concept of "Putinism" and its Impact on the "Normalization" of Georgian-Russian Relations

Author:: Malkhaz Mikeladze
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In view of the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, the Russian elite is formulating conceptual approaches to justify the inevitability of the escalating confrontation with the West and to encompass the foreign priorities of the Russian Federation. Within expert circles, this combination of approaches is increasingly labeled as “Putinism,” with the belief that its main components will have a decisive impact on Russia’s relations with other countries, including Georgia. Amidst the ongoing polarization of Georgian society, the normalization of relations with Russia emerges as one of the most important issues, a normalization process that has triggered radicalization and sharp confrontation between the government and opposition, further complicating the depolarization process and civil dialogue recommended by the European Union. These challenges themselves seem to be obstacles to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, the article aims to review the basic principles of “Putinism” and provide a pragmatic evaluation for the “normalization” of Georgian-Russian relations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Normalization, Vladimir Putin, and Polarization
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

41. The End of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Causes and Expected Consequences

Author:: Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: On November 7, 2023, Russia formally withdrew from the Convention on Arms in Europe (CFE), and in December, NATO suspended the agreement, leading to the collapse of one of the largest arms control treaties since the Cold War. The main goal of the treaty was to ensure security and stability in Europe through conventional arms control; through periodical monitoring, information was shared and trust was built between the parties. The new reality, emerging right after the cancelation of the agreement, has become the subject of active discussion in political and academic circles. Our paper aims to analyze the essence and meaning of the CFE agreement, the reasons for it being cancelled, and the expected results
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Russia, and Convention on Arms in Europe (CFE)
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

42. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties

Author:: Mamuka Zhvania
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
Topic:: Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

43. Occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region: Changes in Russian Politics from the 1990s to 2024

Author:: Mamuka Komakhia
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In the post-Soviet period, the Kremlin’s policy regarding the separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, underwent several stages of transformation. In the 1990s, Moscow positioned itself as a neutral mediator between the conflicting parties. However, following the August 2008 war and the subsequent recognition of the “independence” of these separatist regions, as well as the deployment of armed forces, Moscow became their main ally and security guarantor. Since 2022, after the onset of full-scale military aggression in Ukraine, Moscow has intensified efforts to increase its influence on these occupied regions, aiming for their full integration into Russia’s political, economic, and legal space. The article discusses the stages of transformation in Russian policy towards the occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region from the 1990s to 2024, detailing and analysing changes at each stage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Separatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Abkhazia, and Tskhinvali

44. Freedom isn’t Free: A cost-benefit analysis of support for Ukraine

Author:: Bob Deen and Roman de Baedts
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: More than ten years after the Russian annexation of Crimea and two years after the large-scale invasion, Ukraine is still holding its own against Russia. This is not only due to the courage and efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, but also thanks to the extensive military, economic, and financial support packages from Europe and the US. For 2024, the government had allocated three billion euros for military support to Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression and also pledged an additional three billion for 2025. Following the UK, France, and Germany, the Netherlands has entered into a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine to ensure long-term support. The recently released AIV briefing note and a recent parliamentary letter also advocate for sustained support. However, this Western support is no longer a certainty or uncontested. Particularly in the US, but also in some European NATO countries, calls to halt support to Ukraine are slowly gaining more traction. The American support package of sixty billion dollars was stuck in the House of Representatives for months, causing significant difficulties for the Ukrainian armed forces. President Biden has scaled back his rhetoric from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”. New commitments for new aid to Ukraine stalled at the end of 2023 (with a nearly ninety percent drop), while promised ammunition quantities fell far short. A warning from French President Macron that a Western military intervention should not be ruled out received little support from his foreign counterparts. Although the issue of Western ‘boots on the ground’ also requires further attention, it is not addressed within this memo, and ‘support’ encompasses both economic and material assistance, but without the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Following Putin’s ‘election victory’ in March, the Kremlin escalated its war rhetoric. Government officials are now openly discussing ‘war,’ whereas previously, using that word could land one in prison. This fits into the rhetoric where NATO, rather than Ukraine, is portrayed as the aggressor. Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the formation of two new combined arms Army Corps and accelerated the recruitment of new military personnel. Meanwhile, the Russian war industry is gearing up, producing large quantities of ammunition and equipment for the Russian war effort. The extensive import of artillery ammunition from North Korea and drones from Iran, among other capabilities, further complements Russian stocks. The consequences on the battlefield are already noticeable, as seen in the loss of the city of Avdiivka in February, and developments along the front since. Meanwhile, pressure on Ukrainian troops at the front is mounting. In an interview at the end of March, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will have to cede more land if Western material support continues to be lacking. The renewed Northern front after the second Russian Kharkiv offensive is likely to further stretch Ukrainian defences and resilience in the near future. Despite overwhelming support in the Dutch parliament for continued support for Ukraine, there are nonetheless questions about the duration and scope of future assistance. The question regarding the costs and benefits of providing political, economic, and military support by the Dutch government is extremely relevant in this context. This constitutes more than a simple calculation where profit or loss is expressed in Euros. It also involves security risks and geopolitical and moral costs and benefits that cannot always be quantified in one-dimensional figures. It is therefore essential to adopt a broader understanding of costs and benefits, reasoned from the perspective of Dutch national security interests and the impact of international support on the outcomes of the conflict. An important consideration here is the extent to which support for Ukraine contributes to a military victory, a military loss, or a protracted conflict.
Topic:: Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

45. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:: Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

46. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
Topic:: Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

47. The Impact and Limits of Sanctions on Russia’s Telecoms Industry

Author:: Maria Kolomychenko
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The West responded to Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine with unprecedented sanctions targeting its entire tech industry. While the sanctions on the telecoms sector have not had the intended destructive effect on Russia’s war machine, they have created significant negative side effects for its populace. Russian propaganda is using them to reinforce its narrative that “the West is fighting Russian citizens, and Vladimir Putin is protecting them.”
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, Economy, Telecommunications, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia

48. Banning YouTube in Russia: Just a Matter of Time

Author:: Philipp Dietrich
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: YouTube is the last bastion of free expression and information in Russia, with over 93 million users. A ban on the platform would hurt democratic principles and freedom of speech in the country – and it is not a question of if but when. To prevent the further isolation of Russian society, democratic policymakers must act swiftly by urging Google to cooperate and to bolster YouTube’s infrastructure, as well as by reviewing sanctions.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Social Media, Freedom of Expression, YouTube, and Freedom of Information
Political Geography:: Russia

49. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:: Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:: Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

50. Japan's Arctic Policy: Current Status and Challenges

Author:: Sakiko Hataya
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Ms. Sakiko Hataya, Research Fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan, highlights the increasing importance of the Arctic in Japan's ocean policy and touches upon how Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacts the execution of Japan's Arctic policy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sustainability, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, Asia, and Arctic

51. US Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and Roles for Partners

Author:: Rebecca Pincus
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center, explains that "The development of Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons is dependent on foreign investment and advanced technologies; as the West has withdrawn from Russia, China is an important, if imperfect, substitute..."
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

52. Sino-Russia Arctic Relations: The View from Singapore

Author:: Hema Nadarajah
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Hema Nadarajah, Program Manager for Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, explains that states seeking to deepen their engagement in the Arctic, such as Singapore, may find themselves trying to balance tensions, especially in the wake of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and US-China strategic competition.
Topic:: Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic

53. Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective

Author:: Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Capt. (IND) Anurag Bisen (Retd.), Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, explains that "India needs to step up its engagement to secure its increasing national interest in the Arctic" and "must also use its equities with all the Arctic states to facilitate collaboration, ensuring access to infrastructure, research areas, and data."
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, India, North America, and Arctic

54. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic

Author:: Young Kil Park
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
Topic:: Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic

55. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:: William D. Hartung
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

56. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:: George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

57. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:: Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

58. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order

Author:: Faisal Devji
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Topic:: Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

59. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?

Author:: Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

60. The Price of War

Author:: Jonathan Federle, André Meier, Steffen Müller, Willi Mutschler, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: In an integrated global economy, the economic fallout of war is not confined to the country where the conflict is fought but spills over to other countries. We study the economic effects of large interstate wars using a new data set spanning 150 years of data for more than 60 countries. War on a country’s territory typically leads to an output decline of 30 percent and a 15 percentage point increase in inflation. We find large negative effects also for countries that are geographically close to the war site, irrespective of their participation in the war. Output in neighboring countries falls by more than 10 percent over 5 years, and inflation rises by 5 percentage points on average. Negative spillovers decline with geographic distance and increase in the degree of trade integration with the war site. For very distant countries, output spillovers can turn positive so that wars create winners and losers in the international economy. We rationalize these findings in an international business cycle model, calibrated to capture key features of the data. As the war destroys capital in the war site and productivity falls, trade with nearby economies decreases, generating an endogenous supply-side contraction abroad.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, War, Business, Geoeconomics, Russia-Ukraine War, Spillovers, and Supply Shocks
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Global Focus

61. Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?

Author:: Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Multiple nuclear arms control treaties have collapsed in recent years, but analogies associated with them have returned as possible inspiration to manage risks stemming from artificial intelligence (AI) advancement. Some welcome nuclear arms control analogies as an important aid to understanding strategic competition in AI, while others see them as an irrelevant distraction, weakening the focus on new frameworks to manage AI’s unique and unprecedented aspects. The focus of this debate is sometimes too narrow or overly selective when a wider examination of arms control geopolitics can identify both irrelevant and valuable parallels to assist global security governance for AI. Great power leaders frequently equate AI advancement with arms racing, reasoning that powers lagging behind will soon see their great power status weakened. This logic serves to intensify competition, risking a spiral into more unsafe AI practices. The global norm institutionalization that established nuclear taboos can also stigmatize unethical AI practices. Emphasizing reciprocal risk reduction offers pragmatic starting points for great power management of AI safety. This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cybersecurity, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

62. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

63. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

64. Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview. The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy. Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities. Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Radicalization, Democracy, Ideology, Post-Soviet Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

65. Health Diplomacy as an Aspect of International Humanitarian Cooperation

Author:: Nina Bychkova
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The modern world faces an increasing number of natural, biogenic, and anthropogenic challenges and threats. Addressing most of these challenges requires the mobilization of efforts from multiple states and, in some cases, the entire global community, necessitating constant dialogue to coordinate activities. Consequently, modern international relations are characterized by structural complexity, a diversity of ongoing processes, and varying degrees of involvement from a wide range of actors. As the system of international relations becomes more complex, the scope of issues that states must address in their foreign policy activities also expands. Moreover, since the second half of the 20th century, intergovernmental and nongovernmental international organizations have become an important part of international relations, significantly shaping the agenda and development trends. In addition to international organizations, civil society institutions are gaining increasing influence, also affecting the formation of the state’s foreign policy and the international agenda. International humanitarian cooperation is becoming increasingly important as international relations become more complex. This concept is interpreted differently in Russia and other countries. In Russian academic literature, two approaches are typically distinguished. The narrow approach, where humanitarian cooperation is practically equated with humanitarian aid, is characteristic of the foreign interpretation of the concept. In Russian official documents and academic works, international humanitarian cooperation is understood as the aggregate of interactions among state, supranational, and nonstate actors in the fields of human rights protection, science, education, culture, health care, sports, tourism, humanitarian aid, and others.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Humanitarian Cooperation, Health Diplomacy, Medical Diplomacy, and Vaccine Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

66. 2014-2024: A Decade of Sanctions and the Strengthening of Russia’s Financial Sovereignty

Author:: Alexander Turov
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The summer of 2024 has been extraordinarily hot. Climatologists say the average temperature may exceed median values for the entire history of observations. But it is already clear that the political barometer has reached its peak this year, which is certainly having a direct impact on international relations and the global economy as a whole. The past months following the triumphant conclusion of the 27th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which marked the beginning of the collapse of the neocolonial system of global economic relations, and subsequent significant events in international affairs have confirmed Russia’s clear course toward financial sovereignty. For more than a decade now, that course has been pursued by the West, which has become unfriendly in a fairly short historical period. Yet in previous periods of our country’s history – the building of socialism, communism, advanced socialism, perestroika, and finally liberalism – the West actively used at an affordable price our fuel and raw material resources, which formed the basis of the Western economy and consumer society. The scientific achievements of our scholars also contributed to common global progress, as evidenced by the numerous Nobel Prizes they were awarded. So why, after three decades of euphoria based on the development of the market economy and the liberalization of everything, both necessary and unnecessary, has Russia once again been fenced off by NATO’s walls and subjected to economic sanctions, which essentially amount to an economic blockade? This happened before, during the early days of the young Soviet Republic, but the blockade lasted less than a hundred days – from October 1919 to January 1920 – because the level of understanding of global economic ties that formed the basis of politics and diplomacy among the old Western leaders was far higher than it is among today’s leaders, who seem more inclined to discuss issues concerning minority orientations than to concern themselves with the well-being and pressing needs of the majority.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Sanctions, Economy, and Financial Sovereignty
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

67. Prosecuting Russia’s Crime of Aggression: A critical reflection

Author:: Sonia Boulos
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, international law has become a center piecein Ukraine’s war efforts. The Hyper response of legal and other international institutions have prompted some to call these developmentsas the “Ukraine moment”. Theterm suggeststhat the legal response to the war represents,potentially,atransformative moment for international law in its pursuit of justice. Focusing on the crime of aggression, the aim of this article is to answer the question whether the international response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine symbolizesgenuinelya transformativeinternational law moment
Topic:: International Law, Russia-Ukraine War, Aggression, and Double Standards
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

68. La evolución de Rusia tras la Guerra en Ucrania

Author:: Albert Priego Moreno
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: En febrero de 2022 las tropas rusas entraron en el territorio de Ucrania. Desde entonces Europa en general y Ucrania en particular vive sumida en una situación de gran incertidumbre. Son muchas las previsiones que se han hecho para tratar de encontrar certezas en un mundo que tiene más dudas que certidumbres. Buena parte del futuro de Europa pasa por Ucrania y sobre todo por como acabe la guerra con Rusia. Por ello este trabajo tratará de dibujar tres escenarios del futuro de Rusia partiendo de los siguientes cinco factores: la guerra en Ucrania, la situación de Putin, la economía rusa, las sanciones y la paz social en Rusia. Se utilizará una metodología prospectiva partiendo de un análisis previo de la participación de Rusia en las guerras en las que ha tomado partido. Estos escenarios servirán para ver las consecuencias que puede tener una derrota de Rusia en el frente ucraniano, consecuencias que no solo serían para Rusia y Ucrania sino también para el resto del mundo.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Vladimir Putin, Future, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

69. La ampliación de la Unión Europeatras el conflicto de Ucrania

Author:: Jordi Regi
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El conflicto en Ucrania ha supuesto un nuevo reto para la UE en tanto en cuanto, la solicitud de adhesión a la UE planteada por el presidente ucraniano Zelenski el 28 de febrero de 2022 ha tenido consecuencias directas e indirectas para el futuro de la UE. Tres días después, Georgia y Moldavia presentaron solicitudes similares. En un periodo récord de menos de cuatro meses, en el Consejo Europeo de 23 y 24 de junio de 2022, los líderes de la UE decidieron conceder a Ucrania y Moldavia el estatus de país candidato, y reconocieron la "perspectiva europea" de Georgia, un paso hacia la candidatura formal. Nunca los países de la UE habían reaccionado afirmativamente con tanta rapidez a una solicitud de adhesión a la UE, pero detrás de la rápida respuesta de la UE al adoptar un nuevo proyecto de ampliación había una lógica estrategia geopolítica, y no cabe duda de que se trataba de una decisión histórica que no podía eludir. La problemática derivada del complejo proceso de adhesión y las opciones posibles serán tratadas en este artículo.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

70. Retrospectiva, incógnitas y conjeturas: imaginando la OTAN tras la guerra de Ucrania

Author:: Carlos López Gómez
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Tras el final de la Guerra Fría, la OTAN experimentó una profunda transformación en cuanto a su composición, objetivos, acciones y alcance geográfico. La invasión rusa de Ucrania ha hecho que en los últimos dos años se haya concentrado de nuevo en las funciones tradicionales de la disuasión y la defensa de sus miembros. El artículo explora las variables y condicionantes de las que dependerá el papel de la OTAN en el futuro.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

71. Conflicto en Ucrania. Cuando la estrategia híbrida no funciona

Author:: José M. Martínez Cortés
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: En 2014 las fuerzas armadas rusas invadieron, de forma exitosa, la península de Crimea sin pegar apenas un solo disparo. Supuestamente, las mismas fuerzas armadas invadieron Ucrania en febrero de 2022 con un resultado significativamente diferente. La reducida eficacia operativa demostrada por estas fuerzas armadas lleva a plantearse muchos interrogantes sobre cuáles han sido las causas de este fracaso. El presente artículo pretende entrar en dicho análisis, en lo que respecta fundamentalmente a lo realizado durante 2022, por ser ese período el de mayor interés a nuestros efectos, a la vez que profundiza en el poco difundido papel desempeñado por las fuerzas aéreas rusas.
Topic:: Russia-Ukraine War, Warfare, and Hybrid Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

72. Lecciones militares estratégicas de la Guerra de Ucrania

Author:: Yago Rodríguez
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: La mayor guerra europea desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial es una fuente natural de lecciones para cualquier ejército. En el siguiente estudio ofrecemos una tamización de las lecciones estratégicas estrictamente militares que nos ha dejado la guerra a partir de la disección de la historia militar de la misma.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. Repercussions of the end of the war in Ukraine for the United Nations Security System

Author:: Carlos Espaliú Berdud
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an extraordinarily serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force that was embodied in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter after a long historical process. The fact that it was perpetrated by one of the permanent members of the Security Council implies a breach of the consensus among the Allies in World War II that gave rise to the United Nations and the system of international peacekeeping and security that it brought with it. The final outcome of the war in Ukraine may mean that the blow to the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter may be fatal, should the outcome be favourable to Russian interests, or that, despite being badly damaged, it may continue to exist, should the final outcome of the conflict be favourable to Ukrainian interests.
Topic:: Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, International Community, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

74. China Maritime Report No. 37: Re-Engaging With the World: China's Military Diplomacy in 2023

Author:: Jie Gao and Kenneth W. Allen
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China’s military diplomacy plays a crucial role in advancing the nation's foreign policy objectives and safeguarding its strategic interests. This report highlights a diverse array of activities within military diplomacy, including senior-level meetings, joint military exercises, naval port calls, UN peacekeeping operations, and academic exchanges. Our findings reveal a significant—but incomplete—recovery in China's military diplomacy activities in 2023, following a period of reduced contacts with foreign militaries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Southeast Asia and Russia remain primary partners for China, with emerging strategic importance also seen in Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. Overall, China's military diplomacy underscores its efforts to diversify partnerships and assert its global influence, emphasizing regional stability and international cooperation in pursuit of its diplomatic goals.
Topic:: International Cooperation, United Nations, Peacekeeping, COVID-19, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

75. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:: Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

76. Reconsidering the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict and Security Concerns in Africa

Author:: Ndifon Neji, Immaculata Obaji-Akpet, Michael Otu, Joseph Ebegbulem, Samuel Edet, Ayuk Awunghe, and Nwosu Stanley
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered a conflict that has transformed international relations through drastic impacts on policymaking, energy politics, and alliances. Such impacts have produced severe multi-dimensional consequences for African countries that have yet to be sufficiently interrogated in the literature. In response to this gap, this paper examined the security implications of the conflict for African countries to offer a comprehensive analysis that considers the intersection of the conflict with contemporary economic, human, social, and political issues confronting Africa. In discourse using a qualitative approach and rooted in a theoretical perspective drawn from the Copenhagen School, the paper underlined the security implications as evident in the areas of food security and governance, buttressing that the proxy conflicts and power struggles associated with this war have exacerbated existing challenges related to food availability and interfered with the consolidation of democracy in Africa. The paper concluded that the war’s multi-dimensional impact potentially compounds political instability vectors. It generates dynamics capable of eroding social cohesion and fomenting social unrest in Africa, meriting its designation as an issue of great concern to African policymakers.
Topic:: Security, Human Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Social Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Ukraine

77. Legality of the Use of Cluster Bombs in International Law: A Short Overview

Author:: Vesna Poposka and Abdulmecit Nuredin
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine brought the collective security system towards a dead-end street. After raising the question of nuclear threat, another long-time forgotten question arises again, waking up the ghosts that slept for more than a half-century- the use of cluster bombs. Although an international convention prohibits this type of weapon, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor the United States are part of it, which leads back to the agony of fragmentation of international law versus the erga omnes concept of universally applicable norms and customary rules. Since the war is official and intensive, the law of armed conflict applies no matter which of the states involved denies it or names it differently. The use of cluster munitions from both sides is highly contested in international law—the paper aimed to provide an overview of the applicable legal framework through analytical and comparative methods. Although there is a general notion that cluster munition is banned under international law, the paper’s results show this is not the ultimate case. Contextualisation relies on the four basic principles of humanitarian law.
Topic:: Security, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Global Focus

78. The Changing Conceptual Landscape of the Russian War in Ukraine (2014-Present) and Syria (2011-Present)

Author:: Piotr Pietrzak
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The main goal of this paper is to present and compare the main developments in the Russian wars in Ukraine and Syria by considering the main patterns, parallels, and changing trajectories that could shed more light onto both of these war zones, which are highly interlinked due to Russia’s leading role in both. It analytically, comparatively, and contemplatively approaches those developments by highlighting multiple similarities and the main differences in global responses to these conflicts. Both conflicts should be seen as highly unpredictable, dynamic, and unnecessarily extended asymmetric proxy wars in which global powers test their new military doctrines and their competitors' responses to their unconventional actions and other unsolicited and indirect interferences in the local dynamism of both wars. Unlike in Syria, the Ukrainian war zone is wholly transformative and ready for the adoption of partial hybridization and the utilization of the new software-defined warfare in combination with conventional weapons.
Topic:: International Relations, Conflict, Syrian War, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Syria

79. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?

Author:: Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

80. Georgia’s government is playing with fire: Internal polarisation invites external interference

Author:: Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Georgia’s government distrusts the West and democratic institutions – despite formally supporting Euro-Atlantic integration. It seeks to merge transactional foreign policy with ultra-conservative values and illiberalism. Current policies are polarising the nation, alienating the West, and making Georgia vulnerable to Russia’s interference.
Topic:: Democracy, Institutions, Polarization, Post-Soviet Space, Euroskepticism, and Eastern Neighborhood
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

81. No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The West supports Ukraine as a non-belligerent. China purports to be neutral, but the West increasingly sees it as a non-belligerent on the side of Russia. In a way, the West’s and China’s approaches are not dissimilar: doing enough for “their” side to stop it from losing the war, but otherwise sitting it out in the hope that the other side will somehow give up. That can hardly be called a strategy. Both the West and China will have to review their strategies if they want to preserve their interests. Will this inevitably increase tensions between them?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

82. Procurement by Proxy: How Sahelian Juntas Acquire Equipment from Ousted Security Partners

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: During the past two years military juntas in Mali and Niger have ousted three multilateral security missions in addition to French, and more recently American, forces deployed to fight jihadists in the two countries. Although being preceded by deteriorating relations, the decisions to kick out the international partners have been announced abruptly and the departures have been rushed as juntas have increased pressure for the missions to leave. After making the decision to oust the missions, the juntas have also mounted new obstacles for the missions and their departures, either taking, or forcing the missions to leave a large amount of equipment and material behind. This article argues that this is a deliberate strategy by the military juntas in Mali and Niger to acquire new equipment and material for their security forces, in some cases to be used with new security partners, such as Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, Mali, Sahel, and Niger

83. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:: Michael DiMino
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:: Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

84. A new NATO agenda: Less U.S., less dependency

Author:: Benjamin Friedman
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should aggressively reduce its force presence in Europe. This would be consistent with NATO’s original balancing purpose and U.S. expectations then that garrisoning Europe was a temporary expedient, not a permanent tool of U.S. dominance. The Russian threat, despite being energized by NATO expansion, is insufficient to demand the current defense effort devoted to it in Europe, whether it’s Americans or Europeans making that effort. The results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underline this happy point: Russia has proven weaker than conventional wisdom held, and the advantages of defense evident in the war bode well for the territorial status quo NATO defends in Europe. A U.S. drawdown in Europe is unlikely to spark a European defense renaissance, but even so, the balance of power in Europe will remain intact, and the United States will be better off with the freed-up resources and reduced risks.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, Dependency, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

85. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

86. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:: Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

87. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:: Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

88. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Evolution of Grand Strategy

Author:: Leonid Polyakov
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we are publishing a second series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the second brief of the series, Leonid Polyakov observes that while Ukraine’s strategic objectives have remained the same throughout the war, the ways and means to achieve them have shifted. Surprise and mass have become less relevant, but technology must be mobilised through society-wide efforts if Ukraine is to prevail. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s longer-term security requires the construction of a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

89. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:: International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

90. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

91. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

92. Russia’s War in Ukraine Series: War and Industry

Author:: Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has needed huge volumes of weapons and ammunition for a war that is inherently asymmetrical, largely relying on the capabilities that it had—Soviet and domestically produced weapons—and on donations from partner countries. However, it has become clear that the approach is inadequate, especially if there are interruptions in supplies from outside, and that the restoration of Ukraine’s own military-industrial complex is vital to ensuring its security and defence capability, independence, and victory. In the fourth brief of the series, Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi discusses how ammunition and equipment supply shortages provided the impetus for the revival of the national defence industry and for the repurposing of civilian industry to meet the wartime needs of the armed forces. He also highlights the importance of harnessing the potential of Ukraine’s vibrant high-tech innovation ecosystem, and attracting foreign investments to expand the country’s defence industrial base and integrate it with the European defence industry.
Topic:: Markets, Weapons, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

93. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation

Author:: Maryna Vorotyntseva
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia conducts information and psychological operations to undermine and discredit Ukraine’s mobilisation, damage the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and weaken their willingness to defend their state. In support of these efforts, the Russian military and special services distribute both real and fake photographs and video content on social networks. In addition, the Russian special services use current and former male citizens of Ukraine who have voluntarily switched sides to produce malign content. The recent discussions about and promulgation of new laws related to Ukraine’s mobilisation have offered Russia further opportunities to spread disinformation.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Disinformation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:: Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

95. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

96. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Central Asia

97. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

98. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:: Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

99. Russia’s Space Program After 2024

Author:: Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since 2022, Russia’s space program has been in a state of turbulence and uncertainty. However, the deterioration started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began the first round of the war against Ukraine. Multiple factors have made the sustainable development of the Russian space program impossible: sanctions, an embargo on advanced industrial equipment, workforce shortages, limited financial resources spread among too many projects, cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners except operations on the International Space Station (ISS), and the economic inefficiency of the Russian space industry. The Russian government and Roscosmos are struggling to increase space expenditures, but monetary inflation, cost-plus inflation within the space industry, and devaluation of the ruble do not allow them to reverse the negative trends. Despite these factors, Russia will keep manned spaceflights and the military space program at any cost. Consequently, Russia has two main priorities by the 2030s. First, it must maintain the presence of Russian astronauts in outer space even after the ISS era and without any significant scientific outcomes. Second, it must switch satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics. This preference for quantity over quality of satellites would allow Russia to boost its manufacturing of short-lived satellites, which will be replaced quickly and provide the armed forces with communication and intelligence capabilities. In the area of satellite navigation, Russia will struggle to maintain the current architecture of GRusslobal’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and the development of new architecture with less satellites is also questionable. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s satellite navigation system with new architecture will cover only the Russian and neighboring territories. However, the Russian armed forces use the consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so the deteriorating GLONASS is not a crucial problem for them.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

100. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

Author:: Igor Delanoë
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy on the Black Sea naval theater was contested in the early stage of the conflict. Ukraine’s anti-surface and drone capacities have challenged the Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy at sea, creating a form of sea denial. The Black Sea Fleet adapted its posture to a conflict of attrition. The scope of the missions fulfilled by the Black Sea Fleet has increased over time to include more protection and detection tasks, while active defense remains the general posture at sea. The post-conflict Black Sea Fleet should be more littoralized than before the “special operation.” Lessons already learned from conflict, constraints created by the sanctions, and financial priorities should accelerate the littoralization and the kalibrization of the Black Sea Fleet.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Black Sea Fleet
Political Geography:: Russia and Black Sea

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS