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1. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:
Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans

2. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

3. Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future in Turkey and India, and Iran and Russia

Author:
Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The institutions and practices necessary for open and fair competition for political power are eroding across the world. In some countries, such as Turkey and India, the democratic dividend of electoral competition has been steadily undermined by majoritarian autocrats who have proved adept in campaigning for office and winning elections. In others, such as Russia and Iran, political leaders have marginalised or suppressed electoral processes, reducing them to closely managed performances that seek to demonstrate public consent. At least some traces of the mechanisms of electoral competition often remain in place, however, even where genuine public consent has been almost extinguished. This leaves open the possibility that the trend away from competitive electoral politics could be at least partially reversed in future, in the context of political succession or the electoral defeat of incumbents. In June 2023, LSE IDEAS brought together experts from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and other institutions to examine the potential for restoring the democratic dividend of competitive politics in four major countries. Turkey and India were selected for their timeliness—national parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey in May 2023, and national parliamentary elections are due in India in April 2024—and for their similarities: both political systems are characterised by powerful elected leaders with a strong record of performance in national elections, each backed by large political parties based on an appeal to national and religious identity. Iran and Russia were chosen as examples of two states where competitive electoral politics had been temporarily enabled by significant political change—respectively, an impasse in Iran’s theocracy in the 1990s, and the end of the Soviet Union—only to be undermined by the reassertion of autocratic power. Two assumptions underlay the planning of this discussion on ‘Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future’. The first is that the characterisation of political systems as either democratic or autocratic provides an insufficient basis for explaining many differences in the workings of political institutions, or for guiding policy. The second assumption is that while certain institutions and practices appear to be essential to maintaining open competition for political power—including for example, freedom and diversity of comment in major channels of communication like broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and social media—there is no useful empirical example or theoretical formulation of an ideal or perfect democratic political system. The exclusion from the discussion of countries with longer established forms of competitive politics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, was not intended to suggest an implicit comparison with ideal types of functioning democracies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concern about the maintenance of open competition for political power in every country professing to be a democracy. As David Runciman has said of the future of democratic practices: ‘The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no longer notice when they have ceased to work.’ He warns that ‘democracy could fail while remaining intact’.
Topic:
Elections, Political stability, Autocracy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, India, and Asia

4. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

5. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. "The Great Wall of the Caspian Sea": The Geographic Nature of Russia's Attitudes Towards the Post-Soviet States

Author:
Mariam Mikiashvili
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
As far as the contemporary Russian perspective is concerned, the former Soviet states can be categorized into two geographic groups. The states other than the Baltics, that is. We shall call Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan “the Western Six.” The former Soviet Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – shall be included in “the Eastern Five.” The basis of such a grouping is a country’s geographic location vis-à-vis the Caspian Sea. It would be no news to claim that the prevention of the color revolutions and the democratization of the post-Soviet space has always been the fundamental aim of Russia.1 This translates into the objective to preserve the Russia-approved social and political “stability.” However, the specific Russian actions for the maintenance of the “stability” in various post-Soviet states differ fundamentally. In some of them, “stability” is to be ensured by the internal destabilization of a country as well as subversive actions towards a central government, whereas in others the task is implemented through Russia’s constructive approaches towards a central government and state consolidation. So, to what extent are Russia’s attitudes towards a post-Soviet state influenced by the state’s own politics or regime type? What are the places where “central government,” “state” and “regime stability” are synonymous in the eyes of Russia? What does this “stability” even imply and how is it different from simple “authoritarianism,” the most acceptable model of governance to Russia? Would “democratization” be a precise labelling as the alternative to “stability?” Does democratization in every post-Soviet state cause a similar reaction from Russia?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, Political stability, Geography, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia and Caspian Sea

7. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:
Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

8. Energy: Factor of Stability or Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Author:
Marika Karagianni
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Security of critical economic and energy infrastructure has become a key element in the agenda of both the EU and NATO. The global balance between energy producers and energy importers needs also to be respected in order to secure the smooth operation of global economy and trade. Global energy organizations like OPEC and GAS OPEC see to that. Constructive, multilateral energy diplomacy via the reinforcement of the EMGF (East Med Gas Forum) is considered as the optimum solution to any destabilizing factor in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to become a gas supply source for the EU in the future, alternatively to Russia, which is why it has been identified by Brussels as a future gas diversification source. The official strategy of Cairo is to develop indigenous natural gas resources, with the double aim to increase gas production rates and to export significant amounts to Europe in the immediate future. Egypt is bound to lead gas exports of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and diversification for Europe, through its LNG terminals. The East Med pipeline could follow later on.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Gas, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Africa, Egypt, and Mediterranean

9. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume III, South Asian Perspectives

Author:
Peter Topychkanov, Sanatan Kulshrestha, Yanitra Kumaraguru, Malinda Meegoda, Kritika Roy, Saima Aman Sial, Dmitry Stefanovich, and Maaike Verbruggen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This edited volume is the third in a series of three. The series forms part of a SIPRI project that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in artificial intelligence could have on nuclear weapons and doctrines, as well as on strategic stability and nuclear risk. This volume assembles the perspectives of eight experts on South Asia on why and how machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. It further explores how the adoption of these technologies may have an impact on their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional levels.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, East Asia, and Global Focus

10. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States