Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 3 Years / Topic: Conflict

101. The War in Ukraine: The Challenge of Shaping an Endgame

Author:: Udi Dekel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Although nearly three weeks have passed since Putin invaded Ukraine, there is no framework for an endgame on the horizon. While the United States and the West would like to bring Putin to his knees as he sinks deeper in the Ukrainian mud, Washington must recognize that the longer the war continues, the chances increase for escalation to new levels that neither side wants. Therefore, before the situation is completely out of control, there must be a dialogue with Russia that can lead to an end to the war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

102. Putin’s Dilemma

Author:: Ofer Shelah
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: After more than two weeks of war in Ukraine, initial conclusions can already be drawn. Chief among these is the realization that force application in complicated conditions can confront a decision maker with a serious dilemma, in which precisely a military achievement may destroy any possibility of scoring a political achievement
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

103. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Legal Aspects

Author:: Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Ori Beeri
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Since Russia invaded Ukraine, it has been the object of significant legal pressure. While the various legal measures have no power to stop the bloody war, they deliver a powerful, unequivocal message: any state that flagrantly violates international world and undermines the world order will suffer isolation, condemnation, sanction, and criminal investigations. Israel, which has seemed to lean to sitting on the fence, must join the international efforts against Russia, Otherwise it is liable to find itself on the wrong side of history
Topic:: Military Strategy, Law, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

104. The Ukraine Crisis: An Interim Analysis

Author:: Eldad Shavit, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began only days ago, it is already clear that with this belligerence Putin has upset the world order that has existed since the Second World War. The Western bloc has already begun to realign and is presenting a unified and forceful stance vis-à-vis Moscow. Israel can no longer avoid taking a clear stand and siding fully with the countries opposing Russia
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

105. Avoiding the Dangers of a Protracted Conflict in Ukraine

Author:: Anatol Lieven, Sarang Shidore, and Marcus Stanley
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A protracted conflict in Ukraine looks increasingly plausible. Russia continues to launch attacks on military and civilian targets, and the United States and its partners are increasing shipments of arms to the Zelensky government. Washington is reportedly making plans to support long-term guerrilla warfare against Russian forces, should Kyiv fall. The current path toward a protracted war in Ukraine is highly undesirable and is laden with grave risks to the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and the international community. Such risks include: • a high cost in Ukrainian lives and suffering and the destruction of Ukraine — its infrastructure, institutions, and social fabric; • radicalization of Ukrainian society and a consequent civil war; • escalation to a great-power war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and pitting NATO against Russia, thereby threatening U.S. national security; • a weakening of NATO’s cohesion; • a prolonged global recession that strikes the U.S. as hard as it will any other nation. The United States and its allies should avoid these destructive outcomes by prioritizing support for the Ukrainian government to achieve a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement will result in a more secure outcome for Ukraine, the United States, the European allies, and the rest of the world. While the details of such a settlement lie beyond this brief’s scope, the progress of Ukrainian–Russian talks indicates that a settlement providing for meaningful sovereignty and independence for Ukraine is possible. Avoiding a protracted conflict also implies that the United States should not adopt maximalist objectives, such as regime change in Moscow or the complete and decisive defeat of Russia. It should instead deploy sanctions to build up Ukraine’s negotiating leverage.
Topic:: NATO, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

106. Cutting through the Value Chain: The Long-Run Effects of Decoupling the East from the West

Author:: Gabriel Felbermayr, Alexander Sandkamp, and Hendrik Mahlkow
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: With ever-increasing political tensions between China and Russia on one side and the EU and the US on the other, it only seems a matter of time until protectionist policies cause a decoupling of global value chains. This paper uses a computable general equilibrium trade model calibrated with the latest version of the GTAP database to simulate the effect of doubling non-tariff barriers - both unilateral and reciprocal - between the two blocks on trade and welfare. Imposing trade barriers almost completely eliminates bilateral imports. In addition, changes in price levels lead to higher imports and lower exports of the imposing country group from and to the rest of the world. The targeted country group increases exports to the rest of the world and reduces imports. Welfare falls in all countries involved, suggesting that governments should strive to cooperate rather than turning away from each other. By imposing a trade war on Russia, the political West could inflict severe damage on the Russian economy because of the latter’s smaller relative size.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Conflict, Trade Wars, Protectionism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

107. How the United States Should Respond if Russia Invades Ukraine

Author:: Max Bergmann
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: A Russian invasion of Ukraine must come at a high cost to the Kremlin.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

108. How to Maintain International Unity on Ukraine (Part II)

Author:: Sarah Cliffe, Hanny Megally, Karina Gerlach, Faiza Shaheen, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: This piece is the second part to our analysis published in early April on what it would take to maintain international unity on Ukraine. In the first analysis, we noted the large number of countries that abstained from or voted against the resolution suspending Russia’s membership in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, including nine out of the ten most populous countries in the world.
Topic:: United Nations, Conflict, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

109. Ukraine Russia Crisis: Terrorism Briefing

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Figure 1 highlights that the invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West. This brief covers several aspects relating to the current Ukrainian war, including the frequency of past acts of terrorism in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and covers likely future scenarios. It also analyses cyberattacks on Ukraine over the last decade and lead up to the current war. The main finding is that terrorism increases with the intensity of conflict. Both the Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 saw substantial spikes in terrorist activity around the wars, and as the current war intensifies increased terrorist activity should be expected. Secondly, cyberattacks on Ukraine have markedly increased over the last decade, and especially in the months and weeks leading up to the war. Further, cyberattacks have the potential to unintentionally spill over into other countries because of global connectivity, the effects of which have been seen on numerous occasions. As cyberattacks by nefarious actors are a recent phenomenon, and given the difficulty in the attribution of such attacks, the demarcation between what constitutes a cyberattack, cyber warfare or cyber terrorism are unclear. Regardless, this briefing looks at the broad phenomena of cyberattacks in Ukraine to offer background on recent events.
Topic:: Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

110. World Risk Poll: Spotlight on Ukraine and Russia

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll, when combined with associated data from the Gallup World Poll and a number of other sources, reveals a complex and sometimes counterintuitive view of the world for both Ukrainians and Russians prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Ukrainian citizens’ positive sentiments on a number of questions on social wellbeing were on the rise at a time when global averages were in decline. In the lead-up to the invasion, Ukrainians’ perceptions of safety and security were improving, with the percentage of people reporting feeling safer than five years prior rising from 19 to 26 per cent, bringing it closer to the global average. This represents a major increase, especially as it came at a time when the global average fell markedly, from 36 to 27.4 per cent, and for Russians the rate fell from 19.2 to 17.4 per cent. The conflict has unfolded within the context of Ukraine’s increasing socio-political reorientation toward the West. By November 2021, 58 per cent of Ukrainians said that, if the country were to join just one economic union, it should join the European Union (EU), compared to 21 per cent that said it should join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. This was the highest rating ever recorded. Similarly, 54 per cent said they would vote to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), compared to 28 per cent who would vote against joining. Surprisingly, “war and terrorism” was only the sixth highest-rated concern in Ukraine in 2021. Ukrainians rated health-related risks (not including COVID-19) as their top concern. Transportation-related risks, crime and violence, economic concerns and financial hardship were more frequently cited than “war and terrorism."
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Risk, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

111. Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation

Author:: Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:: Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:: The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation” is dedicated to the challenges and opportunities emerging in the South Caucasus region 2 years after the end of the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 with focus on security and political matters.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Law, Treaties and Agreements, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Landmines, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

112. Sanctioning Russia: Implications and Expectation

Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West rapidly adopted unprecedented sanctions on Russia. These included a series of export controls and the sanctioning of the Russian Central Bank, major institutions in the financial sector as well as individual “oligarchs” who live and conduct business outside of the country. In addition to these government actions by the United States, the European Union and the UK, hundreds of Western private companies have withdrawn from the Russian market or suspended operations, further exacerbating Russian economic uncertainty. How likely are the sanctions to pressure Russia to halt its campaign in Ukraine, what is their purpose and logic, and what additional measures could be imposed?
Topic:: Economics, Hegemony, Sanctions, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

113. The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova

Author:: Dumitru Minzarari
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia could target Moldova by embarking on a limited-scope but overt military invasion; or by pursuing more covert hybrid aggression scenarios. The three most plausible Russian aggression scenarios are: a military action launched from Transnistria; a local, elite-focused rebellion similar to Russia’s exploits in Donbas in 2014, likely centring on the Moldovan region of Gagauzia; and popular unrest stoked by Russia and containing violent elements. The EU and Moldova underestimate the risk of one or more of these happening. The EU’s preferred “resilience” approach to hybrid threats lacks an active component that can effectively respond to, and repel, Russian aggression. Moldova should draw on Western support to implement an “active resilience” policy to better confront and undermine Russian actions. The EU should set up a CSDP mission in Moldova comprising both civilian and military components that helps the Moldovan authorities plan and conduct security threat assessments and protect against military and hybrid risks.
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Hybrid Threats, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Moldova

114. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:: Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

115. Russia Against Ukraine Before the European Court of Human Rights. The Empire Strikes Back?

Author:: Milena Ingelevic-Citak
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: In July 2021, Russia submitted its first inter-state complaint against Ukraine to the European Court of Human Rights. It was an unexpected and intriguing step of the Russian government, especially since many of the presented allegations are linked to the events that initiated the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Referring to the hostilities that began in 2014, the international community was, in principle, unanimous in assessing who the aggressor was. The focus of this research is the strategy of the Russian Federation in its recently initiated legal battle before the Strasbourg Court. This paper presents an attempt to outline the possible motives for taking such a step. Moscow's position on this case is particularly puzzling, as some of the allegations concern the Crimean Peninsula, widely recognized under international law as territory occupied by Russia. In spite of that, doubt arises about the strategic objectives of the Russian authorities in the conflict with Ukraine; the question is whether the actions taken by Russia fall within the scope of its previous strategy or if there has been a new turn in the matter. The first part of this paper outlines the background of the given conflict, the second details Russian policy after the annexation of Crimea, and the third, which is crucial for the formulating of conclusions, presents considerations on Russia's possible motivation and goals in filing a complaint to the European Court Human Rights. The research was conducted mainly based on the merits of the complaint, the statements of the representatives of Russia and Ukraine in the matter, the author's observations, and practitioners' considerations.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Regionalism, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

116. Europe at War

Author:: Robert Cox
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: For the moment as western Europeans watch the nightly media display of Russian brutality in Ukraine, many instinctively feel it’s a long way away. An echo of British Premier Neville Chamberlain’s dismissal of Hitler’s threats to Czechoslovakia in 1938 as a “quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.” One Czech emigrée saw the fatuousness of Chamberlain’s stance—Madeleine Albright. Balts and Poles, their memories fresh of Russian occupation, are clearly nervous. At greater distance, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians feel less threatened. French people show more concern with cost-of-living hikes—albeit driven by Russia’s actions. Yet the violence is happening on all Europeans’ doorstep. One false move, deliberate or careless, and NATO’s Article 5 activates. Perhaps. Let us look at the complexities of the context in which this war has come to pass.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

117. And So Now… It’s War?

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

118. Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
Topic:: NATO, Weapons, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

119. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:: Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

120. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:: Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

121. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

122. Pugwash note on the situation in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: We note with great concern the worsening situation in the ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The annexation of areas currently controlled by Russian military will exacerbate tensions as Ukraine seems determined to recover the occupied regions and is supported by several NATO countries. The situation is quite complex as armed hostilities continue unabated, and opposing security perceptions by the parties involved do not appear easily reconcilable. Despite the fact that prospects for a ceasefire look dim under this current situation, a ceasefire is a necessary step towards stopping this dangerous conflict which, while it is heavily affecting Ukraine, is also a very destabilizing element that threatens international security.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Global Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

123. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

124. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

125. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

126. Growing Azerbaijani–Central Asian Ties Likely to Trigger Conflicts With Russia and Iran

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War (September 29–November 9) has had a transformative effect on the country. It not only changed the attitudes of its population, whose members now feel themselves to be heroes rather than victims (see EDM, January 21), but also bolstered the diplomatic weight and possibilities of the Azerbaijani government in its dealings with other regional states. In prosecuting a triumphant war against Yerevan, Baku demonstrated its own ability to act. But just as importantly, Azerbaijan has shown to peoples and governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia that it is a force to be reckoned with, in part thanks to its growing links with Turkey. Moreover, that alliance makes possible an appealing path to the outside world for all who join it. That reality is causing countries east of the Caspian to look westward to and through Azerbaijan in their economic planning and political calculations. At the same time, however, these developments are generating concerns in Moscow and Tehran, which oppose east-west trade routes that bypass their countries’ territories and instead favor north-south corridors linking Russia and Iran together. As a result, Azerbaijan’s recent successes in expanding links with Central Asia set the stage for new conflicts between Azerbaijan and its Turkic partners, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, which have far more significant naval assets in the Caspian, on the other (see EDM, November 27, 2018 and February 20, 2020; Casp-geo.ru, December 24, 2019; Chinalogist.ru, November 21, 2019).
Topic:: Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

127. Russia’s Iskander Missiles Fail in Karabakh but Cause Crisis in Armenia

Author:: Pavel Felgenhauer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Second Karabakh War, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, began on September 27, 2020, and ended on November 9, 2020, with a Russian-brokered and guaranteed agreement. The conflict claimed the lives of thousands of Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. But after 44 days of fierce fighting, it concluded with Yerevan soundly defeated: Armenia lost territory occupied during the First Karabakh War in 1992–1994 as well as over 30 percent of prewar Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—a region of Soviet Azerbaijan majority populated by ethnic Armenians. Today, the rump self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR or “Artsakh”)—still controlled by Armenians and not recognized by anyone—is fully surrounded by Azerbaijani troops and territory. The rump Karabakh “republic’s” perimeter is guarded by some 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” who also control the so-called Lachin corridor, the only highway left open from Armenia proper to Karabakh through the city of Lachin. The future of the rump NKR and its Armenian population is unclear. Baku refuses to discuss any special administrative status for the territory, insisting Armenians born in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast or their descendants must disarm and apply for Azerbaijani citizenships to stay as a minority inside Azerbaijan. In turn, the NKR leadership has declared Russian an official language alongside Armenian to avoid use of Azerbaijani Turkish (Izvestia, February 17). Officials in Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani) apparently hope this may tempt Moscow to keep its peacekeepers in Karabakh permanently and maybe eventually agree to annex the NKR outright.
Topic:: Weapons, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Nagorno-Karabakh

128. Putin Prioritizes Syria. Biden Should Too.

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: Moscow is in Syria for the long haul and will continue to undermine American efforts there. In recent months, Moscow intensified its activities in Syria against the backdrop of a changing US administration. The Kremlin sent additional military policy units to eastern Syria, and continued diplomatic engagement through the Astana format, a process that superficially has international backing but in practice excludes the United States and boosts Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, Moscow also unveiled at its airbase in Syria a statue to the patron saint of the Russian army, Prince Alexander Nevsky. A growing Russian presence in Syria will further hurt Western interests.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

129. The Overseen Factors Impacting the Afghan Peace Process

Author:: Sahar Khan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The international community is focused on the ongoing intra-Afghan peace process, which has steadied despite several challenges. There are two developments, however, that will have a lasting impact on the process: The International Criminal Court’s investigation into war crimes committed by the Taliban, Afghan forces, and US forces, and the strategic evolution of the Taliban as a legitimate political actor.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Terrorism, Taliban, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

130. Russia and Turkey Deconflict Their Geopolitical Moves in the Caucasus

Author:: Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The recent incidence of war in the Caucasus has shown that, when facing deep domestic troubles, Russia and Turkey demonstrate strikingly different patterns of international behavior. While Russia has become more cautious in responding to external challenges, Turkey has embarked on several power-projecting enterprises. Its forceful interference in the long-smoldering conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh took Russia by surprise and effectively secured a military victory for Azerbaijan. Moscow has assumed the main responsibility for terminating hostilities by deploying a peacekeeping force, but its capacity for managing the war zone and its commitment to deconflicting tensions with Turkey remain uncertain. The United States and the European Union have few levers for influencing this interplay of clashing agendas of local actors and regional powers and fewer reasons to trust Russian and Turkish leaders to put peacebuilding ahead of their ambitions.
Topic:: Security, War, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Caucasus, and Middle East

131. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:: Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

132. Russian Crisis Behavior, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey?

Author:: Richard Giragosian, David G. Lewis, and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan initiated a war to retake the disputed Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts of Azerbaijan held by Armenian forces.1 The forty-four-day war resulted in a resounding defeat for the Armenian forces and only halted with the acceptance of a Russian-imposed agreement for a cessation of hostilities on November 9-10, 2020. Although the war was initially expected to unfold as a war of attrition with an eventual stalemate based on the advantages of terrain of the Armenian defenders, reality differed in terms of duration, intensity, and outcome.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

133. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

134. EU and Russia: From a Partnership to a Rivalry

Author:: Jelena Jurisic
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: At the beginning of the 20th century Halford Mackinder was the first to write about a possibility of integrating Europe and Russia in his famous essay “Geographical Pivot of History.” The latter, on his map of natural crossroads of power, constituted the biggest portion of the “Pivot Area”, later dubbed “the Heartland”, while the former constituted the western part of the “Inner or Marginal Crescent.” Mckinder perceived that an alliance of Europe, as homeland of progress, and Russia, which throughout history influenced Europe by the vastness of its territory, could form the biggest center of power that would span between two oceans and dominate the world. A version of this continental connection was presented some 20 years later by Karl Haushofer who in the alliance of Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan saw a geopolitical force which could crush the domination of the Anglo-Saxon civilization. The next to grasp to the ideal of “Greater Europe” in the fifties was Charles de Gaulle who made a statement about a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.” With the political rapprochement of France and West Germany with the Warsaw Pact led by the USSR he wanted to distance the two for NATO and the dominance of the United States. In the late eighties is was Mikhail Gorbachev who spoke about The “Common European Home” as an ultimate goal of the process of integration, be it in the west as well as in the east of the old continent, in order to end their military and political confrontation through integration. Notwithstanding, with his appeasing foreign policy and wrong steps he achieved the opposite. With the disappearance of ideological chains between Russia and the West the idea of “Greater Europe’’ also ceased to exist. Moscow embarked on the process of democratization, and with it of rapprochement with the US and the EU, and in 1994 the EU–Russia partnership and cooperation agreement was signed. Four years later Boris Yeltsin hosted an informal summit with Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, which resulted in creation of Paris-Berlin- Moscow axis. This axis lasted for just a few minutes as during the press conference the Russian president stated that Russia cannot become a member of the EU and NATO. Pale facial expirations of his guest indicated clearly their thoughts on this statement. Europe did not take seriously the wakened successor of the USSR.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, European Union, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

135. Turkey and Russia in Syrian war: Hostile friendship

Author:: Cemil Doğaç İpek and Mehmet Çağatay Güler
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: This study considers Russian-Turkish relations within the context of the Syrian war. We elaborate on both Russia’s and Turkey’s strategies and their understanding of the Syrian War, and consider how the two countries have managed to stay on the same page despite conflictual strategies and geopolitical interests in Syria. The current literature does not address this question and does not thoroughly compare their actions and engagements in the field. This article aims to clarify Turkey-Russia relations in the Syria and provides evidence of how they are in conflict and cooperate at the same time. In this regard, it is argued that the available evidence indicates that Turkey-Russia relations in Syria operate on the “compartmentalisation” strategy. In order to test this argument, the qualitative research method based on secondary resources is used while the theoretical framework previously formulated by Onis and Yilmaz (2015) is adopted. They conceptualise Turkey-Russia relations as if they do “compartmentalise economic issues and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid the negative spillover of certain disagreements into areas of bilateral cooperation.” Furthermore, they claim that compartmentalisation can be hindered if there are deepening security concerns in an area like Syria. However, this article underscores that compartmentalisation does not only work by separating the economic issue from geopolitical rivalries; it also makes Turkey and Russia able to cooperate and conflict in a specific and fundamentally conflictual geopolitical issue such as Syria. The convergences and divergences that occurred in the Syrian field are conceptualised under the strategy of compartmentalisation. In this context, the cooperation – the signed agreements and established mechanisms, conflicts, and clashes in the field, are acknowledged as the consequences of the compartmentalisation strategy in Syria. The compartmentalisation strategy is specifically used in Syria in order to avoid the negative impacts of direct clashes in bilateral cooperation and agreements. It can therefore be concluded that the deepening divergence in security related issue does not necessarily prevent compartmentalisation; on the contrary, compartmentalisation paves the way for stabilisation of such deepening divergence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Syrian War, and Compartmentalization
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

136. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:: Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

137. Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation

Author:: Zakhar Tropin
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic “programming” of the opponent’s legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
Topic:: Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Lawfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

138. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

139. Ending the Threat of War in Ukraine: A Negotiated Solution to the Donbas Conflict and the Crimean Dispute

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The unresolved conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas region represents by far the greatest danger of a new war in Europe — and by far the greatest risk of a new crisis in relations between the United States and Russia. The Biden administration does not wish to escalate tensions with Russia, and no doubt appreciates that admitting Ukraine into NATO is impossible for the foreseeable future, if only because Germany and France would veto it. Nonetheless, so long as the dispute remains unresolved, the United States will be hostage to developments on the ground that could drag it into a new and perilous crisis.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, War, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

140. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:: Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

141. Security Review: Black Sea Security

Author:: Giorgi Surmava, Zurab Batiashvili, David Batashvili, and Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The following anthology is dedicated to the Black Sea security situation, an issue that drew particularly focused attention following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, when the Kremlin began rapid militarization of the peninsula, while also strengthening its military capabilities in the entire Black Sea basin. The Russian-Ukrainian War was soon followed by the active intervention of Russia in the Syrian conflict, further emphasizing the importance of the Black Sea, as it was precisely through the Black Sea that Russia aided hostilities in Syria and established communication lines with a Russian naval base there. Russia's active engagement in the Black Sea precipitated increased NATO interest towards the region. In recent years, NATO experts have been actively discussing the so-called "Black Sea dimension", that is, the need to develop a new strategy for the region which reflects the improved capabilities of NATO and its individual member states in the Black Sea, forging closer ties with local partners, increasing visits of naval vessels to the Sea, and resisting Russian military domination in general. The exacerbation of the situation in the Black Sea is a significant challenge for Turkey, in particular. The Montreux Convention grants Turkey a special role, which it is trying to maintain, and yet the Russian aggressive policy in the region cannot but trouble it. What role can Georgia play in this situation? What challenges or opportunities does the return of the Black Sea to the strategic map of the world bring for Georgia? This anthology presents the views of four experts from the Rondeli Foundation: General Giorgi Surmava reviews the military capabilities of the Black Sea countries; the Turkish perspective is introduced by Zurab Batiashvili; David Batashvili discusses the Russian point of view; while Alex Petriashvili deliberates the Western approach and the role of Georgia.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Annexation
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Black Sea

142. Security Review: Russia-Ukraine Confrontation

Author:: Giorgio Bilanishvili, Zurab Batiashvili, Nika Petriashvili, and Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: After the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the epicenter of hostilities shifted to eastern Ukraine, specifically to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian-speaking population was not loyal to Kyiv even before that but the events in Crimea and the Russian assistance invigorated the local separatists who, along with adventurers backed by the regular Russian troops, managed to gain control over parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The fighting turned out to be quite bloody and long lasting. There were large casualties on both sides, including civilians. Coupled with a high-profile incident of the downing of a passenger plane, it caused a wide international reverberation and world interest in resolving the conflict. The efforts of the leading OSCE countries had led to a certain agreement and the cessation of intense hostilities by September 2014. A quadripartite agreement (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) was achieved on the separation of the parties and a ceasefire. The line of contact was divided into sectors and precincts where a group of OSCE military observers began to monitor the “silence” regime. Since then, the intensity and scale of the hostilities have been significantly reduced. However, every now and then the situation would worsen which was followed by a new agreement on a ceasefire and the establishment of a “silence” regime. It should be noted that since March 2021, the number of incidents has increased dramatically. At the same time, regular Russian troops began to gather along Ukraine's eastern borders and Crimea.
Topic:: International Relations, National Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, Separatism, and Annexation
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

143. Baku Parade Whispers Geopolitical Complexities in the South Caucasus

Author:: Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on December 10 to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the war over the Karabakh region that ended with the Russia-brokered armistice on November 9-10. The Russian historian, Andrey Zubov, describes the Baku parade as an occasion “rather to celebrate the birth of a new geopolitical alliance than the victory over Armenia”1 . Following the parade, Russia imposed a ban on tomato imports from Azerbaijan in its flagship manner and Russian peacekeepers attempted to do something around the town of Shusha in Karabakh resembling what they have done in Georgia: “borderization”. Azerbaijani state TV, other media outlets and public figures widely and explicitly condemned such behavior of the Russian peacekeepers as a jealous response to the parade demonstration of Armenia’s Russian-made weapons and military equipment captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces or destroyed using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones . Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, watched Turkish soldiers march alongside with Azerbaijanis on the central streets of Baku to the joy of local residents who took to the streets despite the COVID-19 related restrictions in order to salute them. This scene shows a major Russian weakness vis-àvis Turkey in Azerbaijan. Unlike Moscow, whose perception in Azerbaijan is controversial, Ankara enjoys nation-wide support. Recently leaked Russian secret files reveal that it is much more difficult for Moscow to develop proRussian civil society organizations and soft power instruments in Azerbaijan than even in staunchly pro-Western Georgia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, Georgia, and South Caucasus

144. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:: Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

145. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights

Author:: Philip Remler
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
Topic:: Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

146. The Israel-Russia-Syria deal: Cost, beneficiaries and future deals

Author:: Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Israel and Syria concluded a deal on the return of an Israeli woman from Syria, questions arise regarding the cost and what the future of such transactions with Russian mediation should be.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

147. Time to Update Israeli Policy Toward Syria

Author:: Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

148. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:: Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

149. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:: Haytham Manna
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

150. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:: Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

151. The OSCE and Peacekeeping: Track Record and Outlook

Author:: Fred Tanner
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) is one of the OSCE’s few success stories in recent years. This civilian mission has been uniquely able to operate as a quasi-peacekeeping force in high-risk areas of Donbas, monitoring ceasefire compliance and facilitating dialogue and humanitarian action in support of those living in the conflict zone. In the history of the OSCE, there has been only one other ceasefire monitoring mission: the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). This contribution to OSCE Insights considers the track record of OSCE peace operations, with special attention to the abovementioned missions. All OSCE peace operations to date have been civilian missions, and this paper considers military OSCE mission to be unfeasible also for the future. The paper provides lessons learned and recommendations for future missions by the OSCE and other organizations operating in high-risk environments.
Topic:: International Cooperation, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

152. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:: Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

153. The Sino-Russian Geopolitics in Eurasia and China-USA Disputes: Asia Pacific Great Eurasia vs Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento and Marcos Cordeiro Pires
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article aims to analyze the main elements and processes underway in Eurasia, involving three essential actors: the United States, Russia, and China. At first, it is emphasized the importance of Eurasia as a space that has historically influenced the hegemonic disputes between Great Powers. Then, Eurasia is analyzed as a space for development cooperation, presenting the intersections of the Chinese BRI and the Russian EAEU. Last, the US approach to China is addressed, specifically the Indo-Pacific strategy. We conclude that despite the intense pressure to contain the rise of China and Russia in Eurasia, rivaling both powers is not feasible. In the current path, it will boost the cooperation between two giants, China and Russia.
Topic:: Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

154. Starr Forum: The Future of US-Russian Relations: More of the Same or Something Different?

Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Barry Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science, MIT. His current research examines whether the diffusion of power away from the United States can best be understood as the emergence of a multipolar structure of power, and if so, how the United States should navigate this change. His most recent book is Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

155. Energy: Factor of Stability or Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Author:: Marika Karagianni
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Security of critical economic and energy infrastructure has become a key element in the agenda of both the EU and NATO. The global balance between energy producers and energy importers needs also to be respected in order to secure the smooth operation of global economy and trade. Global energy organizations like OPEC and GAS OPEC see to that. Constructive, multilateral energy diplomacy via the reinforcement of the EMGF (East Med Gas Forum) is considered as the optimum solution to any destabilizing factor in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to become a gas supply source for the EU in the future, alternatively to Russia, which is why it has been identified by Brussels as a future gas diversification source. The official strategy of Cairo is to develop indigenous natural gas resources, with the double aim to increase gas production rates and to export significant amounts to Europe in the immediate future. Egypt is bound to lead gas exports of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and diversification for Europe, through its LNG terminals. The East Med pipeline could follow later on.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Gas, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Africa, Egypt, and Mediterranean

156. A Decade of War in Syria: Current Situation and Possible Outcomes/Una Década de Guerra en Siria: Situación Actual y Posibles Desenlaces

Author:: Andrea Cocchini
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This year 2021 marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the armed conflict in Syria which, triggered by graffiti against the government of the al-Assad family, turned into a civil war with at least 390,000 dead, involving numerous States in the Middle East, as well as the major global powers, with their own specific geopolitical interests. This article therefore aims to provide an account of the current situation in Syria and the objectives that these powers still have in this country. Once the two main reasons for intervening in the conflict disappeared, the true nature of this war came to the surface, embedded in the broader contests of historical rivalry between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran on the other. Apparently, none of them really wants to end it, without compensation. / En este año 2021 se cumplen diez años del comienzo del conflicto armado en Siria que, desencadenado por unos grafitis en contra del gobierno guiado con mano autoritaria por la familia al-Assad, se ha convertido en una guerra con, al menos, 390.000 muertos, que ha acabado involucrando a numerosos Estados de Oriente Próximo, así como a grandes potencias, cada una portadora de intereses geopolíticos concretos. El presente artículo pretende dar cuenta de la situación actual de Siria y, en particular, de los objetivos particulares que mantienen en el país diversos actores. Después de que desaparecieran las dos razones principales esgrimidas para intervenir en el conflicto, quedó de manifiesto su auténtica naturaleza de guerra subsidiaria y sectaria, que se inserta en las más amplias contiendas entre rivales históricos como los Estados Unidos y Rusia, por una parte, y Arabia Saudí, Turquía e Irán, por otra, y que ninguno entre ellos parece tener interés en acabar sin recibir compensaciones.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Proxy War, Operation Inherent Resolve, and Euphrates Shield
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and United States of America

157. Post-war Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: The 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh left many issues unresolved and the front lines volatile. The parties should establish a formal communication channel to address urgent post-war problems, Russian peacekeepers need a clearer mandate and aid agencies must be granted access to the conflict zone.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Caucasus

158. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:: Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

159. Georgian Ethnopolitical Conflicts as a Subject of Confrontation between the USA and Russia

Author:: Ekaterine Lomia and Loid Karchava
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Since 2009 Russia has increased its military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pursued the policy of ‘creeping annexation in the occupied territories of Georgia. Today, 20% of Georgian territories are occupied by the Russian Federation. The Russian-baked separatists continuously erect barbed-wire border posts in one of the occupied regions of Georgia-South Ossetia and detain Georgian people, under the pretext of ‘illegally crossing the border’. Fundamental rights of the local population are violated daily since the occupants install barbers through people’s houses, gardens, and cultivated lands. Innocent citizens are forced to leave their homes, belongings, and cultivated lands that are left beyond the occupants’ demarcation line. The paper argues that along with other global challenges of the world, the USA-Russia clashes of interests are also found with the Georgian conflicts. While Washington hugely supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and welcomes its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Russian Federation, on the contrary, prevents the aforementioned process and directly opposes Georgia’s integration into NATO. The USA condemns Russia’s creeping annexation of Georgian territories and continuously calls on Russia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country. Furthermore, the USA-Russia relations have considerably deteriorated following Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Self Determination, Military Intervention, Conflict, Borders, and Territory
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Georgia, North America, and United States of America

160. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:: András Rácz
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

161. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

162. Hybrid warfare –a threat to the national security of the state

Author:: Artem Bratko, Denys Zaharchuk, and Valentyn Zolka
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: In the context of hybrid warfare, an urgent question arises as to the adequacy of responding to its challenges. Ukraine, the EU countries and NATO are facing new threats, which require democracies to make changes in military and political activities, to find new forms and methods of ensuring national security. Hybrid warfare as a form of undeclared war is conducted with the integrated use of military and non-military instruments (economic, political, informational and psychological, etc.), which fundamentally changes the nature of military struggle. Thus, the change in the nature of the current armed conflict and the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine have created an impetus to accelerate transformations and structural changes in the security and defence sector of Ukraine. One of the priority areas of defence reform is the modernization of the management system of the security and defence sector in order to bring it in line with modern military conflicts, achieve interoperability of Ukraine’s defence forces, systematic transition to NATO standards (STANAG) in the organization, armament and training of troops (forces), as well as in the system of operational decision-making.Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has launched a process of destroying the system of European and transatlantic security. The Kremlin’s hybrid actions against Ukraine and other regional states are undermining stability in the area from the Baltic to the Black Sea, creating a serious challenge to peace and security in the region. Ukraine can become a powerful ally with significant military capabilities and invaluable practical experience, including in the field of combating hybrid threats, with successful reforms for NATO membership and a relevant consensus in NATO.
Topic:: NATO, National Security, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

163. Russia’s domestic politics have become part of the West’s Russia policy: The stakes are rising when Navalny returns to Russia

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Among the most signifcant events in Russia in 2020 were the Covid-19 pandemic, reactions to the protests in Belarus, and the poisoning of top opposition politician Aleksey Navalny. Te frst two were clearly events of international signifcance, but so was the medical treatment given to Navalny, frst in Omsk and then in Berlin, after he suffered from symptoms of poisoning dur- ing a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August. In December, a joint study by the investigative journalist groups Bellingcat and The Insider, along with CNN, Der Spiegel and Naval- ny’s FBK Foundation, showed that it was difficult to find more con- clusive evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement in the assassination attempt by a chemical weapons- related poisoning group under the FSB that had been following Na- valny for years. This kind of op- eration would hardly have been possible without the blessing of high-level intelligence. Te ques- tion of whether the FSB leader- ship was proactive in resolving the “Navalny problem” or whether the order came from the Kremlin is irrelevant. Te revealed pattern confrms the long-standing trend of the strengthened role of the se- curity services, especially the FSB, in Russian politics. It is consistent with Putin’s approach to political processes being increasingly seen as issues of national security. Navalny’s self-confidence and style in the revelation videos related to the investigation, receiving ap- proximately 45 million views in less than a month, underscore the extent to which the FSB failed. The target did not die or become paralyzed, but recovered relatively quickly and bounced back, playing for higher and more radical stakes than before. Navalny’s role and reputation as the Kremlin’s most prominent critic has been based on the political pressure on the Kremlin generated by expos- ing elite corruption. While the will- ingness of citizens to see Navalny as an alternative to Putin varies consid- erably – with the majority indifer- ent to politics as a whole – Navalny’s numerous revelations have created an alternative to Russia’s ofcial re- ality, the political potential of which the regime obviously fears.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regionalism, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

164. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry: A View from Moscow

Author:: Sergey Utkin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU is determined to maintain the transatlantic bond, while Russia tends to interpret the EU’s strategic autonomy precisely as autonomy from the US. The Western unity effort is significantly strengthened by the poor state of the EU’s relations with Russia. Russia is ready to pay lip service to the idea of a more capable EU, but instead it sees opportunities in areas where bilateral cooperation with member states is possible. The EU-wide consensus is doomed to remain critical vis-à-vis Russia for the foreseeable future. The EU will increasingly focus on gaining autonomy from Russia, primarily in the energy field and in terms of hard security deterrence. The EU-Russia geopolitical tension, centred on the common neighbourhood, is long-term and might cause as yet unseen damage to the relationship if it is not handled carefully.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Regionalism, Autonomy, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

165. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

166. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:: Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

167. Sino-Russian Convergence on Eurasian Integration: Understanding the Long-Term Engagement

Author:: Shabir Amhad Khan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Russia and China surrounding Eurasia, realizing Halford Mackinder‘s Heartland theory by integrating the Eurasian landmass. Economic, political and strategic complementarities between Russia and China plus geography are the integrative forces compelling both the powers to accommodate each other‘s interests and provide indispensable benefits to each other in the context of Eurasian integration. By developing both the components of cross border connectivity infrastructure i.e. hardware (Roads, Railways, Pipelines, Ports) as well as software (harmonization and coordination of policies, regulations) the dyad is turning the 21st Century into ―Eurasian Century‖. Historically, with the inventions of maritime (Sea lanes of Communication) transportation, the power shifted to Sea powers(West) as they controlled the main transportation routes. The development and hence control over the transportation routes over Eurasia will result into a power shift from Sea powers to land powers (Russia & China). Therefore the stakes are high for both the continental powers in integrating Eurasia. One is World‘s largest energy producer while the other is largest energy consumer. All this mean a permanent need for each other and long-term engagement for at least the rest of 21st century. This complementarily between Russia and China is also turning the heartland i.e. landlocked geography of Central Asian Republics into a blessing for these republics as opposed to the landlocked Afghanistan for which its geography turned to be a curse. Both consider Central Asia as their backyard and therefore unanimous on keeping the backyard stable and developed.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Conflict, Regional Integration, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

168. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea

Author:: Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea

169. TINA for Putin – Or is there an alternative?

Author:: Marc Franco
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: EU Relations with Russia hit the news headlines this week. The visit of EU High Representative Josep Borrell, launched in a constructive spirit, ended up in a diplomatic catastrophe. The Navalny saga and the recent weekly demonstrations all over Russia have been commented on at length in the Western press. What is going on in Russia? How to interpret the recent surge of aggressiveness of theRussianauthorities? Aretheprotestsjusta small hiccup in a stable Putin regime, or is something more going on? To be clear, this is neither the end nor, probably, the beginning of theendofaregime.Buttheeventsarefarfrom insignificant. In this article I look at the ongoing events from three angles: what is the Putin regime up to? What is behind the recent wave of protests? And what are the implications for the EU’s relations with Russia?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

170. The EU and Russia: A New Foreign Policy for the “Carcass”?

Author:: Marc Franco
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Without any irony: the decision of High Representative (HR) Borrell to go to Moscow in early February was courageous and correct. The discussion on EU-Russia relations at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22 February and the conclusions of that meeting were a success. But that does not mean that the EU should not drastically improve its foreign policy game.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

171. Engaging Russia over Syria: Managing Peripheral Conflict and Narrowing Interests

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The United States is examining how to narrow core objectives in the Middle East to focus on improving military readiness and increasing the number of low-density, high-demand assets available for deployment in Asia and Europe. To free up more forces and to help improve readiness, Washington should explore selective engagement with Moscow about securing a formal ceasefire in Syria’s northwest and reaching agreement on a “no-foreign forces zone” in Syria’s south. This policy would not alter the status quo in Syria, but seek to use diplomatic tools to allow for the reallocation of certain resources now tasked with protecting U.S. ground forces. This engagement with the Russian Federation would elevate a key U.S. interest and use counter-terrorism capabilities based in Jordan to disrupt plots against the homeland. It would also seek to use diplomatic tools to create conditions to remove forces that do not directly support this counter-terrorism effort. This approach would retain U.S. forces in the Middle East, but in a way that allows for certain assets to be repositioned in either the United States, Indo-Pacific, or Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

172. A Strategic Triangle in the Arctic? Implications of China–Russia–United States Power Dynamics for Regional Security

Author:: Ian Anthony and Fei Su
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security paper examines security challenges arising from the Arctic activities of three actors with a substantial ‘footprint’—China, Russia and the United States—and how they might be addressed in existing and new frameworks. Arctic and non-Arctic states want to exploit commercial opportunities created by a changing physical environment. Arctic states agree that climate-related challenges can be addressed through cooperation within existing institutions. However, to ensure that increasing human activity stays within acceptable environmental and human security risk levels, non-Arctic states need to be engaged. The risk of unwanted escalation in military tension in the Arctic due to deteriorating relations among major powers over disputes arising elsewhere has grown to the point where it cannot be ignored. A steady increase in military investments in the Arctic, or Arctic operations, will continue, but there is no ready-made framework to address military security challenges. Issues that occupy a ‘grey zone’ between military and non-military security will have to be addressed as digital and transport infrastructure expand in the Arctic. However, there is little experience in how diverse state and non-state actors can manage cooperation and competition simultaneously.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

173. There is No Easy Solution To The Western Balkans' Disinformation Challenge

Author:: Daniel Sunter
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The Western Balkan countries are currently among the most vulnerable to an intentional, Kremlin-supported campaign of disinformation within the European region. The vulnerability of the Western Balkans is exacerbated for several reasons: the countries are not completely integrated into European and EuroAtlantic structures; they harbor the legacy of ethnic and religious tensions from the conflicts of the 1990s; the region continues to experience dysfunctions within its information space; and it is plagued by the unresolved Kosovo issue. Tackling a problem of this magnitude demands a comprehensive approach by governments and media associations supported by the international community
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Disinformation, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Balkans

174. Book Talk. "There Is Nothing for You Here" by Fiona Hill

Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: lease join the Harriman Institute and the Institute for the Study of Human Rights for a book talk by Fiona Hill, author of There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-First Century (Mariner Books, 2021). The talk will be chaired by David L. Phillips (ISHR) with Alexander Cooley (Harriman Institute) as discussant and interviewer. In There Is Nothing for You Here, a celebrated foreign policy expert and key impeachment witness reveals how declining opportunity has set America on the grim path of modern Russia—and draws on her personal journey out of poverty, as well as her unique perspectives as an historian and policy maker, to show how we can return hope to our forgotten places. Fiona Hill grew up in a world of terminal decay. The last of the local mines had closed, businesses were shuttering, and despair was etched in the faces around her. Her father urged her to get out of their blighted corner of northern England: “There is nothing for you here, pet,” he said. The coal-miner’s daughter managed to go further than he ever could have dreamed. She studied in Moscow and at Harvard, became an American citizen, and served three U.S. Presidents. But in the heartlands of both Russia and the United States, she saw troubling reflections of her hometown and similar populist impulses. By the time she offered her brave testimony in the first impeachment inquiry of President Trump, Hill knew that the desperation of forgotten people was driving American politics over the brink—and that we were running out of time to save ourselves from Russia’s fate. In this powerful, deeply personal account, she shares what she has learned, and shows why expanding opportunity is the only long-term hope for our democracy. Fiona Hill is the Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. From 2017 to 2019, she served as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council. From 2006 to 2009, she served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. She has researched and published extensively on issues related to Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, regional conflicts, energy, and strategic issues. Coauthor of Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin and The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold, she holds a master's degree in Soviet studies and a doctorate in history from Harvard University and a master's in Russian and modern history from St. Andrews University in Scotland. She also has pursued studies at Moscow's Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages. Hill is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and lives in the Washington, DC, area.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Violence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

175. The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict in its Fourth Decade

Author:: Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: As the Nagorny Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan enters its fourth decade, the 2020 war was a reminder that it remains the most dangerous conflict in the post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan completely reversed the losses it suffered in the conflict of the early 1990s, leaving the Armenian side defeated and humiliated. Russia inserted itself into the heart of the conflict zone for the first time, through the introduction of a peacekeeping force in Karabakh itself. But a final Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement that resolves the status of Nagorny Karabakh – the trigger for the conflict in 1988 – and a normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan looks as elusive as ever.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS