Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 25 Years / Topic: Military Strategy

1. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:: Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security

Author:: Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

3. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. IMperial or Colonial: The War is Fought Over The Soviet Past an A Broken Relationship

Author:: Li Bennich-Bjorkman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia is trying, through its bombs, attacks, and brutality, to erase what Ukraine was. Therefore, it is a war effort to keep remembering how Ukraine in peace looked like, how it smelled, tasted, and felt. And to never forget that this is a war against Ukraine, in its own right. Not as a representative of the West, and not as a representative of democracy. But because Ukraine is of such importance to Russia, that a break between the two is unthinkable for Putin. That was what Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, realized already in 1991. He, and Ukrainian leaders after him, tried to protect their territory while at the same time reassuring Russia that relations could still be friendly. But Russia has never changed in a similar way
Topic:: Imperialism, Military Strategy, Colonialism, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Exploring the Russian Perspective on the War in Ukraine: Demography's Power and Ukraine's Uniqueness

Author:: Aybars Arda Kilicer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Western officials and media have portrayed Russia as a rogue state that seeks to undermine the fundamental foundations of the Western lifestyle, which are based on democratic and liberal principles, especially more since the invasion of the remaining Ukrainian territories began on 24 February 2022. According to this perspective, Russia allegedly launched its strike to prevent Ukraine from joining the club of liberal nations. This move would have been a clear message to any other post-Soviet countries, further strengthening Russian control over them. It would be unfair to completely dismiss this argument, yet, justifying the simplification of the procedure and the continuation of conflict on these reasons goes much beyond presenting the facts. A thorough examination of the many issues involved is necessary to comprehend the Russian motivations for the ongoing war. This calls for an in-depth analysis of the Crimean Question, focusing on how Russia uses demographics in its foreign strategy. In addition, within the broader context of The Russian World (Russkiy Mir) Vision, it is crucial to understand the relevance of Russia’s unique perspective on Ukraine. The objective of this study is to provide an analytical framework concentrating on these apparently most visible factors for Russia’s willingness to raise tensions in Eastern Europe further and invade the remaining territory under the sovereignty of Ukraine.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. La invasión rusa de Ucrania bajo el prisma de las teorías de control reflexivo

Author:: Arturo Esteban Ceballos
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El presente artículo analiza las causas del fracaso de la fase inicial de la invasión rusa de Ucrania de febrero de 2022 desde el prisma de la teoría del control reflexivo. Esta teoría fue formulada en los años sesenta por el matemático y psicólogo Vladimir Lefebvre, y constituye hoy día una de las fuentes de inspiración de la moderna doctrina político militar de Rusia. Para ello, se ha utilizado un método hipotético deductivo sobre la base de una hipótesis que relaciona este fracaso con el manejo inadecuado de los marcos de información por parte de Rusia. Dado que la moderna doctrina militar de Rusia descansa en gran parte en las teorías del control reflexivo, el fracaso de este último provocó que no se alcanzasen las condiciones decisivas del enfrentamiento en las fases iniciales del conflicto. Ucrania había resistido las medidas activas rusas, lo que ocasionó un error de cálculo en el diseño estratégico inicial del Kremlin.
Topic:: Intelligence, Military Strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Reflexive Control
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

7. The Russian Bloodletting Strategy in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: From Success to Hubris

Author:: Spyridon N. Litsas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The article focuses on the role of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in shaping the balance of power in the Lesser Caucasus as a prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that Russia implemented a “bait and bleed” strategy to discipline Armenia for its pro-Western agenda. In addition, it focuses on Turkey’s role as a supportive apparatus for Azerbaijan’s military efforts against Armenia, evaluating the connection established between Moscow and Ankara. The Nagorno-Karabakh case marked a new manipulative Russian strategy to influence the balance of power in regions with geostrategic significance for the Kremlin.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

8. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:: Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:: James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

11. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

12. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:: Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

13. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:: Pavel Baev
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

15. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

16. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In May 2022, we published our Egmont Paper 116 entitled The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited, in which we suggested, “The current spring recruitment cycle (1 April-15 July 2022) may be considered a more accurate indication of popular support for Putin’s war in Ukraine than the results of public opinion research as we know it. Therefore, the 2022 spring recruitment cycle may be regarded as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine with the voenkomati as its voting stations.” Near the end of this recruitment period, it is time to return to this statement. How did the spring recruitment cycle go, and which conclusion can we draw from it? A critical review.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Civil-Military Relations, Recruitment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

18. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:: Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

19. Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Author:: Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein, and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Social Order, Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

20. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

21. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

22. Russia Futures: Three Trajectories

Author:: Cyrus Newlin and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Beginning in 2018, the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS initiated a research project to explore scenarios related to Russia’s future development and to consider the transatlantic implications of each scenario. The project, which was generously funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was intended to provide policymakers with an understanding of how Russia’s domestic political situation, economic outlook, military activities, and foreign policy might evolve in response to modern-day challenges including climate change, growing competition in the Arctic, and the fraught relationship between China and the collective West. Based on original research and workshops involving U.S., Norwegian, and European experts, CSIS identified three potential scenarios for Russia’s future development. The first scenario envisioned a path of continuity, in which Russian leaders strove to maintain the status quo. The second scenario foresaw a trend of risk reduction in the Kremlin’s decisionmaking that led to a partial normalization of relations with the West. The third scenario considered a darker future, in which Russian leaders accepted a higher degree of risk to manage mounting problems at home and abroad, leading to sustained confrontation with the West and the further detachment of the Russian government from its people. These scenarios were being prepared for publication when Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a renewed invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and ushered in a period of deep uncertainty for European and global affairs. Almost immediately, Russia’s act of aggression turned the country into a global pariah, triggering international sanctions far beyond the Kremlin’s expectations and consolidating transatlantic unity to an extent that was difficult to imagine in the tense months immediately preceding the invasion. As orthodoxies have been challenged and expectations reconsidered, contingencies that were thought impossible—from embargoes of Russian hydrocarbons to the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin—are starting to feature into conversations among policymakers and analysts.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Development, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

23. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:: Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:: Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?

Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. The Alliance of Civilizations and the Role of Spain

Author:: Ramon Blecua
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The crisis over Ukraine reinforces the view that, despite progress in many areas on the international agenda in recent years, the number of people affected by conflict and violence keeps growing. In the past 20 years, the number of forcibly displaced people has doubled, reaching over 80 million. According to United Nations data, over 60 percent of conflicts have relapsed in the last decade, a staggering figure that testifies of the difficulty of conflict resolution in this context. More than 80 percent of conflicts over the past 30 years involve militias and non‑state actors, while the more recent rise in transnational violent extremist groups has increased the challenges for conflict resolution. Civil wars are leading to more protracted conflicts with ethno‑cultural components, which complicate the traditional political approach. Existing multilateral mechanisms and diplomatic negotiations are increasingly ineffective, and a new toolbox for conflict resolution is more urgent than ever. The combination of great power competition, regional struggles for hegemony, and the proliferation of non‑state actors create interlocking and multi‑layered conflicts that impact international peace and stability. At the same time, these elements are challenging the traditional approaches whilst further putting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals at risk, as recognized inter alia by the latest Strategic Plan of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The international multilateral order is being questioned from many different quarters, while the wave of global protests shows the exhaustion of existing economic and political models, as well as the need for a new social contract. The impact of the pandemic and the measures taken to control it are also having a profound impact on these new political and economic dynamics, laying bare the growing inequalities of the new digital economy as well as the weakening of solidarity and common action. The increasingly intricate fabric of peace and conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved have made conflict resolution more complex, as stated in the December 2020 Concept on EU Peace Mediation. Terrorism and radicalization have become a more imminent security threat and tensions related to environmental degradation, irregular migration and forced displacement, are affecting the social fabric in fragile states in unprecedented manners.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Alliance, Multilateralism, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

28. How Russia Fights

Author:: Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

29. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:: Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

30. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

31. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

32. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

33. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. The Russian Federation Dominance in the International Security Environment

Author:: Miroslaw Banasik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This article presents the research results, which set out to explain the mechanisms leading to the achievement of dominance by the Russian Federation in the international security environment. In the research process, the systemic approach was applied. Analysis and criticism of the literature, non-participatory observation and case study elements were used to solve the research problems. As a result, it was determined that the theoretical basis for the Russian Federation's achievement of international dominance is the concept of new generation war. The model of the strategic influence of the Russian Federation is directed at the shaping of the security environment and includes the synchronisation of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, indirect and direct effects, the blurring of the boundaries between war and peace and the application of pressure and aggression. The Russian Federation achieves strategic dominance through asymmetry, chaos, reflexive control, and strategic deterrence. Armed forces provide a key role in asserting dominance, focused on conducting offensive activities and inflicting losses with conventional and nuclear weapons.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Influence, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

35. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:: Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

36. The Black Sea Thread in Russian Foreign Policy and How the United States Can Respond

Author:: Adam Christopher Nettles
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article outlines the evolving geopolitical situation in the Black Sea in the context of Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. It establishes a historically rooted pattern in Russian strategy tied to the region that runs through most recent acts of Russian aggression against its neighbors. It illustrates how after each Russian conflict with its neighbors in the last 20 years Russia has gained more physical coastline on the Black Sea. It roots this behavior in a centuries-long pattern of Russian behavior grounded in practical and ideational motivations. Accordingly, it establishes that Russian aggression in the Black Sea is likely to be a persistent fixture of global great power competition for the near future. The author then proposes a sustainable solution to counter Russian aggression in the theater through U.S. support of the current trend toward increased European “strategic autonomy” within the bounds of the NATO alliance.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Navy, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Black Sea

37. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:: Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

38. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

39. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:: Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

40. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

41. Pugwash note on the situation in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: We note with great concern the worsening situation in the ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The annexation of areas currently controlled by Russian military will exacerbate tensions as Ukraine seems determined to recover the occupied regions and is supported by several NATO countries. The situation is quite complex as armed hostilities continue unabated, and opposing security perceptions by the parties involved do not appear easily reconcilable. Despite the fact that prospects for a ceasefire look dim under this current situation, a ceasefire is a necessary step towards stopping this dangerous conflict which, while it is heavily affecting Ukraine, is also a very destabilizing element that threatens international security.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Global Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

44. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

45. Russia's War and The Future of European Order

Author:: Thomas Diez
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War international order. Yet the scenario of a renewed Cold War must be balanced by alternative visions of European order. This contribution reassesses the concepts of interdependence, socialization, normative power, and international society taken from international relations theory to develop some general lessons for European order and concrete pointers toward alternative policy paths. Such an order needs to build on a more honest engagement, serious great power management mirrored by societal linkages, and creative thinking about joint institutions and regional overlaps.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons from the Western Balkans

Author:: Tefta Kelmendi
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a new momentum for the European Union to review its political and security strategy for the neighborhood. Its enlargement policy – which has become yet another divisive issue in Europe over the past years – is now forced back into the EU’s foreign policy priorities. With Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova officially requesting membership in the EU, deciding how to go about it has become an even greater challenge. Over the past 20 years, we have evidenced a failure of the EU to show results in the Western Balkans – both in terms of driving democratic reforms and the rule of law, as well as in delivering on its promises in the accession process. The war in Ukraine might be the EU’s last chance to reinvigorate its enlargement policy and reposition itself geopolitically in eastern and southeastern Europe.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

47. War, Peace, and (in)Justice in the Nuclear Age

Author:: Ulrich Kűhn
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has created a watershed moment for Europe. The coming weeks and months will decide what kind of peace and security order will shape the old continent. The prominence of nuclear weapons will likely increase in the years ahead. Mutual deterrence between NATO and Russia will be the military component to what may soon turn out to be a new Cold War dividing Europe. While this is already bad news news, Ukraine’s fate has again exposed the system of nuclear deterrence as highly unjust and precarious. The consequences of that sorry state of affairs might soon create additional injustices on a global scale. A realistic view must come to the conclusion that we do not have the time to fight another Cold War
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. War in Ukraine: Ukraine and History

Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:: n this Mile End Institute Webinar, held on Friday 25 March, Dr Lyndsey Jenkins is joined by Dr Joe Cronin, Dr James Ellison and Dr Andy Willimott from the School of History at @QMULOfficial to talk about the War in Ukraine. In this informative session on such a historic moment which will shape our lives and our politics for years to come, our resident experts to discuss Ukraine, its history and politics, Western relations with Russia after the Cold War, the future of NATO and the post-Cold War order, as well as Vladimir Putin's use of the term 'denazification' and the state of Russian politics in 2022.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. The War in Ukraine: More Western Aid and Fear of Escalation

Author:: Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: The United States and other NATO countries have thus far not deviated from their policy regarding the war in Eastern Europe – military and economic assistance, with no boots on the ground. Yet the more the war continues, and while there is a chance of significant escalation, does this policy stand to change?
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

50. The Russia-Ukraine War: Where Do We Go from Here?

Author:: Zvi Magen and Sophie Kobzantsev
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Two months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the goal of a short campaign has clearly not been achieved. Russia now seeks to achieve gains while suspending the negotiations with Kyiv – both to improve its position in advance of future negotiations, and to deliver the message to the West that “you cannot stop us.”
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

51. Investigation of Russia's Crimes in Ukraine: A Turning Point for the International Criminal Court?

Author:: Ori Beeri and Pnina Sharvit Baruch
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: The Chief Prosecutor at The Hague has already begun to investigate actions taken by Russia in the Ukrainian arena, while accelerating judicial proceedings and bureaucracy. This reflects a change of approach, which includes the prioritization of recent events, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of the Court. How will this affect the investigation of the war in Eastern Europe – and the investigation concerning Israel?
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, International Crime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

52. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:: Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

53. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:: Galia Lavi
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

54. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure

Author:: Ofek Reimer
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?

Author:: Helit Barel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: One month into the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat remains. Will Russia’s President decide to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and thereby shatter the 77 years of nuclear deterrence? From a rational perspective, there is little likelihood of this occurring, but thus far Putin has not succeeded in realizing his goals in the Ukrainian theater – and Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. The War in Ukraine: The Challenge of Shaping an Endgame

Author:: Udi Dekel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Although nearly three weeks have passed since Putin invaded Ukraine, there is no framework for an endgame on the horizon. While the United States and the West would like to bring Putin to his knees as he sinks deeper in the Ukrainian mud, Washington must recognize that the longer the war continues, the chances increase for escalation to new levels that neither side wants. Therefore, before the situation is completely out of control, there must be a dialogue with Russia that can lead to an end to the war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Putin’s Dilemma

Author:: Ofer Shelah
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: After more than two weeks of war in Ukraine, initial conclusions can already be drawn. Chief among these is the realization that force application in complicated conditions can confront a decision maker with a serious dilemma, in which precisely a military achievement may destroy any possibility of scoring a political achievement
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

58. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Legal Aspects

Author:: Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Ori Beeri
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Since Russia invaded Ukraine, it has been the object of significant legal pressure. While the various legal measures have no power to stop the bloody war, they deliver a powerful, unequivocal message: any state that flagrantly violates international world and undermines the world order will suffer isolation, condemnation, sanction, and criminal investigations. Israel, which has seemed to lean to sitting on the fence, must join the international efforts against Russia, Otherwise it is liable to find itself on the wrong side of history
Topic:: Military Strategy, Law, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

59. The Ukraine Crisis: An Interim Analysis

Author:: Eldad Shavit, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began only days ago, it is already clear that with this belligerence Putin has upset the world order that has existed since the Second World War. The Western bloc has already begun to realign and is presenting a unified and forceful stance vis-à-vis Moscow. Israel can no longer avoid taking a clear stand and siding fully with the countries opposing Russia
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. Russia-Ukraine: Dangerous Stalemate

Author:: European Institute of Peace
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:: Seven years have passed this month since the Package of Measures for implementation of the Minsk agreements called for an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation…”. Despite endorsement by the UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (February 2015), little or no progress was made in implementing the Minsk agreements, with continued conflict and violations of the ceasefire reported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) on an almost daily basis. Almost 14.000 Ukrainians lost their lives, thousands more were injured, and millions displaced. With no effective ceasefire in place, this is not a “frozen conflict,” and violent escalation may happen by intent, misunderstanding or miscalculation. Today an even more dangerous stalemate has emerged. Deep international concerns have been raised about the reported Russian military build-up along the country’s borders with Ukraine. Further raising the stakes, broader security issues have re-surfaced with Moscow demanding inter alia guarantees from the US and NATO to refrain from any further enlargement of the alliance, including the accession of Ukraine and other states. Despite intensive and on-going international consultations at all levels, there are no signs yet of de-escalation of the crisis. This report has been prepared in consultation with a group of Ukrainian and Russian experts who have been conducting quiet discussions during the past two years on the Minsk peace process and, more broadly, relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These talks are held under the auspices of the European Institute of Peace.[1] Out of deep concern with present developments, it was decided to share more widely the broad consensus among the participants about the urgent need for a sustainable and durable ceasefire as a prerequisite for implementing the Minsk agreements. In a recent encouraging development, the advisers to the Normandy Four (N4) heads of state and government have supported in a joint statement after their meeting in Paris “unconditional observance of the ceasefire of 22 July 2020 regardless of differences on other issues of the implementation of the Minsk agreements.”[2] Reportedly, a follow-up meeting in Berlin on 10 February 2022 yielded no tangible results yet. Even if the Minsk peace process has come to a ground halt at present, it should be realized that the same political and security issues will have to be addressed in any renewed peace efforts in whatever format to restore peace in east Ukraine. This report highlights that any attempt to overcome the current political stalemate needs to be supported by concrete steps to establish a sustainable ceasefire at the ground-level of the conflict. The report analyses the major reasons for why a sustainable ceasefire was not implemented thus far, and offers a ceasefire management tool referred to as a “Coordination and Verification Mechanism” (CVM).
Topic:: Military Strategy, Violence, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. How the United States Should Respond if Russia Invades Ukraine

Author:: Max Bergmann
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: A Russian invasion of Ukraine must come at a high cost to the Kremlin.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

62. Crisis and Bargaining Over Ukraine: A New US-Russia Security Order?

Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: As Russian troops have amassed on Ukraine's border, talks aimed at resolving the standoff between Russia and NATO appear to have collapsed. Poland's Foreign Minister warned that "it seems that the risk of war in the OSCE area is now greater than ever before in the last 30 years." Russia has been seeking a new European security agreement that would include formal binding pledges to limit NATO's expansion and military activities across Eastern Europe. US and NATO officials respond that they will not give up on NATO's principles, especially its "open door" policy towards membership. Ukrainians are bracing for a renewed conflict amidst domestic political turmoil. Are the Russian and Western positions irreconcilable? How did we get to the brink of another conflict? And how would a Russian-Ukrainian war affect Russian and Ukrainian domestic politics? How would it impact Ukrainian identity and foreign policy goals?
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

63. What’s Next? Experts Respond to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Join us for a special meeting of the New York-Russia Public Policy Series, co-hosted by the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia. This event is also cosponsored by the Center for Social Media and Politics at NYU and the Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

64. The Parallels of Russian Bellicosity in the Balkans in the Example of Ukraine

Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Just last month, the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina issued issued a startling threat to the Bosnian government’s aspirations to join NATO. “Bosnia and Herzegovina have the right to decide whether to be a member of NATO, but Moscow reserves the right to respond to such an opportunity,” he said. Russia warned Bosnia and Herzegovina that it could be the Kremlin's next target following Ukraine. This is not the first time Russia has threatened Bosnia. The parallels to Russia’s threats to Ukraine are unerringly uncanny. Bosnia’s significance to Western powers and to Russia stems from the same fact: The country is located squarely at the intersection of NATO and Russian influence. The West recognizes some of the potential Bosnia could have if it were brought into the NATO bloc, but seems not to understand the ramifications of the country slipping into Kremlin-induced disarray. For its part, Russia is just being consistent: Just as it unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Montenegro and North Macedonia from joining NATO, so too is it trying to halt Bosnian aspirations toward the same goal. Bosnia and threatened Balkan states North Macedonia and Montenegro remain fragile to Russian manipulation of its proxies in all of these countries and in the Balkan neighborhood.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

65. Russia’s War on Ukraine: A New Phase

Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered a new phase. The Kremlin’s initial plan to seize Kyiv with a lightning strike failed due to spirited defense by the Ukrainian military. In response, Russia has concentrated forces in the Donbas, and to a lesser extent southern Ukraine. Fighting remains fierce in these areas and experts disagree about the trajectory of the conflict. Some argue that Ukraine’s superior morale and greater international support will be decisive, while others point to Russia’s sheer advantage in numbers. Our panel of experts will discuss the implications of this new phase of the war. Can Ukraine gain back territory lost in recent weeks? Have Russia’s war aims changed? Should the US and NATO change course? Is it time for all sides to seek a negotiated settlement?
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:: Rico Chandra
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:: Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

67. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

68. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:: Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

69. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin

Author:: Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

70. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

71. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
Topic:: Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

72. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:: Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

74. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:: Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

75. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

76. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:: Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

77. tarr Forum: An Update on Russia's War Against Ukraine

Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What is the status of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. Starr Forum: Energy as a Weapon of War: Russia, Ukraine and Europe in Challenging Times

Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: How has Russia weaponized energy in this war? What have been the effects? How have Europeans responded to this weaponization of energy and what may be their responses this winter?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, European Union, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. Russia's Assault on Ukraine: Fallout From the War

Author:: Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating “the rest of our territory.” The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a “grinding struggle” may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

80. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:: Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

81. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:: Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

82. China and Russia: The Naval Projection of Land Powers

Author:: Paulo Fagundes Visentini
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The Russian Federation and China are large land States (the first and fourth, respectively), characterized by their configuration as land powers from a geopolitical perspective. Recently, through its development and extroversion of its economy, China has built a naval power with a world presence. Russia, on the other hand, which lost much of the naval and coastal power that the USSR had, is trying to rebuild its capacity for maritime defense and exploration of the new Arctic Route, but still with limited global projection. By analyzing the recent naval projection of these traditional land powers, the article seeks to discuss the extent to which traditional geopolitics is reaching its zenith and initiating its own overcoming
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Navy, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

83. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:: Dima Course
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

84. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:: Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

85. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:: Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

86. Protocooperation as a Model for the Russia-UAE Partnership

Author:: Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 marked the Russian Federation (RF) return as a key player in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, the relations between Russia and the UAE are of utmost importance for both entities, for the region, and globally. This article seeks to fill a gap in scholarly knowledge by answering questions about the nature of the emerging cooperation between Russia and the UAE. How Russia seeks to use the UAE to expand its sphere of influence in the MENA region and how the UAE uses this cooperation to achieve its foreign policy goals. The article applies protocooperation (an analogy to the ecological relationship) as a model for the Russia-UAE partnership. The RF is strengthening its position in the MENA regarding the UAE as a key partner for regaining its political, economic, and military influence in the MENA region. Russia-UAE’s partnership aims at achieving conjunctural geopolitical interests benefiting from diminished Western, mainly the US, presence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Gulf Nations, and UAE

87. Georgian Ethnopolitical Conflicts as a Subject of Confrontation between the USA and Russia

Author:: Ekaterine Lomia and Loid Karchava
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Since 2009 Russia has increased its military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pursued the policy of ‘creeping annexation in the occupied territories of Georgia. Today, 20% of Georgian territories are occupied by the Russian Federation. The Russian-baked separatists continuously erect barbed-wire border posts in one of the occupied regions of Georgia-South Ossetia and detain Georgian people, under the pretext of ‘illegally crossing the border’. Fundamental rights of the local population are violated daily since the occupants install barbers through people’s houses, gardens, and cultivated lands. Innocent citizens are forced to leave their homes, belongings, and cultivated lands that are left beyond the occupants’ demarcation line. The paper argues that along with other global challenges of the world, the USA-Russia clashes of interests are also found with the Georgian conflicts. While Washington hugely supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and welcomes its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Russian Federation, on the contrary, prevents the aforementioned process and directly opposes Georgia’s integration into NATO. The USA condemns Russia’s creeping annexation of Georgian territories and continuously calls on Russia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country. Furthermore, the USA-Russia relations have considerably deteriorated following Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Self Determination, Military Intervention, Conflict, Borders, and Territory
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Georgia, North America, and United States of America

88. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

89. Russian Relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after U.S. Withdrawal

Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Join us for a meeting of the New York-Russia Public Policy Series, co-hosted by the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia. In this second event of the academic year, our panelists will discuss the status of Russian relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Moderated by Joshua Tucker (NYU Jordan Center) and Alexander Cooley (Harriman Institute). The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the dramatic collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Kabul has ushered in another period of Taliban rule. Regional powers and neighbors have been anticipating the U.S. exit for some time: Russia remains a critical player in the region and, even before the U.S. withdrawal, had demonstrated a pragmatic approach to engaging with the Taliban. What is Moscow’s plan for dealing with the new Afghan government and what are its overall priorities in the region? How will this affect Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states and China? And are there any prospects for renewed cooperation between Moscow and Washington on counterterrorism issues in this period of uncertainty and potential instability? Please join this distinguished group of academic experts who will explore the new complex dynamics of a post-American Afghanistan and Central Asia. This event is supported by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. Speakers Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the Center of Euro-Asian Research and Senior Fellow with the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO Nargis Kassenova, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on Central Asia, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Artemy Kalinovsky, Professor of Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet Studies, Temple University Ekaterina Stepanova, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, National Research Institute of the World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO), Moderated by: Alexander Cooley, Director of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University Joshua Tucker, Director of the Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, New York University
Topic:: International Relations, Military Strategy, Governance, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

90. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

91. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:: Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

92. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:: Marc Franco
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

93. The EU and Russia: A New Foreign Policy for the “Carcass”?

Author:: Marc Franco
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Without any irony: the decision of High Representative (HR) Borrell to go to Moscow in early February was courageous and correct. The discussion on EU-Russia relations at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22 February and the conclusions of that meeting were a success. But that does not mean that the EU should not drastically improve its foreign policy game.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

94. Book Talk. "There Is Nothing for You Here" by Fiona Hill

Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: lease join the Harriman Institute and the Institute for the Study of Human Rights for a book talk by Fiona Hill, author of There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-First Century (Mariner Books, 2021). The talk will be chaired by David L. Phillips (ISHR) with Alexander Cooley (Harriman Institute) as discussant and interviewer. In There Is Nothing for You Here, a celebrated foreign policy expert and key impeachment witness reveals how declining opportunity has set America on the grim path of modern Russia—and draws on her personal journey out of poverty, as well as her unique perspectives as an historian and policy maker, to show how we can return hope to our forgotten places. Fiona Hill grew up in a world of terminal decay. The last of the local mines had closed, businesses were shuttering, and despair was etched in the faces around her. Her father urged her to get out of their blighted corner of northern England: “There is nothing for you here, pet,” he said. The coal-miner’s daughter managed to go further than he ever could have dreamed. She studied in Moscow and at Harvard, became an American citizen, and served three U.S. Presidents. But in the heartlands of both Russia and the United States, she saw troubling reflections of her hometown and similar populist impulses. By the time she offered her brave testimony in the first impeachment inquiry of President Trump, Hill knew that the desperation of forgotten people was driving American politics over the brink—and that we were running out of time to save ourselves from Russia’s fate. In this powerful, deeply personal account, she shares what she has learned, and shows why expanding opportunity is the only long-term hope for our democracy. Fiona Hill is the Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. From 2017 to 2019, she served as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council. From 2006 to 2009, she served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. She has researched and published extensively on issues related to Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, regional conflicts, energy, and strategic issues. Coauthor of Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin and The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold, she holds a master's degree in Soviet studies and a doctorate in history from Harvard University and a master's in Russian and modern history from St. Andrews University in Scotland. She also has pursued studies at Moscow's Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages. Hill is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and lives in the Washington, DC, area.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Violence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

95. Russia in Africa: Soviet Legacies, Current Objectives, Local Responses

Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: In recent years, Russia has stepped up its engagement in Africa, forging military and security agreements as well as business relationships with leaders in several states. What lies behind Russia’s “return” to Africa? During the Cold War, Africa constituted a major site of Soviet geopolitical competition with the U.S. Does this history, as well as the legacy of Soviet antiracism, inform Russia’s current goals and actions on the continent? Panelists will explore this issue, as well as the impact of Russia’s presence on security and humanitarian crises within Africa. What has been the reaction of various local actors to Russia’s presence? Panelists will also discuss the policy response: how should the international community and the West respond to Russian engagement in Africa?
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, and Europe

96. Book Talk. "Air Raid" by Polina Barskova with Translator Valzhyna Mort

Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the Harriman Institute for a discussion with poet and scholar Polina Barskova about her new volume, Air Raid (Ugly Duckling Presse, 2021). She will be joined by translator Valzhyna Mort and moderator Mark Lipovetsky. This event is part of our Contemporary Culture series. The Siege of Leningrad began in 1941 and lasted 872 days, resulting in the most destructive blockade in history. Already shaken by Stalin’s purges of the ’30s, Leningrad withstood the siege at a great human cost. Air Raid takes us through the archives of memory and literature in this city of death. Polina Barskova’s polyphonic poems stretch the boundaries of poetic form—this is what we’re left with after poetry’s failure to save nations and people: post-death, post-Holocaust, post-Siege, post-revolution; post-marriage and post-literature. How does language react to such a catastrophe? How does a poet find language for what cannot be told? This new translation of a leading contemporary Russian poet confronts English excavating its muteness, stutter, and curse.
Topic:: Arts, Military Strategy, Culture, Memory, World War II, and Poetry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

97. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:: Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

98. Russian Crisis Behavior, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey?

Author:: Richard Giragosian, David G. Lewis, and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan initiated a war to retake the disputed Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts of Azerbaijan held by Armenian forces.1 The forty-four-day war resulted in a resounding defeat for the Armenian forces and only halted with the acceptance of a Russian-imposed agreement for a cessation of hostilities on November 9-10, 2020. Although the war was initially expected to unfold as a war of attrition with an eventual stalemate based on the advantages of terrain of the Armenian defenders, reality differed in terms of duration, intensity, and outcome.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

99. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

100. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS