Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 25 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Geopolitics

1. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:: Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:: Florian Vidal
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:: Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

4. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:: Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:: Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:: Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Balkans

7. Western Balkans’ Horizon 2023 – New uncertainties in a changed geopolitical setting

Author:: Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: “The age of uncertainty” has recently become the most used description for the time we live in. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the war approaching now its second year have changed the globe. Global uncertainties and huge geopolitical changes we witness are mirrored in European semiperipheral regions like the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans has been in a limbo for a while with no major progress towards the EU and democracy in general. Instead of steady democratization in the region we witnessed a gradual autocratization, most prominently in Serbia, and constant rise of crisis and tensions.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Autocracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

8. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

9. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:: Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

11. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:: Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

12. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:: Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

13. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:: Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

14. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

15. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:: Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

16. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:: Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

17. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:: Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

18. Evolution of the World Order and Russia’s Ideas About the Outside World

Author:: A. Bogaturov and O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The idea of the outside world and the role that Russia plays in it has undergone radical changes in Moscow’s official worldviews since 2014. The degradation of the international security situation indicates a deep crisis in the existing world order, which was formed in the spirit of the US’s unipolar hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to turn the UN, the only universal platform for reaching collective decisions on an inclusive and equal basis, into a tool of the collective West for pressuring “revisionist states.” The decline in the culture of global-level dialogue leads not only to the aggravation of military-political conflicts but also to the inability to effectively respond to new challenges and transnational threats.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Global Focus

19. The Ripple Effect: A U.S. Diplomatic Strategy for a Changing World Order

Author:: Chester A Crocker and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine upended what policymakers thought they knew about the world and territorial military aggression. The ensuing war has brought destruction to Europe unlike anything since the Second World War. Regardless of how the war ends, several strategic trends, whether entirely new or preexisting and now reinforced, have set in a motion a new strategic environment in which the United States must compete. Ultimately, the new strategic environment is being defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency of middle powers and their importance in solving geopolitical problems rise in tandem. In the spring of 2023, ISD convened two New Global Commons/Schlesinger Strategic Surprise working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group identified key trends and potential strategic surprises emanating from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, honed in on the issues that would affect the strategic environment regardless of the war’s outcome, and put forth policy guidelines and recommendations for the United States as it seeks to navigate a more diverse geopolitical landscape in the coming years.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

20. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:: Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

21. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Craisor-Constantin Ionita
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Russia in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States

Author:: Gaye Christoffersen, Ying Liu, Artyom Lukin, Elena Feditchkina Tracy, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific is an understudied topic—while much of the discussion of Russia in Asia typically focuses on its response to geopolitical rivalries, the volume addresses ideational factors in Russia’s relations with regional and global powers, the domestic drivers of Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy, as well as the complex iteration of regional identities in Asia-Pacific Russia and in the Sino-Russian partnership. Contributors to this volume are based across Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the USA, drawing on a range of multinational perspectives and theoretical approaches. Panelists at this event will present views from Beijing, Vladivostok, and the United States.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

23. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:: Michael Barnett
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

24. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

25. China's Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: While the war in Ukraine is a game changer for international and in particular European security, China appears to be marching on. And, in some ways, it is true. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, under Xi’s leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests. The Report examines China’s current approach to foreign policy, and the drivers of the country’s shift away from tradition. What are the main characteristics of China’s foreign policy in the wake of the Ukraine war? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

26. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Author:: Badri Belkania
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia

27. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

28. Managed Competition: A U.S. Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World

Author:: George Beebe
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated pre-existing momentum toward a multipolar global order. In response, the Biden administration effectively rallied NATO and ensured that Russian forces cannot resubjugate Ukraine. But it has not anchored its tactical moves in a broader strategy to safeguard America’s most critical interests. As a result, we are fast headed toward a two-front geopolitical faceoff in which a belligerent Russia and a rising China are cooperating closely with each other against the United States. In a world in which power is shifting from the West toward the East and Global South, the United States is enmeshed in a proxy war with the world’s largest nuclear power, and Americans face mounting political and social challenges at home, a dangerous gap has emerged between Washington’s global ambitions and its ability to achieve them. The United States had a large margin for strategic error during its era of post-Cold War global primacy, when it faced no significant great power challengers. It has no such cushion today. America needs to rethink its grand strategy. This should involve the following elements: • Recognize that attempts to isolate and weaken Russia and China are likely to fail. The combination of Russia’s vast natural resources and China’s economic heft and centrality to global commerce present a challenge far different from what we faced during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union posed a military and ideological threat but was economically feeble. • Avoid promoting regime change or otherwise undermining political and economic stability in Russia and China, which could have serious blowback effects in the United States. The United States’ economic health is to a great degree dependent on that of China. Information technology has made us vulnerable to external subversion at a time when American society is dangerously divided and mistrustful of key institutions. • Instead, pursue a strategy of managed competition, in which our rivals are not only counterbalanced by American power and alliances, but also are constrained by agreed rules of the game that are tailored to an era in which advances in precision weaponry, cyber technology, and artificial intelligence pose significant new threats to stability. • Be more selective about where the United States should focus its involvement. As a seapower dependent on trade and robust international partnerships, the United States must remain engaged with the world. But Washington can no longer afford to squander its resources on quixotic democratization crusades or on policing regions that are not central to America’s own well-being. Greater burden sharing by allies and partners is essential. • Aim to gain a breathing spell abroad so that we can focus on healing our domestic wounds and advancing prosperity at home. This also means that the United States should avoid framing its global challenges in terms of an existential battle between democracy and authoritarianism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

29. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: For better and for worse

Author:: Europeum
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: for better and for worse, you can read the report from the debate written by Šárka Váchalová. During the debate these questions were discussed: As tensions with authoritarian powers such as Russia and China amplify, how can the EU and ASEAN partnership remain strong moving forward? What are the areas that the two regions can strengthen given the ongoing geopolitical tug of war?
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

31. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

32. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:: Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

33. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:: Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:: Merle Maigre
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

35. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

36. The ‘Kosovo Precedent’: Russia’s justification of military interventions and territorial revisions in Georgia and Ukraine

Author:: Valur Ingimundarson
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this latest Strategic Update, Valur Ingimundarson explores Russia’s use of the ‘Kosovo precedent’, in order to instrumentalise its violation of international norms for geopolitical gain in the post-Soviet space. Ever since Kosovo’s 2008 unique and contested independence process, Russia has increasingly relied paradoxically on the Kosovo case to legally justify support for secession within, and now overt military expansionism into, post-Soviet territory: from its invasion of Georgia and support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to the incorporation of Crimea into the Federation, its invasion of Ukraine, and current effort to absorb the Donbass region.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Military Intervention, Expansion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Georgia

37. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:: Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

39. Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty

Author:: Sinem Adar
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly salient weaknesses in its war against Ukraine have unsettled what was a delicate balance in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey is trying to reap the benefits of this unsettled situation by further intensifying cooperation with a region that it has long considered kin to itself due to linguistic and cultural affinities. These efforts dovetail with rehabilitation attempts of an ever-worsening Turkish economy in the face of an upcoming election in 2023 of historical decisiveness. Beyond these immediate triggers, lurking underneath Ankara’s renewed interest in the region is the post-Cold War strategic ambition to position Turkey as a logistics and energy hub connecting Europe and Asia. Yet skepticism within Europe over Ankara’s strategic orientation at a time of intense geopolitical confrontation and competition abounds. As such, it is necessary to soberly think about Turkey’s place within an emerging Eurasian space and the costs and benefits of engaging with Turkey.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

40. Russia’s Climate Action and Geopolitics of Energy Transition: The Uncertain and Unsettling Outlook following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Kamila Godzinska and Maria Pastukhova
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the outlook for Russia’s energy transition and created uncertainties on the global path towards net zero. In response to global economic shifts, Russia had begun taking steps towards decarbonisation, albeit without plans to depart from its hydrocarbon-based economic model in any substantial way. The new political, trade and financial environment induced by Russia’s act of aggression has damaged its potential to maintain the once-emerging momentum. Russia’s actions and the Western response are also reconfiguring global energy relations, with profound economic and geopolitical consequences that may, unless managed, undermine international cooperation on the energy transition and slow down progress on climate change mitigation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

41. The EU and the Ukraine War: Making Sense of the Rise of a “Geopolitical” Union

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: By ordering Russian armed forces into Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has arguably made the greatest blunder of his twenty-two-year long rule. The Russian president seems to have underestimated not just Ukraine’s capacity to resist the invasion, but also the resolve of the United States and its partners to oppose it.[1] If that is indeed the case, the greatest surprise must have come from the European Union.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. The Black Sea, the spectre of a new Iron Curtain?

Author:: Radu Magdin
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For thousands of years, the Black Sea has been a place of meetings and exchange. It has often been the natural border between empires. Now, together with the Baltic Sea, it is the place where East and West, the United States (through NATO), the European Union, Turkey and Russia still meet on open terrain.
Topic:: NATO, History, European Union, Geopolitics, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, United States of America, and Black Sea

43. Rising Apprehensions

Author:: Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: To the end, Samuel Beckett insisted that he did not know who Godot was, nor what his two characters, Vladimir and Estragon, were waiting for. That was not the least absurdity of his play, which he wrote in French, the Irish author later explained, because he did not know the language well. That is where we all are now: confused over what to expect as we stagger into the second and possibly final half of the Biden presidency. In America, momentarily reset as the leader of the Free World, a democracy at risk; in Europe, an alliance recast by an unwanted war; and elsewhere, a global mutation told in languages we understand poorly even when they carry a slight American accent. This is unchartered territory: across the Atlantic, half the people waiting for Trump to return to the White House and the other half waiting for him to go to prison; around the world, half the people welcoming America’s restored leadership and the other half celebrating its demotion; and all over, rising apprehensions over a war which neither belligerent can realistically win but which both refuse to end.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

44. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:: Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

45. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis in the research of power distribution in Eastern Europe

Author:: Erwin Metera
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article presents Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, which as a scientific method can be an important tool for studying the distribution of power in Eastern Europe, supporting the assumptions of structural realism with an element of quantitative research. This region, as a place where spheres of influence and the ensuing economic and potentially military conflicts meet, is an area where the knowledge of the most precise distribution of power may be a crucial element in the analysis of the genesis of conflicts, the shifts in power distribution during their course, as well as in the prediction of future flashpoints. Being the first attempt to correlate Systemic Geopolitical Analysis with the issue of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the paper contains a hypothesis that Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is a research method that enables an effective analysis of the geopolitical reality in the region because of: 1) the conflicts occurring in the system due to differences in power distribution; 2) the nature of the components of power, measurable by the means of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. Confirming the above hypothesis, the article points to the economic aspect, linked to the Russian natural gas exports, and the military aspect, by taking into account the characteristics of contemporary tensions in the region, which reduce the role of supra-systemic reserves.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Gas, Conflict, Exports, Regional Politics, and Structural Realism
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

46. The Influence of Political Processes and the War in Ukraine on the Formation of Generation Alpha and the iGeneration (Z): Defining Specific Features

Author:: Liudmyla Kryvachuk
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article attempts to analyse and define the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine in the context of the political processes and the war taking place in Ukrainian society. The article discusses the generation issues, taking into account the characteristics of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha. Assuming that a generation is an identifiable group of people who share a similar time of birth and significant events at critical stages of development, the article presents an original approach to determining the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution (2004), the Revolution of Dignity (2014) and the hybrid war (2014-2022) and Russian-Ukrainian war (from 24.02.2022) had a significant impact on the formation of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine.
Topic:: Children, Geopolitics, Youth, Social Policy, Hybrid Warfare, Generation, Generation Z, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

47. Geopolitical Consequences of the War in Ukraine

Author:: John Rennie Short
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new world order that has developed from the bipolar world of 1945 to 1991 and the brief unipolar interlude from 1991 to 2008. This new world order is dominated by a relatively declining U.S. and an emerging Sino-Russo anti American alliance, a renewed sense of the West as a counter to authoritarian regimes and reversal of the globalization trends of the past thirty years. We are moving into a deglobalizing, multipolar world.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Geopolitics, Geography an the Ukrainian Russian War

Author:: Serdar Ş. Güner
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The trigger of the Ukraine-Russia war is the enlargement of NATO, essentially a Western exploitation of Russian weakness emanating from Soviet Union’s dissolution. Russia has communicated her reactions to the enlargement peacefully until the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The second wave of enlargement coming from the direction of neutral states such Finland and Sweden originates from Finnish and Swedish fears of being the next targets of Russian military campaigns. NATO enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality and become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion efforts has led to a further expansion through war. However, the exclusion of and warring with Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large alliance to balance China. The West should understand that it is not wise to create incentives for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Geography, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Paul Dibb
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

50. Building Bridges over Caspian: South Caucasus-Central Asia Cooperation

Author:: Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:: Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:: The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Building Bridges over Caspian: South Caucasus-Central Asia Cooperation” is dedicated to the new paradigms for peacebuilding and geopolitical gaps, as well as possible confrontation and cooperation matrices in the South Caucasus region with focus on security, economic, humanitarian, political and geopolitical aspects. The CSP’s new issue includes 7 articles and 1 book review. The CSP’s current authors analysed the EU’s increasing mediation role towards the South Caucasus region, the importance of the Middle Corridor for transregional connectivity, the recent processes in the South Caucasus region in the light of ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Türkiye’s engagement, as well as the US strategic interests in this region, the possibility of the potential threats for South Caucasus, etc.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Peacebuilding, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Caspian Sea

51. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

52. America’s Great-Power Challenge: Managing Russia’s Decline and China’s Rise

Author:: Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Geopolitics today is characterized by an evolving multipolar great-power competition between China, Russia, and the United States. The zero-sum nature of bipolar Cold War competition logic does not apply so relative losses in power by Russia could help the relative power position of China, and harm long-term American strategic interests, unless carefully managed in Washington. Washington should learn from past multi-state great-power competitions. Great Britain’s approach to Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany in the early 20th century is especially instructive. Like London in 1905, Washington today must stay attentive to the balance of power between itself and China as it manages Moscow’s relative power decline from the military debacle in Ukraine. The United States should defend its interests in Eastern Europe without so undermining Russia that a new period of instability spreads across Eurasia or that China aggrandizes strategically significant relative power gains from Moscow’s infirmity.
Topic:: Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

53. Cyber Posture Trends in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Current understanding of the cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union (EU) merits re-evaluation. It is often assumed that China and Russia are aligned, yet this is not always the case. Unlike Russia, which has an ongoing focus on information security, China’s official documents incorporate both information security and cybersecurity concerns that are similar to those of the EU and the USA. Moreover, while often paired, the EU and the USA have differing regulatory structures in cyberspace. Further, both actors increasingly mirror Chinese and Russian concerns about the impact of information warfare on domestic stability. By examining key trends in each actor’s cyber posture, this SIPRI Research Report identifies points of convergence and divergence. Its conclusions will inform a broader SIPRI project that maps cyber posture trajectories and explores trilateral cyber dynamics among China, Russia and the USA to assist the EU in navigating future cyber escalation and enhancing global cyber stability.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Information Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

54. Energy and Geo-Economics: Evidence Underpinning Russian Intervention in Syria

Author:: Nada El Abdi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. The interests in Syria are numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. We argue that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, to curb extremist proliferation, and to take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political and economic power in the Middle East.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

55. Russia and Turkey Deconflict Their Geopolitical Moves in the Caucasus

Author:: Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The recent incidence of war in the Caucasus has shown that, when facing deep domestic troubles, Russia and Turkey demonstrate strikingly different patterns of international behavior. While Russia has become more cautious in responding to external challenges, Turkey has embarked on several power-projecting enterprises. Its forceful interference in the long-smoldering conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh took Russia by surprise and effectively secured a military victory for Azerbaijan. Moscow has assumed the main responsibility for terminating hostilities by deploying a peacekeeping force, but its capacity for managing the war zone and its commitment to deconflicting tensions with Turkey remain uncertain. The United States and the European Union have few levers for influencing this interplay of clashing agendas of local actors and regional powers and fewer reasons to trust Russian and Turkish leaders to put peacebuilding ahead of their ambitions.
Topic:: Security, War, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Caucasus, and Middle East

56. Assessments and foreign policy implications of the national security of the Republic of Serbia

Author:: Miroslav Mitrovic
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: National security determines the degree to which endangering national interests that sublimate national values is absent. With a review of the genesis and framework of the modern interpretation of national security, the paper discusses its approaches to endangerment. A retrospective of the ideas of endangerment in the paradigm of the changed physiognomy of contemporary conflicts and dynamic geopolitical movements creates the need for an innovative approach and prediction in national security strategic assessments. The paper provides an overview of the internal and external political aspects of national security and a framework for the actions of prominent entities according to the perceived foreign policy interests of importance for the Republic of Serbia’s security. By analysing common and conflicting interests of Serbia and forces that have geopolitical interests in the Western Balkans, it is possible to establish the most objective framework for predicting the trend of relationship development and the vector of influence. The paper analyses Serbia’s interactions with Russia, the United States, and the EU. The findings point to a complex situation regarding Serbia’s national security, where Russia seeks to maintain its strong soft power presence, the United States wants close cooperation and insistence on recognising Kosovo’s independence, and the EU does not vigorously stimulate or promote Serbia’s European integration. In that way, a concrete contribution is made to the developing of strategic assessments of possible trends of importance for the Republic of Serbia’s security, as well as to the achievement of declared national goals.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, Balkans, and United States of America

57. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:: Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:: NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

58. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2020-21

Author:: M. Patrick Hulme and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, is increasingly critical as new and long-standing hotspots— including the Taiwan strait, Korean peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea—become more volatile. The need for confidence-building measures is clear, and a central tool of confidence building is defense transparency. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security, including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, and the major external powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, North Korea, Korea, East China, and United States of America

59. The Russian Northern Fleet – Extended Status and Geopolitical Ambitions

Author:: Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: On December 21, 2020, by Decree #803 of the President of the Russian Federation, the Northern Fleet became the only one throughout the history of Russia to have the authority of a military district. In particular, the decree states that in order to ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation, the Northern Fleet should be considered a strategic-territorial interdisciplinary union of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation which has the tasks of a military district. The Northern Fleet is responsible for the largest territorial zone of Russia. This territory is mostly an ice desert which has strategic importance for Russia. It runs along the North Sea Route which is 7,300 nautical miles from Yokohama to Rotterdam (11,200 nautical miles through the Indian Ocean). In addition, this territory contains a large supply of hydrocarbons and other mineral or marine resources. The shorter lines between the US and Russian strategic missiles and their intended targets also pass through this area.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Navy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Georgia

60. Baku Parade Whispers Geopolitical Complexities in the South Caucasus

Author:: Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on December 10 to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the war over the Karabakh region that ended with the Russia-brokered armistice on November 9-10. The Russian historian, Andrey Zubov, describes the Baku parade as an occasion “rather to celebrate the birth of a new geopolitical alliance than the victory over Armenia”1 . Following the parade, Russia imposed a ban on tomato imports from Azerbaijan in its flagship manner and Russian peacekeepers attempted to do something around the town of Shusha in Karabakh resembling what they have done in Georgia: “borderization”. Azerbaijani state TV, other media outlets and public figures widely and explicitly condemned such behavior of the Russian peacekeepers as a jealous response to the parade demonstration of Armenia’s Russian-made weapons and military equipment captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces or destroyed using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones . Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, watched Turkish soldiers march alongside with Azerbaijanis on the central streets of Baku to the joy of local residents who took to the streets despite the COVID-19 related restrictions in order to salute them. This scene shows a major Russian weakness vis-àvis Turkey in Azerbaijan. Unlike Moscow, whose perception in Azerbaijan is controversial, Ankara enjoys nation-wide support. Recently leaked Russian secret files reveal that it is much more difficult for Moscow to develop proRussian civil society organizations and soft power instruments in Azerbaijan than even in staunchly pro-Western Georgia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, Georgia, and South Caucasus

61. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:: Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

62. Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region

Author:: Heinrich Brauß and András Rácz
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects across the wider Baltic Region. The second part sums up NATO’s response to this evolving strategic challenge, including the potential military threat posed by Russia.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Baltic States

63. Blurry Counterterrorism: A Chance for Russia, A Risk for Europe

Author:: Miriam Heß
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The European Union should actively address the problematic use of counterterrorism by non-European states – especially Russia – and make it a permanent aspect in developing counterterrorism strategies and agendas. Failing to address the misuse of counterterrorism sends the wrong signal not only to those with reason to fear geopolitical interference by their countries of origin, but also to states that pursue “anti-terrorist-operations” in the form of abductions and executions abroad.
Topic:: European Union, Counter-terrorism, Geopolitics, and Risk
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

64. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East

Author:: Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
Topic:: Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

65. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:: Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

66. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:: Gateway House
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America

67. How to Think About the China-Russia Partnership

Author:: James Sherr and Frank Jüris
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Since the conclusion of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, the balance of power between China and Russia has appreciably shifted in favour of the former, but their common definition of the enemy and the complementarity of their core interests remains as strong as it ever was. If the China-Russia relationship is not an alliance, then what is it, and what are its limits? In the Xi-Putin era, apprehension and ambition have transformed the ‘axis of convenience’ into an axis of necessity. But will ‘strategic partnership’ prove important or irrelevant to potential conflicts in Taiwan, Belarus or Ukraine? How much should be made of divergences of approach in Central Asia and the Arctic, where China’s rise leaves no stone unturned? To what extent will Russia continue to welcome the growth of China’s power — to the point of nuclear parity with the United States and, by extension with Russia itself?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

68. Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting

Author:: Johan Norberg and Natalie Simpson
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: According to press information, on 10 September 2021, the Russian Armed Forces plan to start the one-week-long active phase of this year’s annual strategic-level exercise (STRATEX), Zapad (West) 2021, a bilateral large-scale Russo-Belorussian strategic-level exercise, primarily in Belarus and Russia’s Western Military District (MD, see map 1). Large-scale Russian exercises understandably attract much attention and speculation both in Russia and abroad. Most Western comments about Zapad 2017 addressed Russian and international political aspects and detailed several capabilities employed in the exercise and its scenarios or steps and phases. Few, if any, addressed what it meant for the potential of Russian forces to fight wars, which these exercises are all about actually. Russia’s warfighting potential is important for the West writ large for several reasons. Tensions between Russia and NATO are increasing. Russia perceives a growing military threat in its west. Russian strategic documents re-emphasise the importance of military power. Russia actually uses military force to achieve its geopolitical goals, such as in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

69. Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton and Anna Mikulska
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The relationship between the Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Eurasia today. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) original adversary and one of its earliest members have in recent times veered sharply between cooperation—often against NATO’s interests—and competition so intense that it seemed war between them was possible. Politically, their leaders and their systems of government share a basic compatibility predicated on authoritarianism and resistance to what they claim is Western meddling in internal affairs. Militarily, Moscow and Ankara have at times cooperated closely. For instance, the two have worked to marginalize the U.S. military’s influence in Syria, and Turkey has purchased and deployed Russian S-400 air defense systems, putting its defense relationship with the United States in jeopardy. At other times, such as in the military escalation in Idlib (Syria), the Libyan Civil War, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, the two have found themselves backing different sides and had to work assiduously to prevent a direct military clash. Economically, the relationship has been historically unbalanced in Russia’s favor, but Turkey’s increasing trade in services and emergence as an important energy storage and transport hub may change this. The two economies share a basic complementarity, with few areas where they compete in the production of goods and services. This dynamic may increase the ability of their economic relationship to act as a “shock absorber” and minimize the impact of disruptions in other facets of their ties. Overall, Moscow and Ankara have worked to emphasize areas of cooperation and “compartmentalize” areas of difference. Policymakers in Western capitals will need to develop an understanding of the drivers of the Russian-Turkish relationship and their effects on Western interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

70. Russia’s Nuclear Activity in 2020: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19

Author:: Maxim Starchak
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s powerful nuclear arsenal has stood as a cornerstone of its political and military influence. In 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces maintained a high degree of activity. The number of nuclear exercises and air and sea deterrence patrols was stable and not much different from 2019. The Russian strategic nuclear arsenal remains an integral tool of the Kremlin’s pressure on rivals in Europe and North America.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and North America

71. A Decade of War in Syria: Current Situation and Possible Outcomes/Una Década de Guerra en Siria: Situación Actual y Posibles Desenlaces

Author:: Andrea Cocchini
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This year 2021 marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the armed conflict in Syria which, triggered by graffiti against the government of the al-Assad family, turned into a civil war with at least 390,000 dead, involving numerous States in the Middle East, as well as the major global powers, with their own specific geopolitical interests. This article therefore aims to provide an account of the current situation in Syria and the objectives that these powers still have in this country. Once the two main reasons for intervening in the conflict disappeared, the true nature of this war came to the surface, embedded in the broader contests of historical rivalry between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran on the other. Apparently, none of them really wants to end it, without compensation. / En este año 2021 se cumplen diez años del comienzo del conflicto armado en Siria que, desencadenado por unos grafitis en contra del gobierno guiado con mano autoritaria por la familia al-Assad, se ha convertido en una guerra con, al menos, 390.000 muertos, que ha acabado involucrando a numerosos Estados de Oriente Próximo, así como a grandes potencias, cada una portadora de intereses geopolíticos concretos. El presente artículo pretende dar cuenta de la situación actual de Siria y, en particular, de los objetivos particulares que mantienen en el país diversos actores. Después de que desaparecieran las dos razones principales esgrimidas para intervenir en el conflicto, quedó de manifiesto su auténtica naturaleza de guerra subsidiaria y sectaria, que se inserta en las más amplias contiendas entre rivales históricos como los Estados Unidos y Rusia, por una parte, y Arabia Saudí, Turquía e Irán, por otra, y que ninguno entre ellos parece tener interés en acabar sin recibir compensaciones.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Proxy War, Operation Inherent Resolve, and Euphrates Shield
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and United States of America

72. Partners, Competitors, or a Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic

Author:: Jim Townsend and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Arctic’s melting icecaps are changing more than the geography of the region. The diminishing sea ice and declining snow cover have allowed for new shipping lanes and growing access to natural resources, increasing geopolitical competition in the region. A defining feature of this competition is the growing interest and activity of Russia and China in the Arctic. Not only have the two countries increased their presence in the region, but coordination between them is growing. Political observers in Washington and beyond understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their interests and actions will combine and the challenges that such alignment will pose for the United States and its allies and partners. Previous CNAS research has highlighted the risks that greater Russia-China cooperation creates. This research argues that the growing partnership between Moscow and Beijing is amplifying the challenges that both actors pose. In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing. Increasing military cooperation: Through joint research and, to a lesser extent, its joint military exercises with Russia, China is enhancing its military knowledge of and insight into the Arctic. Though China’s actual military presence in the Arctic is minimal, the two countries’ cooperation is enhancing Chinese insight into Russian dual-use technology, which Beijing can use to build its military capabilities. China can learn from Russia’s dual-use and hybrid capability development in the Arctic, accelerating its efforts to erode U.S. military advantages and posing a greater threat in the event of military conflict. Russia and China may also strengthen their military relationship in the Arctic in the future, including expanding the scope of their joint exercises in the region. Ultimately, sustained or deepening Russia-China military cooperation may threaten America’s ability to deter Chinese and Russian aggression in the region.
Topic:: International Relations, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Arctic

73. Strategic Report

Author:: Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:: This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

74. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

75. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:: Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

76. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

77. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:: Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

78. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:: Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

79. The Sino-Russian Geopolitics in Eurasia and China-USA Disputes: Asia Pacific Great Eurasia vs Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento and Marcos Cordeiro Pires
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article aims to analyze the main elements and processes underway in Eurasia, involving three essential actors: the United States, Russia, and China. At first, it is emphasized the importance of Eurasia as a space that has historically influenced the hegemonic disputes between Great Powers. Then, Eurasia is analyzed as a space for development cooperation, presenting the intersections of the Chinese BRI and the Russian EAEU. Last, the US approach to China is addressed, specifically the Indo-Pacific strategy. We conclude that despite the intense pressure to contain the rise of China and Russia in Eurasia, rivaling both powers is not feasible. In the current path, it will boost the cooperation between two giants, China and Russia.
Topic:: Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. Likely Escalation: Potential war over Syria’s Daraa Province after Russian roadmap

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Between August 2and August 18, clashes erupted between the Syrian regime army and the armed opposition groups in Daraa province in southern Syria, after the Syrian regime threatened military action against the groups if they do not commit to a roadmap proposed by Russia, which eventually aims to help the Syrian army retake control on the southern parts of the country.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Refugees, Syrian War, Armed Conflict, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and Daraa

81. Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus

Author:: Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:: Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:: The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-days war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various countries. The CSP’s new issue includes 5 articles, 2 commentaries and 1 book review. In the framework of post-war cooperation situation, the CSP’s current authors analysed the economic difficulties of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s enhancing role in the region and existing geopolitical confrontations, performance of peacekeeping activities, as well as economic cooperation opportunities emerged in the post-war period.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, War, Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Guam

82. Information disorder and What Ukraine is Doing About It: Analysis of Ukraine’s Policies and Actions to Combat Russia-Generated information disorder

Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Abstract:: It is a conventional wisdom that information is power, but even more power lies in the manner in which it is (mis)used. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, all parts of so called ‘information disorder’, are phenomena that seem to be wreaking havoc worldwide nowadays. The emergence of the Internet and social media has brought fundamental changes to the way information is produced, communicated and distributed and thus has given new momentum to the phenomenon of ‘information disorder’. Its effects, in combination with online technologies, are proving to be devastating: it destabilizes public discourse, undermines general belief in democratic institutions and threatens national, international and civilian security. Based on a theoretical analysis approach, the paper will look into the nature of the ‘information disorder’, and how the Internet and social media contribute to its growing influence. It will also examine what are the effects of the phenomenon, and how it threatens national and international security. With Russia arguably being the most aggressive in spreading disinformation nowadays, and Ukraine being the country affected by Russia’s information offensive the most, the paper will try to analyze Ukraine’s policies and actions to combat Russia-generated ‘information disorder’. In the conclusion, the paper will make an effort to suggest recommendations on tackling negative informing.
Topic:: International Security, Geopolitics, Information Age, Basic Data, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

83. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:: Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:: Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:: Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

84. Perceptions and Reflections of the Security Crisis in the Black Sea Region

Author:: Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The first reflection about the geopolitical environment that Bulgaria faced after the tectonic systemic shifts in the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century thirty years later is that the efforts of the country to influence the transformation of the Balkans into a regional security community were successful. The second reflection is that Bulgaria was not able to influence effectively a similar development in the Black Sea area. Both the Balkans and the Caspian Sea-Caucasus- Black Sea area were conflictual knots of relations inherited from the Cold War divide. While the traditional European great powers that polarized the Balkan system of international relations pushing the small countries one against the other and the United States had the strategic interest of pacifying the South Eastern region of Europe, the dominating great power in the Black Sea area – Russia, aimed at preserving the opportunities of coming back to the territories that the Soviet Union lost after its collapse by preserving various degrees of conflictness in the neighbouring countries. Depending on the general condition of the Russian economy and state as well as its domestic political status different opportunities were either designed or just used to preserve the profile of Russia of the empire that sooner or later will be back. What are, in this regard, the perceptions in Bulgaria of the annexation of Crimea?
Topic:: Security, International Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Empire
Political Geography:: Russia, Caucasus, Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Caspian Sea

85. Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy

Author:: Philip Remler
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain the undisputed recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it, a status to which Russia feels entitled.1 The United Nations (UN) is Russia’s most important venue for putting its global aspirations and achievements on display. Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests. The concepts underlying Russia’s use of the UN to promote its aspirations form the subject of this paper. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, devotes great resources to its missions at the UN, especially New York and Geneva. It traditionally cultivates extensive expertise among its mission members, appointing them to UN postings several times over their careers and leaving them in place for long periods. Russian diplomats are noted for their abilities in drafting highly technical UN documents in English—none more so than Sergey Lavrov, currently Russia’s foreign minister and formerly its permanent representative to the UN from 1994 to 2004.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Law, Geopolitics, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:: Russia and United Nations

86. Security Assistance in the Middle East: A Three-Dimensional Chessboard

Author:: Robert Springborg, F.C. "Pink" Williams, and John Zavage
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The United States, Russia, and Iran have chosen markedly different approaches to security assistance in the Middle East, with dramatic implications for statebuilding and stability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the world’s testing ground for the effectiveness of security assistance provided by global and regional powers. That security assistance has contributed to the intensity and frequency of proxy wars—such as those under way or recently wound down in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—and to the militarization of state and substate actors in the MENA region. Security assistance is at the core of struggles for military, strategic, ideological, and even economic preeminence in the Middle East. Yet despite the broad and growing importance of security assistance for the region and for competition within it between global and regional actors, security assistance has been the subject of relatively little comparative analysis. Efforts to assess relationships between the strategic objectives and operational methods of security assistance providers and their relative impacts on recipients are similarly rare.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

87. Social-Conservative Russian soft power: A traditional agenda and illiberal values as a source of attraction or coercion? A case study of Slovakia

Author:: Martin Solik
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The ongoing polarization of European society in the political-ideological context is apparent. This polarization causes considerable tension in society. Sophisticated soft power based on political values and policies that Russia has been using against the West especially since 2012 is a power struggle for people’s minds and souls. Russia does not only try to undercut faith in Europe and its institutions among its citizens, but it also aims to offer a “better” alternative. There is an increasing effort to create an alternative value universe against the “nihilist” and “decadent” West – not only in Russia but also in the whole World. There is quite a visible ambition from the Russian side to become the “illiberal” world leader. This contribution has been drawn up in the context of this urgent issue. The article examines whether Russian soft power fulfils the criteria of attractiveness or just coercion, and what Russia is pursuing by promoting this form of power.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conservatism, Ideology, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Europe, and Slovakia

88. The Evaluation of Russia's Foreign Policy Towards Georgia Following the ‘Rose Revolution’

Author:: Ekaterine Lomia
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: For more than twenty-eight years, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian-Georgian relations have been a substantial ground for mutual confrontation, sharp dispute, and a lack of trust. Continuous tensions and disagreements have adversely affected efforts to achieve a proper balance in bilateral relations between the neighboring countries and resulted in a number of direct and indirect confrontations. Whilst the Russian president seeks to restore Russia’s great power status, regain its past glory and control strategically important regions of the former Soviet space, Georgia, from the very first day of independence, tries to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, develop modern state institutions, strengthen democratic values and integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The paper aims to study Moscow’s current foreign policy strategy towards Georgia following the ‘Rose revolution’ and argues that Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, in August 2008, was a clear illustration of classical realism used by a great power in the XXI century. Russia actively uses hybrid warfare and regularly employs economic leverage on Georgia to eventually achieve its political ends in the Caucasus region.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Annexation
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Georgia

89. Sanctions and the End of Trans-Atlanticism: Iran, Russia, and the Unintended Division of the West

Author:: Rawi Abdelal and Aurélie Bros
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the United States and other Western states, especially the European Union, since the end of the Cold War. But the systematic use of this instrument may produce unintended and somewhat paradoxical geopolitical consequences. The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in the field of energy are particularly illustrative of this phenomenon.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Secondary Sanctions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

90. Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: As in other conflict zones, Moscow cares little about reaching a peace deal so long as it can outmaneuver the West strategically while securing port and energy access—with private contractors playing an increasingly important role. The Kremlin is now openly treating Libya as another focal point of its Middle East activities. After years of U.S. neglect, the country has turned into a proxy war playground, and President Vladimir Putin is vying to become the chief power broker. Earlier this month, he tried (but failed) to get Khalifa Haftar to sign a ceasefire agreement in Moscow with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Putin also participated in the January 19 Berlin conference aimed at getting the parties back on the path toward a political solution. And though the prospects for such a deal remain uncertain, Moscow’s involvement in Libya will continue either way.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Civil War, Geopolitics, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Libya, and North Africa

91. Is It a Nuke?: Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation

Author:: James M. Acton
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Ambiguity about whether a weapon is nuclear-armed prior to its launch is an underappreciated, serious, and growing danger. Rising geopolitical tensions and the decay of arms control are exacerbating the risk that such pre-launch warhead ambiguity could lead to nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Recent developments in technology—as well as potential future advances, such as the development of ambiguous intercontinental missiles—further add to the danger. A first step toward reducing these risks is to enhance awareness among decisionmakers of the causes and potential consequences of ambiguity. Unilateral and cooperative risk-mitigation measures could further reduce the danger of escalation, including in conflicts between the United States and Russia or the United States and China.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

92. Russia’s Shift from “Greater Europe” to “Greater Asia”

Author:: Emil Avdaliani
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: Though analysts tend to portray Russia’s foreign policy as truly global (that is, independent of Europe, the US, and China), the country is plainly tilting toward Asia. The Russian political elite does its best to hide this development, but the country is accumulating more interests and freedom to act in Asia than in Europe or anywhere else.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Global Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

93. Erdoğan Battles on Multiple Fronts in Risky Regional Power Bid

Author:: James M Dorsey
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is at odds with just about everybody. He is on opposite sides with Russia in Syria as well as Libya and is trying the patience of his US and European allies. Turkey and Russia are testing the limits of what was always at best an opportunistic, fragile partnership aimed at capitalizing on a seemingly diminishing US interest in the Middle East, already evident under President Barack Obama and continuing under Donald Trump, who is haphazardly redefining what he sees as America’s national interests.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

94. France and the Russian Presence in Africa

Author:: Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron initiated a Franco-Russian dialogue aimed at improving bilateral relations, as well as EU-Russia relations. This effort could be confounded by the growing Russian engagement in Africa, mainly through their military, business, and propaganda activities. These are increasingly harmful to France, which traditionally engages in the politics and economies of African states. The French government hasn’t yet prepared any coherent strategy vis-à-vis the Russian challenge, preferring to wait it out.
Topic:: International Relations, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and France

95. Palestine in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia is strengthening its relations with both the Palestinian Authority leadership and Hamas in Gaza Strip. It is part of Russia’s consistent strategy towards the Middle East to build a network of influence among regional actors and boost its image as an attractive political partner. In developing relations with the Palestinians, Russia exploits Israel’s sensitivity to Russian activity in Syria, poor relations between Palestine and the U.S., and the deadlock in the peace process.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

96. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

97. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Spring 2020

Author:: Donald M. Bishop, Valerie Jackson, Christopher Davis, Evan N. Polisar, Kerry K. Gershaneck, Troy E. Mitchell, James R. R. Van Eerden, Rosario M. Simonetti, Paolo Tripodi, David E. McCullin, Christopher Whyte, and Jeannie L. Johnson
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2010, MCU Press published the first issue of this journal, formerly known as Marine Corps University Journal, to serve as the bridge between the military Services and the professional military educators, strategists, and historians within the greater Department of Defense community. During the ensuing years, the press and the journal have evolved to offer innovative and active content that continues to serve as a forum for interdisciplinary discussion of national security and international relations issues and how they impact the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps. Now, 10 years later, we see the need to evolve and offer a wider base for those conversations to take place. To celebrate this 10-year anniversary and to reflect the journal’s change in focus over time, the journal has been renamed the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) to honor the constant innovation of our content, our authors, and the topics we present to our readers. JAMS will continue to offer readers thematic, biannual issues that encourage and continue the debates happening across Marine Corps University, the Services, and the Department of Defense. It is no coincidence then that this issue of JAMS focuses on innovation and the future of warfare. Each of the articles presented offers the readers a deep dive into a historical, current, or forward-looking perspective on innovation and the military Services. As with any discussion of the military and abstract concepts such as innovation, we must first set the parameters of our discussion. For many readers, the term innovation evokes thoughts of technology, shiny gadgets, and artificial intelligence. While innovation is not necessarily synonymous with technology, it is certainly a challenge to say what in fact it is—a thing, a concept, an action, the people involved, or all of the above. The experts may not agree on what innovation is, but they can agree that it requires change or transformation to be successful. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War compares the nature of warfare to that of water for “just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” More contemporary agents of innovation include military theorists such as Earl H. Ellis, John R. Boyd, Michael D. Wyly, and John F. Schmitt. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Ellis’s work on Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (Operation Plan 712) in 1921 clearly demonstrated his ability to forecast the future needs for amphibious warfare in the Pacific two decades prior to World War II. Though most readers will recognize former Air Force colonel John R. Boyd for his observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) decision-making loop, his more innovative work may well be seen in the energy maneuverability (E-M) theory, a mathematical study of fighter aviation. Then-major Wyly was tasked with reforming the Marine Corps concept of maneuver warfare in the wake of the Vietnam War. The work of Wyly, Boyd, and William S. Lind would serve as the foundation for Warfighting, Marine Corp Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, that was later formally written by then-captain John Schmitt, along with several other doctrinal publications, including Ground Combat Operations, Campaigning, Command and Control, Planning, Expeditionary Operations, and a revision of Warfighting. The articles in this issue of JAMS continue the discussion fostered by these innovative pathfinders. Our introductory section from the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity discusses the conception and creation of the center and some of its most innovative programs, including the award-winning Destination Unknown graphic novel and the center’s first essay contest, the U.S. Marine Corps Postmortem, and offers insight from Marine Corps leaders who consider both success and failure as critical measures for the strength of an organization. For example, Lieutenant General Loretta E. Reynolds contemplates how the Corps “must find a way to manage today’s risks while constantly readying ourselves for the emerging challenges of the future fight.”
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Counterinsurgency, Culture, Armed Forces, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Geopolitics, History, Surveillance, Think Tanks, Propaganda, Innovation, Armed Conflict, and Game Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Haiti, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

98. Moscow Concerned About Turkish Influence on the Gagauz

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Turkey’s success in the South Caucasus is echoing across the former Soviet space as well as inside the Russian Federation itself; and not surprisingly, Moscow is worried. Azerbaijan is now openly an ally of Turkey and has Turkish military forces on its territory, something Russia had previously said it would never allow. Three of the four Turkic-majority countries in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—have taken note of the change in the balance of forces in the region in Turkey’s favor and are increasingly looking toward Ankara for guidance. And some Turkic nations inside the Russian Federation, Volga Tatars in particular, have organized pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkic demonstrations, which, despite their small size, troubled the central authorities in Moscow (Vestnik Kavkaza, November 29). Except for Azerbaijan, of course, these all represent overwhelmingly long-term challenges. Central Asian countries are not about to make any dramatic geopolitical shifts unless and until additional robust transportation links through the Caucasus make that compelling; whereas the Turkic peoples within the Russian Federation, however strongly they may identify with such pan-Turkic impulses, have few possible outlets for acting on them.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, and Caucasus

99. THE HISTORY OF BRICS’ INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2009-2019): DISCOURSES, INNOVATION AND SENSITIVITIES

Author:: Thiago Gehre
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The BRICS is a group of countries formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that began to operate formally in 2009 as a legitimate, efficient and durable agent of governance in the world order (ACHARYA 2016: 1-27). Scholars all over the world –many of them cited here in this article –have painted the image of the BRICS as an ‘economic colossus’, assuming an underdeveloped intra-bloc cooperation restricted to economic issues. Nonetheless, from an economic starting point, the BRICS has evolved in the last years expanding its cooperation capabilities to a huge array of issues that encapsulates innovation and sensitivity.
Topic:: International Relations, International Affairs, Geopolitics, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

100. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FIELD

Author:: Augusto Leal Rinaldi and Laerte Apolinário Júnior
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The first decade of the 21st century gave way to a series of international political-economic dynamics with the potential to reorganize global power (IKENBERRY, 2018; KITCHEN; COX, 2019; MAHBUBANI, 2009; MEARSHEIMER, 2018, 2019). Among the changes, one common reference is the rise of the BRICS –Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa –and, consequently, their performance for demanding reforms of the global governance system (COOPER, 2016; HURRELL, 2018; ROBERTS; ARMIJO; KATADA, 2018; STUENKEL, 2017). The emerging economies have invested in consolidating their new status by acting in different branches of global governance, demanding changes and policies to see a reasonable parity between their economic weight and ability to participate as real decision-makers. In this context, international regimes are a crucial dimension to consider.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, International Political Economy, Geopolitics, International Development, Economic Development, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

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