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1. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
Topic:
War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?

Author:
Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
Topic:
Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

3. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:
War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. The Russian Bloodletting Strategy in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: From Success to Hubris

Author:
Spyridon N. Litsas
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The article focuses on the role of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in shaping the balance of power in the Lesser Caucasus as a prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that Russia implemented a “bait and bleed” strategy to discipline Armenia for its pro-Western agenda. In addition, it focuses on Turkey’s role as a supportive apparatus for Azerbaijan’s military efforts against Armenia, evaluating the connection established between Moscow and Ankara. The Nagorno-Karabakh case marked a new manipulative Russian strategy to influence the balance of power in regions with geostrategic significance for the Kremlin.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

6. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:
War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

8. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:
Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:
War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?

Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The Course of Cooperation between Russia and its Latin American Partners

Author:
Bartlomiej Znojek
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For the past several years, Russia has been strengthening ties with the authoritarian regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and has developed cooperation with other Latin American countries as an investor in the energy sector, a supplier of weapons and Sputnik-V COVID-19 vaccine, and in other areas. Most Latin American governments have condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but they have not imposed sanctions on Russia. It is in the EU’s interest to persuade its Latin American partners of the validity of the restrictions and to work together to mitigate the negative economic effects of the war.
Topic:
International Cooperation, War, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Vaccine
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Cuba, Latin America, Nicaragua, and Venezuela

11. The Impact of the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine on the EU's Economy

Author:
Melchior Szczepanik
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A spike in energy prices provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inhibit the economic rebound in the EU. Member States will have to face high inflation for longer than previously expected. Forced to increase spending, they also could postpone plans to reduce their debts. The conflict with Russia is mobilising the Community to speed up the development of renewable energy and reduce dependencies on third countries, especially authoritarian ones, in strategic sectors.
Topic:
Energy Policy, War, European Union, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Belarus's Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
From the very beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities have sided with Russia, supporting it politically and militarily, including making its territory available to the Russian troops. In this way, Belarus is also an aggressor and, as a consequence, the EU and the U.S. have imposed further sanctions on it. Regardless of the attempts to engage in Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, Belarus will be negatively affected by the consequences of its government’s policy and the country, although formally sovereign, has ceased to be perceived as an independent entity in international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Sovereignty, War, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus

13. Russia's Wartime Censorship and Propaganda

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have introduced wartime censorship, forbidding the publication of content that does not conform to the official message of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This massive and unprecedented propaganda is leading to an increase in support for Vladimir Putin, and Russians protesting against the war are being brutally repressed and persecuted. The consequence is the strengthening of the totalitarian character of the Russian state and the emigration of Russians who do not support the war. The most significant element of the Russian war propaganda is that of “denazification”, a claim aimed also at Poland.
Topic:
War, Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Censorship
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. How Russia Fights

Author:
Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

15. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:
International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

16. Environment in Times of War: Climate and Energy Challenges in the Post-Soviet Region

Author:
Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine has been devastating both politically and environmentally. On top of the environmental damage directly caused by military operations, the invasion has put an abrupt end to the EU-Russia “green cooperation”, which had previously raised many hopes. At the same time, it has also shifted international attention away from climate and environmental concerns, which are particularly acute in the post-Soviet region. This Report analyses some of the main climate change and environmental issues in the post-Soviet space, providing an initial assessment of the invasion’s impact. The bulk of the latest scholarly and policy production on these matters focuses on Russia — given the country’s geopolitical and energy relevance. However, this analysis finds that environmental disasters such as the desertification of the Aral Sea transcend state borders and require a broader approach both from an analytic and policy standpoint.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, War, European Union, Post-Soviet Space, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Russia's War and The Future of European Order

Author:
Thomas Diez
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War international order. Yet the scenario of a renewed Cold War must be balanced by alternative visions of European order. This contribution reassesses the concepts of interdependence, socialization, normative power, and international society taken from international relations theory to develop some general lessons for European order and concrete pointers toward alternative policy paths. Such an order needs to build on a more honest engagement, serious great power management mirrored by societal linkages, and creative thinking about joint institutions and regional overlaps.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. After Deterrence: Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War for East Asia

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Notwithstanding explicit warnings of the U.S. and its European allies, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th. In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Executive Director at the East Asia Institute (EAI), identifies the Russia-Ukraine war as a case of deterrence failure from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s perspective. He points out weakened U.S. feasibility of military and political punishments against Russia’s Fait Accompli Strategy as the cause behind the escalation of the crisis. Additionally, the author underscores the importance of maintaining the feasibility of punishment in order to deter China and North Korea from launching provocations in East Asia by misperceiving the credibility of the U.S. alliance system’s deterrence posture in East Asia.
Topic:
NATO, War, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

19. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

20. Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the Global Energy Policy

Author:
Mamuka Komakhia
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war has been going on for five months, and it can be said that it is a war that has changed the world, and not only in military and security terms. In this edition of “The Security Review”, we will discuss the food, energy, and transportation aspects of this conflict. Mamuka Komakhia deals with one of the most important aspects of the war - energy, and discusses Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas and the possible scenarios to escape from it.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, War, European Union, Gas, Exports, Energy Dependence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

21. War, Censorship and Public Opinion in Russia: Putin’s Struggle at Home and Abroad

Author:
Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s “special military operation,” as the Kremlin calls its full-scale war against Ukraine, has been underway for the second month in a row. However, the Russian army has not been able to cope with the combat tasks as effectively as Kremlin leaders originally planned. The incredible resilience and courage of the Ukrainian nation has fascinated the world but it has become an additional challenge for the Putin regime. In addition to the fact that the Russian government had to radically change its officially declared military objectives, it also faced the need to tighten measures to maintain control over the situation inside the country. At this stage, the Kremlin has to take effective steps both inside and outside of the country in order to fulfill Putin’s imperialist ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Public Opinion, Censorship, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

22. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:
Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Russia’s War on Ukraine: A New Phase

Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered a new phase. The Kremlin’s initial plan to seize Kyiv with a lightning strike failed due to spirited defense by the Ukrainian military. In response, Russia has concentrated forces in the Donbas, and to a lesser extent southern Ukraine. Fighting remains fierce in these areas and experts disagree about the trajectory of the conflict. Some argue that Ukraine’s superior morale and greater international support will be decisive, while others point to Russia’s sheer advantage in numbers. Our panel of experts will discuss the implications of this new phase of the war. Can Ukraine gain back territory lost in recent weeks? Have Russia’s war aims changed? Should the US and NATO change course? Is it time for all sides to seek a negotiated settlement?
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Navalny and Russia's Opposition During the War: A Conversation with Maria Pevchikh

Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the Harriman Institute at Columbia University for a discussion with Maria Pevchikh, head of the investigation department at the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Moderated by Elise Giuliano, Senior Lecturer in Political Science.
Topic:
War, Authoritarianism, Civil-Military Relations, Opposition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

25. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

26. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. HOW GERMANY’S COALITION CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN’S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION IN UKRAINE

Author:
Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin almost certainly failed to anticipate that Germany would be willing to sacrifice the benefits of cheaper Russian gas to punish Russian aggression in Ukraine. But Tuesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz indefinitely paused certification of the completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline to “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming?
Topic:
NATO, Oil, War, Gas, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

29. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:
Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

30. WHY A SETTLEMENT IN UKRAINE REMAINS OUT OF REACH

Author:
Valerie Sticher
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The Russian invasion and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine show the limits of diplomacy. Despite warning of an impending invasion, efforts to stop the war failed. And despite the high costs on all sides, efforts to stop this horrific war remain elusive. Why is this the case?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

31. HOW HISTORICAL ANALOGIES WOKE UP THE WEST

Author:
Eric Mosinger
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Policymakers, activists, and ordinary people often make analogies between past and present, for example, by labeling 9/11 “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.” In doing so, people hope to better understand surprising events and develop a plan of action for themselves and others. Vladimir Putin employed historical analogies to justify his invasion of Ukraine, while Western leaders drew on their own understanding of World War II history to mobilize a surprisingly muscular response to Russian aggression.
Topic:
War, History, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

32. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:
Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

33. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

35. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

36. Reasons for Russia’s War on Ukraine and its foreseeable consequences on Latin America

Author:
Nancy Janett García Vázquez
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the historical and political reasons that, in the author's opinion, have led to the war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. It is also its purpose to analyze the war' imediate and mediate impacts at the international level, as well as its eventual consequences in the Latin American region.
Topic:
Security, Politics, War, History, Economy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Caribbean

37. Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-days war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various countries. The CSP’s new issue includes 5 articles, 2 commentaries and 1 book review. In the framework of post-war cooperation situation, the CSP’s current authors analysed the economic difficulties of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s enhancing role in the region and existing geopolitical confrontations, performance of peacekeeping activities, as well as economic cooperation opportunities emerged in the post-war period.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, War, Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Guam

38. Russia and Turkey Deconflict Their Geopolitical Moves in the Caucasus

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The recent incidence of war in the Caucasus has shown that, when facing deep domestic troubles, Russia and Turkey demonstrate strikingly different patterns of international behavior. While Russia has become more cautious in responding to external challenges, Turkey has embarked on several power-projecting enterprises. Its forceful interference in the long-smoldering conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh took Russia by surprise and effectively secured a military victory for Azerbaijan. Moscow has assumed the main responsibility for terminating hostilities by deploying a peacekeeping force, but its capacity for managing the war zone and its commitment to deconflicting tensions with Turkey remain uncertain. The United States and the European Union have few levers for influencing this interplay of clashing agendas of local actors and regional powers and fewer reasons to trust Russian and Turkish leaders to put peacebuilding ahead of their ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Caucasus, and Middle East

39. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:
Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

40. Ending the Threat of War in Ukraine: A Negotiated Solution to the Donbas Conflict and the Crimean Dispute

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The unresolved conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas region represents by far the greatest danger of a new war in Europe — and by far the greatest risk of a new crisis in relations between the United States and Russia. The Biden administration does not wish to escalate tensions with Russia, and no doubt appreciates that admitting Ukraine into NATO is impossible for the foreseeable future, if only because Germany and France would veto it. Nonetheless, so long as the dispute remains unresolved, the United States will be hostage to developments on the ground that could drag it into a new and perilous crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, War, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

41. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:
Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

42. From Bad To Worse? The Impact(s) of Covid-19 On Conflict Dynamics

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, when the novel strain of coronavirus first hit the headlines, 12 countries in the world were experiencing organised violence on an extensive scale, with more than 100 incidents of violence and attacks against civilians recorded in that month. To most of these countries, the virus seemed a distant threat at the time. Yet, a few months and over 7 million recorded Covid-19 cases later, it has evolved from a distant threat to a stark reality. The global crisis – which has unleashed an emergency in the world’s public health, political, and economic systems simultaneously – has subjected even the most stable societies to unprecedented disruption. In conflict-affected countries, i.e. countries with ongoing conflicts or a high risk of relapse into conflict, and countries emerging from conflicts, the pandemic has added another layer on top of often multiple existing layers of crisis. Against the backdrop of expert warnings over the particular vulnerabilities of conflict-affected countries to Covid-19, this Brief analyses key emerging dynamics and repercussions in conflict-affected countries in general, and in five countries in particular: Colombia, Libya, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. The focus here is especially on conflicts and countries previously covered by our Conflict Series, so as to build on already accumulated analysis. The Brief identifies three main ways in which the global crisis impacts conflict-affected countries. First, the pandemic itself risks exacerbating inequalities and further burdening already vulnerable groups within conflict-affected societies. Second, local and external conflict parties are quick to capitalise on various opportunities arising from the policy responses to the crisis which also complicate peace and crisis management efforts. Third, the economic fallout puts severe strain on already weak state institutions and undermines governance outcomes (thus increasing the risk of conflict). Of these three dimensions, the policy responses and distraction created by the pandemic have thus far had the most significant repercussions for conflict dynamics, unfortunately often for the worse. The global scale of the crisis and its continuing evolution complicate efforts to seize momentum for peace and set the pandemic apart from previous catastrophic/disruptive events, such as the tsunami in 2004, that in some cases led to a positive shift in local conflict dynamics. The Brief is structured as follows: the main text analyses the emerging trends catalysed by the pandemic crisis in conflict-affected contexts, while the case study boxes discuss the unfolding processes in specific countries. The last section discusses the policy options for preventing further escalatory repercussions.
Topic:
War, Inequality, Conflict, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Asia, South America, North Africa, North America, and Africa

43. Devil in the Detail: Local versus regional approaches to peace in Donbas

Author:
Karen Madoian
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Following the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has witnessed continued violence in the east of the country, with approximately 13,000 people killed, including more than 3,300 civilians, and as many as 30,000 wounded. After a period of stalled negotiations, 2019 brought new momentum to the peace process: Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and his political party ‘Servant of the People’ won an unprecedented majority in the 2019 elections, gaining full control over the executive and legislative branches of power with more than 70% of all votes cast across the country. One of the instrumental factors for President Zelensky’s victory was his promise to end the war in Donbas. To this end, he agreed to revive negotiations in the Normandy Format (between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and reactivated direct communication channels with the Kremlin. The president’s message regarding reconciliation with the separatist, Russia-backed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk appears to resonate with the majority of Ukrainians: more than 50% of citizens believe that Kyiv should negotiate a peace deal with separatist leaders and more than 70% support the Ukrainian president’s engagement in direct dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, War, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

44. The Russian Way of War in Syria: Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation’s intervention in Syria is a watershed event. However the war there ends, its impact on Russia is likely to be profound. For the first time in its post-Soviet history, Russia’s military is fighting outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In doing so, it is exercising military capabilities that had atrophied from long lack of use. Moscow is also rebuilding its diplomatic muscle through its role in Syria by managing a diverse coalition, leading a parallel peace process, and forcing the United States to take the Kremlin’s preferences into account when making decisions in the Middle East. Through Syria, Russia has reemerged on the geopolitical stage. The war is not over, and there are many ways in which things could still go badly for Russia. Moscow may find that a return to geopolitical prominence entails costs and risks at least as great as the rewards that status brings. Nevertheless, the West will be dealing with a Russia that has changed fundamentally through its experience in the war. Understanding these changes and their implications for Western governments is the focus of this conclusion chapter. It is structured around two questions. First, what does Syria tell us about how Russia fights its wars? Second, how has Russia’s experience in Syria affected the capabilities of its armed forces? Answering these questions should increase our understanding of Russia as a geopolitical actor and allow Western governments to make more effective policy on issues where Russia is a factor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

45. Coming Home to Roost: War Threatens to Spill Beyond Syria’s Borders

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
As tens of thousands more refugees are shunted by Turkey toward Europe and a new phase of the brutal Syrian war unfolds, Russia, Turkey, the EU, and the international community are being handed the bill for a flawed short-term approach to the nine-year conflict that lacked empathy for the millions of victims and was likely to magnify rather than resolve problems.
Topic:
War, Refugees, Syrian War, and International Community
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

46. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:
Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

47. The Future of US-Kazakhstan Relations

Author:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since achieving its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has maintained warm relations with the United States. The country regards the United States both as a potential source for trade and investment and as a partner to balance the influence of Russia and China in Central Asia, a perspective which underlines the importance of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s February visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During the visit, Pompeo was generous in his praise for Kazakhstan and highlighted the importance of bilateral ties, while criticizing China’s detention of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, and ethnic Kazakhs in so-called “re-education” camps.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, North America, and United States of America

48. Peace in Ukraine I: A European War

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
To help Ukraine find peace, the EU, NATO, and member states must seek new approaches to arms control discussions with Russia and European security as a whole. They should also consider a more flexible sanctions policy, such that progress in Ukraine may lead to incremental easing. What’s new? Russia’s Ukraine policy, including its military intervention, is driven both by Moscow’s goals in Ukraine itself and its longstanding desire to revise Europe’s security order. Western responses are similarly driven by both Ukraine-specific and Europe-wide interests. A sustainable peace plan must address both sets of factors. Why does it matter? Efforts to make peace in Ukraine by solving problems specific to Ukraine only will fail, because the causes of the conflict are both local and geostrategic. A truly sustainable peace should address European security as a whole to make Russia, its neighbours and the entire continent safer. What should be done? European states should engage Russia in discussions of European security, including regional and sub-regional arms limitations. They should also consider adjusting the current sanctions regime to allow for the lifting of some penalties if Russia contributes to real progress toward peace.
Topic:
NATO, War, Sanctions, European Union, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

49. When Russia Goes to War: Motives, Means and Indicators

Author:
Konrad Muzyka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since Vladimir Putin declared the fall of the Soviet Union to be the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, prompting concerns that Moscow would seek to rebuild its influence by conquering territories on its borders, Russia has deployed combat troops into Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, and inserted private military companies into the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, South Sudan and Venezuela. But there is little consensus among analysts about the meaning of Russia’s military behaviour, or how far it might go in pursuing its interests. Is it trying to rebuild a version of the former Soviet Union? Does it have the will and capability to go to war? Under what circumstances might it be ready to commit combat troops? And how do these questions relate to its immediate neighbourhood, in particular to the Baltic region? This analysis examines Russia’s fundamental motives for going to war in the ‘near abroad’, describes how Russia might wage war in the Baltic states, and identifies some of the indicators that might suggest it is preparing to do so.
Topic:
War, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, and Baltic States

50. A Plan to End the War in Syria: Competing with Russia in the Levant

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States has an interest in allowing the Russian Federation to “win” an outright victory in Syria, so long as it secures from Moscow an agreement that is favorable to the Syrian Kurds, builds in negative consequences for an external actor targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces, and establishes a “deconflict plus”-type mechanism to continue to target Islamic State- and Al Qaeda-linked individuals in Syria. A forward-looking policy that the incoming Biden administration could consider is to deprioritize the nascent threat of the Islamic State as a key factor in driving U.S. national security strategy, and instead focus more intently on long-term competition with great powers. This approach would seek to shape how Moscow spends finite defense dollars—at a time of expected global defense cuts stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that are advantageous to the United States. It also would seek to limit the cost of the U.S. presence in Syria—to include secondary and opportunity costs not accounted for in a basic cost breakdown of the U.S. war against the Islamic State. This approach is not without risk, particularly from a nascent Islamic State insurgency in Russian-controlled territory, but seeks to match U.S. strategic priorities with action and to impose upon a long-term competitor the costs of victory for its intervention in Syria.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, Syrian War, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

51. U.S. Troops Injured in Altercation with Russian Forces: What It Means for the War in Syria

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On August 26, Politico reported that U.S. service members were injured after an altercation with Russian forces in northeast Syria. This pattern of Russian challenges to U.S. forces was enabled by the Trump administration’s decision to retreat from parts of northern Syria in 2019, allowing Russia to fill the void. Until this decision was made, the two countries had agreed to make the Euphrates River the deconfliction line to keep U.S. and Russian forces separated. Russia stayed on the west side of the river, and the United on the east side, where this incident took place. Robert Hamilton, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, commented on the story and warned that it will not be a one-off incident: “We need to respond to this immediately and forcefully. Russian forces deliberately escalated against U.S. partners when I was running the ground deconfliction cell for Syria in 2017, but tended to be careful when U.S. forces were present. Unless we make it clear that we’ll defend ourselves, these escalations will continue with dangerous and unpredictable results.” Below, we offer readers an excerpt from a chapter written by Robert Hamilton from a forthcoming edited volume on Russia’s Way of War in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and North America

52. Security Review: Nagorno-Karabakh War Consequences

Author:
David Batashvili, Giorgio Bilanishvili, and Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Security Review section of the Rondeli Foundation regularly covers topics analyzing the threats facing Georgia, the changes in Georgia's external security environment and the challenges to Georgia's national security policy. Recently, the developments around Karabakh have seriously changed the previous status quo in our region, precipitating new and very significant circumstances, and have brought about a new reality to the countries of the South Caucasus as well as various important players with an interest in the region. Accordingly, the Rondeli Foundation pays special attention to a complex analysis of the new reality created in the context of Georgia's national security environment. To this end, a discussion series, entitled "New Reality in the South Caucasus," was organized in a webinar format providing the interested public with the opportunity to hear the assessments of experts from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Iran and Russia (the discussion series is available on the Rondeli Foundation's YouTube channel and Facebook page. The current issue of the Rondeli Foundation Security Review is also entirely dedicated to the new reality created in our region. It brings together the publications of the Foundation’s researchers that look at and evaluate the current situation from different angles.
Topic:
Security, National Security, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

53. War in NagornoKarabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

54. The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This “war against the West” actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

55. Deterring Russia in the Gray Zone

Author:
Michael A. McCarthy, Matthew A. Moyer, and Brett H. Venable
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The United States lacks a cohesive strategy to deter Russian aggression. Despite being militarily and economically inferior, Russia has undermined the United States and its allies by exploiting the “gray zone,” or the conceptual space between war and peace where nations compete to advance their national interests. In dealing with Russia, the United States must shift its strategic framework from a predominantly military-centric model to one that comprises a whole-of-government approach. The holistic approach must leverage a combination of diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) measures. In this timely and prescient monograph, three active duty military officers and national security fellows from the Harvard Kennedy School look to address this contemporary and complex problem. Through extensive research and consultation with some of the nation’s and academia’s foremost experts, the authors offer policymakers a menu of strategic options to deter Russia in the gray zone and protect vital U.S. national security interests.
Topic:
National Security, War, Military Affairs, Economy, Peace, Deterrence, and Gray Zone
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

56. Hybrid Warfare and Deniability as Understood by the Military

Author:
Håkan Gunneriusson
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Russia and China are terraforming the maritime environment as part of their warfare. In both cases the actions are illegal and the performance is offensive to its actual nature. In the case of China, the practice is construction of artificial islands in the South Chinese Sea and in the case of Russia it is about the infamous bridge built over the Kerch strait, Ukraine. Neither Russia nor China expects an armed conflict with the West in the near future. That is a reasonable assumption, which is weaponized at the political-strategically level. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. China and Russia offer their authoritarian systems as a replacement and there are a lot of pseudo-democratic or even out-right authoritarian regimes on the sideline watching this challenge unfold. The article highlights the difference for the NATO-countries in logic of practice when it comes to the political social field on one hand and the military political field on the other hand. The article uses material from a previously unpublished survey made on NATO-officers then attending courses at NATO Defense College (NDC).
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, European Union, Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

57. The Risks of Foreign Fighters in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In none of the conflicts in the post-Soviet area have so many foreign fighters participated than in the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014. It is estimated that more than 17,000 fighters from 55 countries have fought there on either side. Those fighting on the Russian side pose a special challenge to Ukraine’s security and to neighbouring countries because these fighters can engage in terrorism or other radical actions and are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Topic:
War, Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

58. How the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia threatens the West

Author:
Paul Dibb
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
We’re in an era when the risks of major-power conflict are growing. The most likely contenders are China, the rising power, and the US, the formerly dominant power that’s now in relative decline. The other worrying contingency is conflict between Russia and US-led NATO. But what about the third possibility: the prospect of China and Russia collaborating to challenge American power? The most dangerous scenario for America would be a grand coalition of China and Russia united not by ideology, but by complementary grievances. This paper examines Russian and Chinese concepts of great-power war in the 21st century, their views of the West and its military capabilities, and what risks they might both take to regain lost territories. The paper concludes by examining how America might react, the implications of all this for the West, including Australia, and what sort of armed conflict might be involved.
Topic:
War, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia-Pacific

59. Five Years of War in Donbas

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The war in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas has killed over 13,000 people, displaced millions, and led to the worst rupture in relations between the Russian Federation and the West since the end of the Cold War. The war was caused by inherent cleavages in Ukrainian society, combined with clumsy and self-interested intervention by outside powers. The war’s effects on Ukraine have been profound: the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite; billions of dollars in direct and indirect losses to the Ukrainian economy; a wholesale restructuring of the Ukrainian armed forces; social dislocation and psychological trauma; and unprecedented environmental damage. Despite these sad legacies, there are reasons to be optimistic that a settlement to the conflict is in view. The exhaustion and frustration of people in the separatist-controlled regions, Russia’s changing policy on the war—at least in part a result of rising frustration among the Russian public—and the election of a new Ukrainian government without regional ties or ties to networks of oligarchs all contribute to the possibility of peace. But in order for peace to endure after the war, the Ukrainian state must construct a broad-based, civic national identity, and it must tackle the country’s endemic corruption. The international community must be engaged in both crafting a settlement to the war and helping Ukraine deal with its consequences. External observers may be inclined to point to social division and corruption as the internal causes of the war, and argue that Ukraine has to fix itself before the outside world can intervene to help. And this is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the outside world contributed to the start of war in Ukraine by making the country the object in a geopolitical tussle between Russia and the West. Any honest accounting of the war’s history must acknowledge this fact. And any fair treatment of Ukraine after the war should seek to compensate it through significant, long-term assistance.
Topic:
War, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Separatism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

60. The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conflict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful

Author:
Deborah Jordan Brooks, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The world is experiencing a period of unprecedented demographic change. For the first time in human history, marked disparities in age structures exist across the globe. Around 40 percent of the world's population lives in countries with significant numbers of elderly citizens. In contrast, the majority of the world's people live in developing countries with very large numbers of young people as a proportion of the total population. Yet, demographically, most of the world's states with young populations are aging, and many are doing so quickly. This first-of-its kind systematic theoretical and empirical examination of how these demographic transitions influence the likelihood of interstate conflict shows that countries with a large number of young people as a proportion of the total population are the most prone to international conflict, whereas states with the oldest populations are the most peaceful. Although societal aging is likely to serve as a force for enhanced stability in most, and perhaps all, regions of the world over the long term, the road to a “demographic peace” is likely to be bumpy in many parts of the world in the short to medium term.
Topic:
Demographics, War, International Security, Democracy, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, China, Germany, and Global Focus

61. Moscow’s Syria Campaign: Russian Lessons for the Art of Strategy

Author:
Dima Adamsky
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This monograph argues that the Syrian experience may leave a major imprint on Russian strategic thought and operational art. It explores Moscow’s Syrian campaign and seeks to answer the following questions: How did the Russian art of strategy manifest itself? How did Moscow design the campaign and then estimate its operational performance, judged against its own ends? Which lessons has the Russian strategic community learned? How might these insights project on Moscow’s future strategic behavior? Which strategic trends are more likely than others?
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

62. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Superpowers

Author:
Ed Erickson, Christian H. Heller, T. J. Linzy, Mallory Needleman, Michael Auten, Anthony N. Celso, Keith D. Dickson, Jamie Shea, Ivan Falasca, Steven A. Yeadon, Joshua Tallis, and Ian Klaus
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
There are a variety of reasons to study geopolitical rivalries, and analysts, officers, and politicians are rediscovering such reasons amid the tensions of the last several years. The best reason to study geopolitical rivalries is the simplest: our need to better understand how power works globally. Power not only recurs in human and state affairs but it is also at their very core. Today’s new lexicon—superpower, hyperpower, and great power—is only another reminder of the reality of the various ways that power manifests itself. Power protects and preserves, but a polity without it may be lost within mere decades. Keith D. Dickson’s article in this issue of MCU Journal, “The Challenge of the Sole Superpower in the Postmodern World Order,” illuminates how fuzzy some readers may be in their understanding of this problem; his article on postmodernism calls us to the labor of understanding and reasoning through the hard realities. Ed Erickson’s survey of modern power is replete with cases in which a grand state simply fell, as from a pedestal in a crash upon a stone floor. Modern Japan, always richly talented, rose suddenly as a world actor in the late nineteenth century, but the Japanese Empire fell much more quickly in the mid-twentieth century. A state’s power—or lack thereof—is an unforgiving reality. This issue of MCU Journal, with its focus on rivalries and competition between states, is refreshingly broad in its selection of factors—from competing for or generating power. Dr. Erickson recalls that Alfred Thayer Mahan settled on six conditions for sea power, all still vital. Other authors writing for this issue emphasize, by turns, sea power (Steven Yeadon, Joshua Tallis, and Ian Klaus); cyberpower (Jamie Shea); alliances (T. J. Linzy and Ivan Falasca); information (Dickson); and proxies (Michael Auten, Anthony N. Celso, and others).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Islam, Terrorism, War, History, Power Politics, Military Affairs, European Union, Seapower, Cities, Ottoman Empire, Hybrid Warfare, Cyberspace, Soviet Union, and Safavid Empire
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Lithuania, Georgia, North Africa, Syria, North America, and United States of America

63. War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Today’s geopolitical conflicts, especially among great powers, involve a desire to fundamentally revise the order of alliances as well as solidify new norms of conduct. The purpose of our paper is to delineate two distinct phenomena in international affairs – hybrid warfare, which emphasizes the tactical level and grey-zone conflicts, which incorporates a long-term strategic dimension into international disputes. We argue that hybrid warfare can be a tactical subset of grey-zone conflict deployed under certain conditions and in varying degrees. We examine four case studies: China’s application of ‘unrestricted warfare’, Russia’s strategy of ‘hybrid balancing’, ‘regional hybridism’ practiced by Israel and ‘restricted hybridism’ applied by Canada/NATO globally. We conclude that the solution to challenges from Russia and China is not a military one but a political and collective one based on baseline requirements for building resilience. Israel, on the other hand, is largely uninterested in the revision of order of alliances and will continue to utilize its tactical advantage vis-à-vis regional neighbors to achieve victories in short conflicts. We conclude that NATO (and Canada) should work more closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union to effectively extend security guarantees to its members. In doing so Canada and likeminded countries will involve the costs of engaging in hybrid warfare and the subsequent erosion of democratic accountability.
Topic:
NATO, War, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, Israel, and Asia

64. Political Warfare by Russia

Author:
Kars de Bruijne(ed.)
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Global Security Pulse tracks emerging security trends and risks worldwide. This month the Global Security Pulse focuses on the subject of political warfare. It specifically assesses how it plays a role in the foreign relations of Russia
Topic:
International Relations and War
Political Geography:
Russia

65. A Delicate Balancing Act: Russia, Turkey, and the Kurds

Author:
Pietro A. Shakarian
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
Russia and Turkey have been improving their relationship since June 2016, the Kurdish question presents a potential challenge to their attempts to strengthen their ties. Reconciling Kurdish aspirations with Turkish fears will be a top priority for Moscow in its effort to broker a post-war peace in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Syrian War, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Middle East

66. Belarus-West Relations: The New Normal

Author:
Dzianis Melyantsou
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
This paper is part of CTR's Working Paper Series: "Eastern Voices: Europe's East Faces an Unsettled West." The new geopolitical environment formed after the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, together with emerging threats and challenges, are pressing both Belarus and the West to revise their policies in the region as well as their relations with each other. In this new context, Belarus is seeking a more balanced foreign policy and, at least towards the Ukrainian crisis, a more neutral stance.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, War, Territorial Disputes, Foreign Aid, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Belarus, Crimea, United States of America, and European Union

67. Regards sur l’Eurasie - L’année politique 2016

Author:
Anne De Tinguy, Bayram Balci, François Dauceé, Laure Delcour, Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Aude Merlin, Xavier Richet, Kathy Rousselet, and Julien Vercueil
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
Looking into Eurasia : the year in politics provides some keys to understand the events and phenomena that have left their imprint on a region that has undergone major mutation since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: the post-soviet space. With a cross-cutting approach that is no way claims to be exhaustive, this study seeks to identify the key drivers, the regional dynamics and the underlying issues at stake
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Corruption, Crime, Democratization, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Politics, Sovereignty, War, International Security, Regional Integration, and State
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and European Union

68. Russia’s Active Campaign in Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin Knudsen, Alexandra Lariiciuc, and Franklin Holcomb
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Russia has continued its destabilization campaign in Ukraine using its proxy forces and other means of subversion. The Trump Administration has indicated it is willing to support Ukraine as the Eastern European country faces Russian aggression. President Trump must act to strengthen the U.S.-Ukraine partnership and increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin as part of a broader campaign to deter Russian aggression globally. U.S. officials emphasized their support for Ukraine in a series of diplomatic meetings in May. U.S. President Donald Trump held separate meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin in Washington on May 10 during which he reportedly stressed “Russia’s responsibility to fully implement the Minsk agreements.” This rhetoric echoes previous statements by Trump administration officials. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. will maintain sanctions against Russia “until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered them.”
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

69. Russia’s Unrelenting Attacks On Syrian Civilians

Author:
Genevieve Casagrande
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Russia’s campaign against Syrian civilians continued undeterred by the U.S. strike on April 6 in response to the Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in southern Idlib. Local reports indicate Russia regularly used incendiary munitions and bunker buster munitions in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces in order to inflict mass casualties on the population in rebel-held terrain following the U.S. strike. Russian airstrikes also targeted local civilian infrastructure from April 4 - 25, including hospitals, schools, mosques, and civil defense centers across Syria. Russia continually targeted Khan Shaykhoun, the site of the regime’s chemical attack on April 4, throughout the reporting period. Furthermore, activists claimed Russia targeted a hospital and civil defense center treating those wounded in Khan Shaykhoun immediately following the regime’s sarin gas attack. The use of chemical weapons is just one of many means the pro-regime coalition has to punish anti-Assad populations in Syria. Russia remains a principal contributor to President Assad’s purposeful campaign to target Syrian civilians. The Assad regime has a long history of violence against its own people, but the advanced capabilities Russia has brought to theater have allowed the pro-regime coalition to target civilians with even greater precision.
Topic:
Human Rights and War
Political Geography:
Russia and Syria

70. War by Other Means

Author:
Max Bergmann and Carolyn Kenney
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Liberal democracies across the globe are under attack. They are being attacked not by traditional weapons of war but by disinformation—intentionally false or misleading information designed to deceive targeted audiences. While these attacks may not pose a threat to the physical safety of democratic citizens, they do pose a threat to democracy. In modern democratic societies, credible information is critical to the economy, political system, and way of life that citizens have come to expect. When citizens of democracies do not trust information, the forums for discussing politics and debating policy are compromised. If the media in a democracy is viewed as biased or, worse, as aligned with special interests, the bedrock of the democratic system—its ability to resolve differences through debate, persuasion, and compromise—breaks down. A democratic society can withstand deep disagreements, but if its citizens cannot agree on some basic and fundamental facts, that democracy will struggle to function.
Topic:
War, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

71. The Global Exchange (Spring 2017)

Author:
David J. Bercuson, Randolph Mank, Sarah Goldfeder, Mike Day, David Perry, Peter Jones, David Carment, Milana V. Nikolko, Brett Boudreau, Rolf Holmboe, Darren Schemmer, Andrew Griffith, and Robert Vineberg
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Global Exchange is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Spring 2017 issue includes articles on trade, defense policy, elections and more.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Bilateral Relations, Budget, Elections, Democracy, Negotiation, Peace, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Canada, Syria, North America, United States of America, and Gambia

72. La Turquie face aux réfugiés syriens : entre engagement humanitaire et instrumentalisation politique (Turkey Hosting Syrian Refugees: Between Humanitarian Commitment and Political Instrumentalisation)

Author:
Bayram Balci and Juliette Tolay
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
While the issue of Syrian refugees has led an increasing number of countries to work on curbing arrivals, one country, Turkey, hosts almost half of these refugees. Yet, far from imposing restrictions, Turkey has distinguished itself for its open border policy and large-scale humanitarian contribution. Turkey’s generosity alone is not sufficient to understand this asylum policy put in place specifically for Syrians. There are indeed a number of political factors that indicate a certain level of instrumentalisation of this issue. In particular, Turkey’s benevolent attitude can be explained by Turkey’s early opposition to Assad in the Syrian conflict and its wish to play a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria, as well as by its willingness to extract material and symbolic benefits from the European Union. But the refugee crisis also matters at the level of domestic politics, where different political parties (in power or in the opposition) seem to have used the refugee issue opportunistically, at the expense of a climate favorable to Syrians’ healthy integration in Turkey.
Topic:
Globalization, Migration, Nationalism, Religion, Terrorism, War, International Security, Diaspora, Peacekeeping, Refugees, Syrian War, Regional Integration, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Balkans, and Syria

73. Understanding Public Opinion in Russia During the Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Timothy Frye
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
What are public attitudes in Russia toward the war in Ukraine? Is this Putin’s war, or do his narrative on Ukraine and the policies he has followed toward that country resonate with Russian citizens? If the war has popular support, to what extent is this the case and why?
Topic:
International Relations, War, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

74. Entre européanisation et fragmentation, quel modèle de développement pour le territoire ukrainien? (Between Europeanization and fragmentation, what model of development for the Ukrainian territory?)

Author:
Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
One week before the third Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius on November 28-29, 2013, Ukraine suspended the preparation of an association agreement with the European Union, which had been under negotiation since 2007. When the agreement was finally signed in June 2014, President Yanukovych had fled the country under people’s pressure, and the integrity of Ukraine was challenged in the East by separatists and their Russian allies. These events came paradoxically at a time when the country's cohesion seemed stronger than in the 1990s. Far from being divided into two parts, Ukraine consists of the pieces of broken empires that all have good reasons to join in the state, as recent as this one may be. Indeed, its geography, electoral or economic, does not show a split between two blocks, but various lines of division that do not necessarily herald the breaking up of the state. Since the independence, this diversity had never been translated into new institutions: for several reasons, the reshaping of the centralized regime inherited from the Soviet era was deemed untimely by the country’s political forces. Presented as a priority by the members of the Parliament elected in 2014, the reform of territorial government is being implemented while Ukraine’s driving regions are either paralyzed or threatened by war.
Topic:
Nationalism, Sovereignty, War, Territorial Disputes, Europeanization, Memory, Borders, and State
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and European Union

75. Strategic Insights: Will the Russians Escalate in Syria?

Author:
Dr. W. Andrew Terill
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In an unexpected effort to protect a key Middle Eastern ally, the Kremlin intervened in Syria with military forces in late September 2015. This effort was undertaken to protect the Bashar Assad regime from Islamist and secular rebels now threatening his regime. Moscow initiated this action with a limited force that may be primarily designed to prevent Assad’s ouster but does not have the capabilities to help him retake large tracks of the country from the rebel groups that are now holding them. The Russian leadership made the decision to use military units in Syria at some political cost, aware that it was poisoning relations with many conservative anti-Assad Arabs and complicating its troubled relationship with Western powers.1 At some point, the Russians will have to consider the questions of how well these efforts have met their goal of bolstering the regime and what will be their next moves. They may also be rapidly faced with pressure to escalate their commitment to support the regime, if current actions do not produce meaningful results. They may also learn the painful lesson of other great powers, that military intervention in the Middle East is often much more problematic than national leaders initially expect.
Topic:
Political Violence, Civil War, Islam, Politics, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

76. Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises

Author:
Richard Dr. Weitz
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
China and Russia have engaged in an increasing number of joint exercises in recent years. These drills aim to help them deter and, if necessary, defeat potential threats, such as Islamist terrorists trying to destabilize a Central Asian government, while at the same time reassuring their allies that Russia and China would protect them from such challenges. Furthermore, the exercises and other joint Russia-China military activities have a mutual reassurance function, informing Moscow and Beijing about the other’s military potential and building mutual confidence about their friendly intentions toward one another. Finally, the joint exercises try to communicate to third parties, especially the United States, that Russia and China have a genuine security partnership and that it extends to cover Central Asia, a region of high priority concern for Moscow and Beijing, and possibly other areas, such as northeast Asia. Although the Sino-Russian partnership is limited in key respects, the United States should continue to monitor their defense relationship since it has the potential to become a more significant international security development.
Topic:
Security, War, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia and China

77. A Russian View on Landpower

Author:
Keir Giles and Major General Aleksandr V Rogovoy
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on the Russian military as a potential cause for concern in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong conventional land forces, and how they may be used. With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the Paper presents a valuable insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially critical juncture for European security.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

78. A Look Back at NATO’s 1999 Kosovo Campaign: A Questionably "Legal" but Justifiable Exception?

Author:
Ralph R. Steinke
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
It was the last European war in a bloody century of European wars. Less than ten years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 1999 Kosovo War—Operation Allied Force, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to it—was unique in many respects. From the perspectives of both international law and the law of armed conflict, it significantly challenged the limits of jus ad bellum, the international laws of war governing the circumstances under which nations are permitted to use force, as well as jus in bello, the laws of war relating to proper conduct in war.[1] After decades of a NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff in Europe and proxy wars elsewhere it was not self-defense, but rather humanitarian considerations, that drew the NATO Alliance, with the United States in the forefront, into this conflict. While the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign captured the world’s attention, not long after its conclusion this military operation began to fade from the public memory. Beyond the Balkans, a little more than two years after the Kosovo War’s conclusion, the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, would virtually remove global examination and recollections of the Kosovo conflict from the agenda. The United States and much of the world embarked on an entirely new, 21st century ideological and combative struggle: fighting the scourge of terrorism. Nevertheless, the Kosovo War has alternatively been referred to as a reference point by Americans who have sought a response to the Syrian conflict as well as by Vladimir Putin as justification for his claims to Crimea and the “protection” of Russian nationals. Some sixteen years after the Kosovo conflict and Operation Allied Force, it is worth asking: are there any insights to be recalled and gained from this conflict? What has been the war’s effect on the law of international armed conflict to date? Is Mr. Putin right to refer to the Kosovo campaign as his justification for the use of force, either implied or explicit, in Crimea or greater Ukraine? It will be argued here that in spite of significant concern and warnings then that the Kosovo campaign would provide a dangerous precedent for international law and even global stability,[2] it has had a nominal if not negligible effect on the body of international law as informed by jus ad bellum. In spite of Mr. Putin’s attempts to try to identify it as a precedent, the Kosovo campaign was indeed an exception. While it was characterized as a messy and “ugly” affair,[3] it did accomplish what it intended to do: stop the killing of potentially tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands more from Kosovo, ultimately providing them with a better and more secure life than was possible in the pre-Kosovo campaign period.
Topic:
NATO, War, Conflict, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Kosovo, and Syria

79. Tools of modification and extension of the area of strategic influence of Russia / Herramientas de modificación y ampliación del área de influencia estratégica de Rusia

Author:
Samuel Morales
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
This document analyzes the tools that at present Russia uses with the intention of modifying and extending his area of strategic influence in the East of Europe. It centers fundamentally on the external action of Russia after the change of Government on Ukraine. The document tries to give response, first, to which they are the intentions of Russia with regard to his relations with the European Union; secondly if Russia uses as political tool his energetic resources; and thirdly, if the actions of not linear war developed in the peninsula of Crimea form a part structurally of the external action of Russia. In his development it does not think that the Euromaidan constitutes a point of inflexion in the strategic Russian thought, but rather the point of decision of a strategic approximation to the new world order presented in 2007 and that was applied by the first time in Georgia's war in 2008.
Topic:
Security, War, International Affairs, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

80. Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce Wars Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity

Author:
Yishai Beer
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Abstract:
The exercise of brute force by militaries, though common, reflects professional incompetency. A well-trained military has an inherent interest in enhancing its operational effectiveness and constraining unnecessary brutality. The law of armed conflict, however, generally ignores the constraining effect of the necessity principle, originally intended to allow only the minimally necessary use of force on the battlefield. Consequently, the prevailing law places the burden of restricting the exercise of brute military force upon humanitarian considerations (and the specific norms derived from them). Humanity alone, however, cannot deliver the goods and substantially reduce war’s hazards. This article challenges the current dichotomy between the two pillars – mistakenly assumed to be polar opposites – of the law of armed conflict: necessity and humanity. It calls for the transformation of the military’s self-imposed professional constraining standards into a revised legal standard of necessity. Though the necessity principle justifies the mere use of lethal force, it should not only facilitate wielding the military sword but also function simultaneously as a shield, protecting combatants and non-combatants alike from excessive brutality. The suggested transformation would bind and restrain the prospective exercisers of excessive force, political and military alike, and restrict the potential damage that might be caused both intentionally (to combatants) and collaterally (to non-combatants). The combined effect of the current changes in war’s pattern and the law of armed conflict, in the military and social thinking of recent decades, and the new strategies available due to the development of new military technologies have all created a new war environment – one that may be ready to leverage the constraining potential of military professionalism into a binding legal standard and norms.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Law, Treaties and Agreements, and War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

81. Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars

Author:
Emil Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Despite a considerable amount of ethnographic research into the phenomena of blood revenge and blood feud, little is known about the role of blood revenge in political violence, armed conflict, and irregular war. Yet blood revenge—widespread among many conflict-affected societies of the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond—is not confined to the realm of communal infighting, as previous research has presumed. An empirical analysis of Russia's two counterinsurgency campaigns in Chechnya suggests that the practice of blood revenge has functioned as an important mechanism in encouraging violent mobilization in the local population against the Russian troops and their Chechen proxies. The need to exact blood revenge has taken precedence over an individual's political views, or lack thereof. Triggered by the loss of a relative or humiliation, many apolitical Chechens who initially sought to avoid involvement in the hostilities or who had been skeptical of the insurgency mobilized to exact blood revenge to restore their individual and clan honor. Blood revenge functions as an effective, yet heavily underexplored, grievance-based mechanism encouraging violent mobilization in irregular wars.
Topic:
Political Violence, Civil War, War, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, Chechnya, Yemen, Colombia, Georgia, and Albania

82. Tableau de bord des pays d’Europe centrale et orientale et d’Eurasie 2014 (Volume 2 : Eurasie)

Author:
Jean-Pierre Pagé, Anne De Tinguy, Jacques Sapir, Julien Vercueil, Vitaly Denysyuk, Raphaël Jozan, David Teurtrie, and Faruk Ülgen
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
Le lecteur ne s’étonnera pas de ce que, en 2014, le conflit en Ukraine soit au cœur des préoccupations des pays d'Europe centrale, orientale et de l'Eurasie, même si ses incidences sont diversement ressenties selon les régions considérées. Les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale sont divisés dans leur appréhension politique des événements, et leurs économies ne sont pas directement concernées par les retombées du conflit en Ukraine. On pouvait craindre en revanche qu’elles subissent l’atonie de la zone euro, et son incapacité à retrouver des taux de croissance stimulant la demande extérieure. Cependant – et c’est là une heureuse surprise –, plusieurs d’entre elles ont trouvé la parade en tirant parti des fonds que l’Union européenne leur destine généreusement pour relancer leur demande domestique. Et les effets positifs de cette tactique portent des fruits spectaculaires, d’autant qu’elle se combine avec les incidences de la faible hausse des prix sur le pouvoir d’achat des consommateurs. Il y a là des enseignements à tirer pour la politique économique de l’Europe Occidentale ! Les pays de l’espace eurasiatique sont eux directement aux prises avec les développements du conflit ukrainien. Les incidences en sont multiples : les sanctions et contre-sanctions entre la Russie et l’Union européenne influent grandement sur les économies périphériques, de grands projets comme le gazoduc South Stream sont annulés, les relations des pays d’Asie centrale et du Caucase avec l’Union européenne sont observées avec vigilance par la Russie… La crise ukrainienne, c’est un fait, porte son ombre sur le grand projet de Vladimir Poutine d’instauration d’une Union économique eurasiatique.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, International Organization, Markets, Political Economy, War, Natural Resources, Finance, Regional Integration, Transnational Actors, and Emerging States
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Belarus

83. Afghanistan: the view from Russia

Author:
Józef Lang
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Russia's current and foreseeable policy towards Afghanistan is multi-vectored, complex and shows, at times, signs of incoherence. Russia views developments in Afghanistan as a strategic challenge and is expressing growing concern over the country's prospects for stability after the withdrawal of ISAF forces by the end of 2014. Russian decision-makers fear that a security vacuum emerging after the withdrawal could destabilise Central Asia and have a negative impact on Russia itself. At the same time, Moscow is concerned with Western military presence in the region, which it regards as interference in its neighbourhood. At tactical level, Russia also sees the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to secure its interests both regionally (consolidating its influence in Central Asia) and more widely (in terms of its relations with NATO).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, and Central Asia

84. Trends in international arms transfers, 2013

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2009–13 was 14 per cent higher than in 2004–2008 (see figure 1). The five biggest exporters in 2009–13 were the United States, Russia, Germany, China and France and the five biggest importers were India, China, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, India, Paris, France, Germany, and Saudi Arabia

85. Russia's Hybrid Warfare -Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence

Author:
Heidi Reisinger and Aleksandr Golts
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Ukraine is not even a state!” Putin reportedly advised former US President George W. Bush during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. In 2014 this perception became reality. Russian behaviour during the current Ukraine crisis was based on the traditional Russian idea of a “sphere of influence” and a special responsibility or, stated more bluntly, the “right to interfere” with countries in its “near abroad”. This perspective is also implied by the equally misleading term “post-Soviet space.” The successor states of the Soviet Union are sovereign countries that have developed differently and therefore no longer have much in common. Some of them are members of the European Union and NATO, while others are desperately trying to achieve this goal. Contrary to what Professor John Mearsheimer may suggest. In his article “Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault” he argues that NATO has expanded too far to the East, “into Russia's backyard”, against Moscow's declared will, and therefore carries responsibility for recent events; however, this seems to ignore that NATO was not hunting for new members, but found them knocking at its door.
Topic:
NATO and War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, Soviet Union, and Moscow

86. The North Korean Factor and Russia’s Positions in Asia

Author:
G. Toloraya and A. Torkunov
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
In recent years, Russia’s active and highly vigorous foreign policy in many conflict zones has become an important international factor in the hottest points (Syria being one of them). Russia achieved spectacular diplomatic results. there are, however, problem zones much closer to home. We have in mind the Korean Peninsula, the scene of the oldest and dangerous conflict. Many times in the past, the “soft underbelly” of Russia’s far east left the expert community and the public puzzled and bewildered. Throughout the decades which separate the peninsula from the “hot war” (still very much in evidence de jure and de facto), it has been living amid sluggish confrontation and dramatic developments at the domestic stage of the north and the south, two irreconcilable opponents, and between them.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, and War
Political Geography:
Russia and North Korea

87. Russia's Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus: Performance and Consequence

Author:
Ariel Dr. Cohen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The North Caucasus region has been a source of instability for the past several centuries. Most recently, Chechen aspirations to achieve full independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union led to two disastrous wars. While the active phase of the Chechen conflict ended in 2000 – more than a decade ago—the underlying social, economic, and political issues of the region remain. A low-level insurgency continues to persist in the North Caucasus region, with occasional terrorist attacks in the Russian heartland. There are few reasons to expect any substantial improvement in the situation for years to come. Chechnya functions as a de facto independent entity; Islamist influence in Dagestan is growing, terror attacks continue, and the rest of the North Caucasus requires massive presence of Russian security services to keep the situation under control. Preventing the North Caucasus from slipping back into greater instability requires tackling corruption, cronyism, discrimination, and unemployment—something the Kremlin has so far not been very willing to do. “Small wars” in the Caucasus resonated as far away as Boston, MA, and more international attention and cooperation is necessary to prevent the region from blowing up.
Topic:
Political Violence, Politics, War, International Security, Self Determination, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Soviet Union, Chechnya, and North Caucasus