Political Geography: Norway / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Norway’s vaccine diplomacy during Covid-19

Author:: Emma Sandvik Ling
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: How did Nordic countries manage the tensions and ethical dilemmas of national health security and international solidarity during the Covid-19 vaccine response? This DIIS working paper examines Norway’s Covid-19 vaccine procurement and distribution strategy within the framework of the SCANVAX project on Nordic vaccine diplomacy. The study analyses how Norway worked to procure Covid-19 vaccines to cover the needs of the Norwegian people as well as how Norway engaged in the global pandemic response and efforts to ensure global vaccine distribution. The working paper also examines how tensions between national health security and international solidarity was navigated in public discourse during the pandemic. The case demonstrates how a small non-EU state managed pandemic responses through complex diplomatic arrangements while balancing domestic needs with global solidarity commitments. The working paper is part of the project Strategic solidarity: Scandinavian countries' Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy (SCANVAX) that explores the significant tension between national, regional and international vaccine solidarity during Covid-19 and asks how the dominant policy goal of securing vaccines in the interest of national health security was intertwined with global health security and broader foreign policy objectives, whether related to international solidarity, diplomatic influence, or geopolitical interests. SCANVAX is financed by NordForsk under the Nordic Council of Ministers and implemented by a consortium of researchers from the University of Oslo, Lund University and DIIS.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, COVID-19, and Vaccine Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

2. The Granular Trade and Production Activities (GRANTPA) Database

Author:: Sebastien Bradley, Javier Flórez Mendoza, Mario Larch, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: This paper introduces the Granular Trade and Production Activities (GRANTPA) database, which covers international trade flows for 3,124 products and 247 countries over the period 1995-2019 as well as domestic trade flows and production data for the same number of products and years for a subset of 35 European economies. The original data sources that we employ are Eurostat’s Comext and Prodcom databases. A gravity application delivers a large set of product-level ‘home bias’ estimates, which cannot be obtained without domestic trade flows. The average estimates on the standard gravity variables in our model (e.g., distance) are comparable to those from the related literature. However, our disaggregated estimates are very heterogeneous across products, thus highlighting the importance of our new database.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Production, Gravity Data, Structural Gravity, Home Bias Estimates, and Disaggregated Gravity Estimates
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Norway, Serbia, Iceland, Montenegro, and North Macedonia

3. Finland's partnerships as a NATO member: Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework

Author:: Iro Särkkä, Minna Ålander, Joel Linnainmäki, and Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden. It studies defence cooperation through key strategic, military, economic and political factors, such as the perceived threat environment, military capabilities, strategic culture, and the role member states play in the multilateral security framework of NATO. The report compares these six countries with Finland and identifies factors impacting potential future cooperation. The report finds that regional defence cooperation can yield positive outcomes for NATO. Bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation can enhance intra-alliance policymaking and serve as a tool to build trust with key partners and allies, thus facilitating defence integration within NATO.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

4. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

5. Insights into the U.S. Maternal Mortality Crisis: An International Comparison

Author:: Munira Z. Gunja, Evan D. Gumas, Relebohile Masitha, and Laurie Zephyrin
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Commonwealth Fund
Abstract:: The United States continues to have the highest rate of maternal deaths of any high-income nation, despite a decline since the COVID-19 pandemic. And within the U.S., the rate is by far the highest for Black women. Most of these deaths — over 80 percent — are likely preventable.1 With policies and systems in place to support women during the perinatal period, several high-income countries report virtually no maternal deaths. As policymakers and health care delivery system leaders in the U.S. seek ways to end the nation’s maternal mortality crisis, these countries may offer viable solutions. This brief updates an earlier Commonwealth Fund study of differences in maternal mortality, maternal care workforce composition, and access to postpartum care and social protections between the U.S. and other high-income countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.2 In this edition, we have also included data on Chile, Japan, and Korea — all high-income countries with universal health care systems. For our analysis, we used the most recently available data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which the U.S. is a member. Where country-specific data are more than five years old, we note whether more recent published data from other sources are available for that country. Readers should be aware that because the methods we used to derive updated numbers from other sources may be different from methods the OECD uses, data points may not be comparable to the U.S. rates. For complete details on our methods, see “How We Conducted This Study.”
Topic:: Development, Inequality, Public Health, and Maternal Mortality
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, France, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, North America, Sweden, Netherlands, New Zealand, and United States of America

6. Technology will save the climate! Attitudes towards Norway’s climate policy in four social groups

Author:: Åsta Dyrnes Nordø
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: The risk of opposition from the population increasingly plays a role in choosing the climate policy measures to achieve the objective to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Norway, there is a long-standing cross-party consensus that the development of new technologies will be crucial for solving climate challenges. Comparing public opinion surveys, Norwegians are significantly more convinced that new technology will solve problems induced by climate change, compared people in other European countries. A concrete example of such a technology is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Despite discussions about the costs of establishing the technology, there is a cross-party consensus in Norway that CCS is a good and suitable measure for reaching climate policy goals. In this article, we review the historical background that has led to this broad support in Nor-way. Furthermore, we look at how this has been expressed in the political parties’ attitudes towards CCS. There has been a long standing consensus among all major parties that CCS should be developed and deployed. We argue that this lay the foundation for the societal support for CCS. We analyze data from the Norwegian Coordinated Online panels for research on DEMocracy and governance (KODEM) to examine the attitudes toward CCS among citizens and three functional elites, namely elected representatives, bureaucrats, and journalists. We find that CCS receives strong support in all four groups, but that citizens and elected representative are more skeptical compared to bureaucrats and journalists. However, when looking at the factors that influence the perception of CCS, the pattern is the same for all four groups. The more technology optimistic a person is, the more positively they tend to perceive CCS as a method to fight climate change. We also find that those who think the political efforts to reduce greenhouse gases are too great are less positive about CCS com-pared to those who think the efforts are appropriate or too small. Overall, the analysis indicates that all four societal groups are technology optimistic and characterized by the same attitudes toward climate change. We discuss the role of technology optimism in Norway’s climate policy and the reasons for the high degree of political consensus across groups with different societal functions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Carbon Emissions, Elites, and Attitudes
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

7. Monitoring Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:: Robert U. Nagel, David Guzman, and Carla Koppel
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: To advance the WPS Agenda and monitor progress, in 2019 the governments of Finland and Spain initiated Commitment 2025 (C-25). The member countries agreed to track their efforts to increase the meaningful and substantive participation of women along nine specific commitments related to conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation and mediation processes. This agreement currently has 13 signatories: Finland, Spain, Norway, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Namibia, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) has partnered with C-25 members to track progress toward the commitments. To increase transparency and accountability while also providing metrics for progress, we collected and analyzed data on women’s representation in political governance, diplomatic, and peace and security institutions. We combined data from various sources to generate analysis and insights about the status of progress on C-25 commitments. Findings indicate that concerted efforts are needed to reach targets by 2025. Despite some progress, women’s participation and meaningful inclusion in matters of peace and security is still lacking. Governments can and must do better including and empowering women in peace and security institutions and processes. The data underscore the importance of continued dedication to women’s empowerment and the importance of holding governments accountable through monitoring progress.
Topic:: Security, Women, Accountability, Peace, Transparency, and Monitoring
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Norway, Argentina, Uruguay, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Iceland, and Namibia

8. Norway Between the "High North" and the Baltic Sea

Author:: Håkon Lunde Saxi
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: This article will discuss contemporary Norwegian security and defense policy within a regional and contemporary historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the relative importance assigned to the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North”2 versus the Baltic Sea area. The main argument is that Norwegian security and defense policy is focused on deterrence and defense in the country’s immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation is identified as the main source of regional insecurity. Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly perceived as one interconnected strategic space, with the geopolitical fault-line between NATO and Russia running straight through the region. While not divisible, the region arguably has two sub-theaters: the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” and the Baltic Sea area. Norwegian decisionmakers view the Baltic States as being more at risk from Russian revisionism than Norway itself. This effort is less likely to take the form of overt conventional military aggression than of ambiguous and nebulous “political” and “hybrid” warfare. Therefore, in Norwegian security policy, the Baltic Sea area is today allotted far more attention and resources than before 2014. After years of neglect, Norway realized during the Ukrainian crisis that it had vital security interests in the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the main security priority for Norway remains its maritime High North and Arctic region. The Baltic Sea area, while important, remains a secondary theatre in Norwegian strategy. This article also discusses which allies and partners are considered vital for Norwegian security. Among its security and defense relationships, Norway has long favored building close ties with the larger “maritime powers” to the west over the “continental powers” to the south or the smaller Nordic-Baltic neighbors to the east. To its east, Norway has been linked by shared bonds of common values, histories, and identities to the other Nordic countries and to a lesser extent to the Baltic ones. However, hardnosed calculations of Norwegian interests have continued to favor focusing on developing good and close relations with the maritime Anglo-Saxon powers to the west. As has been the case since Norwegian independence in 1905 and since Norway joined NATO in 1949, the western powers remain the ultimate guarantors of Norwegian security.3 At the same time, Norway has continued to place some limitations on its “integration” into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. These included restrictions on placing nuclear weapons or permanent allied bases in Norway, as well as some limitations on allied activities and exercises in the High North. The main purpose of this “screening” has been to alleviate Russian security concerns.4 This so-called policy of “reassurance” toward Russia aims to maintain the High North as an area of (relative) low tension.5 As one Norwegian Minister of Defense wrote a few years before 2022, the purpose is to combine “deterrence and reassurance” vis-à-vis Russia, in order to achieve “dialogue and cooperation . . . transparency, predictability and good neighborly relations in the High North.”6 The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reduced dialogue and cooperation with Moscow to a bare minimum, but has so far not led to the fundamental abandonment of Norway’s “reassurance” policy toward Russia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Norway, and Baltic Sea

9. Military Culture 2.0: The Female Cadet’s Approach, Feminine Competencies, and Pan-Critical Feminism - Drawing examples from American and Norwegian Special Forces

Author:: Mariah Loukou
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Military values of honour, courage and loyalty are synonymous to male soldiers due to the association of the military with the alpha-male narrative. However, the everchanging nature of war urges for a new approach. One that is identified with female cadets and feminine competencies. The article explores examples from the U.S. and Norway to show practically how military training and education can benefit from the female soldiers’ approach. To back this argument, the author, explores feminist institutionalism and body politics. The author then suggests a new theoretical tool, pan-critical feminism, as the means to incorporate female values and competencies to represent the changing cohort of military institutions. The article finally discusses military culture through the lens of organisational culture to show that there is space for testing this idea, even though social perceptions create barriers to its implementation.
Topic:: Culture, Armed Forces, Feminism, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, North America, and United States of America

10. A Risk-Increasing Safety Strategy? Evaluating the traditional risk mitigating strategy in dealing with dumped ammunition and explosive remnants of war

Author:: Geir Petter Novik, Morten Sommer, and Eirik Bjorheim Abrahamsen
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In Norway, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of explosive remnants of war remain in nature. It has always been recognized that the ordnance could represent a certain explosive risk if disturbed, and that some of the constituents in the ammunition could be harmful to the environment, but, even so, a tacit assumption by decision makers is that, if left alone, the ammunition will slowly become harmless over time. Some argue, however, that the risks are in fact increasing, not diminishing, with time, and that our current risk management strategy could prove to accelerate the risk rather than mitigate it. This article outlines some of the critical issues facing our current risk reduction strategy, as well as raising some concern as to whether the current strategy could be outdated and in need of revision. This study builds up a picture of how the strategy has evolved over time, and how new knowledge and broader risk perspectives can provide further insights into how this strategy could be revised. The conclusion of this investigation is that, on the basis of improved risk assessments highlighting the complex risk picture and the strength of knowledge concept, there is an urgent need to revise the current risk mitigating strategy.
Topic:: Weapons, Risk, and War Remnants
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

11. Hydrogen and Energy Transition: Opportunities for Brazil

Author:: Rafaela Guedes, Gregório Cruz Araújo Maciel, and André Bello
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: Hydrogen has an important versatility in the context of energy transition. It can be used directly as a low or zero-carbon energy source in sectors that are difficult to decarbonize or in energy storage, enabling a larger share of intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar power. In 2021, the Royal General Consulate of Norway in Rio de Janeiro and CEBRI promoted a discussion on the perspectives, technical challenges and economic feasibility of hydrogen production projects, as well as alternative national development strategies for this technology and its potential advantages for Brazil. Panelists from several companies involved in the sector (DNV, NEL Hydrogen, Air Products, Hyrton), as well as Giovani Machado, Director for Energy Economics and Environmental Studies at EPE, Mariane Fosland,General Consul of Norway, and CEBRI Trustee, Winston Fritsch, participated in the panel.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Hydrogen, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Norway, Brazil, and South America

12. Protection of critical infrastructure in Norway – factors, actors and systems

Author:: Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main aim of this article is to examine how the issue of protecting critical infrastructure is addressed in Norway. To answer this question, the article addresses two important sub-questions – what is to be understood in the current historical and the specific Norwegian context as important elements of national critical infrastructure and what is the current understanding of risks and threats that this infrastructure should be protected against? This article is based on a detailed quantitative and qualitative examination of the official Norwegian documents and statements on questions related to various aspects of protecting critical infrastructure in Norway. In section one, structural factors that have played a major part in shaping Norwegian thinking about critical infrastructure are discussed. Section two provides a short summary of the current discussion on elements of critical infrastructure in Norway. In section three, the article discusses official Norwegian perceptions of threats and how they address questions related to critical infrastructure. The fourth section looks at the current official approach to protection of critical infrastructure in the country. The process of building the existing system for protecting critical infrastructure in Norway has been driven by both domestic and international concerns. The system should make it possible for citizens to meet their needs through access to various important societal functions, but it also needs to make it possible to address challenges that stem from the international environment.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

13. Nordic cooperation amid pandemic travel restrictions

Author:: Katja Creutz, Sofie Berglund, Telli Betül Karacan, Alberto Giacometti, and Kristin M. Haugevik
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Since 2020, the Nordic countries have been confronted with the Covid-19 pandemic, which has been a multi-level stress test for the region. The strong basis of open borders and free movement in Nordic cooperation has been questioned by national pandemic measures, including wide travel restrictions. The Nordic dimension to pandemic responses has largely been missing, the trust between the countries has arguably been put to test and cross-border commuters have been subjected to differential treatment. Especially cross-border regions have suffered the consequences of travel restrictions, causing disruptions to work and private life. The report draws attention to the preparedness of the Nordic Region to jointly confront global crises. It explores the different strategies and travel restrictions adopted by four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. It also studies how Nordic cooperation functioned in a time of crisis. At the local level, it examines the economic, labour market and social implications for three cross-border regions, that is, Tornedalen, Svinesund and Öresund. The report finds that while there is room for improvement in handling a crisis like the pandemic, there are diverging views on the desirability to have all-Nordic approaches to situations affecting national security. The consequences are, however, serious for free movement and the aim to become the most integrated region in the world.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Public Health, COVID-19, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden

14. Factsheet: Norwegian Progress Party

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FRP) is a far-right anti-Muslim political party in Norway. Established in 1973, FRP joined government coalitions with the conservative party in 2013 and 2017, but left the governing coalition in January 2020.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Far Right, Political Parties, Muslims, and Norwegian Progress Party
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

15. Cyber Conscription: Experience and Best Practice from Selected Countries

Author:: Martin Hurt and Tiia Sõmer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Cyber conscription is quite a new phenomenon and there is no common definition of the term. Cyber conscripts may carry out a range of functions including technical cybersecurity and cyber defence, as well as IT support, programming and development. They may also serve in more traditional branches such as communications/signals, intelligence, and even social media. This report aims to identify best practices in the use of conscripts and reservists with information and communications technology (ICT)-related education and/or experience, bearing in mind the limited time that they serve. It examines the selection, training and employment of cyber conscripts and reservists in six countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In the countries analysed, the number of volunteers applying for cyber conscription exceeds the military’s needs—there is no immediate need to increase the attractiveness of this type of service. This may change, however, since several nations plan to increase the annual requirement for cyber conscripts. Interviews conducted for this report found that cyber conscripts receive basic military training that mostly follows a uniform pattern common to all conscripts. Only after completing basic military training are cyber conscripts given more specific training, including on cyberspace operations. Several of the armed forces of the countries studied cooperate with universities and have either developed or are planning to launch partnerships with the private sector. Some also provide cyber conscripts with training that gives them a specialist certificate or university credit points. Our report makes recommendations for military authorities that should benefit the armed forces and the individual conscripts, as well as academia and the private sector.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, and Conscription
Political Geography:: Finland, Norway, Estonia, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden

16. Small States, Different Approaches: Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council

Author:: Kristin M. Haugevik, Piret Kuusik, Kristi Raik, and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2021, Estonia and Norway served as elected members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both being relatively small states, defending multilateral cooperation and rules-based international order were important common goals. In the last decade, great power tensions have returned to the Security Council, and multilateralism has again come under pressure. The opportunities of elected members to substantially influence the UNSC agenda are arguably limited by power struggles, complex subject matter and inefficient working methods. In spite of these limitations, both Estonia and Norway achieved some important outcomes as members of the Security Council. Their experiences confirm above all the value of diplomatic experience and reputation-building for elected members. To some extent, the two states have also been able to assume ownership of matters on the UNSC agenda. As in any diplomatic setting, knowing how to “play the game” is key to the ability of small states to punch above their weight. Specific methods through which elected members work to influence the UNSC agenda include coalition-building, actively using the presidency function, organising special events, and assuming the penholder role in a specific country or thematic issue. Common priority areas of Estonia and Norway in the UNSC include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, protection of human rights and especially women’s rights, and addressing new security challenges in the fields of cyber and climate. The most significant experience of cooperation during 2021 was the Estonian-Norwegian joint penholdership of the Afghanistan file which brought the two countries to the centre stage of global diplomacy and reinforced their international profile as small states that make an active and professional contribution to multilateral cooperation. Looking at Estonia’s and Norway’s performance in 2021, some interesting differences can be identified. First, the two states assess the relative importance of the UN differently. In Norway’s foreign policy, there is a strong tradition of prioritising the UN and seeing an active role in multilateral cooperation as an important contribution to national interests and security. By contrast, for Estonia, the UN has not been a foreign policy priority in the past, and its contribution to national security continues to be seen as secondary to membership in Western organisations, notably NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Norway has generally worked a bit more behind the scenes, relying on its long experience and reputation as a constructive contributor to peace diplomacy. It has been active on issues such as the UNSC’s normative protection agenda and climate security, but also the Afghanistan, Syria and North Korea files. Meanwhile, Estonia has taken a rather bold approach as a newcomer visibly promoting its priorities, most notably the cybersecurity agenda. It has also focused on controversial issues of regional security, including the situations in Ukraine and Belarus, trying to use the UN to the advantage of national security through promoting its positions and strengthening coalitions with like-minded countries. Coordination between like-minded states is an integral part of the work of the Council. With Estonia and Norway both present, 2021 saw two Nordic-Baltic states concurrently represented in the Council for the first time. In the future, there may be scope for further strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the framework of the UN structures.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, Estonia, and Baltic States

17. What threatens NATO – and what members can do? The case of Norway and Poland

Author:: Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This research paper examines the critical external and internal challenges that faced NATO at its 70th anniversary, and how the policies of two members – Norway and Poland – can influence the internal cohesion of the Alliance and thus its ability to provide security to all its members. The survival of NATO as a viable security actor will depend on its capacity to maintain internal cohesion, a crucial factor influencing its ability to address external risks, challenges and threats in the increasingly turbulent international environment. This study places the debate in the broader context of discussion on alliance survivability in general, maps the external and internal challenges facing the Alliance after seven decades of its existence, and examines possible risks that the policies of Norway and Poland may pose to NATO’s internal cohesion and thus its ability to react to external challenges.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, and Poland

18. Governance, Social Policy, and Political Economy: Trends in Norway’s Partner Countries

Author:: Stein Sundstol Eriksen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In 2017–2018, NUPI (the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) headed a project where political economy analyses were undertaken in eleven of Norway’s partner countries. These analyses were published as eleven separate reports. The reports focused on power relations and political developments in the partner countries, but they also analyzed the nature of governance. After the publication of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2019, the MFA approached NUPI and requested that we summarize the findings of this report for Norway’s eleven partner countries and assess these findings in light of the political economy analyses. We were also asked to investigate whether there were any connections between the nature and quality of governance on the one hand, and the nature of social policies and the human rights situation on the other. This report presents the findings of this assessment of the governance scores in the light of the above-mentioned political economy analyses. The report is structured as follows: Firstly, after briefly describing the governance indictors used by the World Bank, we summarize the eleven countries’ scores on the various governance indicators. Secondly, we assess the evolution of governance in the eleven countries, by comparing the scores in the 2019 report with those from 2011. Thirdly, we summarize the findings of the political economy analyses of the eleven countries and discuss how they fit with the governance scores. Finally, we present the eleven countries’ expenditure on social policies, as reported in the ILOs World Social Protection Report, and the human rights situation for the partner countries, and then describe how these findings relate to the governance scores.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Political Economy, Governance, and Social Policy
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Norway

19. A Movement Between Parliamentary Politics and the Pathway to Violence and Terrorism: Germany’s Radical Right Narratives and Counter-narratives

Author:: Maximilian Kreter
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hedayah
Abstract:: This country report, written by Maximilian Kreter, is one of the outputs of the CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project, a year-long project under the STRIVE Global Program at Hedayah funded by the European Union and implemented by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). The overall project creates one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. It also proposes counter narratives for these countries and regions and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner.
Topic:: Civil Society, Far Right, Radical Right, Civil Society Organizations, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Canada, Norway, Germany, Hungary, Australia, and New Zealand

20. Radical Right Narratives and Norwegian Counter-narratives in the Decade of Utøya and Bærum Solo-actor Attacks

Author:: Mette Wiggen
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hedayah
Abstract:: This country report, written by Dr. Mette Wiggen, is one of the outputs of the CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project, a year-long project under the STRIVE Global Program at Hedayah funded by the European Union and implemented by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). The overall project creates one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. It also proposes counter narratives for these countries and regions and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner.
Topic:: Civil Society, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Political Extremism, Civil Society Organizations, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Canada, Norway, Germany, Hungary, Australia, and New Zealand

21. UN Treaty Body Promotes BDS at Urging of Norwegian NGO

Author:: Anne Herzberg
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: UN treaty bodies are increasingly violating their mandates as part of discriminatory anti-Israel campaigns. In March 2020, the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) embraced this disturbing trend by adopting a BDS agenda after being convinced to do so by the NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
Topic:: Human Rights, Politics, United Nations, BDS, and NGOs
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Norway, and Palestine

22. Covid-19 bends the rules on internal border controls: Yet another crisis undermining the Schengen acquis?

Author:: Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Free movement within the Schengen Area has been challenged in recent years by national measures: from internal border checks after the ‘migration crisis’ to the closure of borders in the Covid-19 crisis. This is the first time in the history of Schengen that member states have categorically refused entry to other EU citizens who are not registered residents or cross-border workers. Seventeen Schengen countries have submitted a notification on reintroducing internal border control due to Covid-19: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland. The use of Schengen provisions was creative: 12 states justified their internal border controls as a case requiring immediate action (Art. 28), France and Denmark expanded their already existing internal border controls (Art. 25), Finland appealed to the ‘foreseeable event’ clause (Art. 25), and Slovakia and Poland introduced ‘healthcare-police measures’ (Art. 23) before launching border controls (Art. 28). The crisis illustrates the need to reform Schengen in order to maintain the legitimacy of commonly agreed rules.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Schengen, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Norway, France, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Austria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia

23. UN Security Council Elections for 2021-2022 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: Today and yesterday, 17-18 June 2020, the UN General Assembly elected India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway to the UN Security Council for the period of 2021-2022. With their election, 7 of the 15 members of the Council in 2021 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva. Despite its role as the UN body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often the Security Council has been unable to take timely action on mass atrocity situations due to deep political divisions inside the Council over human rights, conflict prevention and national sovereignty. In recent years this has had a debilitating effect on the Council’s capacity to respond to atrocities in Myanmar, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. It is therefore more important than ever for Council members to work in creative ways to ensure that the international community is able to take timely, practical action to prevent atrocities and protect vulnerable populations. Since 2005 the Security Council has adopted 84 resolutions and 21 Presidential Statements that refer to the Responsibility to Protect, including with regard to situations in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria and eight other country situations, as well as a number of thematic issue areas. As we commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Responsibility to Protect, it is our hope that the Security Council will consistently uphold their commitment to taking decisive action to avert emerging crises and halt atrocities wherever they are threatened.
Topic:: United Nations, Elections, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Kenya, India, Norway, Mexico, Ireland, and Global Focus

24. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

25. Common fears, common opportunities? Czechia and Norway in the changing international context

Author:: Benjamin Tallis, Elena Zhirukhina, Mark Galeotti, and Jan Mazač
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:: The policy brief is a result of conclusions from roundtable discussions with policy makers and researchers that took place in Prague and Oslo in late 2019 and early 2020. The researchers studied how to better respond to fear factors and move beyond them in foreign policy. A key observation made in the new brief is that while changes in American, Chinese and Russian foreign policies may trigger anxiety and uncertainty among smaller European states, fears like this can also have productive effects on foreign policy thinking and practice. For states like Czechia and Norway, it can create opportunities for re-thinking support networks and reaching out to new partners. While Norway and Czechia have different historical, geographical and (sometimes) political points of departure, the two states’ assessment of recent international developments is similar. This creates room for conversation and mutual learning - including how to best respond to increased levels of rivalry between great powers, and changing dynamics in the EU and NATO. There are also similarities in how Norway and Czechia perceive their regional collaboration with their respective Nordic and Visegrad states – and how there is considerable scope for them to branch out from their regional formats.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, and Czech Republic

26. What do investors in electric vehicles technologies want?

Author:: Bettina Kast, Eva Bortolotti, and Joëlle Noailly
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:: With 25% of worldwide emissions due to road transport, the deployment of electric vehicles (EVs), full battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles – presents many promises to mitigate climate change. Despite its rapid growth, the market share of EVs vehicle remains low in Europe. Norway leads the EV market with 10% of total vehicle stock, followed by Iceland (3.3%), the Netherlands (1.9%) and Sweden (1.6%) (IEA, 2019). This Policy Brief presents the results of a survey among European clean tech investors examining which policy instruments and design can best mobilize private investments to advance e-mobility technologies.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Green Technology, Private Sector, Transportation, and Ecology
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, and Netherlands

27. Don’t be rude, don’t be docile! How to manage freedom of manoeuvre in tense bilateral diplomacy

Author:: Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Bilateral diplomacy has become increasingly important in today’s multipolar world. A number of cases are analysed in this DIIS Working Paper, where Nordic countries have been ‘disciplined’ in bilateral diplomacy by the emerging great powers of Russia, China, or India. Compared to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, with US unipolarity and EU normative power, the Nordics have experienced a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre. It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise these great powers’ internal affairs or foreign policies based on allegedly universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state’s freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be too docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits. Trial balloons or parallel action with related countries might do exactly that.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and United States of America

28. The European Defence Fund and Norway

Author:: Karsten Friis
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) represents an important step towards a more coherent European security architecture. It is broadly recognised that Europe needs to reduce duplication between, as well as the number of, weapons systems and platforms. The EU recently opened up for associated countries to participate in the Fund, but the Norwegian government has failed to set aside money for the EDF, despite official policy to participate.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

29. China’s role in the Sustainable Development Agenda: Considerations for Norway

Author:: Hans Jørgen Gåsemyr
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s role as an international development actor is growing, with real and increasing potential to impact Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). On some issues, Chinese initiatives align well with Norwegian interests, but China’s approach to development also diverges on some key practices and norms. While Chinese international efforts meet mixed reactions, Norway should stake out its own course for when and how to engage with China over SDGs.
Topic:: Development, International Organization, United Nations, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Norway, and Asia

30. Russian approaches to military technology. The Northern dimension

Author:: Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This policy brief presents the main findings of a project on Russian approaches to technological challenges, and the implications for security developments in the High North. It begins by examining the Russian debate on the technological challenges identified as posing a threat to national security by the country’s policymakers. Next, it explores how these challenges have been dealt with by Russia in the post-2014 context, paying special attention to developments in the field of military technology and how President Putin has taken advantage of these to address questions of strategic balance. Finally, the brief sets out the strategic implications for Norway, as NATO’s representative in this northern corner and Russia’s direct neighbour.
Topic:: Development, Military Affairs, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia and Norway

31. The Geostrategic Arctic: Hard security in the High North

Author:: Harri Mikkola
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The end of the Cold War meant that the Arctic region lost most of its geostrategic relevance. However, due to growing great power competition, the Arctic is back on the geopolitical map. Hard security dynamics in the region are defined by two key elements: the importance of conventional long-range missiles and nuclear weapons for Russia, and the importance of the North Atlantic sea line of communication for European defence. Russia has revitalized its Cold War-era bastion strategy, which aims to ensure the survival of its strategic ballistic missile submarines. In a crisis scenario, this strategy could pose serious challenges to the Nordic countries as well. Five Arctic states are members of NATO and the Alliance’s collective defence is operational in the Arctic. Even if the Arctic is still not a focus area for NATO, the North Atlantic maritime domain is increasingly back on the agenda. Given the divergent strategic interests and lack of common ground between Russia and other Arctic states on grand strategic issues, the Arctic will not be losing its geostrategic importance anytime soon.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, Canada, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Arctic

32. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Great Power Competition

Author:: Christopher C. Harmon, T. J. Linzy, Jack Vahram Kalpakian, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Ryan Burke, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, Zsofia Budai, Kevin Johnston, Blagovest Tashev, Michael Purcell, David McLaughlin, Kashish Parpiani, Daniel De Wit, and Timothy Chess
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In this issue of MCU Journal, the authors discuss various concepts of power and great power competition. For generations, scholars have debated changes in power and how that evolution could potentially impact the United States, its allies, and those hovering on the edge of greatness in whatever form that may take. The concept of power has taken on many meanings as the character of warfare has adapted to the time—hard power, soft power, sea power, airpower, space power, great power, combat power, etc. So how do we define such an abstract concept as power? The Department of Defense (DOD) defines combat power as “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” Clearly, power must be projected; and for our purposes, that means an entity has the “ability . . . to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”
Topic:: Security, NATO, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Migration, History, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Navy, Populism, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, Geography, Ottoman Empire, Information Technology, and Clash of Civilizations
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Sudan, India, Norway, Asia, France, North America, Egypt, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

33. Intensifying Great Power Politics in the Arctic - Point of Consideration by the Kingdom of Denmark: From an analysis of assessments and strategies in Finland, Norway and Iceland

Author:: Mikkel Runge Olesen and Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Arctic is increasingly becoming a region marked by great power competition between the US, Russia and China. This has caused trouble for the Nordic countries in the Arctic, who has had to handle and defuse both potential tensions with both Russia and China, and at the same manage relations with the US – their great power protector – whose new approach to the Artic now openly focuses on Russian and China as strategic competitors in the Arctic. Building on interviews, official documents and the existing literature, this report looks into the experiences from Finland, Norway and Iceland in dealing with this dilemma with the aim of identifying points for consideration by Denmark.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Power Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Arctic

34. Military Offensive Cyber-Capabilities: Small-State Perspectives

Author:: Lilly Pijnenburg Muller
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This Policy Brief provides an overview of the military cyber-defence strategies and capabilities of Norway and of the Netherlands. Comparison of the two different approaches offers insights into their differing tactics and future policy directions. The Brief contributes with a small-state perspective on this malleable and constantly changing field, nuancing the hitherto US-centred debate on the utility and need for deterrence and defence in cyberspace.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Norway, Netherlands, and United States of America

35. Can a Country Save Too Much? The Case of Norway

Author:: Joseph Gagnon
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Many countries have squandered their natural resource endowments. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank routinely hector developing economies to save and invest more of their revenues from resources such as oil and gold for the benefit of future generations after the resources run out. But, can a country save too much of its resource revenues? Gagnon argues that since the first capital transfers to its Government Pension Fund Global in 1996, Norway has saved more than was needed to raise consumption of all generations equally. Norway’s excess saving imposes a cost on the rest of the world during periods of weak aggregate demand and ultralow interest rates. Gagnon proposes a counterfactual saving policy that would have increased Norway’s household consumption by nearly 9 percent on average from 1996 through 2017. The proposed policy would have reduced Norway’s current account surplus by more than one-third, or $13 billion per year on average, from 1996 through 2017. Even now, Norway could raise current consumption by more than US$2,000 per capita, while keeping the contribution of oil wealth to future generations equally large.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Norway

36. Melting Arctic: Implications for the Twenty-First Century

Author:: Ziad Al Achkar
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: The Arctic region has not traditionally been the focus of international politics and world economics; however, recently environmental scientists have flooded the news with the effects of global warming in the region concerning the significant melting ice caps, dramatic ecological degradation, and potential irreversible loss of many species. Climate change is manifesting around the world through floods, ecological degradation, and potentially driving violence and conflict; in the Arctic, all these risks are compounded. The nature of the Arctic pole means that what will happen in the region is guaranteed to have an impact elsewhere. While environmentalists have sounded the alarm about the risks to the environment in the region, there is an ever-growing security danger that faces the Arctic. With ice caps melting and retreating to unprecedented levels, the arctic seabed is now open for nations to explore its reported vast amount of natural resources. This article will identify issues that will shape the twenty-first century of the Arctic. The scope of the article is not meant to be exhaustive of the problems and challenges but offer a thematic overview of the problems. There are three broad categories covered in this article. First, an overview of the changing climate, its ecological and environmental impact, and the challenges of operating in the Arctic. Second, an overview of the economics and international law implications that are a result of climate change and of increased activity in the region. Third, the geopolitics of the Arctic region.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, International Law, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

37. The Arctic Railway and the Sámi: Reconciling national interests with indigenous rights

Author:: Agne Cepinsktye
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Finland and Norway are planning to build the Arctic Railway, stretching from Rovaniemi to Kirkenes through the homeland of the indigenous Sámi people. The state governments have acknowledged their duty to consult with the Sámi, whose culture and livelihoods the railway would affect, but the Sámi have dismissed the consultation efforts thus far as inadequate and have denounced the project. The dispute has exposed the ambiguity of the state’s duty to consult with indigenous peoples: international law firmly establishes the duty but does not prescribe specific rules for carrying it out. In Norway, the domestic regulatory framework concerning the consultation duty is more evolved and the practice of implementation is more consistent than in Finland, but both states still lack an effective legal incorporation of the duty. Despite the ambiguity, the scope of the consultation duty is determined by its purpose: creating favourable conditions to reduce power disparity between the state and indigenous peoples in order to reach an agreement that reconciles national interests with indigenous rights.
Topic:: Human Rights, Regional Cooperation, Indigenous, Transportation, and Railways
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Norway, and Arctic

38. The "Moving Geography": Why are Scandinavian countries increasingly interested in the Middle East?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The dynamics of the Middle East region have gained special attention from the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark) over the past years. There are numerous indicators for this rising level of interest. The most prominent of which are the establishment of institutes for dialogue and cooperation, launching programs for the Danish-Arab partnership, opening Middle East studies center in a Swedish university, and hosting a new round of dialogue for the parties to the Yemeni conflict. Other indicators include providing funds to support future local elections in Libya, supporting non-governmental organizations aimed at assisting internal displaced persons and refugees through local integration or resettlement, and increasing financial incentives for refugees, who return to their home countries. There are various motives behind the Scandinavian interest in the region, including curbing refugee flows, preventing terrorist attacks, containing the threat of extremism, and confronting the Iranian threat.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Neutrality
Political Geography:: Middle East, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Scandinavia

39. How the New Cold War travelled North (Part II) Interaction between Norway and Russia

Author:: Julie Wilhelmsen and Kristian Lundby Gjerde
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This policy brief examines changing Russian and Norwegian approaches to each other in the period 2012–2016, and discusses how the “New Cold War” spread to the North. This is an intriguing question, since both parties had initially stated that, despite the overall worsening of Russia–West relations following the crises in Ukraine, the North should be protected as a space for peaceful interaction. To address this question, watching and tracking the changing patterns of Russian exercises and military modernization is not enough; understanding the rise in tensions requires studying the effects of the interactions underway between the parties in this region. Three interaction effects need to be taken into consideration in explaining why the tense relations following the conflict in Ukraine spread to the low-tension Northern theatre. In this, we stress the interactive dynamics that ensues when two parties start to view each other as threats, interpreting new moves by the other as expressions of hostile intent. Further, we explain the observed New Cold War “contamination” with reference to domestic policy agendas and practices of decision-making. On both the Norwegian and the Russian sides, the new military posturing in the North, now interpreted as part of a growing conflict, has emerged partly as a side-effect of implementing what actually were longstanding national goals.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Norway, and Arctic

40. After Crimea: The future of Nordic Defence Cooperation

Author:: Karsten Friis and Håkon Lunde Saxi
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was originally about cost-effectiveness. The Nordic states sought to work together when training and educating their soldiers, procuring new equipment, and logistically supporting their forces. Faced with a relevantly benign security situation at home, with Russia regarded in principle as a partner, operational military cooperation was primarily about expeditionary operations far from northern Europe. Even if NORDEFCO never became the beacon of Nordic cooperation that some political speeches sought to paint it as, it nonetheless provided the Nordics with a flexible and non-bureaucratic framework through which various forms of defence cooperation could be pursued. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the subsequent deterioration of Western-Russian relations, changed this. NORDEFCO today is much more about meeting pressing security challenges in the Nordic region. This policy brief explores the potential for further Nordic cooperation. What are the opportunities and constraints? The study is primarily based on seven recent interviews with civilian and military officials, as well discussions with independent security scholars, from all the Nordic countries except Iceland.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Norway, Nordic Nations, and Crimea

41. Wielding influence in a new governance architecture: Norway, the G20 and the 2030 Agenda

Author:: Ole Jacob Sending and Joachim Nahem
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The G20 is by dint of its membership – the 20 largest economies in the world – an important decision-making body. Moreover, the challenges currently facing established inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) arguably make the G20 even more important. The G20 is perceived as agile, effective and powerful whereas established IGOs – such as the UN and the World Bank - appear to be bogged down by overly bureaucratic rules, organizational inertia, and a lack of resources to fulfil their mandates. This was on display when the G20 convened in Washington DC during the global financial crisis, and its swift actions, in all likelihood, prevented a more severe global crisis.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, G20, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

42. Democratic Civilian Control over the Security Sector: Comparative Legal Documents

Author:: Philipp H. Fluri and Valentyn Badrack
Publication Date:: 04-2016
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Razumkov Centre
Abstract:: This publication provides a broad range of examples of national legislation as well as international conventions and instruments related to the democratic oversight of the security sector. The product is designed for stakeholders’ easy reference, be they civil society, democratic institutions, government or the security sector itself. Examples are supplied from, among others, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Norway, Poland and Switzerland.
Topic:: Security, Democracy, Legislation, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Canada, Norway, France, Poland, Bulgaria, and Switzerland

43. Cyber Defense: An International View

Author:: Kim Hartmann and Keir Giles
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: An overview of four different national approaches to cyber defense are discussed: those of Norway, Estonia, Germany and Sweden. While providing a useful guide for engagement with the relevant governmental and other organizations in each of these countries, the Paper also compares and contrasts the advantages and drawbacks of each national approach.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Governance, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Norway, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

44. How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany and the Emergence of Human Rights-Sensitive State Ownership Function

Author:: Mikko Rajavuori
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Abstract:: State ownership is thriving. Emerging economies are extending their growing economic power outward through sovereign wealth funds. State-owned multinationals have become top sources of foreign direct investment. Bailouts have recreated powerful state ownership structures in regions where private ownership has traditionally prevailed. The state is back – in shareholder capacity. Approaching the rise of state ownership from a human rights perspective, this article submits that a new conceptualization of state ownership function is emerging. State ownership provides a strong link connecting corporate actions with the international human rights system. Yet the conventional methods used to integrate state ownership in human rights treaty bodies’ discretion seem unable to grasp the changing economic role of governments in the global economy. The article suggests that the notion of the ‘public shareholder’, introduced by the European Court of Human Rights in Heinisch v. Germany (2011), provides a useful lens for interrogating how states should govern the human rights performance of corporations through ownership. When exposed to the recent practice of a range of United Nations treaty bodies, internationalizing state ownership activity becomes framed in human rights terms. In this vision, the whole ownership function becomes a site for turning companies in the state’s portfolio into responsible corporate citizens who take the impact of human rights seriously. Specifically, treaty bodies should advise states to seek human rights governance through private mechanisms in the capacity of the shareholder. In the process, human rights’ checks and balances should constitute a counterweight for market-based initiatives that regulate state activity in the capacity of the shareholder.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Treaties and Agreements, Foreign Direct Investment, Economies, and Courts
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, and Germany

45. When the generation gap collides with military structure: The case of the Norwegian cyber officers

Author:: Hanne Eggen Roislien
Publication Date:: 12-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: As the military integrates cyber into its structures, gradually more nations are recruiting and educating personnel to serve as "cyber officers". Tech-savvy men and women from ‘Generation Y’ grew up in the post-modern era, recognized not only by its individualism and erosion of overarching, coherent maxims, but also by the fact that technology is taken for granted. Thus, in the situation of the cyber officer a particular generation gap occurs, one in which the characteristics of postmodernity, military command structures and the inter-disciplinarity of cyber pull in conflicting directions. This friction creates a peculiar situation as technology and cyber contribute to sharpen the generation gap that necessarily exists between the young generation of cyber officers, and their superiors in the military. I explore this quandary through an examination of cyber officers’ testimonies. In particular, I focus on the cyber officers’ conceptualization of “cyber” and how this resonates with that of their superiors’. The data is ethnographic, based on interviews with cyber officer students at the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe, Norway, Northern Europe, and Scandinavia

46. A Useful Pause in Arctic Drilling

Author:: Bruce M. Everett
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Until last year, drilling for oil in the Arctic was the subject of considerable discussion focused not only on the potential impacts of Arctic resources on the oil market, but also on the environmental and geopolitical implications of opening this area to development. Prospects for Arctic drilling dimmed considerably in 2015 when Shell decided to abandon its ambitious drilling efforts in the Burger Field in the Chukchi Sea, writing off several billion dollars in the process. The recent collapse in oil prices has probably put a stop to Arctic drilling for the time being, and this pause may prove useful in resolving some of the outstanding issues.
Topic:: Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, United States of America, and Oceans

47. AUra's Openings

Author:: Anna Tsing
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: AURA: Aarhus University Research on the Anthropocene
Abstract:: This opening essay has two purposes: first, to offer a small introduction to the papers by Lien, Swanson and myself that follow; and, second, to introduce Aarhus University Research on the Anthropocene (AURA) as a program for studying human-disturbed landscapes. I am in debt to Lien and Swanson for showing me catachresis as a feature of Anthropocene research. Catachresis helps me as I grope for language to describe AURA as an impossible program: a program dedicated to confusing disciplinary boundaries and to describing the challenges of life within the ruins created by modernization’s vast “improvements.” Following their guidance, I allow salmon to lead the way, saving AURA and landlocked landscapes for the sections that come after. Consider Swanson’s description of the strange Hokkaido device called an “Indian water wheel.” Hokkaido fisheries expert Ito Kazutaka visited Oregon’s Columbia River in 1886 and observed water wheels used to capture salmon; when he returned home, he combined the American technologies he noted with a Honshu-style (i.e., central Japanese rather than Hokkaido-based) fishing weir to create what he called the Indian water wheel. And what was “Indian” about this hybrid? Ito meant Native American, unselfconsciously commemorating the indigenous people whose access to salmon was interrupted by frontier-conquest technologies such as the water wheel. Certainly, “Indian” is catachresis. It usefully makes us pause. Japanese salmon are enacted in historically shifting hybrids of U.S. and Japanese frontier technologies recalled through the indigenous displacement they have in common. (In this regard, it seems useful to note that the water wheel was eventually outlawed in Oregon because it also killed off too many salmon.) Inappropriate language appropriately startles us. Connection, comparison, and displacement are wound together in forging modes of being both human and salmon; this is the condition of our times.
Topic:: Environment, Water, Fishing, and Anthropocene
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS