Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography North America

381. The Rwandan Genocide Revisited

Author:
Robert E. Gribbin
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
Twenty-five years ago, in April 1994, the havoc of genocide visited Rwanda. In a three-month-long paroxysm of violence, almost a million souls died. The country was devastated, the remaining population cowed, government non-existent, and the economy in shambles. Twenty-five years ago, in April 1994, the havoc of genocide visited Rwanda. In a three-month-long paroxysm of violence, almost a million souls died. The country was devastated, the remaining population cowed, government non-existent, and the economy in shambles.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Ethnic Conflict, Genocide, Politics, History, Peacekeeping, Refugees, and Memory
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, Tanzania, North America, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic, United States of America, and Zaire

382. Challenges Technologies Pose to U.S.-Russia Arms Control: A Conversation with Dr. Heather Williams

Author:
Fletcher Security Review Staff and Heather Williams
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Dr. Heather Williams is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department and Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. She also does research for the Institute for Defense Analyses on Strategy, Forces, and Resources, and previously was a Research Fellow at Chatham House. Williams received her doctorate from King’s College London for her dissertation on U.S.-Russia arms control from 1968-2010.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

383. The Intelligence Cycle of Targeted Killing in the United States

Author:
Christine Sixta Rinehart
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States has been using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to assassinate terrorist targets since its first RPA strike on November 3, 2002, when a U.S. Predator fired a hellfire missile at a car traveling through the Mar’ib province of Yemen. The intelligence cycle of this targeted killing process is murky at best, and the policy has changed throughout the successive administrations of U.S. presidents. Details exist but there is no defined tangible chain of analysis concerning the selection of the target, the monitoring of the target, and finally, the assassination of the target. This paper attempts to elucidate the intelligence chain of analysis concerning American targeted killing and examine how the intelligence cycle of targeted killing varies through successive presidential administrations. ​ This paper will begin with a short analysis of relevant literature, although sources concerning this topic are scarce. The occurrence of targeted killings of U.S. citizens will also be explained in the literature section. The paper will continue with an elaboration of a generic intelligence cycle model, which will be used to illustrate the intelligence cycle of U.S. targeted killings using both the Reaper and the Predator RPA.[1] The paper will then address differences in the intelligence cycles and processes that have occurred between successive presidents since targeted killing first began in 2002 with President George W. Bush. Lastly, the paper will provide policy prescriptions in reference to improving targeted killing in the Middle East and Africa...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Drones, and Targeted Killing
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

384. The Need for Countries to Establish Robust and Transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Processes

Author:
Sharon Bradford Franklin
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 2017, leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community warned that “more than 30 nations are developing offensive cyberattack capabilities.”1 This means that more than 30 countries may be conducting hacking operations as a method for surveillance, disruption, or destruction. Unregulated cyber surveillance and cyberattacks by government actors can pose risks not only to a government’s foreign adversaries, but also to its own citizens. Thus, as the United States and other nations work to enhance their own offensive cyber capabilities, as well as to develop strategies to defend against potential attacks, it is critical that these countries establish legal regimes to govern such conduct in cyberspace. Although Germany has established a legal framework to regulate government hacking activities,[2] few countries have done so.[3] ​ To bring government hacking operations within the rule of law, a crucial step is to design rules regarding the management of vulnerabilities that governments discover or acquire. As with other cyber actors, when governments conduct hacking operations, this frequently involves exploiting vulnerabilities in computer hardware and software systems. But these same flaws can also be manipulated by a government’s foreign adversaries or other malicious actors. Therefore, when countries consider their abilities to rely on hacking as an investigative tool, as well as their interests in exploiting vulnerabilities for military and intelligence operations, they must also evaluate the capacity of information and communications technology providers to repair bugs and protect the cybersecurity of all users. Determining whether to exploit a vulnerability or disclose it to a vendor for patching involves balancing a variety of different security concerns against each other. ​ Some countries have made progress in formalizing the rules for making these decisions and in publicizing these rules to promote public accountability. In November 2017, the United States released a charter governing its Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP), which outlines how the U.S. government weighs the various competing equities.[4] The charter delineates which components of the government will participate in determinations regarding whether to disclose or retain each newly discovered vulnerability, and it sets forth the criteria to be used and the process to be followed in making such assessments. One year later, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its Equities Process, which follows a similar approach.5 Most recently, in March 2019, Australia released its “Responsible Release Principles for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities,”[6] and Germany is currently working to develop a VEP and is expected to make information about its process public in early 2019.[7] However, as described below, the VEP procedures revealed to date need further improvement,[8] and most of the nations with offensive cyber capabilities have not developed—or at least have not announced—any such framework...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

385. The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age by David Sanger

Author:
David Sanger and Travis Frederick
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger argues that the nature of global power itself is undergoing dramatic changes, brought about by the proliferation of highly advanced cyber capabilities. Today, internet access is nearly ubiquitous, the cost of entry is low, and, particularly in the domain of cyberwarfare, there is one fundamental fact: offensive capabilities have critically outpaced cyber defenses. A weak and impoverished nation like North Korea can hold large swaths of public and private infrastructure in America at risk, steal military OpPlans, and pilfer millions of dollars from foreign banks. A Kremlin reeling from sanctions, low oil prices, and historically low public trust is able to threaten the very foundations of American democracy through targeted social media campaigns and hacking and leaking the emails of a major political party. But while the offensive advantage has given weaker powers greater capacity to pursue their geopolitical objectives, U.S. leadership has found that their response options have not similarly benefitted. America’s offensive cyber prowess so exceeds its own defensive capabilities that officials often hesitate to strike back for fear of establishing norms of retaliation against vulnerable infrastructure or inciting unintended escalation. Sanger argues that without an open public debate among government policy makers, military planners, and academics to coordinate a grand strategy, the United States will be forced to accept a world of constant cyberattacks, limited response options, and the greater risk of capitulating to foreign coercion...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Book Review
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

386. Resilient Power: A New Model for Grid Security

Author:
Lewis Milford and Samantha Donalds
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In the last few years, Washington has been preoccupied with a debate about the security of the nation’s electric grid. The debate is as old as the grid itself: as electrification has come to drive all commerce and government, making it a key element of the country’s national security, what is the best way to protect the grid from terrorist, weather, or cyber-related threats or attacks? ​ As with most things of a political nature, where you stand depends on where you sit. ​ Proponents of coal, oil, and nuclear make the argument that traditional large-scale power plants are not only vital to grid stability, but also that this centralized generation model is the only economically or techno- logically feasible option.[1] It’s an old argument wrapped in new national security rhetoric, and it’s increasingly straining against the facts. More and more analysis and real-life examples show that distributed renewable energy, combined with energy storage technologies, can provide reliable power more affordably and reliably than the centralized generation alternatives...
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, and Electricity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

387. China Global Security Tracker, No.5

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Presenting China as a 'responsible power' – Beijing releases first major defense white paper in four years
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Europe, Canada, Taiwan, France, and North America

388. What North Korea’s Push for Economic Development Means for Human Rights

Author:
Bradley O. Babson
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since his first-annual New Year’s speech in 2012 setting North Korea’s policy priorities, Kim Jong Un has emphasized his commitment to economic development, notably promising his people that they will never have to tighten their belts again. The Byunjin policy of equally prioritizing economic development and security through nuclear and missile programs reflects Kim’s desire to assure regime stability by delivering broad-based economic development while establishing a security environment that deters external threats and potential domestic unrest. While United States policy has used sanctions and other pressures to stymie Kim’s ambitions, the Kim regime has nonetheless modestly furthered economic development and significantly advanced security through its nuclear and missile testing programs.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, Human Rights, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

389. Funding Defence for the Age of Accelerations

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
At a time when even large, high-tech Silicon Valley corporations that operate as market disruptors are challenged to keep up with the pace of change, national Western governments need to ensure that defence funding is responsive to persistent, dramatic and non-linear shifts in the international strategic environment. The United States is experiencing a “deepening crisis of credibility in global affairs”,2 largely resulting from an America-first posture, rather than a multilateral approach with traditional allies. Some nations now view the U.S. as “undermining the international order”,3 and reliance on the U.S. as the leading democratic nation is less certain. Indeed, periods of great economic change “driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact on social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states”,4 create a dynamic that shifts power, influence and trade among nations. Further, nations that can “develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively”5 can gain a comparative advantage in the current security environment, where the rate of technological change is accelerating. However, with adversaries advancing their military technology in increasingly shorter cycles, market dominance by Western defence firms has only fleeting or transitory advantage. The revolution in military technology has been a constant topic for analysts, but the changing military and defence department skill sets required in the future security environment are equally important, with the cyber-realm and space being two prominent examples.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

390. Making the Best of US Withdrawal from Syria

Author:
Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Given Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel must employ focused, operative rhetoric and policy versus the strategic threats it faces.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

391. Monetizing The Linchpin: Trump's Foreign Policy versus the U.S.-Korea Alliance's Value to Washington

Author:
Kyle Ferrier
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s increased emphasis on the cost of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has called into question its appreciation of Seoul’s contributions and raised concerns about the future of the relationship. Amid this uncertainty, this paper highlights key, yet underappreciated benefits that Washington receives from a strong alliance with Seoul. The cost-centric approach being applied to the U.S.-South Korea relationship follows an overarching trend in U.S. foreign policy under Trump, which the paper terms as “trading intangibles for tangibles.” In effect, the White House greatly underestimates the intangible value of longstanding U.S. foreign policy norms, often leveraging them—and in doing so, undermining them—in favor of short-term economic gains. Though intrinsically more difficult to quantify in dollars, intangible aspects of U.S. foreign policy have much greater financial and economic value to the United States. Consequently, and counterproductively, the Trump administration’s approach may actually prove to challenge the U.S. financially, even in areas where the economy isn’t directly involved, such as the U.S. alliance system. In the case of South Korea, Washington is putting its alliance credibility—consisting of deterrence against Pyongyang and assurance with Seoul—on the line by attempting to extract major financial concessions from Seoul, chiefly through military burden-sharing negotiations. The annual $5 billion contribution the U.S. is reportedly asking South Korea to agree to by the end of the year is a steep jump from the just under $1 billion Seoul agreed to earlier in the year. However, this annual $5 billion is dwarfed by what strong alliance credibility with Seoul provides Washington, which is at risk from the Trump administration’s intensified focus on cost. Still, the challenge remains that the nature of these benefits makes them difficult to quantify in dollars. To bridge this gap, the paper recontextualizes existing monetary figures across an array of areas to illustrate a baseline value of the key security benefits Washington enjoys through a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance—essentially, “tangibilizing” the intangibles. Though the actual list of benefits is far more expansive, the three explored in the paper are: preventing the return of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, fostering foreign policy convergence on the Korean Peninsula, and supporting common values in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

392. Recent U.S. and International Assessment of Baltic Security Developments

Author:
Bert Chapman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Objectives: Examining analysis of Baltic security developments from U.S. government and military resources, scholarly journal articles, and multinational public policy research institute assessments. Methods: Analyzing content and rhetoric within these resources to learn how those producing these materials view Baltic security developments and their viewpoints on how the U.S. and its allies should respond to these developments focusing on increasing Russian regional assertiveness. Results: Provides interpretations of Baltic security developments, Russian Baltic policy, and U.S. and NATO responses ot these developments in materials produced by U.S. civilian and military policymakers and multinational scholarly analysis. Includes performance assessments of U.S. programs including the European Deterrence Initiative and potential Russian military activity in the Baltics as reflected in varying reports by the U.S. Government, military, and multinational public policy research institutions. Conclusions: Recommends U.S. and NATO countries recognize a new Cold War exists with a revisionist Russia. Advocates continuing NATO military exercise, upgrading civilian and military infrastructure protection, and enhancing U.S. and allied preparedness. Urges ongoing and candid dialogue between NATO and Russia to keep this situation from erupting into war. Insists the U.S. and its allies adroitly respond to Russian attempts to influence and manipulate public opinion toward Moscow. Expresses concern that U.S. partisan division over 2016 Russian interference in U.S. presidential election makes achieving greater Baltic policy cohesion difficult. Advocates warning Russia of devastating consequences of attempts to militarily invade or subvert Baltic countries.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

393. The royal military college of Canada: Responding to the call for change

Author:
Harry J. Kowal
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) has a very proud history of producing quality officers for over 140 years, delivering excellence in education, research and military training that is responsive to the needs of Canada, the Defence community and the ever-changing global security environment. RMC is unique as it is a military unit that is also a recognized university. The primary mission of RMC is to support the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) by educating, developing and inspiring bilingual and fit, ethical leaders to serve the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Canada with distinction. Since RMC opened its doors in 1876 to the fi rst 18 cadets, there have been a number of studies that have examined the RMC program and that have been the catalyst for positive change. T ese pivotal moments in history have been indispensable for RMC to remain relevant and continually improve. Of late, there has been a significant amount of attention placed on RMC again, defi ning another pivotal moment in RMC’s history that has become the catalyst for change once again. In October 2016, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Jonathan Vance, initiated a Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV) to ensure the high standards expected of RMC are upheld and the Auditor General (AG) of Canada, Mr. Michael Ferguson, completed an audit of the ROTP at RMC, the results of which were presented to Parliament in November 2017. Many changes are already in place, but there is more work to do. With a look at governance, the four-pillar program and the call for change, this paper outlines what steps RMC has and will be taken to posture this ‘university with a difference’ for success for years to come.
Topic:
Security, Education, Armed Forces, Training, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

394. WHAT GAME OF THRONES CAN TELL US ABOUT RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Author:
Betcy Jose and Christoph Stefjes
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
White House National Security Advisor John Bolton recently declared, “In this administration, we’re not afraid to use the phrase ‘Monroe Doctrine.’” The Monroe Doctrine harkens back 200 years to a policy that captures the idea that a hegemonic power holds dominion over a particular geographic region—its sphere of influence—where it serves as the sole arbitrator of the rules of the game. Bolton likely referred to the doctrine’s Roosevelt corollary where, “the United States was justified in exercising ‘international police power’ when there was unrest in Latin America.” In explicitly referencing this doctrine from the past, Bolton seemingly took a page from the playbook of the Game of Thrones’s (GoT) Night King, bringing back to life things once considered dead. As President Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “’The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over. The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states.’”
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, United Nations, and International Order
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

395. After the West? A Positive Transatlantic Agenda in a Post-Atlantic Age

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The golden age of transatlantic relations is behind us. It is tempting to reduce the reasons for this change down to the personalities of the leaders involved, and particularly to the peculiarities of U.S. President Donald Trump, but such an approach would ignore the deeper trends that have been affecting both the European and American sides for years. The relationship between the United States and Europe does not have the centrality it once had for policymakers on either side, and matters ever less to their publics. Part of the reason for the diminution of the relationship’s importance should be cause for celebration: the main strategic adversary that justified America’s deep commitment to the European continent—the Soviet Union (USSR)—has collapsed. Despite divisions and setbacks, most of Europe is reunited and the past two decades have seen a tremendous expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to new members. The Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas have given new impetus to NATO and underscored the willingness of allies to stand together. Setbacks in the rule of law in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and divisions over the management of the Eurozone and the refugee crisis, should not obscure the tremendous success the last three decades have seen for the transatlantic alliance and European unity. Yet there is much that is sobering in the current diminution of ties and cooperation. Other challenges and threats have emerged to demand attention: terrorism, instability in the Middle East, and the rise of China all present new challenges. The financial crisis and failed foreign interventions have fueled skepticism over the role of the United States on the international stage. Internal divisions in Europe and the euro crises have turned European attention inward even as the past two American presidents have pressed Europeans to do more externally and spend more on their own security. Leaders on both sides have pursued different priorities, occasionally differing in their worldviews. The American withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) on May 8th has sparked yet another “crisis of transatlantic relations,” but focusing on specific decisions obscures the deeper trends. Successive American presidents have paid but lip service to their European allies in making decisions beyond the transatlantic sphere and examples of potential cooperation on crises such as Libya or Syria have ended in failure.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

396. La crítica neoconservadora a la política exterior de Donald Trump

Author:
Manuel Iglesias Cavicchioli
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Si los neoconservadores se significaron por su obstinada y radical oposición a la política exterior de Barack Obama, su crítica al desempeño presidencial de Donald Trump no puede decirse que sea de menor entidad. Los neoconservadores consideran que la irrupción política del magnate supone una amenaza para la democracia americana, implicando, asimismo, una deriva de importante calado en el seno del Partido Republicano. A partir de un análisis comparativo entre las ideas fundamentales del ‘trumpismo’ y del neoconservadurismo, este artículo se centrará en estudiar cómo, según la visión neoconservadora, la ‘America First’ foreign policy, al claudicar de las responsabilidades globales de los Estados Unidos, pone en peligro el orden mundial liberal y, en última instancia, la seguridad americana y la seguridad internacional. Finalmente, se prestará atención a la existencia de ciertas coincidencias entre Trump y los neoconservadores y se valorará la posibilidad de una relativa influencia neoconservadora en determinados ámbitos de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, and Neoconservatism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

397. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Peace
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

398. Doubling Down on the U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Olympics Diplomacy Did Not Breach Trust, but TrumpMoon Confidence Is in Jeopardy

Author:
Leif-Eric Easley
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-ROK alliance faced a quickening pace of North Korean provocations in 2016-17, with Pyongyang violating UN Security Council resolutions dozens of times. Those violations included a fourth nuclear test in January 2016, fifth in September 2016, and sixth in September 2017, as well as numerous missile tests of various trajectories from different platforms. North Korea tested intermediate-range missiles overflying Japan and missiles of intercontinental range on lofted trajectories, while developing road-mobile and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. As policymakers in Seoul and Washington coordinated responses to those provocations, changes in national leadership and domestic political preferences brought into question the bilateral trust the alliance needs to deter conflict, reassure publics, and promote regional cooperation. Elections have consequences, even before votes are cast. Enduring international security alliances are based on shared national interests and a track record of diplomatic commitments and military cooperation. For allies with highly integrated defense policies, such as the United States and South Korea, it is natural for policymakers and citizens to keenly observe the national elections of the other country. Will the next government be a reliable partner, or will it fail to honor existing agreements? Will the incoming leadership improve relations, or will it downgrade cooperation? These questions were being asked before Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in were elected. The search for answers inevitably involves speculation, feeding expectations that are often overly optimistic or pessimistic. Ahead of Trump’s election, his campaign rhetoric questioned the terms and intrinsic value of the alliance to an extent not seen since Jimmy Carter’s 1976 campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. President Moon came to power on the heels of conservative president Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal for corruption. Moon’s politics are notably more progressive than Park’s or Trump’s, including a record of pro-engagement policies toward North Korea. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un delivered his 2018 New Year’s Day address claiming that North Korea has the ability to hit any U.S. city with a nuclear-armed missile, but that Pyongyang is ready to re-engage Seoul via participation in the Winter Olympics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Alliance, Olympics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

399. A Way Out of the North Korean Labyrinth

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The sudden announcement of a North Korea-U.S. summit in March 2018 upended all previous diplomacy concerning North Korea’s nuclear program. In return for a bilateral presidential summit, Pyongyang has agreed to suspend testing of its nuclear and missile programs and accepted the continuation of scheduled U.S.-South Korea exercises as planned. While this unexpected development reduces tensions and opens up a political path to a solution on the Korean Peninsula, it also imparts increased urgency for a well-conceived U.S. diplomatic strategy so that the summit and any ensuing negotiations lead to positive outcomes for Washington and Seoul and the other interested parties, thus ensuring its sustainability. In this context, the author advances an assessment of the current situation and a proposal for a U.S. program that could reduce military tensions in and around Korea, lead to the stabilization of a new and legitimate equilibrium in Northeast Asia, and advance shared American, South Korean, and Japanese objectives.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

400. Russia’s hybrid warfare in the form of its energy manoeuvers against Europe: how the EU and NATO can respond together?

Author:
Vira Ratsiborynksa
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO continues evolving and adapting to new security challenges and threats coming from the East and the South. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 the member states of the Alliance reaffi rmed their commitments on the core purposes of the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Th e Warsaw Summit marked a shift from reassurance to deterrence posture sending a signal that the Alliance is ready and is able to meet the challenge of hybrid threats. Th e changing security landscape in the Eastern fl ank reinforces NATO’s need to strengthen its core ‘hard power’ principles as well as update its ‘soft power’ infl uence on issues such as energy security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Energy Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America