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1. US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions

Author:
John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and from Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years. This grim prospect is driven by the United States and China arraying themselves for a strategic rivalry since 2017 through the continuing trade war, economic decoupling, and increasing rhetorical and military positioning for confrontation over Taiwan. In light of the Chinese military’s threatening gestures, belligerent rhetoric, and other recent actions that read like they could be preparation for war, there is a danger that the successive warnings by senior US military commanders that Chinese CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has already decided to use military force in the near term could become the proverbial tail wagging the dog — and could impose a logic that makes a US-China war more likely, rather than enhancing deterrence.1 Therefore, the key question for the United States and its allies is how an increasingly truculent and belligerent Chinese leadership can be incentivized to walk back from the brink. This paper examines what lessons China, the United States, and European allies have drawn from the Ukraine conflict and how such lessons have shaped these actors’ strategic assumptions. It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations for the transatlantic community confronting the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

4. Implications of the Incursions into U.S. and Canadian Airspace

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In the first half of February, a series of serious incidents happened in the airspace of the U.S. and Canada involving shootdowns of four objects, with at least one confirmed as a Chinese balloon, likely used for intelligence. The U.S. administration is conducting an investigation to explain the various platforms, the equipment onboard, and their mission. Because further incidents cannot be excluded, some changes in the rhetoric of the Chinese government should be expected, as well as a higher readiness of air defence networks of the powers.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territory, and Airspace
Political Geography:
China, Canada, North America, and United States of America

5. Towards a Fuzzy World Order: What Role for NATO

Author:
Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Bi-polarity, multi-polarity, the end of globalization, or Cold War v. 2.0. New explanations of world order abound. Often, they are asserted rather than reasoned by pundits looking for their 15 minutes of fame. This paper is much more modest. It eschews grand statements about world order. Rather we demonstrate that the future is far less clear cut and predetermined. Yes, a global binary is emerging around U.S.-China competition, but it is what we describe as fuzzy bifurcation. If our analysis is accurate, then it affects the behavior of other actors differently than a tight bi-polar system. In this paper we look at the implications of a fuzzy bifurcation of world order for that most important of alliances – NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

6. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Author:
Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and North America

7. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

8. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

9. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

10. Buy Before You Build: A Decision Framework for Purchasing Commercial Space Services

Author:
Peter Cunniffe, Megan Lewis, and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A recent wave of private investment in space creates new opportunities for government agencies to benefit from commercial innovation. Leaders of national security space acquisition organizations regularly express their intention to first buy commercial space capabilities and build government space systems only when they must.1 However, achieving greater use of commercial space services requires overcoming barriers that have thus far prevented the government from fully benefiting from private sector funding and creativity. This report assesses the increasingly wide range of commercial space services available to government agencies, identifies obstacles hindering greater use by the US government, and makes recommendations for overcoming them.2 While the report focuses on the US government use of commercial space services, its analysis and recommendations are relevant for governments of other space-faring nations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Space, and Investment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

11. Primer: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Visit to the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While Ukraine, Gaza, and climate change will feature heavily on the agenda during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington, DC, the most important and enduring issue between the two countries is progressing AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) as the key ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) contemporary alliance initiative. If the AUKUS arrangement stalls and fails to have a meaningful impact on the strategic and military balance of power, then America’s regional allies and partners will lose faith that a reinvigorated American-led alliance system can serve as a check on Chinese power. America’s slow progress to reform the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is an immense frustration for Australian and American proponents of AUKUS. However, concerns regarding inadequate investment in the American military industrial base are reasonable and legitimate. Australian defense policy is underfunded and lacks urgency despite defense analysts’ assessment that the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating. Australian underperformance will increase skepticism of AUKUS in both countries. Both countries need to undertake much more detailed scenario planning and commit to the agreed sharing of burdens and responsibilities to deter or defeat China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

12. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

16. Unalone and Unafraid: A Plan for Integrating Uncrewed and Other Emerging Technologies into US Military Forces

Author:
Dan Patt and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
During the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) led global research and development (R&D) and in the process created what are now commonplace technologies, including the internet, precision weapons, and the global positioning system. However, since then the DoD has struggled to incorporate new advancements as initiatives to transform the force or implement a new offset strategy have failed to substantially change the US military’s design or capability development processes. In large part, the DoD’s adoption difficulties result from the center of technological innovation shifting from governments to the private sector, increasingly making the military a technology customer rather than a creator. This is the case with artificial intelligence (AI) and uncrewed systems, which are already upending long-standing approaches to modern warfare. The challenge of integrating these new technologies, many of which are commercially derived, therefore provides a good case study for how the DoD could reform its processes and organizations for innovation. To that end, this study evaluates how the US military could realize more timely development, deployment, and integration of relevant uncrewed systems, and illustrates its proposed methods using examples from the US Navy. The Navy and DoD will need the operational advantages that AI-enabled uncrewed vehicles could offer. Against a resident major power like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US military cannot continue to rely on its historical dominance to deter and defeat aggression. Instead, the DoD will need to attack the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of system destruction warfare by fielding a force that is less predictable, more adaptable, and increasingly resilient. Uncrewed systems could enable such an approach by unlocking the operational innovation of US servicemembers, who could—like their counterparts in Ukraine today—use uncrewed systems to grow the variety of tactics and effects chains that they can employ, which could undermine PLA planning and concepts and afford US forces the capacity to sustain a protracted conflict. The ability of uncrewed systems to provide resilience and adaptability depends on scale. A small fleet of vehicles cannot be simultaneously applied against multiple mission threads or effects chains and will lack the capacity to support extended operations. Uncrewed systems can enable scale by foregoing robust self-defense and focusing on a narrow set of functions to lower their cost and complexity. These limitations will require that uncrewed systems be combined with other uncrewed systems and crewed platforms in systems of systems (SoS), which could exacerbate the US military’s long-standing struggles to integrate forces between and within each service branch. Realizing the benefits of uncrewed systems will therefore demand that the DoD establish routinized processes for integrating new mission threads and SoS. Otherwise, the US military services will only be able to field individual uncrewed systems that replace crewed platforms in existing use cases. US military services are already attempting to improve their ability to integrate SoS through initiatives in experimentation, rapid acquisition, digital interoperability, and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). However, as this report describes for the US Navy, these efforts tend to focus on long-term service objectives rather than near-term operational problems and use a top-down process of systems engineering to guide requirements for future capabilities. This traditional approach assumes that the US military has the time to develop new systems and retains a substantial technological edge over its rivals, but neither condition is likely to endure in the context of the US-PRC competition. To bring uncrewed systems into the force more quickly and gain the resulting operational advantages, the DoD will need to flip its traditional acquisition approach and adapt US military tactics or mission threads so they can integrate uncrewed systems that are available today. This bottom-up method of “mission integration” contrasts with the DoD’s predominant approach of systems engineering and reflects best practices emerging in commercial manufacturing or distribution, where the fastest and most effective way to assimilate robotics is to adjust the organization’s workflow as opposed to developing robots that replace humans in existing workflows.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Emerging Technology, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Avoid a Sequester and Fully Fund a Preeminent Military

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Kennedy Lee
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In early summer 2023, President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling and avert a government default. While compromise is necessary, the deal included caps on overall spending at fiscal 2022 levels and made no exception for national defense. The United States is in the beginning of a tumultuous time: a new cold war with China and Russia. Washington ought to be moving with a great sense of urgency and national purpose to rebuild its defense industrial base (DIB), modernize its nuclear forces to meet the dynamic threats, grow the US Navy, and upgrade critical space systems, among other things. The caps on military spending undermine America’s ability to support its immediate interests in Ukraine and limit its capacity to deter future aggression and expansion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), further violence by China’s junior partner Russia, and rogue action by the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. The debt deal caps US military spending at $886 billion, which may initially appear to be a raise, but effectively flattens the Pentagon budget over the next two years. The dollar amount is 3.2 percent higher than last year’s request and will rise by 1 percent next year for a total of $895 billion in fiscal year 2025. But when accounting for inflation, the cap amounts to a significant cut in real terms over last year’s budget. The projected figures suggest that US defense spending could fall below 3 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since the 1990s’ “peace dividend.” The budget that the Pentagon submitted for this year should be $23 billion higher just to keep pace with the current rate of inflation. This is before factoring in the budget increases necessary to keep up with the evolving threat environment, including an ongoing land war in Europe and a Chinese Communist Party with revanchist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Raising the stakes, the deal also included a provision that triggers an automatic sequester against the budget, including the military: an indiscriminate 1 percent cut if the House and Senate fail to pass 12 annual spending bills by midnight on New Year’s Eve. The military has only now begun to recover from the effects of the sequester that occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Another one now, at a time of acute and immediate threats from multiple adversaries, could have catastrophic effects. Congress would be wise either to urgently amend the bill or to prioritize the imperative of avoiding a second sequester over all other political matters. Then Congress should pass supplemental funding measures to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) has the resources it needs to address the significant shortfalls that already exist and that the Obama-era sequestration only exacerbated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War

Author:
Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Discussions about defense strategy that focus on combat units and fail to account for logistics are irrelevant when it comes to understanding how well the United States can deter or defeat aggression by China or Russia. Planes, ships, and tanks are just weapons systems; making them combat capabilities requires getting them and their crews into the fight; supplying them with fuel, food, water, medical care, and munitions; and keeping them maintained. Logistics, more than the quantity of forces or the quality of technology, will determine the potential combat power available to the United States in future conflict scenarios with China or Russia. It will influence Chinese and Russian decisions about going to war, and when, where, and how to fight. It will bound the military courses of action available to U.S. commanders and delineate the strategic options available to presidents. Despite this critical role, the Department of Defense has systemically underinvested in logistics in terms of money, mental energy, physical assets, and personnel. Neglect of logistics arguably became most severe in the post–Cold War era. Pressure to save money through efficiency and misguided attempts to run the department like a “lean” business disproportionately impacted logistics. Maximizing the ratio of combat “tooth” to logistical “tail” saved money, but at the cost of leaving U.S. armed forces with a logistical system that is stretched thin supporting peacetime operations and wholly unsuited to the demands of warfare with China or Russia. Recognizing U.S. dependence on strained logistics networks, China and Russia have developed means to attack these networks, including long-range missiles and cyberattacks. Barring changes to U.S. logistics and sustainment concepts, such attacks present a grave threat to the department’s ability to uphold U.S. security commitments in East Asia or eastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Logistics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

20. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

Author:
Emily Kilcrease
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

23. Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World

Author:
Maxwell Stewart
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article revisits the 2021 Global Posture Review’s determination for a status quo European force posture in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the poor Russian performance and attrition in the war, and the likely frozen conflict that will emerge, the article lays out the process by which the United States can draw down its permanent presence in Europe to refocus on the Pacific and restructure its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all while maintaining alliance unity. The article has two main recommendations. The first is a time line for a reduced U.S. force posture in Europe from the present to 2035 while placing more emphasis on a European role in NATO leadership. The second is focused on how to maintain strategic flexibility while reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment. It then identifies and provides mitigations for the anticipated risks associated with the recommendations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rebalancing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

24. U.S. Coast Guard Academy Cultural Competence Assessment

Author:
David Chu
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration
Abstract:
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is widely recognized for its six major operational missions: maritime law enforcement, maritime response, maritime prevention, marine transportation system management, maritime security operations, and defense operations. Since 1876, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (the Academy) has served as the one location where USCG officers receive their training. The Academy is an accredited military college granting Bachelor of Science degrees in one of nine engineering or professional majors. Graduates earn a commission as an Ensign in the Coast Guard. The impetus for this report is found in the Coast Guard Academy Improvement Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act of the fiscal year 2021. This legislation called for the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assess the current state of cultural competence (including diversity, equity, and inclusion) of the Coast Guard Academy’s cadets, faculty, and staff. Cultural competence is defined as the ability to understand, appreciate, and interact with people from cultures and belief systems different from one’s own. It encourages the acknowledgment and acceptance of differences in appearance, behavior, and culture. This assessment by a Panel of NAPA Fellows provides actionable recommendations that, when implemented as an integrated whole, will serve to further develop a healthy environment of cultural competence at this critical institution. As a congressionally chartered, independent, non-partisan, and non-profit organization with over 950 distinguished Fellows, NAPA has a unique ability to bring nationally recognized public administration experts together to help government agencies address challenges. I am deeply appreciative of the work of the five NAPA Fellows who served on this Panel and commend the Study Team that contributed valuable insights and expertise throughout the project. We are grateful for the constructive engagement of many USCG and Academy personnel and cadets who provided important observations and context to inform this report. We also thank representatives of the other federal military service academies for their active contributions to this research. Finally, this report has benefited substantially from input offered by many researchers and practitioners in the field of cultural competence, diversity, equity, and inclusion. I trust that this report will be regarded as an encouragement to leaders at the Coast Guard Academy, as it commends many good practices that are already in practice. It should also serve as an actionable guide to putting necessary policy, procedural, and structural elements in place to further develop cultural competence for all. Doing so will further advance the USCG’s compelling mission.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

25. A Call to Action: The Federal Government’s Role in Building a Cybersecurity Workforce for the Nation

Author:
Daniel Chenok and Karen S. Evans
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a significant concern for governments, businesses, universities, service providers, and citizens throughout the country. Ransomware attacks and other cyber intrusions are featured in the news almost daily, and there is a growing demand for cybersecurity workers who can protect the electronic systems that enable so many aspects of our lives and our economy. In recognition of these vulnerabilities, the Academy identified as one of its twelve Grand Challenges in Public Administration the need to Ensure Data Security and Privacy Rights of Individuals. Yet only recently has the federal government begun to bring together key federal and nonfederal actors to address cybersecurity workforce problems. As part of the FY 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security to contract with the National Academy of Public Administration (or a similar organization) to review the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) programs (primarily housed within the Cybersecurity Defense Education and Training [CDET] branch) to build a national cybersecurity workforce. The task was to assess the excellence, scalability, and diversity of select CISA/CDET workforce-development programs and to consider alternative models for building a cyber workforce. Our study Panel of Academy Fellows also looked at additional efforts across the government aimed at ensuring the nation’s cybersecurity workforce needs are being met. The Academy’s Study Team staff performed the research and analysis to inform Panel member analysis and recommendations. I deeply appreciate our Panel members, who provided valuable guidance and introductions to federal and nonfederal leaders in the cybersecurity workforce development field. The views expressed in this report are those of the Panel. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the time and contributions as subject matter experts of Academy Fellows Franklin Reeder, Director Emeritus and Founding Chair, Center for Internet Security, and Ronald Sanders, Staff Director, The Florida Center for Cybersecurity at the University of South Florida. Both went above and beyond to provide information, context, contacts, and other guidance to the Study Team and Panel. Last, but far from least, I appreciate the constructive engagement with CISA leaders and experts— including those in CDET—along with current and former federal officials and numerous private sector leaders in related federal, academic, and private sector fields who contributed to the development of this report. The Panel’s report presents findings and recommendations that support the development of an effective cybersecurity workforce for the government and for the nation. The report acknowledges that this can be done only through strong, ongoing national coordination and leadership reaching across federal agencies and the larger economy. I hope these recommendations help build a more robust and resilient cybersecurity workforce to better support the nation’s long-term security posture and capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Labor Issues, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations: The Restructuring of the Middle East Regional Security

Author:
Devrim Sahin and Ahmet Sözen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper proposes a discussion of its core theoretical argument that the international order is more complex than the theories generated by traditionalist state-centric approaches and critical approaches, including the regional security complex approach. The complexity approach highlights the sensitive dependency of complex systems on the nonlinear feedback loops and dynamic interactions by which the longer term reactions to the behavior of actors could set off actions-reaction spirals. This path dependency is evident in the erosion of U.S.-Turkey relations which is a cause and a consequence of the realignment in the international system and the Middle East regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Defense and Deterrence Against Geo-Economic Coercion What Germany and the EU Can Learn from China and the United States

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The geo-economic conflict between the United States and China as well as uncertainty about America’s longer-term commitment to a liberal and rules-based multilateral order pose risks to Germany’s economic prosperity and national security. The new German government must systematically identify economic dependencies and develop a forward-looking and comprehensive strategy to address vulnerabilities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Deterrence, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
South America and North America

28. US-Philippine Defense Cooperation for Maritime Security

Author:
Jennifer Oreta
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Jennifer Oreta, coordinator of Ateneo Initiative for Southeast Asian Studies, and Asst Prof of the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University Philippines, explains that "[t]he chief maritime security concerns in contemporary Southeast Asia are piracy, terrorism at sea, and China’s seizure of contested islands in the South China Sea."
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and South China Sea

29. Is Ukraine Poised to Join NATO and the European Union?

Author:
Oden Eran and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are more and more voices in the West calling for Kiev’s acceptance into NATO and the European Union. However, this is not the time for rapid measures. Now that Putin has backed himself int a corner, the United States and Europe, in parallel with the harsh sanctions imposed on Russia and the assistance to Ukraine, must leave Moscow a way out
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

30. Achieving a Safer U.S. Nuclear Posture

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• U.S. nuclear posture is on a dangerous path that imperils national security and expends far too many resources. It is not a rational response to external threats but is driven primarily by domestic factors including a hubristic strategy of nuclear supremacy, partisan politics, and entrenched arms lobbies with formidable influence in the Pentagon and Congress. • A safer nuclear policy entails, among other steps, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third, to about 1,000, taking nuclear-armed missiles off hair-trigger alert, embracing no first use or sole purpose doctrines, and requiring an additional senior official to authorize launch. Pacts such as AUKUS that encourage the spread of nuclear weapons technology must also be rethought. • If implemented, these policies will greatly reduce risk while maintaining deterrence; they will also lead to significant savings in the national security budget. A majority of independent experts believe that U.S. national security objectives can be met at far lower levels and with a safer nuclear posture, saving hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades. • Many of these recommendations can be implemented even if the Biden administration’s upcoming Nuclear Posture Review proves disappointing. The president retains substantial policy and budgetary options for reducing the risk of nuclear war and the cost of nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

31. Pathways to Pentagon Spending Reductions: Removing the Obstacles

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Despite the changing security landscape, in which nonmilitary challenges ranging from pandemics to climate change are the gravest threats to the American people, United States security spending continues to focus on the Pentagon at the expense of other agencies and other policy tools. • In December 2021 Congress authorized $768 billion in spending on the Pentagon and related work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy — $25 billion more than the Pentagon asked for, and higher in real terms than peak budgets during the Korean and Vietnam wars and the Reagan buildup of the 1980s. An additional $10 billion in mandatory spending drove the final figure to $778 billion. There are press reports — yet to be officially confirmed by the administration — that the comparable proposal for spending on national defense in the fiscal year 2023 budget could exceed $800 billion.1 • The three main drivers of excessive spending on the Department of Defense are strategic overreach, pork-barrel politics, and corporate lobbying. • An overly ambitious, “cover-the-globe” strategy that favors military primacy and endless war must be replaced with a strategy of restraint that would provide a more-than-sufficient defense while increasing investments in diplomacy, foreign economic development, and other nonmilitary tools of statecraft. • Measures to weaken the influence of the military-industrial complex in the budget process should include prohibiting the armed services from submitting “wish lists” for items that are not in the Pentagon’s official budget request; slowing the “revolving door” between government departments and the weapons industry, and reducing the economic dependence of key communities on Pentagon spending, along with alternative government investments in areas such as infrastructure, green technology, and scientific and public health research.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Spending, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

32. How the United States Should Respond if Russia Invades Ukraine

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
A Russian invasion of Ukraine must come at a high cost to the Kremlin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

33. ¿Un buen aliado? Análisis de la visión estadounidense sobre el rol español en la OTAN

Author:
Juan Tovar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Estados Unidos es el actor más relevante dentro de la OTANy ha condicionado la participación española en la organizacióndesde su ingreso. El artículo analiza desde la perspectiva estadounidense la participación española en la OTAN. Para ello se centra en diferentes factores como serían las declaraciones públicas de los dirigentes estadounidenses en las reuniones bilaterales,la posición de la opinión pública estadounidensey el análisis de diversos objetos de debate como el gasto en defensa, los activos estratégicos españoles, su participación en las diferentes misiones implementadas por la organizacióny la posición española en asuntos y regiones de interéspara Estados Unidos. A pesar de lasdeclaraciones de los líderes estadounidenses sobre el rol españoly la imagen positiva de Españaen la opinión pública estadounidense, se constata un importante margen para su mejora.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Public Opinion, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, North America, and United States of America

34. Keeping Secrets

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans have had a ringside seat at one of the most unusual of presidential shows: President Joe Biden publicly divulging some of our nation’s most protected, secret insights on what Vladimir Putin and his military might be planning. Some have criticized this; most think it has prevented Putin from controlling the war’s narrative. If we are lucky, it could be part of a more important movement toward liberalizing the use and sharing of intelligence. America and its allies could finally be progressing from a vision of war first theorized a hundred years ago. That violent and indiscriminate vision was fully realized with the city-busting aerial attacks of World War II. Ever since, we have believed that being able to decimate a nation’s military, industrial, and demographic capital promises deterrence in peace and quick victories in war. Today, this vision is being slowly supplanted with weaponry and tactics that can target terror precisely, in order to disable nations without decimating them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Classification, and Secrecy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

35. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Military Defence and Security

Author:
Daniel Araya and Meg King
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The twenty-first century is now being shaped by a multipolar system characterized by techno-nationalism and a post-Bretton Woods order. In the face of a rapidly evolving digital era, international cooperation will be critical to ensuring peace and security. Information sharing, expert conferences and multilateral dialogue can help the world’s nation-states and their militaries develop a better understanding of one another’s capabilities and intentions. As a global middle power, Canada could be a major partner in driving this effort. This paper explores the development of military-specific capabilities in the context of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Building on Canadian defence policy, the paper outlines the military applications of AI and the resources needed to manage next-generation military operations, including multilateral engagement and technology governance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

36. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

37. U.S. Defense Posture in the Middle East

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Proponents of a major reduction of forces argue that it is necessary because of growing competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe, a declining U.S. reliance on Gulf oil and gas, a reduced threat from terrorist groups, and a need to focus on diplomacy rather than military force. To inform the debate over the United States’ military presence in the Middle East, this report assesses three posture options for U.S. forces in the region. This report finds that the United States should keep a notable but tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

38. Contested Deployment

Author:
Bert B. Tussing, John Eric Powell, and Benjamin C. Leitzel
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As indicated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and evolving Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, the assumption the homeland will provide a secure space for mobilization and deployment is no longer valid. This integrated research project goes beyond affirming this assumption and contributes to efforts to mitigate the concerns a contested deployment entails. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2, “Army Deployments in a Contested Homeland: A Framework for Protection,” explores how current coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the DoD and state and local government may need realignment, with civil authorities preparing themselves to support military mobilization. Chapter 3, “Strategic Seaports and National Defense in a Contested Environment,” examines the 22 strategic seaports across the United States, identifying issues with throughput, structural integrity, security, readiness, funding, and authorities. Chapter 4, “Single Point of Failure,” identifies how strict adherence to a business efficiency model for munition production and distribution may jeopardize the successful employment of military forces. Chapter 5, “The Interstate Highway System: Reinvestment Needed before a Contested Deployment,” provides the status of the deteriorating road network and explains how associated vulnerabilities could be exploited by an adversary. The two appendices provide points for consideration on cyberattacks and defense and the impacts a full mobilization of reserve forces would have on the homeland.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Public Policy, Army, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

39. Framing the Future of the US Military Profession

Author:
Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Sexual Violence, Army, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:
Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

41. The Department of Defense Contributions to Pandemic Response

Author:
Tom Cullison and J. Stephen Morrison
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DOD) should be systematically incorporated into any evolving U.S. government vision on international health security. A process of strategic planning that encompasses a spectrum of valuable DOD contributions to contain the global Covid-19 pandemic should begin right away. DOD has broad capabilities that have consistently proven their high value in addressing the current Covid-19 pandemic and other historical disease outbreaks, in support of the U.S. civilian-led response. The knowledge and experience gained in crisis response at home and overseas contribute to military readiness and improved coordination of all actors involved in preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease events. This report draws from months of deliberations organized by the CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security’s DOD Working Group. It lays out four concrete and pragmatic recommendations to strengthen DOD’s contributions overseas in advancing U.S. global health security interests
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. Defense Acquisition Trends 2021

Author:
Gregory Sanders, Won Joon Jang, and Alexander Holderness
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Defense Acquisition Trends 2021 is the latest in an annual series of reports examining trends in what the DoD is buying, how the DoD is buying it, and from whom the DoD is buying using data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). This report analyzes the current state of affairs in defense acquisition by combining detailed policy and data analysis to provide a comprehensive overview of the current and future outlook for defense acquisition. It provides critical insights into understanding the current trends in the defense-industrial base and the implications of those trends on acquisition policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. Beyond Foreign Military Sales: Opportunities to Enhance Japan-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation

Author:
Takashi Kodaira
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly severe due to China’s growing military power. Further cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. defense industries will strengthen deterrence, although Japan’s defense industry is currently in a difficult situation, with domestic procurement stagnating. For Japan to fully take advantage of its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, it must maintain and strengthen the defense industry through defense industrial cooperation with the United States. This report examines trend lines in Japan’s defense industrial strategy and potential avenues for bilateral cooperation to enhance capabilities critical to managing complex security challenges facing the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Military Strategy, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

44. Measuring Congressional Impact on Defense Acquisition Funding

Author:
Seamus P. Daniels and Todd Harrison
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Congress exercises its oversight authority on the executive branch’s defense policy via the appropriations process and can choose to match, modify, or eliminate the Department of Defense’s (DoD) requested funding levels for acquisition programs primarily funded by the procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts. Congress’s decisions in this process can have a significant impact on the executive branch’s defense plans by making adjustments to acquisition projects’ program of record. This in turn can force DoD program management teams to alter schedules and contracting actions, causing second-order effects on private sector partners in the acquisition process. To measure Congress’s impact on defense acquisition funding, this study compares the actual funding level for procurement and RDT&E accounts with the original level proposed in the administration’s budget request and identifies patterns in which accounts are regularly adjusted by Congress. It assesses procurement and RDT&E accounts between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2020 and conducts data cuts of acquisition funding at the account, category, military department, and budget activity levels. This analysis ultimately aims to inform defense planners, acquisition officials and program managers, and industry partners of trends in congressional appropriations for defense so they can better anticipate Congress’s impact on defense acquisition funding.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Legislation, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

45. U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022: Peering into the Abyss

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers. It takes a deep look at each military service, as well as special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2022 budget. This report also discusses the debate about legacy equipment, the interaction of the budget and force size, and the decline in force size that the services face with retiring older systems without adequate replacements.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

46. Americans on War Powers, Authorization for Use of Military Force and Arms Sales: A National Survey of Registered Voters

Author:
Steven Kull
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The question of when the United States should use military force is a profound question. There has been a long-running debate about the role of Congress and the President when it comes to making this decisions. The constitution gives Congress the power to fund the military and declare war, and declares the President as the Commander in Chief of the military. However, there are ambiguities about which branch of government has the power in a number of specific situations related to the use of force and the transfer of arms to another country. Currently there are a number of pieces of Congressional legislation that seek to give Congress greater power. One proposal seeks to give Congress greater influence over the use of military force outside of the framework of a declaration of war or in response to an attack on the US. Current law, grounded in the War Powers Act of 1973, requires that the President withdraw troops after 60 days unless Congress votes in favor of continuing it. However, since its passage, every President has considered this unconstitutional and many have not abided by it, keeping forces in place without Congressional approval. In order to stop such a military operation, Congress must gather a veto-proof majority, or bring the President to court. Neither has ever happened. A proposal that has been put forth in Congress is to ‘flip the script’ on this, and automatically cut off funding to such military operations after 60 days, unless Congress actively votes in favor of continuing the operation. (Based on H.R. 2108, H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) Another proposal deals with the termination of a Congressional authorization to use military force (AUMF). Shortly after the September 11 attacks Congress authorized the President to use military force against those responsible for the attacks, or who have aided those responsible. Since then all presidents have used this AUMF to justify various uses of force that some Members of Congress feel go beyond its original purpose. Currently there is a proposal to terminate this AUMF which requires an act of Congress. (Based on H.R. 255 and S. 2391) The last proposal seeks to give Congress greater authority over arms sales. Currently, all arms sales must be approved by the President, and Congress can only halt an arms sale with a majority vote, or more realistically a veto-proof majority. Members of Congress believe that it should be easier for Congress to halt an arms sale. They have introduced a proposal that would also ‘flip the script’ in this case by requiring that any arms sale over $14 million only proceed if Congress votes in favor. (Based on H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) To bring the American people a voice at the table of the current debate on these various pieces of legislation, the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has conducted an in-depth on-line survey of 2,702 registered voters with a probability-based sample provided by Nielsen Scarborough.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

47. The Impact of Finland's and Sweden's Accession to NATO on the Security of the Alliance

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the Alliance’s ability to conduct collective defence missions in the Baltic Sea region and to deter Russia. Therefore, the gains from the enlargement of the Alliance will far exceed the costs, which may include the need to create a new command responsible for missions on the Northern Flank of NATO. However, Türkiye’s opposition may prolong the accession process and increase the risk associated with the intensification of Russia’s provocative actions against the candidates.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Finland, North America, and Sweden

48. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:
Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

49. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

50. Protecting NATO’s security community

Author:
Alexandra Gheciu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Following Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, numerous Western policy-makers and analysts have interpreted the Alliance’s cohesiveness and prompt response as evidence of its value in protecting the transatlantic community of liberal-democracy. NA- TO’s Allies, the argument goes, have clearly demon- strated their shared determination to protect allied ter- ritory and core liberal-democratic values, re-affirming the Alliance’s unshaken commitment to the principle of collective defence. But can this momentum be sus- tained? While the Ukraine crisis has triggered initial prac- tices of unity, it has also highlighted – and rendered more complex – difficult questions, tensions and nor- mative dilemmas for NATO. This policy brief exam- ines some of the key challenges that NATO is likely to face in protecting the transatlantic security commu- nity in the unstable, post-February 2022 environment. What is particularly important to understand is that some of those challenges concern key norms and val- ues around which NATO defines itself. There are no simple answers to the political questions facing the security community – but there are steps that can be taken to put the Allies in a stronger position to ad- dress them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America