Political Geography: Middle East / Topic: Foreign Policy

1. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:: John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

2. Spotlight on US Syria policy

Author:: Charles Lister and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On this week's episode, Director of MEI's Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism Programs Charles Lister and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor talk about US policy toward Syria. The deadly Jan. 28 drone attack on a US military outpost in northeastern Jordan, near the borders with Syria and Iraq, has drawn renewed attention to the US military presence in the area. This comes against a backdrop of regional conflict and escalation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Escalation, and Military
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:: Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

4. Assessing the Impact of Turkey’s Quest for Status Since the 2000s on Foreign Policy Change: Transformational or Transactional?

Author:: Samiratou Dipama and Emel Parlar Dal
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper delves into an assessment of the impact of Turkey’s quest for status since the 2000s on changes in its foreign policy. In other words, how has Turkey’s search for status influenced its foreign policy stances since the 2000s? And can we consider the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy change transformational or transactional in essence? In this vein, this paper will make essential contributions to the existing literature on Turkey’s status-seeking strategies by using specific cases to link them to changes in Turkey’s foreign policy and assessing the extent to which they are transactional or transformational. The examination of this topic is all the more important in light of internal developments in Turkey, such as democratic backsliding and economic crisis, as well external factors such as its tense relationships with the EU, its rapprochement with Russia and China, and its increasingly proactive profile in regional crises. This paper critically assesses the pattern of Turkey’s foreign policy change from transformational and transactional perspectives.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Status, and International Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

5. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. A Bid to Contain Pressure: What are the motives behind Iranian President's East Africa tour?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a trip to Africa from July 11 to 13, 2023, during which he visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on invitations from the leaders of the three countries, President William Ruto, Yoweri Museveni and President Emmerson Mnangagwa, respectively. Raisi led a high-level delegation including First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Health Minister Behrouz Aghaei, and Minister of Agriculture Seyyed Javad Sadati Nejad, and several other high-ranking officials and businessmen.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Uganda, Kenya, Iran, Middle East, Zimbabwe, and East Africa

7. Partnership Diversification: What are the implications of the sixth round of the Russia-GCC strategic dialogue?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Following a five-year hiatus, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, held the sixth round of their strategic dialogue in Moscow on July 10, 2023, at a critical juncture. The meeting has several implications aligning with the Gulf’s endeavors that began in the wake of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and later took shape in the wake of the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Diversification, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

8. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

9. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

10. Diplomatic Defeat: Uncovering the low turnout to the Arab League meeting in Tripoli

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Libya’s outgoing Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, failed to host a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the capital Tripoli on January 21, 2023. The chief diplomats of most of the Arab states and the organization’s secretary-general boycotted the meeting. Representatives of only seven Arab states, including Tunisia’s and Algeria’s foreign ministers, attended the gathering, which was a diplomatic blow to the al-Dbeibah government.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arab League, and Instability
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

11. Unravelling Turkish involvement in the Sahel: Geopolitics and local impact

Author:: Andrew Lebovich and Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: In the past decade, Turkey has significantly expanded its engagement in Africa, leading to concerns within the European Union (EU) that this influence might be used to undermine EU policy and member states. This policy brief analyses the strategic motives and evolution of Turkish involvement in the Sahel region, focusing specifically on Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Drawing from interviews conducted with Sahelian and Turkish political, business, diplomatic and educational stakeholders between October and December 2022, the authors contend that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Sahel demonstrates a multifaceted approach that aims to strengthen its presence across economic, cultural, defence and development spheres. However, it is also emphasised that Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel remains relatively limited when compared to its activities in other African countries, for example Libya, Somalia and Algeria. In light of these findings, this policy brief recommends that the EU adopt a pragmatic approach, drawing lessons from Turkey’s strategy while trying to manage, and where possible benefit from, the impact of Turkish security assistance and to foster opportunities for Sahelian populations in Europe through scholarships and employment initiatives.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel

12. Al-Sudani’s first 100 days – Or how to keep everyone happy

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The job of an Iraqi Prime Minister is a complex balancing act on both the domestic and international fronts. To begin with, there is the challenge of managing competition between the country’s factitious elites. Then there is the unresolved tension between self-interested elites and a citizenry that has largely lost faith in its political leaders. Finally, there is the foreign policy dilemma of balancing political and economic dependence on both the US and Iran. By these standards, Prime Minister Mohammed Shiya al-Sudani’s first 100 days in office have provided a crash course on how to please all sides. He has allocated government positions to his supporters with gusto, provisionally left most Sadrist bastions of power in the state untouched (even though Sadrists are excluded from the government) and offered extensive ‘bread and games’ for the population by promising jobs and social security. Al-Sudani has furthermore sought to reassure opposing foreign actors through a hitherto fairly balanced foreign policy. His approach has been enabled by the broad coalition of Iraqi political elites that brought him to the premiership, along with record oil revenues that help grease the wheels of patronage politics. While structural reforms in politics, administration and economics are overdue, they will not happen because Iraq’s political leaders have no need for them in the immediate term. However, unresolved elite contention, a lack of public investment and the absence of reform mean that Iraq is likely heading for tougher times within the space of a couple of years.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Elites, and Public Investment
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

13. Turkey Earthquake: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: In addition to the direct losses – both human lives and damage to buildings and infrastructure – domestically, the earthquake may have implications for the coming presidential and parliamentary elections. In terms of foreign policy, it triggered a quasi-coup in Turkey’s regional and international relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Natural Disasters, Infrastructure, Elections, and Earthquake
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

14. The Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Iran: Expediency at the Crossroad of Suprra-Nationalism and Soverignty

Author:: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran’s foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. Revolution and how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign relations with other nations have been long discussed in the works of prominent scholars including Leng (1972), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002), and Doma-Nguez & Domínguez (2009). However, what makes the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and, therefore, more confusing to study, is the Shi’a Islamic nature of it.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

15. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies

Author:: Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

16. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

17. Deciphering Erdoğan's Regional Paradigm Shifts

Author:: Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Professor Ofra Bengio analyses the trajectory of Turkish foreign and domestic policies by examining three paradigms in Erdogan's strategy since the early 2000s. In addition, we offer our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake last week.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

18. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES AND ITS EFFECT ON JORDAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Author:: Emad Ayasreh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This research examined the effect of Jordan’s humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Syrian refugees on its foreign policy and attempted to determine whether the strategy is financially sustainable. Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision-makers and leaders worldwide to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interest of vulnerable populations by completely respecting fundamental humanitarian principles. Jordan has allowed many Syrian refugees to cross over and settle in Jordan. This study used a qualitative systematic literature review and quantitative data from the UNHCR to determine the effect of the strategy on Jordan’s foreign policy and whether the strategy could be sustained. The findings showed that Jordan’s stature in terms of its foreign policy has grown, leading to bilateral agreements and participation in international negotiations. However, its humanitarian strategy may not be sustainable with the current level of funding. The funding from foreign countries and international organizations has been insufficient to support the growing number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The literature on this topic is limited, and comprehensive quantitative research is recommended to determine the future effect of the strategy on health care and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

19. WHAT DOES “BIG DATA” TELL? A NETWORK ANALYSIS APPROACH TO THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY’S ROLE PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN 2015 AND 2020

Author:: Hikmet Menguaslan and Sadullah Celik
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: In this paper, we exploited big data (The Global Database Events, Language and Tone - GDELT) by utilizing network analysis to elaborate on the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) Middle East (ME) policy for 2015 and 2020 - our conceptual framework built on the role theory. We identified two dynamics - the positioning of the “Transatlantic” link in Turkish Foreign Policy’s (TFP) orientation and the shape and politics of the JDP elites’ conception of activism - based on which we developed two hypotheses to conceptualize the JDP’s role performance for the period: 1) There was a mismatch between national role conceptions and systemic role prescriptions for Turkey in the period of analysis; 2) This mismatch led the appeal of partnership with non-Western actors to rise. We utilized network analysis by exploiting the GDELT big data set to test our hypotheses empirically. The empirical findings proved the validity of our conceptual arguments.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Political Science, and AKP
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

20. OVERLAPPING COMMUNICATION LOGIC FOR GLOBALIZING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF JORDAN

Author:: Emad Ayasreh
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper explored how Jordan used overlapping communication logic to enhance its global public diplomacy. Few studies have examined Jordan’s public diplomacy, so this research presents vital information about Jordan’s diplomacy nationally, regionally, and internationally. Because of the dynamic cultures, values, and norms brought about by globalization, nations need to use effective communication strategies to promote public diplomacy. In this case, the public referred to both the domestic and foreign public. The three main communication logics explored were individual, relational, and holistic logic. The research adopted a qualitative systematic literature review, and a sample of ten articles was obtained from Google Scholar and Z-Library. The study found that Jordan has used overlapping communication logic to enhance its public diplomacy domestically, in the Middle East, and globally on different occasions. The limitation of this research was its small sample size. Comprehensive quantitative analysis research is recommended to learn how satisfied Jordanians are with their country’s public diplomacy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Communications, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Middle East and Jordan

21. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: For the past century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been driven by the need to preserve the achievements of the Lausanne Treaty in the face of often serious threats from major powers. As a result, Turkey was a predominantly status quo country, and its relations with neighboring states were largely shaped by its place in broader geopolitical struggles. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the subsequent growth of Turkey’s economic, military and diplomatic strength, this has changed. Turkish foreign policy has begun to focus on reshaping the regional order in accordance with its growing desire for influence. Going forward, the nature of Ankara’s efforts, and the response they provoke from Turkey’s neighbors, will be an increasingly crucial factor in determining Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe. Turkey’s new dynamics will remain a source of tension under any future Turkish government, but they need not, if managed well by all sides, lead to a lasting rift between Turkey and the West. The more deeply embroiled Turkey becomes in disputes with key US allies from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf, the more difficult it will be for Washington and Ankara to have a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. And the more Turkey views itself as a revisionist power, the more it will come into conflict with America’s allies. As a result, it is more important than ever for US policymakers to understand the historic trajectory of Turkey’s place in its region. Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a status quo power, an orientation that it maintained for the better part of the last hundred years. Though the new country had been shorn of its former territories in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, it had also forcefully defeated foreign efforts to occupy the territory of Anatolia itself. For modern Turkey’s founders, the success in avoiding complete colonization far outweighed the failure to preserve the full geographic scope of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they forged a pragmatic foreign policy tradition that prioritized preserving their achievement: a Turkish state sovereign and secure within its current borders. This goal remained constant over a long and turbulent 20th century, even as its implications changed, and allowed for Ankara to be flexible about which countries to work with to maximize its self-declared interests. In the inter-war period, when threats came largely from powerful European empires like France, Italy, and Britain, the defense of Turkish sovereignty called for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, Turkey’s geopolitical position changed dramatically. Suddenly, the Soviet Union emerged as the most direct and dangerous threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. In this new strategic context, seeking the support of the United States and NATO became the only feasible way to preserve the imperiled status quo, equip the country’s armed forces, and ultimately defend its borders. The result was a strong and mutually beneficial alliance with the United States and much of Europe. The success of this alliance, however, sometimes obscured the complex, constantly evolving and often paradoxical relationship between Turkey’s status quo orientation and its historically-grounded relationships with regional states. The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a bitter legacy, giving almost all of Turkey’s neighbors both emotional and practical reasons to feel hostility towards it. With other countries that shared a commitment to the status quo, however, Ankara had equally good reason to overcome this animosity. For countries that found themselves on the wrong side of Turkey’s geopolitical alignment, by contrast, these resentments and unresolved problems were consistently exacerbated. The history of Turkey’s regional relationships can be read through the ever-shifting dynamics of power politics and unsettled history. In the case of Greece, for example, Ankara and Athens began an ambitious rapprochement in the 1930s when they both felt their security was threatened by Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. When this shared threat was supplanted by the Soviet Union, the two countries were brought into an even closer alignment under the NATO umbrella. Soon though, the growing rebellion against British rule on Cyprus rendered the status quo unsustainable, leaving Athens and Ankara with radically divergent views on what should come next. Only in this context were a number of longstanding questions re-opened, such as maritime borders and the status of historic minorities in both countries. Crucially, even as tensions over Cyprus worsened, both sides still had Washington to help remind them of their shared security interests. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a position to manage Turkish-Greek tensions in order to pre-empt the risk of an intra-NATO war between two allies that would benefit the Soviets. In other words, by acting as a forceful advocate for the status quo, Washington helped ensure that both Greece and Turkey maintained their shared commitment to it. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, Turkey embraced not just a new foreign policy but a new foreign policy orientation. Ankara is no longer interested in maintaining the status quo—it now wants to transform it. Just as Turkey’s status quo orientation led to different policies as circumstances change, Turkey’s new anti-status quo orientation has also led Erdoğan’s government to pursue different strategies. But to make sense of these shifts, and the reaction they have provoked in the region, it is crucial to appreciate that, no less than in the previous century, Turkey’s neighbors have responded in light of their history but also, more importantly, their own orientation toward the regional status quo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, AKP, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

22. Democracy Promotion After the Iraq War

Author:: Sarah Bush
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The Iraq War has justifiably left Americans skeptical about democracy promotion. Despite its flaws, US democracy promotion is still needed to advance political rights globally. Supporting women’s rights has become an important facet of US democracy promotion. Although autocracies can manipulate women’s rights for their own ends, real and valuable progress has also been made.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

23. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Learning Lessons from a Lost War

Author:: Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: American-led efforts to state and nation-build in Iraq all but failed, resulting in the deaths of 4,431 US troops, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi fatalities, and mixed-at-best results in creating a viable state. Despite these failed efforts in Iraq, the United States will most likely need to work with allies, partners, and the Ukrainian people to reconstruct their country in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Therefore, learning lessons from the war in Iraq is critical for future efforts at state stabilization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Alliance, Iraq War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

24. Erdoğan’s Syria Policy: Continuation of the Status Quo?

Author:: Sinem Adar
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Erdoğan’s victory was driven by rhetoric stoking further conflict with Kurdish actors in Turkey and Syria. He is unlikely to back down from this position in the future. Turkey will seek to balance its “forever war” with the PKK against desires to repatriate Syrian refugees in potential negotiations with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Refugees, Syrian War, Kurds, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

25. The Long Game: Saudi Arabia and Professional Golf

Author:: Sean L. Yom
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The alliance between the PGA Tour and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (which is chaired by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and includes the LIV Golf league) is a strategic victory for Saudi Arabia, which has sought a more integrated presence in global and Western institutions. The merger opens up serious commercial leverage for Saudi Arabia, including control over the PGA Tour’s lucrative licensing operation. The deal has resolved a year-long legal dispute between the two organizations, but questions will be raised about the PGA Tour’s nonprofit status as well as monopoly issues that are being investigated by the US Congress.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sports, Soft Power, and Golf
Political Geography:: Middle East and Saudi Arabia

26. Between Swords of Iron and the Al Aqsa Deluge: The Regional Politics of the Israel-Hamas War

Author:: Brandon Friedman and Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The Hamas-Israel war has derailed but not destroyed the trend towards regional de-escalation and integration. Hamas’ “success” has revived fears in the region of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence and led aspiring regional powers to compete to steer the Muslim world’s attitudes and responses to the crisis . Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s peace partners, face particular domestic challenges that both constrain and incentivize engagement in the crisis. Egypt’s strategic interests have led to a discreet, but more active role, while Jordan’s domestic pressures have led it to keep the crisis at arm’s length. The United Arab Emirates and other conservative Arab states emphasize the need to prevent escalation, to limit civilian deaths, and to implement an immediate ceasefire, and at least publicly, minimize the relevance of “who started” the war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Hamas, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

27. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:: Nate Sibley
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

28. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:: Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

29. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:: Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area

Author:: Robert Greenway
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Abraham Accords provide an unprecedented opportunity to increase trade and investment among its members significantly by establishing a regional free trade area that would ensure progress toward their aspirations, preserve the integrity and stability of global markets, fuel growth, and constrain China’s predatory trade practices. Signatories to the accords committed to a shared vision of peace and prosperity and recognized that economic integration can enable members to achieve their long-term economic goals. The accords have paved the way for comprehensive partnerships on a variety of issues related to security, trade, investment, the environment, innovation, tourism, energy, and other key sectors. While the growth in bilateral trade is of great significance, the true transformative power of these peace agreements lies in expanding regional integration and cooperation. This is already underway. Israel concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in December 2022 and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Both will significantly accelerate economic development and provide incentives for others to follow suit. Israel's new foreign minister, Eli Cohen, recently stated that the volume of trade with Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords in 2020 exceeded $2.8 billion dollars in 2022. While progress has been remarkable, its potential is far greater. According to RAND analysis of the potential of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) between Israel and current signatories, the accords could create 46,000 new jobs and $24 billion in new economic activity for Israel's four partners. The benefits of a multilateral FTA encompassing current signatories would triple the overall benefit, creating more than 150,000 new jobs and new economic activity exceeding $75 billion. A multilateral FTA among an expanded number of potential signatories to the accords could create as much as 4 million new jobs and $1 trillion in new economic activity through 2030. This potential is not lost on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP represents one of the most significant threats challenging the United States and its partners and allies. China’s state-directed economic policies, predatory lending, cyber intrusions, theft of intellectual property, illicit technology transfer and other coercive practices, industrial subsidies, and market access restrictions on key sectors of China’s economy constitute the most significant threats of the coming century. Several trends exacerbate the need for integrating markets aligned toward common goals. The global pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Brexit, tariff tensions, political instability, protectionist policies, and regulatory uncertainty have threatened global trade by disrupting established supply chains and their underlying constellation of business models and trade relationships. As is often the case, these complex and interrelated challenges constitute an opportunity to realign our trade to safeguard the integrity of global markets and pursue US goals and objectives in collaboration with our partners and allies. The Abraham Accords offers just such an opportunity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Free Trade, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:: Middle East and Israel

31. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:: Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

32. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East

Author:: Yair Albeck
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Middle East

33. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:: Robert Greenway
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

34. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

35. House in disorder: How Europeans can help Palestinians fix their political system

Author:: Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Thirty years after the Oslo accords, Israel’s annexation of Palestinian territory is entrenching open-ended conflict and what is increasingly recognised as apartheid. A third intifada is simmering in the West Bank amid expanding Israeli military raids, growing settler violence, and the resurgence of Palestinian armed groups. Conflict in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is further destabilising Gaza and southern Lebanon, risking a serious interlocking regional crisis. A weak and unpopular Palestinian Authority, combined with deepening rivalries among Palestinian leaders and factions, are increasing Palestinian political dysfunction, and exacerbating instability. Confronting Israel’s international law violations remains key. But Europeans can help mitigate negative dynamics by leveraging their funding relationship with the PA to revive Palestinian institutions and reverse the PA’s authoritarian slide. The EU should work with Gulf monarchies to reconfigure post-Abraham accords diplomacy in support of Palestinian rights and national representation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Institutions, and Palestinian Authority
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

36. From shock and awe to stability and flaws: Iraq’s post-invasion journey

Author:: Hamzeh Hadad
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: In the 20 years since the US-led invasion, Iraq’s political order and elite have proven surprisingly resilient in the face of numerous challenges, including terrorism, civil war, threats of secession, and mass protests. The informal consociational system, party politics, patronage networks, and competing paramilitaries are enduring features of Iraqi governance that have maintained stability even as they present many long-term problems. Despite the system’s resilience, Iraq remains deeply challenged by corruption, a lack of economic diversity and development, climate vulnerability, and some persistent security deficits. Europeans should acknowledge the realities of Iraqi governance and work within them to achieve shared European-Iraqi interests rather than seeking to impose their own ideals or solutions. Europeans could, for example, help Iraqis to manage their youth bulge problem, digitise the economy, and prepare for and adapt to climate change.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Political stability, Iraq War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

37. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:: Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

38. The Syrian Civil War Twelve Years On: Can There Be a Constructive Role for Greece?

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Loukas I. Papavasileiou
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Continual and ever-growing foreign involvement led to the internationalization of the armed conflict and turned Syria into a battleground for the strategic competition of several powers. The Kremlin has long viewed Hafez and Bashar al-Assad as indispensable partners in the Middle East and has repeatedly offered its diplomatic and military support in an attempt to achieve its own strategic objectives. Given the destabilizing effects the unending Syrian crisis has had on Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean security, Greece maintains a profound interest in the resolution of the conflict. Greece appointed a Special Envoy for Syria in May 2020 with a view to reinvigorating its policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Greece’s successful re-engagement with key Arab countries and improved relations with other regional actors could pave the way for a more prominent Greek role in Syria. This could entail reinforcing its diplomatic cooperation with the EU Delegation to Syria, leading the EU humanitarian relief effort following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria on 6 February 2023, and formulating a realistic and forward-looking strategy for the future of the Syrian people, including provisions for the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the protection of minority rights.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Political stability, Syrian War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Greece, and Syria

39. A New New Turkey? What an Opposition Victory Would Mean for Ankara’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Nicholas Danforth
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The opposition foreign policy platform seeks to improve relations with the West while simultaneously continuing to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Securing the safe, voluntary and legal return of Syrian refugees through rapprochement with the Assad regime, as the opposition proposes, will prove a non-starter. Ultimately, a democratic Turkey that calibrates its foreign policy to the interests of its citizens rather than the interests of one man will be a stronger and more reliable actor on the global stage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

40. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL FOR YEMEN

Author:: Marta Furlan
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, Houthis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria

41. Russia at War and the Islamic World

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

42. China’s Response to Türkiye’s Volatile Authoritarianism

Author:: Ceren Ergenç and Kenan Göçer
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: This paper investigates Türkiye’s evolving relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale program of infrastructure investment and project financing proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The paper digs deeply into cases from two sectors—transportation and energy—focusing on how heightened and changing local expectations among Turks for these prospective BRI projects have shaped choices and outcomes, including China’s. In so doing, it explores how these shifting Turkish perceptions affect the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye. This paper has several goals: it seeks to understand the reasons behind these local changes, the role of the state and private sector in Türkiye in these changes, and the way China has responded so far. Of course, domestic factors are not the only ones that shape the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye or elsewhere; regional and global trends have had an impact too.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

43. Turkey’s 2023 General Elections and the Kurdish Question

Author:: Ameneh Mehvar and Berk Özlü
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: The most consequential elections in Turkey’s recent history are set to be held on 14 May, when Turkish citizens will elect a new president alongside a new parliament. An ideologically disparate coalition of six opposition parties, ranging from secularists, to Islamic conservatives, and Turkish nationalists, have joined forces under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu to unseat Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan has been in power for 20 years, initially as prime minister and then as president since 2014.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Minorities, Elections, and Kurds
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

44. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:: Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

45. The Transition from Nationalism to Islamism in Iran’s Foreign Policy

Author:: M. Reza Pashayi and Timuçin Kodaman
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:: Altinbas University
Abstract:: The 1979 Iranian Revolution is a multifaceted phenomenon with intricate causes, complex evolution and far-reaching outcomes. Rooted in the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century and the rise to power of the Ayatollahs, its beginnings are distinct but interconnected. Unlike many revolutions of the 20th century, the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a departure from the socialist or communist model and manifested itself as a revolt against both Western and Eastern systems, with unique outcomes. The 1979 Revolution shook a traditional and established order and paved the way for the rise of Islamism within a new political framework. This ideology, like its predecessors, adopted a singular leadership based on religious doctrine. To differentiate itself from global and regional powers and focus on its unique revolution, the Iranian regime shaped a foreign policy summarized by the slogan “neither East nor West, the Islamic Republic” and aimed to export this ideology globally. The policy focused primarily on political and ideological interests, resulting in permanent sanctions imposed by the United States. This economic aspect contributes to the changes in Iran’s foreign policy towards the United States, from pre-revolutionary Persian nationalism to post-Revolutionary political Islam, emphasizing its strength and adaptability in the face of external pressures.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Shiism, and Iranian Revolution
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

46. A Political Economy of Historical Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy

Author:: Inan Rüma
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This study aims to analyse historical continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) within the framework of Critical Theory as elucidated by Robert Cox. It suggests asking how TFP has been affected by the historical changes in relations of production and world orders. Within this framework, it aims to explain the changes in TFP within the relation between the production, the world order and the form of state. It analyses TFP in three historical periods such as the Interwar Years, Cold War and post-Cold War. It exposes that Turkish state (re)formation and foreign policy making has succumbed to the global capitalist relations of production and corresponding world orders. These two have been the major framework(s) of change and continuity in Türkiye’s 100 years-old foreign policy. Its main argument is that the continuity and change in TFP has shown an interplay of relations between production and world order. It concludes that TFP has been in line with the global relations of production so there has been a clear and substantial continuity; and that the arguable changes have been the repercussions of global relations of production and world orders.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Order, Production, and Critical Theory
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

47. Do Campaign Speeches Predict Foreign Policy? An Operational Code and Leadership Trait Analysis of Donald Trump’s MENA Policies

Author:: Merve ÖZDEMİRKIRAN-EMBEL, B. Toygar Halistoprak, and Michael Young
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This article investigates whether campaign speeches during the US presidential elections can help predict foreign policy behavior. We use speeches made by Donald J. Trump during his bid for president in 2016. We compare the analysis from 2016 with his actual foreign policy decisions during his tenure, 2017-2020. Operational code analysis and leadership traits analysis approaches are used to analyze candidate Trump’s foreign policy beliefs and strategies associated with them. We use Profiler Plus software to conduct content analysis which produces OCA and LTA results. We use three separate datasets to analyze Trump’s beliefs and traits focusing on his general foreign policy speeches, the MENA region, and a third one only about Islamic State and Syria. Our results show that Trump’s profile indicates a foreign policy orientation that avoids involvement in affairs that are perceived as beyond immediate interests. The consistency between his beliefs and traits during the 2016 campaign and his actual foreign policy behavior leads us to conclude that individual level analysis, and specifically OCA and LTA approaches, are useful tools to analyze, explain and predict foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, Leadership, Donald Trump, and Political Beliefs
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, and United States of America

48. Türkiye’s First 100 Years

Author:: W. Robert Pearson
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Modern Türkiye (the official spelling of Turkey since 2021) sprang like a phoenix from the ashes in 1923, overcoming daunting odds. Its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had foolishly joined the war with the Central Powers in 1914 and naively thought its Arab subjects would remain loyal, only to have been utterly defeated and then dismembered. A rebellion led by the empire’s most famous war hero and leader, Kemal Ataturk, overthrew the last sultan, rejected an unjust treaty to divide up the country and repelled the occupying Allies. He established a contemporary republic based on popular will and modern law to begin a new history for the Turkish people. Born from the wreckage of war and national chaos, Türkiye now, one hundred years on, has become a formidable player on the global stage. World War One witnessed four empires – the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman – disappear from history. Of the four, the Turks were the most severely treated by the European victors. Little of Germany and none of the Austro-Hungarian states were occupied. Türkiye was. The country also was originally forecast to become a League of Nations mandate, losing its sovereignty, a punishment not assessed against any other Central Power. Türkiye’s victory at the negotiating table in the early 1920’s over the European Allied Powers and on the battlefield principally against the Greeks, who were encouraged by the British to invade Türkiye to recover territories, was a singular achievement. The final agreement – the Treaty of Lausanne – gave Türkiye its complete independence on October 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal as its first president. It was the only such treaty negotiated by a WWI Central Power state with the Allies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Religion, History, Democracy, Economy, Kurds, Ottoman Empire, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

49. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

50. The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei's Political Evolution in Iran

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: During his lengthy tenure as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei has shown a knack for consolidating power by creating layers of bureaucracy in military, economic, and religious affairs. In turn, he has liberally purged officials who have hinted at disloyalty to him, the Islamic Republic, or its governing doctrine, velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). But Khamenei does not lack for personal complexity. As a younger man, he dressed casually, flaunted his love of literature, and composed poetry. And as a leader, he has often demonstrated flexibility—coined as “heroic flexibility” in the case of the 2015 nuclear deal—at times of national risk or strained social cohesion. He has likewise blessed the rise of relatively moderate presidents such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani when he thought their leadership would reinforce national stability. In this wide-ranging study, former Qom theologian Mehdi Khalaji details Khamenei’s political ascent, from his role as an influential cleric in Mashhad to his presidency under Ruhollah Khomeini and his surprising appointment as Supreme Leader. Whoever succeeds him, the author makes plain, will inherit an infrastructure designed to preserve Iran’s authoritarian system and suppress rumblings of internal dissent.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Islam, and Ali Khamenei
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

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