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2. Strategic Survival in Syria
- Author:
- Omar Abu Layla
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- How Russia and Iran maintain their grip in Syria under the shadows of the Ukraine war
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria
3. The Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Iran: Expediency at the Crossroad of Suprra-Nationalism and Soverignty
- Author:
- Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
- Institution:
- Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
- Abstract:
- The direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran’s foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. Revolution and how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign relations with other nations have been long discussed in the works of prominent scholars including Leng (1972), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002), and Doma-Nguez & Domínguez (2009). However, what makes the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and, therefore, more confusing to study, is the Shi’a Islamic nature of it.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
4. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy
- Author:
- Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North America, and United States of America
5. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran
- Author:
- Jonathan Schachter
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
6. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East
- Author:
- Nathan P. Olsen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
7. Ending the use of child soldiers
- Author:
- Alistair Taylor, Mick Mulroy, and Eric Oehlerich
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- On this week's episode Alistair Taylor, MEI's editor-in-chief, is joined by Mick Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich, Senior Fellows with MEI’s Defense & Security Program and the Co-founders of the Lobo Institute and End Child Soldiering, to discuss efforts to stop the recruitment and use of children in combat and rehabilitate former child soldiers. The use of child soliders is a widespread global problem that has a disproportionate impact on the broader Middle East, especially in Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Rehabilitation, and Child Soldiers
- Political Geography:
- Sudan, Middle East, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia
8. To What Extent is Israel Prepared for the Growing Threat of UAVs?
- Author:
- Eden Kaduri, Liran Antebi, and Meir Elran
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has recently figured in the headlines, following UAVs launched by Hezbollah in July 2022 aimed at the Israel natural gas platform in the Karish field, reports of a Hamas project to develop UAVs, a UAV attack against the American al-Tanf base in Syria, and reports that Russia has purchased Iranian UAVs. Such an arsenal in hostile hands constitutes a mounting threat to Israel. Assuming that UAVs, especially offensive ones, will join any high-trajectory fire against Israel, new thinking about the ways of dealing with the threat in the spheres of doctrine, development, and operations is needed. Technological and operational solutions for both the more conventional threat and a scenario of massive UAV attacks in combination with high-trajectory barrages are required. Inter alia, there should be greater reliance on lasers as a cheap solution with much higher output than the current solutions. In addition, preparations should be made for handling extreme scenarios, however unlikely.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Drones
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
9. Tehran Heightens the Pressure as it Strives to Thwart a Regional Air Defense System
- Author:
- Tamir Hayman and Sima Shine
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The heightened discussion of a “regional air defense alliance” was met by increased Iranian activity to block any such measure, including explicit threats that in turn prompted rejection of the idea by senior Gulf figures. It appears that at this stage, relations between Israel and the Gulf states that remain below the radar are preferable to grandiose public statements that do match the reality on the ground
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, Air Force, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
10. Resolving the Gas Dispute with Lebanon: First Exhaust Diplomatic Efforts
- Author:
- Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Hezbollah’s launch of UAVs at the Karish gas field was a cognitive action directed at Israel and the Lebanese, and sparked much public criticism in the Lebanese political establishment, which is eager to reach an arrangement on the gas issue. At this stage, Israel is right not to react to the UAVs militarily, and should continue to try to exhaust the diplomatic route with its northern neighbor to demarcate the maritime border, while recognizing that the Shiite organization will attempt again to challenge the balance of deterrence
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon