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1. The Asian 21st Century

Author:
Azhar Waqar
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
“The Asian 21st Century” is a compilation of essays and articles by Kishore Mahbubani that covers various topics related to the transition of power especially in the context of the geopolitical and economic rise of Asia. In this book, instead of giving an overarching definition of Asia, the author focuses on certain countries, particularly China, Japan, South Korea, India and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries. The book has been divided into four sections; the first section is titled “The End of Era of Western Domination”, the second “The Asian Renaissance”, the third is comprised of articles related to “The Peaceful Rise of China”, and the last one is titled “The Globalization, Multilateralism and Cooperation.”
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Book Review, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

2. Deepening Strategic Alignment: Priorities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Kristi Govella and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
With new leadership in both countries, Japan and the United States are facing an increasingly uncertain global environment. As Japan prepares to revise its core national strategy documents, it is a particularly important time for Tokyo and Washington to deepen their strategic alignment. Although bilateral cooperation continues to proceed relatively smoothly at the operational level, there is a pressing need to articulate a strategic vision to guide alliance priorities and facilitate effective implementation of common objectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Japan’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Structure and Its Implications for South Korea

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the competition for technological supremacy between the United States and China has intensified since the 2020s, the Japanese government is also staking its future on the “revival” of its semiconductor industry by strengthening its supply chain. Japan’s global market share in semiconductor products peaked at around 50% in the 1980s but has since fallen to around 10% in the 2020s. It is now maintaining its presence in the so-called legacy semiconductor sector, which includes power semiconductors, microcontrollers (MCUs), and CMOS image sensors. In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials sector, which maintains a relatively high global market share, certain semiconductor materials—such as yellow phosphorus, helium, rare gases, and fluorite—are exposed to the risk of supply chain disruptions due to high import dependence on specific countries. This WEB paper analyzes the supply chain structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry and examines the government’s semiconductor industry policy from the perspective of strengthening supply chain resilience, with the aim of exploring future directions for cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor industry. In the second section we analyze the input structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry using input-output analysis, while also assessing the import dependency of Japanese semiconductor products and materials to examine the supply chain structure of the industry. The third section provides an overview of the industrial policies the Japanese government has been pursuing since 2020 to revitalize the semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on the next-generation semiconductor project—the Rapidus 2-nanometer foundry. Section IV proposes a cooperation agenda between South Korea and Japan which involves: first, the sharing of supply chain information regarding export control, and joint procurement of semiconductor raw materials; and second, the joint development of semiconductor back-end packaging technologies and cooperation in the field of AI semiconductors.
Topic:
Industry, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

4. Global Demographic Structure and Korea's Productivity: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Sang-Ha Yoon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation driven by low birth rates and aging populations. While this demographic shift is a global phenomenon, South Korea is experiencing it at an unprecedented speed. This change is not merely a social issue but a fundamental economic shock that alters the core engines of growth: labor and capital. As the working-age population shrinks, the contribution of labor to economic growth inevitably turns negative. Consequently, sustaining economic growth depends entirely on productivity. The central challenge for policymakers is no longer just how to expand the workforce, but how to reconfigure the economy to produce more with fewer people through innovation and efficiency. This report analyzes the impact of demographic changes on Korea's productivity, drawing lessons from Japan’s experience and utilizing economic simulations. It explores how aging affects investment incentives and why “intangible assets”—such as technology, software, and organizational know-how—are critical for Korea's economic survival. Furthermore, it highlights how global financial conditions can act as a buffer for Korea's open economy.
Topic:
Demographics, Economic Growth, Labor Market, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

5. Shifting Grounds: Public Opinion and the Future of Trilateral Cooperation in the United States, South Korea, and Japan

Author:
Je Heon (James) Kim
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The August 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David marked a historic milestone in U.S.-South Korea-Japan relations, establishing new frameworks for crisis consultation, information-sharing, military exercises, and cooperation on critical supply chains. Two years on, the durability of that achievement is being tested by a turbulent second Donald Trump administration, rising Chinese assertiveness, an entrenched North Korean nuclear program, and unresolved historical tensions between South Korea and Japan. Whether the Camp David framework endures will depend not only on the decisions of leaders but on the publics whose support sustains them. This report presents findings from comprehensive public opinion surveys conducted in the United States, South Korea, and Japan in August 2025. It examines where the three countries’ publics converge, where they diverge, and what those patterns mean for the future of trilateral cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. Trilateralism Through Transition: Reflections on U.S.-South Korea-Japan Cooperation From Experts and Emerging Leaders

Author:
Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Two years after the Camp David summit among the United States, South Korea, and Japan institutionalized trilateral cooperation, the partnership faces new challenges amid leadership transitions in all three capitals. To assess the stakes, the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) and The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation convened a public panel with Zack Cooper (CSIS), Shihoko Goto (Mansfield Foundation), and Eun A Jo (William & Mary). Drawing on insights from these experts, 15 competitively selected emerging leaders joined a private roundtable to develop blue-sky ideas for the future of trilateral cooperation. This report offers timely perspectives for the policy community on how the three partners can sustain momentum amidst uncertainty.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Leadership, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

7. The New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) launched by Italy, Japan and the UK in 2022 represents a novel partnership among the three countries for the development and production of a next-generation crewed fighter aircraft. A partnership based on equality of rights for and investments by the founding partners, as well as on the principles of Freedom of Action and Freedom of Modification at national level – that means full operational and technological sovereignty on the core platform, differently from the F-35 experience. As such, GCAP presents new challenges and opportunities in political, military and industrial terms, in addition to the programme’s tight schedule and high level of technological ambitions. The cooperation accelerated in 2024 with the establishment of a dedicated international governmental organisation to manage the programme, and the agreement on a joint venture among the three major companies involved on equal foot from the respective countries. This study provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the specific British, Italian and Japanese ways to GCAP, of the programme’s politico-institutional governance and industrial architecture, as well as of training issue and the cross-sectorial implications for Italy. Moreover, a dedicated chapter focuses on the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the US Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programmes in a comparative perspective. The conclusions outline 15 policy recommendations for Italy concerning GCAP.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and F-35
Political Geography:
Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, and Italy

8. The Political Process Involved in Formulating Healthcare Policy in Japan: With a Particular Focus on Advisory Councils, Interest Groups and Medical Officers

Author:
Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Japan’s healthcare policy is defined by a universal health insurance system that guarantees affordable healthcare for all citizens at any time and in any location. The system was established in 1961 and has since undergone a process of evolution through the implementation of national healthcare policies. Despite the existence of conflicts and issues, the mechanism of the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (“Chuikyo”) has continued to advance national healthcare interests. Nevertheless, this resulted in the commencement of criminal proceedings in 2004. The current demographic shifts present a challenge to the long-term sustainability of the national health insurance system, the long-term care insurance system, and the public pension system. This is occurring against a backdrop of rising costs associated with healthcare and long-term care, as well as an unsustainable national budget. The Chuikyo system is confronted with a multitude of challenges. This paper analyses the roles of three key actors in the Japanese national healthcare policy-making process. These actors include advisory councils such as Chuikyo, interest groups such as the Japan Medical Agency, and medical officers of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, who play a pivotal role in the policy-making process. The incremental improvements that Chuikyo produces are insufficient to address the long-term challenges facing the national healthcare policy. Japan’s healthcare model requires reconstruction to align it with the needs of an ageing society with a declining birthrate. Prior to embarking on this important policy work, it is essential to determine who should lead it. It is recommended that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office spearhead a study on radical reform, with strong political leadership and a capable technocrat team to facilitate collaboration with the National Diet and the public. Furthermore, it would be crucial to achieve a consensus through national forums on the fundamental concepts that citizens, as consumers, desire and are prepared to forego from a bottom-up approach. It is essential that the governance structure of the national healthcare system is changed to a decentralised structure so that citizens can be proactively involved in healthcare issues and make autonomous decisions.
Topic:
Politics, Insurance, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

9. Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development

Author:
Angus Lockyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
On April 13, Osaka opened its third and Japan's sixth international exhibition, or expo. This talk draws on a new book to sketch how the latest exhibition emerges from more than a century and a half of exhibitionism, which has included over 1,000 expos in Japan. This history offers a useful, corrective lens on standard accounts of both spectacle and modern Japanese development. Angus Lockyer has taught Japanese, East Asian, and global history in North Carolina and London. "Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development" was published by Cambridge University Press earlier this year. "Japan: A History in Objects," based on the collection of the British Museum, will come out in 2026. Lockyer currently lives in Rhode Island and teaches at RISD. Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.
Topic:
Development, History, and Museums
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

10. Public Expectations of Government Responses to Security Contingencies Around Japan

Author:
Satoshi Machidori, Harukata Takenaka, Amy Catalinac, and Kenneth McElwain
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
In this workshop, scholars Satoshi Machidori and Harukata Takenaka speak on Japanese public attitudes toward possible geopolitical contingencies in the light of changing international environment in East Asia. Their new, large-scale survey experiment examines voter assessments of possible government responses to security crises, including a possible Taiwan contingency. The report also analyzes how perceptions of shared ethnicity may affect public reactions to a hypothetical threat from a democratic regime, expanding the research on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic peace. This research is part of a multi-year study project by ROLES (Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies, University of Tokyo). Speakers: Satoshi Machidori, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies = GRIPS, Japan Discussant: Amy Catalinac, Associate Professor of Politics, NYU Moderator: Kenneth Mori McElwain, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China and the World Program and APEC Study Center.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

11. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India

Author:
Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America

12. Managing an Aging Society: Learning the Right Lessons from Japan

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
As the world and especially other Asian and European economies enter the accelerated process of aging that Japan experienced from the mid-1990s onwards, learning the right policy lessons from Japan’s response is crucial. This paper argues that, overall, Japan has done relatively well by implementing a response that—even if often belatedly so—has mitigated some of the worst economic effects of aging. Japan has successfully raised domestic labor utilization and immigration levels, integrated its economy more with the rest of the world, and implemented a fiscal policy based on debt expansion that has seen debt costs decline. Other advanced Asian economies and China now face aging processes materially faster than Japan’s and will age simultaneously rather than alone like Japan. In addition, many advanced economies will age during a period of much slower global economic growth and less rather than more global trade and investment opening than what Japan faced from the mid-1990s. These less benign international economic and political circumstances mean that many advanced economies will likely not age with the same relative political and economic stability seen in Japan in the last 30 years. In time, this paper argues, “Japanification” will no longer mean a slowly developing economic disaster but will come to mean competent management of a very difficult economic transition.
Topic:
Debt, Demographics, Labor Issues, Immigration, Fiscal Policy, Aging, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

13. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

14. Will China’s economy follow the same path as Japan’s?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since the bursting of China’s real-estate bubble in mid-2021, there has been a growing concern that the Chinese economy could end up like that of Japan in the early 1990s. Some structural patterns are strikingly similar: low private consumption over a long period, especially when compared to the rest of the world, and an excessively high savings ratio, though China’s imbalances now are even larger that Japan’s were then. Initial policy responses to the bursting of their respective bubbles have also been similar. Both China now and Japan then were initially hesitant to ease monetary and fiscal policies, and opted to expand manufacturing, with an eye on external demand, supported by more research and development expenditure. In both cases, the outcomes were stubborn trade surpluses and a mercantilist attitude to their growth problems, leading to the United States taking protectionist measures. China also seems to be following Japan’s offshoring of production to mitigate the impact of protectionism. The main difference, though, is that China now is a poorer country than Japan was then, with still more convergence opportunities ahead. China is also a much bigger military and geopolitical contender than Japan ever was. China’s geopolitical weight is behind the US technological containment of China, but also gives China more room for manoeuvre globally, especially in the Global South. It remains unclear – though globally significant – whether China will be able to deviate from the path followed by Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Innovation, and Real Estate
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

15. Okinawa and Thule US military bases

Author:
Minori Takahashi and Ulrik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Dialogue is key to building trust and legitimacy around US military bases. A comparison of the bases in Okinawa and Thule reveals that the outcome of such dialogues is shaped by who is included in the conversation. Involving regional governments can enhance inclusivity but lead to political instability, while relying on central authorities may offer stability but at the cost of excluding local communities.
Topic:
Legitimacy, Dialogue, Trust, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Greenland

16. Security Cooperation between Japan and the Nordic States in Uncertain Times

Author:
Fei Su, Jingdong Yuan, and Jiayi Zhou
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Amid rising geopolitical tensions and global uncertainty, security dynamics between Japan and the Nordic states are evolving. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Japanese and Nordic security concerns have increasingly converged. Security cooperation between the two regions has expanded through bilateral initiatives and within broader frameworks such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite limitations in states’ resources and political will to operate beyond their immediate neighbourhood, there is mutual recognition of the need to engage more actively, individually and collectively, on security matters. This shared awareness provides a foundation for deeper cooperation in support of both regional and global security.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Threat Perception, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, and Nordic Nations

17. The Inevitability of Tokyo? Japan’s Tourism Boom and Urban Centralisation

Author:
Maximilien Xavier Rehm
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:
Japan welcomed over 36.8 million tourists in 2024, a new record. This influx, along with a growing foreign resident population, is seemingly intensifying the centralisation of people in Tokyo, despite ongoing government efforts to counteract regional depopulation.
Topic:
Demographics, Tourism, Urban, Rural, and Centralization
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Tokyo

18. Identifying Pathways for U.S. Shipbuilding Cooperation with Northeast Asian Allies

Author:
Henry H. Carroll and Cynthia R. Cook
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Military conflict in the Indo-Pacific would demand overwhelming U.S. naval power. Yet the shipbuilding sector faces capacity shortages, industrial base constraints, cost overruns, and delayed delivery, suggesting that Washington should explore alternative pathways for delivering naval capability. One approach is to enhance cooperation with close allies such as Japan and South Korea. Options for cooperation include allied participation in maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); allied purchase and revitalization of U.S. shipyards; various methods of coproduction, including modular construction; and U.S. purchase of allied-built ships. Novel strategies that leverage the United States’ strong and unique network of allies and partners will require thoughtful implementation of industrial cooperation policy, which has historically been challenging. For the United States to strike the right balance between leaning on its allies and partners to alleviate its shipbuilding problems and investing in its own capabilities at home—for these approaches are not mutually exclusive—it should understand the implications of its various cooperative options with its allies.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Navy, Defense Industry, and Shipbuilding
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

19. The Evolution of Japan's Limited Sovereignty: From the Era of Unequal Treaties to the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Author:
Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of Japan's limited sovereignty across two distinct historical periods: the nineteenth-century era of unequal treaties and the post– World War II era shaped by the Japan–U.S. alliance. In the earlier period, treaties imposed by Western powers curtailed Japan’s jurisdictional and tariff autonomy. Paradoxically, these constraints catalysed rapid modernisation and a national drive to restore sovereign equality. In contrast, the post-war period introduced a different model of limited sovereignty: one characterised by strategic dependence through the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). These legal arrangements grant the United States significant military rights on Japanese territory, including base maintenance and jurisdictional authority, raising ongoing concerns about Japan’s territorial and legal autonomy. Further tensions arise from the opaque operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee, whose limited transparency and perceived imbalance in representation have prompted criticism regarding undue U.S. influence. Evolving regional security dynamics and potential shifts in U.S. foreign policy further complicate Japan’s sovereignty posture. Additionally, growing secrecy surrounding national security and the technical nature of defence policy hinder public deliberation and raise broader questions about democratic accountability. Employing an interdisciplinary framework that draws from international law, political science, and history, this study analyses the legal instruments and socio-political contexts that shaped these two periods. By comparing externally imposed and internally accepted constraints on sovereignty, the paper contributes to a deeper understanding of how nations negotiate autonomy within global power structures. This analysis, grounded in a comprehensive review of English and Japanese scholarship, offers a nuanced perspective on Japan’s evolving relationship with limited sovereignty and its implications for democratic governance and strategic positioning in East Asia.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Mainstreaming Security Norms as Japanese Strategy to Gain its Global Power: A Content Analysis on ODA Documents

Author:
Surwandono Surwandono, Ratih Herningtyas, and Rizki Dian Nursita
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
Japan's defeat in World War II did not discourage its obsession to become a global power that influences the behaviour of other countries and the world order at large. Following World War II, despite being constrained by the 1947 Constitution, Japan emerged as an economic agent capable of playing a significant role on the global stage through economic and cultural instruments. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has become one of the key tools for Japan to actively participate and contribute to current global politics. This article aims to identify Japan's strategy in using ODA to maintain its influence as a global power. Using content analysis of 2015 ODA Charter or Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) and the White Paper on Development Cooperation (WPDC), this article finds that Japan's strategy to maintain its influence at the global level is carried out by prioritising human security norms in ODA distribution. The Japanese government consistently applies normative and operational norms regarding human security rather than national security to ensure acceptance from recipient countries. These efforts begin with the development of Japan's legal governance framework, which is designed in a smart, systematic, objective, and visionary manner. Japan demonstrates how a country facing constitutional constraints can become a stable global power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Development Aid, and Human Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

21. India–Japan Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Prospects and Challenges Under Trump

Author:
Yen Pham Thi
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This article examines the India–Japan defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on its geopolitical prospects and challenges under the Trump administration. Strengthened by shared concerns over China’s rising influence and the convergence of their Indo-Pacific strategies, the partnership has evolved beyond symbolic engagement to include joint exercises, technology sharing, and defense dialogues aimed at preserving a free and rules-based regional order. At the same time, India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment, Japan’s dependence on US security guarantees, and the “America First” policy under Trump pose significant constraints. To sustain and deepen cooperation, both nations must enhance bilateral mechanisms, pursue strategic autonomy, expand multilateral engagements, and promote regional norms. These steps are essential for building a resilient, sustainable, and strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific amid a shifting US foreign policy landscape.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

22. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

23. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

25. Japan as a New Strategic Partner in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Author:
Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In April 2024, Japan joined the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) as a new strategic partner alongside the United States and the European Union. The 3SI was established in 2015 with the objective of strengthening connectivity and reducing the disparities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states. The initiative promotes the development of infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital sectors in the region surrounded by the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the relevance of this initiative and has underscored the frail infrastructure in the region and CEE’s economic dependence on Russia. As it becomes increasingly clear that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions are inseparable, Japan is compelled to serve as an active partner in the 3SI as its role is also closely connected to the quality of assistance and support to Ukraine. As Japan embarks on this new partnership with CEE and Baltic countries, however, moving beyond the rhetoric about the importance of this initiative and taking concrete action is a challenge that all the countries involved will have to grapple with. Japan’s dialogue with CEE, and in particular with the Visegrad-4 (V4) group, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, officially started in the early 2000s. For the past twenty years, the relationship has mostly been smooth and without major problems. However, Japan’s engagement with those countries has lacked dynamism, as Japanese foreign policy has mainly been focused on the United States and China. Japan’s investments in CEE have been limited and cautious, and visits from high-ranking Japanese officials have been sporadic. In fact, the visits to Japan by the heads of the states of the V4 and CEE countries have always outnumbered those by their Japanese counterparts. Twenty years later, as CEE countries are realizing that the economic benefit from China is not as great as they had expected, Japan is in a good position to rekindle this relationship. In a January 2022 interview with Nikkei, Akio Miyajima, Ambassador of Japan to Poland, argued that it is crucial for Japan to strengthen relations with these countries. At the time of the interview, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine, and the Ambassador lamented that Japan remained disinterested in the Ukraine issue. Since the invasion a month later, however, Japan has not only taken a clear stance in condemning Russia’s aggression, it has also taken a leadership role in investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine. One of the main concerns about the 3SI is that it currently lacks cohesiveness, as the twelve participating nations are too divided to agree on major joint investments. Another issue is that the initiative mainly takes place on the political level, and cooperation on other levels and dimensions are presently non-existent. How can Japan, in coordination with the United States and Europe, contribute to creating a more systematic approach to non-political partnerships and effective financial support for the participating nations of the 3SI? The topic is still under-researched and as Japan’s strategic partnership was formalized just last year, now is an ideal time for experts from Japan, the United States, and the EU to identify opportunities and common challenges, and discuss ways to jointly implement a roadmap as strategic partners in the 3SI framework. As 2025 marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the 3SI, it is critical for Japan and the other strategic partners to start contributing concretely to the initiative and to deepen their engagement with the participating nations. The tenth summit of the 3SI was held in Warsaw on April 28-29, 2025, and GMF Indo-Pacific partnered with the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, to publish this volume, which gathers the findings and perspectives of five authors from Japan, Europe, and the United States. Prof. Beata Bochorodycz of Adam Mickiewicz University and Dr. Bart Gaens of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs offer a European perspective on Japan’s potential role in the 3SI. Bochorodycz argues that Japan’s engagement will contribute greatly to regional infrastructure development while counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influences in the region. Gaens asserts that Japan’s interest in 3SI is multifold and covers several different areas: business and economics, development and connectivity, and geopolitics. However, he argues that there are also several challenges that impede Tokyo’s stronger involvement, and offers recommendations on its future engagement with the CEE countries. Anthony Kim of the Heritage Foundation and Mirna Galic, formerly with the United States Institute of Peace, contribute to this volume from American perspectives. Kim emphasizes the importance of the 3SI as a platform for attracting private sector investors and encourages Japan to go beyond its political partnership, while Galic reflects on how the 3SI may benefit Japan’s interests and analyzes concrete ways in which Tokyo can support the initiative. Finally, Ambassador Akio Miyajima, who served as Japanese Ambassador to Poland from 2020-2024, leans on his direct experience to recount the strategic evolution of Japan’s engagement with the CEE countries. He examines the Japanese government’s perspective from its first concerns about the expansion of Chinese influence in Europe to the major strategic recalibration that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ambassador Miyajima concludes by analyzing the current global uncertainty stemming from the second Trump administration and offers recommendations on ways to strengthen Japan’s position as a strategic partner to the 3SI.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Defense Cooperation, Strategic Partnerships, and Three Seas Initiative
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

26. Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Why Australia and Japan Must Lead in Capacity Building in Southeast Asia

Author:
Aaron Magunna
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Southeast Asian countries continue to face various maritime policy challenges. Beijing’s aggressive conduct toward other littoral states in the South China Sea and increased China-US tensions have highlighted the pervasiveness of traditional security threats while prospects for a more stable maritime order are undermined by the stalled negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Regional countries are also concerned about issues such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, the effects of the climate crisis, and illegal, unreported, and undocumented (IUU) fishing, which is estimated to cost ASEAN members up to $6 billion annually. Notably, these challenges are not solely linked to narrow maritime security issues but broader maritime governance capabilities, meaning the “capacity to enforce the framework of laws, regulations, policies, and institutions generated both within the legal jurisdictions of states and the international community.” As the new Trump administration has shifted US policy on aid, countries like Australia and Japan will have to increasingly step up in the delivery of maritime capacity-building programs in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Crime, Environment, Governance, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

27. The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Japan balances between Iran and the West and China deepens its ties to Tehran, Israel faces a shifting landscape demanding new regional approaches
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

28. Artificial intelligence in financial security: Legal challenges in Japan’s AML/CFT regime and comparative insights from selected EU countries

Author:
Dawid Trela
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This study examines the legal and regulatory challenges in deploying artificial intelligence (AI) within anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) systems in Japan (focal case) and in Germany, France, and Poland (purposive comparators). It identifies intra- and cross-jurisdictional gaps; assesses alignment with FATF Recommendations 1 and 15, the GDPR, and the EU AI Act; and distils transferable best practices. Doctrinal legal analysis and normative comparative methodology were employed, with limited functional observations where supervisory practice is documented. Sources include statutes and regulations, supervisory guidance, and case law issued from May 2015–May 2025, notably the EU AML package (Reg. (EU) 2024/1624; Dir. (EU) 2024/1640; Reg. (EU) 2024/1620) and the AI Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1689), as well as FATF materials and national guidance (BaFin, CNIL/Tracfin, JFSA). All jurisdictions permit AI in AML/CFT, yet frameworks remain fragmented and under-specified for algorithmic decision-making. Key gaps concern liability for algorithmic outcomes; tensions between transparency/explainability and tippingoff; and safeguards for automated decisions (GDPR Art. 22). Germany/France show higher supervisory maturity (explainability, auditability, DPIA, human-in-the-loop), whereas Japan/Poland rely chiefly on general data-protection duties with limited AML/AI-specific guidance, indicating the need for governance-heavy, auditable, human-in-the-loop designs. Better coordination of the AML, AI, and data-protection regimes is required to ensure both effectiveness and fundamental-rights protection. Japan could benefit from EU practices by formalising human-in-the-loop requirements for high-impact AML decisions, mandating DPIAs, enhancing auditability/reporting for high-risk models, and expanding regulatory sandboxing. The EU should continue aligning the AI Act with the AML Regulation (via AMLA guidance), clarifying oversight, documentation, and explainability expectations for AML use cases.
Topic:
European Union, Accountability, Artificial Intelligence, Data Protection, and Financial Security
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Poland, Germany, Japan, and Asia

29. Legacy or Liability? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis, Kristin Zhu, Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, Maeve Sockwell, Lauren Morganbesser, and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Allies are essential to U.S. strategic competition with China but carry costs and risks that require continuous, realistic management. Polarization in Washington has unfortunately impeded the correct approach: critics on the right are too narrowly focused on military power while advocates on the left underplay the real costs and risks involved in U.S. defense commitments. Across the political spectrum, experts are now calling on allies to shoulder more of the burden for security in the Indo-Pacific. This is positive, but plans to deepen U.S. alliances also need to weigh allied political will and the danger of being drawn into conflicts that do not serve vital U.S. interests. This report inventories these costs and benefits for seven key alliances across eight core areas of U.S.-China strategic competition. We conclude that: Japan can further U.S. aims with China across all eight categories, especially as its defense spending increases. It is willing to cooperate in several key areas and poses low risk of entanglement. Australia can make contributions at a more modest level. Political will to cooperate with the United States has increased but is not steady. Risk of entanglement is low. South Korea is reluctant to use its economic and military power to counter China but poses a substantial military burden and risk on the United States. Chip manufacturing and other nonmilitary capabilities help strengthen the case for the alliance. Key European allies—France, Germany, and the UK—will have a limited military role in the Indo-Pacific, but can support important technological, diplomatic, and political objectives of U.S. China strategy. The Philippines has advantageous military geography—but lacks other benefits and poses an entanglement risk in the South China Sea. We stress that if Washington consistently pursues a statecraft that undermines allied trust in the United States, allied leaders will not support U.S. global objectives, weakening America’s hand in competition with China. Some recent U.S. policies, such as the Trump administration’s broad tariffs, appear to have eroded trust. The United States does not need a revolution in its alliances, which remain a source of strength for America at a time when U.S. power is under strain globally. But Washington does need to move with greater caution when deepening them. Ensuring alliances serve the needs of American citizens at a time when the world is in flux will require realism, periodic reassessment, and continuous adaptation.
Topic:
Alliance, Strategic Competition, Polarization, Statecraft, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, North America, and United States of America

30. Japanese Economic Security as “Derisking”

Author:
Kazuto Suzuki
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “derisking” and how the Japanese Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) has responded to it within the framework of deterrence theory. It explores how ESPA allows deterrence by denial against economic coercion by other states and is itself a derisking measure. It contends that deterrence by denial, which means reducing dependency and improving resilience, could include stockpiling strategic materials, diversifying sources of supply, developing alternative materials, and developing alternative products. However, this paper argues that there is a need to strengthen the mechanism for collaborative deterrence by denial, such as the “Coordination Platform” presented at the G7 Hiroshima Summit. As for other forms of deterrence, such as institutional deterrence and deterrence by punishment, their effectiveness is insufficient, and they face many implementation problems. Therefore, this paper argues that the most optimal derisking strategy at this point is the combination of ESPA and the “Coordination Platform” to strengthen the capabilities of deterrence by denial.
Topic:
Risk, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

31. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

32. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

33. Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia's Industrial Giants

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Asia’s transformation in recent decades into a global manufacturing hub has fueled economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty. However, this success has also massively increased the region’s emissions footprint, making it essential for Asia’s industries to rapidly transition to green technologies and processes. “Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia’s Industrial Giants” assesses the future potential and trajectory for electrolyzers needed to meet green hydrogen (H2) demand in Asia’s four largest economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The report, which was commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero and carried out by Global Efficiency Intelligence, highlights the role of manufacturers as agents of change in the Asia’s net zero transition. The study focuses on the role of green H2 in three priority industries — steel, ammonia, and methanol — under various decarbonization scenarios. In these sectors, green H2 has the capacity to significantly reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive processes with renewable energy-powered electrolysis. Should the four countries adhere to their declared net zero targets, the collective market potential of electrolyzers for these industries is expected to skyrocket to $180 billion by 2050, with a compound annual growth rate as high as 12% between 2030 and 2040. This is nearly five times as large as the market potential under a business-as-usual scenario. The report offers a suite of recommendations for policymakers, industry players, investors, and think thanks aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of green H2 and electrolyzer manufacturing. These targeted strategies aim to collectively support a robust ecosystem for green H2 production and use in these countries toward a net zero industry.
Topic:
Industry, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

34. The Limits of Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Japan-ROK-China Relations After the Fukushima Wastewater Release

Author:
Daria Kurushina
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
More than a decade after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, causing the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the aftermath of the “triple disaster” continues to shape perceptions of Japan among its neighbors. The Japanese government’s decision to release into the sea more than a million tons of treated radioactive wastewater stored at the wrecked Fukushima plant beginning on August 24, 2023, decisively shifted the narrative of Japan’s experience: whereas the country was once viewed as the victim of one of the world’s worst nuclear disasters, it came to be seen by many in Northeast Asia as an atomic chemical antagonist. Following the announcement of the wastewater release, Japan faced an immediate backlash from neighboring countries and the international community over environmental and health concerns. The decision divided public opinion in both Japan and the broader Asia-Pacific region and threatened Japan’s attempts to position itself as the leader of a free, fair, and open Indo-Pacific. The Japanese government’s decision particularly roiled the public in Northeast Asia, where anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from the collective memory of Japan’s military ambition, colonialism, and atrocities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries persists. Meanwhile, authorities in some countries, especially China, intentionally stirred historical grievances and distrust in an attempt to undermine the trilateral relationship among Japan, Korea, and the United States. However, are concerns about the wastewater release warranted? In a Comprehensive Safety Review[1] the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the United Nations nuclear watchdog – determined that the release had no radiological impact on public health and the marine environment. Emphasizing the Fukushima plant’s compliance with “international safety standards,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi focused on the ongoing process of wastewater release and the Japanese’s government accountability for the water’s treatment, while also expressing concerns about the accumulation of tritium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that cannot be removed) in the water and the importance of further research on the effects of the wastewater on marine life. Driven by health concerns, geopolitical dynamics, and the absence of regional consultation, the Japanese decision provoked a furious public backlash among Asia-Pacific nations, particularly in South Korea and China. Relations among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and China have deteriorated in recent years amid rising security concerns over North Korea’s volatility, tensions between China and the United States, and wartime forced-labor reparations that caused long-term damage to Japan-ROK relations long before the rapprochement of 2023.[2] Participants in the Japan-ROK-China trilateral summit now have wastewater as another contentious topic to discuss during the renewed dialogue, which is scheduled to be convened in 2024. As the nuclear wastewater decision seems to have surfaced many thorny issues among the three countries, this paper seeks to explain the regional reaction to Japan’s decision, why this reaction matters, and how the trilateral relationship might evolve alongside the wastewater issue.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Crisis Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Fukushima

35. Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic and Military Horizons

Author:
Erik Isaksson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2023, Japan was on a steady trajectory toward a greater military and diplomatic footprint on the world stage, having just announced a new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Buildup Program in December 2022. These were part of a long-term effort to bolster Japan’s military capabilities and international profile, motivated by a ruling party that has sought these goals since its founding in 1955. Particularly since the start of the war in Ukraine these domestic motivations have gained in relevance by virtue of deteriorating international security. In 2024, we are likely to see Japan further develop its military capabilities, military exports and assistance, partly driven by hard security concerns, and partly by these domestic motivations. These motivations can in turn be understood as an effort to boost Japan’s international status.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

36. What Dilemma is Hampering Japan’s Rise to a Major World Power

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On January 1, 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida vowed to propel Japan to the forefront of the international arena amongst nation-states that have a proactive role in key global affairs and issues. In his New Year's address, Kishida affirmed that he will “exert leadership unique to Japan" through summit diplomacy to "overcome challenges," citing issues such as Russia's war on Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict. The Prime Minister’s comments come on the back of official figures released on February 15, 2024, showing that Japan’s economy has slipped to fourth place after being replaced by Germany as the world’s third largest economy. India is projected to overtake both Japan and Germany and become the world's third-largest economy during the current decade. Between Japan's aspirations to become a major global player and its evident economic decline, there are lingering questions about the obstacles it faces in transforming into a significant influential force in a world moving towards multipolarism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Economy, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

37. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:
Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:
International Relations and Research
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

38. Japan’s Border Measures during Covid-19: How the Crisis Shaped ‘Others’ to Protect the ‘Stability of Self’

Author:
Vuslat Nur Şahin Temel and Zhao Xiru
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic has prompted countries to implement a wide range of specific cross-border security measures. The fear and anxiety induced by this crisis have rapidly expanded and contracted countries’ understanding of ‘self’ and ‘other’. This study examines Japan’s shift from liberal pre- Covid-19 border policies to the most stringent border closure measures among the G7 countries during the pandemic. In this study, we argue that the pandemic-induced fear increased anxiety in Japan’s public health safety identity, rapidly reshaping the conceptualization of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ in crisis scenarios. This shift aligns with Japan’s historical narrative of combating unprecedented threats to public health.
Topic:
Borders, Public Health, Human Security, COVID-19, Isolation, Ontological Security, and Anxiety
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

39. Japan’s Supply Chain Policy and its Implications for South Korea

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This WEB paper analyzed Japan's supply chain policy in line with the implementation of Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, and presented policy implications such as supply chain cooperation between Korea and Japan. First, this paper analyzed the US-led reorganization of the global supply chain and the Japanese government's response to it. In particular, the Japanese government's economic security policy was evaluated from the perspective of how Japan approaches the US-led the global supply chain reorganization. Second, the Japanese government's supply chain policy was analyzed, focusing on the supply chain policy for some critical materials under the Economic Security Promotion Act. Finally, this paper proposed ways for Korea and Japan to cooperate in reshaping the global supply chain led by the United States.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

40. War with China: A View from Early 2024

Author:
Marco J. Lyons
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
US defense analysts are overdue for a fundamental reassessment of the strategic factors that would shape a future Sino-American war. The United States may lower the overall risk of sparking a war between Washington and Beijing by more formally committing advanced US capabilities in intelligence collection and targeting, long-range fires, and theater air and missile defense to Japan and South Korea and by initiating bilateral planning to introduce such capabilities in Taiwan in the future. The US defense community still lacks a broad and integrated national strategy for successfully managing the rivalry with China. A clear-eyed assessment of a possible United States-China war could lead to a national strategy.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

41. Beyond the Quasi-Alliance? An Analysis of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership

Author:
Daisuke Akimoto
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
This article examines a pathway of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” in recent years. Both countries have developed a special strategic partnership, referred to as a “quasi-alliance”. Hence, the purpose of this research is to contextualise the development of the Australia-Japan quasi-alliance from global, regional, and bilateral perspectives. Globally, the quasi-alliance has been influenced by power transition and hegemonic competition in global politics. Regionally, the quasi-alliance has been embedded into the trilateral and multilateral strategic frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Bilaterally, the quasi-alliance has been shaped by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). Nonetheless, close security ties were temporarily adrift over Australia’s submarine deal and realigned by tangible milestones, such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the new JDSC signed off in 2022. While investigating these footsteps of the quasialliance formation, this article considers whether both countries have moved beyond the quasi-alliance toward a full military alliance in the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Quad Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Australia

42. Japan’s Strategic Cooperation with NATO: Connectivity between Ukraine and Taiwan Crises

Author:
Tomonori Yoshizaki and Ayumi Teraoka
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
China’s global outreach and the War in Ukraine have pushed U.S. allies in Asia and Europe closer in recent years. Professor Tomonori Yoshizaki of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS), former Vice President of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, will help us understand the motivations behind the developing ties between Japan and NATO. He will explore the prospects of their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond and conclude by offering implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

43. Strategic Dynamism: 50th Anniversary of Relations and New Security Ties

Author:
Kei Koga
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Japan-Southeast Asia relations marked two milestones in 2023-24. The first was the 50th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN Relations, during which Japan and ASEAN emphasized an equal partnership by adopting the keyword “co-creation” to promote economic prosperity and security stability in Southeast Asia and beyond. The second is strengthening Japan-Philippines bilateral strategic ties, not only bilaterally, but also trilaterally with the United States and quadrilaterally with Australia. Japan continuously engages with other Southeast Asian states and strengthens ties with ASEAN to reinforce ASEAN Centrality and unity, yet a challenge remains: how Japan can design a regional architecture in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific by clarifying the roles and division of labor among those institutions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia

44. The New Cold War Is Sending Tremors through Northeast Asia

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
This dossier looks at how the US-led New Cold War against China is destabilising Northeast Asia, focusing on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Japan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Destabilization, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

45. Japan, the Philippines, and the United States: A New Era of Partnership through Trilateral Defense and Security Cooperation

Author:
Miyoko Taniguchi
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Miyoko Taniguchi, Professor of International Relations and Peace Studies at Miyazaki Municipal University in Japan, explains that the “strengthening of trilateral cooperation [between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines is a significant strategic move to institutionalize the deterrence and response capabilities of US allies and partners, especially to protect the territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and East China Sea.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Sovereignty, Partnerships, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

46. Japan's Arctic Policy: Current Status and Challenges

Author:
Sakiko Hataya
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Ms. Sakiko Hataya, Research Fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan, highlights the increasing importance of the Arctic in Japan's ocean policy and touches upon how Russia's invasion of Ukraine impacts the execution of Japan's Arctic policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sustainability, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Asia, and Arctic

47. United States, UNESCO, and International Relations through Cultural Heritage

Author:
Neel Kamal Chapagain
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Neel Kamal Chapagain, Professor at Ahmedabad University's Centre for Heritage Management, explains that "[c]ultural heritage is becoming a more prominent vehicle for building international ties" and "support for or opposition to global cultural heritage campaigns, like UNESCO, have been used [in US presidential campaigns] to make political statements."
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Heritage, UNESCO, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

48. US-Japan Alliance Resiliency Amid Risks

Author:
Daniel Aldrich and Lei Nishiuwatoko
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Daniel Aldrich and Ms. Lei Nishiuwatoko, Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University and M.S. Candidate at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, respectfully, explain that "[t]he United States and Japan are uniquely positioned to mitigate the existential risk of climate change" and explore how "further policy alignment on the possession and stockpile of nuclear materials... would further strengthen the alliance."
Topic:
Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Alliance, Resilience, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

49. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

50. The Future of Japan-Africa Cooperation: TICAD

Author:
Habib Badawi
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is diffi-cult to view Japan’s participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan’s failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests. As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently hei-ghtened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, International Cooperation, Economy, Trade, Strategic Interests, and Resources
Political Geography:
Africa and Japan

51. Japan’s multi-layered security strategy: Deterrence, coalition-building and economic security

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
At the end of 2022, Japan announced substantial changes to its defence posture with the publication of a new National Security Strategy, a National Defence Strategy, and a Defence Buildup Programme. These included a boosted defence budget and the addition of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. The policy shift is partly driven by the war in Ukraine, even if it can also be seen in the light of a much longer process of incremental changes. Furthermore, the new defence policy should be viewed in a broader context as part of Japan’s evolving multi-layered security strategy. In addition to deterrence, other central pillars of this multi-layered strategy include coalition-building through alignment, Official Security Assistance for developing countries, a normatively pragmatic engagement with the Global South, and economic security. Japan’s enhanced capabilities and increasingly proactive stance on coalition-building and alignment policy offer opportunities for cooperation, including with the EU and NATO. However, a more robust defence posture is offset by domestic challenges, including institutionalized self-imposed restrictions, political opposition, public opinion, economic and fiscal factors, and a greying population.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Aging, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

52. Rapprochement Despite Strategic Divergence: The Significance of the 2024 Japan-China-South Korea Summit

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After four and a half years of interruption, Japan, China, and South Korea finally held their trilateral summit. Initiated in 2008 and planned to be held annually, the summit has promoted three-way economic, trade, and cross-sectoral cooperation. Over the years, historical grievances, territorial disputes, and strategic divergencies between the three neighbours often derailed mutual engagement, thus disrupting the trilateral framework. In 2024, the timing was ripe for the leaders to meet again. The 9th summit has succeeded in restoring communication among Japan, China, and the ROK and in softening somewhat the rough edges of the trilateral framework. This approach reflects the shared understanding in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul that common challenges and goals, including ageing societies and enhanced connectivity of supply chains, require joint responses. As the other regional players in the wider Indo-Pacific, especially the smaller Southeast Asian nations, navigate an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment driven by major power rivalries, the restoration of dialogue among the three Northeast Asian heavyweights sends a positive signal to the whole region. The summit did not lead to major breakthroughs on sensitive matters. Future cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea will likely remain limited to the economic and non-traditional security domains, not crossing over to the more sensitive geopolitical, territorial, and national security issues. At the same time, taking into consideration the continuing divisions over security issues, the strategic significance of restored high-level dialogue among three highly interdependent economies and key geopolitical players in the Indo-Pacific region should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

53. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

54. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

55. Tokyo Has an Opportunity to Become a Financial Hub

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On his September trip to the United States, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attended the United Nations’ annual General Assembly session, and later gave a well-received speech at the Economic Club of New York. His remarks included a comment about how his administration was actively considering a series of policy steps intended to reinvigorate Tokyo’s place in the global financial system; raise Tokyo’s profile as an important financial hub for Asia; and implicitly, regain market share that had been long lost to Hong Kong, and more recently to Singapore. The prime minister’s intentions are laudable, and his suggestions are worth taking seriously. In any case, the proposals under consideration are generally good for financial markets in Tokyo. Cynics will ask whether the horse has left the barn. In a world where continuous face-to-face interaction is less and less necessary for financial transactions, it is fair to ask what it really means to be a financial hub in the twenty-first century. But Japanese officials are not wrong to be concerned about revitalizing Tokyo as an international financial center. Let’s start by acknowledging that the Japanese government—including the prime minister’s office, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Financial Services Agency (FSA), and other official bodies—is serious and prepared to take steps to make Tokyo an attractive place for international financial firms to situate their Asian headquarters. After years of asking market participants for recommendations, policymakers have in hand a menu of policy adjustments that make a lot of sense. The list is long, with proposals ranging from offering official business documentation in English, to having special one-stop and fast-track approval processes, to adjusting tax law. Adjustments to tax law are a major issue: for example, the creation of a temporary tax resident status, relaxation of exit tax rules for foreign nationals, and adjustment of tax rules related to the transfer of overseas assets are constructive, long-standing suggestions. Similarly, adjustments to immigration rules related to foreign domestic workers would make it easier for expats to replicate some of the lifestyle benefits that they enjoy in other areas of East Asia.1 Some of the proposals are easy-to-implement, low-cost, measures that would make life less difficult for foreign firms and expats who want to make Tokyo a regional base. And some of them (e.g., major changes to financial sector law and regulation) are harder to imagine, but possible. The three following observations can be made. First, essentially all of the world’s major financial centers of the twentieth century had common law–based legal and regulatory systems. Japan, like France, has a civil law–based system. This difference matters. Both systems function smoothly in the operational sense, but international finance has been dynamic precisely because it rests upon a legal framework that tends to be permissive with guardrails, as opposed to restrictive with an only-allowed-with-permission structure. The point here is not to litigate the virtues and failings of the world’s two most prominent legal systems. The point is that the Japanese government should be honest with itself about the legal and regulatory norms that it collectively thinks of as Japanese, in the context of attracting foreign financial firms to Tokyo. The right kind of policy shifts could be transformative. That said, from a political perspective, some of them will appear to be very challenging. Second, timing matters, and now may be the right time to take policy risks; a window of opportunity may be closing. The reabsorption of Hong Kong into the People’s Republic of China that started under Carrie Lam is now well advanced, and the city has gone from being the preeminent regional hub for Asian finance to being something much less. It continues to lose vitality. A city that had Anglo law with Chinese characteristics (and geography) is now a different place, having adopted Chinese rules with a superficial Anglo form. That transformation has been an unhappy experience for the cosmopolitan residents of the former crown colony, but it is an opportunity for competing financial centers. Singapore, to pick the obvious example, has benefited from Beijing’s heavy-handed approach to Hong Kong. With common law already in place, an existing and well-developed financial community, and not-dissimilar geographic advantages, Singapore is a natural option for regional headquarters and staff as the Hong Kong business environment deteriorates. But Singapore is physically smaller than Hong Kong, and if the latter occasionally felt like the Chinese version of the financial Wild West, the former feels more like a very buttoned-down, engineered community. So while some of what had been Hong Kong’s centrality, and commercial verve, has moved slightly west, a lot of it has been dispersed far and wide. Dubai has picked up some of the slack, and no doubt some of the business has moved back to London and New York—maybe as an interim step, or maybe for good. There is no preeminent Asian financial hub today. It is still in play, and that is a window of opportunity. Third, the metaphorical pie may be shrinking. What if—in a post-COVID world—a central fact of our new environment is that financial centers, like money itself, have been substantially dematerialized? Even the undisputed global financial centers—New York and London—have experienced some of this new reality. Bank and broker-dealer headquarters are no longer beehives of activity, creativity, and deal-making. They are more like corporate conference centers and operation hubs, only housing activities that require collective physical groups on an as-needed basis. Those activities should not be devalued, but these places are relatively empty shells compared to the Before Times (pre-2020). The large banks’ financial statements tell us that these changes have not hobbled actual financial activity, but the staff does not come to the office every day, and does not want to.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, Banking, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Tokyo

56. Japan’s Approach to the Global South

Author:
Tobias Harris
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in a January 2023 speech in Washington, DC, stressed that if the G7 countries and their developed-world peers neglect the “Global South”, “we will find ourselves in the minority and unable to resolve mounting policy issues.” These remarks set the stage for a major theme of Japan’s G7 presidency that year, during which Tokyo continued to highlight the importance of more “humility” to strengthen relations between the group’s members and the “Global South”. The G7 leaders’ communiqué at their May 2023 Hiroshima summit did not refer explicitly to the Global South—the United States and other nations did not necessarily share Japan’s preference for the term, which risks treating as monolithic an enormously diverse array of countries—but the document stressed the importance of addressing the needs of middle- and low-income states, including a commitment to “continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA)” and to adopting “innovative financing mechanisms”. This emphasis on outreach to the developing countries assumed greater urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when they were often reluctant to support Western efforts to isolate and punish the Kremlin for its aggression. Japan’s approach to the “Global South” is not merely rhetorical. The Kishida government inherited a long-standing approach to developing nations, particularly those in Asia, that seeks to leverage Japanese ODA and public and private investment. The approach has two goals: to promote growth and strengthen economic ties with developing countries, and to foster trust and political credibility that can be translated into influence. The strategy is shaped by Japan’s national interests but seeks to address developing countries’ economic needs without drawing them into an anti-Beijing bloc. The approach has worked well in Southeast Asia, where, thanks to decades of efforts by successive governments, Japan is viewed particularly favorably. Tokyo now appears increasingly determined to pursue the same strategy in other parts of the “Global South”, including South Asia, the Pacific island states, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Latin America. As Japan’s G7 peers seek to undertake their own initiatives to improve relations with the “Global South”, the key principles and successes of the country’s policies are worth examining.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Democracy, Business, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

57. Have Dynamic Spillovers and the Connectedness of Trade Policy Uncertainty Changed During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Sino–US Trade Frictions?

Author:
Chien-Chiang Lee and Farzan Yahya
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the spillover and connectedness between the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) of the United States (US), China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) under global geopolitical risk (GPR), infectious disease equity market volatility (EMVID), and GPR from North Korea (GPRNK) using a relatively novel time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) approach. Additionally, method of moments quantile regression is utilised to estimate the asymmetric effect of GPR, GPRNK, and EMVID on TPU. Our findings suggest that there is a high total and directional spillover amongst underlying variables during Sino–US trade friction that further elevated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period. The US is a net receiver of spillover from the TPU of all economies, while the Chinese TPU receives spillover from EMVID. The results further confirm that both the TPU of China (TPUCN) and the TPU of the US (TPUUS) are vulnerable to EMVID, but the effect is stronger for Chinese TPU in the higher quantiles. Although Japanese TPU is less vulnerable to GPR and EMVID, it is significantly exposed to GPRNK. Korean trade shows resiliency and immunity to pandemic-induced volatility and GPRNK.
Topic:
Trade Wars, Trade Policy, COVID-19, and Spillovers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

58. The Effect of COVID-19 on Firms’ Behaviour: The Case of Japan

Author:
Yuting Chen and Bin Ni
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since the onset of the coronavirus disease (COVID‐19) pandemic, social distancing practices and government‐mandated lockdowns have become the norm. These have cut off interaction amongst people, firms, and society, triggering an even larger decline in economic activity. In this study, we apply annual Japanese foreign affiliate data to quantify how COVID-19 has affected firms’ behaviour in various aspects. The estimation results show that both the revenue and purchasing behaviour of Japanese foreign affiliates were affected during COVID-19. This negative impact is mainly through the channel of stringent regulations imposed by host countries where affiliates are located. The general result we can derive from these findings is that COVID-19 negatively affects Japanese firms engaged in overseas activities. This leaves us with the question of when external shocks such as COVID-19 stand in the way of firms’ overseas activities, and what role the government should play to achieve a balance between safety and economic revival.
Topic:
Trade, COVID-19, Performance Evaluation, and Firms
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

59. Foreign Direct Investment, Brand Value, and Economic Performance: A Multinational Analysis

Author:
Tuba Yıldız, Ünal Arslan, Zeynep Ökten, Yıldız Sağlam Çelıköz, and Hale Kırmızıoğlu
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:
Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:
The visibility and dependability of multinational corporations’ products increase with the fact that they introduce their goods to markets in other nations through foreign direct investments. The method for presenting products to international markets through foreign direct investments reveals the product’s reputation and therefore the brand’s development value. This study examines the relationship between foreign direct investments and brand value in Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Spain, the USA, and the UK for the period 2007-2023. The majority of studies in the literature attempt to explain the impact of brand value on foreign direct investments. However, very few studies explain the impac foreign direct investments on brand value and 1st generation unit root tests were generally used. Unlike existing studies, In this study, the second-generation unit root test, Durbin-Hausman cointegration, and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation methods were used. As a result, it is anticipated that this study will contribute to the literature in this regard. The findings show that increases in foreign direct investments boost brand value.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Corporations, Data, and Branding
Political Geography:
Japan, China, United Kingdom, Canada, India, France, Spain, Australia, Global Focus, and United States of America

60. China, The United States And Japan In A Changing International Order: Historical Foundations Challenged By The Rise Of China

Author:
Cem Yılmaz
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
This study analyses bilateral relations among People’s Republic of China (China), the United States (US), and Japan by comparing the impacts of historical foundations on the one hand and a prominent contemporary factor, which is the rise of China. The study aims to compare basic historical data and the resilience of these data in the face of a rising China. The relationships among the three actors demonstrate that the historical legacy continues to hold prominence in Chinese perspectives of Japan, while the rise of the actor is prominent in American perspectives of China. Both historical legacy and a rising China factor are dominant in Japanese perceptions of China. The Japanese foreign policy towards China is characterised by a mutual reinforcement of both dimensions, resulting in an overall enhancement of their strength. The study, in this instance, demonstrated that historical parameters become less relevant when a contemporary parameter has the potential to have a major effect on history. The rise of China, which has resulted in a fundamental shift in the international order, and the decline in the importance of the historical dimension in the relationships between the actors under examination are viewed as two phenomena that reinforce one another.
Topic:
History, Geopolitics, and International Order
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

61. How Japan Thinks about Energy Security

Author:
Ben Cahill, Jane Nakano, and Kunro Irié
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Energy security is a significant challenge for Japan. As an import-dependent country, Japan has sought to protect itself from fossil fuel supply disruptions and shocks by cultivating strong relationships with exporting countries and investing throughout the energy value chain. More recently, both its largest utilities and its state institutions have focused on raising investment in renewable energy, aiming to decarbonize while retaining a diversity of energy sources. The country pledges ambitious but realistic emissions reductions. Transition pathways will vary in every country, and Japan naturally takes a different view on energy matters than resource-rich countries like the United States. Japan’s climate targets and energy planning show that progress is possible without following exactly the same trajectory as Washington or Brussels.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Sustainability, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

62. It is Time to Reconsider the Hereditary Succession of Politicians and Medical Practitioners in Japan: Reform Ideas to Overcome the Adverse Effects

Author:
Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
This article examines the current status and challenges of Japan’s hereditary succession system, focusing on the hereditary succession of politicians and medical practitioners. It argues that hereditary succession in these two professions has negative impacts on the political and social structures of Japan and proposes some reforms to address this issue. The following two conclusions were reached through the study. First, the hereditary succession of politicians is undoubtedly one of the root causes of the stagnation in politics, which discourages the young generation from engaging in politics. The time has come to rethink whether this is the right thing to do about hereditary succession from a voter perspective, which is a crucial issue in democracy. Second, the hereditary succession of medical practitioners is due to the three factors pointed out in this article. These factors contribute to the social effect of fixing part of the structure of society, which is undesirable as an obstacle to free occupational choice and equal opportunities for young people. It is, therefore, necessary to change the medical education route from a single track to a multiple track and decrease the proportion of hereditary succession so that a diverse range of people with humanity and compassion may become candidates for medical practitioners. This article suggests some possible ideas for reforms to achieve this goal. It is time to reconsider the hereditary succession of politicians and medical practitioners in Japan because the people need those who have humanity and compassion in their mission spirit to contribute to society over time.
Topic:
Politics, Equal Opportunity, and Hereditary Succession
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

63. Elections Aftermath, Session III: China, Taiwan, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance After the Elections

Author:
Andrew J. Nathan, Thomas Christensen, Satoru Mori, Ayumi Teraoka, and George Miller
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
In the third panel of the full-day conference co-sponsored by Columbia University and Keio University, authorities on East Asian and global politics delve into the challenges and opportunities arising from leadership transitions in both Tokyo and Washington and how the two allies can address security challenges surrounding the Taiwan Strait. (Please note: This is a partial video edited in accordance with speaker preferences.) Speakers: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University Thomas Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University Satoru Mori, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University Ayumi Teraoka, Postdoctoral Research Scholar and Lecturer, Columbia University George Miller, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs and Adjunct Professor, Columbia’s Journalism School (moderator)
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, and United States of America

64. Toward A Comparative History of Sexual Violence and War - A Book Talk with Feminist Chizuko Ueno

Author:
Chizuko Ueno and Carol Gluck
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Speaker: Chizuko Ueno, Professor Emerita University of Tokyo, Chief Director of the Non Profit Organization, Women’s Action Network Moderator: Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Columbia University Sexual violence in war is a perennial and a global phenomenon. The “comfort women” system of sexual slavery in Asia and sexual assaults by Allied soldiers in Europe during World War II, the rape camps in Bosnia in the 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia -- the list is long and continues to this day. Based on her book, A Comparative History of War and Sexual Violence, Ueno explores a range of issues, including the discourse of victimhood and the question of agency, rape as a weapon of war, and also love and “horizontal collaboration” between enemies. A provocative argument from Japan’s leading feminist and influential social activist. Speaker Bio: Chizuko Ueno is an emeritas professor at the University of Tokyo. Chief Director of the Non Profit Organization, Women’s Action Network ( http://wan.or.jp/) . A leading feminist theorist and an influential social critic, a prolific author of books and articles and a high-profile intellectual in Japan. In 1994, one of her many acclaimed books, Kindai Kazoku no Seiritsu to Shuen (The Rise and Fall of the Modern Family), won the coveted Suntory Academic Award. English publications are available as follows; The Modern Family in Japan: Its Rise and Fall (2009), Nationalism and Gender (2004). Asahi Shinbun Award winner in 2012 for her contribution to feminism and women’s studies, in addition to studies of care. Received Hän Honor from the Finnish government in 2019 for the contribution to promote gender equality. Selected as a member of American Academy of Art and Sciences in 2020. Event sponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by the Japan Research Program.
Topic:
War, History, Sexual Violence, Comfort Women, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

65. Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity

Author:
Ken Kushida
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Japan’s extreme demographic aging and shrinking is an economic and societal challenge, but also a technological opportunity for global leadership. Technological trajectories of worker automation and worker skill augmentation within Japan are already being shaped by the country’s demographics. Software, robotics, and other technology deployments are transforming the nature of work in a wide range of sectors in Japan’s economy, and across types of work such as blue-collar, white-collar, agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Specific ways in which Japan’s demographics shape technological trajectories include market opportunities, acute labor shortages, and favorable political and regulatory dynamics. The private sector is driving technology deployments in industrial sectors hit hard by Japan’s aging population, ranging from construction and transportation to medical care and finance, with strong government support in each of the domains. Demographically driven technological trajectories play to Japan’s strengths in implementing, deploying, and improving technologies rather than generating breakthrough innovations. Japan’s demographically driven technological trajectory can be an important platform for international technology cooperation, fitting with the top U.S.-Japanese political leadership agreements on fostering strong innovation and technology collaboration ties. Japan’s start-up ecosystem, often in partnership with large incumbent firms, will be critical in deploying new technologies by defining new markets and providing new offerings. An effective analysis goes beyond broad demographic numbers to delve into specific pain points of particular segments of society to better capture their situations and roles in shaping market opportunities that drive technological adoption. This introductory paper: (1) defines key analytical concepts; (2) surveys some of Japan’s key demographic shifts; and (3) highlights cases from agriculture, construction, transportation, healthcare, eldercare, land, and housing ownership.
Topic:
Demographics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Aging
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

66. Camp David and US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation: Consolidating the Northeast Asia Anchor in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Yasuyo Sakata
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Yasuyo Sakata provides a historical overview of US-Japan-ROK defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, from the Korean War to the Camp David Summit, explaining how the trilateral partnership was redefined as an Indo-Pacific partnership and incorporated the “Northeast Asia Anchor.” Sakata argues that Japan and the United States have taken the lead in reconstructing the Indo-Pacific security architecture through their Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies, and that the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship has been incorporated into this framework alongside other alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. Sakata explores how Korea’s shift back towards the Indo-Pacific under President Yoon’s leadership has allowed for expansion of the scope of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, as affirmed during the Camp David Summit. However, Sakata contends that a comprehensive defense approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific involving allies and partners to build upon this foundation and strengthen defense and security cooperation amidst the challenges posed by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, maritime security, cybersecurity, and space. Action is essential, as time is running out to solidify gains from the Camp David Summit and build a stable relationship. Therefore, Sakata argues that Japan and South Korea should strengthen relations deliberately yet cautiously before domestic politics potentially spoil recent progress.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

67. Trilateralism in the Wake of the 2022 Jolt Toward Bipolarity in the Indo-Pacific and World

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Gil Rozman argues that trilateralism reached unprecedented levels in the first two decades of the 21st century. Russia, Japan, and South Korea each sought different triangular frameworks to position themselves at the pivot of great power relations in Northeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region. However, Rozman contends that by 2024 trilateralism had shifted to reinforce bipolarity amidst great power competition. After describing three types of triangular frameworks, Rozman examines the transformation of trilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region from 2022 to 2024 (particularly in Northeast Asia), analyzes the challenges military security, economic security, and national identity gaps pose to trilateralism, and evaluates the potential impact of leadership on triangular relationships. The shift from what Rozman calls triangular pivots to alliance triangles in international relations is primarily driven by security concerns yet also by economic vulnerability and national identity gaps. For Korea, the US-Japan-ROK alliance triangle, which was solidified at the Camp David Summit, is at the center of triangular solidarity. Given the polarized international and regional environment, Rozman argues it is unlikely that leadership could reverse the current trend of alliance triangle consolidation in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Regional Politics, and Trilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

68. Friends in space: NATO and Japan cooperation beyond the skies

Author:
Nanae Baldauff
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO and Japan share compelling reasons for space security cooperation: worldwide ownership of space assets; Japan as among six most capable space powers; and the application of Article 5 to space. Japan is attractive to NATO in terms of space technology, space capabilities, operation, and funding. NATO is attractive to Japan because NATO is becoming a backbone of space-based data hub contributing to the Alliance’ Multi-Domain Operations. NATO-Japan space security cooperation should be pursued through political, operational, educational, and industrial/commercial partnership, and joint training and exercises.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, and Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

69. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and East China

70. Ishiba Takes the Helm: A New Kind of Leader for Japan

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) leadership elections are normally staid and predictable affairs. But scandals in the LDP and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s radical decision to dissolve powerful party factions disrupted business as usual. In an unusually dramatic election on September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged as the new party president — and automatically became prime minister of Japan. Ishiba, a long-standing fixture in the ruling LDP who had run for the position four times before, surprised many observers by defeating eight other contenders including powerful party veterans, popular “young Turks,” and a prominent female lawmaker. He immediately called for a general election on October 27 as an opportunity to secure a mandate for his policies during the often short-lived “honeymoon” for a new prime minister. For the United States, Ishiba brings a strong commitment to the security relationship, albeit from an approach and perspective that have the potential to disrupt the current progress in modernizing the alliance. He has advocated for a more equal partnership and for revisiting the foundational documents that govern the status of the U.S. troops stationed throughout the archipelago. It is an open question whether that element of his campaign rhetoric will translate into governing policies; indeed, he has already appeared to walk back some of his positions, including calling for an “Asian NATO” ahead of the general election. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of many regional security arrangements, any significant change to the bilateral relationship could alter the stability and order of the broader Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Elections, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Prime Minister, and Fumio Kishida
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

71. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

72. On Alliances in Northeast Asia

Author:
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Duyeon Kim, and Yuka Koshino
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Over the past two years, delegations to Washington from Japan and South Korea have one predominant question for their interlocutors: What would a Trump 2.0 administration mean for their countries and for U.S. global leadership more broadly? Both Asian capitals appreciate the upgrades to their bilateral pacts with the United States under the Biden administration’s alliance-centric foreign policy, and express anxiety about the possible return of Trump as commander-in-chief. Even before his election in 2016, Trump had expressed open disdain for U.S. alliances and that skepticism could be amplified in a second term by his “America First” approach. With Kamala Harris now at the top of the Democratic ticket, Washington analysts assume broad continuity in her foreign policy approach, although nuances may yet emerge. But while a Harris election and a second Trump presidency contrast sharply on policy and style, the views from Seoul and Tokyo point to enduring elements of American foreign policy that are likely in either outcome. In many ways, Trump and Harris share an approach to U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Upon taking office in 2017, Trump fractured the Obama administration’s core economic pillar of the so-called rebalance to Asia by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This divorce drew dismay particularly from Japan; Tokyo had seen the 12-nation free trade pact as its primary tool to blunt China’s rising economic sway over the region and to reinforce its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). The Biden-Harris administration has similarly expressed little enthusiasm for re-joining the reformed version that Japan salvaged after the U.S. withdrawal, and its signature regional economic policy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IFEP) lacks the market access that the region’s economies crave. Japan and South Korea also had misgivings about the passage of domestic economic legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act that would have penalized South Korean and Japanese investment in the United States. “Friend-shoring” rhetoric aside, both Seoul and Tokyo see either leader forging an industrial policy that defaults to protectionist trade practices. Both Japan and South Korea are also concerned about diminishing American leadership of the world and the ascendance of illiberal, authoritarian blocs. Biden and the Democratic Party have generally promoted U.S. alliances as underpinning a world order that promotes stability and the rule of law. Yet during Biden’s presidency, wars in Europe and the Middle East have flared, threatening to distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific priorities and driving deep divisions in public opinion both domestically and internationally. Trump and his Republican colleagues, on the other hand, mostly disapprove of U.S. military involvement in international conflict and fidelity to international alliances, particularly NATO. A Trump administration could undermine the rules-based system by brokering deals with authoritarian leaders, neglecting multilateral institutions that seek to quell conflict, and reinforcing the rising ideological isolationism in U.S. politics. Trump and Biden policy convergences aside, Seoul’s and Tokyo’s experiences with each president are starkly different. A Trump presidency would almost certainly present deeper challenges to each country and disrupt the web of security partnerships that both countries view as broadly stabilizing. How Trump would approach the China challenge is likely to be the central question: Will he be relatively supportive of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific if he sees them as amplifying U.S. power and deterrence? Or will he seek to cut his own deals with Beijing that excludes allies’ interests? Would he demand multifold increases in the burden-sharing agreements supporting the U.S. military presence in the region that allies would resist? A separate set of questions arises considering a Democratic victory. Would Harris opt to continue Biden’s approach to alliances? Would her administration see the Indo-Pacific as equally important to the trans-Atlantic partnership? Would Harris’s foreign policy team have a different view of how to handle strategic competition with China? All of these yet-unanswered questions loom large for Japan and South Korea over the coming months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Alliance, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

73. From broad unilateralism to narrow multilateralism in semiconductor chip controls

Author:
Douglas Fuller
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Almost two years into the broad and unilateral chip controls launched by the Biden administration in October 2022 on admittedly broadly-defined national security grounds, there is evidence of significant success in limiting China’s expansion of advanced fabrication (i.e. chipmaking) for the next decade. The success of this American-initiated project has come from refining policy and pursuing policy coordination with key allies, especially Japan and the Netherlands. There are still concerns about China’s expansion of legacy chips and access to AI chips.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan, Netherlands, Global Focus, and United States of America

74. Whaling politics: two worlds that never meet

Author:
Minori Takahashi
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The arrest and detention of environmental activist Paul Watson in Greenland drew renewed attention to Japan’s whaling, specifically the commercial whaling that resumed in July 2019. Japan stopped commercial whaling of large whales in the Antarctic in 1986-87 and coastal whaling by March 1988, following decisions in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). With the stated aim of gaining sufficient knowledge to re-start commercial whaling, Japan conducted research whaling for ecological and resource data, as IWC regulations permit member states to do. In 2010, Watson’s group physically interfered with a ship contributing to Japan’s Whale Research Program near Antarctica, leading Japan to issue a red notice against him through Interpol. 14 years later, in response to Japan’s request, Danish authorities in Greenland, constitutionally linked to Denmark but with extensive autonomy, detained Watson during a refuelling stop. The arrest prompted protests in Europe and an online petition with over 720,000 signatures for his release. Joining the cause are renowned actors, acclaimed filmmakers and even parliamentarians and city mayors. Watson’s legal team claimed the incident was political and that Japan was exploiting Greenland. Faced with intense opposition from otherwise friendly nations, why does Japan continue to engage in whaling?
Topic:
Environment, Politics, European Union, Conservation, and Whaling
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, and Asia

75. Trump 2.0, South Korea’s Martial Law, and Future of Seoul-Tokyo Relations

Author:
Andy Lim and Ji-Young Lee
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Donald Trump, and Martial Law
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

76. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

77. Once Again, Leadership Transitions Challenge US-Japan Alliance

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

78. Regional Overview: The Year of Elections (Finally) Ends

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest). While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government. Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. Spring 2024 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS SUREN TADEVOSYAN BALANCING POWERS: AZERBAIJAN’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AMIDST REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES ………………………….. 6 TIANPING CHE JAPAN JOINS AUKUS: MOTIVATIONS, PROGRESS, AND IMPACT ..………. 22 KNARIK SARGSYAN BETWEEN BLOCS AND BLOCKADES: QATAR’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC MANEUVERS ……………………………….……………….. 44 GUO SONG THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE ………………….…………... 64 BOOK REVIEW: ARTYOM TONOYAN AHMED ZAHID SHAHAB AND ALI AKBAR. (2023). IRAN’S SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ……………………………….………………. 84
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Role Conceptions, AUKUS, Regional Security, Alliance, GCC, Diplomacy, Security, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Eurasia, Japan, Asia, United States of America, Qatar, Gulf Nations, Middle East, Palestine, and Israel

80. The Future of Japan-Africa Cooperation: TICAD

Author:
Habib Badawi
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is diffi-cult to view Japan’s participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan’s failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests. As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently hei-ghtened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
Political Geography:
Africa, Japan, and Asia

81. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

82. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

83. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:
Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

84. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

85. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:
Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

86. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:
Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

87. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

88. Strengthening the Shield: Japan’s Defense Transformation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Joseph I. Grimm, and Rebecca Wittner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan’s government released three major strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. Although Japan has made incremental changes to its security policies and capabilities over the last decade, the new documents mark a notable shift in Japan’s approach to strengthening its defense. The documents reflect Tokyo’s assessment of the rising threats that could challenge Japan’s security and signal Japan’s commitment to build the military capabilities necessary to meet them. This report examines Tokyo’s defense transformation and assesses its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. Japan is “fundamentally reinforcing” its national security and defense policies to cope with its increasingly severe security environment. The military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have been growing steadily for years but appear to be peaking simultaneously. Tensions between Japan and China have occasionally flared in the five decades since they normalized diplomatic relations. But those tensions have reached new heights since 2012, when China began to regularly contest Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By August 2022, Beijing fired five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during China’s live-fire military exercises after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The aim of the missile launches was to signal there would be consequences for Japan if Tokyo were to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unprecedented rate of missile testing since 2022 and Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine have deepened Japanese concerns about the potential for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is taking steps to improve its ability to defend itself and deter an invasion, including through changes to security funding and policy. Tokyo has announced plans to increase its defense spending by 65 percent over the next five years, acquire standoff weapons that could be used for a counterstrike mission, and adopt an “active cyber defense” posture. Japan has clarified the roles of its military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Coast Guard in the event of an attack; committed to establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters for SDF operations; and created a program for supplying partner militaries with security assistance. Effectively employing counterstrike and active cyber defense, however, will require a clearer delineation of the legal authorities for their use as well as the overall military strategies that they would support. In addition, pressure from the Japanese public over tax hikes required to pay for the defense spending increase amid other fiscal pressures could pose a barrier to implementation. Japan plans to strengthen the SDF through boosting readiness and resilience of current forces, acquiring counterstrike and other advanced capabilities, and improving force posture and mobility. The SDF has been plagued by a chronic lack of munitions and other supplies, and most of its facilities do not meet its own standards for resilience against enemy attack. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, though these types of programs often lose out to more high-profile programs. For its counterstrike mission, Japan has announced it will buy U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This initial purchase will provide a stopgap until Japan is able to produce its own longer-range missiles later in the decade. Japan has also announced it will pursue new capabilities in uncrewed systems, space, cyber, and artificial intelligence (AI). But fulfilling these ambitions will be challenging given some short-falls in Japan’s technology base and SDF personnel. Lastly, the SDF is grappling with how to expand its forces in Japan’s southwest islands while maintaining a sufficient presence throughout the country to deter aggression from a range of possible threats. Next, Japan’s strategy emphasizes enhancing security partnerships regionally and across the globe. Japan has recently stepped up its defense cooperation with several Indo-Pacific and European countries. With Australia, Japan is building on a 10-year effort to deepen strategic cooperation, a process that culminated in January 2022 with the completion of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. New bilateral strategic cooperation includes enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the Australian military, increasing rotational SDF training deployments to Australia, and announcing a new joint security declaration that commits to a combined response to military contingencies. Similarly, Japan has long recognized the strategic importance of India and continues to build on the Japan-India relationship through maritime security cooperation, a new joint fighter exercise, and operationalization of their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan and the Philippines are also expanding their defense ties through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training exercises and an important emerging trilateral security relationship with the United States. Over the past year, Japan and South Korea have made significant strides to repair relations since the latest downturn that began in 2018. This will be an incremental process, but there has been progress in the form of leader-level summits and ministerial dialogues, plans to cooperate on sharing data about North Korean missiles, and new trilateral ballistic missile and anti-submarine drills with the United States. Japan also is building defense connections and relationships with European nations. It is pursuing the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy and, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, has sought to deepen strategic ties with NATO. These comprehensive changes to Japan’s defense policies will necessarily reshape the military and security pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities will position Japan to potentially take on some offensive tasks, even while retaining its primarily defensive orientation. This also has implications for alliance contingency planning related to defending Japan directly as well as around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. However, increased joint planning will require updates to alliance command and control (C2) and information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, given resource constraints, the alliance would be well-served to find additional opportunities for military technology sharing, codevelopment, and coproduction, such as through Japanese involvement in the second pillar of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) partnership focused on cooperation on advanced capabilities and defense technology innovation. And the alliance must take steps to improve force posture and readiness, including through enhancing base resiliency and increasing munitions stockpiles. Japan’s fundamental transformation of its defense posture will mean significant changes for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States must adapt its approach to alliance coordination to maximize new opportunities and manage any new challenges. In this context, U.S. policymakers should: Prepare to update the alliance, while recognizing that Japan’s new defense policies will require significant time, resources, and political will to implement. Stay closely aligned with Tokyo on the threat land- scape as well as engagement with geopolitical competitors, especially China. Integrate U.S.-Japan command and control structures. Create an alliance readiness, resilience, and posture implementation task force. Deepen planning for contingencies and bolster extended deterrence. Create a road map for expanding defense technology cooperation concurrently with Japan’s implementation of specific improvements to its information security practices and infrastructure. Innovate operational concepts for uncrewed systems and counterstrike capabilities. Leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance as a hub for minilateral and multilateral security engagement. Build U.S.-Japan alliance mechanisms that will expand cooperation on cyber security and defense. Stand up an alliance dialogue on military personnel issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

89. What Japanese Tourism Amenities are Influenced in Terms of Affecting Inbound Tourist Demand?

Author:
Yoko Konishi and Takashi Saito
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since 2012, the number of inbound tourists to Japan has increased every year, and new records of tourism-related economic indicators are being updated. On the other hand, the sudden inbound boom has led to a concentration of travel destinations, and over-tourism has become a problem. In this paper, we first statistically observe the concentration of tourists by accommodation type for each country of origin. Second, by identifying tourism amenities that contribute to inbound demand, we gain the knowledge necessary to shift demand from facilities with a high concentration of inbound tourists to facilities with lower occupancy. For the analysis, we utilised establishment data from the Online Travel Agency ‘Accommodation Travel Statistics Survey’ and data on tourism resources by region. The results show that the number of rooms, average price, membership of the hotel in a chain, internet availability, room type, number of World Heritage sites, and number of direct flights positively affect inbound demand. In particular, for ryokan (Japanese-style inns) with low occupancy rates and inbound guest ratios, their independence, internet availability, Western-style room availability, number of World Heritage sites, and hot spring facilities are effective in capturing demand.
Topic:
Economics, Tourism, Hospitality, and Travel
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

90. The COVID-19 Pandemic and World Machinery Trade Network

Author:
Kozo Kiyota
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In light of the importance of the machinery trade in global trade, this study examines whether the patterns of machinery exports changed significantly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Frameworks of network analysis and structural break analysis are applied to monthly level bilateral export data from January 2016 to March 2022. The main findings are threefold. First, positive structural change is found in exports in major machinery-exporting countries. Second, negative structural change in centrality is found in Japan and some ASEAN Member States (AMS), which implies a decline in the relative importance of these countries in the global machinery network. Third, the decline in Japanese centrality was not caused by the decline in export values or number of destination countries. Rather, it is attributable to the decline in the centrality of Japan’s export destination countries such as AMS. Noting that Japan has a relatively strong trade relationship with AMS, these results together suggest that the negative shock of the pandemic spread throughout the supply chain, which led to the decline in the relative importance of some countries – such as Japan – in the global machinery trade network.
Topic:
Exports, Trade, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia

91. Book Talk with Jessamyn Abel, Author of "Dream Super-Express"

Author:
Jessamyn Abel, Takuya Tsunoda, and Ariana King
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
A symbol of the "new Japan" displayed at World's Fairs, depicted in travel posters, and celebrated as the product of a national spirit of innovation, the Tōkaidō Shinkansen—the first bullet train, dubbed the "dream super-express"—represents the bold aspirations of a nation rebranding itself after military defeat, but also the deep problems caused by the unbridled postwar drive for economic growth. At the dawn of the space age, how could a train become such an important symbol? In Dream Super-Express (Stanford University Press, 2022), Jessamyn Abel contends that understanding the various, often contradictory, images of the bullet train reveals how infrastructure operates beyond its intended use as a means of transportation to perform cultural and sociological functions.
Topic:
History, Infrastructure, Sociology, Culture, Economic Growth, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

92. To the Brighter Side. New Tendencies in Erecting Statues of Bodhisattva Jizō in Japanese Buddhist Temples

Author:
Alīse Eishō Donnere
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Japan is a predominantly atheistic country, however, Buddhism is still keeping its influence on society. Firstly, funerals are mostly performed according to the Buddhist ritual. Secondly, several times a year the majority of Japanese families visit their relatives’s graves in cemeteries, belonging to Buddhist temples. As a result, Buddhism is associated first of all with death and funeral. Buddhist priests try to make the image of Buddhism brighter in many ways. In this article, we will look at one of these ways – erecting statues that depict simultaneously the beloved bodhisattva Jizo, the priests themselves, visitors and the dead relatives.
Topic:
Religion, History, Buddhism, Death, and Jizo
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

93. Introducing the Research Project “Sacred Narrative – The Political Dimension of Japanese Mythology"

Author:
Klaus Antoni, Julia Dolkovski, and Louise Neubronner
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The Kojiki and Nihon shoki have been integral to the formation of Japanese identity, especially since the 18th century. As such, they were constantly exposed to processes of sacralization and desacralization, i.e., the attribution and removal of authority. The research project “Sacred Narrative – The Political Dimension of Japanese Mythology” is concerned with how certain systems of thought or ideology used these texts in a way that raised them to an elevated position or deprived them of it. Organized in three focus areas, the project delves into the topic of the historical change the Kojiki and Nihon shoki underwent in terms of interpretation and instrumentalization from the Edo period up to modern-day Japan. These investigations are integrated into the research group “De/Sacralization of Texts” at the University of Tübingen that started its work in January 2022. In this interdisciplinary context, “Sacred narrative” seeks to promote the integration of East-Asian textuality into general theory formation.
Topic:
Politics, Culture, Identity, and Mythology
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

94. Starr Forum | Reinventing Japan...Again?

Author:
Richard Samuels, Mary Brinton, Eric Heginbotham, Ulrike Schaede, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Panelists discussed the changes underway in Japan across three domains: business, national security, social relations, and—undergirding each, in public opinion.
Topic:
National Security, Public Opinion, Business, and Social Relations
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

95. Reverse Modernization Analysis: Exploring a History of How Vested Interests Were Politically Marginalized before Modern Economic Development

Author:
Makio Yamada
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
This working paper experiments with what the author calls “reverse modernization analysis,” that is, revisiting the historical West from the perspective of today’s developing countries instead of the teleological approach of modernization theory (just like engineers do reverse engineering). We know today that democracy and authoritarianism alike have witnessed both positive and negative cases of economic development. Therefore, instead of questioning the economic consequence of polity, the paper commences an exploration of an alternative historiography of development focused on how underproductive vested interests were politically marginalized—a political settlement necessary for modern economic development. It briefly examines five major country cases in the period before the 20th century: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preliminary empirical analysis shows that the decline of conservative elites, which is divided into three patterns—revolution, ruler’s alliance, and parliamentary politics—was caused by sui generis courses of events rather than by common systematic factors. This finding may be frustrating, but implies that political games are like sports games: even if a team does its best, victory is not guaranteed when the opponent plays well. The team still needs to stay ready to take advantage of windows of opportunity when they open.
Topic:
History, Economic Development, Modernization, and Vested Interest
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, and Asia

96. Challenges for Feminist-Informed Foreign Policy: Militarisation and Australia’s engagements via AUKUS and NATO

Author:
Christine Agius, Annika Bergman Rosamond, Toni Haastrup, and Katharine A.M. Wright
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
In recent years, Australia has assessed the global and regional security environment as increasingly unstable.i The rising economic and military power of China and broader challenges to the ‘rules based international order’ seemingly signal a period of instability, prompting a reconsideration of Australia’s defence capacity and role in the region. Meanwhile, new forms of cooperation with like-minded states have emerged, most notably the AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021 by then Prime Minister Scott Morison with bipartisan support, which binds Australia more closely with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) militarily. Australia has also strengthened its relations with NATO, aspiring to play a central role in the Indo-Pacific region as a NATO partner, alongside Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. In this AFFPC Issues Paper, we explore the contradictions and tensions that emerge in the framing of national security threats and whether there are opportunities for more inclusive peace and security as promoted by the principles of feminist-informed foreign policy. For example, amidst this focus on militarisation, when the Australian Labor Party (led by Prime Minister Albanese) assumed power in 2022, Foreign Minister Penny Wong articulated a new foreign policy direction, which seemed to leverage broader attention towards feminist-informed acts and commitments. Wong promised that Australia would focus more attention on listening to its regional Pacific partners and committed to enacting a First Nations foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Feminism, Militarization, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Indo-Pacific

97. The global future of nuclear energy

Author:
Matt Bowen
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Energy supply is an integral and essential part of modern society. Since nuclear energy provides low-carbon, baseload power, it could play a larger global role in addressing growing energy demands while reducing the risks of climate change and air pollution. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted energy security as a national imperative that nuclear power could help countries to achieve. Both preserving the existing fleet of reactors and building new advanced nuclear power plants could play a role in achieving deep decarbonization of electricity supply systems by mid-century. Public support, designs with greater inherent safety, licensing advanced reactors, and reasonable costs and schedules will be integral parts of this strategy. Nuclear power’s future would also benefit from national governments putting renewed emphasis on spent nuclear fuel disposition. This report by Matt Bowen discusses a number of actions that the United States, Japan, and other civil nuclear allies could pursue so that nuclear energy can play a larger role in overcoming the challenges related to energy demand, energy security, and associated environmental and public health risks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

98. Diverging Perspectives on Improving Bilateral Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Joint Opinion Poll

Author:
Yul Sohn, Yang Gyu Kim, and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2023, relations between South Korea and Japan began to thaw. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea announced the solution to address disputes regarding forced labor under Japanese colonial rule in March, six bilateral summits were held in the following six months. Intergovernmental exchange has also rapidly increased. With mediation from the United States, South Korea and Japan established consultative groups to address various issues, creating channels of communication between their foreign affairs, defense, industry, finance, and national security offices. People-to-people exchanges, primarily driven by tourism, have also returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Since 2012, they have been stuck over the issue of Comfort Women, and after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, they were in a standoff over the issue of forced labor, a period that can be considered a “crisis of trust” between the two governments. Is 2023 really a year for both countries to put the “lost decade” behind them and usher in a new era? How do the citizens of both countries assess the changes in relations between their two governments? What do they think is the driving force behind the improvement in relations? Has mutual perception improved as relations have improved? Do they perceive that the historical issues, the culprits of the “lost decade,” are being resolved? The results of this year’s survey, marking the 11th year since initiated in 2013, are very interesting and carry significant potential interpretations and policy implications. Firstly, citizens of both countries perceived an improvement in their bilateral relations. Positive evaluations have reached their highest levels, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest points since the survey began. Secondly, there is a noticeable difference in the way citizens of both countries view the progress in bilateral relations. In the case of Japan, favorable opinions have increased with rising favorability toward South Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, and support for a solution to the issue of forced labor. On the other hand, South Korean public opinion has not seen a corresponding increase in positive sentiment regarding these issues, despite increased awareness of an improved relations. Thirdly, these result disparities are reflected in how citizens of both countries assess their governments’ efforts to improve relations. Japanese public opinion supports the efforts of both their own government and the South Korean government to improve relations, while South Korean public opinion has not shown strong support for them. Fourthly, historical issues continue to be a major variable affecting bilateral relations. Citizens of both countries consider historical issues as the primary factor in the development of bilateral relations. South Korea focuses on Japan’s historical perceptions, including issues related to wars, history textbooks, forced labor, and Comfort Women. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned with South Korea’s stance, including anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. From this survey, it can be interpreted that South Korea believes Japan’s historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes that South Korea’s anti-Japanese stance is being corrected. However, the fact remains that there are still significant differences in historical perceptions between the two countries. The implications of the survey results are clear. Both countries need to expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and the economy while also making progress towards reconciliation in historical perceptions. Only when these two wheels of functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move together can the South Korea-Japan relationship truly move onto the right track.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Polls, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

99. 2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan and the ROK-Japan Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO conducted the 11th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll in August and September 2023 to gauge the attitudes of people in both countries regarding their bilateral relations. EAI has presented the survey findings in chart format within the "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." According to the results, citizens of both South Korea and Japan assessed that their bilateral relations have advanced and expressed positive opinions about strengthening cooperation in areas like security and economics, both bilaterally and multilaterally. However, there were contrasting viewpoints between Koreans and Japanese on whether this progress and the importance of bilateral relations have resulted in favorable perceptions of each other`s countries.
Topic:
Security, History, Culture, Public Opinion, Economy, and Perception
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

100. Russia-Ukraine War Compels Japan to Reassess China Challenge, Shift Course on Security

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the grisly Russia-Ukraine war, the security situation in East Asia may appear conducive to the continuation of the long peace that the region has enjoyed for decades. However, the devastating European war has cast a long shadow eastward. While Russia’s military presence in Asia is deeply curtailed as most of its conventional capabilities are redeployed to the Donbas front in Ukraine, the behavior of maverick North Korea has become more reckless and China’s policy has become less predictable and more assertive. As a result, Japan has adopted a more proactive approach to its international security environment predicated on enhancing its military capabilities and deepening security cooperation with key allies and partners, starting with, but not limited to, the U.S.
Topic:
Security, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia