Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Japan

71. Whaling politics: two worlds that never meet

Author:
Minori Takahashi
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The arrest and detention of environmental activist Paul Watson in Greenland drew renewed attention to Japan’s whaling, specifically the commercial whaling that resumed in July 2019. Japan stopped commercial whaling of large whales in the Antarctic in 1986-87 and coastal whaling by March 1988, following decisions in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). With the stated aim of gaining sufficient knowledge to re-start commercial whaling, Japan conducted research whaling for ecological and resource data, as IWC regulations permit member states to do. In 2010, Watson’s group physically interfered with a ship contributing to Japan’s Whale Research Program near Antarctica, leading Japan to issue a red notice against him through Interpol. 14 years later, in response to Japan’s request, Danish authorities in Greenland, constitutionally linked to Denmark but with extensive autonomy, detained Watson during a refuelling stop. The arrest prompted protests in Europe and an online petition with over 720,000 signatures for his release. Joining the cause are renowned actors, acclaimed filmmakers and even parliamentarians and city mayors. Watson’s legal team claimed the incident was political and that Japan was exploiting Greenland. Faced with intense opposition from otherwise friendly nations, why does Japan continue to engage in whaling?
Topic:
Environment, Politics, European Union, Conservation, and Whaling
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, and Asia

72. Trump 2.0, South Korea’s Martial Law, and Future of Seoul-Tokyo Relations

Author:
Andy Lim and Ji-Young Lee
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Donald Trump, and Martial Law
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

73. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

74. Once Again, Leadership Transitions Challenge US-Japan Alliance

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Regional Overview: The Year of Elections (Finally) Ends

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest). While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government. Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

76. Spring 2024 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
CONTENTS SUREN TADEVOSYAN BALANCING POWERS: AZERBAIJAN’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AMIDST REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES ………………………….. 6 TIANPING CHE JAPAN JOINS AUKUS: MOTIVATIONS, PROGRESS, AND IMPACT ..………. 22 KNARIK SARGSYAN BETWEEN BLOCS AND BLOCKADES: QATAR’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC MANEUVERS ……………………………….……………….. 44 GUO SONG THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE ………………….…………... 64 BOOK REVIEW: ARTYOM TONOYAN AHMED ZAHID SHAHAB AND ALI AKBAR. (2023). IRAN’S SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ……………………………….………………. 84
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Role Conceptions, AUKUS, Regional Security, Alliance, GCC, Diplomacy, Security, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Eurasia, Japan, Asia, United States of America, Qatar, Gulf Nations, Middle East, Palestine, and Israel

77. The Future of Japan-Africa Cooperation: TICAD

Author:
Habib Badawi
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is diffi-cult to view Japan’s participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan’s failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests. As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently hei-ghtened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
Political Geography:
Africa, Japan, and Asia

78. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

79. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

80. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:
Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands