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61. Toward A Comparative History of Sexual Violence and War - A Book Talk with Feminist Chizuko Ueno

Author:
Chizuko Ueno and Carol Gluck
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Speaker: Chizuko Ueno, Professor Emerita University of Tokyo, Chief Director of the Non Profit Organization, Women’s Action Network Moderator: Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Columbia University Sexual violence in war is a perennial and a global phenomenon. The “comfort women” system of sexual slavery in Asia and sexual assaults by Allied soldiers in Europe during World War II, the rape camps in Bosnia in the 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia -- the list is long and continues to this day. Based on her book, A Comparative History of War and Sexual Violence, Ueno explores a range of issues, including the discourse of victimhood and the question of agency, rape as a weapon of war, and also love and “horizontal collaboration” between enemies. A provocative argument from Japan’s leading feminist and influential social activist. Speaker Bio: Chizuko Ueno is an emeritas professor at the University of Tokyo. Chief Director of the Non Profit Organization, Women’s Action Network ( http://wan.or.jp/) . A leading feminist theorist and an influential social critic, a prolific author of books and articles and a high-profile intellectual in Japan. In 1994, one of her many acclaimed books, Kindai Kazoku no Seiritsu to Shuen (The Rise and Fall of the Modern Family), won the coveted Suntory Academic Award. English publications are available as follows; The Modern Family in Japan: Its Rise and Fall (2009), Nationalism and Gender (2004). Asahi Shinbun Award winner in 2012 for her contribution to feminism and women’s studies, in addition to studies of care. Received Hän Honor from the Finnish government in 2019 for the contribution to promote gender equality. Selected as a member of American Academy of Art and Sciences in 2020. Event sponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by the Japan Research Program.
Topic:
War, History, Sexual Violence, Comfort Women, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

62. Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity

Author:
Ken Kushida
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Japan’s extreme demographic aging and shrinking is an economic and societal challenge, but also a technological opportunity for global leadership. Technological trajectories of worker automation and worker skill augmentation within Japan are already being shaped by the country’s demographics. Software, robotics, and other technology deployments are transforming the nature of work in a wide range of sectors in Japan’s economy, and across types of work such as blue-collar, white-collar, agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Specific ways in which Japan’s demographics shape technological trajectories include market opportunities, acute labor shortages, and favorable political and regulatory dynamics. The private sector is driving technology deployments in industrial sectors hit hard by Japan’s aging population, ranging from construction and transportation to medical care and finance, with strong government support in each of the domains. Demographically driven technological trajectories play to Japan’s strengths in implementing, deploying, and improving technologies rather than generating breakthrough innovations. Japan’s demographically driven technological trajectory can be an important platform for international technology cooperation, fitting with the top U.S.-Japanese political leadership agreements on fostering strong innovation and technology collaboration ties. Japan’s start-up ecosystem, often in partnership with large incumbent firms, will be critical in deploying new technologies by defining new markets and providing new offerings. An effective analysis goes beyond broad demographic numbers to delve into specific pain points of particular segments of society to better capture their situations and roles in shaping market opportunities that drive technological adoption. This introductory paper: (1) defines key analytical concepts; (2) surveys some of Japan’s key demographic shifts; and (3) highlights cases from agriculture, construction, transportation, healthcare, eldercare, land, and housing ownership.
Topic:
Demographics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Aging
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

63. Camp David and US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation: Consolidating the Northeast Asia Anchor in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Yasuyo Sakata
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Yasuyo Sakata provides a historical overview of US-Japan-ROK defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, from the Korean War to the Camp David Summit, explaining how the trilateral partnership was redefined as an Indo-Pacific partnership and incorporated the “Northeast Asia Anchor.” Sakata argues that Japan and the United States have taken the lead in reconstructing the Indo-Pacific security architecture through their Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies, and that the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship has been incorporated into this framework alongside other alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. Sakata explores how Korea’s shift back towards the Indo-Pacific under President Yoon’s leadership has allowed for expansion of the scope of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, as affirmed during the Camp David Summit. However, Sakata contends that a comprehensive defense approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific involving allies and partners to build upon this foundation and strengthen defense and security cooperation amidst the challenges posed by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, maritime security, cybersecurity, and space. Action is essential, as time is running out to solidify gains from the Camp David Summit and build a stable relationship. Therefore, Sakata argues that Japan and South Korea should strengthen relations deliberately yet cautiously before domestic politics potentially spoil recent progress.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

64. Trilateralism in the Wake of the 2022 Jolt Toward Bipolarity in the Indo-Pacific and World

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Gil Rozman argues that trilateralism reached unprecedented levels in the first two decades of the 21st century. Russia, Japan, and South Korea each sought different triangular frameworks to position themselves at the pivot of great power relations in Northeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region. However, Rozman contends that by 2024 trilateralism had shifted to reinforce bipolarity amidst great power competition. After describing three types of triangular frameworks, Rozman examines the transformation of trilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region from 2022 to 2024 (particularly in Northeast Asia), analyzes the challenges military security, economic security, and national identity gaps pose to trilateralism, and evaluates the potential impact of leadership on triangular relationships. The shift from what Rozman calls triangular pivots to alliance triangles in international relations is primarily driven by security concerns yet also by economic vulnerability and national identity gaps. For Korea, the US-Japan-ROK alliance triangle, which was solidified at the Camp David Summit, is at the center of triangular solidarity. Given the polarized international and regional environment, Rozman argues it is unlikely that leadership could reverse the current trend of alliance triangle consolidation in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Regional Politics, and Trilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

65. Friends in space: NATO and Japan cooperation beyond the skies

Author:
Nanae Baldauff
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO and Japan share compelling reasons for space security cooperation: worldwide ownership of space assets; Japan as among six most capable space powers; and the application of Article 5 to space. Japan is attractive to NATO in terms of space technology, space capabilities, operation, and funding. NATO is attractive to Japan because NATO is becoming a backbone of space-based data hub contributing to the Alliance’ Multi-Domain Operations. NATO-Japan space security cooperation should be pursued through political, operational, educational, and industrial/commercial partnership, and joint training and exercises.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, and Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

66. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and East China

67. Ishiba Takes the Helm: A New Kind of Leader for Japan

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) leadership elections are normally staid and predictable affairs. But scandals in the LDP and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s radical decision to dissolve powerful party factions disrupted business as usual. In an unusually dramatic election on September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged as the new party president — and automatically became prime minister of Japan. Ishiba, a long-standing fixture in the ruling LDP who had run for the position four times before, surprised many observers by defeating eight other contenders including powerful party veterans, popular “young Turks,” and a prominent female lawmaker. He immediately called for a general election on October 27 as an opportunity to secure a mandate for his policies during the often short-lived “honeymoon” for a new prime minister. For the United States, Ishiba brings a strong commitment to the security relationship, albeit from an approach and perspective that have the potential to disrupt the current progress in modernizing the alliance. He has advocated for a more equal partnership and for revisiting the foundational documents that govern the status of the U.S. troops stationed throughout the archipelago. It is an open question whether that element of his campaign rhetoric will translate into governing policies; indeed, he has already appeared to walk back some of his positions, including calling for an “Asian NATO” ahead of the general election. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of many regional security arrangements, any significant change to the bilateral relationship could alter the stability and order of the broader Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Elections, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Prime Minister, and Fumio Kishida
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

68. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

69. On Alliances in Northeast Asia

Author:
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Duyeon Kim, and Yuka Koshino
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Over the past two years, delegations to Washington from Japan and South Korea have one predominant question for their interlocutors: What would a Trump 2.0 administration mean for their countries and for U.S. global leadership more broadly? Both Asian capitals appreciate the upgrades to their bilateral pacts with the United States under the Biden administration’s alliance-centric foreign policy, and express anxiety about the possible return of Trump as commander-in-chief. Even before his election in 2016, Trump had expressed open disdain for U.S. alliances and that skepticism could be amplified in a second term by his “America First” approach. With Kamala Harris now at the top of the Democratic ticket, Washington analysts assume broad continuity in her foreign policy approach, although nuances may yet emerge. But while a Harris election and a second Trump presidency contrast sharply on policy and style, the views from Seoul and Tokyo point to enduring elements of American foreign policy that are likely in either outcome. In many ways, Trump and Harris share an approach to U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Upon taking office in 2017, Trump fractured the Obama administration’s core economic pillar of the so-called rebalance to Asia by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This divorce drew dismay particularly from Japan; Tokyo had seen the 12-nation free trade pact as its primary tool to blunt China’s rising economic sway over the region and to reinforce its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). The Biden-Harris administration has similarly expressed little enthusiasm for re-joining the reformed version that Japan salvaged after the U.S. withdrawal, and its signature regional economic policy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IFEP) lacks the market access that the region’s economies crave. Japan and South Korea also had misgivings about the passage of domestic economic legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act that would have penalized South Korean and Japanese investment in the United States. “Friend-shoring” rhetoric aside, both Seoul and Tokyo see either leader forging an industrial policy that defaults to protectionist trade practices. Both Japan and South Korea are also concerned about diminishing American leadership of the world and the ascendance of illiberal, authoritarian blocs. Biden and the Democratic Party have generally promoted U.S. alliances as underpinning a world order that promotes stability and the rule of law. Yet during Biden’s presidency, wars in Europe and the Middle East have flared, threatening to distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific priorities and driving deep divisions in public opinion both domestically and internationally. Trump and his Republican colleagues, on the other hand, mostly disapprove of U.S. military involvement in international conflict and fidelity to international alliances, particularly NATO. A Trump administration could undermine the rules-based system by brokering deals with authoritarian leaders, neglecting multilateral institutions that seek to quell conflict, and reinforcing the rising ideological isolationism in U.S. politics. Trump and Biden policy convergences aside, Seoul’s and Tokyo’s experiences with each president are starkly different. A Trump presidency would almost certainly present deeper challenges to each country and disrupt the web of security partnerships that both countries view as broadly stabilizing. How Trump would approach the China challenge is likely to be the central question: Will he be relatively supportive of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific if he sees them as amplifying U.S. power and deterrence? Or will he seek to cut his own deals with Beijing that excludes allies’ interests? Would he demand multifold increases in the burden-sharing agreements supporting the U.S. military presence in the region that allies would resist? A separate set of questions arises considering a Democratic victory. Would Harris opt to continue Biden’s approach to alliances? Would her administration see the Indo-Pacific as equally important to the trans-Atlantic partnership? Would Harris’s foreign policy team have a different view of how to handle strategic competition with China? All of these yet-unanswered questions loom large for Japan and South Korea over the coming months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Alliance, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

70. From broad unilateralism to narrow multilateralism in semiconductor chip controls

Author:
Douglas Fuller
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Almost two years into the broad and unilateral chip controls launched by the Biden administration in October 2022 on admittedly broadly-defined national security grounds, there is evidence of significant success in limiting China’s expansion of advanced fabrication (i.e. chipmaking) for the next decade. The success of this American-initiated project has come from refining policy and pursuing policy coordination with key allies, especially Japan and the Netherlands. There are still concerns about China’s expansion of legacy chips and access to AI chips.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan, Netherlands, Global Focus, and United States of America