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21. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

23. Japan as a New Strategic Partner in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Author:
Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In April 2024, Japan joined the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) as a new strategic partner alongside the United States and the European Union. The 3SI was established in 2015 with the objective of strengthening connectivity and reducing the disparities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states. The initiative promotes the development of infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital sectors in the region surrounded by the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the relevance of this initiative and has underscored the frail infrastructure in the region and CEE’s economic dependence on Russia. As it becomes increasingly clear that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions are inseparable, Japan is compelled to serve as an active partner in the 3SI as its role is also closely connected to the quality of assistance and support to Ukraine. As Japan embarks on this new partnership with CEE and Baltic countries, however, moving beyond the rhetoric about the importance of this initiative and taking concrete action is a challenge that all the countries involved will have to grapple with. Japan’s dialogue with CEE, and in particular with the Visegrad-4 (V4) group, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, officially started in the early 2000s. For the past twenty years, the relationship has mostly been smooth and without major problems. However, Japan’s engagement with those countries has lacked dynamism, as Japanese foreign policy has mainly been focused on the United States and China. Japan’s investments in CEE have been limited and cautious, and visits from high-ranking Japanese officials have been sporadic. In fact, the visits to Japan by the heads of the states of the V4 and CEE countries have always outnumbered those by their Japanese counterparts. Twenty years later, as CEE countries are realizing that the economic benefit from China is not as great as they had expected, Japan is in a good position to rekindle this relationship. In a January 2022 interview with Nikkei, Akio Miyajima, Ambassador of Japan to Poland, argued that it is crucial for Japan to strengthen relations with these countries. At the time of the interview, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine, and the Ambassador lamented that Japan remained disinterested in the Ukraine issue. Since the invasion a month later, however, Japan has not only taken a clear stance in condemning Russia’s aggression, it has also taken a leadership role in investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine. One of the main concerns about the 3SI is that it currently lacks cohesiveness, as the twelve participating nations are too divided to agree on major joint investments. Another issue is that the initiative mainly takes place on the political level, and cooperation on other levels and dimensions are presently non-existent. How can Japan, in coordination with the United States and Europe, contribute to creating a more systematic approach to non-political partnerships and effective financial support for the participating nations of the 3SI? The topic is still under-researched and as Japan’s strategic partnership was formalized just last year, now is an ideal time for experts from Japan, the United States, and the EU to identify opportunities and common challenges, and discuss ways to jointly implement a roadmap as strategic partners in the 3SI framework. As 2025 marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the 3SI, it is critical for Japan and the other strategic partners to start contributing concretely to the initiative and to deepen their engagement with the participating nations. The tenth summit of the 3SI was held in Warsaw on April 28-29, 2025, and GMF Indo-Pacific partnered with the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, to publish this volume, which gathers the findings and perspectives of five authors from Japan, Europe, and the United States. Prof. Beata Bochorodycz of Adam Mickiewicz University and Dr. Bart Gaens of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs offer a European perspective on Japan’s potential role in the 3SI. Bochorodycz argues that Japan’s engagement will contribute greatly to regional infrastructure development while counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influences in the region. Gaens asserts that Japan’s interest in 3SI is multifold and covers several different areas: business and economics, development and connectivity, and geopolitics. However, he argues that there are also several challenges that impede Tokyo’s stronger involvement, and offers recommendations on its future engagement with the CEE countries. Anthony Kim of the Heritage Foundation and Mirna Galic, formerly with the United States Institute of Peace, contribute to this volume from American perspectives. Kim emphasizes the importance of the 3SI as a platform for attracting private sector investors and encourages Japan to go beyond its political partnership, while Galic reflects on how the 3SI may benefit Japan’s interests and analyzes concrete ways in which Tokyo can support the initiative. Finally, Ambassador Akio Miyajima, who served as Japanese Ambassador to Poland from 2020-2024, leans on his direct experience to recount the strategic evolution of Japan’s engagement with the CEE countries. He examines the Japanese government’s perspective from its first concerns about the expansion of Chinese influence in Europe to the major strategic recalibration that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ambassador Miyajima concludes by analyzing the current global uncertainty stemming from the second Trump administration and offers recommendations on ways to strengthen Japan’s position as a strategic partner to the 3SI.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Defense Cooperation, Strategic Partnerships, and Three Seas Initiative
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

24. Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Why Australia and Japan Must Lead in Capacity Building in Southeast Asia

Author:
Aaron Magunna
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Southeast Asian countries continue to face various maritime policy challenges. Beijing’s aggressive conduct toward other littoral states in the South China Sea and increased China-US tensions have highlighted the pervasiveness of traditional security threats while prospects for a more stable maritime order are undermined by the stalled negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Regional countries are also concerned about issues such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, the effects of the climate crisis, and illegal, unreported, and undocumented (IUU) fishing, which is estimated to cost ASEAN members up to $6 billion annually. Notably, these challenges are not solely linked to narrow maritime security issues but broader maritime governance capabilities, meaning the “capacity to enforce the framework of laws, regulations, policies, and institutions generated both within the legal jurisdictions of states and the international community.” As the new Trump administration has shifted US policy on aid, countries like Australia and Japan will have to increasingly step up in the delivery of maritime capacity-building programs in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Crime, Environment, Governance, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

25. The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Japan balances between Iran and the West and China deepens its ties to Tehran, Israel faces a shifting landscape demanding new regional approaches
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

26. Artificial intelligence in financial security: Legal challenges in Japan’s AML/CFT regime and comparative insights from selected EU countries

Author:
Dawid Trela
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This study examines the legal and regulatory challenges in deploying artificial intelligence (AI) within anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) systems in Japan (focal case) and in Germany, France, and Poland (purposive comparators). It identifies intra- and cross-jurisdictional gaps; assesses alignment with FATF Recommendations 1 and 15, the GDPR, and the EU AI Act; and distils transferable best practices. Doctrinal legal analysis and normative comparative methodology were employed, with limited functional observations where supervisory practice is documented. Sources include statutes and regulations, supervisory guidance, and case law issued from May 2015–May 2025, notably the EU AML package (Reg. (EU) 2024/1624; Dir. (EU) 2024/1640; Reg. (EU) 2024/1620) and the AI Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1689), as well as FATF materials and national guidance (BaFin, CNIL/Tracfin, JFSA). All jurisdictions permit AI in AML/CFT, yet frameworks remain fragmented and under-specified for algorithmic decision-making. Key gaps concern liability for algorithmic outcomes; tensions between transparency/explainability and tippingoff; and safeguards for automated decisions (GDPR Art. 22). Germany/France show higher supervisory maturity (explainability, auditability, DPIA, human-in-the-loop), whereas Japan/Poland rely chiefly on general data-protection duties with limited AML/AI-specific guidance, indicating the need for governance-heavy, auditable, human-in-the-loop designs. Better coordination of the AML, AI, and data-protection regimes is required to ensure both effectiveness and fundamental-rights protection. Japan could benefit from EU practices by formalising human-in-the-loop requirements for high-impact AML decisions, mandating DPIAs, enhancing auditability/reporting for high-risk models, and expanding regulatory sandboxing. The EU should continue aligning the AI Act with the AML Regulation (via AMLA guidance), clarifying oversight, documentation, and explainability expectations for AML use cases.
Topic:
European Union, Accountability, Artificial Intelligence, Data Protection, and Financial Security
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Poland, Germany, Japan, and Asia

27. Legacy or Liability? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis, Kristin Zhu, Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, Maeve Sockwell, Lauren Morganbesser, and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Allies are essential to U.S. strategic competition with China but carry costs and risks that require continuous, realistic management. Polarization in Washington has unfortunately impeded the correct approach: critics on the right are too narrowly focused on military power while advocates on the left underplay the real costs and risks involved in U.S. defense commitments. Across the political spectrum, experts are now calling on allies to shoulder more of the burden for security in the Indo-Pacific. This is positive, but plans to deepen U.S. alliances also need to weigh allied political will and the danger of being drawn into conflicts that do not serve vital U.S. interests. This report inventories these costs and benefits for seven key alliances across eight core areas of U.S.-China strategic competition. We conclude that: Japan can further U.S. aims with China across all eight categories, especially as its defense spending increases. It is willing to cooperate in several key areas and poses low risk of entanglement. Australia can make contributions at a more modest level. Political will to cooperate with the United States has increased but is not steady. Risk of entanglement is low. South Korea is reluctant to use its economic and military power to counter China but poses a substantial military burden and risk on the United States. Chip manufacturing and other nonmilitary capabilities help strengthen the case for the alliance. Key European allies—France, Germany, and the UK—will have a limited military role in the Indo-Pacific, but can support important technological, diplomatic, and political objectives of U.S. China strategy. The Philippines has advantageous military geography—but lacks other benefits and poses an entanglement risk in the South China Sea. We stress that if Washington consistently pursues a statecraft that undermines allied trust in the United States, allied leaders will not support U.S. global objectives, weakening America’s hand in competition with China. Some recent U.S. policies, such as the Trump administration’s broad tariffs, appear to have eroded trust. The United States does not need a revolution in its alliances, which remain a source of strength for America at a time when U.S. power is under strain globally. But Washington does need to move with greater caution when deepening them. Ensuring alliances serve the needs of American citizens at a time when the world is in flux will require realism, periodic reassessment, and continuous adaptation.
Topic:
Alliance, Strategic Competition, Polarization, Statecraft, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, North America, and United States of America

28. Japanese Economic Security as “Derisking”

Author:
Kazuto Suzuki
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “derisking” and how the Japanese Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) has responded to it within the framework of deterrence theory. It explores how ESPA allows deterrence by denial against economic coercion by other states and is itself a derisking measure. It contends that deterrence by denial, which means reducing dependency and improving resilience, could include stockpiling strategic materials, diversifying sources of supply, developing alternative materials, and developing alternative products. However, this paper argues that there is a need to strengthen the mechanism for collaborative deterrence by denial, such as the “Coordination Platform” presented at the G7 Hiroshima Summit. As for other forms of deterrence, such as institutional deterrence and deterrence by punishment, their effectiveness is insufficient, and they face many implementation problems. Therefore, this paper argues that the most optimal derisking strategy at this point is the combination of ESPA and the “Coordination Platform” to strengthen the capabilities of deterrence by denial.
Topic:
Risk, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

29. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

30. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia