Political Geography: Japan - CIAO Search Results

51. Tritium Troubles: The Politics of Fukushima’s Treated Water Release in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Following approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan has begun to release into the Pacific Ocean treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on 24 August. The power plant was the site of the nuclear disaster that occurred on 11 March 2011 as a consequence of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. Water has been continuously pumped into the nuclear power plant to cool down the reactors’ fuel rods since the disaster. However, current treatment methods are unable to eliminate tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, resulting in the storage of tons of contaminated water in thousands of tanks on site. The current plans consequently entail the release of more than a million tons of tritium-contaminated water. The Japanese authorities, the IAEA and a majority of scientists concur that the concentration of tritium in the stored water falls within the safety limits.[1] Nevertheless, the release of water containing tritium from the site has encountered opposition from environmental activists and ordinary citizens within and outside Japan. It has also faced criticism from a minority of scientists who argue that the consequences of the release remain unpredictable. This cross-border measure has highlighted, and somehow even exacerbated, political tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, it has occurred within a regional political order that remains in flux, featuring rampant competition between the US and China, Japan’s own ongoing overhaul of national defence and a consequential tilt in the foreign policy of South Korea after the 2022 elections in favour of Washington and Tokyo. Furthermore, the media clamour surrounding the water release has also extended beyond the region, fuelling the public debate on nuclear energy in several Western countries, including Italy.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Radiation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, and Fukushima

52. Japan’s New Trade Strategy Focuses on Supply Chain Resilience and Trade Liberalization

Author:: Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Since the inauguration of the U.S Trump administration in January 2017, Japan's trade strategies have been shifting from trade liberalization to protectionism, emphasizing the strengthening of supply chains. The Kishida cabinet, which was launched in October 2021, is strengthening economic cooperation with the United States through bilateral dialogue as well as multilateral cooperation frameworks such as IPEF. It also enacted the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, and strengthened industrial policies for strategic industries such as the semiconductors. However, the Japanese government's new trade strategy is not limited to supply chain strengthening measures and industrial policies. It is aiming to take the lead in digital trade, which is a new trade issue, and bolster its leadership in CPTPP. This brief is structured as follows. In the following section we will examine Japan’s new trade strategy in terms of supply chain resilience, focusing on industrial policies represented by reshoring policy and national semiconductor strategy, and supply chain policies of critical materials outlined in the Economic Security Promotion Act enacted in May 2022. And we look at bilateral coopera-tion between the U.S and Japan, and key negotiation agenda on supply chains at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The third section reviews the Japan’s trade liberalization strategy focused on the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), and Digital Trade Agreements. In particular, we derived the direction of Japan’s free trade policy through an analysis of the characteristics of the CPTPP as a 21st-century trade norm, and a comparative analysis of major regulations related to e-commerce in the CPTPP, US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement, and RCEP.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Resilience, Supply Chains, and Liberalization
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

53. Economic Cooperation Policies of China, Japan and India towards South Asia and Their Implications for Korea

Author:: Jeong Gon Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: With the Indo-Pacific region increasingly gaining recognition for its strategic importance, countries such as China, Japan, and India are seeking close economic cooperation with South Asian countries. This report analyses these countries’ strategic perspectives and cooperation policies towards South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) under the rapidly changing international political and economic environment, and examines Korea’s future economic cooperation strategies and policies. Korea’s economic cooperation with South Asian countries has mainly focused on ODA. Although trade and investment have been centered on some manufacturing industries, they have recently shown a shrinking trend. While competition among major countries in South Asia is in full swing, it is necessary to establish a new direction for economic cooperation and promote policies towards South Asia from a strategic perspective.
Topic:: Economics, Regional Integration, Economic Cooperation, and Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

54. Adaptation of Law and Policy in an Aged Society: Guardianship Law and People’s Behavioural Pattern

Author:: Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This essay reviews some typologies of people’s behavioural patterns and examines relationships between guardianship laws and policies and people’s behavioural patterns in Japan and the State of Victoria. Through such analysis, a consideration regarding the adaptation of law and policy in an aged society is addressed. By reviewing people’s behavioural patterns in these two states, two keywords appear essential in practice under the guardianship law and policy: one is “family reliance”; the other is “value of individual autonomy.” Most Japanese do not rely on legal measures, including adult guardianship when it concerns private autonomy for property management and personal affairs, but they can use legal measures even staying with family reliance. The guardianship law in Japan must be reformed to create a limited guardianship type with less than one year for self-revocation. With the value of individual autonomy, people can decide by themselves what to do for the future. This issue is difficult to tackle because of the legal consciousness of older Japanese adults and the nuanced relationships between relatives. It is recommended that Japanese people should debate value issues in public for a better society and to ensure the people’s participation in social affairs through their own initiatives for establishing the value of individual autonomy. The baby boom generation, who are educated at schools in democracy postwar, may change the behavioural pattern of older adults in the future. The research method is an interdisciplinary literature survey and interviews with experts, with a particular focus on comparative guardianship law and policy studies in Japan and the State of Victoria.
Topic:: Family, Aging, Autonomy, Behavior, Guardianship, and Reliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Canada, Asia, and North America

55. Public Interest and State Legitimation: Early Modern England, Japan, and China–Book Talk, Wenkai He

Author:: Wenkai He and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Wenkai He is an associate professor of Social Science in the Division of Social Science at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He conducts deep and contextualized historical analysis of state formation in England, Japan, and China from the 16th to 19th century. He will give a talk on his second book, Public Interest and State Legitimation: Early Modern England, Japan, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), which investigates the connections between state capacity, state legitimation and the expansion of political participation. He demonstrates how in each case a public interest-based discourse of state legitimation provided a common platform upon which state and society collaborated to provide public goods such as famine relief and large-scale infrastructural facilities. Each discourse of state legitimation entailed ‘passive rights’ that allowed subordinates to justify their demands on the state to redress welfare grievances. Conflicts between domestic welfare and other dimensions of public interest, however, could instigate cross-regional and cross-sectoral mass petitions for fundamental political reforms that were likewise justified by the state’s proclaimed duty to safeguard the public interest; these mass petitions might ultimately transform the state. Such a political ‘great divergence’ occurred in England (1760s-1780s) and Japan (1870s-1880s), but not in China.
Topic:: History, State Formation, Book Talk, and Public Interest
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and England

56. Japan’s Role in Indo-Pacific Security

Author:: Satoru Mori and Ayumi Teraoka
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Facing an ever-intensifying security environment and rapidly shifting diplomatic and economic landscapes in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan aims to minimize the risks of an armed conflict while maximizing opportunities for region-wide economic and social exchange in an era of enduring great power rivalry. What are Japan’s challenges in deterring an armed conflict over Taiwan? What is Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific and what are its implications for the region? How does Japan envisage the roles that the Japan-US alliance and security cooperation with other countries may play in the Indo-Pacific? These and other issues and questions will be explored in order to illuminate what role Japan can play in regional security.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

57. Book Launch & Talk: Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Mireya Solís and Gerald Curtis
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Dr. Mireya Solís of the Brookings Institution will lead a talk and Q&A session on her new book Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific scheduled for release on 1 September 2023. The book delves into Japan's transformation into a significant player in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, highlighting its strengths in democratic resilience, social stability, and proactive diplomacy, while addressing pressing issues such as depopulation, rising inequality, and regional peace threats.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Democracy, Inequality, Leadership, Resilience, Social Stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

58. Why will Indonesia become more important and what does that mean for Japan and the US?

Author:: Masafumi Ishii and Gerald Curtis
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Over the next 10-20 years Indonesia will become an increasingly important player on the international stage. Masafumi ISHII, former Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia, will clarify the reasons for Indonesia's growing importance and discuss what Japan and the US need to do to engage more closely with Indonesia and to align responses to regional contingencies such as the Taiwan straits.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Emerging Powers, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

59. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:: Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

60. Why Democracies Implement Better Climate Actions: Case Study of India, the Philippines, and Japan

Author:: Niranjan Sahoo and Jisoo Park
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Asia is the most populous and one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Long coastline, vast low lying areas comprising many small island nations make it highly susceptible to climate change such as rising sea level and extreme weather events like floods, landslides. For many critics, democracies' response to climate change is much impeded due to their slow decision-making process and short-termism governed by electoral compulsions. Some analysts go as far as to claim that authoritarianism is needed to tackle the crisis more effectively. However, close examination of different governance structure's climate actions strongly supports that democracies are inherently better at handling climate crisis compared to authoritarian regimes. This article explores the multifaceted impact of climate change to democracy and delves into the case studies of India, the Philippines, and Japan to identify strengths as well as areas of improvement that democracies should consider to establish meaningful climate actions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Asia, and Philippines

61. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:: Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

62. Japan’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative: Strengthening Japan’s Defense and Global Normative Power

Author:: Seunghee Oh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Seunghee Oh, a research professor at Seoul National University Institute of Japanese Studies, suggests that Pyongyang perceives the current global order as a “new Cold War” and views strengthening trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as hostile to its national interest. In response to North Korea’s moves, Japan prioritizes multilateral initiatives to strengthen its security ties with other partners in the region and the globe. Dr. Oh further claims that as Tokyo assumes the presidency of the G7 Hiroshima Summit this year and has been elected as a non-permanent member of the 2023-24 UN Security Council, Japan is well-positioned to criticize North Korea as an international norm violator and proactively address the North Korean problem and utilize it to enhance its global leadership.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Cold War, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and North Korea

63. Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance

Author:: Calvin Heng and Eyck Freymann
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The strategic interests of Asian countries in the Arctic continue to grow despite the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have their eye on Russia’s Arctic energy resources, and China is further seeking to leverage Russian weakness to expand its operational presence in the Arctic Ocean. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are less prominent in Arctic regional institutions, yet they have distinctive interests in Arctic science, governance, and resources and are resuming dialogue about Arctic matters amongst themselves. This policy brief reviews the key differences in how Asian states are approaching the Arctic through a survey of their strategic documents, public statements, and diplomatic and commercial activities.
Topic:: Governance, Multilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, South Korea, Singapore, and Arctic

64. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:: David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

65. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

Author:: Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea

66. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:: Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

67. Great Power Politics: The Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Global South

Author:: Kei Koga
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 marks the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and there are expectations that their relationship will be upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Given the good diplomatic, security, and economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, ties are likely to be strengthened. However, Japan is now taking a more competitive strategy toward China, as indicated in the three security documents issued in December 2022, while Southeast Asian states generally continued the same strategic posture by which they have good relations with all great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, while Japan issued the “New Plan for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that emphasizes the “Global South,” it remained silent about ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific, and it was unclear what roles Japan expects ASEAN to play. Although both Japan and Southeast Asian states need to adjust their roles in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains to be seen whether the 50th anniversary becomes an opportunity for clarification.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Power Politics, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Japan, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

68. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

69. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

70. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

71. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

72. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. Japan Matters for America/America Matters for Japan (2023)

Author:: East-West Center
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The 4th edition of Japan Matters for America/America Matters for Japan, part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and Japan at the national, state, and local levels. This publication and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-Indo-Pacific relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Economics, Education, Politics, Science and Technology, Governance, Population, Public Health, and Travel
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

74. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries

Author:: Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:: In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

75. Climate Change in Japan’s New Defence and Security Strategies

Author:: Alistair D B Cook
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Japan has taken concrete steps to integrate climate change into its defence and security strategy going forward, and to provide the necessary budget for implementing the relevant measures needed in mitigating the impacts of this threat. This may signal a more prominent leadership role for Japan on climate security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Environment
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

76. Japan’s Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth Strategy

Author:: Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Japan is mobilizing all its policy capabilities for energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy and hydrogen energy from the perspective of realizing carbon neutrality by 2050. Among them, the overseas development and return of hydrogen energy to Japan and the domestic green hydrogen development are making great progress since the announcement of the basic hydrogen strategy in December 2017. Japan promotes the green growth strategy (December 2020) as a national strategy to achieve the 2030 GHG reduction target of 46% (compared to 2013) (NDC) and to realize ‘carbon neutrality by 2050’. Japan's green growth strategy sets 14 areas as key development industries, including offshore wind power, hydrogen, nuclear power, automobiles and batteries, semiconductors, and information & technology. It also presents action plans in the key 14 areas such as R&D, demonstration projects, introduction expansion, and self-reliance/commercialization according to the growth stage of each area. In this WEB, we would like to explore which part of Japan's energy transition policy and green growth strategy the Korean government will refer to in order to achieve the task of realizing carbon neutrality by 2050, and cooperate with Japanese government.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economic Growth, Fossil Fuels, Carbon Emissions, Hydrogen, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

77. Network and Text Analysis on Digital Trade Agreements

Author:: Kyu Yub Lee, Cheon-Kee Lee, Won Seok Choi, Jyun-Hyun Eom, and Unjung Whang
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: We use the Trade Agreements Provisions on Electronic Commerce and Data and their corresponding texts to undertake network and text analysis on trade agreements with digital trade chapters to identify which countries are important in the network and how similar or different their texts of digital trade chapters are. centrality values reflect which countries are influential in the network, while values of similarity assess the level of similarity between the texts of digital trade chapters concluded by these countries. Centrality and similarity are complementary in assessing the relative positions of countries in the network, where the number of linkages between countries is significant in centrality and the quality of digital trade chapters is critical in similarity. We interpret this to mean that a country with a high degree of centrality is likely to be a rule-promoter in the network, whereas a country with a high degree of similarity is likely to be a rule-maker. The brief highlights three key findings from network and text analysis of digital trade agreements: (1) The U.S. has been the best rule-maker but not the best rule-promoter, whereas Singapore has been the best rule-promoter but not the best rule-maker. (2) China is a rule-maker, but to a weaker extent than the U.S., and Korea is a rule-promoter, although it is less active than Singapore. (3) Japan and Australia have served as both rule-makers and rule-promoters. Identification of countries’ relative positions in the network of digital trade agreements would be useful at the start of talks on digital trade policy.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and United States of America

78. A Future Projection of Post-Covid-19 in Japan: Universal Values and International Cooperation

Author:: Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This essay aims to clarify the most popular impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine a future projection of Post-COVID-19 in Japan. This is based on interdisciplinary studies, particularly the literature survey on global governance in English and Japanese. Japan has consistently lived after WWII under the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Given the challenges caused by the pandemic, it is unpredictable how much conflict between multiple powers will hinder national security and economic globalization. The following five actions should be executed: Japan should participate in international research activities to envision a future society, Japan should adopt a unique future concept to address ageing populations and social security reform in their international cooperation, a review of neoliberalism, construction of a society that can respond to societal risks, and political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with serious social risks should be championed.
Topic:: Health, Governance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

79. Japan's New Security Strategy and the Changing Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Sheila Smith and Gerald Curtis
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Major changes that have occurred in the global political economy and in international politics in recent years have had a profound impact on nations all around the world. This is nowhere more evident than in the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and especially Japan. This conversation addresses Japan's evolving foreign policy and its impact in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

80. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:: Alice Pannier
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:: Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

81. Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries. Longstanding Strategic Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement

Author:: Celine Pajon
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), building on its historical ties and strategic interests in the region. The wealth of these territories in fishery resources and raw materials, the crucial importance of the maritime routes, and the strategic geographical location of PICs in the context of Sino-American rivalry have been key factors behind Tokyo's expanding engagement. Despite these strategic interests, the cooperation with the PICs in the postwar era up until the emergence of the Indo-Pacific narrative has been quite fragmented, reflecting the rather low priority given to the region, the multiplicity of the objectives pursued, and the diversity of engaged actors. Nevertheless, the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) process initiated in 1997 provided an innovative multilateral framework to coordinate with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) over economic cooperation, improve Japan’s communications and iron out tensions, starting with nuclear. The incorporation of the PICs into Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision cements their position in Tokyo’s efforts to preserve a rules-based international order and counterbalance China’s growing influence. Security issues of Asia have thus started to appear on the agenda of the PALM Summits. In addition, Japan has stepped up its cooperation with its closest allies and partners – the US and Australia – as part of the operationalization of a FOIP in Oceania. Finally, a major provider of development aid, Tokyo has also become a diplomatic and security partner for the Pacific Islands. Japan has stepped up naval diplomacy and defense dialogues in the region, in addition to being very active in maritime capacity-building, as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. Despite the rise of Japanese cooperation, which is now truly multidimensional and strategic, Tokyo's ability to influence the Pacific islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. Indeed, the PICs feel little concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. With the US and its other partners increasing their presence in the area, there is a strong impetus for Japan to reinvest in the Pacific. However, Tokyo has yet to develop a formal strategy or vision for the region. This could be announced at the next PALM summit in 2024, which will mark the 10th iteration of this meeting and could be a significant milestone.
Topic:: Development, Cooperation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

82. The People Powering Japan’s Startup Ecosystem

Author:: Kenji Kushida
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Japan’s startup ecosystem is now able to attract human capital in ways that were not possible fifteen years ago. Employment flexibility is critical to a maturing startup ecosystem, and Japan’s startup ecosystem is now enjoying positive feedback loops. Japan’s startup ecosystem now draws from top universities; large, prestigious companies; government ministries; global, foreign multinational corporations; and the startup ecosystem itself. While Japan’s lifetime employment system in large companies is alive and well, the rise of new employment logics has grown in parallel with corporate Japan’s traditional employment system. The rise of foreign firms and the IT industry, along with the declining attractiveness of large companies, has created a new logic of opportunities for top talent. Global linkages are still a challenge, and the government should focus on efforts to remove barriers to all global collaborations, especially given the disruption caused by Japan’s abrupt border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Topic:: Employment, Business, Human Capital, and Startup
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

83. Fossil Fuel Industry Phase-Out and Just Transition: Designing Policies to Protect Workers’ Living Standards

Author:: Robert Pollin
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This paper focuses on just transition policies targeted at supporting workers now employed in the fossil fuel industries and ancillary sectors within high-income economies. As a general normative principle, I argue that the overarching aim of such policies should be to protect workers against major losses in their living standards resulting through the fossil fuel industry phase-out. The impacted workers should be provided with three critical guarantees to accomplish this, in the area of jobs, compensation and pensions. Just transition policies should also support workers in the areas of job search, retraining and relocation, but these forms of support should be understood as supplementary. Within the framework of these broad principles, the paper first reviews experiences with transitional policies in Germany, the UK, the EU and, more briefly, Japan and Canada. A critical point that emerges is that these just transition policies do not provide the needed guarantees for assuring workers that they will not experience major living standard declines. The paper then describe an illustrative just transition program for workers that includes reemployment, income and pension guarantees, focusing on a case study for the U.S. state of West Virginia. The results show that the costs of the just transition program for West Virginia’s fossil fuel industry dependent workers will amount to an annual average of about $42,000 per worker, equal to about 0.2 percent of West Virginia’s GDP. I briefly summarize results from the seven other studies of U.S. states and for the overall U.S. economy. For the U.S. economy overall, the just transition program’s costs would total to about 0.015 percent of GDP. These findings demonstrate that providing a generous just transition program does not entail unaffordable levels of public spending. Robust just transition policies should therefore be understood as an entirely realistic prospect for all high-income economies.
Topic:: Political Economy, Labor Issues, European Union, GDP, Economy, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:: Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, and Germany

84. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

85. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

86. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:: Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

87. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

88. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:: Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

89. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:: Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

90. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

91. Strengthening the Shield: Japan’s Defense Transformation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Joseph I. Grimm, and Rebecca Wittner
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In December 2022, Japan’s government released three major strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. Although Japan has made incremental changes to its security policies and capabilities over the last decade, the new documents mark a notable shift in Japan’s approach to strengthening its defense. The documents reflect Tokyo’s assessment of the rising threats that could challenge Japan’s security and signal Japan’s commitment to build the military capabilities necessary to meet them. This report examines Tokyo’s defense transformation and assesses its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. Japan is “fundamentally reinforcing” its national security and defense policies to cope with its increasingly severe security environment. The military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have been growing steadily for years but appear to be peaking simultaneously. Tensions between Japan and China have occasionally flared in the five decades since they normalized diplomatic relations. But those tensions have reached new heights since 2012, when China began to regularly contest Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By August 2022, Beijing fired five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during China’s live-fire military exercises after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The aim of the missile launches was to signal there would be consequences for Japan if Tokyo were to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unprecedented rate of missile testing since 2022 and Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine have deepened Japanese concerns about the potential for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is taking steps to improve its ability to defend itself and deter an invasion, including through changes to security funding and policy. Tokyo has announced plans to increase its defense spending by 65 percent over the next five years, acquire standoff weapons that could be used for a counterstrike mission, and adopt an “active cyber defense” posture. Japan has clarified the roles of its military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Coast Guard in the event of an attack; committed to establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters for SDF operations; and created a program for supplying partner militaries with security assistance. Effectively employing counterstrike and active cyber defense, however, will require a clearer delineation of the legal authorities for their use as well as the overall military strategies that they would support. In addition, pressure from the Japanese public over tax hikes required to pay for the defense spending increase amid other fiscal pressures could pose a barrier to implementation. Japan plans to strengthen the SDF through boosting readiness and resilience of current forces, acquiring counterstrike and other advanced capabilities, and improving force posture and mobility. The SDF has been plagued by a chronic lack of munitions and other supplies, and most of its facilities do not meet its own standards for resilience against enemy attack. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, though these types of programs often lose out to more high-profile programs. For its counterstrike mission, Japan has announced it will buy U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This initial purchase will provide a stopgap until Japan is able to produce its own longer-range missiles later in the decade. Japan has also announced it will pursue new capabilities in uncrewed systems, space, cyber, and artificial intelligence (AI). But fulfilling these ambitions will be challenging given some short-falls in Japan’s technology base and SDF personnel. Lastly, the SDF is grappling with how to expand its forces in Japan’s southwest islands while maintaining a sufficient presence throughout the country to deter aggression from a range of possible threats. Next, Japan’s strategy emphasizes enhancing security partnerships regionally and across the globe. Japan has recently stepped up its defense cooperation with several Indo-Pacific and European countries. With Australia, Japan is building on a 10-year effort to deepen strategic cooperation, a process that culminated in January 2022 with the completion of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. New bilateral strategic cooperation includes enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the Australian military, increasing rotational SDF training deployments to Australia, and announcing a new joint security declaration that commits to a combined response to military contingencies. Similarly, Japan has long recognized the strategic importance of India and continues to build on the Japan-India relationship through maritime security cooperation, a new joint fighter exercise, and operationalization of their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan and the Philippines are also expanding their defense ties through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training exercises and an important emerging trilateral security relationship with the United States. Over the past year, Japan and South Korea have made significant strides to repair relations since the latest downturn that began in 2018. This will be an incremental process, but there has been progress in the form of leader-level summits and ministerial dialogues, plans to cooperate on sharing data about North Korean missiles, and new trilateral ballistic missile and anti-submarine drills with the United States. Japan also is building defense connections and relationships with European nations. It is pursuing the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy and, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, has sought to deepen strategic ties with NATO. These comprehensive changes to Japan’s defense policies will necessarily reshape the military and security pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities will position Japan to potentially take on some offensive tasks, even while retaining its primarily defensive orientation. This also has implications for alliance contingency planning related to defending Japan directly as well as around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. However, increased joint planning will require updates to alliance command and control (C2) and information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, given resource constraints, the alliance would be well-served to find additional opportunities for military technology sharing, codevelopment, and coproduction, such as through Japanese involvement in the second pillar of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) partnership focused on cooperation on advanced capabilities and defense technology innovation. And the alliance must take steps to improve force posture and readiness, including through enhancing base resiliency and increasing munitions stockpiles. Japan’s fundamental transformation of its defense posture will mean significant changes for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States must adapt its approach to alliance coordination to maximize new opportunities and manage any new challenges. In this context, U.S. policymakers should: Prepare to update the alliance, while recognizing that Japan’s new defense policies will require significant time, resources, and political will to implement. Stay closely aligned with Tokyo on the threat land- scape as well as engagement with geopolitical competitors, especially China. Integrate U.S.-Japan command and control structures. Create an alliance readiness, resilience, and posture implementation task force. Deepen planning for contingencies and bolster extended deterrence. Create a road map for expanding defense technology cooperation concurrently with Japan’s implementation of specific improvements to its information security practices and infrastructure. Innovate operational concepts for uncrewed systems and counterstrike capabilities. Leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance as a hub for minilateral and multilateral security engagement. Build U.S.-Japan alliance mechanisms that will expand cooperation on cyber security and defense. Stand up an alliance dialogue on military personnel issues.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

92. What Japanese Tourism Amenities are Influenced in Terms of Affecting Inbound Tourist Demand?

Author:: Yoko Konishi and Takashi Saito
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Since 2012, the number of inbound tourists to Japan has increased every year, and new records of tourism-related economic indicators are being updated. On the other hand, the sudden inbound boom has led to a concentration of travel destinations, and over-tourism has become a problem. In this paper, we first statistically observe the concentration of tourists by accommodation type for each country of origin. Second, by identifying tourism amenities that contribute to inbound demand, we gain the knowledge necessary to shift demand from facilities with a high concentration of inbound tourists to facilities with lower occupancy. For the analysis, we utilised establishment data from the Online Travel Agency ‘Accommodation Travel Statistics Survey’ and data on tourism resources by region. The results show that the number of rooms, average price, membership of the hotel in a chain, internet availability, room type, number of World Heritage sites, and number of direct flights positively affect inbound demand. In particular, for ryokan (Japanese-style inns) with low occupancy rates and inbound guest ratios, their independence, internet availability, Western-style room availability, number of World Heritage sites, and hot spring facilities are effective in capturing demand.
Topic:: Economics, Tourism, Hospitality, and Travel
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

93. The COVID-19 Pandemic and World Machinery Trade Network

Author:: Kozo Kiyota
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: In light of the importance of the machinery trade in global trade, this study examines whether the patterns of machinery exports changed significantly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Frameworks of network analysis and structural break analysis are applied to monthly level bilateral export data from January 2016 to March 2022. The main findings are threefold. First, positive structural change is found in exports in major machinery-exporting countries. Second, negative structural change in centrality is found in Japan and some ASEAN Member States (AMS), which implies a decline in the relative importance of these countries in the global machinery network. Third, the decline in Japanese centrality was not caused by the decline in export values or number of destination countries. Rather, it is attributable to the decline in the centrality of Japan’s export destination countries such as AMS. Noting that Japan has a relatively strong trade relationship with AMS, these results together suggest that the negative shock of the pandemic spread throughout the supply chain, which led to the decline in the relative importance of some countries – such as Japan – in the global machinery trade network.
Topic:: Exports, Trade, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia

94. Book Talk with Jessamyn Abel, Author of "Dream Super-Express"

Author:: Jessamyn Abel, Takuya Tsunoda, and Ariana King
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: A symbol of the "new Japan" displayed at World's Fairs, depicted in travel posters, and celebrated as the product of a national spirit of innovation, the Tōkaidō Shinkansen—the first bullet train, dubbed the "dream super-express"—represents the bold aspirations of a nation rebranding itself after military defeat, but also the deep problems caused by the unbridled postwar drive for economic growth. At the dawn of the space age, how could a train become such an important symbol? In Dream Super-Express (Stanford University Press, 2022), Jessamyn Abel contends that understanding the various, often contradictory, images of the bullet train reveals how infrastructure operates beyond its intended use as a means of transportation to perform cultural and sociological functions.
Topic:: History, Infrastructure, Sociology, Culture, Economic Growth, and Book Talk
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

95. To the Brighter Side. New Tendencies in Erecting Statues of Bodhisattva Jizō in Japanese Buddhist Temples

Author:: Alīse Eishō Donnere
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Japan is a predominantly atheistic country, however, Buddhism is still keeping its influence on society. Firstly, funerals are mostly performed according to the Buddhist ritual. Secondly, several times a year the majority of Japanese families visit their relatives’s graves in cemeteries, belonging to Buddhist temples. As a result, Buddhism is associated first of all with death and funeral. Buddhist priests try to make the image of Buddhism brighter in many ways. In this article, we will look at one of these ways – erecting statues that depict simultaneously the beloved bodhisattva Jizo, the priests themselves, visitors and the dead relatives.
Topic:: Religion, History, Buddhism, Death, and Jizo
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

96. Introducing the Research Project “Sacred Narrative – The Political Dimension of Japanese Mythology"

Author:: Klaus Antoni, Julia Dolkovski, and Louise Neubronner
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The Kojiki and Nihon shoki have been integral to the formation of Japanese identity, especially since the 18th century. As such, they were constantly exposed to processes of sacralization and desacralization, i.e., the attribution and removal of authority. The research project “Sacred Narrative – The Political Dimension of Japanese Mythology” is concerned with how certain systems of thought or ideology used these texts in a way that raised them to an elevated position or deprived them of it. Organized in three focus areas, the project delves into the topic of the historical change the Kojiki and Nihon shoki underwent in terms of interpretation and instrumentalization from the Edo period up to modern-day Japan. These investigations are integrated into the research group “De/Sacralization of Texts” at the University of Tübingen that started its work in January 2022. In this interdisciplinary context, “Sacred narrative” seeks to promote the integration of East-Asian textuality into general theory formation.
Topic:: Politics, Culture, Identity, and Mythology
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

97. Starr Forum | Reinventing Japan...Again?

Author:: Richard Samuels, Mary Brinton, Eric Heginbotham, Ulrike Schaede, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Panelists discussed the changes underway in Japan across three domains: business, national security, social relations, and—undergirding each, in public opinion.
Topic:: National Security, Public Opinion, Business, and Social Relations
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

98. Reverse Modernization Analysis: Exploring a History of How Vested Interests Were Politically Marginalized before Modern Economic Development

Author:: Makio Yamada
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: This working paper experiments with what the author calls “reverse modernization analysis,” that is, revisiting the historical West from the perspective of today’s developing countries instead of the teleological approach of modernization theory (just like engineers do reverse engineering). We know today that democracy and authoritarianism alike have witnessed both positive and negative cases of economic development. Therefore, instead of questioning the economic consequence of polity, the paper commences an exploration of an alternative historiography of development focused on how underproductive vested interests were politically marginalized—a political settlement necessary for modern economic development. It briefly examines five major country cases in the period before the 20th century: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preliminary empirical analysis shows that the decline of conservative elites, which is divided into three patterns—revolution, ruler’s alliance, and parliamentary politics—was caused by sui generis courses of events rather than by common systematic factors. This finding may be frustrating, but implies that political games are like sports games: even if a team does its best, victory is not guaranteed when the opponent plays well. The team still needs to stay ready to take advantage of windows of opportunity when they open.
Topic:: History, Economic Development, Modernization, and Vested Interest
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, and Asia

99. Challenges for Feminist-Informed Foreign Policy: Militarisation and Australia’s engagements via AUKUS and NATO

Author:: Christine Agius, Annika Bergman Rosamond, Toni Haastrup, and Katharine A.M. Wright
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:: In recent years, Australia has assessed the global and regional security environment as increasingly unstable.i The rising economic and military power of China and broader challenges to the ‘rules based international order’ seemingly signal a period of instability, prompting a reconsideration of Australia’s defence capacity and role in the region. Meanwhile, new forms of cooperation with like-minded states have emerged, most notably the AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021 by then Prime Minister Scott Morison with bipartisan support, which binds Australia more closely with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) militarily. Australia has also strengthened its relations with NATO, aspiring to play a central role in the Indo-Pacific region as a NATO partner, alongside Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. In this AFFPC Issues Paper, we explore the contradictions and tensions that emerge in the framing of national security threats and whether there are opportunities for more inclusive peace and security as promoted by the principles of feminist-informed foreign policy. For example, amidst this focus on militarisation, when the Australian Labor Party (led by Prime Minister Albanese) assumed power in 2022, Foreign Minister Penny Wong articulated a new foreign policy direction, which seemed to leverage broader attention towards feminist-informed acts and commitments. Wong promised that Australia would focus more attention on listening to its regional Pacific partners and committed to enacting a First Nations foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Feminism, Militarization, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Indo-Pacific

100. The global future of nuclear energy

Author:: Matt Bowen
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Energy supply is an integral and essential part of modern society. Since nuclear energy provides low-carbon, baseload power, it could play a larger global role in addressing growing energy demands while reducing the risks of climate change and air pollution. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted energy security as a national imperative that nuclear power could help countries to achieve. Both preserving the existing fleet of reactors and building new advanced nuclear power plants could play a role in achieving deep decarbonization of electricity supply systems by mid-century. Public support, designs with greater inherent safety, licensing advanced reactors, and reasonable costs and schedules will be integral parts of this strategy. Nuclear power’s future would also benefit from national governments putting renewed emphasis on spent nuclear fuel disposition. This report by Matt Bowen discusses a number of actions that the United States, Japan, and other civil nuclear allies could pursue so that nuclear energy can play a larger role in overcoming the challenges related to energy demand, energy security, and associated environmental and public health risks.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

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