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2. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea
3. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral
- Author:
- Jeffrey Ordaniel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea
4. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy
- Author:
- Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, and South Korea
5. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum
- Author:
- Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
6. The Quad's Next Chapter
- Author:
- Karl Friedhoff
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania
7. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves
- Author:
- Ryan Ashley
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
8. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China
- Author:
- John Lee and Lavina Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America
9. The Future of the Quad and the Emerging Architecture in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Garima Mohan and Kristi Govella
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The Quadrilateral grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the Quad) has come a long way from its origins, establishing itself as a crucial pillar of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture and significantly shifting in tone and focus from its early iterations. Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has been elevated to a leader-level dialogue, it has begun issuing joint statements, and it has developed a new working-group structure to facilitate cooperation. It has also significantly broadened and deepened its agenda to include vaccines, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, cyber, and space. These recent changes to the Quad raise several questions about its future trajectory. What are the drivers of engagement, the domestic support, and the bureaucratic capacity in the four countries to continue investing in the Quad? How well does the Quad’s new working-group structure function, and will the working groups be able to deliver tangible results? How has the Quad’s agenda evolved, and will it return to its initial focus on security challenges? Are the Quad countries open to cooperation with additional countries and, if so, what form will this take? This paper analyzes these questions drawing on recent publications, official statements, and interviews with key experts and policymakers in the four countries. In doing so, it offers five key takeaways into the Quad as an evolving part of the Indo-Pacific architecture, as well as a vehicle for achieving the goals of its four member countries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Quad Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Japan, India, Asia, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
10. Trouble on the Rocks: US Policy in East China Sea and South China Sea Disputes
- Author:
- Benjamin Tracy
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The South and East China Seas are strategic not only for US security and commercial interests, but are vitally so for US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Both countries are involved in territorial disputes with China, a rising power and security concern for the US and its allies. Despite treaty alliances with both, the United States has consistently confirmed that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered under Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty while stating that Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea are not explicitly covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This research project aims to understand why US policy is inconsistent in defending treaty allies’ territory. The methods used to solve this question are to look at the historical context of both disputes as well as strategic interests. UNCLOS is also analyzed to see whether international law influenced US policy. The result was that the US more consistently covered the Senkaku Islands due to the need to gain Japan’s trust as an ally in the post-war order and the US has an interest in maintaining status-quo in the region. There are three recommendations for the US in order to create a more consistent policy, which include signing UNCLOS, reengaging with regional allies such as the Philippines to establish a stronger defense commitment, and strengthening alliances with actors such as the Quad as well as the UK and France.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea
11. Abe Shinzo: In Memoriam
- Author:
- Rob York, Jada Fraser, Stephen Nagy, Brad Glosserman, and Kei Koga
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- A famous, albeit fictional, statesman once said “A good act does not wash out the bad, nor a bad act the good.” As Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, Abe Shinzo left a legacy. Fair-minded individuals would be able to find grounds for criticism in that record: Abe climbed to leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party by stoking doubts about his country’s record in World War II, provoking outrage from neighboring countries. He relished sparring with his rivals in Japan’s other political parties and in the press; his country’s press freedom ranking consequently declined under his leadership. His efforts at addressing his country’s stagnant economy and moribund birthrate saw, interpreted charitably, only modest successes. But Abe Shinzo should be remembered for much more than that. Much as Winston Churchill should be remembered, both for his foresight regarding the rise of the Nazi threat and his record as ruthless defender of Britain’s colonial interests, proponents of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision that Abe championed should remember his record as a partisan, but also as an international institution builder in an age where both “freedom” and “openness” are under attack in the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, he revived Japan as an international player and helped set the stage for multilateral cooperation to preserve existing rules and norms, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such efforts make him one of the most influential statesmen of this era. Since Abe’s shocking assassination on July 8, the Pacific Forum has sought to ensure that the fullness of this legacy is remembered, and as such used our PacNet series to explain his impact from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, we reached out to many old friends whose names are familiar to the Pacific Forum’s long-time readers. In PacNet #37, Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum’s senior advisor and my co-editor at Comparative Connections, identifies the specific attributes of Abe’s—specifically his strongly held opinions and behind-the-scenes advocacy—that made it possible for him to be this institutional builder and to restore Japan’s role on the foreign policy stage. In PacNet #36 Stephen Nagy of the International Christian University in Tokyo provides a comprehensive overview of Abe the diplomat, including his successful managing of relations with the PRC, which were actually at a low point before his lengthy stint as PM. In PacNet #39 Kei Koga of Nanyang Technological University demonstrates how under Abe, Japan countered the PRC’s growing influence in Southeast Asian countries through sustained engagement, winning their trust despite their unwillingness to match his hawkishness toward Beijing. Furthermore, in PacNet #43 Jagannath Panda of ISDP, Sweden explains how Abe’s dealings with India paved the way for the latter’s increased engagement with the outside world, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. In PacNet #40, I note that Abe’s tireless engagement with American presidents across changes in parties has made good relations with Tokyo that rarest of things in US politics: an area of bipartisan agreement that looks unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 election. The Pacific Forum also reached beyond its regular contributors’ list to acquire new perspectives. Shihoko Goto of the Wilson Center details Abe’s prescient vision for the defense of Taiwan, something the US would gradually awaken to. Jada Frasier—an MA student in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service that we believe policy professionals will be hearing from more and more in the future—explains how despite causing tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship, Abe also deserves credit for increasing the two East Asian democracies’ opportunities for security cooperation through his emphasis on minilateral groupings. Now that Japan has laid the former prime minister to rest last week, those who remember the darker side of his leadership will find grounds to do so, and some of those criticisms will be warranted. Abe, however, left a legacy far beyond those unpleasantries, especially if, as was the case with Churchill, his country and the international community rise to the challenge they presently face.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Leadership, Assassination, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
12. Strengthening Japan-ROK Relations: The Prime Time to Rebuild Relations Through Young Parliamentary Diplomacy
- Author:
- Hideshi Futori
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol began his remarkable administration by emphasizing the values of freedom and democracy, and the triangular Japan-U.S.-ROK relationship. Contrasting the previous administration, which prioritized reconciliation with North Korea, President Yoon embraced positive messages on restoring Japan-ROK relations even before taking office. On August 15, the National Liberation Day of Korea, President Yoon described Japan as a “neighbor that joins forces against the challenges that threaten freedom.” Such a posture clearly distinguishes President Yoon’s approach from that of previous South Korean administrations. Truly, even after the Yoon Administration’s approval rating began declining, Japan-ROK relations were not used politically to alleviate the pressure. One of the best takeaways from my recent visit to South Korea was Foreign Minister Park Chun’s assurance to “persistently work from a strategic perspective to improve relations with Japan, a partner that shares the universal values of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.” Heretofore, Japan has not been able to capitalize on the precious opportunities it has been afforded to mend ties with Korea. Instead, Japan continues to take a hardline approach toward South Korea and is unable to flexibly respond, instead prioritizing Japan’s self-image, as suggested by the export control regulations toward South Korea. Since 2019, the Japanese government has tightened control regulations on exports of semiconductor materials to South Korea in response to potential seizures of Japanese assets as reparations for forced labor claims related to Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. I believe Japan should consider changing its policies toward South Korea as South Korea has proactively improved its policies in response to Japan’s request, nonetheless, the effects have faded. From the perspective of economic security, it is also necessary to diversify Japan’s supply chain and strengthen trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea. Similar voices have been raised not only from South Korea but also by Japanese experts.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Parliament
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, and South Korea
13. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order
- Author:
- Yu Inagaki
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
14. What the Quad Is, Is Not, and Should Not Be
- Author:
- Daniel Depetris
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Since its establishment in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad) has transformed into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern—particularly the rise of China. The U.S. has pushed for this transformation. Quad members speak of the group as a forum for issues in the Indo-Pacific ranging from COVID-19 and climate change to emerging technologies. But China, Asia’s biggest power, is integral to addressing each issue. In early 2021, the group’s leaders signed a joint statement reiterating the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific—a reference to what all four members regard as China’s illegitimate claims in the South and East China Seas. Indo-Pacific Quad members also have disputes with China: India over its shared border with China; Japan over China’s sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands; and Australia over worsening ties, including onerous trade restrictions and tariffs.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Quad Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Australia, and United States of America
15. Japan's Foreign Policy Under Kishida
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The government of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, formed on 10 November, will continue the foreign policy of his predecessors Abe Shinzō and Suga Yoshihide. In response to China’s regional policy, Japan intends to develop its military potential and deepen cooperation with the U.S. and other partners, including European, in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Kishida will strive for stable relations with China and trade liberalisation in the region out of Japan’s own economic interest. The new government’s focus on the country’s internal socioeconomic problems will be conducive to maintaining the current course in foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Government, Economy, and Domestic Policy
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
16. Shaping the Indo-Pacific? Japan and Europeanisation
- Author:
- Yee-Kuang Heng
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- In this Strategic Update, Professor Yee-Kuang Heng investigates European power projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific, and its converging nature with Japan’s attempt to shape the regional environment in its favour. While UK threat perceptions have converged significantly with Japan’s since former Prime Minister David Cameron’s promulgation of a “golden era” in relations with China, managing expectations of Japan’s attempt to ‘shape’ and encourage Europeanisation remains crucial. But is it fair to conclude that Japan has been successful in encouraging a stronger European presence to help it shape the Indo-Pacific order?
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Europeanization, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific
17. US, Japan, and South Korea Coordination Key to Competing in Southeast Asia
- Author:
- Karl Friedhoff and Lea Chang
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- In picking fronts that offer the paths of least resistance, trilateral cooperation will maximize the presence of all three countries in ASEAN, maintaining balance in the region and making collective progress toward economic and development goals. Despite its size, economic dynamism, and geographic position, Southeast Asia has received comparatively little attention in US foreign policy. Even as American policy becomes more focused on China, the United States lacks a coordinated strategy to respond to and compete with China’s vast trade and investment in Southeast Asia. But most ASEAN countries are wary of China’s growing influence and would be open to US involvement as they look to diversify. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States must supplement its focus on the South China Sea with diplomatic and financial efforts on land. These efforts should offer an alternative to China’s largesse but should not seek a direct competition in hard infrastructure or in terms of dollar amounts invested. Nor should the United States go it alone. Instead, it should seek to cooperate with its allies—Japan and South Korea in particular—to pursue their respective competitive advantages. These include identifying and investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises in ASEAN, developing human capital in the region, and conducting joint maritime cleanup activities in coordination with ASEAN countries. Creating coordinated activities with Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia should be the first step for the United States to roll back China’s influence in the region. But these efforts will need to be calibrated to ensure that they focus on the needs of countries in the region and not just engulf the region in the US-China competition.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
18. Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans Wary of China's Intentions
- Author:
- Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Dina Smeltz
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- American, Japanese, and South Korean publics see China as a more of a threat than a partner. Trilateral cooperation will be key to managing China's rise. Against a backdrop of growing regional rivalry, March and April 2021 surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, and South Korea show that publics in all three countries share similar views of China’s growing influence and intentions. But the data also show that internal divisions within the US-Japan-South Korea relationship will pose challenges to deeper cooperation.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Public Opinion
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, East Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
19. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation
- Author:
- Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia
20. Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?
- Author:
- Bahadir Pehlivanturk
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan’s potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Legislation
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
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