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81. Arab Peace Initiative II: How Arab Leadership Could Design a Peace Plan in Israel and Palestine

Author:
Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Past peace processes in Israel and Palestine failed to offer long-term solutions to the conflict, but they showed what makes negotiations work. In the latest round of hostilities in Gaza, key Arab governments are uniquely positioned to leverage relationships with all parties to lay out the conditions that could broker a lasting peace. An Arab Peace Initiative II, with multilateral oversight, would have to offer real benefits for all parties. But for any lasting framework to take hold, these important conditions need to be met. Palestinian and Jewish national identities should be recognized as legitimate and in need of institutional expression. Individual human rights in both communities need to be protected. Antisemitic, Islamophobic, and racist rhetoric and actions must be explicitly and unconditionally repudiated by all actors. Any targeting of civilians should not be merely rejected but actively combated by all actors. Settlement activities in the Palestinian territories and forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt, Jordan, or anywhere else should be considered outlawed actions that all actors commit to fight against. Full diplomatic, political, and economic relations among participating states should be an outcome of the negotiation process. No stateless people should be left behind at the conclusion of any set of agreements.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and Occupation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

82. Starr Forum: The Israel-Hamas conflict: Expert perspectives on the ongoing crisis

Author:
Marsin Alshamary, David Kirkpatrick, Peter Krause, Steven Simon, and Evan Lieberman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speakers: Marsin Alshamary on the regional impact. Alshamary, MIT PhD '20, is an assistant professor at Boston College, and an expert on religion, civil society and social movements in the Shi’a Middle East. David Kirkpatrick on Hamas’s strategy. Kirkpatrick is a staff writer for The New Yorker and has worked for more than two decades as a reporter for the New York Times. Peter Krause on the historical context and Israeli strategy. Krause, MIT PhD '11, is an associate professor of political science at Boston College, and an expert on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. Steven Simon on US policy. Simon, a former Robert E Wilhelm Fellow at CIS, served as the National Security Council (NSC) senior director for the Middle East and North Africa during the Obama Administration and as the NSC senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House. Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa at MIT and the director of the Center for International Studies (CIS).
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Hamas, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

83. Emile Bustani Seminar: "The Egyptian army in the 1967 Six-Day War: Lessons for the present"

Author:
Khaled Fahmy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Few events in modern Middle Eastern history were as central as the Six-Day War of 1967. Surpassed in its significance probably only by the Nakba of 1948, the Naksa, or “setback,” as the 1967 war was euphemistically called, saw Israel inflicting a decisive defeat on three of its Arab neighbors combined. Of all the belligerent countries, Egypt was the most deeply affected. Its army was obliterated; its territory occupied; its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the undisputed leader of Egypt and the Arab World, was a broken man; and Nasserism was dealt a death blow. This talk looks closely into the performance of the Egyptian army in Sinai over the 36 hours of combat. It argues that while the defeat was inevitable, given Israel’s military, diplomatic and economic superiority, the scale, speed and depth of the Egyptian army’s defeat requires a close look at civil-military relations. Specifically, it looks at how the Egyptian army, starting from 1961, had deviated from its military mandate and encroached on all aspects of the economy, creating what was termed “a state within a state”. The paper also tracks the fatal steps undertaken by Abdel-Hakim Amir, the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, to snatch control of the army from Nasser, so much so that by the outbreak of the war in June 1967 Nasser was ignorant of his army’s true capabilities. The talk concludes by drawing comparisons with the present-day army under President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and asks to what degree the current army’s preoccupation running its economic empire has affected its fighting capabilitie
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, Military, and Six-Day War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

84. United States Diplomacy and the 1973 War

Author:
Daniel C. Kurtzer
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ushered in a period of active American diplomacy that contributed to two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements, one Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and, several years later, the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace. The successes of the American efforts masked a number of significant weaknesses in concept, strategy, and tactics that would plague U.S. diplomacy in the decades that followed. The story of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be told through “before and after” narratives of critical inflection points. The period after World War I—which witnessed the adoption of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine—was unlike anything that preceded the Great War. The period after the 1948 war—Israel’s war of independence and Palestine’s nakba—upturned history and took the central characters of that era in an entirely different direction from what preceded. The same can be said for the June 1967 war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Henry Kissinger, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1973 War, and 1967 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, Egypt, and United States of America

85. Israel and the United States Did Not See the 1973 War Coming

Author:
Zaki Shalom
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Israel’s mistaken pre-war assumptions about the 1973 War caused it to fail to foresee the potential outbreak of a war with Egypt and Syria. What were these calculations based on and why did the United States follow suit? In early October 1973, Israeli intelligence agencies began to receive information regarding Egypt’s (and Syria’s) intention to launch a war against Israel in the coming days. The timing of the expected offensive was not yet known. Only in the early morning of October 6, 1973, would a highly reliable intelligence agent of the Mossad inform Israeli authorities that war would begin in the late afternoon hours. The exact time was not mentioned, but for one reason or another the Israelis believed the Egyptian military offensive would begin at 6:00 pm. Concurrently, Egypt began to deploy massive military power along the Suez Canal, very close to Israel’s military forces on the other side of the canal. The war broke out at 2:00 pm—four hours before the expected time.
Topic:
Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Military, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and United States of America

86. Shifting Tides: Egypt’s Unexpected Path After the 1973 War

Author:
Ali E. Hillal Dessouki
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
When the war erupted at 2 o’clock in the afternoon on October 6, 1973, I had working for the Center for Political and Strategic Studies at Al-Ahram for the past few months. Earlier in August 1973, I had returned to Egypt after seven years of completing my graduate studies at McGill University in Canada. Soon after, I was appointed as an assistant professor of political science at Cairo University and joined the Al-Ahram Center. The center’s main job to was to monitor the domestic politics of Israel. It was supported by Mohamed Hassanein Haykal, editor of Al-Ahram and a confidante of President Nasser, and directed by Hatem Sadek, Nasser’s son-in-law. It included a group of senior researchers comprising a number of sophisticated social scientists, retired ambassadors, and policy analysts. The senior researchers used to meet on a weekly basis, and by late September, they met daily to discuss the development of events in the Middle East. All of us were at hand and the center was charged with writing daily position papers prepared specially for the president. For the following three weeks, I was commissioned to write the daily political commentary directed toward Israel, which was aired on Egyptian radio. War is a momentous event in history. It can be a catalyst for societal changes, a source of new ideas, and an impetus for replacement and transformation. War is also closely associated with the process of state formation and the development of national pride and patriotism. Moreover, the balance of power between states is impacted by war, and great wars produce new international institutions and systems.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Pragmatism, 1973 War, and Anwar Sadat
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North Africa, and Egypt

87. The 1973 October War and the Soviet Union

Author:
Vitaly Naumkin and Vasily Kuznetsov
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The fourth consecutive Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, called the Day of Atonement War or the October War, shook the Middle East in the second half of the last century. It was an exceedingly unusual war in many ways. First, the key role in the Arab coalition was played by Egypt. Second, unprecedented success was achieved by the Arabs—although temporarily and on a limited scale—which had a noticeable impact on the situation in the Middle East conflict zone. Third, Arab attacks against Israeli troops were mounted for the first time with no involvement of external actors. Lastly, the conflict came to a halt unexpectedly, leaving observers with the impression of a well-orchestrated performance. This conflict was also discordant with the “zero-sum game” paradigm that had underlain all previous Arab-Israeli wars. This time, the conflict occurred against the backdrop of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s U-turn toward the United States shortly before the war and followed a decision made by Soviet leaders to withdraw their military specialists from Egypt. Another unusual aspect of this conflict was that Moscow formally learned about the war only after it began. Even more puzzling was that Moscow nevertheless continued to provide military assistance to the Egyptians.
Topic:
History, Soviet Union, 1973 War, and Anwar Sadat
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Soviet Union, North Africa, and Egypt

88. Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at the 1973 War Half a Century On

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The October 1973 War is bound to continue to fascinate historians and many others for a long time to come. There are countless dimensions to the last of the Arab-Israeli interstate wars. The obvious military aspects of the war alone are worth thousands of pages. Then there is the superpower dimension, given that the 1973 War was the first conflict of the new period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is also a leadership angle, since none of the three leaders of the United States, Egypt, and Israel were around during the 1967 War and each felt they were now being tested. There are also the public domestic dynamics and decision-making struggles each country faced, alongside other countries with various levels of engagement like Syria and Jordan. Moreover, there is the role of regional players before, during, and after the war. Needless to say, historians of the war will remain busy for quite some time. I will explore two of these many dimensions: first, an example of the miscalculations within the United States, Israel, and Egypt that impacted the war and second, the legacies of the 1973 War that cannot be separated from the miscalculations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Armed Conflict, Henry Kissinger, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt

89. Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking

Author:
Gil Murciano
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israeli governments have successfully isolated the normalization process from events in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. This separation has assisted the development of the process but, at the same time, impeded its potential to expand and deepen. In the last few months, the Netanyahu-Smotrich government has pursued policy efforts to challenge the status quo in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), increasing the risk of Israeli-Palestinian escalation. These steps changed the normalization countries’ attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinian issue. Their attempt to minimize involvement in the Palestinian issue has been replaced by a strong stance against Israeli government policy, and increased involvement, especially by the United Arab Emirates, in the Palestinian arena. Moreover, normalization countries appear to be reconsidering their policy of normalization vis-à-vis Israel and the value of further developing relations with it if the government continues its current line of escalation. The mainstream political right has branded the normalization process a historic success story. Its popularity among the general public, particularly moderate right-wing voters, turns normalization countries into significant leverage points to stop Israeli annexation and escalation activities. The threat of downgrading relations could incentivize the Israeli government to refrain from violating the status quo in the OPT. Subsequently, the specific involvement of the normalization countries in halting the escalation trends may serve as a basis for expanding their overall political involvement in the Palestinian issue, as separate countries or as part of international coalitions. Paradoxically, this Israeli right-wing government and its escalatory policies create an opportunity to finally leverage the normalization process to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Occupation, Normalization, Abraham Accords, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

90. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza

Author:
Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza