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71. Saudi Normalization with Israel, Domestic 'Transformation,' and U.S. Policy

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Prospects for a Saudi-Israel diplomatic breakthrough appear to have cooled lately amid Riyadh’s rapprochement with Tehran and domestic ferment in Israel. But a narrow focus on these obstacles misses deeper, more encouraging trend lines, including Saudi public receptivity to people-to-people contact already underway in business and sports. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has stirringly referred to Israel as a “potential ally,” and the transformative post-oil future he is mapping out for the kingdom offers the promise of bilateral cooperation in commerce, high-tech, and tourism, among other sectors. Notwithstanding Riyadh’s deal with Iran, the Saudis and Israelis still share a common threat in the Islamic Republic and a common interest to address it. The key to a Saudi-Israel normalization agreement, writes Segal Executive Director Robert Satloff in this new Institute Policy Note, is the U.S. role. While cautioning that a “Sadat to Jerusalem” moment is unrealistic for Saudi Arabia and Israel in the near future, especially given competing priorities for Riyadh, he argues that President Biden could—if he so chooses—negotiate a historic three-way, win-win-win arrangement that not only establishes formal Saudi-Israel relations but also advances a range of important American interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Reform, Democracy, Normalization, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

72. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

73. The United States Is Rapidly Losing Arab Hearts and Minds Through Gaza War, While Competitors Benefit

Author:
Munqith Dagher and Karl Kaltenthaler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Throughout the fifteen years that following the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, each American presidential administration has experienced domestic calls to leave the Middle East. However, each time these voices grew louder, a new regional variable emerged that compelled the American administration to return to its traditional role dictated by urgent strategic security and economic interests. After the withdrawal from Iraq, a strategic vacuum led to the emergence of and fight against ISIS, with the deaths of thousands both locally and internationally, and millions from the region displaced. The U.S. military was forced to return to the region to contribute to the efforts to eliminate ISIS. When this goal was declared completed, new regional threats emerged in the form of Iran and its weapons, which threatened not only America’s allies but also the free flow of global oil supplies. While the Biden administration thought this problem could be resolved through a package of incentives and agreements with Iran, the war in Gaza has emerged to confirm once again the error of U.S. assessments that contend that this region is no longer important to America’s strategic interests. According to the third section of the U.S. National Security Strategy document signed by President Biden in October 2022, America's top priority on the global stage is to surpass China, followed by limiting Russia's influence. The national security priorities also include combating terrorism in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

74. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

75. New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
AWashington Institute poll conducted from November 14 to December 6, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens measured how Saudi attitudes have shifted due to the Israel-Hamas war. According to responses, the Saudi popular attitude towards the outcome of the war is clear: the overwhelming majority (91%) express agreement with the statement that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” And as for the role of the broader Arab world, almost all (96%) agree with the proposal that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Polling during a war is likely to produce more volatile results as circumstances shift quickly on the ground—during the current polling period, for instance, the Israel-Hamas war had several major shifts, including a temporary ceasefire from November 24-30 and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s incursions into southern Gaza. However, comparisons with Saudi polling fielded in August can help provide a barometer as to just how sharply this conflict has, at least temporarily, shifted certain attitudes, and how little it has moved others. While Hamas as a movement remains unpopular among the majority of Saudis—in contrast to a new trend of widespread popular support in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—just 16% of Saudis say that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution to the conflict based on the 1967 borders.” Nor do most believe that Hamas’s attack on October 7 targeted Israeli civilians—the overwhelming majority of Saudis (95%) responded that Hamas did not actually kill civilians when asked about whether they believed the Hamas killing of civilians was against Islam. This view is widespread across the eight countries polled by TWI, and similar results appear in a recently released poll of Palestinians from PSR. There, the overwhelming majority reported that they had not seen any videos of Hamas members committing atrocities, and only 10% of Palestinians (17% of Gazans and 5% of West Bankers) stated that they believed that Hamas committed war crimes in the current war, in comparison to 95% who say the same about Israel. While the majority of Saudis continue to express a negative opinion of Hamas, the Israel-Hamas war has generated a significant boost in its popularity. There has been a thirty point shift in positive attitudes towards Hamas, from just 10% in August to 40% in November/December. Responses in the most recent poll, alongside those in 2014 and 2021, demonstrate the increased popularity Hamas achieves among some Saudis during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with its likely disappearance over time. In the aftermath of the 2021 Hamas-Israel conflict, for instance, five years of steadily decreasing popularity in Saudi Arabia suddenly reversed, though just to a quarter (23%) of the total population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Hamas, and Polls
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Gulf Nations

76. To Prevent the PA from Unraveling, Address Internal Reform

Author:
Ghaith al-Omari
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Last year was one of the bloodiest in the West Bank since the second Palestinian intifada two decades ago, and 2023 is already on track to surpass it. Worse yet, the latest surge of violence comes at a time of exceptional fragility within the Palestinian Authority. Much of this fragility can be attributed to Israeli actions that chip away at the PA’s credibility and effectiveness—a fact driven home by Israel’s deadly February 22 raid in Nablus (see below). Yet the PA’s poor governance and political ossification are key contributors as well, as leaders in Ramallah steadily lose control over parts of the West Bank in a vicious cycle of instability and ever-eroding legitimacy. If this trajectory continues, the PA might even run the risk of unraveling altogether. As the United States seeks diplomatic ways to restore calm and curb escalatory policies on both sides, it should pay closer attention to domestic Palestinian factors that contribute to these damaging trends.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Diplomacy, Reform, Democracy, and Palestinian Authority
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

77. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

78. The Rise and Immediate Fall of Israel-Libya Relations

Author:
Ben Fishman
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On August 27, Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen revealed that he had met with his Libyan counterpart Najla al-Mangoush in Rome, sparking an imbroglio in both of their countries and further abroad. Protests erupted immediately across Libya, including at the Foreign Ministry and the residence of Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who likely authorized the meeting. Dabaiba tried to calm the situation by suspending Mangoush and naming an interim foreign minister, while his Government of National Unity (GNU) called the incident a chance encounter alongside Italy’s foreign minister rather than a planned meeting. As protests continued on August 28, Dabaiba appeared at the Palestinian embassy in Tripoli, where he donned a scarf depicting the Dome of the Rock, announced that he had officially dismissed Mangoush, and reiterated Libya’s dedication to the Palestinian cause. Fearing further backlash and potential violence, Mangoush fled to Istanbul. Unlike her predecessors, who were experienced diplomats familiar with Libya’s byzantine Foreign Ministry, Mangoush had no diplomatic background. Dabaiba appointed her in March 2021 only after another female candidate drew criticism, and she faced a unique challenge as a woman among exclusively male foreign ministers across the region. She lacked a power base of her own and wielded narrow influence outside of what Dabaiba and his circle granted her. Yet she was resilient during her first two years in office, surviving calls for her resignation over controversial statements criticizing Turkey’s military presence in Libya, praising Russia’s positive relationship with the GNU, and cooperating with the United States on the extradition of a Pan Am 103 bombing suspect (see below). The State Department named her an International Woman of Courage in 2022, citing her work with civil society organizations and her expertise in conflict resolution (gained in part from PhD work at George Mason University).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Libya, and North Africa

79. Syrians' Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Ammar Musarea
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When the al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization—launched their al-Aqsa Flood operation, Syrians were already on edge. They had been following news of peaceful protests that have been taking place for almost two months in the Suwayda Governorate, which is majority Druze, as well as in other Syrian governorates. Protestors have called for the end of the Assad regime, the release of tens of thousands of prisoners, and the implementation of UN resolutions on Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and Russian aircraft have carried out daily bombings on civilians in Idlib and the surrounding countryside, which have displaced more than 100,000 Syrians. The Syrian Network for Human Rights stated that the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks on northwestern Syria have resulted in around 45 civilian deaths including 13 children, 9 women, and 3 humanitarian aid workers. They said that 51 critical facilities had also been targeted during October 2023. Al-Aqsa Flood also comes at a time when Syrians in regime-controlled areas face increasingly difficult living conditions. Concurrently, the International Court of Justice is beginning initial proceedings for Canada and the Netherlands’ case against the Assad regime for crimes of torture. The response to events in Israel and Gaza have not been monolithic; reactions have varied significantly depending on factions’ alliances and proximity to the conflict. On the one hand, there is widespread disillusionment with actors claiming to liberate Palestine, a reflection of how groups like Hamas failed to support the Syrian people’s revolution against the Assad regime. However, Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes. Simultaneously, Syrians have not forgotten the crimes that the terrorist organization Hezbollah has carried out against them in support of the regime, as well as Hamas’ backstabbing in trying to reestablish ties with the Assad regime. Hamas' close ties with Iran, the main backer of the Damascus government, are another source of anger in anti-regime circles.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Syrian War, Hamas, and October 7
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Syria

80. Morocco and North Africa Are Feeling Anti-Normalization Ripples from the Gaza War

Author:
Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The conflict will make it more difficult for Washington and Israel to preserve—let alone expand—the diplomatic progress they have made with North African governments in recent years, particularly as public opposition intensifies. North Africa has not been spared from the reverberations of the Hamas-Israel war. Morocco may be the country most profoundly affected given its relatively strong relations with Israel and the United States, while anti-normalization trends elsewhere in the region are being firmly reinforced, creating new challenges for Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Normalization, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and Morocco