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62. Israel’s assassinations outside Palestine | ACLED Insight
- Author:
- Ameneh Mehvar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- In a significant development, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on 31 July in an attack attributed to Israel,1 just a day after Israel claimed responsibility for the death of a top Hezbollah commander in the south of Beirut. Following the 7 October attacks that killed around 1,200 Israelis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have killed dozens of Hamas senior figures and commanders during their intense campaign in Gaza. But also beyond Gaza, Israel has targeted senior figures of Hamas and other allied members of the ‘axis of resistance.’ The recent events mark the latest in a series of at least 34 Israeli attacks that have led to the death of at least 39 commanders and senior members of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran in the past 10 months (see graph and map below).
- Topic:
- Extrajudicial Killings, Assassination, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon
63. Iranians Don’t Want a War With Israel
- Author:
- Kourosh Ziabari
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- Most believe that Tehran’s engagement in the battle for Palestinian emancipation is intrusive and uncalled for
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
64. A bipartisan Iran strategy for the next US administration—and the next two decades
- Author:
- Atlantic Council
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The United States needs a bipartisan strategy toward Iran that can be maintained across several administrations, one that works patiently and resolutely to counter Iran’s efforts to dominate the Middle East, drive the United States out, destroy Israel, and threaten Arab allies. Pressure to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and to halt its malign regional influence is crucial—but won’t work absent a strategic goal of new negotiations to address both challenges simultaneously. The United States must also counter Iran’s hostage taking, assassinations, and cyber and election meddling by triggering automatic penalties and responses in lockstep with allies.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
65. CTC Sentinel: February 2024 Issue
- Author:
- Don Rassler, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, and Daisy Muibu
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Long-range aerial attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group, including a ballistic missile that traveled at least a thousand miles toward Israel before being intercepted (reportedly in space) on October 31, 2023, are focusing minds on long-range stand-off terrorism. In this month’s feature article, which conceptualizes, outlines, and examines the implications of this emerging threat vector, Don Rassler argues that the notion that terrorists could strike the United States across the oceans with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is becoming increasingly less far-fetched. Rassler writes that “over the coming decade, hydrogen fuel cell and solar UAS technology will evolve and mature, and will also likely become more available and accessible to the average consumer, which will make longer ranges more accessible as well. Other disruptive technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, will also mature and will likely be used by extremists to help them optimize system performance and to overcome, or devise creative solutions to, technical long-range UAS challenges.” He warns that “long-range stand-off terrorism will be attractive to some extremists because it opens-up new attack pathways, can enable surprise, and has the potential to deliver a potent psychological, ‘we can strike you from afar’ punch. Over the next decade advancements in commercial technologies and systems will also make range, and extended range, more accessible for violent non-state-entities, making it likely that in the future long-range terrorism will become even more of a threat.” Rassler’s article is the first in a new recurring series in CTC Sentinel entitled “On the Horizon” that will examine emerging counterterrorism challenges. Our interview is with Christopher Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. “We need to have sustainable CT operations that prevent terrorists’ actions, principally al-Qa`ida and ISIS, to ensure we are not distracted by what we view as the longer-term strategic priorities, such as peer adversaries,” he says. “As the rest of the Department and other parts of the U.S. government are doing less CT, [this] means that those who are doing it have to do it better and, in many respects, do it more proportionally to the rest of the national security enterprise. This is why SOF is looked to as the lead for the CT fight in the Department.” Daisy Muibu examines the state of Somalia’s military campaign against al-Shabaab. She writes that: “A year and five months after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the initial optimism that characterized its first few months have diminished as the counterinsurgency’s momentum has stalled in the central regions of the country.” She adds that “with only a year left until African Union forces are mandated to fully draw down, significant obstacles remain that cast doubts over the government’s ambitious goals to defeat al-Shabaab and assume full responsibility for securing the country by December 31, 2024.”
- Topic:
- National Security, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Houthis, and Al-Shabaab
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Somalia, Global Focus, and United States of America
66. April 2024 Issue
- Author:
- Michael Knights, Sean Morrow, Asher Spain, Kevin Jackson, and Paul D. Williams
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights provides a highly detailed assessment of the six-month Houthi war effort that has seen the Tehran-backed group launch missiles at Israel and attack shipping off the coasts of Yemen. He assesses that: “The Houthis have used the Gaza crisis to vault into the front ranks of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance,’ arguably as the only axis partner to truly globalize the conflict through their anti-shipping attacks on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The movement has demonstrated boldness—as the first axis member to fire ballistic missiles at Israel—and resilience in the face of U.S.-U.K. airstrikes. The Houthis are likely to emerge from the war as a more confident, ambitious, and aggressive terrorist army, with a taste for provocative and eye-catching acts of defiance against Israel and the United States.” Our interview is with Colonel (Ret.) Miri Eisin, the director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University who previously served in a variety of senior intelligence roles in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). She stresses the need to learn lessons from the intelligence failures that preceded the Hamas-led October 7 attack so that Israel is not surprised again, for example with regard to the kind of threat Hezbollah could pose in the coming months. “All of us made wrong assumptions, and the combination of all of them brought about a colossal failure,” she says. “We collectively were wrong about the capability. We were wrong about the intentions. We were wrong about the ferocity.” Kévin Jackson assesses the current state of al-Qa`ida Central. He writes that “while the challenges facing the group are real, it should not be written off, as it has proved time and again more resilient than expected.” He adds that “in the wake of the Gaza war, al-Qa`ida likely feels emboldened by what it perceives as a uniquely auspicious geopolitical context to further its global ambitions.” The African Union is set to withdraw the remainder of its forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024. Paul Williams evaluates whether the Somali National Army (SNA) or al-Shabaab would be stronger militarily if this happens. He writes that “the SNA would retain an advantage in terms of size, material resources, and external support but performs poorly on non-material dimensions and would remain dependent upon external finance and security assistance. Overall, however, al-Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.”
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Houthis, African Union, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Somalia
67. CTC Sentinel: October 2024 Issue
- Author:
- Michel Wyss, Brian Dodwell, Michael Knights, and Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- A year on from the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel, the Middle East is entering its most dangerous period in living memory. The unfolding events will have far-reaching consequences for the region and the international terror threat. In our feature article, Michel Wyss assesses the intelligence failings in the lead-up to October 7. He writes: “Israel’s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons,” adding that “failures and negligence hampered both Israel’s overall political assessment as well as collection, analysis, and dissemination at the intelligence level.” He argues that one lesson learned is the need for humility and that also includes “the recognition that even seasoned intelligence analysts can fall prey to their own blind spots.” Our interview is with Christopher O’Leary, former FBI Counterterrorism Senior Executive and Director of Hostage Recovery. He provides insights from his more than two decades of working on counterterrorism investigations for the FBI. Reflecting on the Israeli experience since October 7, he discusses key variables for a government to consider when faced with a hostage crisis. Michael Knights examines a year of Houthi attacks against Israel and shipping off the coast of Yemen. He writes: “Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.” Matthew Levitt assesses the threat posed by Iran’s weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs). He writes: “Today, with Iran’s proxies wreaking havoc throughout the region, officials worry Tehran may have already provided weaponized PBAs to several of its partners and proxies. Such a capability, tactically deployed on the battlefield, could enable further October 7-style cross-border raids or kidnapping operations.” This issue is my hundredth at the helm of CTC Sentinel. It is an ongoing privilege to feature the insights of the best and brightest in our field and to count as my colleagues the extraordinary group of leaders and thinkers at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Houthis, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, and Palestine
68. North Korean Support to Iran’s Proxy Partners
- Author:
- Bruce E. Bechtol
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- This essay details the role of North Korea weapons, delivery systems, and technical expertise to Iran’s regional allies (Syria, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas) – starting during the Cold War and transitioning into the PostCold War period. Pyongyang has proliferated chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional arms, and sent advisers, trainers, engineers, and technicians for a variety of projects to Syria. The 2012-2020 Syrian civil war moreover expanded the Assad regime’s need for all kinds of North Korean arms. Hezbollah’s military intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime has also forced the Lebanese guerilla movement and its Iranian patron to become increasingly dependent on North Korean weapons and expertise. The Israeli war with Hamas that began on October 7, 2023, has seen a terrorist force supplied with weapons by both North Korea and Iran – often in collaboration when it comes to getting the weapons and training to Hamas operatives.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, and Proxy Groups
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, and Syria
69. Economic Cooperation: A Driver of Stability in the MENA Region?
- Author:
- Valeria Talbot
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faces a complex landscape where economic cooperation is increasingly linked to regional stability. For decades, economic factors have influenced the foreign policy of MENA countries. However, since 2020, shared economic challenges – exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, oil market fluctuations and the global repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – have spurred initiatives for rapprochement. The October 7 attacks and subsequent Gaza and Lebanon conflicts pose a threat to such progresses. Can economic partnerships serve as a basis for lasting peace in MENA region? What forms of collaboration could enhance stability in the face of persistent security challenges? What are the primary constraints and challenges that limit the potential of economic cooperation as a stabilizing force in the MENA region?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economic Cooperation, COVID-19, Armed Conflict, Abraham Accords, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North Africa, and Gulf Nations
70. Who are the Houthis? Ansar Allah’s Islamic Propaganda in Yemen and Beyond
- Author:
- Jonathan Franco
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In this new edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Jonathan Franco examines the ideology of Ansar Allah (commonly referred to as the Houthis) and explains how it mobilizes its ideology to justify its intervention in the Israel-Gaza War.
- Topic:
- Military Intervention, Ideology, Islamism, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza
71. Syria After Asad: A Conflict Without Closure
- Author:
- Brandon Friedman
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In this special edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Brandon Friedman explains how the fall of the Asad regime affects the unresolved dimensions of the Syrian conflict.
- Topic:
- Syrian War, Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad, and Post-Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria
72. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?
- Author:
- Tato Kvamladze
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
73. New Canal Threatens the Peace Between the Taliban and Central Asia
- Author:
- Bruce Pannier
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Since their return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have managed to reach an understanding with most of the Central Asian governments to preserve a relative calm along the areas of the Afghan-Central Asian frontier. Disputes over water use have suddenly become an issue that could derail ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Specifically, the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could lead to the loss of water for tens of thousands of people in downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, three people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters along the Afghan-Iranian border over rights to water from the Helmand River.
- Topic:
- Natural Resources, Water, Taliban, Borders, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan
74. The Shah’s Son and the Future of Iranian Opposition
- Author:
- Lior Sternfeld
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- For the Iranian opposition movement to be viable, it has to offer a clear vision for Iran that can unite most Iranians. Those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran must keep in mind the people in Iran, including those who have not yet shown any support for the opposition, and let them know what their future would look like if the opposition prevails. Any movement that would try to rely on sentiments favoring the Iranian monarchy is doomed to fail. The Iranian people will not get behind replacing one autocratic leader for another. This is one of the reasons for despair among many Iranians of the middle generation. The Iranian opposition’s vision for the country should include the role of those who are now employed or involved in the state apparatus.
- Topic:
- History, Domestic Politics, and Opposition
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
75. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties
- Author:
- Leon Hadar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
76. Iran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Vastly Improved Hamas’s Operational Capabilities
- Author:
- Colin P. Clarke
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Iran has provided training, equipment, and financing to Hamas over the years, vastly improving the terrorist organization’s capabilities, evidenced by the cross-border attack into Israel on October 7 that resulted in more than 1,400 killed. The unification of Iran’s network of proxies under the purview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani has been a force multiplier and cemented Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy as the most effective means of encircling Israel. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas completely, but any attempt to do so will come at an extremely high cost and could spur other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah to join the fray, prolonging the conflict and increasing the likelihood of a region-wide conflagration.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Proxy Groups, and Axis of Resistance
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
77. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror
- Author:
- Nate Sibley
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
78. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea
79. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran
- Author:
- Jonathan Schachter
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
80. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East
- Author:
- Robert Greenway
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East