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1. Mitigating Humanitarian Impact in a Complex Sanctions Environment: The European Union and the Sanctions Regimes against Iran

Author:
Keith A. Preble and Kolja Brockmann
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Iran is one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world. The combination of sanctions on Iran imposed by the United States, the United Nations and the European Union (EU) in response to, among others, nuclear and ballistic missile activities and human rights violations provides for a sanctions environment that is highly complex and difficult to navigate for exporters, financial institutions and humanitarian actors. Particularly in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is renewed attention to the humanitarian impact of sanctions, especially in the case of Iran which became one of the flashpoints of the pandemic. The focus of this paper is on the array of overlapping sanctions and the mitigation of humanitarian impact, with a particular focus on EU sanctions policy and instruments. The paper outlines key milestones and phases in the imposition of sanctions on Iran by the three main sanctioning actors, the USA, the UN and the EU, thus demonstrating the complexity and the at times coordinated or contradictory nature of the different sanctions. It then explores the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iran by discussing several illustrative indicators and the impact of sanctions on the provision of international humanitarian aid. The paper reviews existing mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian impact of sanctions and how they could be improved. In the context of the sanctions of Iran, but also beyond, the paper finds that there is a clear need to further strengthen compliance, enforcement and coordination of EU sanctions, including in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It concludes by providing specific recommendations for the EU and its member states on improving the effective use of sanctions and reducing their humanitarian impact, including through strengthening key instruments and assessment processes, better coordination with the USA and more engagement with humanitarian actors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Sanctions, European Union, Arms Trade, Disarmament, and Exports
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

2. Four Scenarios for the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After a hiatus of over five months, negotiations to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, have finally resumed in Vienna. Struck in July 2015 by Iran and a group of six powers – France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US, as well as the EU (E3/EU+3)–, the JCPOA placed limits on Iranian nuclear activities, while also introducing a highly intrusive inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deal is in a comatose state due to former US President Donald Trump’s decision to unilaterally pull out of the agreement and re-adopt all sanctions on Iran in May 2018. In response, since May 2019 Iran has progressively reduced its compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the deal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Transatlantic Relations, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

3. Dealing Preventively with NPT Withdrawal

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since it came into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has worked remarkably well to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The one major exception is North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003. Despite this track record of success, the stability of the current non-proliferation regime could be significantly undermined by further withdrawals by countries such as Iran. The right of states to withdraw from the NPT is clearly stated in the Treaty. Article X.1 provides that: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Since it is impossible to deny the right of states parties to withdraw from the NPT, it is all the more important to put in place appropriate preventive measures to dissuade withdrawal from the Treaty. The urgency of dealing preventively with NPT withdrawal increases as more nonnuclear-weapon states are poised to become “nuclear threshold states.”1 As the IAEA reported in 2008: “Much of the sensitive information coming from the [Abdul Qadeer Khan] network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dissemination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge enrichment and, more disturbing, information that relates to nuclear weapon design.”2 and: “a substantial amount of sensitive information related to the fabrication of a nuclear weapon was available to members of the network."3 The widespread dissemination of this type of scientific and technical information raises the prospect that more states will acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thus increasing the
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. Majority of Iranians Oppose Development of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Amir Farmanesh
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Both the United States and Iran have been among the countries worst hit by the coronavirus, but neither country has moved away from mutual confrontation. Nationwide surveys conducted by IranPoll this winter – before the spread of the virus and before the US strike against Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani – show that although Iranians say their country should not develop nuclear weapons, they have lost confidence in the nuclear agreement and think that the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany) have not lived up to their obligations. Chicago Council survey results from January 2020 show that a majority of Americans say they would favor rejoining the agreement if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Disarmament, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

5. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

6. Exploring the Transfer Potential of the JCPOA for Zonal Disarmament Arrangements in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Daniel Muller
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue advocates using elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or agreement/accord) in prospective negotiations to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle East. In a stalemated situation resembling efforts to negotiate a zonal arrangement, the JCPOA after more than 12 years of negotiations succeeded in striking a multilateral deal among adversaries with diverging capabilities and agendas who doubted each other’s intentions and were reluctant to make concessions.By establishing an incentive-based mechanism that encouraged and facilitated cooperation, the JCPOA succeeded in trading various issues to reach common ground in an incremental step-by-step approach of carefully sequenced quid pro quos. Framed as an agreement among equals and safeguarded by multiple compliance mechanisms, the JCPOA (or aspects of it) could serve as a toolbox for zonal negotiations on disarmament, help to link hardened actors, and break up entrenched interest structures and dogmatic policy positions.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

7. 2016 Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament, Nonproliferation Efforts

Author:
Elizabeth Philipp and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The report, "Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2013-2016," is the third in a series that measures the performance of 11 key states in 10 universally-recognized nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear security categories over the past three years. The study evaluated the records of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—each of which possess nuclear weapons—as well as Iran and Syria, which are states of proliferation concern.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America

8. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Marcus Taylor
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The study, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan—each of which possess nuclear weapons—and North Korea—which maintains a nuclear weapons capability—as well as Iran and Syria, which are under investigation for possible nuclear weapons-related activity.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America