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Begin New Search Political Geography Iran Publication Year within 5 Years

1. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)

Author:
Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
Publication Date:
12-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
Topic:
Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

2. The Unraveling of Iran’s Regional Strategy

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Hezbollah’s decline, Syria’s collapse and Iran’s strategic failures have reshaped the region. No new threats can be allowed to emerge
Topic:
Hezbollah, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

3. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

4. Reforming Iran’s Energy Policy: Strategies for Sustainability, Subsidies, and Global Integration

Author:
Behdad Gilzad Kohan and Hamid Dahouei
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Iran’s energy sector, rich in natural gifts and brimming with potential, struggles to realize its promise due to systemic inefficiencies, heavy dependence on fossil fuels, outdated infrastructure, and the weight of international sanctions. These challenges plague Iran with recurring energy crises, including seasonal energy shortages, environmental degradation, and socio-economic discontent. This article investigates the root causes of Iran’s energy challenges and offers a comprehensive analysis of the critical deficiencies of Iranian energy policies. Based on these insights, the article proposes a strategic roadmap with immediate, medium-term, and long-term policy recommendations to stabilize the sector, most critical of which include subsidy reforms, ambitious renewable energy integration, and energy efficiency improvements. The proposed reforms emphasize the importance of transparent governance, targeted investments, and stakeholder engagement to achieve meaningful change. By aligning its energy policies with global sustainability trends and addressing domestic inefficiencies, Iran can transform its energy sector into a model of innovation and equity.
Topic:
Sanctions, Reform, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, Subsidies, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

5. A Resurgent Trump Returns to a Turbulent Middle East

Author:
Paul Salem
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Trump’s unpredictable yet forceful leadership is entering a region in flux, offering both challenges and opportunities for his second term
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hezbollah, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

6. Two to tango: Russian-Iranian drone cooperation

Author:
Katie Fricke, Taylor Hankins, and Victoria Jones
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Iran and Russia are strengthening their partnership through collaboration on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) development and deployment. Iran’s drone programme presents a multifaceted challenge to NATO. The acquisition of Western technology through reverse engineering, coupled with Iran’s growing reputation as a drone supplier, enhances its military capabilities and global infl uence. Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine exposes vulnerabilities in NATO-provided defence systems and undermines eff orts to protect member states and partner countries. The proliferation of this technology to other state and non-state actors complicates NATO’s defence strategies. It is important for NATO to understand the drone warfare dynamics shaped by the Russia-Iran partnership. Analysing their innovations and integration into military doctrines is crucial for anticipating threats and developing countermeasures.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

7. A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, and Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change. Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future. The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions. Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria. Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface. The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.
Topic:
Regime Change, Geopolitics, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and Eastern Mediterranean

8. Hizballah’s Identity Crisis in the Wake of Nasrallah's Assassination

Author:
Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
This new edition of Tel Aviv Notes examines Hizballah's actions during the "Iron Swords" war. The Author Eitan Ishai analyzes Hassan Nasrallah's strategy in the conflict, arguing that the identity dilemma inherent in Hizballah's existence led its Secretary-General to misjudge the situation and misinterpret Israel's moves. This critical miscalculation resulted in a devastating blow to Hizballah, raising concerns about its status in Lebanon and ultimately leading to Nasrallah's demise.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Hezbollah, Assassination, and Hassan Nasrallah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

9. Shallow Ramparts: Air and Missile Defenses in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War

Author:
Sam Lair
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
There are two remarkable stories about defenses during the war between Israel and Iran in June 2025. One is the failure of Iran’s much-discussed air defense system; the other, the success of the Israeli missile defense system. This chapter begins with the poor Iranian performance before turning to the Israeli defensive efforts. Ultimately, the war underscored how fragile Iran’s air defenses were, how key air superiority was to Israeli strategy, and how strained the Israeli air and missile defense system was despite its impressive performance. The June 2025 war illustrates the difficulty of air and missile defense in modern high-intensity conflict, demonstrating challenges facing defenders and strategies for the offense.
Topic:
Security, Missile Defense, Armed Conflict, and Air Defense
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

10. Regional Terrorism Trends Before and After October 7

Author:
Suat Cubukcu, Eoin B. Healy, and Adam Blackwell
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel triggered a rapid escalation in regional conflict and reshaped the operational landscape of Iran-backed violent non-state actors. Using data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center’s GRID database, this article compares patterns of terrorist violence in the Middle East one year before and after the attack. The analyses reveal a dramatic rise in drone, rocket, and missile attacks—particularly by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—against U.S., Israeli, and maritime targets. Despite the volume, these attacks caused limited casualties due to advanced U.S. and Israeli defenses, signaling a broader shift toward low-cost, high-frequency stand-off warfare, causing disruption over decisive outcomes. While Hezbollah and Hamas suffered major losses at the hands of Israeli forces, the Houthis emerged as Iran’s most active and disruptive proxy. The analysis underscores a post-October 7 reconfiguration of the proxy landscape and highlights the strategic limits of Iran’s indirect warfare and its eroded ability to deter direct Israeli attacks on Iran.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Proxy Groups, Regional Security, October 7, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

11. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

12. Iran in the Israeli Calculus: What Comes Next?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Israeli-American war on Iran has not fully achieved its intended goals. While it may have caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and gained relative advantage in armed confrontations, the underlying hostilities remain unresolved, escalating the risk of renewed military conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Nuclear Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

13. The war on Iran: End of the battle is a prelude to the next round

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Israel launched a war on Iran to halt its nuclear project. Iran hit vital Israeli sites in response. Unable to act alone, Israel relied on U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Qatari mediation secured a ceasefire, but without resolving root causes, making future escalation likely.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Escalation, Airstrikes, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

14. How the Twelve-Days War with Iran Tested the Strategic Alliance between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus

Author:
Spyros Katsoulas
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Spyros Katsoulas explains how the triangular Israeli-Greek-Cyprus relationship survived the test of the 12 day war with Iran this past June, while noting that challenges remain on the horizon stemming from both Turkish and Israeli policy trajectories.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Strategic Planning, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, and Cyprus

15. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:
Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

16. Israel's Attacks on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Goodbye to Economic Sanctions?

Author:
Amos Nadan
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Prof. Amos Nadan evaluates the Iran-Israel war in light of past attempts to use economic sanctions as a tool of coercion against Iran.
Topic:
Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Coercion, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

17. Humiliation and Transformation: The Islamic Republic After the 12-Day War

Author:
Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 exposed critical weaknesses in the Islamic Republic’s military, strategic, and ideological frameworks, marking a turning point for the regime. The Iranian government’s failure to achieve its political and military objectives undermined the regime’s credibility, revealed the limits of its deterrence, and intensified internal debates about its future. This paper examines the war’s causes, conduct, and consequences, analyzing its impact on Iran’s governance, ideology, and regional standing. I argue that the conflict accelerated the regime’s loss of strategic coherence, prompting increased repression, a nationalist pivot, and institutional restructuring, while leaving Iran vulnerable to future crises.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

18. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:
WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

19. Grievance and Flawed Governance in Iran’s Baluchestan

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? As Iran struggles with geopolitical tensions and economic duress, its periphery regions are facing additional challenges. Baluchestan, the southern part of Sistan and Baluchestan province, has experienced recurrent unrest. Many residents feel the government discriminates against them as a religious and ethnic minority. Militancy persists. Environmental concerns compound the difficulties. Why does it matter? The central government’s repeated pledges to reduce poverty in Baluchestan through development and improved governance have been undermined by chronic mismanagement, lack of investment and suppression of dissent. Deepening socio-economic disparities, threats of militancy and growing environmental challenges are likely to bring greater strains. What should be done? Enhancing popular participation in local governance, making economic reforms and improving environmental stewardship are the best ways to address Baluchestan’s entrenched crisis. But meaningful progress will require considerable support from the central government, notwithstanding the other huge challenges it faces at home and abroad.
Topic:
Economics, Poverty, Governance, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Baluchestan

20. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Author:
Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

21. The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a critical catalyst for cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—what the authors call the “axis of upheaval.” Already, defense cooperation between these countries has enabled Russian aggression against Ukraine, increased their military capabilities in ways that make each country a more formidable threat, emboldened their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine and experience in modern warfare, for example, are diffusing to each axis country. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist. The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

22. Rise of the E-Militias: Designated Terrorist Groups Infest Iraq’s Digital Economy

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iraq’s digital economy is one of its fastest-growing sectors, driven by an expanding youth population, a transition to e-governance services, and the potential for Iraq to become a regional data transit hub. As with militia monetization of Iraq’s oil sector, the telecommunications industry is attracting the attention of U.S.-designated terrorist groups. They have two motives: to generate threat finances and to control and monitor data to strengthen their grip on the population and on Western diplomatic, military, and commercial entities inside Iraq. In the year before Iraq’s November 2025 elections, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani revealed the extent of militia penetration of the sector by awarding sensitive telecoms contracts to a now-sanctioned militia economic conglomerate, while also offering U.S.-origin equipment to militias and channeling lucrative 5G mobile telephony licenses exclusively to militia businessmen.
Topic:
Terrorism, Digital Economy, Telecommunications, and E-Government
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

23. Bleak with some silver linings: scenarios for EU-Iran relations

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In 2015, relations between the European Union (EU) and Iran reached a peak with the conclusion of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) between Russia, China, the US, the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran. The deal was capably facilitated by the EU External Action Service without losing sight of the interests of its larger Member States. At the surface, Iran accepted temporarily binding constraints on the development of its nuclear programme in exchange for reintegration into the global economy. At a deeper level, the deal was meant to prevent nuclear proliferation across the region and to start building back trust – especially between the US and Iran – as a basis for follow-up discussions about regional threat perceptions and security postures, including elements like Iran’s missile programme and regional security activities. However, by late 2024, three major turning points had brought EU-Iran relations to an all-time low: first, the E3 and EU’s failure to deliver on their part of the nuclear deal after US withdrawal in 2018; second, Iranian arms deliveries to Russia since 2022; and third, near-unconditional support for Israel from European countries like Germany, the UK and France since 7 October 2023, including against Iran and its ‘axis of resistance’ (a network of armed groups linked to Iran with various degrees of autonomy and support). It is in this context that the present brief outlines scenarios for EU-Iran relations for the next two to three years. The purpose of scenario development is to imagine different futures under conditions of uncertainty in order to foster a better understanding of the pathways that can lead to any of these futures.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

24. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

25. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

26. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:
Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, and South Africa

27. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:
Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

28. Iran’s 1979 revolution and its resonance today

Author:
Alex Vatanka and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, MEI Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka, MEI Non-resident Scholar Andrew Scott Cooper, and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor discuss the Iranian Revolution of 1979. A seminal event in the history of the modern Middle East, the revolution transformed Iran and its impact continues to reverberate across the region today, nearly five decades on.
Topic:
History, Geopolitics, and Iranian Revolution
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

29. The Gaza War's Regional Reverberations

Author:
Randa Slim and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, President and CEO of the Middle East Institute Paul Salem and Director of MEI’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program Randa Slim speak to MEI's Editor-in-Chief Alistair Taylor about growing concerns over the potential for large-scale regional escalation as the Gaza war continues. *Note: This episode was recorded before drone attacks that killed US soldiers in Jordan on 1/28. *
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Escalation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

30. Politicization, Ratification of International Agreements, and Domestic Political Competition in Non-Democracies: The Case of Iran and the Paris Climate Accords

Author:
Reşat Bayer and Bijan Tafazzoli
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
While some degree of competition is present in many authoritarian regimes, the implications of such controlled competition on international issues have not received much consideration, including towards international environmental accords. We attempt to rectify this through a framework where we focus on internal political competition in a hybrid, nondemocratic system where national elections are held regularly. Specifically, we argue that the presence of multiple actors competing in elections in nondemocratic settings results in them assuming positions on various issues, justifying their positions, and attempting to mobilize their supporters with considerable implications for international environmental policies. We display our argument in the context of Iranian debates on the ratification of the Paris Climate Accords. Our findings demonstrate that the competing Iranian sides rely on different justifications for their environmental positions, resulting in extensive (negative) competitions of rhetoric where the international dimension emerges as an important feature in the internal competition. Overall, we show that political competition within non-democracies is likely to add to the complexity of international (environmental) negotiations and cooperation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Elections, Paris Agreement, Narrative, and Regime Survival
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

31. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

32. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA

Author:
Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

33. The Aras Corridor: Azerbaijan's Rationale Behind the Deal with Iran

Author:
Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and its subsequent push for the Zangezur Corridor, Baku, and Tehran have been embroiled in fierce waves of escalation. With the launch of construction works for the Aras Corridor as the purported replacement to the Zangezur Corridor, the two nations appear to have made a breakthrough, and a thaw can be seen in current bilateral relations. In lieu of Baku’s strong push for the Zangezur Corridor over the last three years, the change in direction triggers the immediate question as to why Azerbaijan agreed to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran. In order to properly address this question, it is essential to distinguish Azerbaijan’s Zangezur Corridor project from its Zangezur discourse, which can otherwise lead to misunderstandings. The main reason for Baku’s concession to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran and backtracking from the Zangezur Corridor is that Baku has achieved its objectives in the Zangezur discourse. Having achieved those objectives, the Zangezur Corridor alone, without the discourse, is of mere local importance to Azerbaijan. Yet the hype around it still persists, with the subsequent international reactions having made the topic somewhat toxic for Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

34. The BRICS Expansion: Prerequisits and Anticipated Threats

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On January 1st, 2024, BRICS officially expanded. Initially, it was expected that six new states would become members of this club representing the “Global South” - Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Argentina. However, Argentina changed its mind at the last minute due to the election of Javier Milei as president. Unlike his predecessor, Alberto Fernandez, Milei is changing the vector of the country’s foreign policy from the «South» to the «West». Despite predictions of its breakup due to heterogeneity, the BRICS bloc has lasted longer than anticipated. During its time, the number of BRICS members has doubled, and there are still many countries interested in joining. As the BRICS countries strengthen their massive economy and even bigger goals, their ability to influence the world order increases, which may ultimately pose a threat to the entire Western free world. This paper will seek to provide brief answers to the following questions within the frame of expert opinion: 1. What is BRICS? 2. What events led to its expansion? and 3. What threats should we expect from the strengthening of the bloc?
Topic:
Alliance, BRICS, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Iran, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

35. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

36. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

37. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:
Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:
Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

38. The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science

Author:
Marc Lynch, Ibrahim S. I. Rabaia, Fiona B. Adamson, and Alexei Abrams
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
This special issue of POMEPS Studies offers a platform for scholars to think through what feels like a moment of rupture for the Middle East, for Middle East Studies, and for long-standing assumptions about the region’s politics. This POMEPS collection originated as an open call for papers for scholars affected by or invested in these urgent issues, in an initial effort to give a platform and a voice to those in our network who have grappled with these trends. We kept the call intentionally broad, asking potential authors to reflect on the effects of October 7 and the Gaza War on politics or scholarship. As it turned out, most of the contributors wanted to talk about academic freedoms and the conditions of public discourse in their countries – perhaps because of how profoundly they felt this crisis, perhaps because of the availability of other platforms to discuss the war itself. The issues confronting our field have never been more urgent and the need for academic networks and institutions to rise up to defend it has never been greater.
Topic:
Civil Society, Diplomacy, Education, Genocide, Political Science, Institutions, Academia, Houthis, Forced Migration, Activism, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Frantz Fanon
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, Germany, Jordan, Czech Republic, and Gulf Nations

39. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations

Author:
Jeremy Pressman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE

40. The Making and Diasporization of Iranian Sexual, Religious, and Political Asylum Seekers

Author:
Navid Fozi
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Since the 1979 Revolution in Iran, waves of Iranian migrants, mostly asylum seekers, have formed diasporas composed of four to six million people.1 Asylum- seeking thus illustrates one of the most significant modes of Iranian global mobil- ity. The continuous revolutionary conditions perpetuated by the Revolutionary Guards and Revolutionary Courts have been identified as the sole contributor to the diasporization of Iranians.2 I argue that such a myopic focus on revolutionary moments obfuscates the marginalizing historical processes that have shaped asylum- seeking as a means of engagement with domestic and global inequality. The Islamic Republic has heralded a culmination of Iranian diasporic displacement unleashed by the deterritorializing effects of neoliberal world capitalism through economic globalization and mobility to meet labor demand.3 Coupled with the apparatuses of the modern nation-state, the judiciary, police, and education system have given the traditional exclusionary practices a modern character. I will draw on my fieldwork with Iranian asylum seekers and refugees in tran- sit through Türkiye pursuing permanent resettlement, mainly in North America, Australia, and Europe. These Iranians compose heterogeneous populations that embark on an arduous journey from the Global South to the Global North. They form diasporas of communities whose marginality in Iran predates the Islamic Re- public. Each group finds its own niche while becoming part of the Iranian diaspora. Bahá’ís born into Bahá’i families, heterodox Muslim mystics, and the ethno-religious communities of Kurdish Yársán constitute a group of Iranian asylum seekers who embrace religious ideals and practices that differ from Iran’s official religion: Shīʿi Twelver Islam. As I discuss later, this Shīʿi strand developed in sixteenth-century Iran and promoted a messianic expectation for the return of the twelfth Shīʿi Imam.
Topic:
Religion, Diaspora, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

41. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Rivalry that Remade the Middle East

Author:
Hassan Hassan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Observers often liken Iran’s strategic policy thinking to the intricate and patient process of crafting a Persian rug.1 The analogy illustrates how Tehran’s strategies, like the rug’s final inscriptions, only become clear upon completion, as seemingly random daily actions gradually reveal a coherent pattern. The comparison is apt for Iran’s traditional approach to power projection but may also be appropriate considering recent changes that have affected both Iran’s coveted rug market and the country’s regional and international outlook. Iran has successfully emerged from a series of geopolitical challenges beginning with the war against Iraq in the 1980s, followed by the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003, and culminating in popular uprisings after 2011—which were backed by its adversaries and threatened its allies in the region. In spite of Iran’s emergence from such challenges, factors such as the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Donald Trump presidency have crippled the Iranian economy and undermined Tehran’s ability to project power effectively.2 In the four decades following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been a prominent player in regional conflicts, particularly against Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 3 Iran has largely maintained the upper hand in the wake of these confrontations, contrary to expectations after the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 The Islamic Republic outlasted Saddam Hussein’s 1980-1988 war, extended its influence via proxies across multiple nations, and cemented its presence in four Arab capitals, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This apparent dominance peaked on 14 September 2019, when two major Saudi oil facilities—the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil field—were attacked using drones. 5 The attack roughly halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production and affected around 5 percent of the global oil supply. 6 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Although Iran denied any involvement, Saudi Arabian officials and the United States nonetheless suggested that drones and cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Rivalry, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

42. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative

Author:
Mansoor Moaddel
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
Topic:
Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

43. False Dawn: Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Amidst Improved Saudi-Iranian Relations

Author:
David Wood
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
On 17 October 2019, furious protests erupted across Lebanon as citizens came to a shocking realization: the country’s leaders had destroyed the economy. Decades of corruption and mismanagement had emptied the state’s coffers, trig- gering a domestic banking collapse and frittering away many Lebanese residents’ life savings. Now, almost five years later, the situation has only grown worse. The Lebanese lira (LBP) has been devalued to the point of irrelevance, crashing from 1,507.5 LBP for 1 USD to over 140,000 LBP in March 2023. House- holds give up essentials like health insurance to pay for diesel power generators and solar panels, as public electricity provisions—along with many other key state services—barely function.1 Meanwhile, the country’s leaders stubbornly resist implementing much-needed economic reforms, blaming the economic crisis on a wide range of factors, from Syrian refugees to general instability in the Middle East. A regularly proffered excuse emphasizes the role of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry has periodically played out on Lebanese soil. This theory argues that Lebanon is a “penetrated society,” inextricably tied to and paralyzed by geopolitical competition, including the Saudi–Iranian con- frontation.2 Thus, Lebanese leaders cannot resolve their disputes until these two regional heavyweights, amongst other foreign powers, reconcile their conflicting interests in Lebanon. Regional competition overlays a domestic political structure already prone to deadlock, which rigidly apportions power between Lebanon’s frequently feuding sectarian communities. Accordingly, various Lebanese politicians hoped that improved Iranian-Saudi relations—facilitated in March 2023 by Chinese mediation—would lead to a breakthrough in their ability to tackle Lebanon’s economic meltdown. Yet, this optimistic reading overestimates the extent of Tehran and Riyadh’s cautious détente, which is unlikely to translate into constructive engagement in Lebanon any time soon. It also downplays the true obstacle to Lebanon’s economic reform process: corruption in the country’s own political and financial elite.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Economic Crisis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon

44. The Nuclear Iran “Concept” Is Already Here: Time Is Short to Prevent Israel’s—and America’s—Next Calamitous Intelligence Failure

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Groupthink and unchallenged false assumptions about enemy capabilities and decision-making led to the disasters of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 Hamas-led terrorist invasion of Israel. The lessons of these failures demand that Israel’s political and military leadership and their American counterparts immediately reconsider their assumptions about the Iranian nuclear threat to avoid an even costlier miscalculation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, October 7, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

45. How the War in Ukraine Shapes Iran’s Strategic Gains and Ambitions

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine War has strengthened military-industrial ties between Moscow and Tehran. Most concerning is their deepening collaboration in dual-use technologies and disruptive weapons systems. Moscow has provided technical assistance to Tehran in key areas, including its space program, which can help the Islamic Republic develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Iran’s interest in Russian anti-stealth radars and air-superiority fighters is worrying. Russia’s extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones has allowed the Iranian defense technological and industrial base to advance its drone warfare systems, collect large amounts of operational data, and improve its loitering munitions designs and production. A Russian victory in Ukraine would likely accelerate such cooperation, given the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions, among other factors. So far, the Islamic Republic has been the winner of the Russia-Ukraine War. Below are some key highlights from this policy memo: The Russian military’s reliance on using munitions from Iran to exhaust Ukraine’s combat capabilities has provided Tehran with unprecedented opportunities. In the absence of adequate deterrents in place, Iran has already become a combat drone supplier to the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the Russian Federation, turning the Islamic Republic into a menacing threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance’s eastern and southern fronts. Open-source intelligence tracks a meaningful rise in the Russian military’s use of Iran-supplied Shahed baseline loitering munitions, indicating that the joint Russo-Iranian drone plant in Tatarstan, Russia, is capable of producing scores of kamikaze drones annually at low cost. Such facilities can soon mushroom across the Russian Federation. With Tehran demonstrating growing control over its airspace while the country moves closer to obtaining military-grade nuclear capabilities, Russia can help the Islamic Republic make its airspace more dangerous than ever. A combination of anti-stealth radar, the Su-35 air-superiority fighter squadrons protected by underground basing, and a large number of layered strategic air defenses can prove lethal even against fifth-generation, stealth combat aircraft. Accordingly, the Western intelligence community should remain vigilant over any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran involving anti-stealth radars and space program assets, keeping in mind that the latter can easily translate into intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, Iran is now investing in infrastructure within Russia—including dredging the Volga River and establishing shipping companies in the port city of Astrakhan—allowing the two countries to further expand the strategic route across the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

46. Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza is pushing the shadow conflict between Iran and Israel out into the open. There is a grave risk that this escalates further in Lebanon and Syria – where Iran wields powerful influence – and spirals into a full-blown regional war. The intensifying conflict in Syria and Lebanon is the result of Israel’s escalating response since Hamas’s attacks on 7 October and Iran’s “forward-defence” strategy, which aims to confront potential threats before they come close to Iranian borders. Iran’s strategy is underpinned by a decades-long effort to embed its influence in Lebanon and Syria. Western governments will not find this easy to dislodge, and an intensified coercive strategy to push Iran out of the Levant would likely be counterproductive. But Iran’s focus on preserving its influence and deterrence capability – which trumps its ideological commitment to supporting Palestinians and fighting Israel – offers opportunities to prevent a wider war. Europeans should now focus on de-escalating tensions in Lebanon and Syria; increasing conditional support for actors in both countries to advance local stabilisation goals; and intensifying their backing for structural reform that can slowly dilute Iran’s dominance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transnational Actors, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria

47. Mending fences: Europe’s stake in the Saudi-Iran detente

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey and Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Saudi-Iran rivalry has long deepened conflict lines in the Middle East. But growing mutual vulnerabilities prompted a quiet rapprochement, culminating in the 2023 Beijing de-escalation agreement. While it hasn’t led to conflict resolution, this detente has helped contain regional escalation. Dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran remains frequent amid the Gaza crisis and could become even more important after the Israeli killing of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Europeans should actively support Saudi-Iran engagement as a vital diplomatic path to regional stability, rather than viewing it as Iran’s attempt to evade US sanctions. If Iran’s new leadership is willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue and other files, Europeans should see Saudi Arabia as a channel to help facilitate necessary economic relief to Iran as part of any new deal. Europeans could help both countries navigate tension around America’s regional involvement, ensuring Saudi-Israel normalisation does not undermine Saudi-Iran diplomacy. If Iran refuses to enter negotiations and relations with the West deteriorate further, Europeans should still consider Saudi Arabia as a valuable mediator between the West and Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Rapprochement, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

48. Proxy battles: Iraq, Iran, and the turmoil in the Middle East

Author:
Hamzeh Hadad
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza has deepened the Middle East’s fault lines. Iran and its proxies and the US and Israel have engaged in a cycle of tit-for-tat attacks across the region, with the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Syria and Iran’s direct retaliation against Israel threatening to escalate into a regional war. Iraqi paramilitaries operating as part of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ have also attacked US forces in Iraq, who responded with reprisals of their own. This, and the increasing risk of a wider war, imperils the relative stability Iraq has enjoyed over the past few years and the country’s fledgling role as a regional mediator. Iran’s influence in Iraq increased following the US invasion of 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein – but their relationship is far from being a simple agent-proxy arrangement. Iran’s strongest influence is through its paramilitaries’ presence in Iraq’s security apparatus, but Iraq has also exhibited some political independence from its neighbour and maintains financial leverage over Iran. Europeans can help increase Iraq’s autonomy. In the economic sector, they should strengthen its financial institutions through global integration and digitisation. European countries can also work alongside Gulf states to broaden their ties with Iraq, including in foreign investment and a shift from a development or humanitarian aid framework towards normal bilateral ties. However, for any European policy to be successful in Iraq, it must be designed within a broader framework of ending the war in Gaza and resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – without which the dangerous escalation across the Middle East may continue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

49. Nuclear Danger and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

50. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)

Author:
Hui Zhang
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
China and Iran

51. Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With the continued fighting in Gaza, a nuclear rubicon of sorts has been crossed: Elected Israeli officials — a deputy minister and a ruling party member of Parliament—not only have publicly referenced Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, but suggested how such weapons might be used to target Gaza. This is unprecedented. More recently, Iran directly attacked an Israeli-manned intelligence outpost in Iraq and publicized a staged missile strike against a mock Israeli air base. Iran also has inched within weeks of making several nuclear weapons and made its military ever more immune to first strikes against its key missile and nuclear facilities. Iran and its proxies also now have long-range, high-precision missiles that can easily reach key Israeli targets. None of these developments is positive. For decades, most security analysts assumed Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons were only deployed to deter attacks and that Iran would not dare to attack Israel directly. The attached war game report, “Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed,” directly challenges these assumptions. The game starts in 2027 with Israeli intelligence reporting that Iran is mating nuclear warheads to its long-range missiles. This prompts Israel to ask Washington to collaborate in a conventional military strike against key Iranian nuclear facilities and missile bases. Not wanting to be drawn into a major war with Iran, the United States, however, demurs and instead offers Israel U.S. standoff hypersonic missiles. Several moves later, Israel, isolated and desperate, launches two nuclear strikes against Iran to which Iran replies with a nuclear strike of its own. The game raised several basic questions. Would Israel or Iran conduct further military nuclear operations? Might Israel target Tehran with nuclear weapons? Might Iran target Tel Aviv with nuclear arms? Would Russia or the United States be drawn into the war? These and other unknowns informed the game’s key findings. These included: 1. The strategic uncertainties generated after an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange are likely to be at least as fraught as any that might arise before such a clash. 2. Although Israel and Iran might initially avoid the nuclear targeting of innocents, such self-restraint is tenuous. 3. Multilateral support for Israeli security may be essential to deter Israeli nuclear use but will likely hinge on Israeli willingness to discuss regional denuclearization. 4. Little progress is likely in reducing Middle Eastern nuclear threats if the United States continues its public policy of denying knowledge of Israeli nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Nonproliferation, and War Games
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

52. Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons

Author:
Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Key Takeaways: (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

53. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

54. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

55. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

56. Egypt Polling Shows Rise in Positive Views of Hamas; Iran-Backed Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood Remain Unpopular

Author:
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians. Arecent public opinion survey of Egyptian citizens, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in November/December by a regional commercial firm, revealed that after years of adopting a negative view towards Hamas, three-quarters of Egyptians now view the movement positively, demonstrating the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on Egyptian public opinion. The majority of Egyptians continue to reject ties with Israel and Israelis, while Iran’s proxies remain unpopular, while the majority of Egyptians believe that the United States can put an end to the war in Gaza. Regarding the United States’ role in the ongoing war in Gaza, the current poll showed that more than three-quarters of Egyptians agreed that “the U.S. is still in the best position to help end the war in Gaza, even if I disagree with its policies.” However, Egyptians are currently divided on the proposition that “We cannot count on the U.S. these days, so we should look more to other nations like Russia or China as partners.” While 57% of Egyptians agreed with this proposition, 42% disagreed. In terms of the role that Arab countries should play in the ongoing conflict, the current poll showed mixed views. A significant majority of Egyptians (97%) demanded that Arab states take a tough stand against Israel and “immediately sever all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Yet although not unanimous, over two thirds (69%) of Egyptians likewise agreed that “Arab governments should take a more active role in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, offering both sides incentives to take more moderate positions.” Moreover, an overwhelming majority (96%) of Egyptians believed that their country should provide more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even if that requires some practical coordination with Israel. Notably, while Hamas has experienced a surge of popularity—in line with significant jumps among other Arab publics polled—these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The current Egyptian government finds both the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its Palestinian offshoot threatening to domestic politics. For almost eight years, since the release of the Fall 2015 poll results, where Hamas received negative scores, the majority of Egyptians demonstrated a negative attitude towards Hamas. In contrast, the current poll shows that three-quarters of Egyptians view Hamas positively, while less than a quarter hold a negative view. Likewise, the large majority expressed agreement with the view that the war in
Topic:
Public Opinion, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Polls, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, and Egypt

57. Navigating Cybersecurity and Surveillance: Iran's Dual Strategy for National Security

Author:
Nima Khorrami
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While Iranian officials acknowledge the significance of cyber tools and AI for foreign policy, they are acutely aware of the country’s financial and scientific limitations. Discussions and debates surrounding the utilization and significance of cyberspace and artificial intelligence in Iran primarily revolve around two key perspectives: viewing them as integral components of national security strategy, and understanding cyber capabilities and AI as essential tools for safeguarding national interests. Within the context of Tehran’s extensively publicized forward defense doctrine, it is reasonable to expect that Tehran would develop (AI assisted) offensive cyber capabilities, allowing it to infiltrate its adversaries’ systems and execute preemptive actions against perceived threats. A critical prerequisite for doing so, in turn, would be to put in place robust surveillance capabilities which can alarm the officials of any potential incoming attack. However, available evidence suggests a dire lack of such capabilities not least because Iran’s critical infrastructure has been the target of frequent cyberattacks, allegedly originating from Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

58. Does Leadership Matter? Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and the Change in Iranian Foreign Policy

Author:
Çağla Lüleci-Sula
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Following Rouhani's victory in the 2013 presidential elections, Iran's foreign policy (IFP) underwent significant changes after over a decade under Ahmadinejad. To date, only a few academic studies have attempted to incorporate a specific individual-level theory into their respective analyses, even though a large body of literature contends that leadership change is the decisive factor in differences in Iran's policy towards the US and the EU. This study analyzes the leadership styles of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani to reveal the possible impact of decision-maker personalities on foreign policy, and to develop an account of the moderation in IFP. Accordingly, it asks, “How does leadership style influence IFP towards the 'Western world'?" Theoretically, the study benefits from Hermann’s ‘Leadership Trait Analysis’ to find out the impact of leaders’ personalities on foreign policy behaviors of states. Empirically, it analyzes both presidents’ spontaneously selected political speeches, consisting of their answers in interviews and press conferences. Methodologically, the study utilizes the software Profiler Plus to assess individual traits of leaders. Interpreting leadership trait scores of two presidents, the study concludes that certain leadership features allow the construction of foreign policies that are more moderate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Hassan Rouhani, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

59. Expert Voices: Iran’s record-low election turnout

Author:
Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI's Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka discusses his main takeaways from Iran's recent elections and their record-low voter turnout.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Voting Behavior
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

60. What’s next in the Israel-Iran conflict?

Author:
Eran Etzion, Mick Mulroy, and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record briefing on what's next in the Israel-Iran conflict. Speakers Eran Etzion Non-Resident Scholar, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, Middle East Institute Mick Mulroy Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Defense & Security Program, Middle East Institute Alex Vatanka Iran Program Director, Middle East Institute
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

61. Tackling the proxy problem: Mitigating the threat posed by Iran's "Axis of Resistance"

Author:
Alex Vatanka, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, and Sabri Ates
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza has revealed much about the relationships Iran maintains with its proxy forces across the region, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iraq. While the various militant groups in the “Axis of Resistance” all receive support from the Islamic Republic, each has its own objectives and strategic focus, a point underlined by the Houthis’ emergence as a key new regional player. The group has fired on commercial ships, attacked military vessels, and shut down maritime traffic on one of the world’s most significant trade arteries. If the situation escalates, Iran-backed groups could unleash far greater havoc, both within the region and well beyond its borders. What steps can the US and its partners take now to ensure that additional Iranian-supported forces do not join the Gaza conflict? And how can Iran’s proxies be deterred from acting to help de-escalate tensions across the region? And what, if anything, can Washington do to change the strategic calculations in Tehran?
Topic:
Proxy Groups, Axis of Resistance, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria

62. How might the second Trump administration navigate the Middle East?

Author:
Ryan Crocker and Gerald Feierstein
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s return to the presidency comes at a tumultuous time in the Middle East. While on the campaign trail, Trump vowed to offer strong support for Israel and insisted he can bring peace to the region. What challenges and opportunities will he face on both fronts? And how different is the strategic landscape of today’s Middle East compared to when he left the White House? This on-the-record briefing will feature Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker, career diplomat with the US Foreign Service. His previous appointments included US Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. The briefing will also feature Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, former US Ambassador to Yemen and Distinguished Senior Fellow on US Diplomacy at MEI. Our experts will discuss what the incoming second Trump administration will mean for the Middle East; the current conflicts in the region; the future of US-Iran relations; and the prospects of securing more normalization agreements between Israel and its neighbors. Speakers Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker Fmr. US Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Lebanon Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein Fmr. US Ambassador to YemenDistinguished Senior Fellow on US Diplomacy, MEI
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

63. Houthi Motivations Driving the Red Sea Crisis: Understanding How Ansar Allah’s Strategic Culture Goes Beyond Gaza and Iran

Author:
Jonah Carlson
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Ansar Allah, known as the “Houthi movement,” has conducted attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea since October 2023. This event is now known as the “Red Sea Crisis.” Classifying Ansar Allah as merely an Iranian proxy, or categorizing its actions as a mere response to the conflict in Gaza and support for Hamas, inadequately explains these attacks. This article uses the cultural topography method to analyze the culture of the movement and provide alternative motivations for the attacks, such as consolidating domestic support and crafting a strong national appearance. The article concludes that Ansar Allah’s attacks on the Red Sea are more motivated by the belief they will yield pragmatic and material benefits for the movement rather than ideological or cultural overlap with Palestine or Iran.
Topic:
Houthis, Hamas, Shipping, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Ansar Allah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza

64. Sanctions and Postcolonial Statecraft in Iran: Resisting the Iran Libya Sanctions Act and Beyond

Author:
Andrew Thomas
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Though economic sanctions are designed to weaken and isolate their target for the stated purpose of policy change, in the case of Iran they have often invigorated its desire to defy Western coercion and domination. Since the Islamic revolution this has led to multiple political standoffs, including notably during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration and the post-nuclear deal standoff with the United States (US). Through sanctions, the West has often been unwilling to accept little less than a grand bargain on Iranian foreign policy, which has informed and contributed to a postcolonial narrative of resistance in the Iranian state. This narrative has served as an integral tool of Iranian statecraft in an effort to bolster the leadership’s legitimacy. By looking at elite discourse and Iranian government responses to the Iran Libya Sanctions Act during Ahmadinejad’s government and the Trump Administration’s Maximum Pressure campaign, this article highlights narratives of postcolonial resistance in Iran’s response to US sanctions, in an effort to explain why sanctions often push them further away from acquiescence to international norms.
Topic:
Post Colonialism, Sanctions, Iran, and Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Libya, and United States of America

65. Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic’s ninth president assumes office with an unenviable inheritance of domestic discontent, regional turmoil and poor relations with the West. He should work to bridge the state-society gap, while outside powers should test his administration’s willingness to shift from an escalatory posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Presidency, and Masoud Pezeshkian
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

66. Has the Iranian challenge been forgotten?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel must take seriously Iran’s stated intention to destroy the Jewish state. Iran’s desire to attain nuclear weapons serves its goal of eliminating Israel and its strategy of using its proxies to threaten Israel’s civilian population. All measures taken so far to stop Tehran’s nuclear project have failed, and Israel has no choice but to urgently eliminate this threat by military means.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

67. Tehran’s Armenian weapons supply route

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Armenia is one of several routes used by Iran to smuggle arms to its regional proxies and clients. It also manufactures its own versions of Russian weapons that are used only by these groups and provides them with the knowledge to locally manufacture Iranian arms.
Topic:
Weapons, Proxy Groups, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Armenia

68. Changes in the military deployment of the United States and their implications for Israel’s wars in the region

Author:
Eytan Gilboa
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
At the start of the Gaza War, President Biden warned Iran and its proxies against launching an all-out attack on Israel and sent aircraft carriers to the region to clarify his intentions. The withdrawal of the Gerald R. Ford carrier from the Mediterranean could be interpreted as a sign of American weakness, diminish deterrence of Iran, and undermine US mediation efforts in Lebanon.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

69. Mapping the Post-Assad Landscape

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The collapse of the Assad regime weakens Iran and the CRINK Axis, but Islamist radicalism and rising Turkish influence demand Israel’s military vigilance and diplomatic engagement.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Islamism, Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

70. Why Is It Taking So Long to Destroy Hamas?

Author:
Gabi Siboni
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For years, the Gaza Strip has been of secondary importance, with the General Staff focusing primarily on the northern front and Iran. This focus has come at the expense of intelligence gathering, building operational plans, and operational attention to Gaza.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

71. Iranian Subversive Efforts in Jordan: A Strategic Threat Requiring a Robust Response

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Against the background of Hamas' ongoing war with Israel (and the expressions of support for it among Palestinians and Islamists in Jordan), the Iranian regime has intensified its efforts to subvert the Hashemite monarchy. The arrests in March 2024 of Iranian agents involved in smuggling arms to Muslim Brotherhood elements in Jordan are part of a campaign to counter the role of Tehran in bringing both drugs and weapons over the Syrian and Iraqi borders into Jordan. Tensions rose further over Jordan's supportive role in foiling the Iranian attack on Israel on 14 April 2024. For the Iranian regime, the destabilization of Jordan is a vital precursor for the strategic goal of turning Judea and Samaria into "another Gaza", as Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei suggested back in 2014: hence the importance of American and Israeli support for Jordan. The stability of the Kingdom (and thus the need to reduce economic and social strains) is a vital interest of both Israel and the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamism, Muslim Brotherhood, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Jordan

72. The Tragedy behind Israel’s Ostensible Triumph

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The killing by Israel of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, the Islamist Shia militia that controls South Lebanon, may well go down in history as the harbinger of a seismic change in the balance of power in the Levant and arguably the whole Middle East. Iran’s ensuing retaliatory missile strike makes war with Israel all but inevitable, though its magnitude remains uncertain. Part of it will be fought with missiles, rockets and drones flying across the sky between the two arch-enemies. Part of it will be fought across the region, possibly wherever Iran’s axis of resistance – the network of pro-Iran armed groups spanning Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Yemen is based. Most of it will likely be fought in Lebanon, home to Hezbollah, whose demise – or even severe weakening – would result in Iran’s influence in the Levant being curtailed. While Israel’s onslaught on Hezbollah has tilted the balance of power heavily in its favour, it is too early to make predictions – after all, the Middle East has disrupted expectations time and time again in the past. It is still possible though to make some considerations and discuss a few open questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hezbollah, Proxy Groups, and Hassan Nasrallah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and United States of America

73. Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Jack Keating
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Each one of these states threatens U.S. interests. Yet they are far from a coherent bloc and largely pose threats independent of one another.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

74. Israel’s assassinations outside Palestine | ACLED Insight

Author:
Ameneh Mehvar
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In a significant development, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on 31 July in an attack attributed to Israel,1 just a day after Israel claimed responsibility for the death of a top Hezbollah commander in the south of Beirut. Following the 7 October attacks that killed around 1,200 Israelis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have killed dozens of Hamas senior figures and commanders during their intense campaign in Gaza. But also beyond Gaza, Israel has targeted senior figures of Hamas and other allied members of the ‘axis of resistance.’ The recent events mark the latest in a series of at least 34 Israeli attacks that have led to the death of at least 39 commanders and senior members of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran in the past 10 months (see graph and map below).
Topic:
Extrajudicial Killings, Assassination, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

75. Iranians Don’t Want a War With Israel

Author:
Kourosh Ziabari
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Most believe that Tehran’s engagement in the battle for Palestinian emancipation is intrusive and uncalled for
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

76. A bipartisan Iran strategy for the next US administration—and the next two decades

Author:
Atlantic Council
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States needs a bipartisan strategy toward Iran that can be maintained across several administrations, one that works patiently and resolutely to counter Iran’s efforts to dominate the Middle East, drive the United States out, destroy Israel, and threaten Arab allies. Pressure to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and to halt its malign regional influence is crucial—but won’t work absent a strategic goal of new negotiations to address both challenges simultaneously. The United States must also counter Iran’s hostage taking, assassinations, and cyber and election meddling by triggering automatic penalties and responses in lockstep with allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

77. CTC Sentinel: February 2024 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, and Daisy Muibu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Long-range aerial attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group, including a ballistic missile that traveled at least a thousand miles toward Israel before being intercepted (reportedly in space) on October 31, 2023, are focusing minds on long-range stand-off terrorism. In this month’s feature article, which conceptualizes, outlines, and examines the implications of this emerging threat vector, Don Rassler argues that the notion that terrorists could strike the United States across the oceans with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is becoming increasingly less far-fetched. Rassler writes that “over the coming decade, hydrogen fuel cell and solar UAS technology will evolve and mature, and will also likely become more available and accessible to the average consumer, which will make longer ranges more accessible as well. Other disruptive technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, will also mature and will likely be used by extremists to help them optimize system performance and to overcome, or devise creative solutions to, technical long-range UAS challenges.” He warns that “long-range stand-off terrorism will be attractive to some extremists because it opens-up new attack pathways, can enable surprise, and has the potential to deliver a potent psychological, ‘we can strike you from afar’ punch. Over the next decade advancements in commercial technologies and systems will also make range, and extended range, more accessible for violent non-state-entities, making it likely that in the future long-range terrorism will become even more of a threat.” Rassler’s article is the first in a new recurring series in CTC Sentinel entitled “On the Horizon” that will examine emerging counterterrorism challenges. Our interview is with Christopher Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. “We need to have sustainable CT operations that prevent terrorists’ actions, principally al-Qa`ida and ISIS, to ensure we are not distracted by what we view as the longer-term strategic priorities, such as peer adversaries,” he says. “As the rest of the Department and other parts of the U.S. government are doing less CT, [this] means that those who are doing it have to do it better and, in many respects, do it more proportionally to the rest of the national security enterprise. This is why SOF is looked to as the lead for the CT fight in the Department.” Daisy Muibu examines the state of Somalia’s military campaign against al-Shabaab. She writes that: “A year and five months after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the initial optimism that characterized its first few months have diminished as the counterinsurgency’s momentum has stalled in the central regions of the country.” She adds that “with only a year left until African Union forces are mandated to fully draw down, significant obstacles remain that cast doubts over the government’s ambitious goals to defeat al-Shabaab and assume full responsibility for securing the country by December 31, 2024.”
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Houthis, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Somalia, Global Focus, and United States of America

78. April 2024 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Sean Morrow, Asher Spain, Kevin Jackson, and Paul D. Williams
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights provides a highly detailed assessment of the six-month Houthi war effort that has seen the Tehran-backed group launch missiles at Israel and attack shipping off the coasts of Yemen. He assesses that: “The Houthis have used the Gaza crisis to vault into the front ranks of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance,’ arguably as the only axis partner to truly globalize the conflict through their anti-shipping attacks on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The movement has demonstrated boldness—as the first axis member to fire ballistic missiles at Israel—and resilience in the face of U.S.-U.K. airstrikes. The Houthis are likely to emerge from the war as a more confident, ambitious, and aggressive terrorist army, with a taste for provocative and eye-catching acts of defiance against Israel and the United States.” Our interview is with Colonel (Ret.) Miri Eisin, the director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University who previously served in a variety of senior intelligence roles in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). She stresses the need to learn lessons from the intelligence failures that preceded the Hamas-led October 7 attack so that Israel is not surprised again, for example with regard to the kind of threat Hezbollah could pose in the coming months. “All of us made wrong assumptions, and the combination of all of them brought about a colossal failure,” she says. “We collectively were wrong about the capability. We were wrong about the intentions. We were wrong about the ferocity.” Kévin Jackson assesses the current state of al-Qa`ida Central. He writes that “while the challenges facing the group are real, it should not be written off, as it has proved time and again more resilient than expected.” He adds that “in the wake of the Gaza war, al-Qa`ida likely feels emboldened by what it perceives as a uniquely auspicious geopolitical context to further its global ambitions.” The African Union is set to withdraw the remainder of its forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024. Paul Williams evaluates whether the Somali National Army (SNA) or al-Shabaab would be stronger militarily if this happens. He writes that “the SNA would retain an advantage in terms of size, material resources, and external support but performs poorly on non-material dimensions and would remain dependent upon external finance and security assistance. Overall, however, al-Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Houthis, African Union, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Somalia

79. CTC Sentinel: October 2024 Issue

Author:
Michel Wyss, Brian Dodwell, Michael Knights, and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
A year on from the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel, the Middle East is entering its most dangerous period in living memory. The unfolding events will have far-reaching consequences for the region and the international terror threat. In our feature article, Michel Wyss assesses the intelligence failings in the lead-up to October 7. He writes: “Israel’s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons,” adding that “failures and negligence hampered both Israel’s overall political assessment as well as collection, analysis, and dissemination at the intelligence level.” He argues that one lesson learned is the need for humility and that also includes “the recognition that even seasoned intelligence analysts can fall prey to their own blind spots.” Our interview is with Christopher O’Leary, former FBI Counterterrorism Senior Executive and Director of Hostage Recovery. He provides insights from his more than two decades of working on counterterrorism investigations for the FBI. Reflecting on the Israeli experience since October 7, he discusses key variables for a government to consider when faced with a hostage crisis. Michael Knights examines a year of Houthi attacks against Israel and shipping off the coast of Yemen. He writes: “Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.” Matthew Levitt assesses the threat posed by Iran’s weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs). He writes: “Today, with Iran’s proxies wreaking havoc throughout the region, officials worry Tehran may have already provided weaponized PBAs to several of its partners and proxies. Such a capability, tactically deployed on the battlefield, could enable further October 7-style cross-border raids or kidnapping operations.” This issue is my hundredth at the helm of CTC Sentinel. It is an ongoing privilege to feature the insights of the best and brightest in our field and to count as my colleagues the extraordinary group of leaders and thinkers at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.
Topic:
Terrorism, Houthis, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, and Palestine

80. North Korean Support to Iran’s Proxy Partners

Author:
Bruce E. Bechtol
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
This essay details the role of North Korea weapons, delivery systems, and technical expertise to Iran’s regional allies (Syria, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas) – starting during the Cold War and transitioning into the PostCold War period. Pyongyang has proliferated chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional arms, and sent advisers, trainers, engineers, and technicians for a variety of projects to Syria. The 2012-2020 Syrian civil war moreover expanded the Assad regime’s need for all kinds of North Korean arms. Hezbollah’s military intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime has also forced the Lebanese guerilla movement and its Iranian patron to become increasingly dependent on North Korean weapons and expertise. The Israeli war with Hamas that began on October 7, 2023, has seen a terrorist force supplied with weapons by both North Korea and Iran – often in collaboration when it comes to getting the weapons and training to Hamas operatives.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, and Syria

81. Economic Cooperation: A Driver of Stability in the MENA Region?

Author:
Valeria Talbot
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faces a complex landscape where economic cooperation is increasingly linked to regional stability. For decades, economic factors have influenced the foreign policy of MENA countries. However, since 2020, shared economic challenges – exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, oil market fluctuations and the global repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – have spurred initiatives for rapprochement. The October 7 attacks and subsequent Gaza and Lebanon conflicts pose a threat to such progresses. Can economic partnerships serve as a basis for lasting peace in MENA region? What forms of collaboration could enhance stability in the face of persistent security challenges? What are the primary constraints and challenges that limit the potential of economic cooperation as a stabilizing force in the MENA region?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economic Cooperation, COVID-19, Armed Conflict, Abraham Accords, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North Africa, and Gulf Nations

82. Who are the Houthis? Ansar Allah’s Islamic Propaganda in Yemen and Beyond

Author:
Jonathan Franco
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this new edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Jonathan Franco examines the ideology of Ansar Allah (commonly referred to as the Houthis) and explains how it mobilizes its ideology to justify its intervention in the Israel-Gaza War.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Ideology, Islamism, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza

83. Syria After Asad: A Conflict Without Closure

Author:
Brandon Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this special edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Brandon Friedman explains how the fall of the Asad regime affects the unresolved dimensions of the Syrian conflict.
Topic:
Syrian War, Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

84. The Israeli Gamble: A Prolonged, All-Out Regional War

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Israeli war is spreading into Lebanon and may also encompass Iran, with objectives shifting from abandoning Gaza support to enforcing deep changes for Israel's security, according to Netanyahu's government. Israel's failure to achieve its goals is evident, with rising costs and increased reliance on the U.S. in its conflict with Iran.
Topic:
Security, Displacement, Armed Conflict, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

85. Iranian-Turkish Jockeying: Low-Intensity Dynamics

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Turkish and Iranian interests clash over two key issues: the Iraqi-Turkish development corridor and the Zangezur corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran sees these as threats to its influence and aims to counter them. Despite this, tensions are low, and shared threats might encourage both countries to prioritise cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

86. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

87. New Canal Threatens the Peace Between the Taliban and Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since their return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have managed to reach an understanding with most of the Central Asian governments to preserve a relative calm along the areas of the Afghan-Central Asian frontier. Disputes over water use have suddenly become an issue that could derail ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Specifically, the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could lead to the loss of water for tens of thousands of people in downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, three people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters along the Afghan-Iranian border over rights to water from the Helmand River.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Water, Taliban, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

88. The Shah’s Son and the Future of Iranian Opposition

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
For the Iranian opposition movement to be viable, it has to offer a clear vision for Iran that can unite most Iranians. Those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran must keep in mind the people in Iran, including those who have not yet shown any support for the opposition, and let them know what their future would look like if the opposition prevails. Any movement that would try to rely on sentiments favoring the Iranian monarchy is doomed to fail. The Iranian people will not get behind replacing one autocratic leader for another. This is one of the reasons for despair among many Iranians of the middle generation. The Iranian opposition’s vision for the country should include the role of those who are now employed or involved in the state apparatus.
Topic:
History, Domestic Politics, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

89. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

90. Iran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Vastly Improved Hamas’s Operational Capabilities

Author:
Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Iran has provided training, equipment, and financing to Hamas over the years, vastly improving the terrorist organization’s capabilities, evidenced by the cross-border attack into Israel on October 7 that resulted in more than 1,400 killed. The unification of Iran’s network of proxies under the purview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani has been a force multiplier and cemented Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy as the most effective means of encircling Israel. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas completely, but any attempt to do so will come at an extremely high cost and could spur other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah to join the fray, prolonging the conflict and increasing the likelihood of a region-wide conflagration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Proxy Groups, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

91. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

92. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

93. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

94. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

95. Petroleum and Progress in Iran: An Interview with Gregory Brew

Author:
Mirek Tobiáš Hošman and Gregory Brew
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, Iran developed into the world’s first petro-state. In the recently published Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War (2022, Cambridge University Press), author Gregory Brew argues that Pahlavi petro-state emerged from a confluence of global and local forces in the context of the Cold War, the global oil economy, and the nascent practice and discourse of international development assistance. The Toynbee Prize Foundation interviewed Gregory Brew on the main arguments and events of his book. Next to providing a brief chronology of the political and economic development of Iran in post-WW2 decades – including the episode of the failed attempt to nationalize Iranian oil industry in the early 1950s followed by the coup d’état in 1953 – Brew explained the concept of dual integration introduced in his book, which tries to account for both local and global integration of the Iranian oil industry. He also highlighted the role of the international development actors, including the World Bank, American developmentalists and development economists in shaping the Pahlavi regime and the Iranian development project.
Topic:
Development, Oil, History, and Industry
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

96. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

97. CTC Sentinel: June 2023 Issue

Author:
Pierre Boussel, Kristina Hummel, Teddy Macdonald, Ashley A. Mattheis, Amarnath Amarasingam, Graham Macklin, and Marc-Andre Argentino
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Pierre Boussel provides a deep examination of the Quds Force in Syria. He writes: “The key mission of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) is to defend the Iranian Islamic Revolution and create armed militias in the countries of its ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Its organization is opaque and complex, coordinating combat operations with soft-power actions aimed at, among other initiatives, establishing a Pax Irania in the Middle East, a ‘peace’ of which it is the initiator and guarantor. Although the Quds Force’s apparatus in Syria has been under pressure from Israeli airstrikes, Tehran is sticking to its mission set: infiltrating Syrian civil society and sending fighters to the north, where the civil war will one day end, and to the south, on the edge of the Golan Heights, to establish a base against Israel if necessary.” Our interview is with Brian Nelson, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. He describes how his office “marshals the Department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the dual aims of safeguarding our financial system against illicit use and also combating corrupt regimes, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats.” On May 6, 2023, Mauricio Garcia, a man with longstanding neo-Nazi views, murdered eight people in a mass shooting at the Allen Premium Outlets mall in Allen, Texas. Ashley Mattheis, Amarnath Amarasingam, Graham Macklin, and Marc-André Argentino look at what led to the attack. They write that the deceased perpetrator “had an ideologically fuzzy tapestry of extreme thoughts tied to rampant violence. He appeared to view neo-Nazis and other members of the extreme far-right as living the ‘real’ masculine ideal in its fullest form by their commitment to generating dominance through violent, radical, racial, and cultural action. This interaction between race and gender is an increasingly present aspect of far-right violence and needs to be better understood.”
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Financial Crimes, Far Right, Mass Shootings, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Political Extremism, Quds Force, Domestic Terrorism, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, North America, United States of America, and Golan Heights

98. Iranian Turks In Nation-Building Process: First Pahlavi Era

Author:
Heidari Mojtaba
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
The study explores the emergence of Turkic identity because of identity politics committed in the aftermath of the nation-state building in Iran after 1925. It is believed that the primordial nationalism on the base of the Aryan race impacted the country’s diverse population and ethnic categories and the imposition of highly restrictive measures and social policies in cementing Iranian nationalism built upon the Persian culture and myth, paved the way for the politicization of identity. To obtain a thorough analysis, a set of theories are applied. Pierre Bourdieu’s class formation and symbolic concept of power and language in a semi-patrimonial society and the social identity theory and having an eclectic grasp of the literature on assimilation and violence have contributed to the theoretical base of the study. Firsthand materials, journals, and archives are used to enrich the research content. The establishment of the modern state in the 20th century and the biased ethnic-lingual policies precipitated centrifugal forces among ethnic realities, so the alchemy of stereotyping and discrimination, and social comparison giving birth to group identification contributed to the politicization of ethnic identity among Azerbaijani Turks and their ethnic awareness.
Topic:
Ethnicity, Identity, Racism, Turkic People, and Nation Building
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

99. The Transition from Nationalism to Islamism in Iran’s Foreign Policy

Author:
M. Reza Pashayi and Timuçin Kodaman
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
The 1979 Iranian Revolution is a multifaceted phenomenon with intricate causes, complex evolution and far-reaching outcomes. Rooted in the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century and the rise to power of the Ayatollahs, its beginnings are distinct but interconnected. Unlike many revolutions of the 20th century, the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a departure from the socialist or communist model and manifested itself as a revolt against both Western and Eastern systems, with unique outcomes. The 1979 Revolution shook a traditional and established order and paved the way for the rise of Islamism within a new political framework. This ideology, like its predecessors, adopted a singular leadership based on religious doctrine. To differentiate itself from global and regional powers and focus on its unique revolution, the Iranian regime shaped a foreign policy summarized by the slogan “neither East nor West, the Islamic Republic” and aimed to export this ideology globally. The policy focused primarily on political and ideological interests, resulting in permanent sanctions imposed by the United States. This economic aspect contributes to the changes in Iran’s foreign policy towards the United States, from pre-revolutionary Persian nationalism to post-Revolutionary political Islam, emphasizing its strength and adaptability in the face of external pressures.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Shiism, and Iranian Revolution
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

100. Strategic Hedging or Alignment? Qatar’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran in the Wake of the Blockade Crisis

Author:
Duygu Dersan Orhan
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The blockade imposed on Qatar changed the power dynamics in the Persian Gulf, increasing tension and insecurity in the area. Qatar’s ability to overcome the blockade was largely due to its cooperation with Iran, and the two countries’ ties grew as a result. This study investigates whether Qatar’s long-standing hedging toward Iran has changed into an alignment in the wake of the 2017 blockade. The key conclusion of the article is that, despite Qatar’s faint signals of alignment with Iran during the blockade, it did not entirely stray from its hedging strategy. Qatar-Iran relations has been selected as a case study to illustrate the effects of regional developments and security crises on the hedging strategy within the context of the Blockade Crisis.
Topic:
Partnerships, Small states, Economic Cooperation, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Qatar, and Gulf Nations