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32. Regional Order Making after October 7
- Author:
- Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Marc Lynch, Simon Mabon, Waleed Hazbun, and Curtis R. Ryan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
- Abstract:
- In December 2024, we convened a workshop at the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute in partnership with POMEPS and SEPAD to discuss regional changes and their meaning for our book. How did the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and Israel’s rapidly expanding military actions from Lebanon to Iran change the region? Were those changes in line with the book’s theoretical predictions? And what would our book have to say to the new aspirants hoping to remake regional order?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Alliance, Violence, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and United States of America
33. China’s Long Game in Iran’s Short War
- Author:
- Pierre Pahlavi
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- Following the twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, China has quietly accelerated its strategic partnership with a weakened Islamic Republic through renewed infrastructure commitments, expanded technological cooperation, and deepened diplomatic alignment. This calculated entrenchment represents Beijing’s broader ambition to reshape the post-American architecture of influence across Eurasia, potentially shifting the future of Middle Eastern geopolitics away from Western capitals toward Beijing.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Asia
34. Virtual Briefing Series | The Future of US-Iran Relations
- Author:
- Zeina AlShaib, Alan Eyre, and Jason Campbell
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- This on-the-record briefing, moderated by MEI's Zeina Al-Shaib, discussed the future of US-Iran relations. The recent 12-day war saw coordinated US and Israeli airstrikes against key Iranian military officials and nuclear facilities. Washington is weighing Iran’s conditional offer to return to nuclear negotiations contingent on firm security guarantees. Tehran is assessing whether to pursue diplomacy or reinforce its deterrent capabilities after this decisive confrontation. What impact will Tehran’s and Washington’s next steps have on the region’s already fragile political balance? The briefing featured Alan Eyre, a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI. A former senior State Department diplomat, Eyre served as a core member of the US nuclear negotiating team with Iran in 2010-15. The briefing also featured Jason H. Campbell, Senior Fellow at MEI. Campbell has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Our experts discussed the lessons learned from the war between Israel and Iran; the prospect of renewed fighting; the future of Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the ripple effect of this conflict on the wider region; as well as outlines of a durable diplomatic solution.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
35. The Regional and Domestic Elements of Erdoğan's Grand Strategy
- Author:
- Alistair Taylor, Matthew Czekaj, and Gonul Tol
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Gönül Tol to discuss how shifting regional dynamics — from the Israel-Iran war to renewed violence in southern Syria — are reshaping Turkey’s foreign policy and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's domestic agenda. They unpack Ankara’s ties with the US under the Trump administration, its strained relations with Israel, the implications of Turkey’s peace process with the PKK, and Erdoğan’s bid to maintain his hold on power. The conversation also explores how Turkey is positioning itself as Western engagement grows more uncertain and what this means for the future of democracy in the country.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, PKK, Regional Politics, and Political Transition
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and United States of America
36. Costly Adaptation, Not Capitulation: Iran’s Likely Trajectory Under the Post—JCPOA Pressure Campaign
- Author:
- Hadi Kahalzadeh
- Publication Date:
- 12-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Following the 12-day war with Israel, the reinstatement of U.N. Security Council snapback sanctions, and Washington’s renewed maximum pressure campaign, the Islamic Republic is now experiencing the most intense external political and economic coercion in its history. Yet this strategy is unlikely to deliver on the United States’ intended goals of regime change or nuclear restraint. Instead, it is pushing Iran toward deeper poverty, more complex security postures, and a trajectory that increases, not reduces, the likelihood of a costly military confrontation. From Tehran’s standpoint, Washington’s objectives extend beyond nuclear limits toward regime change. Negotiations are viewed as potential ambushes for another round of conflict, and accepting U.S. demands would be politically humiliating. In this deadlock, Tehran opts for resistance as the only survivable path. Iran has adapted its economy to withstand the strains caused by far-reaching Western sanctions through a wide range of measures. These include diversification, trade restructuring, de-dollarization, alternative banking pathways including offshore banking to circumvent U.S. control, shifting trade eastward to China (now Iran’s top trading partner), and import substitution in manufacturing and agriculture. When intense external political and economic pressures fail to produce the expected capitulation, a misinterpretation of Iran’s vulnerability could invite further pressure. Without a credible diplomatic path, this dynamic creates the possibility for a dangerous escalation cycle. While U.S. strikes on Iran this past June did considerable damage to nuclear facilities, Iran retains enough nuclear fissile material and technical expertise to preserve a position of strategic ambiguity. Iran’s adaptation strategy has preserved core state function and regime cohesion, even as the general public has suffered. Increasingly, Iran has become a patron welfare state, rewarding regime loyalty and shielding public employees and politically connected groups from the effects of sanctions, shifting economic burden onto the broader, politically disconnected public. By 2027, Iran will have approximately 10 million more people in poverty, a figure that could bring Iran’s overall poverty rate to 70 percent. Prolonging hardship for the Iranian public will not succeed in toppling Iran’s leaders or advancing U.S. objectives; the Iranian regime itself has proven adept at absorbing the costs of Western pressure, adapting its economy, and retaining nuclear leverage. America’s pressure-only policy only heightens the risk of a major Middle East war and thus should be discarded. The U.S. should instead reengage diplomatically with the Iranian regime toward the goal of stringent limits on Iranian nuclear capabilities in return for economic relief.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Regime Change, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Domestic Politics, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
37. The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal
- Author:
- Hadi Kahalzadeh
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- President Donald Trump can secure a new, better nuclear deal with Iran by removing the barriers that have prevented American companies from entering the Iranian market. This could be achieved through a phased approach that would not require immediately lifting primary sanctions. Doing so would help secure greater nuclear concessions from Iran, generate economic opportunities for American companies that would create an estimated 200,000 American jobs annually, and make a new agreement more durable by strengthening its political bases of support in both the United States and Iran. Decades of sanctions on Iran have failed to compel political capitulation. Instead, Iran has rationally developed a so-called “resistance economy” that evades sanctions, benefiting and empowering hard-liners with close connections to the government. In Washington, many misinterpret Tehran’s resistance and believe that sanctions have not worked because the pressure has not been great enough. But Tehran has held firm, not because sanctions have been too mild but because of a lack of clear and immediate benefits from disarmament. A U.S. policy that includes real economic incentives for compliance will change this equation, empowering more moderate elements of Iranian society and bringing economic benefits not only to the Iranian middle class but to the U.S. and the wider Persian Gulf region. President Trump should issue targeted Office of Foreign Assets Control general licenses, enabling the export of up to $25 billion in U.S. goods annually to Iran, primarily in aviation, agriculture, automotive production, and telecommunications. A deal should also license a five-year carve-out for American–owned foreign subsidiaries operating in Iran, enabling U.S. access to as much as $4 trillion in unrealized Iranian investment opportunities by 2040. Such a license would allow the United States to partner with Gulf regional allies to modernize Iran’s transport and logistics networks, thereby advancing broader regional development and cooperation. The prospect of losing such partnerships would be a powerful incentive for Iran to exercise military and political restraint. In parallel with the technical nuclear discussions, a dedicated economic dialogue could explore ways to keep Iran’s consumer market open to American companies in the near term and unlock investment opportunities for U.S. investors over time. One potential method in that vein would be the inclusion of a “snap-forward” mechanism, in which economic openings accelerate based on Iranian compliance and good behavior. Such a carrot offers the path toward a more robust and dynamic U.S.–Iran economic partnership built on trust. Incorporating economic incentives into a new U.S.–Iran nuclear agreement would benefit private sector constituencies in both countries, bolstering American jobs and industry while reintegrating Iran into the global economy. In the long term, such a multifaceted agreement could blaze a path toward peaceful coexistence with Iran.
- Topic:
- Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Negotiation, Nuclear Energy, and Foreign Policy
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
38. The Cape Assurance Corridor: Turning Maritime Security into a Regional Export for Southern Africa
- Author:
- Erika van der Merwe
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Good Governance Africa (GGA)
- Abstract:
- Red Sea insecurity has rerouted significant volumes of global trade around the Cape of Good Hope, shifting both demand and opportunity toward Southern Africa’s waters. The region can convert this diversion into a durable preference by offering an exportable public good in the form of assurance. This means delivering safe, predictable, and increasingly low‑carbon passage that insurers can price and operators can plan around. This brief proposes a SADC‑led Cape Corridor Assurance Framework that integrates existing regional centres with national Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) feeds to produce daily risk bulletins, incident metrics, and audited port KPIs in formats recognised by underwriters and Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs). A Clean‑Corridor Compliance Code with continuous automatic identification systems (AIS) for high‑risk calls, designated and monitored Ship-to-Ship (STS) zones, and beneficial‑ownership disclosures can help deter shadow‑fleets without penalising compliant traffic. Cable resilience should be treated as core corridor infrastructure through charted no-anchor/no-trawl areas, VTS integration, and pre-contracted rapid repair capabilities. Service reliability should be showcased through transparent KPI dashboards at Durban, Cape Town, and Ngqura, regularised offshore bunkering at Algoa Bay, and green-fuel bunkering at Saldanha and Walvis Bay, all under strict safety and environmental protocols. This package complements the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by standardising essential security and regulatory practices, while also endeavouring to respect national sovereignty through a minimum‑standards approach. In a world of geopolitical detours, the most profitable route is the one whose risks are visible, managed, and insurable. With pragmatic governance and disciplined execution, Southern Africa can make the Cape Corridor that route.
- Topic:
- Exports, Trade, Resilience, Shipping, Supply Chains, Instability, and Maritime Security
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Iran, Middle East, South Africa, and United States of America
39. CRINK Security Ties: Growing Cooperation, Anchored by China and Russia
- Author:
- Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Hugh Grant-Chapman, Truly Tinsley, and Feifei Hung
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Military and security cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) accelerated significantly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This includes a surge in transfers of arms and dual-use goods, a new mutual defense pact, and more frequent and diversified joint military exercises. Observable security cooperation has taken place bilaterally or trilaterally, with no discernable official cooperation taking place quadrilaterally. However, there have been instances of Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean players working together in diffuse ways to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Overall, the China-Russia security partnership is the most robust, but North Korea and Iran have quickly strengthened security cooperation as well, primarily with Russia. Despite strengthened ties among CRINK countries, the four countries are not always on the same page. To date, limited overt military support for Iran following attacks by Israel and the United States showcased how various factors—transactional calculations, power asymmetries, geographic distance, simultaneity of conflict and fatigue, U.S. military involvement, different interests, and elements of distrust—affect the willingness of CRINK countries to directly support one another via military means. Overall, the two larger powers—China and Russia—anchor CRINK cooperation. They have much more to offer to incentivize others to support them, and they are the most closely aligned bilateral actors. China, Russia, and North Korea are the trio most likely to support one another in times of need.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Security, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine, and Asia
40. Air Superiority in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Iran and Ukraine
- Author:
- Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine in more than three years of fighting, but Israel seized air superiority over Iran in less than four days. Despite the vastly different circumstances and strategic objectives facing each nation’s forces, this CSIS comparison of the two campaigns holds lessons for countries seeking to achieve air superiority in modern conflicts—or to deny it to their adversaries. Israel succeeded where Russia failed by building and equipping an organization that fit an offensive air superiority doctrine, preparing the battlefield with special operations forces, and taking full advantage of its intelligence edge. Ukraine succeeded where Iran failed in taking advantage of dispersion and mobility to prevent its suppressed air defenses from being destroyed.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Special Operations, Air Force, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East