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2. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America
3. Reforming Iran’s Energy Policy: Strategies for Sustainability, Subsidies, and Global Integration
- Author:
- Behdad Gilzad Kohan and Hamid Dahouei
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
- Institution:
- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
- Abstract:
- Iran’s energy sector, rich in natural gifts and brimming with potential, struggles to realize its promise due to systemic inefficiencies, heavy dependence on fossil fuels, outdated infrastructure, and the weight of international sanctions. These challenges plague Iran with recurring energy crises, including seasonal energy shortages, environmental degradation, and socio-economic discontent. This article investigates the root causes of Iran’s energy challenges and offers a comprehensive analysis of the critical deficiencies of Iranian energy policies. Based on these insights, the article proposes a strategic roadmap with immediate, medium-term, and long-term policy recommendations to stabilize the sector, most critical of which include subsidy reforms, ambitious renewable energy integration, and energy efficiency improvements. The proposed reforms emphasize the importance of transparent governance, targeted investments, and stakeholder engagement to achieve meaningful change. By aligning its energy policies with global sustainability trends and addressing domestic inefficiencies, Iran can transform its energy sector into a model of innovation and equity.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Reform, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, Subsidies, and Energy Sector
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
4. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives
- Author:
- Henry D. Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America
5. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria
- Author:
- Charles Lister and Douglas London
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria
6. Iran’s 1979 revolution and its resonance today
- Author:
- Alex Vatanka and Alistair Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- On this week's episode, MEI Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka, MEI Non-resident Scholar Andrew Scott Cooper, and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor discuss the Iranian Revolution of 1979. A seminal event in the history of the modern Middle East, the revolution transformed Iran and its impact continues to reverberate across the region today, nearly five decades on.
- Topic:
- History, Geopolitics, and Iranian Revolution
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
7. The Gaza War's Regional Reverberations
- Author:
- Randa Slim and Alistair Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- On this week's episode, President and CEO of the Middle East Institute Paul Salem and Director of MEI’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program Randa Slim speak to MEI's Editor-in-Chief Alistair Taylor about growing concerns over the potential for large-scale regional escalation as the Gaza war continues. *Note: This episode was recorded before drone attacks that killed US soldiers in Jordan on 1/28. *
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Conflict, Escalation, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
8. Politicization, Ratification of International Agreements, and Domestic Political Competition in Non-Democracies: The Case of Iran and the Paris Climate Accords
- Author:
- Reşat Bayer and Bijan Tafazzoli
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- While some degree of competition is present in many authoritarian regimes, the implications of such controlled competition on international issues have not received much consideration, including towards international environmental accords. We attempt to rectify this through a framework where we focus on internal political competition in a hybrid, nondemocratic system where national elections are held regularly. Specifically, we argue that the presence of multiple actors competing in elections in nondemocratic settings results in them assuming positions on various issues, justifying their positions, and attempting to mobilize their supporters with considerable implications for international environmental policies. We display our argument in the context of Iranian debates on the ratification of the Paris Climate Accords. Our findings demonstrate that the competing Iranian sides rely on different justifications for their environmental positions, resulting in extensive (negative) competitions of rhetoric where the international dimension emerges as an important feature in the internal competition. Overall, we show that political competition within non-democracies is likely to add to the complexity of international (environmental) negotiations and cooperation.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Elections, Paris Agreement, Narrative, and Regime Survival
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
9. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?
- Author:
- Vasif Huseynov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus
10. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Francesco Siccardi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt
11. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority
- Author:
- Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Iran, and South Africa
12. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA
- Author:
- Kelsey Davenport
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
13. The Aras Corridor: Azerbaijan's Rationale Behind the Deal with Iran
- Author:
- Rahim Rahimov
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and its subsequent push for the Zangezur Corridor, Baku, and Tehran have been embroiled in fierce waves of escalation. With the launch of construction works for the Aras Corridor as the purported replacement to the Zangezur Corridor, the two nations appear to have made a breakthrough, and a thaw can be seen in current bilateral relations. In lieu of Baku’s strong push for the Zangezur Corridor over the last three years, the change in direction triggers the immediate question as to why Azerbaijan agreed to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran. In order to properly address this question, it is essential to distinguish Azerbaijan’s Zangezur Corridor project from its Zangezur discourse, which can otherwise lead to misunderstandings. The main reason for Baku’s concession to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran and backtracking from the Zangezur Corridor is that Baku has achieved its objectives in the Zangezur discourse. Having achieved those objectives, the Zangezur Corridor alone, without the discourse, is of mere local importance to Azerbaijan. Yet the hype around it still persists, with the subsequent international reactions having made the topic somewhat toxic for Azerbaijan.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh
14. The BRICS Expansion: Prerequisits and Anticipated Threats
- Author:
- Mariam Macharashvili
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- On January 1st, 2024, BRICS officially expanded. Initially, it was expected that six new states would become members of this club representing the “Global South” - Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Argentina. However, Argentina changed its mind at the last minute due to the election of Javier Milei as president. Unlike his predecessor, Alberto Fernandez, Milei is changing the vector of the country’s foreign policy from the «South» to the «West». Despite predictions of its breakup due to heterogeneity, the BRICS bloc has lasted longer than anticipated. During its time, the number of BRICS members has doubled, and there are still many countries interested in joining. As the BRICS countries strengthen their massive economy and even bigger goals, their ability to influence the world order increases, which may ultimately pose a threat to the entire Western free world. This paper will seek to provide brief answers to the following questions within the frame of expert opinion: 1. What is BRICS? 2. What events led to its expansion? and 3. What threats should we expect from the strengthening of the bloc?
- Topic:
- Alliance, BRICS, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates
15. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024
- Author:
- Erwin van Veen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
- Topic:
- Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
16. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
- Topic:
- Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
17. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran
- Author:
- Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
- Topic:
- Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
18. The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science
- Author:
- Marc Lynch, Ibrahim S. I. Rabaia, Fiona B. Adamson, and Alexei Abrams
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
- Abstract:
- This special issue of POMEPS Studies offers a platform for scholars to think through what feels like a moment of rupture for the Middle East, for Middle East Studies, and for long-standing assumptions about the region’s politics. This POMEPS collection originated as an open call for papers for scholars affected by or invested in these urgent issues, in an initial effort to give a platform and a voice to those in our network who have grappled with these trends. We kept the call intentionally broad, asking potential authors to reflect on the effects of October 7 and the Gaza War on politics or scholarship. As it turned out, most of the contributors wanted to talk about academic freedoms and the conditions of public discourse in their countries – perhaps because of how profoundly they felt this crisis, perhaps because of the availability of other platforms to discuss the war itself. The issues confronting our field have never been more urgent and the need for academic networks and institutions to rise up to defend it has never been greater.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Diplomacy, Education, Genocide, Political Science, Institutions, Academia, Houthis, Forced Migration, Activism, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Frantz Fanon
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, Germany, Jordan, Czech Republic, and Gulf Nations
19. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations
- Author:
- Jeremy Pressman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE
20. The Making and Diasporization of Iranian Sexual, Religious, and Political Asylum Seekers
- Author:
- Navid Fozi
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since the 1979 Revolution in Iran, waves of Iranian migrants, mostly asylum seekers, have formed diasporas composed of four to six million people.1 Asylum- seeking thus illustrates one of the most significant modes of Iranian global mobil- ity. The continuous revolutionary conditions perpetuated by the Revolutionary Guards and Revolutionary Courts have been identified as the sole contributor to the diasporization of Iranians.2 I argue that such a myopic focus on revolutionary moments obfuscates the marginalizing historical processes that have shaped asylum- seeking as a means of engagement with domestic and global inequality. The Islamic Republic has heralded a culmination of Iranian diasporic displacement unleashed by the deterritorializing effects of neoliberal world capitalism through economic globalization and mobility to meet labor demand.3 Coupled with the apparatuses of the modern nation-state, the judiciary, police, and education system have given the traditional exclusionary practices a modern character. I will draw on my fieldwork with Iranian asylum seekers and refugees in tran- sit through Türkiye pursuing permanent resettlement, mainly in North America, Australia, and Europe. These Iranians compose heterogeneous populations that embark on an arduous journey from the Global South to the Global North. They form diasporas of communities whose marginality in Iran predates the Islamic Re- public. Each group finds its own niche while becoming part of the Iranian diaspora. Bahá’ís born into Bahá’i families, heterodox Muslim mystics, and the ethno-religious communities of Kurdish Yársán constitute a group of Iranian asylum seekers who embrace religious ideals and practices that differ from Iran’s official religion: Shīʿi Twelver Islam. As I discuss later, this Shīʿi strand developed in sixteenth-century Iran and promoted a messianic expectation for the return of the twelfth Shīʿi Imam.
- Topic:
- Religion, Diaspora, and Asylum Seekers
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
21. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Rivalry that Remade the Middle East
- Author:
- Hassan Hassan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Observers often liken Iran’s strategic policy thinking to the intricate and patient process of crafting a Persian rug.1 The analogy illustrates how Tehran’s strategies, like the rug’s final inscriptions, only become clear upon completion, as seemingly random daily actions gradually reveal a coherent pattern. The comparison is apt for Iran’s traditional approach to power projection but may also be appropriate considering recent changes that have affected both Iran’s coveted rug market and the country’s regional and international outlook. Iran has successfully emerged from a series of geopolitical challenges beginning with the war against Iraq in the 1980s, followed by the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003, and culminating in popular uprisings after 2011—which were backed by its adversaries and threatened its allies in the region. In spite of Iran’s emergence from such challenges, factors such as the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Donald Trump presidency have crippled the Iranian economy and undermined Tehran’s ability to project power effectively.2 In the four decades following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been a prominent player in regional conflicts, particularly against Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 3 Iran has largely maintained the upper hand in the wake of these confrontations, contrary to expectations after the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 The Islamic Republic outlasted Saddam Hussein’s 1980-1988 war, extended its influence via proxies across multiple nations, and cemented its presence in four Arab capitals, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This apparent dominance peaked on 14 September 2019, when two major Saudi oil facilities—the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil field—were attacked using drones. 5 The attack roughly halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production and affected around 5 percent of the global oil supply. 6 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Although Iran denied any involvement, Saudi Arabian officials and the United States nonetheless suggested that drones and cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, Rivalry, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia
22. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative
- Author:
- Mansoor Moaddel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
- Topic:
- Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia
23. False Dawn: Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Amidst Improved Saudi-Iranian Relations
- Author:
- David Wood
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 17 October 2019, furious protests erupted across Lebanon as citizens came to a shocking realization: the country’s leaders had destroyed the economy. Decades of corruption and mismanagement had emptied the state’s coffers, trig- gering a domestic banking collapse and frittering away many Lebanese residents’ life savings. Now, almost five years later, the situation has only grown worse. The Lebanese lira (LBP) has been devalued to the point of irrelevance, crashing from 1,507.5 LBP for 1 USD to over 140,000 LBP in March 2023. House- holds give up essentials like health insurance to pay for diesel power generators and solar panels, as public electricity provisions—along with many other key state services—barely function.1 Meanwhile, the country’s leaders stubbornly resist implementing much-needed economic reforms, blaming the economic crisis on a wide range of factors, from Syrian refugees to general instability in the Middle East. A regularly proffered excuse emphasizes the role of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry has periodically played out on Lebanese soil. This theory argues that Lebanon is a “penetrated society,” inextricably tied to and paralyzed by geopolitical competition, including the Saudi–Iranian con- frontation.2 Thus, Lebanese leaders cannot resolve their disputes until these two regional heavyweights, amongst other foreign powers, reconcile their conflicting interests in Lebanon. Regional competition overlays a domestic political structure already prone to deadlock, which rigidly apportions power between Lebanon’s frequently feuding sectarian communities. Accordingly, various Lebanese politicians hoped that improved Iranian-Saudi relations—facilitated in March 2023 by Chinese mediation—would lead to a breakthrough in their ability to tackle Lebanon’s economic meltdown. Yet, this optimistic reading overestimates the extent of Tehran and Riyadh’s cautious détente, which is unlikely to translate into constructive engagement in Lebanon any time soon. It also downplays the true obstacle to Lebanon’s economic reform process: corruption in the country’s own political and financial elite.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Diplomacy, Economic Crisis, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon
24. The Nuclear Iran “Concept” Is Already Here: Time Is Short to Prevent Israel’s—and America’s—Next Calamitous Intelligence Failure
- Author:
- Jonathan Schachter
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Groupthink and unchallenged false assumptions about enemy capabilities and decision-making led to the disasters of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 Hamas-led terrorist invasion of Israel. The lessons of these failures demand that Israel’s political and military leadership and their American counterparts immediately reconsider their assumptions about the Iranian nuclear threat to avoid an even costlier miscalculation.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, October 7, and 1973 War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
25. How the War in Ukraine Shapes Iran’s Strategic Gains and Ambitions
- Author:
- Can Kasapoglu
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The Russia-Ukraine War has strengthened military-industrial ties between Moscow and Tehran. Most concerning is their deepening collaboration in dual-use technologies and disruptive weapons systems. Moscow has provided technical assistance to Tehran in key areas, including its space program, which can help the Islamic Republic develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Iran’s interest in Russian anti-stealth radars and air-superiority fighters is worrying. Russia’s extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones has allowed the Iranian defense technological and industrial base to advance its drone warfare systems, collect large amounts of operational data, and improve its loitering munitions designs and production. A Russian victory in Ukraine would likely accelerate such cooperation, given the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions, among other factors. So far, the Islamic Republic has been the winner of the Russia-Ukraine War. Below are some key highlights from this policy memo: The Russian military’s reliance on using munitions from Iran to exhaust Ukraine’s combat capabilities has provided Tehran with unprecedented opportunities. In the absence of adequate deterrents in place, Iran has already become a combat drone supplier to the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the Russian Federation, turning the Islamic Republic into a menacing threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance’s eastern and southern fronts. Open-source intelligence tracks a meaningful rise in the Russian military’s use of Iran-supplied Shahed baseline loitering munitions, indicating that the joint Russo-Iranian drone plant in Tatarstan, Russia, is capable of producing scores of kamikaze drones annually at low cost. Such facilities can soon mushroom across the Russian Federation. With Tehran demonstrating growing control over its airspace while the country moves closer to obtaining military-grade nuclear capabilities, Russia can help the Islamic Republic make its airspace more dangerous than ever. A combination of anti-stealth radar, the Su-35 air-superiority fighter squadrons protected by underground basing, and a large number of layered strategic air defenses can prove lethal even against fifth-generation, stealth combat aircraft. Accordingly, the Western intelligence community should remain vigilant over any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran involving anti-stealth radars and space program assets, keeping in mind that the latter can easily translate into intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, Iran is now investing in infrastructure within Russia—including dredging the Volga River and establishing shipping companies in the port city of Astrakhan—allowing the two countries to further expand the strategic route across the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.
- Topic:
- National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
26. Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon
- Author:
- Hamidreza Azizi and Julien Barnes-Dacey
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The war in Gaza is pushing the shadow conflict between Iran and Israel out into the open. There is a grave risk that this escalates further in Lebanon and Syria – where Iran wields powerful influence – and spirals into a full-blown regional war. The intensifying conflict in Syria and Lebanon is the result of Israel’s escalating response since Hamas’s attacks on 7 October and Iran’s “forward-defence” strategy, which aims to confront potential threats before they come close to Iranian borders. Iran’s strategy is underpinned by a decades-long effort to embed its influence in Lebanon and Syria. Western governments will not find this easy to dislodge, and an intensified coercive strategy to push Iran out of the Levant would likely be counterproductive. But Iran’s focus on preserving its influence and deterrence capability – which trumps its ideological commitment to supporting Palestinians and fighting Israel – offers opportunities to prevent a wider war. Europeans should now focus on de-escalating tensions in Lebanon and Syria; increasing conditional support for actors in both countries to advance local stabilisation goals; and intensifying their backing for structural reform that can slowly dilute Iran’s dominance.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Transnational Actors, Regional Power, and October 7
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria
27. Mending fences: Europe’s stake in the Saudi-Iran detente
- Author:
- Julien Barnes-Dacey and Cinzia Bianco
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Saudi-Iran rivalry has long deepened conflict lines in the Middle East. But growing mutual vulnerabilities prompted a quiet rapprochement, culminating in the 2023 Beijing de-escalation agreement. While it hasn’t led to conflict resolution, this detente has helped contain regional escalation. Dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran remains frequent amid the Gaza crisis and could become even more important after the Israeli killing of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Europeans should actively support Saudi-Iran engagement as a vital diplomatic path to regional stability, rather than viewing it as Iran’s attempt to evade US sanctions. If Iran’s new leadership is willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue and other files, Europeans should see Saudi Arabia as a channel to help facilitate necessary economic relief to Iran as part of any new deal. Europeans could help both countries navigate tension around America’s regional involvement, ensuring Saudi-Israel normalisation does not undermine Saudi-Iran diplomacy. If Iran refuses to enter negotiations and relations with the West deteriorate further, Europeans should still consider Saudi Arabia as a valuable mediator between the West and Iran.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Rapprochement, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia
28. Proxy battles: Iraq, Iran, and the turmoil in the Middle East
- Author:
- Hamzeh Hadad
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The war in Gaza has deepened the Middle East’s fault lines. Iran and its proxies and the US and Israel have engaged in a cycle of tit-for-tat attacks across the region, with the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Syria and Iran’s direct retaliation against Israel threatening to escalate into a regional war. Iraqi paramilitaries operating as part of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ have also attacked US forces in Iraq, who responded with reprisals of their own. This, and the increasing risk of a wider war, imperils the relative stability Iraq has enjoyed over the past few years and the country’s fledgling role as a regional mediator. Iran’s influence in Iraq increased following the US invasion of 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein – but their relationship is far from being a simple agent-proxy arrangement. Iran’s strongest influence is through its paramilitaries’ presence in Iraq’s security apparatus, but Iraq has also exhibited some political independence from its neighbour and maintains financial leverage over Iran. Europeans can help increase Iraq’s autonomy. In the economic sector, they should strengthen its financial institutions through global integration and digitisation. European countries can also work alongside Gulf states to broaden their ties with Iraq, including in foreign investment and a shift from a development or humanitarian aid framework towards normal bilateral ties. However, for any European policy to be successful in Iraq, it must be designed within a broader framework of ending the war in Gaza and resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – without which the dangerous escalation across the Middle East may continue.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Political stability, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
29. Nuclear Danger and the NPT
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
30. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)
- Author:
- Hui Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- China and Iran
31. Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- With the continued fighting in Gaza, a nuclear rubicon of sorts has been crossed: Elected Israeli officials — a deputy minister and a ruling party member of Parliament—not only have publicly referenced Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, but suggested how such weapons might be used to target Gaza. This is unprecedented. More recently, Iran directly attacked an Israeli-manned intelligence outpost in Iraq and publicized a staged missile strike against a mock Israeli air base. Iran also has inched within weeks of making several nuclear weapons and made its military ever more immune to first strikes against its key missile and nuclear facilities. Iran and its proxies also now have long-range, high-precision missiles that can easily reach key Israeli targets. None of these developments is positive. For decades, most security analysts assumed Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons were only deployed to deter attacks and that Iran would not dare to attack Israel directly. The attached war game report, “Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed,” directly challenges these assumptions. The game starts in 2027 with Israeli intelligence reporting that Iran is mating nuclear warheads to its long-range missiles. This prompts Israel to ask Washington to collaborate in a conventional military strike against key Iranian nuclear facilities and missile bases. Not wanting to be drawn into a major war with Iran, the United States, however, demurs and instead offers Israel U.S. standoff hypersonic missiles. Several moves later, Israel, isolated and desperate, launches two nuclear strikes against Iran to which Iran replies with a nuclear strike of its own. The game raised several basic questions. Would Israel or Iran conduct further military nuclear operations? Might Israel target Tehran with nuclear weapons? Might Iran target Tel Aviv with nuclear arms? Would Russia or the United States be drawn into the war? These and other unknowns informed the game’s key findings. These included: 1. The strategic uncertainties generated after an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange are likely to be at least as fraught as any that might arise before such a clash. 2. Although Israel and Iran might initially avoid the nuclear targeting of innocents, such self-restraint is tenuous. 3. Multilateral support for Israeli security may be essential to deter Israeli nuclear use but will likely hinge on Israeli willingness to discuss regional denuclearization. 4. Little progress is likely in reducing Middle Eastern nuclear threats if the United States continues its public policy of denying knowledge of Israeli nuclear weapons.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Nonproliferation, and War Games
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
32. Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons
- Author:
- Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Key Takeaways: (1) Big leap forward. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Iran-Russia defense relationship has moved past the previous client-patron dynamic, with Iran emerging as an important provider of defense technology to Russia. Bilateral cooperation has expanded both in degree and in kind. In pre-existing areas of cooperation—such as electronic warfare, space, cyberspace, and military-to-military contacts—engagement has accelerated or deepened. Since 2022, Iran and Russia have also cooperated in entirely new areas. Those have included Iran’s provision of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV production technology, and UAV training to Russia, alongside Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war and assistance with expertise on evading sanctions. (2) The gloves are off. Since February 2022, what were historically key drivers of defense cooperation—a shared animosity toward the United States and the international order it promotes (including in the Middle East), and each side’s interest in military technology that the other side can offer—have increased in importance. Key constraints—Russia’s susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure, causing it to limit cooperation with Iran; Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes; Russian reputational concerns over collaborating with Iran; Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology; or historical mistrust—have become less relevant with Moscow’s growing dependence on Iran and its increased enmity toward the United States and Europe. (3) Growing institutionalization. Amid a general increase in numbers of mutual visits and high-level engagements among military and defense officials, Iran and Russia have taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship. Those have included work on a new strategic cooperation agreement to replace the one from 2001, forays into joint production of some weapon systems, and joint efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure that should provide a further boost to defense cooperation. (4) Thinking about the future in three steps. We propose a three-step methodology to think through the contours of bilateral defense cooperation over the next three to five years. It involves a) extrapolating from current trend lines, drivers, and constraints; b) drawing up inventories of future military needs for each country and identifying the areas in which the other country could help meet those needs; and c) accounting for potential high-impact scenarios and developments that may trigger dramatic shifts in cooperation. The latter include various scenarios of war in the Middle East, the end of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, and regime change in either Russia or Iran. (5) Neither a transactional relationship nor a military alliance. Present trend lines and drivers suggest that the relationship is no longer purely transactional and will probably not lapse back into the patron-client dynamic that characterized it prior to 2022, even once the war in Ukraine ends. Iran and Russia each have specific military-technical needs that the other might help meet. That said, beyond Russia’s campaign against Ukraine, Iranian needs from Russia will be greater than Russian needs for advanced technology from Iran. Other constraints—chiefly both countries’ challenges in procuring advanced components because of sanctions, Russia’s aversion to antagonizing the Gulf Arab states, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority in key areas—will also likely continue to act as brakes on the defense relationship, precluding it from developing into a full-fledged military alliance.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East
33. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones
- Author:
- David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine
34. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States
- Author:
- Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
35. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology
- Author:
- David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East
36. Egypt Polling Shows Rise in Positive Views of Hamas; Iran-Backed Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood Remain Unpopular
- Author:
- Mohamed Abdelaziz
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians. Arecent public opinion survey of Egyptian citizens, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in November/December by a regional commercial firm, revealed that after years of adopting a negative view towards Hamas, three-quarters of Egyptians now view the movement positively, demonstrating the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on Egyptian public opinion. The majority of Egyptians continue to reject ties with Israel and Israelis, while Iran’s proxies remain unpopular, while the majority of Egyptians believe that the United States can put an end to the war in Gaza. Regarding the United States’ role in the ongoing war in Gaza, the current poll showed that more than three-quarters of Egyptians agreed that “the U.S. is still in the best position to help end the war in Gaza, even if I disagree with its policies.” However, Egyptians are currently divided on the proposition that “We cannot count on the U.S. these days, so we should look more to other nations like Russia or China as partners.” While 57% of Egyptians agreed with this proposition, 42% disagreed. In terms of the role that Arab countries should play in the ongoing conflict, the current poll showed mixed views. A significant majority of Egyptians (97%) demanded that Arab states take a tough stand against Israel and “immediately sever all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Yet although not unanimous, over two thirds (69%) of Egyptians likewise agreed that “Arab governments should take a more active role in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, offering both sides incentives to take more moderate positions.” Moreover, an overwhelming majority (96%) of Egyptians believed that their country should provide more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even if that requires some practical coordination with Israel. Notably, while Hamas has experienced a surge of popularity—in line with significant jumps among other Arab publics polled—these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The current Egyptian government finds both the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its Palestinian offshoot threatening to domestic politics. For almost eight years, since the release of the Fall 2015 poll results, where Hamas received negative scores, the majority of Egyptians demonstrated a negative attitude towards Hamas. In contrast, the current poll shows that three-quarters of Egyptians view Hamas positively, while less than a quarter hold a negative view. Likewise, the large majority expressed agreement with the view that the war in
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Polls, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Palestine, and Egypt
37. Navigating Cybersecurity and Surveillance: Iran's Dual Strategy for National Security
- Author:
- Nima Khorrami
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- While Iranian officials acknowledge the significance of cyber tools and AI for foreign policy, they are acutely aware of the country’s financial and scientific limitations. Discussions and debates surrounding the utilization and significance of cyberspace and artificial intelligence in Iran primarily revolve around two key perspectives: viewing them as integral components of national security strategy, and understanding cyber capabilities and AI as essential tools for safeguarding national interests. Within the context of Tehran’s extensively publicized forward defense doctrine, it is reasonable to expect that Tehran would develop (AI assisted) offensive cyber capabilities, allowing it to infiltrate its adversaries’ systems and execute preemptive actions against perceived threats. A critical prerequisite for doing so, in turn, would be to put in place robust surveillance capabilities which can alarm the officials of any potential incoming attack. However, available evidence suggests a dire lack of such capabilities not least because Iran’s critical infrastructure has been the target of frequent cyberattacks, allegedly originating from Israel.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Surveillance
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
38. Does Leadership Matter? Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and the Change in Iranian Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Çağla Lüleci-Sula
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Institution:
- Sakarya University (SAU)
- Abstract:
- Following Rouhani's victory in the 2013 presidential elections, Iran's foreign policy (IFP) underwent significant changes after over a decade under Ahmadinejad. To date, only a few academic studies have attempted to incorporate a specific individual-level theory into their respective analyses, even though a large body of literature contends that leadership change is the decisive factor in differences in Iran's policy towards the US and the EU. This study analyzes the leadership styles of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani to reveal the possible impact of decision-maker personalities on foreign policy, and to develop an account of the moderation in IFP. Accordingly, it asks, “How does leadership style influence IFP towards the 'Western world'?" Theoretically, the study benefits from Hermann’s ‘Leadership Trait Analysis’ to find out the impact of leaders’ personalities on foreign policy behaviors of states. Empirically, it analyzes both presidents’ spontaneously selected political speeches, consisting of their answers in interviews and press conferences. Methodologically, the study utilizes the software Profiler Plus to assess individual traits of leaders. Interpreting leadership trait scores of two presidents, the study concludes that certain leadership features allow the construction of foreign policies that are more moderate.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Leadership, Hassan Rouhani, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
39. Expert Voices: Iran’s record-low election turnout
- Author:
- Alex Vatanka
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- MEI's Iran Program Director Alex Vatanka discusses his main takeaways from Iran's recent elections and their record-low voter turnout.
- Topic:
- Elections, Domestic Politics, and Voting Behavior
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
40. What’s next in the Israel-Iran conflict?
- Author:
- Eran Etzion, Mick Mulroy, and Alex Vatanka
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record briefing on what's next in the Israel-Iran conflict. Speakers Eran Etzion Non-Resident Scholar, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, Middle East Institute Mick Mulroy Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Defense & Security Program, Middle East Institute Alex Vatanka Iran Program Director, Middle East Institute
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
41. Tackling the proxy problem: Mitigating the threat posed by Iran's "Axis of Resistance"
- Author:
- Alex Vatanka, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, and Sabri Ates
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The war in Gaza has revealed much about the relationships Iran maintains with its proxy forces across the region, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iraq. While the various militant groups in the “Axis of Resistance” all receive support from the Islamic Republic, each has its own objectives and strategic focus, a point underlined by the Houthis’ emergence as a key new regional player. The group has fired on commercial ships, attacked military vessels, and shut down maritime traffic on one of the world’s most significant trade arteries. If the situation escalates, Iran-backed groups could unleash far greater havoc, both within the region and well beyond its borders. What steps can the US and its partners take now to ensure that additional Iranian-supported forces do not join the Gaza conflict? And how can Iran’s proxies be deterred from acting to help de-escalate tensions across the region? And what, if anything, can Washington do to change the strategic calculations in Tehran?
- Topic:
- Proxy Groups, Axis of Resistance, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria
42. How might the second Trump administration navigate the Middle East?
- Author:
- Ryan Crocker and Gerald Feierstein
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- Donald Trump’s return to the presidency comes at a tumultuous time in the Middle East. While on the campaign trail, Trump vowed to offer strong support for Israel and insisted he can bring peace to the region. What challenges and opportunities will he face on both fronts? And how different is the strategic landscape of today’s Middle East compared to when he left the White House? This on-the-record briefing will feature Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker, career diplomat with the US Foreign Service. His previous appointments included US Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. The briefing will also feature Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, former US Ambassador to Yemen and Distinguished Senior Fellow on US Diplomacy at MEI. Our experts will discuss what the incoming second Trump administration will mean for the Middle East; the current conflicts in the region; the future of US-Iran relations; and the prospects of securing more normalization agreements between Israel and its neighbors. Speakers Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker Fmr. US Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Lebanon Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein Fmr. US Ambassador to YemenDistinguished Senior Fellow on US Diplomacy, MEI
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, and Middle East
43. Houthi Motivations Driving the Red Sea Crisis: Understanding How Ansar Allah’s Strategic Culture Goes Beyond Gaza and Iran
- Author:
- Jonah Carlson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- Ansar Allah, known as the “Houthi movement,” has conducted attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea since October 2023. This event is now known as the “Red Sea Crisis.” Classifying Ansar Allah as merely an Iranian proxy, or categorizing its actions as a mere response to the conflict in Gaza and support for Hamas, inadequately explains these attacks. This article uses the cultural topography method to analyze the culture of the movement and provide alternative motivations for the attacks, such as consolidating domestic support and crafting a strong national appearance. The article concludes that Ansar Allah’s attacks on the Red Sea are more motivated by the belief they will yield pragmatic and material benefits for the movement rather than ideological or cultural overlap with Palestine or Iran.
- Topic:
- Houthis, Hamas, Shipping, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Ansar Allah
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, and Gaza
44. Sanctions and Postcolonial Statecraft in Iran: Resisting the Iran Libya Sanctions Act and Beyond
- Author:
- Andrew Thomas
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
- Institution:
- Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
- Abstract:
- Though economic sanctions are designed to weaken and isolate their target for the stated purpose of policy change, in the case of Iran they have often invigorated its desire to defy Western coercion and domination. Since the Islamic revolution this has led to multiple political standoffs, including notably during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration and the post-nuclear deal standoff with the United States (US). Through sanctions, the West has often been unwilling to accept little less than a grand bargain on Iranian foreign policy, which has informed and contributed to a postcolonial narrative of resistance in the Iranian state. This narrative has served as an integral tool of Iranian statecraft in an effort to bolster the leadership’s legitimacy. By looking at elite discourse and Iranian government responses to the Iran Libya Sanctions Act during Ahmadinejad’s government and the Trump Administration’s Maximum Pressure campaign, this article highlights narratives of postcolonial resistance in Iran’s response to US sanctions, in an effort to explain why sanctions often push them further away from acquiescence to international norms.
- Topic:
- Post Colonialism, Sanctions, Iran, and Resistance
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Libya, and United States of America
45. Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- The Islamic Republic’s ninth president assumes office with an unenviable inheritance of domestic discontent, regional turmoil and poor relations with the West. He should work to bridge the state-society gap, while outside powers should test his administration’s willingness to shift from an escalatory posture.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Presidency, and Masoud Pezeshkian
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
46. Has the Iranian challenge been forgotten?
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel must take seriously Iran’s stated intention to destroy the Jewish state. Iran’s desire to attain nuclear weapons serves its goal of eliminating Israel and its strategy of using its proxies to threaten Israel’s civilian population. All measures taken so far to stop Tehran’s nuclear project have failed, and Israel has no choice but to urgently eliminate this threat by military means.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Proxy Groups
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
47. Tehran’s Armenian weapons supply route
- Author:
- Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Armenia is one of several routes used by Iran to smuggle arms to its regional proxies and clients. It also manufactures its own versions of Russian weapons that are used only by these groups and provides them with the knowledge to locally manufacture Iranian arms.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Proxy Groups, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Armenia
48. Changes in the military deployment of the United States and their implications for Israel’s wars in the region
- Author:
- Eytan Gilboa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- At the start of the Gaza War, President Biden warned Iran and its proxies against launching an all-out attack on Israel and sent aircraft carriers to the region to clarify his intentions. The withdrawal of the Gerald R. Ford carrier from the Mediterranean could be interpreted as a sign of American weakness, diminish deterrence of Iran, and undermine US mediation efforts in Lebanon.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
49. Mapping the Post-Assad Landscape
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The collapse of the Assad regime weakens Iran and the CRINK Axis, but Islamist radicalism and rising Turkish influence demand Israel’s military vigilance and diplomatic engagement.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Islamism, Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
50. Why Is It Taking So Long to Destroy Hamas?
- Author:
- Gabi Siboni
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- For years, the Gaza Strip has been of secondary importance, with the General Staff focusing primarily on the northern front and Iran. This focus has come at the expense of intelligence gathering, building operational plans, and operational attention to Gaza.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza